RevEAL: Single-Trace Side-Channel Leakage of the SEAL Homomorphic Encryption Library

Aydin F., Karabulut E., Potluri S., ALKIM E., Aysu A.

25th Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition (DATE), ELECTR NETWORK, 14 - 23 Mart 2022, ss.1527-1532, (Tam Metin Bildiri) identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Bildiri / Tam Metin Bildiri
  • Basıldığı Ülke: ELECTR NETWORK
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.1527-1532
  • Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

This paper demonstrates the first side-channel attack on homomorphic encryption (HE), which allows computing on encrypted data. We reveal a power-based side-channel leakage of Microsoft SEAL prior to v3.6 that implements the Brakerski/FanVercauteren (BFV) protocol. Our proposed attack targets the Gaussian sampling in the SEAL's encryption phase and can extract the entire message with a single power measurement.