KADER, no.1, pp.209-232, 2021 (Peer-Reviewed Journal)
In the article, Ḥāccī Hasanzāda’s (d. 911/1505-1506) work called Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a will be evaluated. The main subject of the work is goodness/ḥusun-badness/kubuḥ and human verbs. The problem of goodness-badness is related to the field of God, man, acts, and values. Human actions are linked to the God-human relationship. Discussing God, human and moral values as an issue is closely related to the entire thought system. The issues are explored within the framework of Ashʿarī-Muʿtazila and Māturīdī schools of thought. In addition, the scientific accumulation of the philosophy school is reviewed. Common and separate aspects of schools are emphasized. The differences between Ashʿarī and Māturīdī doctrines are examined. In Ashʿarī, values are relative and they depend on the subject. None of the actions have absolute permanent values. Actions gain their values according to the context. Therefore, the basic criterion of values should be unchanging religion. Although there are various currents within the Māturīdī school, the majority unites with Muʿtazila. Values are objective according to these two schools. There are values that are independent of the subject and context. This means accepting a set of unchanging values independent of religion. In principle, the human being cannot influence the ontological structure of the actions in the Ashʿarī’s. There is no one who influences existence other than God. Late period Māturīdī thought tried to open up space where a man can influence his own volitional actions without prejudice to God’s creativity by arranging four special propositions. Despite everything, according to Ḥāccī Hasanzāda, both schools are united by high values. Ḥāccī Hasanzāda does not explicitly choose a position on the issue of goodness-badness. He mostly interprets the consistency within the schools and makes comparisons between them. In the context of human acts, he examines the premises of the Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a theory one by one and questions their basis. It points to the inadequate and unnecessary aspects of some of the premises. Ĥāshiya attached special importance to the ontology of the will. As with other problematic issues, he presented in detail the approaches of various schools on this subject. In the article, the research method and thought structure in Ḥāccī Hasanzāda’s work will be examined in the context of theological problems. While doing this examination, the limits of frequently used resources will be respected. It is known that the controversy of theology-philosophy-mysticism did not lose its vitality during the reign of Fatih Sultan Meḥmed, where Ḥāccī Hasanzād lived. On the one hand, the absurdities of philosophy such as Tahāfut al-falāsifah are updated again in this period, on the other hand, the schools of kalām-philosophy-Sufism are compared. Instead of the words philosophy or al-falāsifah, the special name “al-Ḥukamāʾ” is preferred. This preference appears to be a product of certain sensitivities. It is incomplete to explain the naming preference with personal inclinations. It is necessary to consider together with the conditions of the period. At that time, philosophy and mysticism were harmonized in certain aspects. So to speak, philosophy-mysticism united and took its guard against the science of kalām. However, in the period of Ḥāccī Hasanzāda, the contrasts between the systems are not yet complete, they are in the research phase. Whatever the case, Ḥāccī Hasanzāda’s distance from philosophy and mysticism did not cause him to ignore his philosophical accumulation. The approach of philosophy, in the words of Ḥāccī Hasanzāda, the systems of al-Ḥukamāʾ/ philosophers and mutakallim/ theologians were analyzed together. It is noteworthy that there is no place for the Sufism approach in the Ĥāshiya. Being indifferent to the theological criticisms of Sufism can be explained by personal tendencies, but cannot be explained in terms of the period. Because it is known that at that time, the school of mysticism was brought to theology as the third alternative to theology and philosophy. First of all, Ḥāccī Hasanzāda has a mindset that attaches importance to the line of kalām-fiqh. Ḥāccī Hasanzāda knows and expresses that the issues in Ĥāshiya are predominant in kalām. The thought systems were compared in the Ĥāshiya, but the Ashʿarī-Muʿtazila and Māturīdī schools within the kalām system itself were given more intensity. The problems in the sources produced in the Mutaʾakhkhirīn or the Second classical period were dealt with and the descriptions of the contemporaries were criticized. Ḥāccī Hasanzāda evaluates the schools of kalām rather than adopting and defending them openly, analyzes in depth the solutions to problems involving theology and philosophy, and points out the problematic points.