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**Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)**

**AN ANALYSIS OF PARTY ORIENTATIONS  
TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNION IN SERBIA:  
POLITICAL COMPETITION, IDEOLOGY AND  
IDENTITY POLITICS**

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**Prof. Dr. Metin ARIKAN**  
Müdür

## DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this doctoral thesis titled as “An Analysis of Party Orientations towards European Union in Serbia: Political Competition, Ideology and Identity Politics” has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honour.

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Önder CANVEREN

*S./Cml.*

**ABSTRACT**  
**Doctoral Thesis**  
**Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)**  
**An Analysis of Party Orientations towards European Union in Serbia: Political**  
**Competition, Ideology and Identity Politics\***  
**Önder CANVEREN**

**Dokuz Eylül University**  
**Graduate School of Social Sciences**  
**Department of European Union**  
**European Studies Program**

**This dissertation examines Serbia - European Union (EU) relations from the windows of political parties as the critical actors and gate-keepers, based on the assumption that the domestic context matters for Europeanization. Firstly, the research employs a quantitative expert survey to identify party positions and inter-party variances towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization. Secondly a qualitative thematic content analysis of party documents is conducted to explore any underlying causes and legitimization strategies.**

**With the help of expert survey, political parties are categorized into three groups: Pro-European, Soft, and Hard Eurosceptic. Next, the dissertation addresses causal explanations by drawing on eight altered comparative hypotheses from the following models: ideology, political competition, and identity politics. To understand their legitimizing strategies, party documents are thematically analysed in a deductive method by the following codes: normativity, identity, rationality, Kosovo, and the Russian alternative.**

**The current political conjecture in Belgrade continues over altered orientations in between old/new and identity/rationality, creating schisms in the political arena. Empirical data reveals that party orientations in Serbia remain under the identity politics. Pro-Europeanism is instrumentalized as a strategic-**

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**rational foreign policy orientation, excluding any normative perspective; whereas Euroscepticism is laid down under the shadow of history. In line with the rational actor model, pro-European parties frame the EU agenda as the path for the construction of a new Serbia by focusing on promises and the gains. Euroscepticism still marginalises the West/EU by referring to the recent past, Kosovo problem and the Russian alternative.**

**Keywords: European Union, Balkans, Serbia, Enlargement, Europeanization, Political Parties, Comparative Politics.**



## **ÖZET**

### **Doktora Tezi**

#### **Sırbistan'da Avrupa Birliği'ne İlişkin Parti Yönelimlerinin Bir Analizi: Siyasi Rekabet, İdeoloji ve Kimlik Siyaseti\*\***

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**Avrupa Birliği Anabilim Dalı**

**Avrupa Çalışmaları Programı**

Bu tez çalışması, Avrupalılaşma için iç politika dinamiklerinin önemli olduğu varsayımına dayanarak Sırbistan - Avrupa Birliği (AB) ilişkilerini, süreçte eşik bekçisi olarak kritik rol oynayan siyasi partiler üzerinden incelemektedir. Araştırmada siyasi partilerin AB, AB üyeliği ve Avrupalılaşmaya yönelik pozisyonlarının tespiti ve partiler-arası farklılıkların karşılaştırmalı analizi için ilk olarak nicel uzman anketi; altında yatan nedenler ve meşrulaştırma stratejileri içinse parti dokümanlarının nitel tematik içerik çözümlemesi yöntemleri kullanılmıştır.

Uzman anketi yardımıyla, siyasi partiler üç kategoriye ayrılmıştır: Avrupa Yanlısı, Yumuşak ve Katı Avrupa Karşısı. Nedensel açıklama için, üç model (siyasi rekabet, ideoloji ve kimlik siyaseti) yardımıyla oluşturulan sekiz alternatif hipotez üzerinden karşılaştırma testleri yapılmıştır. Parti dokümanlarının tematik içerik analizi için kodlar yardımıyla tümden gelim yöntemi kullanılmıştır: Normatif, kimliksel, rasyonel, Kosova ve Rusya alternatifi.

Belgrad'daki mevcut siyasal düzlem, eski ile yeninin, kimlik ile rasyonalitenin alternatif söylemleri üzerinden inşa edilmiş belirgin bir hizipleşmeye dayanmaktadır. Ampirik veriler, Sırbistan'daki parti yönelimlerinin kimlik siyaseti üzerinden şekillendiğini ortaya koymaktadır.

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\*\* Bu tez çalışması, 2214-A Yurt Dışı Doktora Sırası Araştırma Burs Programı ve 2211-A Genel Yurt İçi Doktora Burs Programı kapsamında Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu (TÜBİTAK) tarafından desteklenmiştir.

**Normatif perspektiften uzak olan Avrupa-taraftarlığı, stratejik/rasyonel bir dış politika oryantasyonu olarak araçsallaştırılırken; Avrupa karşıtlığı tarihin gölgesinde şekillenmektedir. Taraftar partiler rasyonel aktör modeline uygun olarak AB gündemini, muhtemel kazanım ve vaatlere odaklanarak yeni bir Sırbistan'ın inşası üzerinden çerçevelendirmektedir. Sırbistan'da Avrupa karşıtları ise yakın geçmişte yaşananlara ve Kosova sorununa yoğunlaşarak Batı'yı/AB'yi ötekileştirmeye devam etmekte ve Rusya'yı dış politika alternatifi olarak sunmaktadır.**

**Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Balkanlar, Sırbistan, Genişleme, Avrupalılaşma, Siyasi Partiler, Karşılaştırmalı Siyaset.**

**AN ANALYSIS OF PARTY ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN  
UNION IN SERBIA: POLITICAL COMPETITION, IDEOLOGY AND  
IDENTITY POLITICS**

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## ABBREVIATIONS

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| <b>BDZS</b>  | Bosniak Democratic Union of Sandžak                                       |
| <b>BiH</b>   | Bosnia and Herzegovina  |
| <b>CARDS</b> | Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization    |
| <b>CEE</b>   | Central and Eastern Europe  |
| <b>CFSP</b>  | Common Foreign and Security Policy  |
| <b>CoE</b>   | Council of Europe   |
| <b>DJB</b>   | It's enough – Dosta je bilo   |
| <b>DOS</b>   | Democratic Opposition of Serbia - Demokratska opozicija Srbije            |
| <b>DS</b>    | Democratic Party - Demokratska stranka                                    |
| <b>DSS</b>   | Democratic Party of Serbia - Demokratska stranka Srbije                   |
| <b>EU</b>    | European Union  |
| <b>EULEX</b> | European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo                              |
| <b>ICTY</b>  | The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia             |
| <b>IDPs</b>  | Internally Displaced Persons  |
| <b>IMF</b>   | International Monetary Fund   |
| <b>IPA</b>   | Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance                                   |
| <b>JS</b>    | United Serbia - Jedinstvena Srbija  |
| <b>KFOR</b>  | The Kosovo Force  |
| <b>KLA</b>   | Kosovo Liberation Army  |
| <b>KP</b>    | Communist Party - Komunistička partija                                    |
| <b>LDK</b>   | The Democratic League of Kosovo   |
| <b>LDP</b>   | Liberal Democratic Party - Liberalno demokratska partija                  |
| <b>LGBT</b>  | Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender                                   |
| <b>LSV</b>   | League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina - Liga socijaldemokrata Vojvodine |
| <b>MP</b>    | Member of Parliament  |
| <b>NATO</b>  | North Atlantic Treaty Organization  |
| <b>NDI</b>   | The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs               |
| <b>No</b>    | Number  |

|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| <b>NOVA</b>    | New Party - Nova stranka   |
| <b>NS</b>      | New Serbia - Nova Srbija   |
| <b>NSS</b>     | People's Peasant Party - Narodna Seljačka Stranka                            |
| <b>OSCE</b>    | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe                         |
| <b>p</b>       | Page   |
| <b>PDD</b>     | Party for Democratic Action  |
| <b>PDK</b>     | Democratic Party of Kosovo   |
| <b>pp</b>      | Pages  |
| <b>PS</b>      | Movement of Socialists - Pokret socijalista                                  |
| <b>PSS</b>     | Strength of Serbia Movement - Pokret Snaga Srbije                            |
| <b>PUPS</b>    | Party of United Pensioners of Serbia - Partija ujedinjenih penzionera Srbije |
| <b>RCC</b>     | The Regional Cooperation Council   |
| <b>RTS</b>     | The National Radio   |
| <b>SAA</b>     | Stabilization and Association Agreement                                      |
| <b>SANU</b>    | The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts                                     |
| <b>SAP</b>     | The Stabilization and Association Process                                    |
| <b>SDA</b>     | Party of Democratic Action of Sandžak - Stranka demokratske akcije Sandžaka  |
| <b>SDP</b>     | Social Democratic Party of Serbia - Socijaldemokratska partija Srbije        |
| <b>SDS</b>     | Social Democratic Party - Socijaldemokratska stranka                         |
| <b>SNP</b>     | Serbian People's Party - Srpska narodna partija                              |
| <b>SNS</b>     | Serbian Progressive Party - Srpska napredna stranka                          |
| <b>SPO</b>     | Serbian Renewal Movement - Srpski pokret obnove                              |
| <b>SPS</b>     | Socialist Party of Serbia - Socijalistička partija Srbije                    |
| <b>SRS</b>     | Serbian Radical Party - Srpska radikalna stranka                             |
| <b>SVM</b>     | Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians - Savez vojvođanskih Mađara                 |
| <b>TUBITAK</b> | The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey                  |
| <b>UK</b>      | United Kingdom   |
| <b>UN</b>      | United Nations   |
| <b>UNHCR</b>   | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees                                |

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| <b>UNMIK</b> | The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo |
| <b>UNSC</b>  | United Nations Security Council                             |
| <b>USA</b>   | United States of America                                    |
| <b>USS</b>   | United Peasant Party  |
| <b>Vol</b>   | Volume  |
| <b>WB</b>    | World Bank  |
| <b>ZES</b>   | Green Party - Zelena Stranka                                |
| <b>ZS</b>    | Greens of Serbia - Zeleni Srbije                            |
| <b>ZZS</b>   | Together for Serbia - Zajedno za Srbiju                     |



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## INTRODUCTION

Geographically, the Balkans do not fit in an East/West discussion; rather they serve as a bridge between the two worlds.<sup>1</sup> The region's political history also supports this claim, for example in terms of dichotomies like Christianity versus Islam, Catholic versus Orthodox, and Istanbul versus Vienna. In *Zemun* district, located across the river, the impression is of Habsburg and classical Western architecture whereas in the old town, centred around the *Kalemegdan*, a more Oriental architectural landscape appears. Similarly, while *Novi Sad*, one of the largest cities in Serbia's northwest, is reminiscent of Central Europe, travelling to the opposite corner of the country, to *Niš*, we find ourselves back in the Orient.

Walking along *Knez Mihailova Street*, the sounds of national instruments and heartfelt songs unique to both East and West blend into one another at the same time and place. In the evenings, one can witness large crowds surrounding musicians playing Turbo-folk music, a symbol of a post-socialist trend whereby culture is defined by the political dualism of pro-European liberalism versus conservative nationalism.<sup>2</sup> In the lobby of *Hotel Moskva*, another symbolic establishment, one can meet retired Yugoslavian bureaucrats, spouting their Yugo-nostalgia. It is a venue that clearly does not meet the standards of modern Europe since smoking is still allowed and homemade *rakija* and wines are listed on the menu. On the way to the *Church of Saint Sava*, another iconic structure of the city, one observes Serbia's new economic liberalization projects: the recently-opened Hilton Hotel. As a house of worship that was never completed due to war, demolitions, and economic deprivations since 1895, the church symbolizes the unfinished business in Serbia, a nation-state building process, and the search for its position in international politics.

At this point, one of the main questions is which direction the Sava and Danube Rivers flow through Belgrade. In this respect, Serbia's ongoing Europeanization can be framed as a process to end its historical position of being a bridge, and to reposition it within a European Serbia.

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<sup>1</sup> Maria Todorova, **Imagining the Balkans**, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997.

<sup>2</sup> Rory Archer, "Assessing Turbofolk Controversies: Popular Music between the Nation and the Balkans", **Southeastern Europe**, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2012, pp. 178-207.

However, ongoing Europeanization process in Serbia is complex because it depends more on domestic-driven dynamics. Although Serbia gained EU candidate status in 2012, the relationship between the two sides has not always been harmonious. Europeanization in Serbia has been slower and more complex, and has met with more resistance than expected.<sup>3</sup> Progress has been described as insufficient by the European Commission.<sup>4</sup> However, the direction, scope, and future of relations will most probably be determined more by Serbian domestic dynamics than any conditionality mechanism. In a weak Serbian state, characterized by dysfunctional institutions, still formal and certain informal “gate-keeper” national elites continue to dominate the state as a struggle to domain their own interests and status quo via political power.<sup>5</sup>

Political parties are non-negligible actors in the process of Europeanization that are closely monitored to understand whether they can provide an effective bridge between their country and the EU. Because the concerns and preferences of political parties play a greater role in the changing dynamics of EU politics, party mechanisms in Serbia fail to meet expectations for EU membership,<sup>6</sup> their discourses fluctuate between pro-European and Eurosceptic themes, and their unstable party orientations lie outside EU norms and standards.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, it is unclear whether Serbian elites fully support the EU integration or not.

Under the shadow of deep historical legacies and longstanding dilemmas, this dissertation problematizes Serbia-EU relations in terms of political parties as critical actors and gate-keepers, based on the assumption that the domestic context matters for Europeanization. Following an examination of the position of Serbian political parties concerning EU, EU membership, and Europeanization, it attempts to identify the factors that influence the positions and contextualization of political parties concerning

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<sup>3</sup> İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, “Batı Balkanlar Avrupa Yolunda”, **İKV Yayınları** 267, 2013, [http://www.ikv.org.tr/images/upload/data/files/bati\\_balkanlar\\_ab\\_yolunda-web.pdf](http://www.ikv.org.tr/images/upload/data/files/bati_balkanlar_ab_yolunda-web.pdf), (26.05.2018), p. 32.

<sup>4</sup> European Commission, “Serbia 2015 Report”, **Enlargement**, 10.11.2015, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2015/20151110\\_report\\_serbia.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_serbia.pdf), (26.05.2018), pp. 4-6.

<sup>5</sup> Marko Kmezić, “Social Movements and Democratization in Serbia since Milošević”, **The Democratic Potential of Emerging Social Movements in Southeastern Europe**, (Ed. Jasmin Mujanović), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Sarajevo, 2017, p. 23.

<sup>6</sup> Danica Fink-Hafner, “Europeanization and Party System Mechanics: Comparing Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro”, **Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online**, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, pp. 167-181.

<sup>7</sup> Jelena Subotić, “Explaining Difficult States: The Problems of Europeanization in Serbia”, **East European Politics and Societies**, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2010, pp. 595-616.

Serbia's EU membership. In other words, it asks why some Serbian parties support EU membership while others do not. It also attempts to answer to this question by investigating how political parties legitimize their positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization. Therefore, this dissertation examines thoroughly the bilateral relations from "Serbian perspective."

The dissertation first assigns the parties to three categories that originate from the Europeanization literature: *Pro-European*, and *Hard versus Soft Eurosceptic*. The dissertation then examines causal explanations for this by drawing on an altered comparative hypotheses, based on three models of party politics: *ideology*, *political competition*, and *identity politics*. Thirdly, in order to analyse why some parties support EU membership and Europeanization whereas others do not, the study extensively examines the party strategies legitimizing their orientations via thematic codes modelled on the Europeanization literature, including Serbia-specific issues: *normativity*, *identity*, *rationality*, *Kosovo*, and *the Russian alternative*.

To identify the factors that lead to the positive and negative approaches of Serbian political parties, this study adopts a new technique that synthesizes expert survey (Appendix 4) and thematic content analysis and draws on both quantitative and qualitative methods. These methods were operationalized in a nine months of field-work in Belgrade (primary data).<sup>8</sup> First, an expert survey, using a 7-point Likert scale, was administered to 24 participants specialized in Serbia-EU relations and/or party politics (Appendix 3). All responses were coded, categorized, and analysed using IBM SPSS statistical software.

Secondly, to detail the various factors and rationales on which party positions are based, developed, and thereby legitimized, a thematic content analysis was conducted using MAXQDA software on documents relevant to the following eight political parties: Serbian Progressive Party (*Srpska napredna stranka* - SNS), Serbian Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka* - SRS), Socialist Party of Serbia (*Socijalistička partija Srbije* - SPS), Enough is Enough (*Dosta je bilo* - DJB), Democratic Party (*Demokratska stranka* - DS), Social Democratic Party of Serbia

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<sup>8</sup> Field-works were conducted during the nine months stay (September 15, 2017 – June 15, 2018) at University of Belgrade Faculty of Political Sciences under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Slobodan Samardžić in collaboration with Assist. Prof. Dr. Dušan Spasojević, supported by the 2214-A International Research Fellowship for Doctoral Students of TUBITAK.

(*Socijaldemokratska partija Srbije* - SDP), DVERI (*Doors – Dveri*), and Democratic Party of Serbia (*Demokratska stranka Srbije* - DSS).

The overall political conjuncture in Serbia tends to favour Brussels because anti-EU parties in Serbia are weak, in terms of both numbers and strength in the Parliament. Seventeen political parties in the Parliament share Pro-European positions whereas only four parties are Hard-Eurosceptic actors. There are eight Soft-Eurosceptic parties that take a more suspicious position towards the EU and membership.

From the field-work in Serbia (expert survey and content analysis) the study concluded that the main factor behind the political parties' position and support for EU membership and Europeanization lies within the *identity politics*. Party positions and inter-party variances are influenced more by identity politics, including the Kosovo issue and the Russian alternative than by ideology or political competition. Findings from the expert survey indicate that the models of political competition and ideology are ineffective approaches for explaining party positions and inter-party variations. This general fact in party politics leads to the rejection of comparative hypotheses for left-wing versus right-wing, minority versus majority, and government versus opposition parties.

The thematic content analysis of the party documents demonstrates that Pro-European parties have instrumentalized the process of constructing a “new” Serbia by focusing on promises of the gains of EU membership, in line with the rational actor model. Conversely, Hard-Eurosceptic parties frame the EU as the other and/or enemy due to the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombardment and the recognition of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence by the EU member states.

Serbia's ruling parties, the SNS, SDP, and SPS, have all framed the ongoing negotiation processes with the EU in their foreign policy perspective. This is why they frame EU membership in accordance with the logic of consequences, and focus on the gains and membership by emphasizing possible economic advantages for development, getting rid of Serbia's negative image, and becoming a regional power. For this reason, the normative dimension of relations is deemphasized in their documents. Similarly, it is not even felt necessary to lean towards the identity

dimension with the assumption that historically and sociologically Serbia belongs to European family of nations.

The fact that the normative dimension has yet to be sufficiently addressed by the government has created a central space for pro-European opposition parties the DS and DJB (soft-Eurosceptic) for their anti-government rhetoric. The rationale for the ruling government to legitimize EU membership through the rational actor model with the slogan of building a “new” Serbia has been targeted by these two pro-European opposition parties.

Comparing the Hard-Eurosceptic parties, the thematic content analysis indicates that the opposition is more normative for DVERI, but more threat perception and identity-oriented for the SRS. Kosovo is the main focus of the third Eurosceptic party, the DSS. Although the discourses they use to justify their positions are different, all parties refer to recent history. In short, Euroscepticism in Serbia is all about history and identity. Another common point is the Eurasian foreign policy proposal by Eurosceptic parties, calling for deepening cooperation with Russia as an alternative to EU membership.

#### **a. A Brief Overview of the Literature on Serbia–EU Relations**

Following the Bulldozer Revolution of 2000, the collapse of Milošević’s regime began a delayed transition.<sup>9</sup> Brussels considered the end of the regime as an essential opportunity to revise and renew its relations with Balkan countries, including Serbia. During the Thessaloniki Summit (2003), countries of the Western Balkans were announced as potential candidates, which implied that new relations would advance their membership prospects. However, Serbia’s position remained stagnant due to competition between the nationalists’ and reformists’ alternative visions of the future; this created a new political climate dominated by conflict during the early years of the transition.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Sarah Birch, “The 2000 Elections in Yugoslavia: The ‘Bulldozer Revolution’”, **Electoral Studies**, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2002, pp. 473-533.

<sup>10</sup> Branislav Radeljić, “The Politics of (no) Alternatives in post-Milošević Serbia”, **Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies**, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014, pp. 243–259; Dan D. Lazear, “Domestic Politics and European Integration in Serbia: The Year 2012 and the Paradox of Moderate Nationalism”, **Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences**, Vol. 183, 2015, pp. 99-104.



On the other hand, Brussels viewed Serbia's cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the normalisation of relations with Kosovo as conditions during pre-accession years for further improving Serbia-EU relations. Alternative discourses and visions (modernist/reformist versus traditional/conservative) peaked both before and during political campaigns, especially in the 2008 elections. These were won by an electoral block called *For a European Serbia*, a milestone in terms of Serbia-EU relations, in the light of subsequent developments.<sup>11</sup> In 2013, negotiations began following concessions exhibited by Belgrade's attitude and policy towards cooperating with the ICTY and Kosovo.

After these developments, several studies noted the success of Serbian Europeanization, with a significant proportion focusing on Serbia's candidacy status, based on the external incentives model (rational institutionalism and conditionality). For example, regarding one of the key issues in relations, namely war criminals Pawelec and Grimm argued that Serbia's cooperation with the ICTY resulted from international pressure from the EU and the United States of America (USA) and the subsequent rewards.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, other studies argued that the EU's influence was leading to a reconstruction of Serbian identity. Kostovicova proposed that this new identity was used as a tool for legitimization during the transition.<sup>13</sup> In another study, Serbia's appearance in the Eurovision song contest was interpreted as a reward for being accepted as truly European.<sup>14</sup> One study on the revision of the national calendar concluded that the reconstructed Europeanized identity had allowed Serbia to start facing its past.<sup>15</sup> Since 2008, the literature on Serbia-EU relations has been

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<sup>11</sup> Irena Ristić, "Serbia's EU Integration Process: The Momentum of 2008", *Panoeconomicus*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2009, pp. 111-125.

<sup>12</sup> Maria Pawelec and Sonja Grimm, "Does National Identity Matter? Political Conditionality and the Crucial Case of Serbia's (non-)Co-operation with the ICTY", *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 6, 2014, pp. 1290-1306.

<sup>13</sup> Denisa Kostovicova, "Post-Socialist Identity, Territoriality and European Integration: Serbia's Return to Europe after Milošević", *GeoJournal*, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2004, pp. 23-30.

<sup>14</sup> Marijana Mitrović, "'New Face of Serbia' at the Eurovision Song Contest: International Media Spectacle and National Identity", *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2010, pp. 171-185.

<sup>15</sup> Lea David, "Impression Management of a Contested Past: Serbia's Evolving National Calendar", *Memory Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2014, pp. 472-483.

supplemented with subject-related or micro studies covering gender equality,<sup>16</sup> Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT),<sup>17</sup> minority rights,<sup>18</sup> agriculture,<sup>19</sup> institutional structuring,<sup>20</sup> and the rule of law.<sup>21</sup>

However, to meet all the EU's membership conditions and strengthen Serbia's democracy, comprehensive and convincing reforms are still required in crucial areas, notably on the rule of law, fight against corruption, competitiveness, and regional cooperation and reconciliation.<sup>22</sup> It is therefore still too early to conclude whether effective and lasting Europeanization has been achieved regarding its candidacy status and the start of the negotiations in 2013. Europeanization in Serbia, which has been slower, more complex, and has met more resistance than expected,<sup>23</sup> has been evaluated as insufficient by the Commission.<sup>24</sup> Today, there is consensus in the literature that Serbia's Europeanization will be drawn out.<sup>25</sup>

Several reasons are cited in the literature for these shortcomings. First of all, Serbia's case is unique in that its transition and democratization are referred in various approaches of post-communist transition, from modernization theory and the role of

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<sup>16</sup> Suzana Ignjatović and Aleksandar Bošković, "Are we there yet? Citizens of Serbia and Public Policy on Gender Equality within the EU Accession Context", **European Journal of Women's Studies**, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2013, pp. 425-440.

<sup>17</sup> George Vasilev, "LGBT Recognition in EU Accession States: How Identification with Europe Enhances the Transformative Power of Discourse", **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2016, pp. 748-772.

<sup>18</sup> Teresa Cierco, "The Limits of Europeanization on Minority Rights in Serbia: The Roma Minority", **International Journal on Minority and Group Rights**, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2017, pp. 123-149.

<sup>19</sup> Matthew Gorton, Philip Lowe, Steve Quarrie and Vlade Zarić, "European Rule Adoption in Central and Eastern Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Agricultural Water Management in Serbia", **Environmental Politics**, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2010, pp. 578-598.

<sup>20</sup> Branislav Malagurski, "Territorial Organization and Support Institutions as Preconditions to Efficient International Cooperation between European Union and South-east Europe Countries: Cases of Croatia and Serbia", **Pravni Vjesnik**, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2008, pp. 49-59.

<sup>21</sup> Leonarda Morlino and Amichai Magen, "EU Rule of Law Promotion in Romania, Turkey and Serbia-Montenegro: Domestic Elites and Responsiveness to Differentiated External Influence", **Workshop: Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law: American and European Strategies and Instruments**. Stanford University, Stanford, 2004.

<sup>22</sup> European Commission, 2018 Enlargement Strategy Paper, p. 3.

<sup>23</sup> İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, Batı Balkanlar Avrupa Yolunda, p. 32.

<sup>24</sup> European Commission, "Serbia 2015 Report", **Enlargement**, 10.11.2015, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2015/20151110\\_report\\_serbia.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_serbia.pdf), (26.05.2018), pp. 4-6.

<sup>25</sup> Othon Anastasakis, "The Europeanization of the Balkans", **Brown Journal of World Affairs**, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2005, pp. 77-88; Olivera Djordjevic, "The Limits of Europeanization 'from without': Is There an EU-Driven Democratization Process in Serbia?", **UNISCI Discussion Papers**, Vol. 18, 2008, pp. 77-93; Bernhard Stahl, "Another 'Strategic Accession'? The EU and Serbia (2000-2010)", **Nationalities Papers**, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2013, pp. 447-468; Soeren Keil, "Europeanization, State-Building and Democratization in the Western Balkans", **Nationalities Papers**, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2013, pp. 343-353.

historical regime legacies to state-building, ethnic heterogeneity, and war.<sup>26</sup> Secondly, Serbia is also an example of how the historical legacies from pre-communist and communist regimes condition political and institutional choice in post-conflict and post-communist transitions.<sup>27</sup> Thirdly, Serbia's case is particularly challenging due to its context-driven dynamics, primarily domestic politics.

## **b. Literature Review of Party Politics within the Context of Serbia-EU Relations**

Europeanization has often been positioned between the EU's conditionality clauses and the applicants' willingness to comply<sup>28</sup> in a way that the challenge of improving the quality of governance, necessary for building sustainable and stable democracies, depends largely on the nation's own actors.<sup>29</sup> The Serbian case is no exception as Serbia-EU relations are analysed in the literature by predominantly focusing on foreign policy, post-conflict transition, and intra-regional dynamics or ad-hoc issues, with limited attention to party politics. It is possible to categorize the literature on Serbian political parties within the context of EU membership into six perspectives:

**(I) Political parties as the root cause of non-Europeanization:** According to Fink-Hafner, party mechanisms in Serbia have failed to meet EU expectations in terms of institutionalization and legitimacy.<sup>30</sup> Similarly, Subotić adds that the discourse of the political elites lies well outside EU norms and standards.<sup>31</sup> This makes it unclear whether Serbia's elites fully support EU integration, given their limited level of socialization in terms of Europeanization. According to Obradović-Wochnik and Wochnik, internal actors manipulated Serbia-EU relations over the Kosovo issue by

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<sup>26</sup> Grigore Pop-Eleches, "Communist Development and the Postcommunist Democratic Deficit", **Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe**, (Eds. Mark Beissinger and Stephen Kotkin), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 28-51.

<sup>27</sup> Danijela Dolenec, **Democratic Institutions and Authoritarian Rule in Southeast Europe**, ECPR Press, Colchester, 2013.

<sup>28</sup> Radeljic, p. 3.

<sup>29</sup> Cohen and Lampe, p. 94.

<sup>30</sup> Danica Fink-Hafner, "Europeanization and Party System Mechanics: Comparing Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro", **Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online**, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, pp. 167-181.

<sup>31</sup> Jelena Subotić, "Explaining Difficult States: The Problems of Europeanization in Serbia", **East European Politics and Societies**, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2010, pp. 595-616.

over-emphasizing the complexities involved.<sup>32</sup> In another study, Kostovicova states that Serbia's elites have employed denial strategies during their partial attitude and policy change.<sup>33</sup>

**(II) Historical legacies shaping party politics:** Lazić argues that the historical legacies have encouraged the historical auto/production of cultural patterns by the political elites.<sup>34</sup> This has created contradictions in Serbia, especially concerns the encounters between East and West, and between traditional and modern. Similarly, Cohen and Lampe characterize Serbian party politics by a historical dichotomy of pro-European versus Eurosceptic.<sup>35</sup> Gallo argues that this historical dualism is the result of EU policies clashing with international law during the dissolution of Yugoslavia.<sup>36</sup>

An alternative reading exploits the mode of transition and argues that the end of Milošević's regime caused a paradox in Serbia: the previous ruling elites kept their political and economic powers.<sup>37</sup> According to Stojic, Serbian parties' stances on EU membership are multifaceted and dynamic, again due to historical legacies.<sup>38</sup> Bandović and Vujačić detail this continuities and transformations in party positions to argue that it undermines the decisive role of the Kosovo issue in factionalism.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, Fink lists economic and political sanctions, NATO bombing, and Kosovo as the legacies that have created a common distrust of the EU, observing a larger sympathy with that the geopolitical alternative of Russia.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Jelena Obradović-Wochnik and Alexander Wochnik, "Europeanising the 'Kosovo Question': Serbia's Policies in the Context of EU Integration", **West European Politics**, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2012, pp. 1158-1181.

<sup>33</sup> Denisa Kostovicova, "When Enlargement Meets Common Foreign and Security Policy: Serbia's Europeanisation, Visa Liberalisation and the Kosovo Policy", **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 66, No. 1, 2014, pp. 67-87.

<sup>34</sup> Mladen Lazić, "Serbia: A Part of both the East and the West?", **Sociologija**, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2003, pp. 193-216.

<sup>35</sup> Cohen and Lampe, p. 251.

<sup>36</sup> Domenico Gallo, "A Collateral Aspect of NATO Aggression: European Union Sanctions - The Parable of EU Sanctions: From Preventing War to Collective Punishment", **International Problems**, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2000.

<sup>37</sup> Mladen Lazić and Slobodan Cvejić, "Changes in the Recruitment Patterns of the Economic and Political Elites in Serbia", **Sociologija**, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2006, pp. 97-112.

<sup>38</sup> Marko Stojic, "The Changing Nature of Serbian Political Parties' Attitudes towards Serbian EU Membership", **Sussex European Institute**, Sussex, 2010.

<sup>39</sup> Igor Bandović and Marko Vujačić, "The European Question in Serbia's Party Politics", **EU Integration and Party Politics in the Balkans**, (Ed. Corina Stratulat), European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2014, pp. 47-68.

<sup>40</sup> Fink-Hafner, p. 180.

**(III) Sources of Euroscepticism in party politics:** In relation to the second theme, studies have investigated the political parties to identify the sources of Euroscepticism. AntoniĆ relates the recognition of Kosovo's secession by EU member states as the root cause of Euroscepticism,<sup>41</sup> while Stonic suggest it was the pre-condition of cooperation with the ICTY.<sup>42</sup> Nezi concludes that mistrust of the EU and Eurosceptic discourse are widespread, especially among extreme right parties.<sup>43</sup> Koljević<sup>44</sup> and Neumann<sup>45</sup> discussed otherness in terms of threat perception and enemy image(s).

**(IV) The question of identity and political parties:** According to Stojic, "The particular nature of European issues, closely related to crucial identity and statehood dilemmas in these post-conflict societies, largely determined party stances on the EU, feeding significant Eurosceptic sentiments."<sup>46</sup> According to Peskin, identity politics in Serbia are distinct from the European identity with the Euro-Asian/Russian alternative, due to the conflicts of the 1990s and Kosovo, which have hindered Europeanization.<sup>47</sup> It is necessary to emphasize that, in almost all analyses, the Kosovo issue is highlighted as the main challenge and obstacle.<sup>48</sup> In another work on the identity dimension of relations, Koljević uses the expression 'East meets West' for Serbia in order to refer

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<sup>41</sup> Slobodan AntoniĆ, "Euroscepticism in Serbia", **Serbian Political Thought**, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2012, pp. 67-96.

<sup>42</sup> Marko Stojic, "Between Europhobia and Europhilia: Party and Popular Attitudes towards Membership of the European Union in Serbia and Croatia", **Perspectives on European Politics and Society**, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2006, pp. 312-335.

<sup>43</sup> Spyridoula Nezi, Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos and Panayiota Toka, "Explaining the Attitudes of Parliamentarians towards European Integration in Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia: Party Affiliation, 'Left-Right' Self-placement or Country Origin?", **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 61, No. 6, 2009, pp. 1003-1020.

<sup>44</sup> Bogdana Koljević, "Rethinking the Question of Otherness and Democracy in European Philosophy", **Serbian Political Thought**, Vol. 2, No. 1-2, 2010, pp. 113-119.

<sup>45</sup> Iver B. Neumann, "Europe and the Others", **Serbian Political Thought**, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2011, pp. 7-19.

<sup>46</sup> Marko Stojic, **Party Responses to the EU in the Western Balkans: Transformation, Opposition or Defiance?**, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018.

<sup>47</sup> Victor Peskin, **International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State Cooperation**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008; Tina Freyburg and Solveig Richter, "National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of EU Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans", **Journal of European Public Policy**, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2010, pp. 263-81; Jelena Subotić, "Europe is a State of Mind: Identity and Europeanization in the Balkans", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2011, pp. 309-330.

<sup>48</sup> Vedran Dzihic and Angela Wieser, "The Crisis of Expectations-Europeanisation as 'Acquis Démocratique' and its Limits: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia", **L'Europe en Formation**, Vol. 3, 2008, pp. 81-98.

to two competing identities: pro-European versus pro-Russian.<sup>49</sup> In his empirical research, Šuvaković concludes that the sense of belonging to a European identity is weak, although support for EU membership is strong and primarily motivated by money.<sup>50</sup>

**(V) Analysis of the position shift among political parties:** The faction after the 2000 Bulldozer Revolution evolved over time in favour of pro-Europeanism due to position changes within Serbia's mainstream parties. Various studies have problematized the causes of this position-shift. According to Spasojevic, this shift was due to the party leadership and a gradual ideological shift.<sup>51</sup> On the other hand, Baca argues that voting behaviour has been the determining factor in this process: "Voters abandoned nationalist, anti-EU parties as they learned more about them."<sup>52</sup> Taking identity transformation into account, Vachu argues that source of political competition in Serbia have shifted away from nationalism towards larger consensus on joining the EU.<sup>53</sup> According to Atlagić, Serbia's negative image in world affairs has enabled post-Milošević elites to instrumentalize EU membership as the path to Pax Americana club that necessitates shifts in values and identity.<sup>54</sup> Božilović also details the possible challenges that integration will reveal in terms of Serbian culture.<sup>55</sup>

Contrary to the hypothesis on a shift in positions, Radojević argues that Serbia does not fully meet European standards due to the lack of consensus among the political elites on institutional and political reforms.<sup>56</sup> Similarly, according to

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<sup>49</sup> Bogdana Koljević, "The Role of Serbs in the Creation of New Europe", **Serbian Political Thought**, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2017, pp. 79-91.

<sup>50</sup> Uroš V. Šuvaković, "Orientation towards EU Integration and Existence of Euro Identity - Serbian Students Attitudes", **Serbian Political Thought**, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2015, pp. 61-79.

<sup>51</sup> Dusan Spasojevic, "Europeanization of Serbian Party System – Accountability to Brussels or to People", **Fifth Euroacademia International Conference: The European Union and Politicization of Europe**, Bologna, 14-15.10.2016, (Europeanization of Serbian Party System).

<sup>52</sup> Erin Baca, **Croatia and Serbia: Two Roads Diverged or Wandering down the Same Path? Institutionalization and Europeanization of Party Systems since the 2000 Democratic Elections**, (Unpublished MA Thesis), University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Department of Political Science, Chapel Hill, 2011.

<sup>53</sup> Milada Anna Vachudova, "Party Positions, EU Leverage and Democratic Backsliding in the Western Balkans and Beyond", **Conference: Rejected Europe, Beloved Europe, Cleavage Europe?** European University Institute, May 2017.

<sup>54</sup> Siniša Atlagić, "International Positioning of Serbia in the Era of Pax Americana", **Serbian Political Thought**, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2015, pp. 27-37.

