An exploration in school formation: Income vs. Ability

ALKAN A., Anbarci N., Sarpca S.

ECONOMICS LETTERS, cilt.117, sa.2, ss.500-504, 2012 (SSCI, Scopus) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 117 Sayı: 2
  • Basım Tarihi: 2012
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.048
  • Dergi Adı: ECONOMICS LETTERS
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.500-504
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: School formation, Stable matching, Peer effects, Multilateral bargaining, Assortative matching
  • Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Adresli: Hayır

Özet

We study stable school formation among four students that differ in ability and income. In the presence of ability complementarities and school costs to be shared, we identify the conditions under which a stable allocation is efficient, inefficient, nonexistent, and tell who become peers. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.