RevEAL: Single-Trace Side-Channel Leakage of the SEAL Homomorphic Encryption Library

Aydin F., Karabulut E., Potluri S., ALKIM E., Aysu A.

25th Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition (DATE), ELECTR NETWORK, 14 - 23 March 2022, pp.1527-1532 identifier

  • Publication Type: Conference Paper / Full Text
  • Page Numbers: pp.1527-1532
  • Dokuz Eylül University Affiliated: Yes


This paper demonstrates the first side-channel attack on homomorphic encryption (HE), which allows computing on encrypted data. We reveal a power-based side-channel leakage of Microsoft SEAL prior to v3.6 that implements the Brakerski/FanVercauteren (BFV) protocol. Our proposed attack targets the Gaussian sampling in the SEAL's encryption phase and can extract the entire message with a single power measurement.