<sup>55</sup> Nikola Božilović, "Tradicija i modernizacija (evropske perspektive kulture na Balkanu)", **Sociologija**, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2010, pp. 113-126, (Tradition and Modernization: European Perspectives of Culture in the Balkans).

<sup>56</sup> Miodrag Radojević, "European Standards and Constitutional Changes in Serbia", **Serbian Political Thought**, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2011, pp. 81-101.

Paszkievicz, countries in the region share similar motives, with the ultimate goal of EU membership being economic development.<sup>57</sup> However, Fejes does emphasize a second reason, namely strengthening administrative and institutional capacity for cross-border cooperation.<sup>58</sup>

**(VI) Value systems and political parties:** The last theme in the literature examining Serbia-EU relations through party politics focuses on distinct levels of the elites' socialization, questioning their value systems. From his empirical analysis, Lazić concludes that Serbia's political and economic elites have not adopted liberal values as a clearly dominant framework of orientation.<sup>59</sup> A similar observation can be made for Serbia's local political elites, who are insufficiently open to the aspirations, ideas, and experiences of others.<sup>60</sup> According to Orlović, the Europeanization of parties and the party system is far more limited than that in other countries in the region.<sup>61</sup> There is a limited pattern of Europeanization of party politics in Serbia, only applicable if taking their membership in European party family, adapting their programmes and organization, and imposing European themes in electoral campaigns.<sup>62</sup> Finally, another empirical study shows that Serbia's left-wing and ethnic minority parties are more in favour of the EU and Serbia's membership.<sup>63</sup>

Previous studies on party politics in Serbia concerning Europeanization have addressed historical legacies, identity, sources of Euroscepticism, position shifts, and their value systems. The originality of this dissertation lies in the research techniques used to address the question of party positions in Serbia and its findings. The approach to this topic is original: there is no similar study on party orientations in Serbia's case

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<sup>57</sup> Jędrzej Paszkiewicz, "Regional Cooperation in Western Balkans: A view from Inside the European Union: The Premises and Obstacles", **Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi**, Vol. 2, 2009, pp. 149-160.

<sup>58</sup> Zsuzsanna Fejes, "The European Territorial Cohesion – with Special Focus on Serbia", **Serbian Political Thought**, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2011, pp. 39-61.

<sup>59</sup> Mladen Lazić, "Spread of Value Orientations among Political and Economic Elites in Serbia", **Romanian Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2007, pp. 67-83.

<sup>60</sup> Vladimir Vuletić, "Between the National Past and (an) European Future", **Sociologija**, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2003, pp. 217-236.

<sup>61</sup> Slaviša Orlović, "Europeanisation and Democratisation of Parties and Party System of Serbia", **Politics in Central Europe**, Vol. 3, No. 1-2, 2007, (Europeanisation and Democratisation), pp. 92-104.

<sup>62</sup> Slaviša Orlović, "Parties and the Party System of Serbia and European Integrations", **Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online**, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, pp. 205-222.

<sup>63</sup> Mladen Lazić and Vladimir Vuletić, "The Nation State and the EU in the Perceptions of Political and Economic Elites: The Case of Serbia in Comparative Perspective", **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 61, No. 6, 2009, pp. 987-1001.

using the same research methods. By adopting a new technique (synthesizing expert surveys and content analysis), in which both quantitative and qualitative methods were operationalized in a 9-month field-work in Belgrade, this dissertation reinterprets party orientations from a new perspective. The empirical data provides an opportunity to compare two alternative research techniques, which shows that the findings of both methods support each other. Secondly, this study departs from previous studies in the literature in questioning pro-Europeanism in Serbia via a systematic approach. This analysis is the first to explore an under-researched topic, namely the factors affecting pro-Europeanism in Serbian party politics, to produce new knowledge regarding the legitimization strategies framed by different parties. Lastly, while this analysis reaches similar findings and conclusions to previous studies regarding Euroscepticism in Serbia, it makes a new contribution to the literature by offering a stronger justification for the analysis by adopting a new research technique.

### c. Research Methods

Unlike the traditional approach to EU conditionality, this study examines Serbia-EU relations via political parties due to their critical gate-keeper positions. For this purpose, party positions, their possible causes, and arguments developed to justify party positions were examined by an expert survey and thematic content analysis of party documents. Based on the assumption that domestic context matters, this dissertation aims to answer the following three research questions:

- I. *What are the positions of Serbian political parties concerning the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization?*
- II. *What are the factors affecting the positions and contextualization of the political parties? What are the rationales on which these positions are based, and the theses developed?*
- III. *How do political parties in Serbia legitimize their positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization?*


Three alternative categorizations for party positions, based on the literature and analysed in greater detail in the first chapter, were operationalized. Having a positive position on the EU and Europeanization is conceptualized by the term **Pro-Europeanism**. Conversely, Euroscepticism refers to a negative and/or rejective position towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization. The first type, **Hard**



**Euroscepticism**, entails complete rejection of the EU and opposes joining the EU as a full member whereas **Soft Euroscepticism** refers to conditional or qualified opposition to the EU and EU membership.

Because the causes of party positions and inter-party differentiations vary, this study modelled three alternative approaches; **ideology**, **political competition**, and **identity politics** to explain why some Serbian parties support EU membership while others do not. The independent variables and the research hypotheses originated from three models of legitimization proposed by Habermas<sup>64</sup> and Sjurssen:<sup>65</sup> (1) based on the utility expectations in the form of economic and security gains *pragmatic*; (2) relying on the collective understanding of ‘us’ and values shaping responsibility *ethical/political*; (3) based on the sense of justification that emerges from values and the perception of the good life embedded in the community *moral*. Based on these models, this study re-formulated and adopted moral justification as **ideology**, pragmatism as **political competition**, and ethical-political justification as **identity politics** (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Research Design**



The following hypotheses were formulated to answer the second research question, based on these models:

<sup>64</sup> Jürgen Habermas, “On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason”, **Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics**, (Ed. Jürgen Habermas), The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 1-17.

<sup>65</sup> Helene Sjurssen, “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy?”, **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2002, pp. 496-499.

*H-1: Left and right-wing parties are likely to adopt opposing positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization.*

*H-2: Moderate parties are more likely to be (more) pro-European than extreme parties.*

*H-3: Government and opposition parties are likely adopt opposite positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization.*

*H-4: Political parties are apt to follow their electoral position towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization.*

*H-5: Minority parties are apt to be (more) pro-European than majority parties.*

*H-6: Political parties with more an inclusive supranational identity orientation are apt to be (more) pro-European than those with a national exclusive identity orientation.*

*H-7: Eurosceptic parties are apt to be (more) pro-Russian than pro-European parties.*

*H-8: Eurosceptic parties are apt to be (more) anti-NATO than pro-European parties.*

Laver and Hunt propose three measurement methods for determining party positions: (1) analysis of party documents; (2) mass public opinion surveys; (3) the use of expert judgments.<sup>66</sup> According to Ray, each of these methods has distinctive advantages and disadvantages.<sup>67</sup> Although the manifesto reflects the overall parties' positions and provides accurate details, the content analysis carries a risk of being subjectively interpreted. Public opinion surveys are functional, especially when comparing party/leader and electorate opinions. Lastly, the reliance on expert opinion is instrumental, especially when party manifestos and public surveys are lacking and/or insufficient.

This dissertation first administered an expert survey to 24 participants specialized in Serbia-EU relations and/or party politics. The survey instrument developed by Dr. Liesbet Hooghe was slightly modified after administering six pilot surveys (three in Turkey and three in Serbia). Sample selection used purposive sampling to find participants that were all highly proficient in English and specialized in Serbia-EU relations and/or party politics. Most surveys were conducted face-to-face, although six participants submitted their questionnaires via e-mail. Lastly, snowball sampling was employed to ensure a representative sample size given that only a few respondents did not participate or respond to the initial e-mail. The survey

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<sup>66</sup> Michael Laver and Ben W. Hunt, **Policy and Party Competition**, Routledge, New York, 1992.

<sup>67</sup> Leonard Ray, "Measuring Party Orientations towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey", **European Journal of Political Research**, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1999, pp. 284-285.

instrument used a 7-point Likert scale. All responses were coded, categorized, and analysed using the statistical software, IBM SPSS.

To analyse why pro-EU parties follow such a positive policy and vice versa for anti-EU parties, and determine the factors and rationales behind these choices, thematic content analysis was applied to documents relevant to the eight political parties: Serbian Progressive Party (*Srpska napredna stranka* - SNS), Serbian Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka* - SRS), Socialist Party of Serbia (*Socijalistička partija Srbije* - SPS), Enough is Enough (*Dosta je bilo* - DJB), Democratic Party (*Demokratska stranka* - DS), Social Democratic Party of Serbia (*Socijaldemokratska partija Srbije* - SDP), DVERI (Doors - Dveri) and Democratic Party of Serbia (*Demokratska stranka Srbije* - DSS), advised by Prof. Dr. Slobodan Samardžić, my supervisor at University of Belgrade, taking investigating the roles and effects of political parties in Serbia since 2008. Currently, out of 250 seats in Serbia's parliament, 195 are held by members representing these parties.

First, 154 documents were collected, including party programs, statements, election campaigns, press releases, and interviews (74 primary sources and 80 secondary sources). In addition to the rational, normative, and identity dimensions, which deductively constitute the theoretical framework of this study, a thematic analysis of documents using MAXQDA was carried out that also focused on Serbia-related issues: Kosovo, and Russia as an alternative (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2:** Thematic Codes for the Content Analysis of Party Documents

| Codes from the Research Model | Serbia-Specific Codes    |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Normative (+)                 | Russia as a Partner      |
| Normative (-)                 | Russia as an Alternative |
| Security (+)                  | Kosovo (+)               |
| Security (-)                  | Kosovo (-)               |
| Benefit                       | Others                   |
| Cost                          |                          |
| Identity (+)                  |                          |
| Identity (-)                  |                          |

The ruling coalition's political parties were also analysed from the viewpoint of three models of domestic change in the Europeanization literature: the External

Incentives Model (Rational Institutionalism), the Social Learning Model (Sociological Institutionalism), and the Lesson-Drawing Model (Historical Institutionalism). On the other hand, Eurosceptic parties were examined based on their range between Hard-Eurosceptic and Soft-Eurosceptic to determine their position(s) in relation to rational, identity, or normative references of political justification.

#### **d. Organization of the Dissertation**

The dissertation consisted of five chapters. The first chapter, entitled “Conceptual and Theoretical Framework: Europeanization, Party Position and Political Orientation,” provides a detailed explanation of Europeanization and EU conditionality; covering definitions, theoretical origins, and mechanisms. It also provides a critique of the arguments regarding contextualism as a new treatment of the orthodox Europeanization literature. The chapter then examines party preferences towards the EU in order to conceptualize the dependent variable - party positions - to determine the theoretical and conceptual framework of the first research question: *What are the positions of political parties in Serbia concerning the EU, membership, and Europeanization.* Finally, the chapter presents the research models, the independent variables - ideology, political competition and identity politics - and the hypotheses for the second research question: *What are the factors affecting the positions and contextualizations of Serbia’s political parties?*

The second chapter, “From Victimhood to the EU Accession: Political Elites and Domestic Dynamics in Serbia since 1999,” is the main historical background chapter that analyses Milošević’s presidency, the rebirth of Serbian nationalism, and the processes leading up to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Following a thorough examination of the origins and consequences of the Kosovo crisis, and the question of cooperation with the ICTY as obstacles in the pre-accession period, the chapter examines Serbia’s recent history by focusing on current “victimhood” narrative as a continuing obstacle.

The third chapter, “The EU’s Enlargement Strategy on the Western Balkans and the Ongoing Europeanization Process in Serbia,” is designed as a “transition” chapter from the historical background to the focus of the study, covering the EU’s

policy priorities, opportunities, and the obstacles in the Western Balkans, as well as Serbia-EU relations from a chronological (pre versus post-2008 periods) perspective. This part examines Serbia's relations with the EU as "one step forward two steps backward." The unfulfilled and frustrating expectations in these relations lead to the conclusion that Serbian Europeanization does not follow a progressive or linear path due to the country's uncompleted transition and slow progress towards fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria.

Following a detailed analysis of the main pillars of party politics in Serbia, the fourth chapter explains the statistical analysis of the expert survey based on the data collected. Drawing on the research models, this chapter firstly profiles political parties in accordance with three categorical party positions. It then tests the research hypotheses to determine the party positions and inter-party differentiations, with the help of IBM SPSS software.

The final chapter analyses in detail the various factors and rationales on which party positions are based, developed, and thereby legitimized through a thematic content analysis of party documents using MAXQDA. In addition to the rational, normative, and identity dimensions, which deductively constitutes the theoretical framework of the dissertation, a thematic analysis of the documents was carried out that specifically focused on Serbian issues, particularly Kosovo, and Russia as a partner versus the alternative.

Overall, Pro-Europeanism is framed as a strategic-rational orientation for the construction of a "new" Serbia whereas Euroscepticism is laid down under the shadow of "history." Through a critical reading of the Europeanization literature, the next chapter will detail various reasons why domestic context and political parties matter. The chapter will then frame the research models and related hypotheses.

# CHAPTER ONE

## CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: EUROPEANIZATION, PARTY POSITION AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

*Treating Europe in its broadest sense also means that we need to go beyond simply applying Western models to Eastern cases and recognise that the transformation of Europe means that there may be a need to recast western models of politics.*

Szczerbiak and Taggart, "Opposing Europe", 2000

World renowned political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote in his critically acclaimed thesis that the fall of the Berlin Wall has symbolised the victory of liberal democracy as the final form of human government, which has constituted the end of history and mankind's ideological evolution.<sup>68</sup> According to Fukuyama, the ideological competition between the West and the East had come to an end, which led to the political and economic liberalization in regions out of the West. This victory, according to Fukuyama, was the proposal of a new normative/historical mission for the West: the spread of liberal democracy around the world.

Developments in the past reveal that the EU in fact has undertaken this mission. In 1993, the EU adopted particular criteria called the *Copenhagen Criteria* for its enlargement strategy. In contrast to the previous enlargements during the Cold War, liberal norms and values, as highlighted by Fukuyama, were linked as conditions for the later waves.<sup>69</sup> Since then, the enlargement has reflected a community perspective encapsulated by a post-nationalist, liberal identity,<sup>70</sup> which Manners conceives as the normative power of Europe.<sup>71</sup> With regard to this particular mission, the EU went through four Enlargement phases that opened its door to 16 new members from the

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<sup>68</sup> Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", **The National Interest**, Vol.16, 1989, pp. 3-18.

<sup>69</sup> According to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, any European state which respects the values referred to Article II and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. Article 2: The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

<sup>70</sup> Frank Schimmelfenning, "Liberal Identity and Postnationalist Inclusion: The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", **The Expansion of Western European Regional Organization**, (Ed. Lars Erik Cederman), Lynne Rienner Publications, Boulder, 2001, p. 184.

<sup>71</sup> Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", **JCMS: Journal Of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002, pp. 235-258.

Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). During their accessions, the EU captured the frame, *Uniting East and West*, reflecting this new mission and policy orientation.<sup>72</sup> Afterwards, the political and economic liberalization in the CEE from the late 1990s to the early 2000s were portrayed as the EU's great achievement involving its strategies of conditionality and external governance.<sup>73</sup>

However, since 2010, the CEE countries have faced many difficult challenges in terms of the aforementioned norms and values. In 2016 Freedom in the World report of Freedom House, the authors warned that 29 of the former Communist countries' overall democracy scores had declined every year since 2004.<sup>74</sup> The report, entitled "Europe in Question," stressed on Europe's rising populism, xenophobia and nationalism.<sup>75</sup> These disturbing and substantial criticisms necessitate the re-orientation of the scope of Europeanization and its external governance model. Thus, the concept and the connected models should be re-conceptualized as a process, consisting of complex sequences and time patterns.<sup>76</sup> Therefore, its strengths and weaknesses are supposed to be discussed and considered for on a case by case basis in the literature.<sup>77</sup>

A simple, yet speculative analysis for Serbia-EU relations is purely based on the assumption that the EU conditionality will be inadequate to interpret the interaction. Similar to other candidate countries in the region, Serbia's domestic affairs are fragile and fraught with instability. In other words, there is always the potential for possible crises and threats. In fact, the direction, scope and the future of the relations will be determined more by Serbian domestic dynamics rather than any conditionality mechanism. The processes have become so strained in recent years that satire has found its way to create some laughs. "According to the pessimist scenario, Serbia will enter the EU during Turkey's presidency; but according to the optimistic scenario,

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<sup>72</sup> European Union, "Enlargement", **EU by Topic**, 03/11/2016, [https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/enlargement\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/enlargement_en) (03.11.2016).

<sup>73</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe", **Journal of European Public Policy**, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2004, (Governance by Conditionality), pp. 675-676.

<sup>74</sup> "Nations in Transition", **Freedom House**, 2016, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2016>, (01.11.2016).

<sup>75</sup> "Nations in Transition", p. 6.

<sup>76</sup> Claudio M. Radaelli, "Europeanization: Solution or Problem?", **European Integration Online Papers (EIoP)**, Vol. 8, 2004, (Solution or Problem?), p. 10.

<sup>77</sup> James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon, "Conditionality and Compliance in the EU's Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national Government", **JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2004, (Conditionality and Compliance), p. 548.

Turkey will enter the EU during Serbia's presidency.”<sup>78</sup>

Diverging from the traditional approach of EU conditionality, Serbia-EU relations is examined via political parties since they are considered as critical ‘gatekeepers’ in accession process. For this purpose, the dissertation focuses on the party positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization and it investigates the question of why some Serbian political parties support the EU membership while the others do not. In an attempt to answer this question, the dissertation analyses the possible causes, and the arguments developed to justify political orientations with the help of expert survey and content analysis of party documents.

As the theoretical and conceptual framework of the dissertation, this chapter first examines the Europeanization and conditionality in detail as the conceptual frameworks. Second, it problematizes the question why domestic context matters with a critical reading for theoretical models and research hypotheses.

In this context, the chapter is consisted of five sections. First and second sections of the chapter will examine the concept of Europeanization as well as EU conditionality in depth covering definitions, theoretical origins and mechanisms. The third section will provide a critique of Europeanization literature with regard to contextualism, as a new treatment in the literature. Section four will examine party preferences towards the EU, EU Membership and Europeanization in order to determine the dependent variable as the framework of the research questions: *the positions of the political parties in Serbia concerning the EU, EU membership and Europeanization*. The last section of the chapter will elaborate three models ideology, political competition and identity politics in order to frame the independent variables and the hypotheses for the second and main research question: *What are the factors affecting the positions and contextualization of the political parties?*

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<sup>78</sup> “SPRDAJU SE S NAMA: Srbija će ući u EU za vreme predsedavanja Turske!”, **Telegraf.rs**, 12.10.2012, <http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/politika/376251-predmet-sale-srbija-ce-uci-u-eu-za-vreme-predsedavanja-turske>, (26.05.2018), (We are Spoiler: Serbia will join the EU during the presidency of Turkey).



## **I. EUROPEANIZATION: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The demise of the Cold War not only dissolved a bipolar world system, but also opened up a more complex platform for political regimes and domestic dynamics in many former communist-countries. Consequently, many newly established post-communist countries transformed into being very complicated cases.<sup>79</sup> One party/one-man regimes in the CEE entering into this period of change during the early 1990s allowed dramatic political transitions and social transformations. Dependently, this shift also re-formed academic studies in that the “wall” which had been built between international relations and political science slowly began to thaw. A wide-range of models and hypotheses encompassing international and domestic politics came forth both in theoretical frameworks and empirical studies.

In the shadow of this new orientation in theory and practice, the transitions faced by the EU served as an incentive to thoroughly examine a number of cases. Over the past two decades, researchers have investigated the causes and consequences of the interaction (processes) between the CEE and the EU (as an international relations field) and its impacts on domestic politics (as a political science field). The EU's capacity, role and influence during their transition, became one of the dominant topics of European studies.<sup>80</sup> In this new era, the concept of Europeanization was re-formulated for assessing (I) the effects of the EU policies on the domestic politics of these countries in transition, and (II) understanding how and what kind of new opportunities and limitations influence domestic policies.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, **The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century**, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1993, (The Third Wave), p. 104.

<sup>80</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, "EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange", **European Union Politics**, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2008, (EU Democracy Promotion), p. 188.

<sup>81</sup> Johan P. Olsen, "The Many Faces of Europeanization", **JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 40, No. 5, 2002, (Many Faces of Europeanization), pp. 932-937.

## A. Defining Europeanization

Due to the complex relation of networks, in which internal and external dynamics are mutually interdependent, the review of literature produced a concept stack for the term, **Europeanization**. Mjoset defines Europeanization as “the expansion of the effect of Europe especially towards the areas outside the original sources of the European corporate models,”<sup>82</sup> while Börzel considers it as “a process in which national policy areas are increasingly subject to policies created at the level of Europe.”<sup>83</sup> According to Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, Europeanization is:

*The emergence and development of the policy networks specialized in creating political, legal and social institutions and rules with sanction power that formalize different governance structures at the level of Europe, i.e. the interactions between actors, and ensure the solution of political problems.*<sup>84</sup>

Olsen frames five different areas in which the term can be operationalized: (I) The change in the external borders of Europe (enlargement); (II) institutionalization at the European level; (III) penetration of the institutions at the European level to national and sub-national governance systems; (IV) export of the European political organization and governance beyond Europe; and lastly, (V) Europeanization in the sense of a political integration process for building a single and politically strong Europe.<sup>85</sup> On the other hand, Radaelli, details a formula that is appropriate for candidate and third countries by defining Europeanization as:

*The (I) structuring (II) expansion and (III) institutionalization process of formal or informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, usage, common beliefs and norms that are defined and consolidated first in the EU decisions, and then included in internal discourses, identities, political structures and public policies.*<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Lars Mjoset, "Historical Meanings of Europeanisation", **Arena Working Paper**, No. 24, 1997, p. 1.

<sup>83</sup> Tanja A. Börzel, "Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanization in Germany and Spain", **JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 37, No. 4, 1999, p. 574.

<sup>84</sup> Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso and Thomas Risse-Kappen, **Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change**, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001, (Transforming Europe), p. 3.

<sup>85</sup> Olsen, Many Faces of Europeanization, pp. 923-924.

<sup>86</sup> Claudio M. Radaelli, "The Europeanization of Public Policy", **The Politics of Europeanization**, (Eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, (Public Policy), p. 30.

In their examination on the historical progress of the theoretical literature, Bölükbaşı, Ertugal and Özçürümez point out to three distinct stages.<sup>87</sup> The first generation corresponding to the European Community period focused more on integration and the institutionalization process at the Union level. In this stage, classical integration theories such as Functionalism, Supra-nationalism and Inter-governmentalism came into prominence. The second generation emerged following the establishment of the Common Market (1987); in light of certain varied “governance” models, it set out to give a clear definition of the EU as an actor. The current generation in the post-Cold War era focuses on the interaction between the EU and nation-state through the lenses of Europeanization.

Exadaktylos and Radaelli’s critique of the literature pertaining to the current generation is riddled with flaws; they claim the models are mutually poor in research design and causal explanations, underlining methodological studies still to have the supremacy of innovation and creativity.<sup>88</sup> Additionally, Radaelli concludes that Europeanization undertakes important tasks, such as understanding and analysing impacts; more specifically, exploring endogenous international governance in models of domestic politics and the relationship between agency and change.<sup>89</sup>

Looking at Europeanization as an interactive process between the EU and nation-state, the first observation is the necessity of inconvenience, often referred to as *misfit* or *mismatch*, between European and domestic level policies, processes and institutions.<sup>90</sup> Börzel and Risse identify two types of misfit in which Europeanization exerts adaptive pressure on a nation-state.<sup>91</sup> The “policy misfit” originated from the differences between the domestic and EU rules and regulations whereas the “institutional misfit” originated from domestic institutions and procedures. According to Börzel and Risse, a misfit is a necessary condition; many have hypothesized that the lower the compatibility between European and domestic processes, policies, and

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<sup>87</sup> H. Tolga Bölükbaşı, Ebru Ertugal and Saime Özçürümez, "Avrupa Entegrasyonu Kuramlarıyla Türkiye’yi Konu Alan Yazının Etkileşimi: Avrupalılaşıma Araştırma Programını Türkiye Özelinde Yeniden Düşünmek", **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, Vol. 8, No. 30, 2011, pp. 79-82.

<sup>88</sup> Theofanis Exadaktylos and Claudio M. Radaelli, "Research Design in European Studies: The Case of Europeanization", **JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2009, p. 526.

<sup>89</sup> Radaelli, *Solution or Problem*, p. 2.

<sup>90</sup> Radaelli, *Solution or Problem*, p. 6.

<sup>91</sup> Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change", **European Integration Online Papers (EIoP)**, Vol. 4, No. 15, 2000, (Domestic Change), p. 5.

institutions; the higher the adaptive pressure.<sup>92</sup>

A second observation centres on the debate over whether Europeanization expresses the impacts or the process. The first approach problematizes Europeanization in terms of its impacts/outcomes that are domestic changes. The literature broadly distinguishes between five different scenarios regarding the scope and the degree of domestic change: inertia, absorption, accommodation, transformation and retrenchment.<sup>93</sup> Risse, Cowles and Caporaso align factors affecting domestic change as multiple veto points, mediating formal institutions and political and organizational culture.<sup>94</sup>

Contrary to the first approach, the term Europeanization does not necessarily mean that it converges according to the second approach. Europeanization may lead to convergence, but it is the process itself rather than being the impact itself.<sup>95</sup> Although these two approaches are differentiated, both examine the interaction between the EU and nation-states. There are three formulated procedures for the direction of EU - nation-state relations which includes top-down procedure (down loading), bottom-up procedure (uploading), and horizontal procedure (cross-loading).

### **1. Top-down Procedure (Downloading)**

This procedure places emphasis on the EU's influence towards the member/candidate countries.<sup>96</sup> This formulation considers both the process and its impacts as the change emanating from the EU's influence. The misfit between European and domestic level is the pre-condition that causes pressure from the EU to the nation-state (top-down).<sup>97</sup> Consequently, Europeanization is most accurately

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<sup>92</sup> Börzel and Risse, *Domestic Change*, p. 5.

<sup>93</sup> Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, "Conceptualising the Domestic Impact", **The Politics of Europeanization**, (Eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, (Conceptualising), p. 71.

<sup>94</sup> Cowles and Risse-Kappen, *Transforming Europe*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>95</sup> Maarten Vink, "What is Europeanization and Other Questions on a New Research Agenda", **The Second YEN Research Meeting on Europeanisation**, University of Bocconi, Milano, 2002, p. 5.

<sup>96</sup> Jim Buller and Andrew Gamble, "Conceptualizing Europeanization", **Public Policy and Administration**, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2002, pp. 17-20; Kenneth Dyson and Klaus H. Goetz, "Germany and Europe: Beyond Congruence", **Conference - Germany and Europe: A Europeanised Germany?**, British Academy, London, 2002; Stephen George, "The Europeanization of UK Politics and Policy-Making: The Effects of European Integration on the UK", **UACES/ESRC Workshop**, Sheffield University, Sheffield, 2001.

<sup>97</sup> Börzel and Risse, *Conceptualising*, p. 61.

defined as a set of regional commercial, formally organized, and ideational powers designed for change directly/indirectly affecting national politics, practices and policies.<sup>98</sup> As a process, it is a purposeful move on the way to a mutual EU practice, away from traditionally various countrywide public policies.<sup>99</sup> Policy areas that are characterized as supranational, such as the Common Market and Monetary Union, the EU and its institutions explicitly follow the downloading procedure.

## 2. Bottom-up Procedure (Uploading)

The second approach is useful to explain “why and under what conditions” member states shape EU policy, politics and institutions. This procedure allows one to discuss the ways in which a member state makes its preferences heard, so that an EU policy, politics or institution reflects its proposals and policy advices (bottom-up).<sup>100</sup> This approach is concentrated on EU-level decision making processes which portrays Europeanization as a bargaining chip amongst governments to export their own model to the EU.<sup>101</sup> Germany’s role in the monetary convergence process and the United Kingdom’s (UK) involvement in environment policy are cases illustrated in the literature exemplifying uploading procedure.<sup>102</sup>

## 3. Horizontal Procedure (Cross-loading)

In this model, Europeanization is framed as a combination of top-down and bottom-up procedures that depict the transfer of concepts and policies between the EU and nation-states as having a horizontal character.<sup>103</sup> The EU platform paves the way for cooperation and at the same time, allows for the competition entailing the

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<sup>98</sup> Vivien A. Schmidt, "Europeanization and the Mechanics of Economic Policy Adjustment", **European Integration Online Papers (EIoP)**, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2001, p. 13.

<sup>99</sup> Martin Lodge, "Isomorphism of National Policies? The ‘Europeanisation’ of German Competition and Public Procurement Law", **West European Politics**, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2000, p. 89.

<sup>100</sup> Tanja A. Börzel and Diana Panke, "Europeanization", **European Union Politics**, (Eds. Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 412.

<sup>101</sup> Tanja A. Börzel, "Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with its Member States", **Reihe Politikwissenschaft Political Science Series**, No. 93, 2003, p. 14.

<sup>102</sup> Tanja A. Börzel, "Pace Setting, Food Dragging, and Fence Sitting: Member States Responses to Europeanization", **JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2002, p. 194.

<sup>103</sup> Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan, "Europeanization and Domestic Change", **The Europeanization of British Politics**, (Eds. Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan), Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p. 22.

harmonization of ideas and policies. Governments contact with one another at the EU level in order to express their priorities and preferences as an uploading procedure. In the end, they are supposed to integrate the final decision (outcome) to domestic level as downloading. The “best practices model” is a prime example of this cross-loading procedure.<sup>104</sup>

## **B. Europeanization and Institutionalism**

As already analysed, Europeanization brings forth the process, while at the same time, domestic change. Institutionalism problematizes the process and the potential to transform existing institutions, which is called as domestic change. Due to the subject of change, Institutionalism constitutes the theoretical infrastructure for the literature and arises from the following three versions:<sup>105</sup> Historical, Rational Choice and Sociological Institutionalism.

Although Europeanization is a modern and fashionable term, Institutionalism, as a broader theory, dates back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In his analysis, Max Weber considered “customs, conventions, social norms, religious and cultural beliefs, households, kinship, ethnic boundaries, organizations, community, class, status groups, markets, law, and the state” as the institutional frameworks.<sup>106</sup> He explained that rationality and choice should be analysed within the context of the institutional framework, thus his writings formed the essence of Institutional Theory. In the 1930s, Parsons remarked that rules and values constitute the institution, not the concrete pattern of behaviour or social relations.<sup>107</sup> Meyer added that specific institutional environments were the main elements that constituted domestic structures (establishing and defining their core entities, purposes, and interrelationships); further, he stated that collective myth, ceremonial administration, legitimacy and survival were central to the discussion.<sup>108</sup> In the 1980s, DiMaggio and Powell re-oriented the theory

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<sup>104</sup> For details see: European Commission, "Best Practices", **The EU Single Market**, April 2015, [http://ec.europa.eu/internal\\_market/scoreboard/feedback/best\\_practices/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/feedback/best_practices/index_en.htm), (04.11.2016).

<sup>105</sup> Börzel and Risse, Domestic Change, p. 2.

<sup>106</sup> Max Weber, **Economy and Society**, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978.

<sup>107</sup> Talcott Parsons, "Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions", **American Sociological Review**, Vol. 55, No. 3, 1990, p. 324.

<sup>108</sup> John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony", **American Journal of Sociology**, Vol. 83, No. 2, 1977, pp. 340-363.

of organization and social change by implementing models that provided the inspiration for Europeanization: coercion, imitation, and norms.<sup>109</sup>

Their revisions led to New Institutionalism, whereby institutions are reconceptualised as the rules in a society where humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.<sup>110</sup> Hall and Taylor postulated the main principles of New Institutionalism elucidated the role institutions play in the determination of socio-political consequences.<sup>111</sup> In 1989, March and Olsen discussed how institutions affect the flow of history highlighting details associated with comprehends, changes and the maintenance.<sup>112</sup> In 2007, Powell asserted that the ongoing debate within the theory was due to sources of institutional pressures: "Where do rational myths come from? How do practices travel and circulate? What are the primary sources of legitimacy?"<sup>113</sup>

In sum institutionalism examines institutional background in detail because of their critical role in shaping the public administration. The main focus of the approach is the institution by itself as a dependent variable and explicit causes of a general trend which goes beyond the sole domain of public administration. These overall assumptions were central in the discussions that surrounded the various approaches of New Institutionalism in Europeanization literature. There are three versions of institutionalism: Historical, Rational Choice and Sociological Institutionalism.

## 1. Historical Institutionalism

Assuming current institutions as the reflection of past experience and as legacies of public administration, Historical Institutionalism brings political conflict and social dissent forward into the discussion. Accordingly, it reframes institutions as

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<sup>109</sup> Paul J. Dimaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields", **American Sociological Review**, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1983, pp. 147-160.

<sup>110</sup> Douglass C. North, **Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 3.

<sup>111</sup> Peter A. Hall and Rosemary CR Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms", **Political Studies**, Vol. 44, No. 5, 1996, p. 936.

<sup>112</sup> James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, **Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics**, The Free Press, New York, 1989.

<sup>113</sup> Walter W. Powell, "The New Institutionalism", **The International Encyclopaedia of Organization Studies**, Sage Publishers, Thousand Oaks, 2008.

historical bodies that do not easily change over time.<sup>114</sup> Historical Institutionalism is based on the assumption that the historical process of institutions is primarily responsible for structural change and its related reforms.<sup>115</sup>

Either due to the uncertainty associated with the institutional design or because of new constitution and/or international treaty, their survival may create high costs and set high institutional thresholds for later reforms.<sup>116</sup> In addition, the existing institutions and policies could stop producing positive feedbacks, thereby, signalling for re-structuring and policy change.<sup>117</sup> In these different scenarios, the decisive role of historical factors, primarily crises and historical milestones, contain the potential and references for change (Europeanization), a process determined by *path-dependency*.<sup>118</sup>

## 2. Rational Choice Institutionalism

This approach is grounded on the assumptions that national actors are rational, strategic utility-maximizers, goal-oriented and they try to maximize their interests. In this model, actors matter, and their decisions are important. Actors are considered as homogenous, and the processes that shape Europeanization are mechanical. If reforms for membership lead to the redistribution of resources, then Europeanization is instrumentalized as an emerging political opportunity, offering also additional resources for some actors, while severely restraining the ability of others to pursue their objectives.<sup>119</sup> Secondly, if the gains, obtained during Europeanization surpass the transaction costs of the processes, then the domestic change is considered to be rational, national and instrumental for decision-makers who behave in accordance with

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<sup>114</sup> Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics", **American Political Science Review**, Vol. 94, No. 2, 2000, p. 251.

<sup>115</sup> Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics", **Annual Review of Political Science**, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 369–404.

<sup>116</sup> Mark A. Pollack, "The New Institutionalism and EU Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis", **Governance**, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1996, pp. 437-438.

<sup>117</sup> Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Ann Thelen, "Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies", **Beyond Continuity: Institutional Changes in Advanced Political Economies**, (Eds. Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Ann Thelen), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 6-7.

<sup>118</sup> For the details of the concept and discussion see: Pierson, pp. 251-267.

<sup>119</sup> Börzel and Risse, *Conceptualising*, p. 63.



*logic of consequences*. Accordingly, the absolute benefit obtained by membership must open the door for political, economic and social changes.<sup>120</sup>

### 3. Sociological Institutionalism

This school of thought considers institutions in a broader term, including both formal rules and informal norms and conventions. According to the sociological institutionalism, institutions constitute decision makers, shaping the way in which political actors view the world.<sup>121</sup> Sociological institutionalism stresses the constitutive social nature of actors and their behaviours. Therefore, assuming institutions as rational is not enough for the approach. This assumption emphasizes the importance of social context and identity in which cost-benefit calculations are made during Europeanization.

In contrast to the second model, actors are considered to act within the framework of *logic of appropriateness*, and in line with internalised norms and values.<sup>122</sup> Accordingly, the process is directly related to actors' collective understanding, learning and socialization. Europeanization carries off when both the learning and socialization steps are in compliance with European norms and values, which is more likely lead to the adoption of them. The process, therefore, becomes functional and goal-oriented with the emergence, expansion and internalization of new (European) ideas, norms and collective understandings.<sup>123</sup> However, this transformation takes place in long-run compare to rational institutionalism.<sup>124</sup>

Post-communist transitions in the CEE are the most concentrated cases that scholars have viewed through the New Institutionalism lens. From the Historical

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<sup>120</sup> Heather Grabbe, "How does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity", **Journal of European Public Policy**, Vol. 8, No. 6, 2001, p. 1020; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe", **The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe**, (Eds. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier), Cornell University, Ithaca, 2005, (Conceptualizing), pp. 5-6.

<sup>121</sup> Mark A. Pollack, "The New Institutionalisms and European Integration", **European Integration Theory**, (Eds. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez), Hampshire, Oxford, 2009, p. 127.

