Religion as A Form of Life: Some Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Concept of “Religion”


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Bilen O.

Humanities Bulletin, cilt.2, sa.2, ss.54-61, 2019 (Hakemli Dergi)

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 2 Sayı: 2
  • Basım Tarihi: 2019
  • Dergi Adı: Humanities Bulletin
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: ERIHPlus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.54-61
  • Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

Abstract

Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion and religious language has some bearings on the current discussions on place of the religion in the secular societies. Early Wittgenstein represents a restrictive concept of religion as the religious language remains beyond the limits of ordinary experience and senses. In the Investigations religious life regarded as one form of life among other life experiences and hence the religious expression may as well constitutes a particular language game in itself. Wittgenstenians are divided on implications of this new conception of religion later works of Wittgenstein indicates.
In this article I will analyze the implications of Wittgenstein’s concept of religion and religious language in the context of his later works. The question about the religion as a form of life needs to be answered as follows: Is religious language, according to Wittgenstein, a closed discourse that only within particular religious language game becomes meaningful? Or does Wittgenstein take religion in the sense of religious experience or just a set of beliefs? These questions are important to re-evaluate the legal, moral discussion about the place of religion in the modern public life.