Risk and user preferences in winner determination


Creative Commons License

Demir G. K., Gini M.

5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, ICEC '03, Pittsburgh, PA, United States Of America, 30 September - 03 October 2003, vol.50, pp.150-157 identifier

  • Publication Type: Conference Paper / Full Text
  • Volume: 50
  • Doi Number: 10.1145/948005.948025
  • City: Pittsburgh, PA
  • Country: United States Of America
  • Page Numbers: pp.150-157
  • Keywords: automated auctions, expected utility, multi-agent contracting, risk, winner determination
  • Dokuz Eylül University Affiliated: No

Abstract

We discuss a solution to the winner determination problem which takes into account not only costs but also risk aversion of the agent that accepts the bids and works for tasks that have time and precedence constraints. We develop an equivalent unit approach to the group of tasks to analyze the system and use Expected Utility Theory as the basic mechanism for decision-making. Our theoretical and experimental analysis shows that Expected Utility is especially useful for choosing between cheap-but-risky and costly-but-safe bids. Moreover, we show how bids with similar costs and similar probabilities of being successfully completed but different time windows can be efficiently selected or rejected.