<sup>122</sup> James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders", **International Organization**, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998, p. 949.

<sup>123</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Social Construction and Integration", **Journal of European Public Policy**, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1999, pp. 548-551.

<sup>124</sup> Canan Balkır and Diğdem Soyaltın, **Avrupalaşma: Tarih, Kavram, Kuram ve Türkiye Uygulaması**, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2018, pp. 85-86.

Institutionalism perspective, the Europeanization processes in the CEE reflect their cultural and ideological re-orientation following the fall of Berlin Wall. During the transition period, Europeanization has been perceived as a “fresh start”<sup>125</sup> and the “return to Europe.”<sup>126</sup> However, the Rationalist model, which places emphasis on the role(s) of governance, power and interest, is more causally linked because of the attractiveness and the rationality of EU membership.<sup>127</sup> They propose that EU conditionality has provided rational incentives for decision makers to undertake reforms (costs) for the credible perspective of membership (benefit).<sup>128</sup> Lastly, Sociological Institutionalism emphasizes the constitutive power of EU, clarifying that social learning and the diffusion of legitimate norms at international level have played a central role during the post-communist transition.<sup>129</sup>

### C. Mechanisms Driving Europeanization

The Europeanization of domestic institutions follows various forms of institutional change across member/candidate states and policy sectors. The impact(s) of European-level policy-making on nation-state depends both on EU-driven and domestic-driven dynamics. Parallel to each theoretical perspective, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier derive three mechanisms for domestic change:<sup>130</sup>

**Figure 3:** Mechanisms Driving Europeanization

| <b>Actors</b>                | <b><i>Logic of consequences</i></b> | <b><i>Logic of appropriateness</i></b> |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| <b><i>EU-driven</i></b>      | External incentives model           | Social learning model                  |
| <b><i>Country-driven</i></b> | Lesson-drawing model                | Lesson-drawing model                   |

Source: Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *Conceptualizing the Europeanization*, p. 8.

<sup>125</sup> David Stark, "Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe", **East European Politics and Society**, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1992, p. 17.

<sup>126</sup> Reinhard Heinisch and Christa Landsberger, "Returning to Europe: East Central Europe's Complex Relationship with European Integration and its Repercussions", **Twenty First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy**, (Eds. Daniele Albertazzi, et al.), Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007, pp. 67-83.

<sup>127</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *Conceptualizing*, p. 9.

<sup>128</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *Governance by Conditionality*, pp. 663-664.

<sup>129</sup> Judith Kelley, "International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions", **International Organization**, Vol. 58, No. 3, 2004, pp. 425-458.

<sup>130</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *Conceptualizing*, pp. 1-28.

## 1. External Incentives Model

This model originated from Rational Institutionalism's focus on logic of consequences and EU external rewards. In this top-down mechanism, material reward such as financial help, technical assistance or membership motivates domestic (rational) actors to adopt rules. *EU Conditionality* is a prime example in which the Union sets rules as conditions for candidate countries seeking EU rewards of assistance, institutional ties and more vitally membership.<sup>131</sup>

## 2. Social Learning Model

This model is derived from Sociological Institutionalism and it predicates on *logic of appropriateness* and engages in social learning and the socialization of domestic actors. Social learning establishes an agency-centred approach to bring out transformation in actors' norms, interests and identities.<sup>132</sup> According to this model, domestic change is possible only if the EU persuades candidate countries to identify themselves as part of the European community and internalize EU norms and values.<sup>133</sup> Hence, the EU's attractiveness derives from their motivation to gain international acceptance, political legitimacy or a better/positive image.<sup>134</sup> This model is drawn from cognitive social psychology, in a mechanism that EU persuasion will lead to domestic change through capacity building, the promotion of transnational cooperation and exchange of good practices.

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<sup>131</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *Governance by Conditionality*, p. 671.

<sup>132</sup> Thomas Risse, "A European Identity? Europeanisation and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities", **Transforming Europe: Europeanisation and Domestic Change**, (Eds. Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso and Thomas Risse), Cornell University Press, New York, 2001, (Nation-State), p. 210.

<sup>133</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework", **International Organization**, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2005, (Socialization in Europe), p. 804; Robert G. Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War", **The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics**, (Ed. Peter J. Katzenstein), Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 271-316.

<sup>134</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey", **JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2003, pp. 497-498.

### 3. Lesson-Drawing Model

In this last model, the EU's impact is not as explicit as in the previous ones. The political motivation is more domestic-driven, in that national elites may adopt EU rules as a way of responding to domestic needs and overcoming political challenges. According to this approach, if more EU norms and conditions provide appropriate responses and beneficial solutions to domestic policy dilemmas, then the more appropriate and transferable into the EU, which in turn, will lead to domestic change.<sup>135</sup>

## II. EUROPEANIZATION IN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES: EU CONDITIONALITY

Since the late 1990s, the EU has been described as a soft, civil or normative power, but more importantly, as a transformative power.<sup>136</sup> In the ensuing years, especially after the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), actorhood question for the EU has been associated with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) task. In this context, membership conditionality is indicated to be the most efficient and powerful EU foreign policy instrument.<sup>137</sup>

As a broader term used in political science and international relations, **conditionality** refers to the use of conditions; an actor attaches an award that will benefit and not impose a cost on another actor in order to influence her behaviour.<sup>138</sup> International organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) are the actors that virulently pursue this strategy as a mean to obtain certain goals, generally economic liberalization. It is possible to distinguish the generations of conditionality into two aspects: (I) Economic conditionality originated from liberal

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<sup>135</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, "Europeanization beyond Europe", **Living Reviews in European Governance (LREG)**, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2007, p. 6.

<sup>136</sup> Thomas Diez and Ian Manners, "Reflecting on Normative Power Europe", **Power in World Politics**, (Eds. Felix Berenskoetter, M. J. Williams), Routledge, London, 2007, pp. 173-188.

<sup>137</sup> Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, EU Democracy Promotion, p. 188; Karen E. Smith, "The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality", **The Enlargement of the European Union**, (Ed. Marise Cremona), Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p. 108.

<sup>138</sup> Tanja A. Börzel and Eva G. Heidbreder, "Conditionality", **International Encyclopedia of Political Science**, Sage Publishing, London, 2011.

school that correlated the distribution of aid in accordance with the adoption of certain economic policies and goals of the donors on the recipient side.<sup>139</sup> (II) Political conditionality is the strategy "in which the validity of an international agreement is made depend upon the partner's mutual respect for certain principles, normally related to human rights, democracy, good governance and the rule of law."<sup>140</sup>

Depending on the promises given by the referee to the target, there are two types of conditionality: (1) positive conditionality entails promising benefits to target if it fulfils the conditions. There are two scenarios within positive conditionality. The first, in case of compliance, the reward(s) will be granted (ex ante conditionality); and second, in case of noncompliance, reward(s) will be suspended or withdrawn (ex post conditionality). (2) As a second version, negative conditionality inflicts punishment (sanctioning) if a specific obligation is omitted by the target.<sup>141</sup>

More specifically, **EU conditionality** refers to the EU's strategy in which it sets certain rules (available in Figure 4) as conditions that nation-states must fulfil in order to obtain the EU's rewards of assistance, institutional ties or membership.<sup>142</sup> Generally speaking, conditionality is instrumental in extensive EU policy sectors and areas. The EU's neighbouring policy, the Monetary Union and Schengen Area, are well-known examples in which Brussels pursues this strategy. As a transformative power, the EU's enlargement policy has been portrayed as being the most detailed and wide-ranging formulated conditionality<sup>143</sup> in order to boost a liberal and democratic space within and near Europe.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> Hilde Selbervik, "Aid and Conditionality", **OECD**, July 1999, <http://www.oecd.org/countries/tanzania/35178610.pdf>, (20.09.2016), pp. 12-13.

<sup>140</sup> Johanne D. Saltnes, "The EU's Human Rights Policy: Unpacking the Literature on the EU's Implementation of Aid Conditionality", **Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-State (ARENA) Working Paper**, No. 2, 2013, p. 1.

<sup>141</sup> Natalie Tocci, "The EU and Conflict Resolution in Turkey and Georgia: Hindering EU Potential through the Political Management of Contractual Relations", **JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2008, p. 882.

<sup>142</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *Governance by Conditionality*, p. 671.

<sup>143</sup> Heather Grabbe, "European Union Conditionality and the *Acquis Communautaire*", **International Political Science Review**, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2002, p. 250.

<sup>144</sup> Othon Anastasakis and Dimitar Bechev, "EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process", **Workshop on EU and the Balkans: The Implications of EU Conditionality**, University of Oxford, Oxford, April 2003, p. 5.

**Figure 4:** Copenhagen Criteria



Source: "Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993", **Presidency Conclusions**, 17.04.2002, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf), (22.09.2016), pp. 1-2.

**The overall aim** of EU conditionality is to influence the behaviours of the candidates. Through the various mechanisms earlier discussed, EU conditionality is instrumental in spreading European norms and values to non-EU states.<sup>145</sup> According to Diez, the pure existence of the Copenhagen Criteria as membership conditions is evidence as to what the EU will propose to diffuse these norms into non-member countries.<sup>146</sup> In the overall aim, the EU follows the **positive conditionality**, which relies on the reinforcement by reward approach. Unlike punishment instruments to accomplish its aims, the EU uses its normative/civilian power.<sup>147</sup> The EU uses smaller sticks and larger carrots in its enlargement strategy in which it offers financial aid, institutional ties and eventually membership (the carrot) to persuade the candidates.<sup>148</sup>

A second general feature of EU conditionality is its notion of **being a process**.<sup>149</sup> Rather than being a constant element of causation, EU conditionality refers to an open-ended, gradual process, consisting of complex sequences and time patterns.<sup>150</sup> Thirdly, membership conditionality has an **asymmetric** character. The process is represented by a hierarchical external governance model that is transferred

<sup>145</sup> Mjoset, p. 1.

<sup>146</sup> Thomas Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering Normative Power Europe", *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2005, p. 630.

<sup>147</sup> Diez, p. 613.

<sup>148</sup> Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, EU Democracy Promotion, p. 190.

<sup>149</sup> Philippe C. Schmitter, "Reflections on the Impact of the European Union upon "Domestic" Democracy in its Member States", *Organizing Political Institutions-Essays for Johan P. Olsen*, (Eds. Morten Egeberg and Per Laegreid), Scandinavian University Press, Oslo, 1999, pp. 289-298.

<sup>150</sup> Claudio M. Radaelli, Solution or Problem, p. 10.

top-down; it is a highly co-ordinated and co-operative procedure between the EU and candidate states.<sup>151</sup> Accession is a one-way process that the EU is not only a player, but also the referee.<sup>152</sup>

Hughes defines conditionality as the practice of a stronger actor imposing reforms on a weaker.<sup>153</sup> This definition opened up discussions regarding **power politics** as an alternative conceptualization of EU conditionality. According to Scott, the EU's external governance is directly correlated with the quality of the existing EU institutions,<sup>154</sup> whereas a power-politics explanation concludes that the main determining factor is the EU's power and interdependence on third countries.<sup>155</sup>

In 1993, the EU culminated the principles and mechanisms for countries bidding for membership, called **Copenhagen Criteria** (see: Figure 4). At the Summit, member states agreed to reshape certain structural elements of the accession processes that sought to improve market access, assistance, and further economic integration.<sup>156</sup> In the Presidency Conclusion, it stressed:

*Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.*<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> For details see: B. Guy Peters, "Managing Horizontal Government: The Politics of Co-ordination", **Public Administration**, Vol. 76, No. 2, 1998, pp. 295-311; Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, "National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement", **East European Politics and Societies**, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2003, pp. 21-31.

<sup>152</sup> Heather Grabbe, "A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants", **European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre**, 1999, p. 6.

<sup>153</sup> James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon, **Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality**, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2004, p. 3.

<sup>154</sup> Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, "EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in European Politics", **Journal of European Public Policy**, Vol. 16, No. 6, 2009, p. 802.

<sup>155</sup> Adrian Hyde-Price, "'Normative' Power Europe: A Realist Critique", **Journal of European Public Policy**, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, pp. 217-234.

<sup>156</sup> "Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993", **Presidency Conclusions**, 17.04.2002, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf), (22.09.2016), pp. 1-2.

<sup>157</sup> "Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993", pp. 1-2.

Candidate countries follow three stages for membership:<sup>158</sup>

- I. *When a country is ready, it becomes an official candidate for membership- but this does not necessarily mean that formal negotiations have been opened.*
- II. *The candidate moves on to formal membership negotiations, a process that involves the adoption of established EU law, preparations to be in a position to properly apply and enforce them and implementation of judicial, administrative, economic and other reforms necessary for the country to meet the conditions for joining, known as accession criteria.<sup>159</sup>*
- III. *When the negotiations and accompanying reforms have been completed to the satisfaction of both sides, the country can join the EU.<sup>160</sup>*

Are the scholarly writings in the Europeanization literature capable of explaining domestic change? Moreover, Hix questions, “Is European integration really a powerful force in the development of domestic political systems as much of the Europeanization literature suggests?”<sup>161</sup> These broader ontological suspicions and criticisms arose following question: How can we accurately assess that the change is correlated or caused by Europeanization, and not by other variables? In fact, a dominant motivation of policy-makers for domestic change may originate from other sources and processes independent of Europeanization. According to Radaelli, other mechanisms such as globalization and domestic politics may matter more than Europeanization.<sup>162</sup>

### III. THE QUESTION OF CONTEXTUALISM IN EUROPEANIZATION

The existing approaches essentially ignore the internal dynamics and mainly concentrate on the interaction between the EU and nation-state. This is the reason why

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<sup>158</sup> European Commission, “Steps towards Joining”, **Enlargement Policy**, 27.06.2013, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining/index_en.htm), (10.09.2016). Following are the secondary instruments of the EU to manage the membership conditionality during the accession process: Association Agreements, Criticism and Démarches in the Light of the Copenhagen Criteria, Agenda 2000 and the Opinions, The Regular Reports, Accession Partnerships and the National Programs for the Adoption Negotiations and Screening.

<sup>159</sup> During this second phase of negotiations, candidate countries are supposed to open and close 35 chapters. For the full list of the chapters and the details, see: European Commission, “Chapters of the Acquis”, **Enlargement Policy**, 27.06.2013, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index_en.htm), (10.09.2016).

<sup>160</sup> The Accession Treaty is supposed to be ratified by the European and national parliaments.

<sup>161</sup> Simon Hix and Klaus H. Goetz, “Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems”, **West European Politics**, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000, p. 20.

<sup>162</sup> Radaelli, *Solution or Problem*, p. 8.



they are insufficient, thus rendered redundant by projected future enlargements.<sup>163</sup> Consequently, the division between the institutional and the actor-centred approaches is eroded. In this respect, not only the relative weight of the institution and/or actor-related causalities, but also the way in which institutions are defined and the way in which actors act within the institutions become the subject of analyses.<sup>164</sup>

One major assumption shared by the integration theories seems to largely ignore this domestic dimension – the behaviour of the actors within the institutions. Realism framed the integration as a response to geopolitical pressures by rational actors.<sup>165</sup> Liberalism developed their model on national governments as the key actors, thus depicting EU institutions as complementary, playing a mediating role during the bargaining.<sup>166</sup> Neo-functionalists, on the other hand, devised the integration purely as a top-down project by bureaucrats and politicians, and assess the cost-benefits in a dynamic context of problem solving, spill-over and learning.<sup>167</sup> One exception is Constructivism that appeared with an alternative model. Based on the logic of appropriateness, national elites and domestic dynamics became their subject of analyses in their proposed mechanisms of socialization, social learning and identity.

Although Constructivism challenged both state-centrism and rationality models and emerged as an alternative theory in both international relations and political science; however, its model does not provide an explicit institutional framework for facilitating the socialization and learning processes.<sup>168</sup> The level of co-ordination they problematize between horizontal and vertical policy transfer is debatable.<sup>169</sup> Vertical policy transfer is embedded in EU policy; whereas, horizontal policy transfer incorporates social learning and involves the other member states,

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<sup>163</sup> Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul A. Taggart, "Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation", **SEI Working Paper**, No. 36, 2000, (Opposing Europe), p. 4.

<sup>164</sup> Hix and Goetz, p. 18.

<sup>165</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe", **Daedalus**, Vol. 95, No. 3, 1966, p. 906.

<sup>166</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory", **International Security**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1995, pp. 44-50.

<sup>167</sup> For details see: Ernst B. Haas, **The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957**, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958.

<sup>168</sup> Christos J. Paraskevopoulos, **EU Enlargement and Multi-level Governance in European Public Policy-Making: Actors, Institutions and Policy Learning**, Libero Istituto Universitario Carlo Cattaneo, Castellanza, 2002, p. 4.

<sup>169</sup> Kerry Howell, "Developing Conceptualizations of Europeanization and European Integration: Mixing Methodologies", **ESRC Seminar Series, UACES Study Group on the Europeanization of British Politics**, London, 2002, p. 27.

without EU intervention, which opens their epistemological and methodological framework into discussion.

Since the establishment of the Common Market and the introduction of Maastricht Treaty, the EU has transformed into a more complex, multi-dimensional and multi-level character, which compounds the analyses.<sup>170</sup> Currently, the EU integration became more complex as a contested platform not only for political parties, but also for interest groups and social movements.<sup>171</sup> According to Hix and Goetz, due to the rise of a more “multi-level” EU polity, togetherness of comparative politics and international relations increased that necessitates multi-disciplinary approaches for the analysis.<sup>172</sup> This is apparent, especially since candidate countries have always been in a totally diverse situation as far as Europeanization is concerned.<sup>173</sup> The segregation of the process and varied outcomes between candidate countries lead analysts to problematize domestic politics, and increasingly take domestic factors into account.<sup>174</sup>

### **A. Europeanization and National Elites**

As a general observation, national institutions and particularly pre-existing institutional infrastructure, matter for Europeanization.<sup>175</sup> In this sense, Yazgan shares the following determinations:

*Nevertheless, that different result, found in terms of the countries' assessment of Europeanization clearly shows that the structure and domestic policy developments are significant factors that affect the EU process. After all, the understanding, preference, and theories that make up the policies are the main units that construe and implement the EU policies.*<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, **Multi-level Governance and European Integration**, Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, 2001, p. 12.

<sup>171</sup> Marco R. Steenbergen and Gary Marks, "Introduction: Models of Political Conflict in the European Union ", **European Integration and Political Conflict**, (Eds. Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 2.

<sup>172</sup> Hix and Goetz, p. 2.

<sup>173</sup> Attila Agh, "The Reform of State Administration in Hungary: The Capacity of Core Ministries to Manage the Europeanization", **ECPR Joint Session of Workshops**, Turin, 22-27.03.2002, p. 4.

<sup>174</sup> Radaelli, Public Policy, pp. 40-45.

<sup>175</sup> Robert Harmsen, "The Europeanization of National Administrations: A Comparative Study of France and the Netherlands", **Governance**, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1999, pp. 81-113.

<sup>176</sup> Hatice Yazgan, "Bir Kavramsal Çerçeve Olarak "Avrupalaşma": Kapsam, Gerekliklik ve Sınırlar", **Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi**, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2012, p. 136.

Mattli and Plumper advocate that the effectiveness of EU conditionality stands up to incentives within the domestic political arena of the applicant country.<sup>177</sup> Alike, Vachudova stresses that internal dynamics determine the way ruling elites respond to the incentives of EU membership.<sup>178</sup> Bulmer and Lequesne define national actors as “gatekeepers” between the EU and the nation-state during the accession.<sup>179</sup> Sousa made the following determinations on the role and importance of the national elites during Europeanization:

*Impulses from Europe are interpreted by national elites and this interpretation and perception of Europe is decisive for the kind of response, which is considered appropriate. If we want to understand the impact of Europe on nation states we first have to understand how actors in those nation states perceive Europe. National elites are exposed to impulses from the European Union but this exposure does not take place in a political vacuum. Elites respond to Europe in ways that are influenced by the way in which Europe is socially constructed and made meaningful in the national context. A study of Europeanization should be concerned with how best to study this process of political interpretation and sense making.*<sup>180</sup>

As a consequence, national elites are indiscernible actors and are closely followed in order to understand whether or not they can effectively provide a bridge between their country and the EU.<sup>181</sup> It is worth highlighting that at least four domestic actors resemble ruling elites: governmental-administrative institutions, national parliaments, the judiciary, and interest associations.<sup>182</sup> According to Raunio and Hix, amongst the national ruling elites, the legislative power of the parliament is a significant variable that cannot be ignored in where political parties as legislatures have the power of constitutional bargain, either to amend or reject the EU-

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<sup>177</sup> Walter Mattli and Thomas Plümpner, "The Demand-side Politics of EU Enlargement: Democracy and the Application for EU Membership", **Journal of European Public Policy**, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2002, pp. 550-574; Thomas Plumper, Christina Schneider and Vera Troeger, "Regulatory Conditionality and Membership Accession in the EU: Evidence from a Heckman Selection Model", **Workshop The Governance of Global Issues: Effectiveness, Accountability and Constitutionalization**, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, 2003.

<sup>178</sup> Milada Anna Vachudova, "Party Positions, EU Leverage and Democratic Backsliding in the Western Balkans and Beyond", **JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2014, pp. 122-138.

<sup>179</sup> Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne, "New Perspectives on EU-Member State Relationships", **Questions de Recherche/Research in Questions**, No. 4, 2002, p. 4.

<sup>180</sup> Maja M. Sousa, "The Domestic Turn in Europeanization Studies: Elite Perceptions of Europe", **The ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop at Nicosia**, Nicosia, 25-30.04.2006, p. 5.

<sup>181</sup> Ray, p. 283.

<sup>182</sup> Hix and Goetz, p. 15.

harmonization packages.<sup>183</sup> This is why Europeanization processes should be considered as a game played into the hands of political parties.<sup>184</sup> Their concerns and preferences have a greater role in the changing dynamics of EU politics, which requires an approach beyond the simple analysis of EU conditionality.

## **B. Europeanization and Political Parties**

A transition phase that is favourable to democratization does not only depend on structural dynamics, but also actor-oriented factors including domestic elites and political parties. Political elites play a critical role on the onset and early phase of transition particularly on shaping the institutionalization process. Their willingness in the early period of transition shapes the liberalization process.<sup>185</sup> A functioning political organizations and a strong party system are inevitable pre-conditions for a new political system that can ensure political competition, political rights, independent institutions and a dynamic civil society.<sup>186</sup> According to Diamond, political parties are indispensable actors for representing certain interests and policy preferences as well as candidates. Their power of organizing the political agenda with their alternative visions and political promises make them the main actors of democracies.<sup>187</sup>

There is a relationship between the two phenomena, that is, the domestic change by the asset of EU involvements and the role of the political parties to follow their traditional tasks of representation, legislation and government.<sup>188</sup> We observe an emergence of studies questioning the relations and the interactions between political parties and Europeanization. Their analyses have broadened the literature by closely examining the involvement of political parties into the discussion: (I) national parties' general orientation on European integration; (II) the importance of European issues for

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<sup>183</sup> Tapio Raunio and Simon Hix, "Backbenchers Learn to Fight Back: European Integration and Parliamentary Government", **West European Politics**, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000, p. 142.

<sup>184</sup> Jakob Tolstrup, "When can External Actors Influence Democratization? Leverage, Linkages, and Gatekeeper Elites", **Democratization**, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2013, p. 720.

<sup>185</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 108.

<sup>186</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, **Political Order in Changing Societies**, Yale University Press, London, 1968, pp. 276-278.

<sup>187</sup> Larry Diamond, et al., **Consolidating in the Third Wave Democracies – Regional Challenges**, The Johns Hopkins University Press, London, 1997, p. 23.

<sup>188</sup> Robert Ladrech, "Europeanization and Political Parties towards a Framework for Analysis", **Party Politics**, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2002, p. 390.

the party politics; and (III) the degree to which parties are internally divided on EU issues.<sup>189</sup>

Studies that identify political parties as the dependent variable problematize how national parties and the party system are affected by the hold of EU as a new field of study.<sup>190</sup> According to Mair, Europe may be the shaping element of inter-party competition as such by affecting the format and the mechanism of party politics.<sup>191</sup> Firstly, Europeanization may affect the format of the party system; for example, causing party dissolution and the closing of new party formation. Secondly, it may affect the mechanism of the party system in a way in which parties interact with each other in regard to the voting platform, either by transforming the ideological distance or by encouraging the emergence of a new European-centred dimension of competition.

Enyedi and Lewis examined the impacts of Europeanization on political parties and concluded that "EU institutions and the European integration process in general, have been able to strengthen the position of some parties (winners) and weaken others (losers)."<sup>192</sup> So the question, of "who the winners and the losers are?" just might be another important element for the analyses of party positions and preferences.

Ladrech's review of this existing trend in the literature categorises the analyses of political parties into two groups. The first group acknowledges the EU as an environment, which grips substantial concerns for political parties in the European Parliament. The second group centres on the policy orientation on EU for each political parties, usually in comparative studies.<sup>193</sup> Prominent scholars Szczerbiak and Taggart conclude that in most cases, parties in candidate countries view the integration process within the frameworks of the accession negotiations and the final "gift" that will be offered by Brussels.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> Ray, p. 284.

<sup>190</sup> Ladrech, pp. 393-400.

<sup>191</sup> Peter Mair, "The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems", **West European Politics**, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000, p. 28.

<sup>192</sup> Zsolt Enyedi and Paul G. Lewis, "The Impact of the European Union on Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe", **The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe**, (Eds. Paul G. Lewis and Zdenka Mansfeldová), Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2007, p. 247.

<sup>193</sup> Ladrech, p. 390.

<sup>194</sup> Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, "Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality", **SEI Working Paper**, No. 69, 2003, (Theorising Euroscepticism), p. 8.

Subotić, who introduced an identity dimension and the masses into the interaction between political parties and Europeanization, emphasizes that in a country where European identity is not widely shared, pro-European actors will have difficulty in building support and forming coalition which will increase adoption costs.<sup>195</sup> Thus, for the process to be successful, it is necessary for national elites and institutions to orient and re-orient their identities, interests, and perceptions in a way compatible with Europe.<sup>196</sup>

The orthodox Europeanization scheme, in which the literature does not adequately incorporate the internal dynamics of countries into the analytical framework, is insufficient to understand the cases. It is inevitable to re-visit the scheme within the domestic context: internal dynamics and the domestic actors. It is possible to argue that political parties play the most critical role at domestic level because of their legislative and executive powers. A reformist mission and political willingness shared by leading political parties are necessity for a goal-oriented and functional process. This mission and political willingness expected from political parties depends first and foremost on their orientations and response to the EU, EU membership and Europeanization.

#### **IV. PARTY POSITIONS: PRO-EUROPEANISM VERSUS SOFT AND HARD EUROSCEPTICISM**

Agenda setting or placing certain issues at the centre of political attention, is a crucial element for determining position.<sup>197</sup> As a general rule, political actors emphasize issues (agenda setting) that are gainful to themselves, while they usually disregard the ones that are unfavourable.<sup>198</sup> Firstly, the position matters only if the issue/actor is a leading subject and both meaningful and significant for the decision

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<sup>195</sup> Subotić, *Europe is a State of Mind*, pp. 313-315.

<sup>196</sup> Checkel, *Socialization in Europe*, p. 804; Morten Egeberg, "Transcending Intergovernmentalism? Identity and Role Perceptions of National Officials in EU Decision-Making", **Journal of European Public Policy**, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1999, pp. 458-461.

<sup>197</sup> Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Stefaan Walgrave, **Agenda Setting, Policies, and Political Systems: A Comparative Approach**, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2014, pp. 1-18.

<sup>198</sup> Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Peter B. Mortensen, "Who Sets the Agenda and who responds to it in the Danish Parliament? A New Model of Issue Competition and Agenda- Setting", **European Journal of Political Research**, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2010, pp. 257-258.

makers. Secondly, political parties amongst alternative actors have substantial influence on which issues are covered in domestic politics.<sup>199</sup> Lastly, according to the utility of the issues, actors normally take a positive, neutral or negative stance that has originated for a variety of reasons.

According to Elster, a political psychologist, a position defines not only the perspective, but also the interests of the actors.<sup>200</sup> From an international relations perspective, foreign policy preferences and the policy implementations are the consequences of complex processes that depend first, on actors' ideas whose interests are formulated, and second on the national elites, who pick, conceptualize and develops the ideas when they agree on that Europeanization fits with the institutions and political culture at national level.<sup>201</sup> Flood classifies six alternative positions on the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization:

- 1) *Rejectionist* - refers to a systemic opposition to integration and membership;
- 2) *Revisionist* - a position in favour of the return to the state of affairs before major EU treaty revisions and policy areas;
- 3) *Minimalist* - accepting the status quo, but resisting further EU integration;
- 4) *Gradualist* - supports further integration only if the process is taken slowly and with great care;
- 5) *Reformist* – in favour of constructive engagement, emphasising the need to reform (improve) one or more EU institutions and dimensions; and lastly
- 6) *Maximalist* – a position that favours pushing forward with the current process as rapidly as possible due to the practicality for a higher level of integration.<sup>202</sup>

Kopecký and Mudde assert that there can be confusion between the positions and concepts of EU-optimism and EU-pessimism. EU-optimism refers to the belief in the EU as it is integrating; whereas, EU-pessimism is indicative of showing displeasure towards the EU and its direction. Similarly, both concepts are not grounded on the party's general orientation; however, there is a certain dissatisfaction and longing quest for changes in EU-pessimism. Consequently, while all rejectionists can be categorised as EU-pessimist, it is not possible to label every EU-pessimist as a rejectionist.<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> David N. Hopmann, et al., "Party Media Agenda-Setting How Parties Influence Election News Coverage", **Party Politics**, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2012, p. 173.

<sup>200</sup> Jon Elster, **Political Psychology**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 63.

<sup>201</sup> Gamze Tanil, "The Social Constructivist Fusion Perspective: A Theory for Europeanization", **Perspectives on European Politics and Society**, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2014, p. 493.

<sup>202</sup> Chris Flood, "Euroscepticism: A Problematic Concept", **The UACES 32<sup>nd</sup> Annual Conference and 7<sup>th</sup> Research Conference**, Queen's University, Belfast, 2-4.09.2002, p. 5.

<sup>203</sup> Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, "The Two Sides of Euroscepticism Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe", **European Union Politics**, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2002, (Two Sides of Euroscepticism), p. 302.

Szczerbiak and Taggart provide an insightful perspective on the somewhat confusing use of causality of party position (long-term) and the use of Eurosceptic discourse (short-term) in interparty competition. According to Szczerbiak and Taggart, these two phenomena, in addition to the causal mechanisms, need to be clearly distinguished for analytical purposes. They discuss how positions are motivated by normative-ideological impulses and stress the imperatives of strategic-tactical positioning,<sup>204</sup> as detailed in the first and second models: ideology and political competition.

This monition raises yet another question on whether party position has a static characteristic independent of time and place. Party competition in politics might be the source of positions so that it can be constructed and re-constructed as a short-term tactical instrument. In addition, the re-orientation of the party's identity and its stance towards the EU might not come about due to inter-party dynamics, rather as a consequence of major attitude change. According to Kelman, three different mechanisms affect the attitudes of the decision-makers: 1) when the calculation of gaining specific rewards or approval avoids specific punishment (compliance); 2) when the decision-makers prefer to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship (identification); and 3) when the ideas and actions of which it is composed is intrinsically rewarding (internalization).<sup>205</sup>

Having a positive position on the EU, EU membership and Europeanization is conceptualised with the term, **Pro-Europeanism**. It is an expected position to be adopted by a political party and refers to supporting the EU, integration and membership. Kopecký and Mudde divide this support into two categories: "Diffuse support" expresses the general support of European ideas while "specific support" refers to the general support for European practices.<sup>206</sup> Following two concepts are relatively similar in terms of how they are defined, yet they are conceptualized differently. Firstly, the term *Europhile* is defined as the belief in the key ideas of European integration. It is institutionalized cooperation concentrated on the basis of mutual sovereignty (the political dimension) and an integrated free market economy

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<sup>204</sup> Szczerbiak and Taggart, *Theorising Euroscepticism*, p. 5.

<sup>205</sup> Herbert C. Kelman, "Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1958, p. 53.

<sup>206</sup> Kopecký and Mudde, *Two Sides of Euroscepticism*, p. 300.



(the economic dimension).<sup>207</sup> Secondly, *Euro-enthusiasm* is an alternative concept and refers to the general support of the EU and integration, but in a much stronger way.<sup>208</sup>

On the contrary, **Euroscepticism** refers to a negative and/or rejective position towards the EU, EU membership and Europeanization. According to Taggart, Euroscepticism “expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.”<sup>209</sup> According to the scope and size of opposition, there are two types of Euroscepticism: hard (principled) and soft (contingent).

**Hard Euroscepticism** involves the complete rejection of the entire EU project and opposes joining or remaining as member. **Soft Euroscepticism** refers to a conditional or qualified opposition to European integration that has originated from either “policy” Euroscepticism or “national-interest” Euroscepticism.<sup>210</sup> Policy Euroscepticism is yet another form of motivation and is frequently discussed in the context with regard to size, level and the content of the integration. It is more associated with certain issues, time and country-specific reactions. Contrarily, national-interest Euroscepticism is observed when an actor objects in order to defend the state’s national interest. In spite of committing to a hard approach, an actor may still maintain a nominal commitment to the EU.<sup>211</sup> Thus, adoption of a soft Eurosceptic discourse may emerge not in all circumstances and time, but in detailed-specific topics as a case of micro/ad hoc opposition.

Lastly, Laver and Hunt propose three units of measurement for determining party positions: (1) the analysis of party documents; (2) the use of mass public opinion surveys; and (3) the use of expert judgments.<sup>212</sup> According to Ray, each of these methods has distinctive advantages and disadvantages.<sup>213</sup> Although the manifesto

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<sup>207</sup> Kopecký and Mudde, Two Sides of Euroscepticism, p. 301.

<sup>208</sup> Bogdan W. Mach, Kazimierz M. Slomczynski and Wojciech Zaborowski, "The Alliance of Poland with Western Europe: How Polish Euro-Enthusiasts and Euro-Skeptics Change Their Opinions", **International Journal of Sociology**, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1998, p. 76.

<sup>209</sup> Paul Taggart, "A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems", **European Journal of Political Research**, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1998, (Euroscepticism in Europe), p. 366.

<sup>210</sup> Szczerbiak and Taggart, Opposing Europe, p. 6.

<sup>211</sup> Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, "The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States", **SEI Working Paper**, No. 51, 2002, (The Party Politics of Euroscepticism), pp. 7-8.

<sup>212</sup> Laver and Hunt, 1992.

<sup>213</sup> Ray, pp. 284-285.

reflects the overall party position and the logics in details, the content analysis carries a risk of being subjectively interpreted. Public opinion surveys are functional, especially when making comparisons between the party/leader and the electorate opinion. Moreover, there are limited surveys concentrating on party position and the EU issue(s). Finally, the reliance on expert judgements is instrumental when the party manifestos and public surveys are lacking and/or insufficient.

Position of the political parties' on a given agenda is one of the main concerns of the analysis in political science, with different approaches and models. Taking political science and the Europeanization literatures into account for the analysis of the second research question, causal explanations of party positions, comparative hypotheses are formulated over three alternative models in the following section: ideology, political competition and identity politics.

## **V. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR POLITICAL ORIENTATION**

The concept of position is not a new issue in the social sciences. Since the Enlightenment, philosophers have questioned the dynamics that cause position. Rawls' Theory of Justice conceptualised position as the most favoured interpretation of commonly shared presumptions by the members of a society in which there is competition between alternative senses of justice.<sup>214</sup> Descartes, as the classical founder of Rationality, argued that the essential nature of a physical object exists in space, with a size, shape and location in which actors create perceptions by providing external knowledge, using reasoning and rational intuition.<sup>215</sup> Hume, who examined human nature from a psychological basis, detailed how moral judgments of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) play a significant role when people are focused on achieving their particular interests as immediate products of passion.<sup>216</sup> Similarly, Hutcheson, a proponent of Moral Sense Theory, argued that human beings make moral judgments by using their sentiments rather than their rational capacities.<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> John Rawls, **A Theory of Justice**, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 15-19.


<sup>215</sup> Rene Descartes, **The Principles of Philosophy**, (Trans. Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P. Miller), Kluwer Academic Publisher, Boston, 1991, pp. 1-57.

<sup>216</sup> David Hume, **A Treatise of Human Nature**, Dover Publications, New York, 2003, pp. 238-248.

<sup>217</sup> William Frankena, "Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory", **Journal of the History of Ideas**, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1955, pp. 356-375.

Similarly, both Habermas<sup>218</sup> and Sjursen<sup>219</sup> proposed three legitimacy and justification models that are used as mobilizing arguments for enlargement and Europeanization: (1) Pragmatic - based on the utility expectations in the form of economic and security gains; (2) Ethical/Political - relies on the collective understanding of “us” and values shaping the responsibility; and (3) Moral - the sense of justification emerges from values and the perception of “good life” embedded in the community. Based on philosophical grounds and their models, this study reformulated and adopted moral justification as *ideology*; pragmatism as *political competition* and ethical-political justification as *identity politics* (see Figure 5).

