Research Information System
International Journal of Social and Economic Studies, vol.3, no.2, pp.1-12, 2022 (Peer-Reviewed Journal)
This paper proposes that differences in fairness of elections between democracies can explain differences in government quality. Institutionalized unfairness in parliamentary elections decreases incumbents’ perceived political costs of underperforming in democracies. When incumbents are aware that formal and informal political institutions allow manipulation of upcoming elections to maximize chances of winning, they can invest less in policies normally expected to win them votes, resulting in below-par economic, political and social outcomes for the society. I propose a simple yet novel measure of electoral fairness and test it against governments’ average regulatory quality for 34 European countries between 1998-2017. The findings suggest a significant relationship between institutionalized electoral fairness and government quality, implying that countries with unfairer elections are governed less efficiently.