Preventing Ottoman-Iranian Cooperation: The Black Sea Dimension of Russian Diplomacy


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Keçeci S.

II. International Eastern Black Sea Symposium - Türkiye & Russia: Historical, Diplomatic and Geopolitical Perspectives, Rize, Turkey, 27 - 28 April 2026, (Unpublished)

  • Publication Type: Conference Paper / Unpublished
  • City: Rize
  • Country: Turkey
  • Dokuz Eylül University Affiliated: Yes

Abstract

This paper argues that Russian naval and maritime dominance in the Black Sea played a decisive but underappreciated role in preventing meaningful strategic cooperation between the Ottoman Empire and Iran during the wars of the 1820s. While the failure of an Ottoman-Iranian alliance is usually explained through diplomatic mistrust, dynastic politics, or religious rivalry, this study highlights how maritime coercion by Russia structurally constrained Ottoman strategic choices and indirectly shaped Iranian decision-making. Drawing on Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian archival perspectives, the paper reframes the Black Sea as a diplomatic theatre rather than merely a naval one. Russian sea power enabled St Petersburg to threaten the Anatolian coastline, control supply routes, and project force deep into Ottoman territory. This maritime pressure forced Istanbul to prioritize its northern and western vulnerabilities, reducing its ability to coordinate military planning with Tehran during the Irano-Ottoman War (1821-23) and the subsequent Russo-Iranian and Russo-Ottoman wars. The result was a strategic separation of the two southern empires that Russia consistently exploited. The paper further demonstrates how naval supremacy amplified Russia’s diplomatic leverage. The presence of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea transformed negotiations by creating a constant threat of escalation, encouraging Ottoman caution and limiting the scope of Ottoman-Iranian cooperation to sporadic and ineffective initiatives. Maritime coercion thus functioned as a silent but powerful diplomatic instrument that complemented Russia’s fiscal-military superiority and its ability to wage sequential wars against its rivals. By integrating maritime history with diplomatic and geopolitical analysis, this paper contributes to a broader reassessment of the Eastern Question and the imperial struggle for the Caucasus. It argues that the Black Sea was not a peripheral theatre but a central arena where sea power reshaped alliances, constrained diplomacy, and decisively influenced the balance of power between the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian empires.