**Figure 5:** Alternative Models to Explain Party Positions



### A. Position as a Reflection of Ideology

Downs defines ideology as “the verbal image of the good society and the chief means of constructing such a society.”<sup>220</sup> According to Lane, ideology is intrinsically normative and generative.<sup>221</sup> It is generative in terms of being used as a “shortcut” that can facilitate taking a stand on an issue. It is normative as a “political sophistication” that ideological values are then pooled with political information to produce non-random thoughts on particular substances. Ideology leads people to “put into the

<sup>218</sup> Habermas, pp. 1-17.

<sup>219</sup> Sjursen, pp. 496-499.

<sup>220</sup> Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Harper and Row, New York, 1957, p. 96.

<sup>221</sup> Robert E. Lane, “Patterns of Political Belief”, *Handbook of Political Psychology*, (Ed. Jeanne Knutson), Jossey Bass, San Francisco, 1973, p. 85.

world” ontology that facilitates opinion formation.<sup>222</sup> According to Martin and Desmond, ideology is the factor that directly affects position and policy orientation, not in reasoning models, but through its baseline principles and values.<sup>223</sup> Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock claim that, "ideological affect should make a clear contribution to political reasoning: It should condition the relationship between general political preferences, as measured by ideological identification, and specific issue position."<sup>224</sup>

At the fundamental level, ideological competition and polarization are about the differences in valuations, in both abstract and concrete terms (values and attitudes).<sup>225</sup> According to Heywood, ideologies present a systematically organised worldview, a vision for a good society and a model for political change.<sup>226</sup> He argues that due to these particular functions, ideology has a powerful emotional or affective character, expressing hopes and fears, sympathies and hatreds.<sup>227</sup> Political parties that have a programmatic character may indeed adopt an ideology in order to attract the masses.

In political science, ideology is categorized in different versions (see Figure 6). The Linear spectrum, graphically aligned from Left to Right, strongly focus on economy, originated from the Soviet Revolution and the Cold War. In the 1950s, a new categorization, the Horseshoe Spectrum, emerged in the literature. This version categorizes ideologies according to their distance from democratic values, and ideologies are represented in the moderate versus extremist lines. According to the last spectrum, which is not examined in this study, it is possible to categorize ideologies as “classical” and “new” based on the time period they were formed.

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<sup>222</sup> John Levi Martin and Matthew Desmond, “Political Position and Social Knowledge”, **Sociological Forum**, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2010, p. 8.

<sup>223</sup> Martin and Desmond, p. 9.


<sup>224</sup> Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Phillip E. Tetlock, **Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 156.

<sup>225</sup> Michael Billig, “Political Ideology: Social Psychological Aspects”, **The Social Dimension**, (Ed. Henri Tajfel), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 446-470.

<sup>226</sup> Andrew Heywood, **Political Ideologies: An Introduction**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, p. 11.

<sup>227</sup> Heywood, p. 12.

**Figure 6: Ideologies and Political Spectrum**



Source: Andrew Heywood, **Political Ideologies: An Introduction**, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, pp. 16-18.

In the linear spectrum, political parties are not merely represented as empty vessels characterized by their positions that are either oriented in the left or right. A political party's response to a new issue is the product of their right versus left placement.<sup>228</sup> In other words, it is the ideology that determines party position. The division between the left and right spectrum revolves around human nature, values and state intervention. According to the linear spectrum, the left/right dimension appears to underlie the political actors' worldview, position and behaviour. The hypothesis is that political actors assimilate new policy issues raised by domestic politics or European integration within their existing schemas of left/right.<sup>229</sup>

Based on a review of the literature, Keulman and Koóssp created three sub-models to better explain the left versus right contestation in European integration:<sup>230</sup> I) the Regulation Model, European politics may cause an opposite stance and competition between the left which favours common economic regulations while the right pushes for less regulations; II) the Hix-Lord Model, due to the engagement of the integration/accession in national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the left/right

<sup>228</sup> Gary Marks and Carole J. Wilson, "The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration", **British Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2000, p. 434.

<sup>229</sup> Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen, "Understanding Political Contestation in the European Union", **Comparative Political Studies**, Vol. 35, No. 8, 2002, p. 889.

<sup>230</sup> Kenneth Keulman and Agnes Katalin Koóssp, **European Identity: Its Feasibility and Desirability**, Lexington Books, Maryland, 2014, pp. 202-203.

division involves the sharing of values among functional interests; and III) the Hooghe-Marks Model, the EU as a wealth project directly links to redistribution of income, social policy, unemployment as the core of the left/right contestation. Given these models, presenting a generalizable hypothesis on the direction and size of differentiations between the left and right is difficult. Given this particular reason, the current debate in the literature centres on whether or not there is a polarization between the left and the right, which allows us to formulize a univariate-attributive hypothesis.

***Hypothesis-1: Left versus Right parties are likely to adopt polar positions towards the EU, EU Membership and Europeanization.***

According to Lipset and Rokkan, the political spectrum in Europe is shaped by the interactions and conflicts between state building, religion and class that have evolved since historical milestones, such as from the Reformation to the Industrial Revolution.<sup>231</sup> The collapse of the numerous socialist regimes is formulated as the latest milestone, which has re-shaped the contemporary political spectrum. Firstly, the end of the Cold War has led to the development of a host of new democracies; and secondly, the inter-party conflicts, which have emerged free from classical left versus right spectrum over issues such as environment and migration.<sup>232</sup> Britain, for instance, exemplifies a “Third Way,” which is said to have replaced the old ideological division by more consensual, non-ideological politics.<sup>233</sup> As a new version of ideological categorization, the Horseshoe Spectrum divides political parties that fall into the categories between moderate and extreme.

This spectrum was also on the agenda during the early years of integration. Haas, the founder of Neo-Functionalism, observed that the EU has been the product of political parties of the centre-right, centre, and to a lesser extent, the centre-left who have dominated decision making in Europe from the early years of the integration.<sup>234</sup> Considering the occupations in the European Parliament today, it is possible to verify

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<sup>231</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments", **The West European Party System**, (Ed. Peter Mair), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 91-111.

<sup>232</sup> John Huber and Ronald Inglehart, "Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies", **Party Politics**, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995, p. 74.

<sup>233</sup> David Weltman and Michael Billig, "The Political Psychology of Contemporary Anti-Politics: A Discursive Approach to the End of Ideology Era", **Political Psychology**, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2001, p. 369.

<sup>234</sup> Haas, pp. 113-159.

his argument that political parties in the centre (moderate), as categorised by the Horseshoe Spectrum, are the driving force behind European integration. In light of the Horseshoe Spectrum, this study will test the following hypothesis:

***Hypothesis-2: Moderate parties are apt to be (more) pro-European in comparison to extreme parties.***

Katz and Mair devised a different conceptualization, yet in many ways similar to the moderate versus extreme division. They support the categorization of political parties as *protest versus mainstream* parties. Protest parties reject and stand outside the established group of mainstream parties.<sup>235</sup> They are revisionists who are dissatisfied with the established status quo and are committed to changing the structural dynamics of the domestic politics. Mainstream parties represent the insiders of the system and the supporters of the regime, who are status-quo oriented and are solely in pursuit of maintaining the existing system. The difference between the two is that protest parties are non-revolutionary anti-system parties without an ideological orientation; while extreme parties are revolutionary anti-system parties do have an ideological orientation.<sup>236</sup>

Sitter, who identifies protest parties as the “anti-establishment opposition,” claims that they fall within the left-socialists and “new politics” on the left and within the “new populists” on the right.<sup>237</sup> From the EU’s point of view, Euroscepticism might be an instrument for the protest parties to differentiate themselves from mainstream parties.<sup>238</sup> Secondly, they can systematize Euroscepticism in party politics as a form of anti-elite discourse.<sup>239</sup> In the analysis of the data, the study excluded this particular approach because of the assumption that the anti-system stance of protest parties as actors might have dissolved in the crucible of extremism. Furthermore, there are no parties in Serbia that can be categorically classified as protesters.

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<sup>235</sup> Szczerbiak and Taggart, *Opposing Europe*, p. 7.

<sup>236</sup> Meindert Fennema, "Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe", **Party Politics**, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1997, pp. 473-492.

<sup>237</sup> Nick Sitter, "The Politics of Opposition and European Integration in Scandinavia: Is Euroscepticism a Government Opposition Dynamic?", **West European Politics**, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2001, p. 25.

<sup>238</sup> Taggart, *Euroscepticism in Europe*, p. 382.

<sup>239</sup> Sitter, p. 24.

There is also a fourth alternative approach that was not included into this study. In 1967, Political sociologists Lipset and Rokkan established a new theory called *Social Cleavages* that linked modern party politics with historical sociology. A fundamental statute in this approach is that social identity is the building block of party support in Western Europe.<sup>240</sup> In this model, parties are not unfilled pots into which issue positions are adopted in response to their organizations with historically rooted orientations.<sup>241</sup>

According to this scheme, party politics and the electoral (cleavages) in the Euro-Atlantic domain have experienced four phases ever since the Industrial Revolution:<sup>242</sup> 1) Centre versus Periphery - between elites in the urban areas (centre) and those in rural areas (periphery); 2) State versus Church - between religious and secular groups; 3) Owner versus Worker - a class cleavage, brings about the establishment of parties on the left and right; and 4) Land versus Industry – state control over economy via tariffs versus liberal market economy based on freedom for industrial enterprise.

Firstly, the use of social cleavages necessitates a broader historical and sociological analysis and a time dependent flow in order to understand and explain the party positions. This approach is not viable in our Serbian case since the country is full of newly established political parties that were established after the collapse of Communism. Secondly, Lipset and Rokkan conceptualised and proposed the theory for political parties in the industrialised Euro-Atlantic world, which has a distinct historical process, not similar to that of the Western Balkans.

## **B. Position as a Reflection of Political Competition**

In any given situation where political parties are shaped by the elements of ideology, party position and political orientation may be interpreted through the lenses of the first model of ideology.<sup>243</sup> The organic competition experienced between left versus right and moderate versus extreme is constructed with differing values,

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<sup>240</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, **Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives**, Free Press, New York, 1967.

<sup>241</sup> Marks and Wilson, p. 434.

<sup>242</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, pp. 1-64.

<sup>243</sup> Marks and Wilson, p. 459.



worldviews and paradigms and internalized by the varied political parties. However, in a given situation where ideology and its instruments are not the main determinant in party politics, it is impossible to implement the first model. Contrary to the hypotheses of the first model, there are studies in the literature that have concluded that ideological affiliations do not significantly impact party position and political orientation on the EU.<sup>244</sup>

In 1957, Anthony Downs published his seminal study, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, in which he asserted that political parties in multi-party systems converge to the median voters.<sup>245</sup> According to Downs, politicians are office seekers, motivated solely by the material benefits of holding office, where the ones to receive the most votes become the government. This is a competition among the political parties in which the ultimate aim is to gain as many votes as possible. In this model, party position is framed to purely reflect the redistribution of powers, party pragmatism and political tactics.<sup>246</sup> Ladrech offers the following observation on how party competition is significant to exploit:

*To the extent the EU itself becomes politicized in national politics, new voters may be targeted in an opportunistic strategy, either in a pro- or anti-EU position. The politicization of the EU may become a concern for party management, even leading to new party formation. Several factors can instigate changing tactics and strategies by parties designed to capitalize on the 'EU issue'. Among them may be existing patterns of competition incorporating the number of parties in a national party system, the presence of a strongly pro- or anti-EU party, and the nature of a party's 'dominant coalition.'*<sup>247</sup>

From the viewpoint of its power base, party identification might not be correlated with ideological orientation, but instead, with voters' socio-economic status, worldviews and identity orientation, which are decisive motivations of voters' behaviours.<sup>248</sup> Although the ideology model allows us to calculate core votes from

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<sup>244</sup> José Real-Dato, György Lengyel and Borbala Göncz, "National Elites' Preferences on the Europeanization of Policy-making", **The Europe of Elites: A Study into the Europeanness of Europe's Economic and Political Elites**, (Eds. Heinrich Best, György Lengyel and Luca Verzichelli), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 77-78.

<sup>245</sup> Anthony Downs, "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy", **Journal of Political Economy**, Vol. 65, No. 2, 1957, (Political Action in a Democracy), pp. 135-150.

<sup>246</sup> Laure Neumayer, "Euroscepticism as a Political Label: The Use of European Union Issues in Political Competition in the New Member States", **European Journal of Political Research**, Vol. 47, 2008, p. 137.

<sup>247</sup> Ladrech, p. 397.

<sup>248</sup> Anthony F. Heath, Roger M. Jowell and John K. Curtice, **The Rise of New Labour: Party Policies and Voter Choices**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 165.

partisan groups, it is difficult to conduct accurate observations among the median position voters.<sup>249</sup> Within the framework of this observation, a pragmatic, interest-based party might have a more tactical and interest oriented position depending on how European integration is likely to benefit itself and its supporters. In this scenario, party position is firmly rooted, discursive, fixed and relative.<sup>250</sup>

The position on the EU is inextricably linked to the party competition, firstly between the *government and opposition*. The EU question in party politics may emerge as the instruments of political campaign and the politics of opposition.<sup>251</sup> During the campaigns, the opposition parties may take an opposite stance against the ruling party's EU orientation as an electoral appeal. For example, some parties may find Euroscepticism a useful tactic in an electoral campaign or as a way of opposing against the ruling party(s). However, rooted, discursive, fixed and relative content and depth of party position between governments and the opposition, it is impossible to make any generable and/or casual-bivariate hypothesis on the type:

***Hypothesis-3: Government and Opposition Parties are likely to adopt polar positions towards the EU, EU Membership and Europeanization.***

Sometimes the masses designate party competition in an uploading procedure. The national sentiment of the voting population might be directed more towards topical issues such as the EU, as a driving force of voting behaviours.<sup>252</sup> An alternative causal explanation of party orientation towards EU appears in this literature on *electoral studies*. Early scholars indicated that voting behaviour was correlated to one's positions on various issues and their evaluations of the party's positions (fitness).<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>249</sup> James Adams, **Party Competition and Responsible Party Government: A Theory of Spatial Competition Based upon Insights from Behavioural Voting Research**, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor MI, 2001; James Adams and Samuel Merrill III, "Modeling Party Strategies and Policy Representation in Multiparty Elections: Why are Strategies so Extreme?", **American Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 43, No. 3, 1999, pp. 765–791.

<sup>250</sup> Szczerbiak and Taggart, *Theorising Euroscepticism*, p. 19.

<sup>251</sup> Sitter, p. 24.

<sup>252</sup> Heath, et al., p. 156.

<sup>253</sup> Bernard B. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, **Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign**, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1954, p. 285 and pp. 308–311; Paul Felix Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, **The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up his Mind in a Presidential Campaign**, Columbia University Press, New York, 1944; Angus Campbell, et al., **The American Voter**, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960; Green Wiley, Bradley Palmquist Donald and Eric Schickler, **Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters**, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002.

One of the most basic assumptions for free and fair elections is that political parties strictly formulate their policies as a means of gaining (more) votes. As Downs points out, citizens vote for political figures whose positions are side with their own.<sup>254</sup> In response, political parties continuously shape and re-shape their positions based upon the broader acceptances among the masses. In other words, it is the masses who determine the party position and policy orientation (bottom-up/uploading) that is contextualised as the electoral impact on party politics.<sup>255</sup>

In this context, Carmines and Stimson institutionalize a new approach to political competition and voting behaviour. According to them, party competition is grounded in certain issues represented by the mass's agenda and is more significant than ideology or identity politics; this is referred to as “issue competition.”<sup>256</sup> According to this new approach, party competition might be entirely about their positional competition in relation to mainly topical issues such as unemployment, social policy, migration and refugees, law and order, or foreign policy.<sup>257</sup> Similarly, single-issue parties<sup>258</sup> may adopt and politicize one of these (salient) issues and instrumentalized their stance on them as the base of party identity in the electoral competition.<sup>259</sup>

The EU may be the grounded issue in party politics and electoral competition. Vries’ quantitative study concluded that the party’s intrinsic positioning with regard to the EU is the main factor of the inter-party competition when the campaign has the

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<sup>254</sup> Downs, *Political Action in a Democracy*, p. 141.

<sup>255</sup> For details see: James Adams, et al., “Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties’ Policy Shifts, 1976-1998”, **American Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 50, 2006, pp. 513-529; James Adams, Lawrence Ezrow and Zeynep Somer-Topcu, “Is Anybody Listening? Evidence that Voters do not Respond to European Parties’ Policy Statements during Elections”, **American Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 55, 2011, pp. 370–382; James Adams and Zeynep Somer-Topcu, “Moderate Now, Win Votes Later: The Electoral Consequences of Parties’ Policy Shifts in 25 Postwar Democracies”, **The Journal of Politics**, Vol. 71, 2009, pp. 678-692.

<sup>256</sup> Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, “On the Evolution of Political Issues”, **Agenda Formation**, (Ed. William H. Riker), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1993, pp. 151-152.

<sup>257</sup> Christoffer Green-Pedersen, “The Growing Importance of Issue Competition: The Changing Nature of Party Competition in Western Europe”, **Political Studies**, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2007, p. 609.

<sup>258</sup> In contemporary Europe, there is not only issue competition but also newly emerged one-issue parties. Mudde defines single-issue party as having an electorate with no particular social structure, lacking ideological manifestation and addressing only one all-encompassing issue. For details see: Cas Mudde, “The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the Immigration Issue”, **West European Politics**, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1999, pp. 182-197.

<sup>259</sup> Bernt Aardal and Pieter van Wijnen, “Issue Voting”, **The European Voter**, (Ed. Jacques JA Thomassen), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 192–212.

occupation on EU issues.<sup>260</sup> In another study Vries et al., share the observation that there is an increasing polarization trend among member states about European issues during elections and voting.<sup>261</sup> Based on this bottom-up approach that focuses on electoral studies, we will test the following hypothesis:

***Hypothesis-4: Political parties are apt to follow their electoral position towards the EU, EU Membership and Europeanization.***

A third faction of the model is subject to the electoral representations of political parties regarding race, ethnicity and religious sectarianism. Whether a party is the representative of *dominant-majority* groups or *nondominant-minority* groups might determine party position and political orientation. This positional differentiation is central in explaining why the EU and Europeanization lead to different consequences between the majority and minority of society and also their representatives in the political system. The general observation is that, Europeanization provides new solutions to the question of nationality, which favours minorities more than the majority.<sup>262</sup> The respect for and protection of minorities is one of the fundamental political expectations and conditions of the accession,<sup>263</sup> and challenges the state's authority from above.<sup>264</sup> Multiple comparative studies across Europe have determined that minority parties fall under the pro-European bloc due to EU's agenda setting actually push for domestic change in favour of them.<sup>265</sup>

There are different explanatory hypotheses to understand this overall positive stance of minority groups. Firstly, Europeanization may re-structure the centre (majority) - periphery (minority) cleavage in a country during the political, legislative and institutional reforms that undermine the functional purpose of nation-state.<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>260</sup> Catherine E. De Vries, "EU Issue Voting: Asset or Liability? How European Integration Affects Parties' Electoral Fortunes", **European Union Politics**, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2010, pp. 89-117.

<sup>261</sup> Catherine E. De Vries, et al., "Individual and Contextual Variation in EU Issue Voting: The Role of Political Information", **Electoral Studies**, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2011, pp. 16-28.

<sup>262</sup> Michael Keating, "European Integration and the Nationalities Question", **Politics & Society**, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2004, pp. 1-22.

<sup>263</sup> European Commission, "Accession Criteria", **Enlargement**, 07.09.2012, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm), (02.10.2016).

<sup>264</sup> Anwen Elias, **Minority Nationalist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative Study**, Routledge, London and New York, 2009, p. 2.

<sup>265</sup> Simon Hix and Christopher Lord, **Political Parties in the European Union**, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1997, (Political Parties), p. 27.

<sup>266</sup> Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, **Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of West European Peripheries**, Sage Publications, London, 1983.

Secondly, the EU, as a living laboratory, may supply new ways of thinking for sovereignty, territoriality and identity.<sup>267</sup> Through social learning and lesson-drawing mechanisms, domestic actors may re-define the notion of sovereignty, territorial integrity and nation-state, which encourages for new policy preferences. Thirdly, EU integration may minimize minorities' dependency on the nation-state and the majority of society in a way that through providing new opportunities, the European arena alters to domestic arena.<sup>268</sup>

However, political parties that represent the dominant-majority group may frame the integration and accession as a threat. Dominant-majority parties might perceive the EU and Europeanization as potential threats to territorial integrity and national sovereignty that could be brought on by accession.<sup>269</sup> Contrary to the EU conditionality, majority parties might struggle to protect the existing status quo in opposition to those smaller and somehow excluded minority parties. This differentiation leads to the following hypothesis:

***Hypothesis-5: Minority parties are apt to be (more) pro-European compared to majority parties.***

There is a third approach in this model that categorizes party position within the framework of the *core-periphery distinction*. Katz and Mair claim that certain political parties benefit from being a cartel of the system with the concomitant access to state funding at the core, while others are excluded with non-accession at the periphery.<sup>270</sup> The position on the EU, EU membership and Europeanization differentiates between the parties at the core and periphery, in a sense that, parties at the periphery are likely to be (more) Eurosceptic when compared to parties at the core.<sup>271</sup> The study did not take this hypothesis as part of its analysis because 1) it is complex to figure out which party(s) has access to state funding and which does not;

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<sup>267</sup> Montserrat Guibernau, **Nations without States: Political Communities in a Global Age**, Blackwell, Malden, 1999, p. 149.

<sup>268</sup> Michael Keating and John McGarry, **Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 4.

<sup>269</sup> Stéphanie Dechezelles and Michel Perottino, "Right Wing Populist Parties and their Effect on National Identity Politics under the Conditions of Europeanization", **ECPR Workshop: Is Populism a Side-Effect of the Europeanization of Political Competition?**, Rennes, 11-16.04.2008, p. 5.

<sup>270</sup> Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party", **Party Politics**, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995, p. 16.

<sup>271</sup> Szczerbiak and Taggart, *Opposing Europe*, p. 5.

and 2) it is not easy to generally divide Serbian parties into core versus periphery spectrum during its continuing transition.

### C. Position as a Reflection of Identity Politics

National identity is the ground on which sovereign nation-states have been established as the modern form of political community. It dates back to the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which identified the key international relations principles of sovereignty, the equality of states, and the principle of non-intervention. Since this particular time period, the diplomatic history has linked nationalism to the “the world of nations,” which has elevated national identity above other loyalties in politics.<sup>272</sup>

Miller defines national identity as the story of common past, locating the belongs as a member in a meaningful design crossing through shared past and place.<sup>273</sup> Within the particular historical and political contexts, belongs find themselves “entrapped” under the shadow of collective stories related to national identity that cannot be abandoned.<sup>274</sup> These ties continue to strengthen today as the source of legitimacy for the regimes and their survival. From the perspective of political science, nationalism first emerged as a system-structuring logic and secondly, as a political project.<sup>275</sup>

Tajfel's *Social Identity Theory* was a touchstone in the field of social psychology. He argued that intergroup behaviours were based on the perceptions of group status, legitimacy and stability, thus discriminated between *us* versus *them*. According to Tajfel, in-group members (*us*) will seek to find negative aspects of an out-group (*them*) in order to enhance their self-image.<sup>276</sup>

Adapting Tajfel's model to political science, Helbling et al., distinguished identity-based frames within domestic politics as *National Exclusive*, rich in nationalistic and xenophobic arguments that emphasize the preservation of traditional

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<sup>272</sup> Michael Billig, **Banal Nationalism**, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1995, pp. 60-92.

<sup>273</sup> David Miller, **On Nationality**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 22-27.

<sup>274</sup> Miller, pp. 22-27.

<sup>275</sup> Anthony D. Smith, “Towards a Global Culture?”, **Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity**, (Ed. Mike Featherstone), SAGE Publications, London, 1991, p. 184.

<sup>276</sup> Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict”, **The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations**, Vol. 33, No. 47, 1979, p. 40.

values, political self-determination and national independence. In contrast, *Multicultural-Inclusive* represents opposing arguments, such as cultural plurality and tolerance, includes broader moral principles like peace and equality, and their legalist counterparts - human rights and democracy.<sup>277</sup> The polarization in framing applies to the differentiation between those who perceive nation as the appropriate focus of identity and those who identify themselves more supranational.<sup>278</sup>

Although national identity and identity politics are intensified in social psychology and political science, it became a more important topic in international relations due to the emergence of Social Constructivism. Wendt, opened non-material dimensions that brought new ideas and identity into international relations discussions. He asserted, "the structure of any social system contains three elements: material conditions, interests, and ideas."<sup>279</sup>

According to Social Constructivism, collective understandings, ideas and culture make up norms and institutions which constitute agents' perceptions, identities and interests. This is the reason why the behaviour of political agents is socially constructed by collective meaning, interpretations and assumptions about the world in any national context. This is due to the fact that identity politics (nationalist sentiments) constitute a distinct normative motivation in larger masses and political parties.<sup>280</sup> As a normative motivation at the level of national politics, it can also influence and direct foreign policy orientation. Rumelili's following observation is noteworthy, "the degree to which the other is perceived and represented as a threat to self's identity... particularly important in international relations because of its potential security implications; the construction of the other as threatening to self's identity may produce conflict."<sup>281</sup>

Regarding the Europeanization process; ideas, identities and perceptions of oneself and Europe are expected to impact on subsequent policy choices.<sup>282</sup> The level,

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<sup>277</sup> Marc Helbling, Dominic Höglinger and Bruno Wüest, "How Political Parties Frame the European Integration Process", **European Journal of Political Research**, Vol. 49, 2010, pp. 496–521.

<sup>278</sup> Taggart, Euroscepticism in Europe, p. 379.

<sup>279</sup> Alexander Wendt, **Social Theory of International Politics**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 139.

<sup>280</sup> Anthony Heath, et al., "British National Sentiment", **British Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1999, p. 155.

<sup>281</sup> Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation", **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2004, p. 36.

<sup>282</sup> Tanil, p. 483.

direction and scope of national identity are worth addressing where the meaning of belonging to Europe is being contested and negotiated among the political elites.<sup>283</sup> Hix and Lord align national sovereignty, as one of two driving dimension of EU politics, with ideology. A more principled stance towards the EU, EU membership and Europeanization might be the outcome of the understanding of national identity, including nationalism, concern for democracy and sovereignty, or even international opposition to regional integration.<sup>284</sup> Throughout the literature, there are various macro studies on the interaction between national identity and Europeanization process that problematize the compatibility of ideas between Europe and national identities,<sup>285</sup> electoral calculations,<sup>286</sup> or the elites' ability to appropriate the language of the masses.<sup>287</sup>

According to this model, the policy orientation on the EU fictionalizes under the shadow of identity politics ranging from nationalism to supranationalism. Political parties may interpret Europeanization as a challenge or an opportunity and both routes imply important consequences as a reflection of their identity orientation.<sup>288</sup> A negative stance may come from a way of thinking that entails cooperation with 'pure' nation-states without the loss of national sovereignty or identity,<sup>289</sup> being an isolation party in general terms or disagree on the debate of how much national sovereignty is to be delegated to the EU.<sup>290</sup> Depending on these discussions, the last hypothesis that will be tested is as follows:

***Hypothesis-6: Political parties with inclusive supranational identity orientation are apt to be (more) pro-European compared to those with national exclusive identity orientation.***

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<sup>283</sup> Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus", **British Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2009, pp. 21-22.

<sup>284</sup> Sitter, p. 24.

<sup>285</sup> Martin Marcussen, et al., "Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation State Identities", **Journal of European Public Policy**, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1999, pp. 614-633.

<sup>286</sup> Daniele Caramani, "The Europeanization of Electoral Politics: An Analysis of Converging Voting Distributions in 30 European Party Systems, 1970-2008", **Party Politics**, Vol. 18, 2012, pp. 803-823.

<sup>287</sup> Karl W. Deutsch, "The Tread of European Nationalism-the Language Aspect", **American Political Science Review**, Vol. 36, No. 3, 1942, pp. 533-541.

<sup>288</sup> Nevena Nancheva, **Between Nationalism and Europeanisation: Narratives of National Identity in Bulgaria and Macedonia**, ECPR Press, Colchester, 2015, p. 19.

<sup>289</sup> Cas Mudde, **The Ideology of the Extreme Right**, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000, pp. 152-153.

<sup>290</sup> Kopecký and Mudde, Two Sides of Euroscepticism, p. 320.



The expert survey includes altered questions for each model and for the comparative hypotheses (see: Appendix 4). Due to the scope and content of the analysis and the applicability of the expert survey, the study is limited with a total of six alternative hypotheses based on three models to explain party positions and inter-party differentiations.

## **VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS**

Observing Serbia as a difficult Europeanization case, this dissertation is designed with the main assumption that domestic context matters via taking the critical reading of the literature. Therefore, this dissertation questions Serbia-EU relations over political parties. Political parties as the main actors in the process play a critical role due to their 'gatekeeper' position between the EU and the national level and their responsibilities for the necessary reforms. In an attempt to do so this chapter first questioned the party positions (pro-Europeanism, soft-Euroscepticism and hard-Euroscepticism) towards the EU, EU membership and Europeanization; secondly causal explanations for inter-party variances and thirdly legitimization strategies adopted by political parties to justify their positions.

To do such a research the study follows a certain theoretical framework. Therefore, this chapter examined the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of the study which included Europeanization, EU conditionality and party positions. Following this examination, comparative hypotheses are formulated through three political science models that includes ideology, political competition and identity politics. In addition, the chapter also examined the legitimization strategies originated from Europeanization literature that includes normative, rational and identity strategies. The study adopted these strategies as the codes for the content analysis of party documents in the fifth chapter.

There is even a broader literature and additional hypotheses on party positions and political orientations towards the EU. Due to time limitation, scope of the study and the applicability of the expert survey, the analysis is limited to six hypotheses.

## CHAPTER TWO

### FROM VICTIMHOOD TO THE EU ACCESSION: POLITICAL ELITES AND DOMESTIC DYNAMICS IN SERBIA SINCE 1999

*Only unity saves the Serbs.*  
Serbian proverb

*Our defence was a heroic defence, a heroic defence from the aggression launched by NATO... Now this is an outrage against a whole people - against a whole nation...*  
Milošević, "Defence in The Hague", 2002<sup>291</sup>

Historical accounts of the Balkan conflicts have had a deep impact on both the perception and construction of contemporary Balkan politics. Serbia's case is no exception; modern politics in Belgrade contain intense references to the past and its legacies. An analysis without historical references will block a comprehensive perspective to understand and explain Serbian Europeanization process. Contemporary political dynamics in Belgrade have remains associated with the elements of Balkan history; thus, still hindering any sustainable transitions. History illustrates the background of 'old' Serbia and its legacy causes challenges for the 'new' Serbia, bidding for EU membership.

The social climate of the mid-1980s forced Serbians to consider themselves to be the victim of Yugoslavian policy. Tito's policies during his late period and the 1974 Constitution were blamed to be the policy of Croats and Slovenes that deprived Serbia of its own lands: Kosovo and Vojvodina (Yugoslavization of Serbia). Serbian leader Milošević's rise to power in 1987 had taken place during the advancing of polarization among Serbs, Albanians, Croatian, Bosniak and Slovene political elites. This idea of Serbs considering themselves as victims became the discursive basis of Milošević regime since the late 1980s.<sup>292</sup> As a populist leader, Milošević depicted himself as "intuitively understood and effectively expressed the nationalist yearnings of large numbers of Serbs on both the elite and popular levels."<sup>293</sup>

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<sup>291</sup> "Milosevic Defence Transcript", **BBC**, 14.02.2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1820382.stm>, (02.05.2016).

<sup>292</sup> Rei Shigeno, "Nationalism and Serbian Intellectuals", **Perspectives on European Politics and Society**, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2004, pp. 135-159.

<sup>293</sup> Lenard J. Cohen, **Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic**, Westview Press, Boulder, 2001, (Serpent in the Bosom), p. 80.

Based on this historical legacy, this chapter will start with an examination of Milošević's presidency, the rebirth of Serbian nationalism and the processes leading up to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The chapter will continue with a thorough analysis of the origins and the consequences of the Kosovo crisis, including NATO operations as the root causes of Serbia's current "victimhood" narrative. The chapter also examines the pre-accession period by getting into details of the Bulldozer Revolution in 2000 that leads to the fall of Milošević. The chapter will continue with a focus on the early years of the transition (2000 and 2008) when Belgrade experienced tensions between *Euro sceptic nationalists* and *pro-European reformists*. In addition, the cooperation with the ICTY and the normalisation of the relations with Kosovo that emerged as the critical issues in bilateral relations (during pre-accession period) creating conflict amongst the Serbian political elites will be the last issue that will be analysed in this chapter.

## **I. IN THE SHADOW OF HISTORY: SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ AND REBIRTH OF SERBIAN NATIONALISM**

Milošević was transferred to the Netherlands on June 28, 2001 for the ICTY,<sup>294</sup> same day of the anniversary of the 1389 Kosovo Battle when he made his historical speech in 1989. Ironically, and perhaps dramatically 12 years earlier, at the ceremony of his presidency which coincided with the 600<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Kosovo Battle,<sup>295</sup> Milošević addressed to one million enthusiastic Serbs with posters bearing icon-style portraits of Christ, Prince Lazar and himself, side by side:

*At this place, in the heart of Serbia at the Field of Kosovo, six centuries ago, a full 600 years ago, one of the greatest battles of the time took place... By the force of social circumstances this great 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo is taking place in a year in which Serbia, after many years, after decades, has*

<sup>294</sup> Based on the U.N. Security Council decision in 1993, ICTY was established in order to examine the violations of international law during the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

<sup>295</sup> Although the Serbian troops led by Knez Lazar were defeated by the Ottomans under the command of Sultan Murad I, the anniversary was marked by Serbs with the quasi-mystical national representation with following myths: (I) On the eve of the Battle, Prince Lazar was offered the choice between establishing either a heavenly or an earthly kingdom. Lazar chose the former, which prevented his victory but ensured the creation of a perpetual heavenly realm for the Serbian people. (II) Serbian 'victory' was supplemented by that of a knight by the name of Obilic' or Kobelic' who joined the Ottoman camp and killed the Sultan. (III) The betrayal of Vuk Brankovic is said to have led the Serbian army into defeat. For details see: Florian Bieber, "Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering: The Kosovo Myth from 600th Anniversary to the Present", **Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice**, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2002, pp. 96-97.

*regained its state, national and spiritual integrity... The lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to follow the Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of its history... Even later, when a socialist Yugoslavia was set up, in this new state the Serbian leadership remained divided, prone to compromise to the detriment of its own people. Disunity among Serbian politicians made Serbia lag behind and the inferiority of those politicians humiliated Serbia... The Kosovo battle contains another great symbol. This is the symbol of heroism. Poems, dances, literature and history are devoted to it. The Kosovo heroism has been inspiring our creativity for six centuries and has been feeding our pride... Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles...*<sup>296</sup>

In his long Gazimestan Speech, enriched by nationalism and populism, Milošević seemed to offer a 'new' vision for the Serbs who were longing for liberation and unity. He managed to appeal to the Serbs by merging mythical allusions with promises of a glorious Serbian future.

#### **A. Alternative Explanations for the Rise of Serbian Nationalism**

Almost all studies on Milošević and his appeal to nationalism and contemporary Balkan politics analysts refer to the Gazimestan speech. However, the portrayal of the content of the speech is quite different in various analyses. It is possible to categorize the literature on Milošević's impact on nationalism and bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia in three different schools of analyses: (I) Milošević as the root cause for nationalism, (II) the rise of nationalism and Milošević as the legacy of Tito's Yugoslavia, (III) nationalism as the outcome of Milošević's individual life and cognition.

The first school of analysis expose Milošević as the root cause of the Serbian nationalism which they connect his rule with the ethnic conflicts during the collapse of Yugoslavia.<sup>297</sup> Accordingly, Serbia under his rule (1991-2000) is portrayed as a typical example of authoritarianism,<sup>298</sup> post-communist dictatorship and/or tyranny.<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> Slobodan Milošević, "Gazimestan Speech: Gazimestan, Kosovo, 28 June 1989", **Speeches that Reshaped the World**, (Ed. Alan J. Whiticker), New Holland Publishers, Sydney, 2009.

<sup>297</sup> Branimir Anzulovic, **Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide**, New York University Press, New York, 1999.

<sup>298</sup> Mark R. Thompson and Philipp Kuntz, "Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbian October", **Journal of Democracy**, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2004, pp. 159-172.

<sup>299</sup> Vidosav Stevanovic, **Milosevic: The People's Tyrant**, trans. Trude Johansson, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2004; Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, **Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant**, The Free Press, New York, 1999.

This literature portrays Milošević as the origin of the 'new' Serbia where nationalism emerged as the stronghold of the regime and the conflicts created by nationalism ruined its reputation. As a “chamber politician,” nationalism and ethnic rhetoric helped Milošević first for his rise to power, then to gain the public support against his rivals,<sup>300</sup> and lastly to ensure the survival of his regime.<sup>301</sup> During his rule, nationalism and identity were at the centre of his political campaigns.<sup>302</sup> In addition, Milošević, in collaboration with nationalists, historians and novelists and intellectuals - mostly from the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) - consolidated the ideological support for a new Serbia.<sup>303</sup>

According to Pappas, Milošević had successfully politicized the set of accusations - not of economic or systemic inefficiencies - but as a genocide of Serbian population making references to political and cultural developments in Yugoslavia. He created the concept of threat against the Serbian existence within Yugoslavia and declared himself as the 'saviour' of the nation for national integrity.<sup>304</sup> However, Milošević's card of nationalism was criticized as being aggressive, exclusive and ethnocentric that culminated in ethnic conflicts during the 1990s.<sup>305</sup> As an example, Pappas concludes that “the Yugoslav crisis of the late 1980s was the outcome of the irresponsible politicization of national myths and other shared cultural symbols by a self-interested political leader”<sup>306</sup> that is Milošević.

Milošević is perceived not only as the founder of Serbian nationalism, but also as the main transmitter of national ideology. The Gazimestan speech is considered as a milestone in which Milošević initiated the national movement that reached its apogee among the general population for the national homogenization.<sup>307</sup> According to

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<sup>300</sup> Mischa Glenny, **The Fall of Yugoslavia**, Penguin Books, London, 1996, p. 20; Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, pp. 86-92.

<sup>301</sup> Ronald Wintrobe, "Slobodan Milosevic and the Fire of Nationalism", **World Economics**, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2002, p. 10.

<sup>302</sup> Vladimir Goati, "A Deficit in Legitimacy: The Political Development of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", **Democratic Reconstruction in Balkans**, (Eds. Margaret Blunden and Patrick Burke), University of Westminster-Centre for the Study of Democracy, London, 2001.

<sup>303</sup> Shigeno, p. 143.

<sup>304</sup> Takis S. Pappas, "Shared Culture, Individual Strategy and Collective Action: Explaining Slobodan Milošević's Charismatic Rise to Power" **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2005, p. 197.

<sup>305</sup> Brad K. Blitz, **War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation**, Brookes University, Oxford, 2006.

<sup>306</sup> Pappas, p. 205.

<sup>307</sup> Mihailo Crnobrnja, **Yugoslav Drama**, McGill-Queen's Press, London, 1996, p. 97.

Guzina, the techniques used by the Serbian regime to reduce or limit ethno cultural diversity ranged from curbing territorial autonomy, restricting the language rights of ethnic groups and capping state-sponsored multicultural programs to intimidation, terror, and forced expulsion of populations (ethnic cleansing).<sup>308</sup> In another study, Lyon blames Milošević for victimizing local Bosniaks by state terror that led to widespread official discrimination and the ethnic cleansing of entire villages.<sup>309</sup>

The second school of analysis focus more on the political dynamics in Tito's Yugoslavia as the cause for the rise of nationalisms in former Yugoslav republics. For the second school, the crisis in former Yugoslavia cannot be understood without an analysis of the legitimacy issue since the establishment of 1974 Constitution. Serbs linked their ethnic threat perception to Kosovo and securitized the concentration of the old regime's conservative forces in late 1980s.<sup>310</sup> Inter-federal relations in Yugoslavia was complex under the rivalry of a Yugoslavia either under Serb or Croatian dominance.<sup>311</sup>

For this second school of analyses, Gazimestan speech by Milošević functioned effectively as a symbolic repudiation of the Titoist legacy.<sup>312</sup> Leading figures and political elites, who were no longer interested in Tito's "brotherhood and unity of nations and nationalities" strategy, did not give consent to their nation's status. From the mid-1980s, however, this dissatisfaction and the legitimacy crisis in Yugoslavia turned into antagonistic differences between nations which contributed to the intensification of Serbian nationalism especially during the last 15 years of communist regime.<sup>313</sup>

In the immediate aftermath of collapse of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav nationalism was stronger than Serbian nationalism. Milošević, as a pragmatist and populist leader was perceived as the moderate protector of Yugoslavia (and communism) against

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<sup>308</sup> Dejan Guzina, **Nationalism in the Context of an Illiberal Multination State: The Case of Serbia**, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation), Carleton University, Ottawa, 2000.

<sup>309</sup> James Lyon, "Serbia's Sandžak under Milošević: Identity, Nationalism and Survival", **Human Rights Review**, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2008, pp. 71-92.

<sup>310</sup> Vesna Pesic, "Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis", **United States Institute of Peace**, Washington, 1996, p. 11.

<sup>311</sup> Dr. Marko Milankovic, **Interview**, Belgrade, December 18, 2017.

<sup>312</sup> Robert Thomas, **Serbia under Milošević: Politics in the 1990s**, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, London, 1999, p. 50.

<sup>313</sup> Dejan Jović, **Yugoslavia: A State that Withered Away**, Purdue University Press, Indiana, 2008, pp. 264-274.

Croatian, Albanian and Bosniak nationalists, royalists, Chetniks and Ustaše during the 1990s. In fact, Tito's socialism was replaced by nationalist regimes not only in Serbia but also in all other republics before and during the civil wars. In addition to that, the opposition leaders in Serbian Republic Šešelj and Drašković, proposed a more hard-liner nationalistic position against the regime.

Most studies pointed out that this milestone speech went parallel with the publication of a draft document, titled *Memorandum* by SANU in 1986. The document that examines the role of Serbian intellectuals, with reference to the specific political, ideological, social and economic circumstances in the creation of a new nationalist discourse played a critical role on the construction of nationalism.<sup>314</sup> This discourse slowly but surely dominated their universalist and democratic commitments.<sup>315</sup> This way of thinking and analysis open the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans up for discussion as Dragovib-Soso underlines:

*How much can be blamed on 'discourse' and the intellectuals, and how much on Milošević and the army, Tudjman and his cohorts, and even the 'peaceful Slovenes' who pulled the plug under the Yugoslav federation in disregard of the consequences? Finally, what about the other national intelligentsias? Quotes from Albanian, Croatian, and Slovene intellectuals do not always shed a most 'liberal light' on their discursive products. Therefore, a logical question arises: why should one have expected Serbian intellectuals to preserve their universalist commitments in the face of the particularism of their Slovene, Croatian, or Albanian counterparts? And, if this could not have been expected, were there variants of Serbian particularism that would have been more compatible with a democratic outcome?*<sup>316</sup>

Two issue-specific studies emerged within this second school of analyses which focus on the rise of nationalism and Milošević as the legacy of Tito's Yugoslavia. Firstly, a few studies underline the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the formation and the spread of victimhood, nationalism, and keeping the history alive. Historically speaking, Serbian national identity has been constructed as the combination of language and religion. Eastern Orthodox Church differentiates Serbs from other Slavic groups in ethno-religious references. This religion-dominated

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<sup>314</sup> Christina Morus, "The SANU Memorandum: Intellectual Authority and the Constitution of an Exclusive Serbian People", *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2007, pp. 142-165.

<sup>315</sup> Jasna Dragovib-Soso, *Saviours of the Nation: Serbia's Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism*, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2002, p. 2.

<sup>316</sup> Dragovib-Soso, p. 2.

identity also has strong historical and emotional ties to the regions which is called “Old Serbia.”

The Serbian Orthodox Church, the composer of the Kosovo myth, marked the political space of ‘Greater Serbia’<sup>317</sup> and formally expressed their sided positions in domestic and regional crises.<sup>318</sup> The involvement of quasi-mystical national discourse introduced the religion and historical myths as critical instruments. In addition, they provided the opportunity of religion for political elites to legitimize their claims, while religious institutions and groups used nationalism for their own reaffirmation. Religious institutions (Catholic, Orthodox and Islam) during that time supported secession and nation-state building process as ethno-religious cases.<sup>319</sup> At the same time secular politicians brought religion and its symbols into the forefront as a characteristic instrument and a symbol of national identity and state.<sup>320</sup>

Secondly, studies based on Culturalist approaches portray Serbs, Croats, Muslims and others as the parts of “tradition of violent interethnic struggle” throughout history with only short intervals of peace during the Tito regime.<sup>321</sup> The people in the Balkans have often been characterized with the violent character due to the long-term cultural codes including literary products and teaching of the churches.<sup>322</sup> Kaplan persuasively promoted the ethnic hatred thesis, explaining the explosion of killings through the processes of history and memory that were composed of unforgettable details such as sights, exalted emotions, grim statistics and cruel ironies.<sup>323</sup>

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<sup>317</sup> In Milošević’s own words: “These are the questions of borders, essential state questions. The borders, as you know, are always dictated by the strong, never by weak ones... If we must fight, then my God, we will fight and I hope they will not be so crazy as to fight against us. Because if we don’t know how to work well or to do business, at least we know how to fight well.” Stephen Engelberg, “Carving out a Greater Serbia”, **The New York Times**, 01.09.1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/01/magazine/carving-out-a-greater-serbia.html?pagewanted=all>, (11.05.2016).

<sup>318</sup> Ivan Iveković, "Nationalism and the Political Use and Abuse of Religion: The Politicization of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam in Yugoslav Successor States", **Social Compass**, Vol. 49, 2002, pp. 523-536.

<sup>319</sup> Dr. Goran Nikolas, **Interview**, Belgrade, October 29, 2017.

<sup>320</sup> Rada Drezgić, "Religion, Politics and Gender in the Context of Nation-State Formation: The Case of Serbia", **Third World Quarterly**, Vol. 31, No. 6, 2010, pp. 955-970.

<sup>321</sup> Lenard J. Cohen, **Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and Balkan Politics in Transition**, Westview Press, Oxford, 1993, (Broken Bonds), p. 268.

<sup>322</sup> Anzulovic, pp. 147-174.

<sup>323</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, "A Reader's Guide to the Balkans", **The New York Times**, 18.04.1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/18/books/a-reader-s-guide-to-the-balkans.html?pagewanted=all>, (28.04.2016).



Contrary to this second school of analysis that make Milošević the subject and the outcome of the history, the third school of analysis examines the individual cognition in reference to his childhood and his wife. Milošević was born in 1941 in Požarevac, at the height of the Nazi occupation. Located a few miles south of Belgrade, the Nazi-occupied Yugoslav capital, Požarevac was a small town which has had a negative reputation with a nearby nineteenth-century prison.

Within this context, young Slobodan was born into a time and atmosphere of turmoil. He was definitely negatively affected by the Croatian collaborators, known as Ustaše, who wielded broad police powers to abuse Serbs.<sup>324</sup> Milošević who had an in-depth history knowledge also knew how to exploit people's feelings by referring to past.<sup>325</sup> He was good at creating the myth of leadership by inciting nationalist sentiments. According to Cohen, "Milošević's presumptuous decision to become the 'voice' of the Serbian people and to struggle for Serbian interest had a deep resonance in the Serbian and Balkan's past and body politics."<sup>326</sup>

Milošević is also considered as the victim of his wife: Mirjana (Mira) Marković.<sup>327</sup> She was a professor of sociology at University of Belgrade, a media reviewer and also the leader of the Yugoslav United Left. Some referred to her as "Serbia's Lady Macbeth," since she played a key role both in Milošević's system of rule and in his social psychology.<sup>328</sup> The influence of Mira was usually viewed as very negative and harmful in a way that she impacted on his cognitive reading of "us/friend" versus "them/enemy."

President Ivan Stambolić appointed Milošević as the leader of Serbia's Communists in 1986, and in April 1987 asked him to move Kosovo to talk to Albanian leaders. When Milošević entered their ethno-symbolic cultural hall in Polje, local Serbs were trying tell him their problems were beaten by the local police that was mainly composed of Albanians. It was at this moment that Milošević changed himself

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<sup>324</sup> Michael Scharf and William Schabas, **Slobodan Milosevic on Trial: A Companion**, Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 2002, p. 5.

<sup>325</sup> Louis Sell, **Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia**, Duke University Press, Durham, 2003.

<sup>326</sup> Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, p. 80.

<sup>327</sup> Janine N. Clark, **Slobodan Milošević: A Case Study of the Criminal Leader** (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation), University of Nottingham, Nottingham, 2006.

<sup>328</sup> Sell, p. 176.

from being a communist leader into a Serbian nationalist.<sup>329</sup> Seeing the crowd beaten by the police, he quickly responded with his well-cited statement: "No one will be allowed to beat you!" He became a 'national saviour' by protecting a group of Kosovo Serbs in front of cameras. His statement not only became a part of contemporary Serbian folklore, but also transformed a party apparatchik into the leader of the masses: "No one will be allowed to beat you!"

## B. Inside Story: Milošević's Serbia

While the other post-communist elites in CEE used to focus on democratisation and accession to the EU, post-communist elites in the Balkans politicized nationalism as the new source of legitimacy which in fact led to a delay in transition to democracy.<sup>330</sup> Political developments under his rule can be categorised as a process into a competitive authoritarianism<sup>331</sup> compared to post-communist regimes of that time in CEE.<sup>332</sup> Through controlling the bureaucracy and media at domestic level and 'ethnification of the political sphere' at regional level, Milošević remained as a dominant leader until 2000.<sup>333</sup> During that time, the opposition was fragmented and powerless to propose an attractive alternative vision.<sup>334</sup> In fact, an opposite stance against the regime's nationalist preferences was not also a politically feasible preference. As Pappas quotes from Djukić:

*(Milošević) succeeded in something that no Serbian politician had managed: he was widely accepted by the intelligentsia ... It was difficult to recognize certain*

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<sup>329</sup> Guzina, p. 156.

<sup>330</sup> Florian Bieber, "The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia", **International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society**, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2003, pp. 73-90.

<sup>331</sup> Competitive authoritarianism is a hybrid, partly free and semi-democratic governance in which elections are regularly held and are generally free of massive fraud, incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results. For details see: Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism", **Journal of Democracy**, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002, pp. 51-65.

<sup>332</sup> Nebojša Vladislavljević, "Competitive Authoritarianism and Popular Protest: Evidence from Serbia under Milošević", **International Political Science Review**, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2016, pp. 36-50.

<sup>333</sup> Florian Bieber, "Power Sharing after Yugoslavia. Functionality and Dysfunctionality of Power Sharing Institutions Post-war Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo", **Conference: From Power-sharing to Democracy: Post-conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies**, The University of Western Ontario, London, 8-10.11.2002.

<sup>334</sup> Nicholas Miller, "A Failed Transition: The Case of Serbia", **Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe**, (Ed. Bruce Parrott), Cambridge University Press, London, 1997, pp. 146-188.

*learned individuals who had courageously opposed Tito's regime now rallying with such fervour around the Serbian leader... They opened the door of history for him, with a love that made the flower of the Serbian intelligentsia hardly recognizable.*<sup>335</sup>

As a way of transition from Titoism to 'ethnification of the political sphere,' certain policy implementations including Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution (1986-1989), adoption of the new Constitution (1992) as well as the hard power orientation in security policies occupied the agenda of Milošević's rule. Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution was a street protest movement for the transition from Titoism to nationalism that was organized by the supporters of Milošević.<sup>336</sup> He had promised the Serbian people to struggle against poverty, corruption, and bureaucratic oligarchy during the protests. The campaign was based on the claims that Serbs in Kosovo were being harassed by Albanians, due to the 1974 Constitution which ensured autonomy for Kosovo, under the influence of the other Yugoslav republics. Not only Albanians, but also Slovenians and Croats were also blamed for the suppression of Serbia's power and create an environment for the exploitation of Serbs.<sup>337</sup> Due to the changes brought by Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution in power, distribution and the balance of powers between the federal states, federal constitution was revised and Serbian control over its provinces was enhanced.

In spite of the dissatisfaction with the post-1974 version of Yugoslavia (the right to secede), and the statues of Serbian minorities living in other republics; Serbs have framed Yugoslavia as the only way of ensuring the unity of Serbs under one state.<sup>338</sup> During that period the concept, 'Serbian national interest' was formulated and identified more in ethnic terms that included the well-being of all ethnic Serbs living in other republics.<sup>339</sup>

Not surprisingly Milošević's new constitution had a nationalist character that provided the basis for Serbian nationalism and a nation-state, as well as the

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<sup>335</sup> Nebojša Vladislavljević, **Serbia's Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization**, Palgrave, Macmillan, 2008.

<sup>336</sup> Shigeno, pp. 143-144.

<sup>337</sup> Ian Kearns, "Western Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy in Serbia", **The Political Quarterly**, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1999, p. 23.

<sup>338</sup> Bojan Todosijevic, "Serbia", **The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe**, (Eds. Sten Berglund et al.), Edward Elgar, Northampton, 2013, pp. 526-527.

<sup>339</sup> Vojin Dimitrijevic, "Trouble Defining Serbia's National Interest", **Serbia Matters: Domestic Reforms and European Integration**, (Eds. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang Petritsch, Goran Svilanovic and Christophe Solioz), Nomos Publishers, Baden-Baden, 2009, p. 146.

constitutional legitimacy for a one-man rule in Serbia.<sup>340</sup> Referring to “the centuries lasted struggle of the Serbian people,” the Preamble was determined to create a democratic State of the Serbian people.<sup>341</sup> Article 72 of the new constitution stated “The Republic of Serbia shall maintain relations with the Serbs living outside the Republic of Serbia in order to preserve their national and cultural-historical identity.”<sup>342</sup>

Similar to Serbia, in Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and to some extent in Macedonia, nationalists advocated anticommunism in order to bolster their appeal and their legitimacy. Just before the civil war in 1991, nationalists gained the control of power in other federations.<sup>343</sup> In the first phase of the transition (roughly between 1991 and 1993), Serbia’s policy was to save the old Yugoslavia by resorting to force. However, by reference to hard-power as a security policy instrument to ensure territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was not a successful method to prevent the dissolution of the federations.

Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia declared their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Slovenian path to the independence was quick, it took ten days after the referendum conducted in 1990 since with a low level violence. Similar to Slovenia, Macedonia’s (1991) and Montenegro’s (2006) independence was peaceful ones as well. Croatia’s conflict with Serbian minority as an urban warfare emerged in the disputed borders in Croatia.

In the second phase (roughly between 1993 and 1995), when the international community recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent states, Serbia sought to unite the Serbian diaspora and its ethnic territories in Croatia and BiH to form a Serbian national state which it would call “Greater Serbia.” However, all ethnic groups played their cards of nationalism and warfare in mixed population of BiH which made Serbian move more complicated. The bloody Bosnian War (1992-1995) ended up with war

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<sup>340</sup> Robert M. Hayden, **Blueprints for a House Divided: the Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts**, University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 1999.

<sup>341</sup> Robert M. Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics", **Slavic Review**, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1992, pp. 654-673.

<sup>342</sup> "The Constitution", **Republic of Serbia**, 28.09.1990, <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN019071.pdf>, (27.03.2016).

<sup>343</sup> Deninison Rusinow, "To be or not to be: Yugoslavia as Hamlet," **Field Staff Reports**, No. 18, 1991.

crimes, crimes against humanity as well as genocide which left very negative legacies for Serbia.

The dynamics that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia has been a favourite subject of debates concerning the causes of the wars among the Yugoslav successors. The first group of explanations has underlined the role of Serbian nationalism and Milošević's manipulative role to obtain, consolidate and sphere his power in the face of intimidating opponents in Yugoslavia's violent breakdown.<sup>344</sup> Second group of scholars concentrated on the ethnic cleansing campaigns in Croatia and BiH that was the result of historical disputes led by hatreds within the Yugoslav nations. The bloody dissolution of the state was considered as the consequence of the aggressive character of greater Serbian nationalism that was the continuation of the 19<sup>th</sup> century programs of Serbian unification and Serbia's war of conquest.<sup>345</sup>

Third group of explanations focus more on institutional breakdown within the republics due to their ethnically divided character. Institutional breakdown especially after Tito's death led national actors of each groups to advance their irredentist territorial claims and "historical" rights and the need for "just" wars as a way of addressing their "security dilemma."<sup>346</sup> According to this third group, the collapse of constructive concept - the concept of Yugoslav nation - has been destroyed and replaced by ethnic/nation identity which led to the dissolution.<sup>347</sup> In fact, Yugoslavia was portrayed as an example of "the last empire" and Tito as an example of "the last emperor". Therefore, following his dead Yugoslavia entered the process of disintegration.<sup>348</sup>

As an alternative to the previous one, the fourth group of explanations problematized the world politics by asserting that the collapse of the Soviet Union left

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<sup>344</sup> Vladimir Goati, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: The Role of Political Elites", **Nationalities Papers**, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1997, pp. 455-467.

<sup>345</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, **Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History**, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1993.

<sup>346</sup> Ivan Čolović, **The Politics of Symbol in Serbia: Essays in Political Anthropology**, Hurst, London, 2002.

<sup>347</sup> Andrew Baruch Wachtel, **Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation**, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998.

<sup>348</sup> Katrin Boeckh, "Crumbling of Empires and Emerging States: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as (Multi)national Countries, in: 1914-1918", **International Encyclopaedia of the First World War**, (Eds. Ute Daniel et al.), 23.06.2015, [http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/crumbling\\_of\\_empires\\_and\\_emerging\\_states\\_czechoslovakia\\_and\\_yugoslavia\\_as\\_multinational\\_countries](http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/crumbling_of_empires_and_emerging_states_czechoslovakia_and_yugoslavia_as_multinational_countries), (12.04.2016).

Yugoslavia vulnerable to pressure from the West. Consequently, this pressure encouraged anti-communism and nationalist forces in traditionally western oriented countries such as Slovenia and Croatia as well as the Soviet and other Eastern European regimes to start their war of independence.<sup>349</sup>

All new states, established after the disintegration of Yugoslavia were recognized by Belgrade, but Kosovo, as the last and unending crisis of the Balkans was inherited.

### C. An Unending Battle: Kosovo

*As long as Kosovo is in our hearts, minds and songs, it will be ours, because hope dies last. Kosovo is to Serbia what Jerusalem is to the Jews, and without Kosovo, Serbia is like a body without a head or a heart. Europe sees, knows and tolerates the fact that those responsible for a terrible crime against the Kosovo Serbs have not been punished, so as a start, the exiled must be allowed to return to their homes. Those who control the world and boast about democracy and human rights must find a fair solution for Kosovo and not let crime and force triumph.*<sup>350</sup>

Irinej, Patriarch of Serbian Orthodox Church, 2014, University of Belgrade

Patriarch Irinej as the highest authority in Serbian Orthodox Church pointed out the historical and religious role and importance of Kosovo in their national identity in the above-quoted statement. As can be understood from the description, Serbian obsession has been with its own history and its past rather than its future.<sup>351</sup> Kosovo as the seat of the old patriarchate of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the place of the holy battle against the Ottomans made the Serbians believe that Kosovo was the historical Serbian motherland.<sup>352</sup>

However, from the Kosovo Albanians' point of view, their elimination from Albania since the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 was itself unacceptable. Based on historical references, some groups in Albanian society which emerged as hardliner

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<sup>349</sup> Veljko Kadijevic, **Moje Vidjenje Raspada (My View on Disintegration)**, Politika, Belgrade, 1993, quoted from Dejan Jovic, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia A Critical Review of Explanatory Approaches", **European Journal of Social Theory**, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2001, pp. 101-120.

<sup>350</sup> "Patriarch Irinej: Kosovo is Serbian Jerusalem", **Orthodox Christianity**, 18.03.2014, <http://orthochristian.com/69303.html>, (10.02.2017).

<sup>351</sup> Warren Zimmerman, "Origins of a Catastrophe: Memoirs of the Last American Ambassador to Yugoslavia", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 74, 1995, p 2.

<sup>352</sup> Donald Danreuther, "War in Kosovo: History, Development and Aftermath", **Kosovo: Perceptions of War and its Aftermath**, (Eds. Mary Buckley et al.), Continuum, London, 2001, pp. 13-14.

during the dissolution, always went against any crystallization attempts of non-Albanian rules: first centralized and Serb-dominated Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929-1941) and the second Yugoslavia, under the leadership of Tito after the Second World War. The 1974 Constitution organized the state structure based on territorial unit consisting of six republics (Serbia, BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia) and two autonomous provinces within the Republic of Serbia (Kosovo and Vojvodina). The Albanian statement for self-determination is grounded on the demographic structure of Kosovo. In addition to that, they politisized in international arena that Kosovo's independence would contribute to regional peace and stability.<sup>353</sup>

Kosovo was portrayed not as a separate province, but rather as the part of a larger Serbia. For some Serbs, the creation of two autonomous units in 1974 within Serbia was unfair. Power relations in Kosovo were entirely upturned after Milošević came into presidency. Starting from 1989 on, the autonomy of Kosovo was gradually abolished and ended with the new Constitution (1992) that has been in clash with the 1974 Constitution.<sup>354</sup> As a reaction, Albanian deputies of the provincial Parliament adopted the "Declaration of the Independence of Kosovo" in 1990 on July 2. Nevertheless, Belgrade responded with a referendum in Serbia which abolished the autonomy including the dissolution of local parliaments and governments in Kosovo and Vojvodina and approved Serbian direct rule.

Milošević wanted to ensure his political control of Kosovo through the emergency laws that came into force in 1989 as well as the *Serbization of institutions*.<sup>355</sup> As a result, repressive measures were taken against the Albanian population. The police were placed under the control of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs followed by the local radio and TV stations. *Serbization* also spread to other institutions such as hospitals, industrial relations, schooling and other public administrations. For instance, Belgrade carried out a vast wave of dismissals of Albanian doctors during the 1990s. Regarding private companies, the Parliament

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<sup>353</sup> Selver B. Sahin, "The Use of the 'Exceptionalism' Argument in Kosovo: An Analysis of the Rationalization of External Interference in the Conflict: Themes", **Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies**, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2009, pp. 235-255.

<sup>354</sup> Hüseyin Emiroğlu, **Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Kosova Sorunu (1989-2000)**, Asil Yayın Dağıtım, Ankara, 2010, pp. 109-130.

<sup>355</sup> Borislav Radovic, "Yugoslav Wars 1991-1999 and Some of their Social Consequences", **Torture in War: Consequences and Rehabilitation of Victims-Yugoslav Experience**, (Eds. Željko Špirić et al.), International Aid Network, Belgrade, 2004, pp. 25-70.

introduced an ethnic quota system of employment. Besides, Albanian workers had to sign the declaration of loyalty in which they had to express their consent to the policies of Serbian government. Serbian became the mandatory educational language, and the cities, villages and their streets were re-named.<sup>356</sup>

During the early years, against discrimination and human rights violations Albanians replied with a strategy of passive resistance and “shadow” state.<sup>357</sup> Firstly, Albanians boycotted elections organized by Belgrade and held their own elections during which Ibrahim Rugova elected as the president and his Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) as the governing political organization. Secondly, they introduced Albanian “parallel” institutions (such as taxation, education, media and healthcare).<sup>358</sup>

There were parallel, competing approaches among the Albanians until 1999 when Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and his armed struggle approach dominated in Kosovo. The Dayton Peace (1995) reinforced the approach that disobedience and parallel institutions could not help them and their objectives against Belgrade. The political exclusion of the Kosovo question in the international meetings accelerated radicalization of Albanians.<sup>359</sup> A radicalized Albanian resistance movement, KLA that was founded in 1991 decided to take up arms in 1996. KLA aimed at changing first the perception and then the attitude of international community from silence to intervention through a successful strategy of internationalisation.

Listed as a terrorist group, the KLA involved in direct clash with the Serbian forces, by even attacking civilians. KLA also destroyed approximately 150 Serbian historical churches and holy places by playing the card of religion.<sup>360</sup> KLA’s small scale hit-and-run terror strategies helped it to increase its popularity among the Albanians. However, these moves also led to the human right violations exerted by Serbian forces. Among these violations, the Račak Massacre in 1999 ended with mass killing of 45 Albanians. This massacre that emerged as a milestone during the conflict

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<sup>356</sup> Lazar Nikolic, “Ethnic Prejudices and Discrimination: The Case of Kosovo”, **Understanding the War in Kosovo**, (Eds. Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski), Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2003, pp. 51-76.

<sup>357</sup> Tim Judah, "The Kosovo Liberation Army", **Perceptions**, Vol. 5, 2000, p. 67.

<sup>358</sup> “Parallel Structures in Kosovo”, **OSCE - Report**, no date, <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/24618?download=true>, (14.02.2017), pp. 5-6.

<sup>359</sup> Klejda Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army", **Studies in Conflict & Terrorism**, Vol. 31, No. 12, 2008, pp. 1103-1119.

<sup>360</sup> Christopher Deliso, “Religion and Thought”, **Culture and Customs of Serbia and Montenegro**, (Ed. Christopher Deliso), Greenwood Press, London, 2009, p. 33.



later led to an international intervention. USA Ambassador Richard Holbrooke later said:

*The KLA was arming; the KLA was taking very provocative steps in an effort to draw the west into the crisis. That was ultimately successful, the Serbs were playing right into the KLA's hands by committing atrocity after atrocity, way overreacting, wiping out entire villages, outrageous actions that had to be responded to.*<sup>361</sup>

In the aftermath of the massacre, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) strongly condemned the atrocities committed by Serbians.<sup>362</sup> Similar statements were followed by Contact Group, Council of Europe (CoE), NATO and the EU. However, internationalisation strategy of the KLA failed to change Belgrade's way of thinking and the way of ensuring security. For Milošević, the struggle of Serbs in Kosovo was the struggle between life and death:

*This has not been just a question of Kosovo, although Kosovo, too, is of immense importance to us. The freedom of our entire country is in question, and Kosovo would have only served as a door for foreign troops to get in and put in question precisely these greatest values of ours.*<sup>363</sup>

The UNSC hand out certain resolutions calling for a cease fire between the Albanians and the Serbs.<sup>364</sup> Moreover, the UNSC warned the condition in Kosovo to be a danger to peace and security and laid a burden on Serbian part (Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998). However, these initiatives under the United Nations (UN) failed to resolve the tension in Kosovo. Russia and China as the permanent members of UNSC opposed to the Council's enforcement action. As an alternative, Contact Group that was composed of the USA, UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia organized a Peace Conference (1999) in Rambouillet, France. However, a final deal was not signed in this group.

As a last resort, NATO initiated a new negotiations between the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. NATO effectively presented the parties with a proposal to be signed. This proposal annoyed the Albanians for not granting them independence and

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<sup>361</sup> Richard Holbrooke, "Interview", **Newsnight**, 20.08.1999, quoted in Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, p. 191.

<sup>362</sup> "Security Council Strongly Condemns Massacre of Kosovo Albanians in Southern Kosovo", **United Nations**, 19.01.1999, <http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990119.sc6628.html>, (10.03.2016).

<sup>363</sup> "Yugoslav President Milosevic Addresses the Nation", **Serbia-Info**, 24.03.1999, <http://www.serbia-info.com/news/1999-03/24/10032.html>, (05.02.2016).

<sup>364</sup> "Resolution 1160: Security Council Imposes Arms Embargo on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Pending Action to Resolve Kosovo Crisis", **UNSC**, 31.03.1998, <http://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980331.SC6496.html>, (11.05.2016).

angered the Serbians by calling for political autonomy in Kosovo. After Milošević rejected the proposed solution Serbian Armed Forces launched a new attacks on KLA, and NATO started its first war: *Operation Allied Force* in phases (March-June 1999).

First, NATO forces hit Serbian air defences to secure the skies for allied flights. Second, NATO attacked ground armed forces such as army, police, and paramilitary units. Third, NATO forces attacked the strategic infrastructure targets like power stations.<sup>365</sup> The day NATO bombing began on March 24, 1999, Milošević stated that such foreign interventions affected the “freedom of the entire country”<sup>366</sup> and also called for a “peaceful and political resolution of problems in Kosovo” as well as the “equality of all national communities.”<sup>367</sup> When the bombing ended on June 10, 1999, Milošević reiterated the idea of sovereignty and portrayed himself as the winner by stating the following: “We shall not give Kosovo away, since the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country is guaranteed by the UN.”<sup>368</sup>

Since late 1990s Kosovo has been represented as an “exception”<sup>369</sup> by international community. NATO’s unauthorized intervention was justified via “exceptional” claims on Kosovo including the “new” concepts in international law such as pre-emptive war, responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention. In his address to the nation on airstrikes against Serbian targets, USA President, Clinton explained the causes of the strikes as follows:

*We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war, to defuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results. And we act to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the cause of peace.*<sup>370</sup>

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<sup>365</sup> The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, **Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response and Lessons Learnt**, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, pp. 92-93.

<sup>366</sup> "Milosevic's Statement: 'Defend the Country'", **BBC**, 24.03.1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/302775.stm>, (02.03.1999).

<sup>367</sup> "NATO Attack on Yugoslavia Begins", **CNN**, 24.03.1999, <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/24/kosovo.strikes/>, (02.03.2016).

<sup>368</sup> "Slobodan Milosevic Addresses Yugoslavia", **Washington Post**, 10.06.1999, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/june99/textmilosevic.htm>, (02.03.2016).

<sup>369</sup> While most states viewed NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign to stop Serbian persecution of Kosovars as illegal under international law, that breach of state sovereignty was nonetheless forgiven, or at least tolerated, largely on overriding moral grounds.

<sup>370</sup> William J. Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 24 March 1999", **The American Presidency Project**, 24.03.1999, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57305>, (21.04.2016).

A similar stand was shared by the British partner, Prime Minister Tony Blair, who would accept NATO's military action as a "moral crusade" as well as its defence of its "values."<sup>371</sup> Blair claimed that NATO's commitment to "spreading the values of liberty, human rights, the rule of law and an open society" would make Europe a "safer" place. During the USA-led NATO operation against Serbia; UK, France, Germany and even pro-Serbian Greece signed a NATO decision that provided logistics support and get involved in the air campaign.

The Russian Federation which in general, is seen as a natural ally of Serbia due to a common history, religion and culture could not meet Serbian expectations.<sup>372</sup> Serbs was expecting Russian leverage against NATO and UN-authorized military intervention.<sup>373</sup> In fact, Serbs were also expecting that Russia's concerns about NATO's post-Cold War strategies including enlargement and interventions beyond its territory without the UN authorization,<sup>374</sup> would work in their favour. During this period, the majority (78%) of the Serbian population shared the belief that Moscow would back Serbia in a scenario of war and conflict.<sup>375</sup> However, Russia made it clear that Moscow would avoid any conflict with NATO in case of crisis and Belgrade should take a diplomatic option for the future of Kosovo.<sup>376</sup> Expectation and the calculations were misleading, since at the end Russia did not assist Serbia.

Following NATO's 77 days bombings in Serbia and Kosovo, UNSC adopted the Resolution 1244 on June 10, 1999 to solve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo and, to this end, made the safe and free return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes possible.<sup>377</sup> The resolution also anticipated a broad autonomy

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<sup>371</sup> "The Blair Doctrine", **PBS News Hour**, 22.04.1999, [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international-jan-june99-blair\\_doctrine4-23/](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international-jan-june99-blair_doctrine4-23/), (23.03.2016).

<sup>372</sup> David Mac Kenzie, **The Serbs and Russians, Eastern Europe Monographs**, Columbia University Press, Boulder, 1996, p. 3.

<sup>373</sup> Stephen T. Hosmer, **Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When he did**, Santa Monica, California, 2001, p. 3.

<sup>374</sup> Dov Lynch, "'Walking the Tightrope': The Kosovo Conflict and Russia in European Security, 1998-August 1999", **European Security**, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1999, pp. 57-83.

<sup>375</sup> Tim Judah, **Kosovo: War and Revenge**, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000 (Kosovo: War and Revenge).

<sup>376</sup> Dragan Vuksic, "Serbia-Russia Military Political Relations in the Process of Solving Kosovo Issue and in the Future", **ISAC FUND**, <http://www.isac-fund.org/download/Serbia%20-%20Russia%20Military%20Political%20Relations%20in%20the%20Process%20of%20Solving%20Kosovo%20Issue%20and%20in%20the%20Future.pdf>, (09.03.2016).

<sup>377</sup> "Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) on the Situation Relating Kosovo", **United Nations**, 10.06.1999, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement>, (17.03.2016).

as the final solution of Kosovo crisis. This is why the resolution reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia today in favour of Serbian hypothesis.

Independent International Commission on Kosovo proposed some form of (conditional) independence after NATO operation as the solution.<sup>378</sup> As authorized by the Resolution, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and authorized NATO-led peacekeeping force, Kosovo Force (KFOR), took the rule of Kosovo under transitional UN administration. The rationale behind the international administration was to advance towards a fair and just society following the realization of certain minimum preconditions in Kosovo.<sup>379</sup> The roadmap drawn up for Kosovo was to create a democratic, safe and respectable Kosovo on the way to Europe as underlined by Michael Steiner, Special Representative of the Secretary-General.<sup>380</sup> However, until Kosovo's independence in 2008, the peace-building and state building processes went side by side.

#### **D. Bulldozer Revolution**

In 1998, Nikolić-Ristanović categorised Serbian society as bipolar, including the friends and foes of Milošević and his regime.<sup>381</sup> There was a social cleavage between traditional and modern values, between older and younger generations, between urban and rural populations, and between highly educated and less educated groups.<sup>382</sup>

There was a political vacuum in the aftermath of NATO's intervention. However, social dualism and polarization within the opposition groups helped the

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<sup>378</sup> "The Kosovo Report", **Independent International Commission on Kosovo**, 2000, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F62789D9FCC56FB3C1256C1700303E3B-thekosovoreport.htm>, (11.05.2016).

<sup>379</sup> Bernhard Knoll, "From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and the Problem of an International Administration's Open-ended Mandate", **European Journal of International Law**, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2005, pp. 637-660.

<sup>380</sup> Michael Steiner, "Address to the Security Council by SRS Michael Steiner", **UNMIK Press Release**, 31.07.2002, <http://www.unmikonline.org/PR/792%20-%20Address%20to%20the%20Security%20Council.dot>, (11.05.2016).

<sup>381</sup> Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović, "War, Nationalism, and Mothers in the Former Yugoslavia", **The Women and War Reader**, (Eds. Loiss Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin), New York University Press, New York, 1998, pp. 234-239.

<sup>382</sup> Eric D. Gordy, **Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives**, Penn State Press, Pennsylvania, 2010, pp. 51-52.

regime for long years to manipulate the public perceptions and impoverish the opposition. This situation did not immediately bring Milošević down due to opposition (SPO and SRS) who backed Milošević during the wars and conflicts. However, within one year, civil society, the media and activists were able to organize and unite the Serbian opposition against the one-man regime.

In the aftermath of the wars and conflicts and during the Western sanctions, social and economic problems started dominating the political agenda. Milošević started losing his popularity mainly because of his absolute personality in power, lack of reforms and progress in Serbia's political and economic system, and above all by his authoritarian policies exercised during the wars.<sup>383</sup> At the same time, the regime maintained a "semi-democracy" character with periodically repeated elections that gave the chance of debate over regime preferences for opposition parties and some independent media.<sup>384</sup>

Although Milošević's term was set to end in 2001, he called for early elections that would be held on September 24, 2000 assuming that he would win the election one more time. In July 2000, he also changed the Yugoslav presidential election system. In the new system rather than the parliament, the people were going to directly elect the president. Milošević, ran for the elections using his usual nationalistic card including his usual discourse of victimization. Opposition groups that included 18 parties formed an election coalition called *Democratic Opposition of Serbia* (DOS) and selected Vojislav Koštunica as their candidate. The DOS managed to win more than 50% of the votes. However, next morning Milošević appealed the election results and declared a second ballot as the opposition was celebrating their victories. Organized demonstrations started all over Serbia, beginning on the 27<sup>th</sup> of September with approximately half a million people participating (10% of the country's population).<sup>385</sup>

Unlike the old massive opposition protest campaigns that used to fail, this time the Serbian opposition was successful. This last one succeeded changing the regime.

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<sup>383</sup> Karmen Erjavec and Zala Volčič, "The Kosovo Battle: Media's Recontextualization of the Serbian Nationalistic Discourses", *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, Vol. 12, 2007, (The Kosovo Battle), pp. 67-86.

<sup>384</sup> Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, p. 423.

<sup>385</sup> Tristan Landry, "The Colour Revolutions in the Rearview Mirror: Closer than They Appear", *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2011, pp. 1-24.

The disappearance of the fear among the large Serbian population and bureaucratic elites was one of the leading dynamics that differed from the previous attempts.<sup>386</sup> The majority of the protestors who identified themselves as Serbs (83.5%) were well-educated between the ages of 20-35 and lived mostly in urban areas. Notably absent were farmers, blue-collar workers and oligarchs. The protestors' motivations for participation were articulated in a variety of responses: justice for voters (59.6%), the desire to destroy communism (23.8%), and/or to build a western-type society (23.2%). Both the expectations and demands for the future were listed as more civic freedom (43%) and a western version of democratic state (92%).<sup>387</sup>

The Otpor Movement, founded in 1998 by Serbian students, played a leading role in opposition through their creative and non-violent methods.<sup>388</sup> Their protest methods included stickers (with the main slogan 'He's Finished') and stencilled fists on the walls of the major cities. Further, they administered radio channels such as B92 as well as Index and ANEM networks. They also organized certain artistic activities such as street theatre, cultural events, where Milošević's pictures were destroyed.<sup>389</sup> Otpor popularized a simple, but innovative campaign with the slogans "He is done!" and "It is time!" during the street protests.<sup>390</sup>

"Save Serbia and kill yourself, Slobo" became a popular slogan; Ljubisav Ćokić, an unemployed bulldozer operator, used his vehicle to storm the propaganda machine of the regime - the offices of television and The National Radio (RTS) building. These eponymous events represented the turning point of the protests and led to what is known today as the "Bulldozer Revolution."<sup>391</sup> In planning these protests, the reaction of security forces was the main concern of oppositions to prevent them

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<sup>386</sup> Roger Cohen, "Who Really Brought down Milosevic?", **New York Times Magazine**, 26.11.2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/26/magazine/who-really-brought-down-milosevic.html?pagewanted=all>, (20.02.2016).

<sup>387</sup> Quoted from Marc W. Steinberg, "When Politics Goes Pop: On the Intersections of Popular and Political Culture and the Case of Serbian Student Protests", **Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest**, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2004, p. 12.

<sup>388</sup> This first colourful revolution repeated in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan categorised as counterelite-led, non-violent mass protests following fraudulent elections in Eurasian postsocialist countries in hybrid through creative, non-violent mass protests. For the details see: Julia Gerlach, **Color Revolutions in Eurasia**, Springer, Berlin, 2014.

<sup>389</sup> Landry, p. 3.

<sup>390</sup> Gerlach, p. 5.

<sup>391</sup> Bulldozer Revolution differs from the other examples according to the methods used by the Serbians that were inspired by Gandhi and the writings of apostles of non-violence by well-known scholar Gene Sharp. For details see: Landry, pp. 1-24.

from intervening on Milošević's behalf.<sup>392</sup> Armed forces did not follow regime's orders in a way that Milošević was unprotected during the protests. Interestingly, Serbian Orthodox Church, as leading organization in historical and cultural life of the country also called on him to accept the election result.<sup>393</sup> On October 6, 2000, Milošević had to recognize Koštunica's victory and left the power in the following day.

In April 2001, Milošević was arrested and charged with the misuse of state funds and abuse of power while in office. In June, Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić overruled the Constitutional Court and authorized Milošević's extradition to the ICTY. Consequently, Milošević was charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. His trial began in February 2002 and lasted four years. In March 2006, before the final decision of the Court, Milošević was found dead in his prison cell and was buried in his hometown, Požarevac.

## II. THE VICTIMHOOD NARRATIVE AS THE LEGACY OF THE MILOŠEVIĆ'S REGIME

When Milošević left power, he was the hero for the half of the Serbian population and tyrant for the other half. During his rule, he managed to turn every opportunity, from the war to the peace negotiations from his country's isolation to his extradition to court in The Hague into a means of popularity and myth.<sup>394</sup> The economic sanctions imposed on Serbia and the NATO military intervention in 1999 strengthened Milošević, as he represented himself as the defender of the Serbs against NATO and the West. Not surprisingly his defence before the court at the ICTY, after all, turned into a "Milošević show." According to Pappas, political preferences by Milošević have intensely displayed ethnic outlooks by politicizing cultural themes and thus, creating a myth of a leader out of cultural and national myths.<sup>395</sup> The manoeuvres

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<sup>392</sup> Timothy Edmunds, "Intelligence Agencies and Democratisation: Continuity and Change in Serbia after Milosevic", **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 60, No. 1, 2008, pp. 25-48.

<sup>393</sup> Svetozar Stojanovic, **Serbia: The Democratic Revolution**, Humanity Books, New York, 2002, p. 202.

<sup>394</sup> Karmen Erjavec and Zala Volčič, "Rehabilitating Milošević: Posthumous Coverage of the Milošević Regime in Serbian Newspapers", **Social Semiotics**, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2009, pp. 125-147.

<sup>395</sup> Pappas, p. 205.

and the propaganda of Milošević on Kosovo emerged as the deep-rooted remaining of the past: *victimhood*.

In the Milošević era, being a Serb was equivalent (meant) to being a victim. This sense of victimhood caused anger and looked as if to validate Serbian conflicts in Croatia, BiH, and Kosovo as self-defence.<sup>396</sup> However, the loss of Kosovo has been the most difficult defeat for Serbia in the past decade. Neither the expulsion and emigration of Serbs from Croatia, nor the failure to secure a stronger Serbian republic in BiH has had a similar impact as the end of Serbia's rule over Kosovo.<sup>397</sup> From the viewpoint of the Serbs, Kosovo as the site of Serbian heroism, martyrdom, and struggle had gone under the occupation of anti-Serbian forces for the third time.

The discourse and the narrative of "victimhood," believed to be caused by the Westerners still have a domino effect among both the elites and the mass.<sup>398</sup> First and foremost motivation of the victimhood perception is based on the Serbian way of interpretation concerning the origin and the beginning of the crisis. As opposed to the main stream argument that the Albanians were the victims of the Balkans, Serbians in fact counter their argument by claiming that they in fact are the "real" victims.<sup>399</sup> It was not the Serbian people, but the Albanian nationalists who began to exploit the principles of equality and national rights. According to a set plan of action, the Albanians (the KLA) were able to manipulate the international community. Carnegie asserts, "It has been consistently ignored, but the Kosovar Albanians themselves began the terrorism long before Milošević came to power."<sup>400</sup>

Conflict with Albanians in Kosovo began just after the death of Tito in 1981. Albanian rebellions (terrorists) used violence against Yugoslavia, including the damaging of all the symbols and factories.<sup>401</sup> Even before the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991, many Serbs had left Kosovo due to their growing discomfort with Albanian

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<sup>396</sup> Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, **Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996.

<sup>397</sup> Florian Bieber and Židas Daskalovski, **Understanding the War in Kosovo**, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2003, p. 132.

<sup>398</sup> Veljko Vujačić, "Reexamining the 'Serbian Exceptionalism' Thesis", **Filozofija i Društvo**, Vol. 21, 2003, pp. 205-246.

<sup>399</sup> Stef Jansen, "Victims, Underdogs and Rebels Discursive Practices of Resistance in Serbian Protest", **Critique of Anthropology**, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2000, pp. 393-419.

<sup>400</sup> Marc Carnegie, "The Albanian Front", **The American Spectator**, Vol. 32, No. 6, 1999, p. 42.

<sup>401</sup> Branka Magaš, **The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92**, Verso, London, 1993.



majority, and their anti-Yugoslavian/Serbian threats of violence.<sup>402</sup> Ultimately, the KLA succeeded in internationalization of the crisis for outside help, manipulating the crisis in Kosovo much worse.<sup>403</sup> According to the Serbs, the truth was that they followed their historical, legal and democratic rights of sovereignty, territorial integrity as well as security.<sup>404</sup>

Serbia's perception and position towards world politics and the international community has often been offensive, reactionary and laced with conspiracy theories.<sup>405</sup> Moreover, the closeness and xenophobic attitudes were brought by the influential regime propaganda that portrayed Western countries as the aggressors.<sup>406</sup> The NATO bombings were perceived as the most difficult period of Serbia since World War II, in which they were subjected to the most brutal forms of aggression by NATO that Serbians identified as "North American Terrorist Organization." Milošević's regime equated NATO to the Nazis, comparing President Clinton to Hitler.<sup>407</sup> From their viewpoint, the NATO bombings reflected USA imperialism which had violated international law, territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations and countries. For example, in his address to the public, new President Koštunica proclaimed Kosovo a phony state that was created by the bombs that NATO used in order to destroy Serbia.<sup>408</sup>

It was not only NATO, but also the UN, the ICTY and the EU that were linked with a strong sense of injustice and antagonism. The majority of Serbs felt that the

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<sup>402</sup> Tim Judah, **The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia**, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1997, pp. 152-157.

<sup>403</sup> John R. Fulton, "NATO and the KLA: How the West Encouraged Terrorism", **Global Security Studies**, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2010, pp. 130-41.

<sup>404</sup> Shigeno, pp. 141-142.

<sup>405</sup> Rehn's spokeswoman said that he was grateful of Prime Minister Kostunica, stopped short of putting responsibility on the EU for Serbia-Montenegro's 6-0 defeat against Argentina in the World Cup. Lucia Kubosova, "Serbia to File New Mladic Arrest Plan", **EUobserver**, 26.06.2006, <https://euobserver.com/political/21952>, (10.05.2016).

<sup>406</sup> Ljiljana J. Bačević, **Srbi i Evropa (Serbs and Europe)**, Centar za antiratnu akciju, Beograd, 2001, quoted from Dragan Popadić, "Building up European Identity: From the Chimney Smoke", **MIRICO Final Conference**, Frankfurt am Main, 24-24.10.2008.

<sup>407</sup> "Behind the Headlines: Balkan Crisis Evokes Images from the Holocaust and Exodus", **Jewish Telegraphic Agency**, 06.04.1999, <http://www.jta.org/1999/04/06/archive/behind-the-headlines-balkan-crisis-evokes-images-from-the-holocaust-and-exodus-2>, (08.05.2016).

<sup>408</sup> "Prime Minister Kostunica: Proclamation of Phoney State on Serbia's Territory Result of US Policy of Force", **Serbian Orthodox Church**, 17.02.2008, [http://www.spc.rs/eng/prime\\_minister\\_kostunica\\_proclamation\\_phoney\\_state\\_serbia%E2%80%99s\\_territory\\_result\\_us\\_policy\\_force](http://www.spc.rs/eng/prime_minister_kostunica_proclamation_phoney_state_serbia%E2%80%99s_territory_result_us_policy_force), (11.05.2016).

West followed a biased approach that solely incriminated the Serbs.<sup>409</sup> These strong sense of injustice and antagonism emerged also against the UN system. Despite UN Resolution 1244, which ensured Kosovo within the sovereign territory of Serbia; through the “unfair” way, Kosovo was “stolen” by the international community on behalf of the Albanians. Thus, Kosovo has undergone a transformative process, including ethno-symbolic references such as being the historical land of Serbian origins, cultural myth of unfairness and exploitation suffered by the Serbs.<sup>410</sup>

For instance, Tadić, the third Serbian president stated, “It is evident that the secessionist move by the Assembly of Kosovo is an attempt to bypass the Security Council and unilaterally impose a solution.” He then appealed to the Council to “unambiguously reconfirm that the fundamental principles of the Charter of the UN and international law have universal validity,” asking member states of the UN to “fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia, in accordance with their obligations under international law, the UN charter and UN Security Resolution 1244.”<sup>411</sup>

According to Serbian nationalists, the ICTY, which was considered an international 'tool,' followed a selective justice that prejudiced and enforced double standards against the Serbs, hindering justice.<sup>412</sup> For Serbs all international initiatives followed a selective approach for transitional justice in a way that biased decisions were taken when it came to crimes committed by the Croats in BiH or by Albanians in Kosovo. The UN War Crimes Prosecutor for instance declined to investigate NATO’s bombings<sup>413</sup> and the ICTY has represented the “victor’s justice.”<sup>414</sup>

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<sup>409</sup> Diana Johnston, **Ahmakların Seferi: Yugoslavya, NATO ve Batı’nın Aldatmacaları**, çev. Emre Ergüven, Bağlam, Ankara, 2004, pp. 93-94.

<sup>410</sup> Jelena Obradovic, "Kosovo: The View from Serbia", **ISS Analysis**, April 2008, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/kosovo.pdf>, (02.02.2016).

<sup>411</sup> “Letter Dated 17 February 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Serbia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General”, **UN General Assembly Security Council**, 19.02.2008, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20S%202008%20111.pdf>, (02.02.2016).

<sup>412</sup> Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovic, "Potential for the Use of Informal Mechanisms and Responses to the Kosovo Conflict - Serbian Perspective", **Restoring Justice after Large-scale Violent Conflicts**, (Ed. Ivo Aertsen et al.), Willan Publishing, Devon, 2008, p. 166.

<sup>413</sup> Barbara Crossette, "U.N. War Crimes Prosecutor Declines to Investigate NATO", **The New York Times**, 03.06.2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/03/world/un-war-crimes-prosecutor-declines-to-investigate-nato.html>, (11.03.2016).

<sup>414</sup> Kari M. Osland, “The Trial of Milošević”, **Serbia since 1989: Politics and Society under Milosevic and After**, (Eds. Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran I. Pavlakovic), University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2015, p. 236.

In the case of the EU and the member states' support for Kosovo's independence, Brussels' backing of the Ahtisaari Plan led to the independence of Kosovo. EU acted as the main donor of the Albanians, thus creating a strong sense of injustice and antagonism towards the EU by the Serbs.<sup>415</sup> This cognition was went along with a harsh sentimental elements - distrust, antagonism and opposition towards the EU.<sup>416</sup>

For some time following the conflict, Serbian elites "exported" shame on other Balkan nations and the Westerners by constructing a nationalistic narrative - bad faith and living in falsehood.<sup>417</sup> The narrative of victimhood emerged as the top leading legacy of Milošević's regime following the Bulldozer Revolution in 2000. Since then, the Serbian political culture, especially during the period of 2000-2008, encircled a denial syndrome that has xenophobic nationalist characteristics.<sup>418</sup> The narrative of victimhood and denial syndrome was sustained in post-Milošević Serbia especially among the larger nationalist groups. The end of the old regime did not bring a clear detachment from his nationalist policy mostly in two areas: Kosovo and the ICTY. The ideology of victimization continued to serve as a repository of nationalists.<sup>419</sup> The all-powerful representatives of the Milošević regime (especially army and secret services) kept their positions within the power structures.

In dealing with its past legacy, Serbia's self-identification of victimhood created both the trouble of escapism and denial during its pre-accession conditionality. Still today, even after the revolution, there is no real agreement on what actually took place in the near past and why, or how to assess the main actors, and the direction Serbia should go.<sup>420</sup> During the years of uncertainty in post-Milošević Serbia, it took nearly 15 years for the EU to convince Belgrade to cooperate and comply with the ICTY and normalize its relations with Kosovo (still an unfinished business).

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<sup>415</sup> Altuğ Günal, **Sırbistan'ın Avrupa'ya Dönüşü: Nedenler, Engeller, Beklentiler ve AB Faktörü**, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation), Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İzmir, 2011.

<sup>416</sup> Dragan Popadić, "Building up European Identity: From the Chimney Smoke", **MIRICO Final Conference**, Frankfurt am Main, 24-24.10.2008.

<sup>417</sup> Ramet, The Denial Syndrome, p. 44.

<sup>418</sup> Sabrina P. Ramet, "The Denial Syndrome and its Consequences: Serbian Political Culture since 2000", **Communist and Post-Communist Studies**, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2007, (The Denial Syndrome) pp. 41-58.

<sup>419</sup> Nenad Dimitrijevic, "Serbia after the Criminal Past: What Went Wrong and What should be Done", **International Journal of Transitional Justice**, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2008, pp. 5-22.

<sup>420</sup> Popadić, p. 10.

### III. TRANSITION PERIOD IN SERBIA: CONFLICT BETWEEN NATIONALISTS AND REFORMISTS

The peaceful revolution in Serbia did not create totally a new political structure in Belgrade. Domestic elites, including political ones of the previous regime, were not replaced,<sup>421</sup> but kept their positions as part of the politics and bureaucracy.<sup>422</sup> Nebojša Čović, the Serbian Vice-President at the time, approved the major features of continuity with the previous regime, admitting, "After some time we came to the stage where everything is the same, only he (Milošević) is missing."<sup>423</sup>

During the first decade of the transition, there was no lustration in Serbia, but rather continuity of structures and individuals with the old regime. Institutions, actors, values and reflections did not simply disappear; instead, they turned into a set of features as the legacies of Milošević era.<sup>424</sup> As a prime reflection of the notion, President Tadić later in 2011 accused people from the state that protected war criminals and let them walk (around) freely.<sup>425</sup>

Belgrade sent conflicting outlook during the early years of political transition which did not dismiss the negative image of Serbia possessed by the previous regime. The perception of the international community was that although Milošević was not in politics, the country had not really entered a new era. His legacies made it difficult for Serbia to gain international acceptance and certain opportunities until their limited cooperation with the ICTY,<sup>426</sup> and normalisation of the relations with Kosovo.

Identity and nationalism especially came to the fore as a continuation of the past in this new era. Nationalist rhetoric continued to dominate the public sphere; emphasizing ethnicity and claiming common descent, history, religion, and

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<sup>421</sup> Current president of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić was a member of Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and deputy Prime Minister at the time, Vojislav Šešelj was also put on trial in The Hague. Current prime minister, Aleksandar Vučić is also blamed to actively involve in 'Greater Serbia' ideology while Ivica Dačić, who used to be spokesman of Milosevic is running currently as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>422</sup> Ivan Vejvoda, "Serbia after Four Years of Transition", **The Western Balkans: Moving on**, (Ed. Judy Batt), Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2004, pp. 37-54.

<sup>423</sup> Cited in Ognjen Pribicevic, "Serbia after Milošević", **Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2004, pp. 109-110.

<sup>424</sup> Massari, p. 267.

<sup>425</sup> Valerie Zabriskie, "Serbia after Mladic Arrest", **Euronews**, 03.06.2011, <http://www.euronews.com/2011/06/03/serbia-after-mladic-arrest/>, (10.04.2016).

<sup>426</sup> Massari, p. 269.

territory.<sup>427</sup> The political processes and the prevailing value orientations, revealed as the legacies, continuity and reproduction of what were essentially the same institutional and ideological patterns.<sup>428</sup> This continuity made the Serbian transition problematic.<sup>429</sup>

Just at the beginning of the transition, the regime conflict regarding the competitive political scene divided the political parties into two sects as pro-Europeans (reformists) and anti-Europeans (nationalists).<sup>430</sup> More precisely, Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and repeatedly SRS have been the main pillars of the Milošević regime; while DS, Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), and New Serbia (NS) have remained as the reformists. In addition, the parties of the ethnic minorities have taken a pro-European reformist stance.

The parties that were newly established, G17+ and LDP have joined the reformer side of the political spectrum. At the leadership level, while President Koštunica (2000-2003) represented the nationalists although he was more moderate and not in the same camp with SRS and SPS,<sup>431</sup> Prime Minister Đinđić represented the reformists. This dualism in 'new' Serbia led two political wings to go into political fights rather than working on the reformation of a new regime.

This dualism had a significant impact on foreign policy due to the competition between the nationalists and the reformists. Serbian foreign policy orientation has been the major issue of conflict. The conflicting ideas in foreign policy were mainly related to Kosovo's status, cooperation with the ICTY, EU integration and relations with Moscow. Reformists were concerned with the new setting, confirming a modern, democratic, pro-European orientation; while nationalists who pursued a foreign policy based on history, religion, nationalism and traditional form of alliances were in favour

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<sup>427</sup> Iavor Rangelov, "International Law and Local Ideology in Serbia", **Peace Review**, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2004, pp. 331-337.

<sup>428</sup> Lazić, Value Orientations, pp. 195-207.

<sup>429</sup> Mladen Ostošić, **Between Justice and Stability: The Politics of War Crimes Prosecutions in post-Milosevic Serbia**, Routledge, London, 2014.

<sup>430</sup> Bochsler, pp. 99-118.

<sup>431</sup> Koštunica, who was widely seen as a representative of the national-democratic wing in post Milošević's Serbia, in fact was pro-EU until 2006-2007. He actually did not hesitate to sever relations with the West and the EU when he found it necessary to protect national dignity. ... For details see: Janine Natalya Clark, "Vojislav Koštunica: Some Reflections on his time as Prime Minister", **Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies**, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008, pp. 31-46.

of a 'Kosovo-first' policy. Previous EU Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn's observation is worth quoting:

*Some politicians in Serbia are using Kosovo to turn towards Moscow, instead of toward Brussels... The Serb people could choose greater freedom, better standard of living, peaceful neighbourly relations, or risk self-isolation if they choose nationalist authoritarianism that is offered by those who reject the European Union and the European way of living.*<sup>432</sup>

The balance during the first two years of transition, between the reformist Đinđić and the nationalist Koštunica, changed in favour of the nationalists after Đinđić's assassination.<sup>433</sup> The two coalition governments (2004-2008) that were formed since then by Koštunica as the prime minister ruled out the reforms for the fulfilment of the EU's pre-accession conditions with their main agenda(s) with national sovereignty and statehood issues. In this manner, he was against the idea of any extradition of war criminals accused by the ICTY in The Hague.<sup>434</sup> While reforms on the economy were seriously slowed down and the opening of the negotiations for signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) was suspended, Koštunica stated that he favoured voluntary surrender rather than the cooperation with The Hague.

'Kosovo first' policy preferences by nationalists revealed Russia as an alternative to the EU. Russia's ambassador to Belgrade described the Serbs as the bright representatives of the Slavic tribes.<sup>435</sup> President Nikolić in his first official foreign visit to Russia said, "The only thing I love more than Russia is Serbia."<sup>436</sup> There are many reasons which Serbia attached significance to its relations with Moscow. Russia has always been vocal about its support for Serbia over the Kosovo issue in UNSC, and its donations for the damaged Serbian heritages in Kosovo.<sup>437</sup> Both

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<sup>432</sup> Olli Rehn, "Europe's Smart Power in its Region and the World", **Speech at the European Studies Centre, St Antony's College**, University of Oxford, Oxford, 2008.

<sup>433</sup> Ramet, *The Denial Syndrome*, p. 48.

<sup>434</sup> Prof. Dr. Nebojsa Vladislavljovic, **Interview**, Belgrade, December 20, 2017.

<sup>435</sup> Andrej Ivanji, "Ambassador who could not be more Serb than Serbs", **B92**, 15.09.2012, [http://www.b92.net/eng/insight/tvshows.php?yyyy=2012&mm=09&nav\\_id=82233](http://www.b92.net/eng/insight/tvshows.php?yyyy=2012&mm=09&nav_id=82233), (01.06.2016).

<sup>436</sup> "President Loves only Serbia more than Russia", **B92**, 10.09.2012, [http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2012&mm=09&dd=10&nav\\_id=82164](http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2012&mm=09&dd=10&nav_id=82164), (01.03.2016).

<sup>437</sup> "A New Era in Russian-Serbian Relations?", **The Economist**, 12.09.2012, <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=939550278&Country=Serbia&topic=Politics>, (14.03.2016).

Russia and Serbia often talk about their Slavic and Orthodox brotherhood.<sup>438</sup> Furthermore, Russia is a significant trade partner for Belgrade.<sup>439</sup>

Despite nationalists, reformists perceived the EU as the only viable foreign policy aim in order to avoid international sanctions, getting restoration assistance, ensuring aid packages and new trade agreements for the political and economic liberalization.<sup>440</sup> However until 2008, Serbian politicians were not able to make the EU vision the mainstream objective of the new regime as Serbia was perceived as the 'frustrating and often disappointing partner' in the Western Balkans.<sup>441</sup> Firstly, the lack of a 'European vision' was compounded by the negative idea of Europe propagated by the nationalists, who presented the EU as something necessarily anti-Serbian due to its 'pro-Kosovo' stance.<sup>442</sup> Secondly, being pro-European was still costly due to the victimhood and denial syndrome.

Serbia's pre-European process harboured confusion, dilemmas and no well-defined concept of relations.<sup>443</sup> In 2007, the National Assembly declared Serbia's military neutrality against any existing security communities including NATO. This decision threatened to isolate Serbia from Euro-Atlantic integration altogether, and led critics to believe that Serbia preferred to strengthen its diplomatic relations with Russia over the EU membership.<sup>444</sup> Ukraine's ambassador to Belgrade accused Serbia, being the instrument of Russia by adding that Serbia cannot sit on two chairs.<sup>445</sup> Belgrade might have entered the process of transitional justice through ICTY and contribute to the peace in the region just after the Revolution, but the agenda delayed to post-2008

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<sup>438</sup> Enza Roberta Petrillo, "Russian Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: Which Perspective?", **Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)**, No. 169, 2013.

<sup>439</sup> Russia is one of the major trade partner 7.2% of total merchandise trade. For details see: "Serbia – Trade Profile", **WTO**, 2017, [https://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/statis\\_e/daily\\_update\\_e/trade\\_profiles/RS\\_e.pdf](https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/daily_update_e/trade_profiles/RS_e.pdf), (25.09.2018).

<sup>440</sup> Radeljić, p. 245.

<sup>441</sup> Judy Batt, "The Question of Serbia", **European Union Institute for Security Studies**, No. 81, 2005, p. 9.

<sup>442</sup> Erjavec and Volcic, *The Kosovo Battle*, pp. 67–86.

<sup>443</sup> Srećko Đukić, "Serbia's Relations with Russia: An Overview of the Post-Yugoslav (Post-Soviet) Era", **The Challenges of Serbia's Foreign Policy**, (Ed. Jelica Minić), European Movement Serbia, Belgrade, 2015, pp. 31-36.

<sup>444</sup> Obradović-Wochnik and Wochnik, pp. 1158-1181.

<sup>445</sup> "Ukraine's Ambassador: Putin Using Serbia to Destroy Europe", **B92**, 01.11.2017, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/world.php?yyyy=2017&mm=11&dd=01&nav\\_id=102697](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/world.php?yyyy=2017&mm=11&dd=01&nav_id=102697), (25.12.2018).

period.<sup>446</sup> The EU had to wait for the arrival of a pro-EU governing coalition until 2008 for the improvement of Serbia-EU relations.

In spite of the Bulldozer Revolution in 2000 the early years of the transition (2000 and 2008) when Belgrade experienced tensions between Eurosceptic nationalists and pro-European reformists, the cooperation with the ICTY and the normalisation of the relations with Kosovo emerged as the critical issues in bilateral relations (during pre-accession period) between the EU and Serbia.

#### **A. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)**

Not only the public perception but also a large number of domestic elites in Serbia also displayed symptoms of the denial syndrome and the victimhood narrative for the role and responsibilities during the conflicts and the wars. They preferred to transpose the guilt of war crimes to the Croats, Bosniaks, and Kosovar Albanians and considered the Trial as a biased and illegitimate trial. During the 2000-2005 period, reformists headed by Đinđić and nationalists headed by Koštunica did not agree with each other on the issue of war criminals and dealing with the past. The reformists in an attempt to accelerate Serbia's integration into the EU launched the policy of extraditing suspected war criminals to The Hague. Nationalists opposed this policy and Koštunica objected to the dismissal of members of previous regime from bureaucracy including the security with his concern for national unity and consensus.<sup>447</sup>

In 2003 in order to investigate war crimes and organized crime, Serbian government established The War Crimes Chamber of the Belgrade District Court (Special Court for War Crimes) and the Organized Crime Chamber of the Belgrade District Court (Special Court for Organized Crime) two specialized domestic courts. However, this situation postponed the fulfilment of Serbia's international legal obligations since the state-dominated courts preferred to follow the state's preferences.

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<sup>446</sup> Subotić, *Europe is a State of Mind*, pp. 309-330.

<sup>447</sup> Audrey H. Budding, "From Dissidents to Presidents: Dobrica Ćosić and Vojislav Koštunica Compared", *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2004, pp. 185-201.



Serbian government's reluctance for cooperation with the ICTY increased when International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded in its well-known case, (*Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro*, 2007) that the acts committed at Srebrenica by the Serbians fell within the acts of genocide.<sup>448</sup> Moreover, the Court concluded that Former Republic of Yugoslavia violated its obligation to prevent the Srebrenica genocide and also failed in its duty to co-operate fully with the ICTY.<sup>449</sup> The Court declared FRY as responsible for the genocide.<sup>450</sup> President Tadić read the decision as the proof that Serbia did not commit the genocide, while Prime Minister Koštunica called all the former Yugoslav nations in solving the war crimes and bringing their perpetrators to justice.<sup>451</sup>

In response to Serbian quest to get involved into the SAA, compliance with ICTY was formulated as pre-condition. Since the initiation of the progress reports in 2005, the EU has repeatedly clarified that Serbia should show further significant progress, mainly concerning cooperation with the ICTY.<sup>452</sup> In May 2006, the EU suspended the negotiations due to Serbia's non-compliance and non-cooperation with the ICTY.<sup>453</sup> The pro-EU reformists' candidate Boris Tadić, who promised to take

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<sup>448</sup> For the full version of the decision, see: "Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (*Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro*)", **ICJ - Summary of the Judgment of 26 February 2007**, 26.02.2007, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13687.pdf>, (18.04.2016).

<sup>449</sup> This failure constituted a violation by the Respondent of its duties as a party to the Dayton Agreement, and as a Member of the UN, and accordingly a violation of its obligations under Article VI of the Genocide Convention.

<sup>450</sup> The Court concluded that "there is nothing which could justify an affirmative response to this question. It has not been shown that the FRY army took part in the massacres, nor that the political leaders of the FRY had a hand in preparing, planning or in any way carrying out the massacres... At the relevant time, July 1995, according to the Court, "neither the Republika Srpska nor the VRS could be regarded as mere instruments through which the FRY was acting, and as lacking any real autonomy. The Court therefore finds that the acts of genocide at Srebrenica cannot be attributed to the Respondent as having been committed by its organs or by persons or entities wholly dependent upon it, and thus do not on this basis entail the Respondent's international responsibility."

<sup>451</sup> "Disappointment in Bosnia, Relief in Serbia", **B92**, 26.02.2007, [http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2007&mm=02&dd=26&nav\\_id=39835](http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2007&mm=02&dd=26&nav_id=39835), (03.03.2016).

<sup>452</sup> European Commission, "Serbia and Montenegro: 2005 Progress Report", **EU Enlargement Strategy**, 09.11.2005, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs\\_autres\\_institutions/commission\\_europeenne/sec/2005/1428/COM\\_SEC\(2005\)1428\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/sec/2005/1428/COM_SEC(2005)1428_EN.pdf), (13.03.2016).

<sup>453</sup> "Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union concerning Council Common Position 2009/717/CFSP of 24 September 2009 Extending Common Position 2004/694/CFSP on further Measures in Support of the Effective Implementation of the Mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)", **Council of the European Union**, 16.12.2009, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/111978.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/111978.pdf), (14.02.2016).

Serbia into the EU was elected as the president in 2004. In the following years under the influence of the EU conditionality, Serbian government arrested and sent the most wanted war criminals to The Hague.<sup>454</sup> Moreover, on July 10, 2005 Tadić visited Srebrenica on the 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary. Consequently, domestic dynamics and the rise of a reformist president led to the reopening of the negotiations later in 2007.<sup>455</sup>

## **B. “Kosovo First” Policy**

Soon after the Revolution, Belgrade advised Serbs in Kosovo to boycott the government institutions and UNMIK bodies as well as the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).<sup>456</sup> Serbian minority in Kosovo that is located mostly in the northern part, set up ‘parallel institutions’ against the administration(s) in Pristina and facilitated the consolidation of the Serb-majority areas of North Mitrovica and Leposavić. This policy embedded Serbian versus Albanian separations, and weakened EULEX objectives and operations due to the fact that EULEX had practically did not extent to Serbian-dominated regions in Kosovo. Consequently, to confirm policies of Serbs in Kosovo, the National Assembly of Serbia passed a Resolution on the Protection of Sovereignty and National Integrity, which stated that the proposed EU mission for “implementing Ahtisaari’s rejected plan” would be a “violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia.”<sup>457</sup>

During the years leading to Kosovo’s independence, Serbian nationalists sabotaged the possibility of alternative positions on Kosovo by shaping public opinion, using Milošević era discourse, and pushing a nationalist agenda.<sup>458</sup> Kosovo was presented to the public as a national question, irreconcilable and incompatible with the accession. Territorial integrity of Serbia was not an issue that could be discussed as

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<sup>454</sup> Bosnian Serb wartime leader Radovan Karadžić is arrested in 2008; Mladic and Goran Hadzic were arrested in 2011.

<sup>455</sup> In 2008, this time, the Netherlands and Belgium used their veto powers and froze the trade-related part of the SAA with Serbia.

<sup>456</sup> International Crisis Group, "Serb Integration in Kosovo: Taking the Plunge Europe", **Report No. 200**, 12.05.2009, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/kosovo/200-serb-integration-in-kosovo-taking-the-plunge.aspx>, (01.06.2016).

<sup>457</sup> "Serbian Parliament's Kosovo Resolution", **B92**, 27.12.2007, [http://www.b92.net/eng/insight/strategies.php?yyyy=2007&mm=12&nav\\_id=46517](http://www.b92.net/eng/insight/strategies.php?yyyy=2007&mm=12&nav_id=46517), (01.06.2016).

<sup>458</sup> Obradović-Wochnik and Wochnik, pp. 1158-1181.

part of the EU accession deals. This became very clear during the status talks in 2006 between Serbia and Kosovo.<sup>459</sup> As the status talks eventually became deadlocked after Serbia rejected the Ahtisaari Plan, Serbia's solution was to adopt a new constitution in September 2006, in which it declared that Kosovo still part of Serbia.

The situation drastically changed by the end of 2007, when it became clear that Kosovo would unilaterally declare independence, given the fact that there had been no agreement on this issue through negotiations. Furthermore, the EU decided to send its rule of law mission, EULEX, to Kosovo in order to replace the UN mission, without the UNSC approval. Meanwhile, a large majority of the EU member states expressed their readiness to recognize Kosovo as an independent state.

Prime Minister Koštunica viewed the mission as an attempt of the EU to recognize Kosovo as an independent state.<sup>460</sup> The plan by Martti Ahtisaari, UN envoy, in February 2007 welcomed by Albanians, but rejected by the Serbs.<sup>461</sup> The initiatives has failed and Albanians unilaterally declared Kosovo's independence. Since 1999, the future of Kosovo's final status are on table including Serbia's bid for membership in a way that the normalisations of the relations between Belgrade and Pristina as a pre-condition is still under negotiations by the mediation of Brussels.

#### IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

History is one of the leading indicators to understand and explain the contemporary Balkan politics. Serbia as the country of transition from communism to capitalism and from an authoritarian rule to a somewhat defective democracy has been impacted from the legacies of the past. Serbian history under the shadow of nationalism produces and re-produces obstacles and challenges and causes up & down path-way in its transition. Victimhood is still an alive laboratory for status quo oriented nationalist groups which stand for a Eurosceptic position. Unending battle of Kosovo

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<sup>459</sup> Marc Weller, "The Vienna Negotiations on the Final Status for Kosovo", *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 4, 2008, pp. 670-679.

<sup>460</sup> Elitsa Vucheva, "EU Kosovo Mission 'Unacceptable' for Serbia", *EUobserver*, 17.12.2004, <https://euobserver.com/enlargement/25350>, (17.02.2016).

<sup>461</sup> "Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement", *United Nations - Ahtisaari Plan*, 02.02.2007, <http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Proposal%20.pdf>, (24.03.2016).

and the cooperation with the ICTY emerged as high-cost pre-conditions imposed by the EU for these pan-European reformist elites. Although there are important developments towards the cooperation with the ICTY, Kosovo remains unresolved and contains fragile equation open to manipulation and violence.

Despite the heavy legacy of the past as well as the costs of the process and the existence of influential veto players, within this new conjuncture, the reformists have been successful in fulfilling the pre-conditions for the accession in 2013. The year 2008 (detailed in the next chapter), known as the longest year in Belgrade, ended more beneficial for the reformists, following their victories in elections that were perceived as a referendum on EU membership. Since then, the perceptions and positions towards Serbian identity and the national interests that were linked to EU integration had undergone through a redefining and restructuring process.

However, Serbian elites have been sensitive on the future of Kosovo that was considered as a national security priority. Serbia's transition has undergone "a one step forward two steps backward" process that has encompassed unfulfilled and frustrating expectations for the current leadership. In fact, it is problematic to suggest what exactly is new in 'new' Serbia, due to its uncompleted transition and its attempt to be slow on the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### THE EU'S ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY ON THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE ONGOING EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS IN SERBIA

*I am convinced that the change of our attitude towards Europe and the West... represents the creation of a more successful, modern and stronger Serbia; Serbia that can become a true leader in the region in the level of wages and pensions, economic growth, political stability... We are lagging behind our closer neighbours in all respects, not to mention the European giants.*

Aleksandar Vučić, Current President of Serbia, 2013

Political interdependence is significant in Western Balkans due to the cosmopolitan structure of geography, the legacy of history, and ultimately the nation-state building process following the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia. This interdependency of Western Balkan countries is also valid in their foreign policies as well as their ongoing Europeanization process. Therefore, it is not viable to ignore regional interdependency in our analyses. For example, without taking Belgrade into consideration, it will not be easy to analyse BiH, Montenegro and the newly established Kosovo's politics. Similarly, developments in these countries also have impacts on Serbia's Europeanization process that directly and/or indirectly affects domestic, regional and European policies as well.

As analysed in detail in the previous chapter, this observation was also evident in terms of policy priorities, opportunities and the obstacles the EU faced with during the pre-accession negotiations. For that reason, we have to examine both the EU's enlargement policy on the Western Balkans as a whole and at the same time the projections of these policies in the candidate countries as one-by-one cases. In order to uncover this context of political interdependence and dualism associated with domestic and regional politics; this chapter is designed as a "transition" section from historical background to the main focus of the study that is the party responses on the EU in Serbia.

To this end, the EU's enlargement strategy towards the Western Balkans has been analysed by covering policy priorities, opportunities and the obstacles. Main concentration of the chapter is Serbia's integration process into the EU. Accordingly, the chapter will describe Serbia-EU relations during the period of post-2008 elections by taking the attitude change among the political parties mainly of nationalists into

consideration. In the last part of the chapter, Serbia-EU relations will be analysed in the framework of the negotiations under the shadow of Copenhagen criteria (2008-2018).

Following their victories in the 2008 general elections in Serbia, which can be considered as a referendum on Serbian EU membership, the reformists gained an upper hand in Belgrade. Since then, the perceptions and positions towards Serbian identity and the national interests that were linked to EU integration had undergone through a redefining and restructuring process. The quote from the current President Vučić, sharply sums up the attitude change among the Serbian elites. They seem to renounce the victimhood legacy of the past and came out with a new vision for the country that is a European Serbia. In spite of the heavy legacy of the past as well as the costs of the process and the existence of influential veto players; the reformists have been successful in fulfilling the pre-conditions for the accession started in 2013.

However, Serbia - EU relations have undergone 'a one step forward two steps backward' process that has encompassed unfulfilled and frustrating expectations. In fact, it is still problematic and early to suggest that Serbian Europeanization follows a progressive and linear process due to its uncompleted transition and its slow progress on the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria.

## **I. THE EU'S ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY ON THE WESTERN BALKANS**

When the Common Market was established in 1986, the EU gave priority to its institutional and policy-based integration. However, the end of the Cold War reshaped European politics as new nation-states emerged into the CEE. As a consequence, Brussels had to both enlarge and deepen its agenda as European politics entered into a new decade. The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, featured three pillars and gave new direction and future to the EU. The CFSP agreed to be one of the main pillars. However, the CFSP, which disposes declarations, diplomacy, meetings and negotiations as standard diplomatic instruments, failed to prevent the Balkan wars in all initiatives taken.<sup>462</sup>

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<sup>462</sup> Stephen Keukeleire, "The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional, and Structural Diplomacy", **Diplomacy and Statecraft**, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2003, pp. 31-56.

CFSP in its early years was not enough to overcome the complexities during the break-up of Yugoslavia.<sup>463</sup> Inexperienced EU, in foreign and security policy, lacked providing 'soft' as well as 'hard' instruments yet again, the main structural shortcomings of the EU's conflict management in the Western Balkans since the 1990s. Europe could have stopped the successive wars during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, if the EU had been a stronger and a more united actor.<sup>464</sup> This failure strengthened the positions of the regional political elites side-lined by the USA-led UN and NATO interventions.

### A. Policy Priorities

The early 1990s emerged as the decade of uncertainty and lack of consensus among the EU member states towards the CFSP. The obstacles rose from the EU's failure to come up with a functional strategy to peacefully resolve the conflicts.<sup>465</sup> The London Conference in 1992 was the most obvious reflection of the inconsistent and unsuccessful search for solutions where conflicting perspectives and solutions were being discussed.<sup>466</sup> The intra-and inter-country diversities, the conceptualization of the conflict (whether it was a war, a civil war etc.) and how to deal with it all emerged as the prominent causes behind the Union's failure. As a consequence, the impact of the EU on the conflicts remained miniscule; integration and association were not an option until the crises ceased to be (violent) conflicts of subordination.<sup>467</sup>

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<sup>463</sup> Stefan Wolff and Annemarie Peen Rodt, "The EU and the Management of Ethnic Conflict", **The Protection of Minorities in the Wider Europe**, (Eds. Mark Weller et al.), Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2008, pp. 128-153.

<sup>464</sup> Charles Grant, "European Defence post-Kosovo?", **Centre for European Reform**, 2012, <https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2012/cerwp3-5671.pdf>, (22.02.2016), p. 2.

<sup>465</sup> Robert Dover, "The EU and the Bosnian Civil War 1992-95: The Capabilities-Expectations Gap at the Heart of EU Foreign Policy", **European Security**, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2005, p. 298.

<sup>466</sup> Mustafa Türkeş, "Bosna-Hersek Problemi: Londra Konferansı (1992) ve Siyasi Sonuçları", **Prof. Abdurrahman Çaycıya Armağan**, (Ed. Kollektif), Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Ankara, 1995, pp. 469-482.

<sup>467</sup> Thomas Diez, et al., "The European Union and the Transformation of Border Conflicts: Theorising the Impact of Integration and Association", **Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies**, January 2004, <http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/polsis/research/eu-border-conflict/wp01-eu-transformation-of-border-conflicts.pdf>, (24.04.2016), p. 9.

Political changes in Serbia and Croatia in early 2000s immensely strengthened the EU's hand in the Western Balkans due to its transition to multi-party system, which resulted in the rising of reformists. It is possible to share two observations of the EU's policy preferences since then: I) The EU had been cautiously pursuing a strategy of gradual engagement towards South East Europe.<sup>468</sup> Post-communist countries in the region have been involved, step by step, into a political dynamic similar to that of CEE,<sup>469</sup> and II) Brussels aimed to play the Union's self-assumed role of a promoter of regional cooperation<sup>470</sup> which the Commission underlines as the EU's continued capacity as a global actor.<sup>471</sup> The Stability Pact (1999) first provided a framework for comprehensive conflict resolution and delayed integration as a long-term horizon.<sup>472</sup>

During the early years of the disintegration, Europe defined the region as "Southeast Europe" as an alternative discourse to "Balkans." The crystallization of a negative image towards the Balkans in the Western world repeatedly canalized into self-congratulatory vision of enlightened "Europeanness" that set the standard of civilization and progress.<sup>473</sup> The Balkans was a place of backwardness, perpetual conflict, tribal competitions in clash with modern rationality similar to Todorova's critical reading towards Western perceptions, "Balkanism."<sup>474</sup>

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<sup>468</sup> Dimitar Bechev, **Constructing South East Europe: The Politics of Regional Identity in the Balkans**, Palgrave, London, 2006.

<sup>469</sup> European Commission, "2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper", **Enlargement**, 09.11.2005, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0561:FIN:EN:PDF>, (11.04.2016), p. 2.

<sup>470</sup> The Commission stated: "All the countries in the region need to be assisted in their attempts to synchronise regional co-operation efforts with the requirements of EU integration. The Stabilisation and Association process, Stability Pact and financial assistance each play a complementary role in this respect." For the details see: European Commission, "Making a Success of Enlargement Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the Progress towards Accession by each of the Candidate Countries", **Enlargement**, 2011, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key\\_documents/2001/strategy\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/strategy_en.pdf), (11.04.2016).

<sup>471</sup> European Commission, "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013", **Enlargement**, 10.10.2012, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2012/package/strategy\\_paper\\_2012\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/strategy_paper_2012_en.pdf), (11.04.2016), (Strategy 2012-2013), p. 10.

<sup>472</sup> Bendieck (2004) Der Konflikt im ehemaligen Jugoslawien und die Europäische Integration: Eine Analyse ausgewählter Politikfelder, Opladen, Leske Budrich, quoted from Thomas Diez, et al., "The European Union and the Transformation of Border Conflicts: Theorising the Impact of Integration and Association", **Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies**, January 2004, <http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/polsis/research/eu-border-conflict/wp01-eu-transformation-of-border-conflicts.pdf>, (24.04.2016), p. 9.

<sup>473</sup> Todorova, pp. 3-20.

<sup>474</sup> Todorova, pp. 3-20.



Post-Tito conflict in the region usually referred to as “the war in the Balkans” or even as “the Third Balkan War.”<sup>475</sup> The entire story and the processes of interactions are considered as the process of transforming those less-European and/or anti-European societies into European civilization and progress. The word ‘Serbian’ has become an adjective rather than being the name of a nation which has negative meanings.<sup>476</sup> Vuk Jeremić, former minister for foreign affairs (2007-2012), criticized Europeans by stating, “When they speak positively about us, they call us South East Europe and when they don’t, we are simply Balkans...”<sup>477</sup>

While the past refers to the conflict and the wars, the EU’s enlargement policy is portrayed as an investment in peace, security and stability.<sup>478</sup> The accession of the region is rendered as the way in overcoming the legacy of the past, thus fostering reconciliation.<sup>479</sup> Within the post-conflict environment, the EU has adopted a more comprehensive political framework for security and peace.<sup>480</sup> The language and the way the Western Balkans were portrayed in the Enlargement Strategy papers, strikingly reflect this Europeanization versus Balkanization dualism. The Strategy Paper in 2012 stated that the Western Balkans seems to be leaving the legacy of the past by remaining firmly on the path to reform. The accession process is defined as method for investment for European future.<sup>481</sup> Serbia is legitimized as it brought Serbian people into the European mainstream.<sup>482</sup> For the Commission, the enlargement

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<sup>475</sup> Glenny, pp. 1-30.

<sup>476</sup> Altuğ Günel, “Sırbistan Cumhuriyeti”, **Çağdaş Balkan Siyaseti**, (Eds. Murat Necip Arman and Nazif Mandacı), Gazi Kitapevi, Ankara, 2012, p. 89.

<sup>477</sup> Vuk Jeremić and Nickolay Mladenov, "Balkans 2020: The Ministerial Debate", **Public Lecture**, 18.11.2010, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=808>, (11.04.2016).

<sup>478</sup> Murat Necip Arman, **Avrupa Birliği’nin Batı Balkanlar Genişlemesi: Bir Dış Politika Aracı Olarak Kimlik Dönüşümü**, (Unpublished Doctorate Dissertation), Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İzmir, 2007.

<sup>479</sup> European Commission, “EU Enlargement Strategy”, **Enlargement**, 10.11.2015, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2015/20151110\\_strategy\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_strategy_paper_en.pdf), (11.04.2016), (EU Enlargement Strategy), p. 4.

<sup>480</sup> Bülent Sarper Ağır, Barış Gürsoy and Murat Necip Arman, “European Perspective of Human Security and the Western Balkans”, **Revista de Stiinte Politice**, Vol. 50, 2016, p. 51.

<sup>481</sup> European Commission, Strategy 2012-2013, p. 11.

<sup>482</sup> European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007”, **Enlargement**, 08.11.2006, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2006/nov/com\\_649\\_strategy\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/com_649_strategy_paper_en.pdf), (11.04.2016).

strategy fulfilled the “unfinished business,” by now including the Western Balkans to the European pool.<sup>483</sup>

The EU’s enlargement strategy in the Western Balkans is motivated, not only by normative notions, but also rational dimensions that include security, peace and stability. The region’s political and economic transition is portrayed as central to the interests of the EU,<sup>484</sup> and the enlargement is institutionalized as the EU’s strategic interests in stability, security and conflict prevention. In addition, prosperity and growth opportunities throughout the region, including transportation and energy routes, are believed to increase the EU’s influence in the world. These are the reasons why good neighbourly relations; regional cooperation and the peaceful settlement of disputes were repeatedly emphasized as key priorities for all countries.<sup>485</sup> Three strategic benefits of the enlargement are listed as follows:

*I) To make Europe a safer place by reducing the impact of cross-border crime, reinforcing peace and stability in the Western Balkans and promoting recovery and reconciliation after the wars in the 1990s; II) The enlargement helps us (Europe) ensure that our own high standards are applied beyond our borders, which reduces the risks of EU citizens being affected; for example, by imported pollution through integration and cooperation in areas like energy, transport, rule of law, migration, food safety, consumer and environmental protection and climate change; and III) A bigger Europe is a stronger Europe. Accession benefited both - the countries joining the EU and the full member states of the EU. As the EU expands, opportunities for companies, investors, consumers, tourists, students and property owners would increase.*<sup>486</sup>

A new concept emerged in the literature for the EU’s enlargement strategy towards the region. The “Copenhagen Plus” criteria encompassed a strong security dimension that demanded politically sensitive reforms in the early ‘pre-pre-accession phase,’ such as UNSC Resolution-1244, Dayton, Kumanovo, Ohrid, Belgrade, and the

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<sup>483</sup> European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012“, **Enlargement**, 12.10.2011,

[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2011/package/strategy\\_paper\\_2011\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/strategy_paper_2011_en.pdf), (11.04.2016), (Strategy 2011-2012), p. 4.

<sup>484</sup> European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009”, **Enlargement**, 5.11.2008, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press\\_corner/key\\_documents/reports\\_nov\\_2008/strategy\\_paper\\_incl\\_country\\_conclu\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key_documents/reports_nov_2008/strategy_paper_incl_country_conclu_en.pdf), (11.04.2016), (Strategy 2008-2009), p. 8.

<sup>485</sup> European Commission, Strategy 2008-2009, p. 13.

<sup>486</sup> European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy Paper and Main Challenges 2014-2015”, **Enlargement**, 08.10.2014, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2014/20141008-strategy-paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-strategy-paper_en.pdf), (11.04.2016), (Strategy 2014-2015), p. 3.

Agreement on Normalization of Serbia-Kosovo Relations.<sup>487</sup> Countries in the region were bound to fulfil new conditions that differed from previous enlargements on politically sensitive issues; for example, the requirement of full cooperation with the ICTY, post-conflict transition and peaceful settlement of the disputes.

Serbia's integration comprised a critical dimension within all those priorities and strategies instrumentalized by the EU. Many EU members placed importance on Serbian integration as the best method of guaranteeing peace in the Balkans, a far cry from an earlier view based on the Milošević factor.<sup>488</sup> The Commission unambiguously stated that Serbia's role in the stabilization of the region is a key factor.<sup>489</sup>

## B. Opportunities and the Obstacles

The EU wielded its full arsenal of instruments for encouraging regionalization within the Western Balkans: cooperation agreements, group-to-group political dialogue (EU-Western Balkans summits), economic assistance, and lastly, as a final stage before the membership, accession.<sup>490</sup> Brussels institutionalized a regional approach to the Balkans (regional pact) as agreed on by NATO members during the Washington Summit in April 1999.<sup>491</sup> The Stability Pact for South East Europe in 1999 reflected the EU's conviction that "something had to be done."<sup>492</sup> The EU has announced "the inclusiveness of its policy towards the Western Balkans, starting with

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<sup>487</sup> European Parliament, "The Western Balkans and EU Enlargement: Lessons Learned, Ways forward and Prospects ahead", **Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department**, 2015, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/534999/EXPO\\_IDA\(2015\)534999\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/534999/EXPO_IDA(2015)534999_EN.pdf), (13.04.2016), p. 13.

<sup>488</sup> Robert J. Pranger, "The Milosevic and Islamization Factors: Writing Contemporary History in the Balkans", **Mediterranean Quarterly**, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2011, pp. 1-14.

<sup>489</sup> European Commission, "Report from the Commission - The Stabilisation and Association Process for South East Europe - Second Annual Report", **EUR-Lex**, 2003, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52003DC0139>, (11.04.2016), (Second Annual Report), p. 33.

<sup>490</sup> Smith, pp. 86-93.

<sup>491</sup> In the Summit, it is declared that 'There is(a) need for a comprehensive approach to the stabilization of the crisis region in south-eastern Europe and to the integration of the countries of the region into the Euro-Atlantic community.' For details see: "NATO Summit", **NATO**, 22.06.1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9904-wsh/9904-wsh.htm>, (10.05.2016).

<sup>492</sup> Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, "Turbo-charged Negotiations: The EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe", **Journal of European Public Policy**, Vol. 7, No. 5, 2000, pp. 773-774.

the “regional approach” in the mid-1990s and most prominently through the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) launched in 1999.”<sup>493</sup>

The EU decided to play its most successful foreign policy instrument - enlargement. The endorsed text mentioned the Copenhagen criteria and in the very long run, it stated the membership. Both the framework document and summit declaration outlined an ambitious set of economic, political and security objectives. At the Santa Maria Feira Council in 2000, the Western Balkan states were recognized as potential members.<sup>494</sup> The 2003 European Council in Thessaloniki reaffirmed that all countries in the region were potential candidates for the EU membership. This was a direct signal to the successors, including Serbia; and also, a geopolitical redefinition that the Western Balkans are part and parcel of the Union’s “in-group.”<sup>495</sup> The EU’s carrot and stick strategy was again on the table - which the Western Balkans was to become the new target of the EU conditionality.

The Stability Pact was replaced by the SAP,<sup>496</sup> an institutionally more advanced framework. The SAP offered the Western Balkans SAA modelled on the 1990s Europe Agreements as a U-turn from multilateralism and regionalism to bilateralism which was underlined as the road to Europe.<sup>497</sup> The Western Balkan countries were involved in a progressive partnership with a view of stabilizing the region through cooperation, good neighbourly relations and establishing a free-trade area. The SAP set out common political and economic goals; although, progress

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<sup>493</sup> European Commission, Strategy 2011-2012, p. 3.

<sup>494</sup> European Parliament, “Santa Maria Da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000 Conclusions of the Presidency”, **Summits**, 2000, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm), (10.03.2016).

<sup>495</sup> At the Thessaloniki summit in 2003, the European Council declared that “the future of the Balkans is within the European Union.” For the full paper see: European Commission, “EU-Western Balkans Summit Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003”, **Press Release**, 21.06.2003, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_PRES-03-163\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm), (10.03.2016).

<sup>496</sup> The SAA is the process aims to stabilize potential candidate countries before the negotiations. In Western Balkans regional cooperation is a pre-condition described as “Democratization and reconciliation and regional cooperation on one hand and approximation of each of these countries with the EU, on the other hand, comprise integrity.” For the full paper see: European Commission, “Zagreb Summit – Recent Achievements in Regional Cooperation and Concrete Measures to Make the EU Perspective Tangible for the Citizens of the Western Balkans”, **Press Release**, 08.05.2007, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-07-169\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-169_en.htm), (10.03.2016).

<sup>497</sup> European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy Paper and Main Challenges 2000-2001”, **Enlargement**, 2000, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key\\_documents/2000/strat\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/strat_en.pdf), (11.04.2016).

evaluations were based on a countries' own merits.<sup>498</sup> In 2001, the EU inaugurated the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) programme as part of SAP, which was replaced by the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) in 2007. The SAP was signed by Macedonia (2004), Albania (2009), Montenegro (2010) and lastly by Serbia (2013). The Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) was officially launched in 2008 in order to institutionalize and formalize the intra-regional cooperation for the aims of promotion and enhancement of regional cooperation and to support Euro-Atlantic integration of the aspiring countries.<sup>499</sup>

**Table 1:** IPA Allocations (Billion €)

| Country                                      | Allocations<br>(2007-<br>2013) | Disbursements<br>(2007-2014) | Allocations<br>(2014-<br>2020) |
|--|--------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Albania                                      | 512                            | 277                          | 649                            |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina                       | 554                            | 360                          | 166                            |
| Croatia                                      | 802                            | 449                          | -                              |
| Kosovo                                       | 679                            | 486                          | 645                            |
| The Former Yugoslav Republic of<br>Macedonia | 508                            | 250                          | 664                            |
| Montenegro                                   | 191                            | 131                          | 270                            |
| Serbia                                       | 1213                           | 791                          | 1508                           |
| Turkey                                       | 4396                           | 2556                         | 4454                           |
| Iceland                                      | 35                             | 6                            | -                              |
| Regional                                     | 1150                           | 938                          | 2959                           |
| Cross Border Cooperation                     | 514                            | 319                          | -                              |
| Total  | 10554                          | 6563                         | 11315                          |

Source: European Commission, "Overview-Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance", **European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations**, 24.02.2016, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/overview/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/overview/index_en.htm), (11.04.2016).

The 2007 enlargement of Bulgaria and Romania was a direct message to other countries in the region - if you comply with the Copenhagen criteria and other specific conditions, you will be welcomed.<sup>500</sup> In 2007, the Commission listed the priorities of the enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans as followed: the fundamental

<sup>498</sup> European Commission, "Stabilisation and Association Process", **Enlargement**, 2012, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap_en.htm), (10.03.2016).

<sup>499</sup> For the details see: "Overview", **Regional Cooperation Council**, 2014, <http://www.rcc.int/pages/2/overview>, (10.03.2016).

<sup>500</sup> Their compliance with the European standards is still on question and discussion. For the details see: Dimitris Papadimitriou and Eli Gateva, "Between Enlargement-led Europeanisation and Balkan Exceptionalism: An Appraisal of Bulgaria's and Romania's Entry into the European Union", **Perspectives on European Politics and Society**, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2009, pp. 152-166.

issues of state-building, good governance, administrative and judicial reform, rule of law, reconciliation, compliance with the ICTY, and civil society development.<sup>501</sup>

However, following the agenda proved to be problematic; the Euro-zone debt crisis and later migration crisis preoccupied the EU institutions, thus reducing the interest and active involvement of the EU in the Western Balkans. In its place, the EU pursued a “wait and see” strategy. Secondly, the negative influence of the crises on the candidate countries, lower economic growth and higher unemployment rates, slowed down the Europeanization in the region.<sup>502</sup> Nevertheless, Croatia emerged as an exception in this new era when it entered into the Union as the 28<sup>th</sup> member in 2013.

The historical legacies and bad reputation of the Western Balkans and Serbia created a bad image, which caused to a decline of public support for enlargement in the member states. Subsequently, this only enhanced the suspicions on the processes and damaged the reliability of the interactions.<sup>503</sup> Today, public opinion among the member states is less favourable due to economic crisis and increasing migration and the majority is against any future enlargement.<sup>504</sup> Moreover, some Western Balkan countries are faced with a decline of public support for EU membership. This decreasing support is the result of the accession fatigue that was led by the limited capacity of the applicant countries for reform in addition to declining credibility of the EU and its capability as a soft power.<sup>505</sup>

Bilateral disputes between member states (Greece, Croatia) and the Western Balkan candidate countries caused the blockages during the accession process. The enlargement process then depend not only on progress within the region, but also on

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<sup>501</sup> European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy Paper and Main Challenges 2007-2008”, **Enlargement**, 06.11.2007, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2007/nov/strategy\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/strategy_paper_en.pdf), (11.04.2016), p. 4.

<sup>502</sup> Dimitar Bechev, “The Periphery of the Periphery: The Western Balkans and the Euro Crisis”, **European Council on Foreign Relations**, 2012, [http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR60\\_WESTERN\\_BALKANS\\_BRIEF\\_AW.pdf](http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR60_WESTERN_BALKANS_BRIEF_AW.pdf), (05.02.2016).

<sup>503</sup> Dragan Popadić, “Building up European Identity: From the Chimney Smoke”, **MIRICO Final Conference**, Frankfurt am Main, October 24-24, 2008.

<sup>504</sup> Danilo Di Mauro and Marta Fraile, “Who Wants more? Attitudes towards EU Enlargement in Time of Crisis”, **EUDO Spotlight** Vol. 4, 2012, pp. 2-3.

<sup>505</sup> Jelica Minić, “A Change in the Context of EU Enlargement: What is to be Done?”, **The Challenges of Serbia’s Foreign Policy-Collection of Papers**, (Ed. Jelica Minić), European Movement Serbia, Belgrade, 2015, p. 21.

politics in the EU member states.<sup>506</sup> Croatia's accession to the EU disadvantageously enhanced Zagreb's hands, via the veto power, under the asymmetric relations. In April 2016, Croatia vetoed Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights), which is also currently critical for Serbian democratization.<sup>507</sup>

More recently, the attention of the EU has shifted to Ukraine and Euro-Asia, thus further away from issues of the Western Balkans. The rivalry between Russia and the West, not only within the EU, but also in the Western Balkans, passed ahead of the Europeanization agenda. Serbia refused to align itself with numerous EU declarations criticizing Russia in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and opted not to join EU economic sanctions introduced in response to Russia's destabilizing role in Ukraine.<sup>508</sup>

Moreover, the current and unsolved dispute over the refugee crisis originating from Syria has also pushed the Europeanization agenda aside, since the Western Balkans and Turkey have been seriously affected by the refugee crisis.<sup>509</sup> In response, Brussels came up with a new 17-point action strategy plan that included four sub-mechanisms: 1) Information exchange and coordination; 2) reception capacity; 3) border management; and 4) humanitarian support and fight against migrant smuggling and human trafficking.<sup>510</sup> By far, Serbia has received the largest percentage of Syrian refugees seeking international protection in the Western Balkans.<sup>511</sup>

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 2015, there were 35,309 refugees and 220,227 internally displaced persons (IDPs) within the region. In addition, Serbia emerged as the country of migration flows 44,892

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<sup>506</sup> Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat, "Introduction", **EU Member States and Enlargement towards the Balkans**, (Eds. Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat), European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2015, p. 2.

<sup>507</sup> During the Vienna summit, Western Balkan countries signed the declaration ensuring not to block each other's EU path. For details see: European Commission, EU Enlargement Strategy, p. 12.

<sup>508</sup> Florent Marciacq, "What does it Mean that Serbia Refuses to Align itself with European Sanctions against Russia?", **Balkans in Europe Policy Blog**, 02.11.2014, <http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/biepag/node/125>, (08.04.2016).

<sup>509</sup> European Commission, EU Enlargement Strategy, p. 3.

<sup>510</sup> European Commission, "Managing the Refugee Crisis Western Balkans Route: Progress Report", **Home Affairs**, 10.02.2016, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/managing\\_the\\_refugee\\_crisis\\_-\\_western\\_balkans\\_route\\_state\\_of\\_play\\_report\\_20160210\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/managing_the_refugee_crisis_-_western_balkans_route_state_of_play_report_20160210_en.pdf), (11.04.2016).

<sup>511</sup> "2015 UNHCR Subregional Operations Profile - South-Eastern Europe", **UNHCR**, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48d9f6.html>, (11.04.2016).

refugees, 55,253 asylum seekers and 220,227 IDPs originated from Serbia.<sup>512</sup> Serbia's agenda setting has been occupied by issues of migration, particularly since the visa liberalization and the agreement for re-admission was added to the EU's agenda. In 2006, both the Strategy for Combating Human Trafficking in the Republic of Serbia and the Strategy for Integrated Border Management were adopted. Serbia introduced the Strategy of Reintegration of the Returnees Based on the Readmission Agreement and The Strategy for Combating Illegal Migration in the Republic of Serbia for the period from 2009-2014 in 2009. Moreover, in 2009, Serbia adopted the Migration Management Strategy, which was connected to the Sustainable Return and Subsidence Strategy in 2010.<sup>513</sup>

In 2014, Austria, Germany and France institutionalized a new initiative called the *Berlin Process*. They hoped that this initiative would be instrumental in encouraging reforms and accepting realistic priorities for core connectivity investments. Further, they expected this initiative to act as a platform to help resolve outstanding bilateral issues.<sup>514</sup> The process is based on a framework for a period of four years that includes Albania, BiH, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. In the first Conference in Berlin, the regional goals of expanding economic cooperation and sustainable growth were set as targets in an attempt to achieve additional progress in the areas of reform, resolve outstanding bilateral and internal issues, and reconcile within and between the societies.<sup>515</sup>

One year later in 2015, Italy joined the process during the second summit meeting in Vienna. The sectors that were identified for concentration and progress were as followed: regional cooperation and solutions for bilateral disputes; the rule of law and good governance; the fight against extremism; migration; economic prosperity and connectivity especially in transportation, energy and investment; market

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<sup>512</sup> "2015 UNHCR Subregional Operations Profile - South-Eastern Europe", UNHCR.

<sup>513</sup> "About Migration", **Commissariat for Refugees**, 2014, <http://www.kirs.gov.rs/articles/aboutmig.php?lang=ENG>, (11.04.2016).

<sup>514</sup> European Commission, Strategy 2014-2015, p. 17.

<sup>515</sup> "Final Declaration by the Chair of the Conference on the Western Balkans", **The Federal Government (Germany)**, 28.08.2014, <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2014/2014-08-28-balkan.html>, (13.03.2016).



integration-trade facilitation, mobility and joint growth initiatives; youth, education, science and research; and lastly civil society.<sup>516</sup>

Although candidacy status introduced a new phase of politics in the region, the success of the process depends on the following inter and intra-regional dynamics; for example, the transitional justice against the highly contested ethno-nationalist rhetoric in the region, a viable solution to bilateral and internal problems, more attractive conditionality based strategies to steady political and economic elites on EU integration in comparison to alternative power struggles for influence and power in the region, such as the USA, Russia, Turkey and China.<sup>517</sup> As analysed in the following part with reference to nationalist versus reformist fractions in the Serbian case, the two main challenges and costs for the reformists have been subjected to Serbia's integration process: 1) The cooperation with ICTY; and 2) the unresolved issue of Kosovo.<sup>518</sup>

## II. SERBIA-EU RELATIONS IN PRE-ACCESSION PERIOD

In the February 2008 presidential election campaign of Serbia, two issues were central: the future of Kosovo, and the orientation of Serbia's foreign policy towards Brussels or Moscow.<sup>519</sup> Opinion differences regarding both EU integration and Kosovo independence severely tested the 2008 DSS-DS coalition government. DSS's view was that EU membership must be abandoned until the EU agrees with Serbia's position on Kosovo, while DS preferred not to tie the two issues together.

SRS's leader Nikolić did not promote Greater Serbia during his campaign, but he claimed that any agreement with the EU would weaken Serbia's position on the Kosovo question and promised to strengthen ties with Russia instead. He argued that Serbia needed to accept the reality in Kosovo. However, both Tadić (leader of DS) and

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<sup>516</sup> European Commission, "Final Declaration by the Chair of the Vienna Western Balkans Summit 27 August 2015", **Enlargement**, 27.08.2015, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/policy-highlights/regional-cooperation/20150828\\_chairmans\\_conclusions\\_western\\_balkans\\_summit.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/policy-highlights/regional-cooperation/20150828_chairmans_conclusions_western_balkans_summit.pdf), (01.03.2016), pp. 1-8.

<sup>517</sup> Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, "The Unfulfilled Promise: Completing the Balkan Enlargement", **European Fund for the Balkans Publications**, May 2014, <http://balkanfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Policy-Paper-Completing-Enlargement-2.pdf>, (10.04.2016), p. 14.

<sup>518</sup> Bandović and Vujačić, p. 49.

<sup>519</sup> According to the electoral system, if and none of the candidates received the majority of votes, voting is repeated within 15 days from the day of holding the last polling.

Nikolić stressed their pro-Russian commitments in the second round and travelled to Moscow. Tadić received 50.31% of the votes, just 2.5 points higher than Nikolić in the second round. The re-election of Tadić was seen as the victory for the pro-European orientation in Serbia. However, just 2 days before Kosovo declared its independence Tadić took an oath “to invest all his efforts in the preservation of sovereignty and integrity of the territory of the Republic of Serbia, including Kosovo and Metohija as its integral part.”<sup>520</sup>

Following the 2007 election in November, Hashim Thaçi, the leader of conservative Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and Fatmir Sejdiu, the leader of the centre-right LDK formed a coalition. On 17 February 2008, Kosovan government declared the independence of Kosovo from Serbia that contained the following sentence in the declaration text: “Reaffirming our wish to become fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic family of democracies.”<sup>521</sup>

Following Kosovo's declaration of independence, Serbian political figures and masses organized a large demonstration called “Kosovo is Serbia.” Some diplomatic missions and businesses of the countries that recognized Kosovo’s independence were attacked in Belgrade. Similar to the elite positions, Serbian public with nationalist motivations also refused to give up Kosovo on the basis of widely-held notions of history as well as the myth that Kosovo was the cradle of identity. Prime Minister Koštunica argued that “Kosovo's unilateral declaration of a false state is the final act of a policy that started with the NATO aggression against Serbia in 1999,” and called for harsh measures against countries that would recognize Kosovo, while president Tadić said “Serbia will never recognize Kosovo and Metohija's independence,” but added that the state “must not now undertake hasty moves.”<sup>522</sup>

The independence of Kosovo recognized by 22 member states without a reached consensus within the EU. Today Brussels look for the ways to sphere its own influence in Serbia which aims to ensure its territorial integrity, and in Kosovo which

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<sup>520</sup> For the full text of the oath see: “Constitution of the Republic of Serbia/Article 114”, **Government of the Republic of Serbia**, 2016,

[http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice\\_o\\_srbiji/ustav.php?change\\_lang=en](http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav.php?change_lang=en), (17.03.2016).

<sup>521</sup> “Full Text: Kosovo Declaration”, **BBC**, 17.02.2008,

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249677.stm>, (13.02.2016).

<sup>522</sup> “Serbia Annuls Kosovo Independence Declaration”, **B92**, 17.02.2008,

[http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=17&nav\\_id=47781](http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=17&nav_id=47781), (12.04.2016).

seeks for recognition. This caused a problematic equation and negatively impacts pro-European forces both in Serbia and Kosovo to continue their European path. Although Kosovo is not recognized by five EU members (Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania, and Greece), Pristina is given potential candidate status with an asterisked footnote containing the text agreed in the Belgrade–Pristina negotiations: "This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSC Resolution-1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence."

The recognition of Kosovo's independence by neighboring countries (except BiH) caused a new crisis between Serbia and other states in the region. The declaration of Kosovo's independence without the approval of Belgrade and lack of international consensus has left a new problem not only on Belgrade and Pristina but also on Europeanization process in the region due to the intra-regional complexities.<sup>523</sup>

In fact, the partial recognition of Kosovo has not solved the problem. Instead, it produced three new problems in the region risks not only the EU enlargement, but also the regional stability and peace: I) Serbia-Kosovo relations have stayed frozen in political and diplomatic levels in spite of other interactions in lower level imposed by Brussels such as trade, economy and transportation. II) Kosovo today is an 'in-between' state or a 'quasi-state.' It is neither an independent state recognised by all EU member-states and UNSC members (China and Russia) which constrain from applying for membership in international organizations, including the EU. III) Kosovo's bid for Euro-Atlantic integration became more complicated for formal reasons (it is not recognized by all EU member states) and Serbia's EU integration is too costly for political reasons (it does not want to recognize Kosovo's independence).<sup>524</sup>

This incentive not only worsened the already extremely difficult relations between nationalists and reformists, but also seriously endangered the political status of reformists in Serbia. In the meantime, Eurosceptic nationalists led by Prime Minister Koštunica 'just waited' for an event as *casus belli* for publicly require to end Serbia's ties with the EU. Reformist parties in the ruling coalition continued to maintain their

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<sup>523</sup> Milenko Petrovic, "The Changed EU Approach-New Challenges for the Western Balkan States after 2005?", **The Democratic Transition of Post-Communist Europe**, (Ed. Milenko Petrovic), Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013, (The Changed EU Approach), pp. 131-159.

<sup>524</sup> Petrovic, The Changed EU Approach, pp. 146-159.

main orientation “Serbia in the EU, with Kosovo (as its part).”<sup>525</sup> The DS-DSS coalition broke over the disagreement whether the accession process would continue or not. DS and other nationalist actors linked the question of Kosovo with Serbia’s EU path. Therefore, they called for the suspension of EU accession. The DS, however, took a strong pro-European position against international isolation. In spite of the Eurosceptic ministers in the cabinet, Belgrade decided to sign the SAA with the EU. However, this resulted with the collapse of the coalition, led to early parliamentary election in May 2008.

The Serbian parliamentary elections in 2008 were held at a time of extremely high political tensions. Both nationalists and the reformists played the Kosovo and the EU cards during their campaigns. Prime Minister Koštunica and his DSS opted to focus their strategy almost exclusively on opposing Serbia’s SAA which the party felt was a de facto threat to Serbia’s territorial integrity. Although recognition of Kosovo was not officially listed as a condition for the EU membership, DSS shaped its election campaign over two choice for voters: Kosovo or European integration.<sup>526</sup>

SRS, DSS and NS argued that, before signing the SAA, the EU stance towards Serbian internationally recognized borders had to be resolved and that the issue of Serbian recognition of Kosovo would certainly be set as a precondition for EU accession, in the future. Furthermore, the coalition “For a European Serbia”<sup>527</sup> insisted that the SAA was neutral regarding the status of Kosovo and that it was primarily an economic agreement that opened up the possibility for a better life for the citizens of Serbia. They also added that the EU as such had no authority to recognize Kosovo's independence while five EU member states had not recognized Kosovo.

The EU followed ‘carrot’ strategy in order to reduce the reactions due to Kosovo and to empower reformists in Serbia. In January 2008, Serbia and the EU signed the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement.<sup>528</sup> In February, the Council adopted the European partnership for Serbia. Less than two weeks before the election,

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<sup>525</sup> Milenko Petrovic, **The Democratic Transition of Post-Communist Europe: In the Shadow of Communist Differences and Uneven Europeanisation**, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013.

<sup>526</sup> Andrew Konitzer, "Speaking European: Conditionality, Public Attitudes and pro-European Party Rhetoric in the Western Balkans", **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 63, No. 10, 2011, pp. 1853-1888.

<sup>527</sup> Coalition around the DS, including G17+, SPO, and the League of Vojvodina Social Democrats (Liga socialdemokrata Vojvodine, LSV).

<sup>528</sup> Visa-free travel regime with the EU entered into force on 19 December 2009.

the Council decided to allow Serbia to sign the SAA<sup>529</sup> and Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related issues.<sup>530</sup> The EU was actively involved in the elections in Serbia and took a position in favour of those reformists.

The election gave a landslide victory to the coalition for a European Serbia.<sup>531</sup> From the viewpoint of the voting behaviours and public opinion, the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections demonstrated the public support for the EU perspective which resisted nationalistic demagoguery.<sup>532</sup> As a consequence, the 2008 elections proved to be a 'political earthquake' that reshaped the party scene in Serbia in favour of those reformists.<sup>533</sup>

### III. THE ANALYSIS OF THE ATTITUDE CHANGE AMONG THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN SERBIA

The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) as nationalist parties and the continuity of the previous regime have remained both practically unreformed and maintained a strong anti-European rhetoric. SRS's leader Nikolić repeatedly referred to Europe and the EU as 'evil' during the election campaign.<sup>534</sup> In addition to that, the SRS used their nationalist and anti-EU cards, manipulated with the victimhood syndrome in 2008 when Kosovo declared its independence. However, the anti-EU bloc lost influence and became fragmented and increasingly irrelevant in political terms.<sup>535</sup>

The DSS changed its attitude and abandoned its anti-European position. Similarly, the SPS became a legitimate left-wing party which also entered into the pro-

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<sup>529</sup> On 14 June 2010 the Council of the EU (Foreign Affairs Council) decided to initiate the ratification process for the SAA with Serbia. The European Parliament ratified the Stabilization and Association Agreement with Serbia on 19 January 2011. The ratification process in the EU member states was completed on 18 June 2013, when the SAA was ratified by Lithuania.

<sup>530</sup> On 1 February 2010, the Interim Trade Agreement between the EU and Serbia entered into force.

<sup>531</sup> For a European Serbia coalition led by Tadić received the 38.4% of the votes and 102/250 seats in the parliament while SRS took the 29.4% of the votes followed by 11.6% for DSS.

<sup>532</sup> Srdjan Cvijic, "The New Serbia: Fast forward towards the EU?", **EPC Policy Brief**, Brussels, 2009.

<sup>533</sup> Marko Stojic, "Europe and the Serbian Parliamentary Election of May 2000", **EPERN Election Briefing**, No. 50, (Serbian Parliamentary Election), 2008.

<sup>534</sup> Maurizio Massari, "Do All Roads Lead to Brussels? Analysis of the Different Trajectories of Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina", **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2005, pp. 259-273.

<sup>535</sup> Bandović and Vujači, p. 55.

European coalition. Finally, the newly formed Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) emerged as the latest reformist party, following a split within the SRS.<sup>536</sup> Following the elections, pro-EU members of the SRS left and formed the SNS under the leaderships of Tomislav Nikolić (previous President) and Aleksandar Vučić (current President).

The SPS is *sui generis*, in that their positions shifted from hard-line nationalism to a more pro-EU stance as a consequence of intra-party dynamics. Between 2000 and 2006, a reformist fraction developed within the party. This fraction waited patiently for the right time to change the party leader following the death of Milošević in 2006. The party delegates in December 2006 elected Iвица Dačić as their new leader. Through the internal transformation (replacement of the leadership), the SPS reshaped its political stance, with a new vision for Serbia and an encouraging discourse on the EU. The new coalition agreed upon the pro-EU policy directives. By preserving Kosovo within the borders of Serbia, they would continue the negotiations that mandated further cooperation with the ICTY, improvement of macro-economy and the fight against corruption and organized crimes.<sup>537</sup>

Three groups of factors contributed to the attitude change and position shift among the Serbian nationalists that paralleled Kelman's hypotheses on attitude change.<sup>538</sup> Firstly, from a more bottom-up approach, one may argue that the position shift evolved as the outcome to the response of the public in 2008. Public opinion (see Table 2) sent a direct message that hard-line stances on nationalist issues were no longer a winning strategy.<sup>539</sup> Due to the fact that the nationalists had to find ways to attract as much public support as possible, this move resulted in being a more strategic calculation rather than as an outcome of a fundamental shift in their value system. For instance, the SNS arrived at the conclusion that in order to remain as a relevant party

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<sup>536</sup> Nikolić and Vučić had certain disagreement and conflict of vision for SRS with the top party members, controlled by the ICTY indictee Šešelj, and then decided to form a new right-wing party - SNS. A large majority of party members and voters aligned with the SNS.


<sup>537</sup> Stojic, Serbian Parliamentary Election, p. 2.

<sup>538</sup> Kelman describes three different mechanisms for attitude change among the decision-makers: compliance, identification and internalization. Compliance refers to attitude change with the calculation of gaining specific rewards or approval and avoids specific punishment. Identification refers to attitude change when the decision-makers want to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship. Lastly, internalization refers to change when the ideas and actions of which it is composed is intrinsically rewarding. For details see: Kelman, pp. 51-60.

<sup>539</sup> Konitzer, pp. 1878-1883.

in politics, it felt the need to abandon its nationalist line, framing old discourse and veto-player position against European reforms.<sup>540</sup>

**Table 2:** Public Opinion towards the EU Membership



Source: “European Orientation of Serbian Citizens”, **Ministry of European Integration**, December 2017, [http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna\\_dokumenta/istrazivanja\\_javnog\\_mnjenja/opinion\\_poll\\_december\\_17.pdf](http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mnjenja/opinion_poll_december_17.pdf), (29.09.2018), p. 4.

Secondly, from the rationalist perspective, one could argue both strategically and politically that the position shift in domestic politics and the appeal to the EU was the result of the reforms made within political parties. The nationalists who opposed the EU eventually lost the support of the electorate or began to be side-lined by their domestic counterparts. Thus, the shift in their position amounted as a strategic adaptation to new political realities for the purpose of survival.<sup>541</sup> In addition to that, for governing positions, the party leaders softened the nationalistic rhetoric and formulated moderate, achievable and acceptable party goals in order to make themselves a desirable coalition partner.<sup>542</sup>

In light of the Serbia-EU interaction, a third argument may be considered as an alternative causal explanation for their attitude changes based on the conditionality. EU membership was instrumentalized as the only way of realizing Serbia’s national

<sup>540</sup> Bandović and Vujači, p. 61.

<sup>541</sup> Bandović and Vujači, p. 61.

<sup>542</sup> Bandović and Vujači, pp. 61-62.

interests including political and economic gains, and Serbian dignity in the Western Balkans.<sup>543</sup> That both the EU Conditionality and the carrot and stick method convinced the political elites that they should fulfil their obligations to the ICTY, Kosovo, democratization and liberalization. Given the fact that Serbia's integration process in pre-accession period used to be halted twice,<sup>544</sup> there was simply "no alternative" than an eventual accession for Serbia. Such that other states in the region have already started their EU process in a way that geographically and politically Belgrade surrounded by Europe.<sup>545</sup> The EU's credible carrot strategy mounted vast pressure on the Serbian parties to cooperate with the ICTY and take a step for Kosovo, thus moving their country forward on the EU path.<sup>546</sup> Especially economic motivations encouraged political elites to follow a more realist policy preferences.<sup>547</sup>

This new way of thinking served as the path of ending Serbian isolation and an opportunity for Serbia to eliminate its negative image.<sup>548</sup> While the EU membership was perceived as the future of Belgrade, the nationalists linked to Serbia's past was re-visited and portrayed as radical as other face of Serbia, and which did not let Serbia adopt a new face.<sup>549</sup> A slow but steady wakefulness of the mistakes by previous regime and its tough costs in the SPS had a significant effect of the attitude change in the party. This change also led to an ideational dimension.<sup>550</sup>

The 'Europeanized' Serbian political elites provided value-based and identity-related rationalisations for their new positions. In advocating for EU integration, they emphasized the geographical closeness, value systems, the sharing history and traditions, and the mutual fate shared by Serbia and the Union.<sup>551</sup> The SPS' program

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<sup>543</sup> Günal, pp. 131-182.

<sup>544</sup> First, between May and June 2007, the Council suspended the negotiations with Serbia for the SAA. Then, in April 2008, the Council made the ratification of the SAA with Serbia conditional upon the country's full cooperation with the ICTY. This second blockade lasted until Mladić was arrested in May 2011 and handed over to The Hague.

<sup>545</sup> Othon Anastasakis and Dimitar Bechev, "EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process", **South East European Studies Programme**, <http://www.epus.rs/sr/aktivnosti/konferencije/solun/pdf/ostala/conditio.pdf>, 2003, pp. 1-20.

<sup>546</sup> Bandović and Vujači, p. 53.

<sup>547</sup> İbrahim Alper Arısoy, "Balkan Paradoksu: Bir Parçalanma ve Bütünleşme Alanı Olarak Güneydoğu Avrupa", **Avrasya Etüdleri**, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2013, pp. 79-104.

<sup>548</sup> Berta Hegedusova, **Serbia in Transition**, (Unpublished MA Thesis), Lund University Department of Political Science, Lund, 2013.

<sup>549</sup> Hegedusova, p. 45.

<sup>550</sup> Bandović and Vujači, p. 60.

<sup>551</sup> Bandović and Vujači, p. 57.



adopted in 2010 underlined Serbia's "shared" history, civilization, values, and traditions and was put their full support and endorsement for Serbia's accession negotiations.<sup>552</sup>

The new political discourse presented Serbian identity as European. Certain policies in parallel with the "new" Serbia were implemented following the attitude change. For instance, the lyrics of Serbia's "new face," performed in the Eurovision Song Contest in 2007, not only characterized the dimensions of (re)creating an identity, the recycling of memory and imagined tradition, but also referenced European cultural, media and political spheres.<sup>553</sup> Belgrade introduced a new Serbian national calendar in order to meet both Europe's expectations and further Serbian interests to join the EU.<sup>554</sup>

In March 2010, the Serbian parliament adopted a resolution<sup>555</sup> that apologized for the Srebrenica massacre: "The parliament of Serbia strongly condemns the crime committed against the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica in July 1995, as determined by the ICJ ruling."<sup>556</sup> Similarly, the Prime Minister at the time, Mirko Cvetković, evaluated the apology as Serbia's desire of regional reconciliation and good neighbourly relations.<sup>557</sup> Serbia's current President, Vučić, participated in the 2015 anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre held in BiH although he was chased away by stone-throwing protesters.<sup>558</sup> Similarly, when the EU opened the first two chapters in 2015, President Vučić underlined that it was time to work hard in order to enter into

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<sup>552</sup> Programme of the SPS adopted at the Main Board meeting on 11 December 2010.

<sup>553</sup> Mitrović, pp. 171-185.

<sup>554</sup> David, pp. 472-483.

<sup>555</sup> For a European Serbia, G17 Plus, the Socialist Party, United Serbia Party, Pensioners' Party and minority parties all voted in favour of the resolution, while the Democratic Party of Serbia and the New Serbia Party voted against. 127 members of the parliament voted in favour of the resolution out of a total of 250.

<sup>556</sup> "Serbia Adopts Resolution Condemning Srebrenica Massacre", **Balkan Insight**, 31.03.2010, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-adopts-resolution-condemning-srebrenica-massacre>, (01.06.2016).

<sup>557</sup> Vesna Peric Zimonjic, "Serbia Apologise for Srebrenica Massacre", **Independent**, 31.03.2010, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/serbia-apologise-for-srebrenica-massacre-1931656.html>, (22.04.2016).

<sup>558</sup> "Srebrenica Massacre Anniversary: Crowds Chase Serb PM away", **BBC**, 11.07.2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33491540>, (07.03.2016).

the big family of the European nations, which also affirmed the type of society Serbia wanted to be.<sup>559</sup>

#### **IV. FOR A EUROPEAN SERBIA: THE ACCESSION PROCESS AND EUROPEANIZATION IN SERBIA**

The pre-accession formulated conditionality strategy succeeded in convincing and coercing Belgrade to cooperate with the ICTY. However, the “normalisation of the relations with Kosovo” still remains unresolved, occupying the agenda of Serbia-EU relations since 2008.

The EU’s institutionalization of security and peace was the main target in the Western Balkans. However, it faced critical obstacles, dilemmas and inconsistency when it came to its relations with Kosovo that in turn, affected the enlargement in the region. For many years, Kosovo did not have the right of self-representation, which was transferred to the UNMIK in international forums and foreign affairs. After the UNMIK completed its mission in 2012, Kosovo encountered many problems, one of which was representation in the region as well in the EU affairs. This was due to the non-recognition of Kosovo by Serbia and BiH in the Western Balkans and five EU member states. However, in all EU enlargement-related documents and the official web pages, Kosovo was categorized as a potential candidate that could be granted an independent, sovereign and internationally recognized state.<sup>560</sup>

Since 2008, the EU has maintained its mandate in Kosovo through EULEX, with the four operational objectives: (1) Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising to support to Kosovo’s rule of law institutions; (2) Executive objective in order to ensure that rule of law services are delivered until the progress of local authorities allows

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<sup>559</sup> Maja Poznatov, "Opening of Chapters a Historic Step for Serbia", **EurActiv**, 18.12.2015, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/opening-of-chapters-a-historic-step-for-serbia/>, (02.02.2016).

<sup>560</sup> The early reference to Kosovo was declared as “full support for implementation of Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council for Kosovo” However, due to the demands of opponents of Kosovo’s independence, concrete formulations for “Kosovo’s membership in EU” or “Kosovo’s integration in EU” are often removed. In 2005, in a joint report presenting the future role of the EU in Kosovo, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Policy and Security, Javier Solana, and the Enlargement Commissioner, Oli Rehn, expressed “no matter what the future status of Kosovo is, it should have the power of signing treaties.” Since the EU can sign treaties only with independent countries the aforementioned reference to a conferred “power to sign treaties” is perceived as significant and suggests that the EU considers the status of Kosovo as an independent state.

complete transition of executive functions to local authorities; (3) North objective to restore the rule of law throughout the north of Kosovo; and (4) Support to the dialogue with the EU and the implementation.<sup>561</sup> The EU's main logic towards Kosovo can be summarized as the main standards that should take place before status during the nation-state building process.<sup>562</sup> For the time being, Kosovo's status within the EU had remained unclear; although the official declaration of the Commission in 2009 claims "The absence of a common agreed stance on the status of Kosovo does not prevent the EU from being substantially engaged in Kosovo."<sup>563</sup> At the moment Serbia and BiH are following similar policies to "normalize their relations with Kosovo." This policy could be considered a long-term investment during this postponed period.

For the Commission, further progress in this area remains essential for advancing the European future of both Serbia and Kosovo.<sup>564</sup> For Serbia's accession process to the EU, the normalisation of the relations with Kosovo had been the most sensitive and vulnerable issue within the complex Balkan politics. The re-defining of national interest and a new approach on Kosovo issue had not been easy. The Serbian side still adopts a *status quo* oriented position by previously formulated national objectives vis-a-vis Kosovo.<sup>565</sup> Firstly, Kosovo issue still serves on Serbian nationalism as the only possible political instrument. Secondly, pro-European actors are not ready to tackle its own, internal problems; most notably, its internal arrangement and consolidation thereof. As a prime example, current Serbian constitution reflects the unwillingness of political elites to make a final deal for the

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<sup>561</sup> European Union External Relations, "EULEX Implements its Mandate through Four Operational Objectives", **About EULEX**, <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,44>, (10.02.2016).

<sup>562</sup> Jonuz Abdullai and Ngadhnjim Brovina, "Peace-building and State-building Challenges in the Republic of Kosovo", **Revista De Științe Politice - Revue Des Sciences Politiques**, No. 47, 2015.

<sup>563</sup> European Commission, "Kosovo - Fulfilling its European Perspective", **Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council**, 14.10.2009, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2009/kosovo\\_study\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/kosovo_study_en.pdf), (02.04.2016).

<sup>564</sup> European Commission, "Kosovo 2015 Report", **EU Enlargement Strategy**, 10.11.2015, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2015/20151110\\_report\\_kosovo.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_kosovo.pdf), (02.04.2016).

<sup>565</sup> Batt, p. 36.

Kosovo. It has also been a costly step as underlined by President Vučić,<sup>566</sup> while both the public opinion<sup>567</sup> and policy-makers<sup>568</sup> had similar reflections to the Milošević era.

Serbia's Kosovo policy is consolidated independently from political leaders and the daily politics. Any government that may initiate a new perspective instead of mainstream/traditional one will have to take a very high political risk/cost.<sup>569</sup> It is entrenched through the Serbian constitution.<sup>570</sup> Chapter VII of the Serbian Constitution (Territorial Organization) defines Kosovo as one of the autonomous province (Article 182) and the President of the Republic is obliged to swear to preserve the sovereignty and integrity of the territory of the Republic of Serbia, including Kosovo and Metohija as its constituent part (Article 114).<sup>571</sup> The National Security Strategy, that was adopted in 2009 announced secession of the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija as the main threat to Serbian territorial integrity. Interestingly, the same document underlines Belgrade's willingness to European integration, which is linked to its national interest.<sup>572</sup>

The official webpage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a prime example of the dilemma that current Serbian political elites face. Moreover, the webpage contains the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia, including Kosovo and Metohija; while the EU integration process is placed in a highlighted box as the main goal.<sup>573</sup> Belgrade carries out a policy that runs accession and 'national interests in

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<sup>566</sup> Isabelle Kumar, "EU Membership Remains Serbia's Priority, Says PM Aleksandar Vucic", **Euronews**, 19.05.2015, <http://www.euronews.com/2015/05/19/membership-of-the-european-union-remains-a-priority-for-serbia-says-prime/>, (24.04.2016).

<sup>567</sup> 57% of the population refuse to accept Kosovo's independence even if it means staying out the EU. For details see: "Survey of Serbian Public Opinion", **Centre for Insights in Survey Research**, November-December 2015, [http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/serbia\\_november\\_2015\\_poll\\_public\\_release.pdf](http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/serbia_november_2015_poll_public_release.pdf), (15.05.2016).

<sup>568</sup> In an interview, President Tadić said over Kosovo as the identity of Serbia and origin of Serbian national identity while taking the origin of the problem as 100 years ago which is similar to Milosevic's perception. For details see: Zabriskie, "Serbia after Mladic Arrest."

<sup>569</sup> Dr. Marko Savkovic, **Interview**, Belgrade, December 12, 2017.

<sup>570</sup> Obradović-Wochnik and Wochnik, pp. 1158-1181.

<sup>571</sup> "Constitution of the Republic of Serbia", **Government of the Republic of Serbia**, 2016, [http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice\\_o\\_srbiji/ustav.php?change\\_lang=en](http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav.php?change_lang=en), (17.03.2016).

<sup>572</sup> "National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia", **Republic of Serbia**, October 2009, <http://www.voa.mod.gov.rs/documents/national-security-strategy-of-the-republic-of-serbia.pdf>, (17.03.2016).

<sup>573</sup> "Web Page", **Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia**, 2016, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/>, (22.03.2016).

Kosovo' together.<sup>574</sup> In this case, the previous President Tadić's statement reflects the dilemma:

*I am not expecting that European Union politicians are going to try to convince me to recognize Kosovo independence. Those who try something like that will fail. But, at the same time, I don't expect that Serbia can start a new conflict within the European Union. That is why we tabled a resolution with the 27 European Union countries in a joint assembly with the United Nations last summer [in which] we opened dialogue with Pristina.*<sup>575</sup>

The EU had facilitated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, in order to promote cooperation, achieve progress for EU path and to improve daily lives for citizens.<sup>576</sup> In 2011, the negotiations began and were mediated by the EU. After 23 lengthy roundtable discussions, two agreements were signed: (1) The Brussel Agreements of 2013 that had integrated the Serbian community of Northern Kosovo into Kosovo's legal system with certain guarantees; also the agreement stated that neither side would block the other's progress on their accession to the EU.<sup>577</sup> Serbia also required to dismantle the so-called "parallel structures" in Northern Kosovo; and (2) the agreement explained the details regarding energy, telecommunications and the association of Serbian municipalities and the Ibar River Bridge.

Following the milestone agreement in 2013, the Commission recommended the opening of accession negotiations with Serbia to the Council. In its report, the Commission stressed that Serbia took substantial steps towards observable and supportable development of relations with Kosovo that lead to a number of "irreversible changes on the ground."<sup>578</sup> In June 2013, Catherine Ashton (High Representative) and Stefan Füle (Commissioner for Enlargement) requested "a clear and positive decision" to open negotiations with Serbia. The Foreign Affairs Council

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<sup>574</sup> Gül Pınar Ekrem Gülboy, "Türkiye ve Sırbistan'ın Avrupa Birliği'ne Giriş Süreçlerinin Karşılaştırılması", **Türkiye – Sırbistan İlişkileri**, (Eds. Yeliz Okay and Tuncay Babalı), Doğu Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2012, p. 116.

<sup>575</sup> "Serbia after Mladic Arrest", **Euronews**, 03.06.2011, <http://www.euronews.com/2011/06/03/serbia-after-mladic-arrest/>, (10.04.2016).

<sup>576</sup> European Union External Action, "EU Relations with Kosovo", **Kosovo**, [http://eeas.europa.eu/kosovo/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/kosovo/index_en.htm), (07.03.2016).

<sup>577</sup> "First Agreement of the Principles Governing the Normalization of the Relations", **RTS**, 19.04.2013, <http://www.rts.rs/upload/storyBoxFileData/2013/04/20/3224318/Originalni%20tekst%20Predloga%20Osporazuma.pdf>, (12.04.2016).

<sup>578</sup> European Commission, "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014", **Enlargement**, 16.10.2013, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52013DC0700>, (12.04.2016).

later recommended to the Council to start negotiations with Serbia by January 2014. As a result of the progress towards normalisation of relations with Kosovo and the agreements that had been put forth, the Council decided to open accession negotiations with Serbia on June 28, 2013. Two months later, the SAA entered into force. The First Intergovernmental Conference took place on January 21, 2014 followed by the Second Conference held in December of 2015.

**Figure 7:** Negotiation Process - The Chapters

| Acquis Chapter                          | Chapter Opened | Current Status              |
|---|----------------|-----------------------------|
| 5. Public Procurement                   | June 2016      | Moderately prepared         |
| 6. Company Law                          | December 2017  | Good level of preparation   |
| 7. Intellectual Property Law            | June 2017      | Good level of preparation   |
| 13. Fisheries                           | June 2018      | Moderately prepared         |
| 20. Enterprise & Industrial Policy      | February 2017  | Moderately prepared         |
| 23. Judiciary & Fundamental Rights      | June 2016      | Some level of preparation   |
| 24. Justice, Freedom & Security         | June 2016      | Some level of preparation   |
| 25. Science & Research                  | December 2016  | Closed                      |
| 26. Education & Culture                 | December 2016  | Closed                      |
| 29. Customs Union                       | June 2017      | Good level of preparation   |
| 30. External Relations                  | December 2017  | Moderately prepared         |
| 32. Financial Control                   | December 2015  | Moderately prepared         |
| 33. Financial & Budgetary Provisions    | June 2018      | Early stage of preparations |
| 35. Other Issues: Relations with Kosovo | December 2015  |                             |

Source: European Commission, “Serbia 2018 Progress Report”, **EU Enlargement Strategy**, 17.04.2018, <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-serbia-report.pdf>, (04.10.2018).

Currently, there are 21 unopened chapters, 14 opened and 2 completed chapters (25-Science & Research; 26-Education & Culture). According to the last progress report in 2018,<sup>579</sup> Serbia has accomplished a good level in its preparations of three chapters (6-Company Law; 7-Intellectual Property Law; 29-Customs Union). Moreover, it is moderately prepared for chapters on Fisheries, Enterprise & Industrial Policy, External Relations and Financial Control. Financial & Budgetary Provisions is listed as early stage of preparation while Judiciary & Fundamental Rights and Justice, Freedom & Security are still on some level of preparation.

<sup>579</sup> European Commission, “Serbia 2018 Progress Report”, **EU Enlargement Strategy**, 17.04.2018, <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-serbia-report.pdf>, (30.07.2018).

## V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is obvious that the EU's enlargement policy for the Western Balkans is not as unproblematic as the CEE cases. However, the EU vision is the most imperative project, being designed for the establishment of peace and stability in the region. The success of the process depends on the inter and intra-region dynamics: the transitional justice against the highly contested ethno-nationalist rhetoric, a viable solution to bilateral and internal problems, more attractive conditionality-based strategies to steady domestic elites on EU integration. Consequently, the EU has and should have both a more regional approach and at the same time a country-by-country approach as well.

Belgrade has a critical place for EU's policy priorities and strategies in the region. From the viewpoint of the EU, Serbia's "role in the stabilization of the region is a key factor"<sup>580</sup> for EU's priorities and the expectations in the region in a sense that other candidates and potential candidates such as Montenegro, BiH and Kosovo have a direct interdependency to Belgrade.

Nevertheless, the lack of consensus on Kosovo's final status among the member states causes the postponement of an unknown resolution, which also undermines the future of negotiations with Belgrade. Although the 2008 elections have strengthened the grip of the reformists in the country and there has been a position and attitude change among the nationalists, Serbian politics have risks and vulnerabilities in ongoing Europeanization process due to Kosovo's status.

Lastly, despite the candidacy status approved in 2012, Serbian transition is still full of major structural problems: corruption, rule of law and public administration. At this point, the political expectations of the Union have not been adequately met and the reformists have acted heavily in the political and economic liberalization of the country. Instead of the positive climate and agenda setting, the process still and will depend on the willingness, ability and capability of decision makers in Belgrade. While the Union's regional perspective in its enlargement policy is important in understanding and explaining Serbia-EU relations, domestic perspective for membership and general position and attitudes of political elites are paramount

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<sup>580</sup> European Commission, Second Annual Report, p. 33.

parameters that must be carefully considered for a detailed analysis of opportunities and obstacles in the ongoing process. To repeat, the process will depend on national elites who play the roles of gatekeepers between the EU and Serbia during the accession.





## CHAPTER FOUR

### A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PARTY POSITIONS

*With their illiberal discourse and dogmas, Serbian Liberals, who are acting as internal outsiders, frame the EU membership as the foundation for solving all the troubles we have.*

Prof. Dr. Zoran Ćirjaković, **Interview**, Belgrade, 2017

The EU's external incentives model is empirically valid for the CEE,<sup>581</sup> but raises certain problems for the Western Balkans.<sup>582</sup> It is therefore still too early to conclude if effective and lasting Europeanization has been achieved in Serbia regarding its candidacy status and the start of the negotiations. Although the country has achieved membership status, the relationship between the two sides is not always harmonious, with Europeanization in Serbia being slower, more complex, and meeting more resistance than expected,<sup>583</sup> and that the process will be drawn out.<sup>584</sup> Its progress has been deemed insufficient by the Commission.<sup>585</sup>

It is particularly challenging due to the context-driven dynamics of its domestic politics. National elites are indiscernible actors that should be closely followed in order to understand whether they can provide an effective bridge between “their” country and the EU.<sup>586</sup> According to Raunio and Hix, amongst the national ruling elites, the legislative power of the parliament is a significant variable that cannot be ignored, through which political parties as legislators have the power to make constitutional bargains to amend or reject EU harmonization packages.<sup>587</sup> Thus, Europeanization should be considered as a game played by political parties.<sup>588</sup> This makes their concerns and preferences have a greater role in the changing dynamics of EU politics, which requires an approach beyond the simple analysis of EU conditionality.

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<sup>581</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, **The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe**, Cornell University Press, New York, 2005.

<sup>582</sup> Florian Bieber, “Building Impossible States? State-Building Strategies and EU Membership in the Western Balkans”, **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 63, No. 10, 2011, pp. 1783-1802.

<sup>583</sup> İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, p. 32.

<sup>584</sup> Djordjevic, pp. 77-93; Stahl, pp. 447-468; Keil, pp. 343-353.

<sup>585</sup> “Serbia 2015 Report”, **European Commission**, 10.11.2015, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2015/20151110\\_report\\_serbia.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_serbia.pdf), (26.05.2018), pp. 4-6.

<sup>586</sup> Ray, p. 283.

<sup>587</sup> Tapio Raunio and Simon Hix, “Backbenchers Learn to Fight Back: European Integration and Parliamentary Government”, **West European Politics**, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000, p. 142.

<sup>588</sup> Tolstrup, pp. 718-721.

As detailed in the first chapter regarding new patterns developing within Europeanization literature, the process has often been positioned between the EU's conditionality clauses and applicants' willingness to comply<sup>589</sup> such that the challenge of improving the quality of governance necessary for building sustainable and stable democracies largely depends on the region's own actors.<sup>590</sup> For this reason, this dissertation aims at analysing Serbian parties' positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization from a comparative perspective. To analyse the Serbian parties' positions, it aims to answer the following research questions: (I) What are the positions of political parties in Serbia concerning the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization? (II) What are the factors affecting the positions and contextualizations of these political parties? What are the rationales on which these positions are based and their theses developed? (III) How do political parties in Serbia legitimize their positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization?

Accordingly, this chapter first determines the parties' positions before testing the research hypotheses through the analysis of the expert survey. This chapter consists of six sections. The first section details the main pillars of party politics in Serbia, including the most recent parliamentary election. The second part explains the methodology of the analysis. The following section includes the statistical analysis for the dependent variable and political parties according to their relevant positions via descriptive tables to answer the first research question. In the fourth section, the same procedure is repeated for the independent variables. The political parties are statistically compared according to their characteristics (political competition, ideology, and identity politics) formulated in the research hypotheses to provide causal explanations of their stances. In the fifth section, based on the models and formulated hypotheses, comparative tests are completed for party positions and inter-party differentiations.

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<sup>589</sup> Radeljic, p. 3.

<sup>590</sup> Cohen and Lampe, p. 94.

## **I. MAIN PILLARS OF PARTY POLITICS IN SERBIA**

Party politics is not institutionalized in Serbia. On the contrary, the current electoral system and the leader-centred political culture prevent a stable and functioning party system from taking root. In general, Serbia's political parties with their "catch-all strategies," have short-term and somewhat populist orientations, which also decreases political stability and predictability.

History is one of the leading indicators for understanding and explaining party politics in Serbia. As a country of transition, it has been affected by legacies of the past. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the legacies of previous regime have produced and re-produced various obstacles and challenges in Serbian politics; hence, the country's fluctuating progress towards democratic transition. Victimhood is still a lively laboratory for status quo-oriented nationalist parties with Eurosceptic positions (detailed in the second chapter).

The bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia, the unending struggle over Kosovo, and cooperation with the ICTY were high-cost pre-conditions imposed by the EU for pan-European reformist parties. Identity politics, particularly the Kosovo issue, complicates Europeanization in Serbia (detailed in the third chapter). This unresolved problem remains a key political issue, especially for Eurosceptic parties. The main foreign policy that continues to frustrate and create dilemmas within the Serbian political system is the relationship between the EU and Russia. This topic continues to dominate both Serbia's political agenda and its election campaigns.

### **A. Political Parties in the Early Post-Milošević Era**

Following Nazi occupation during the Second World War, former partisans came into power in the Balkans with Soviet support to found the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, unifying the southern Slavs under the slogan of "brotherhood and unity." These socialist leaders introduced "decentralization" as the way to achieve territorial integrity by establishing a genuine federation with considerable autonomy for ethnic groups in each republic and province. Although the regime abolished multi-party elections in 1946, candidates only proposed by the League of Communists of

Yugoslavia or by the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia run for occupations in elections as the way to manage political elites. Following 27 years of Tito's charismatic leadership (1953-1980), Yugoslavia entered a new phase of "uncertainty" with the fundamental question of political legitimacy in the 1980s. After the death of Tito, free elections were again reintroduced in 1990, when nationalists came to power in various Yugoslav republics.

The social transformations and political transitions in the Western Balkans, including Serbia, are often framed as *defective, delayed, and incomplete*, when compared to other post-communist countries in the CEE. According to Anastakis, the post-Yugoslav states joined the group of democratizing countries much later than other countries in the CEE due to continuity with their communist past, their illiberal start (electoral systems), and the total collapse of competitive order in politics.<sup>591</sup>

As analysed in detail in the second chapter, Milošević, the regime's formidable leader, controlled and mostly abused the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government. During his time, parliament merely functioned as a "talking shop," as opposed to acting as a legislative power. The regime instrumentalized majoritarian-style elections, particularly during the early elections, as a way of "manage" member(s) of parliament (MPs).<sup>592</sup>

In 2000, Milošević called for early elections, an action that would ultimately lead to his own demise. Despite his party's control of parliament, he was defeated in the first round of elections by the opposition. For the first time in history, opposition groups allied against him and headed into the elections with a common nomination, creating a new phase for party politics in Serbia. Consequently, the type of regime, the mode of transition, and the issue of political parties – including financial, organisational, and positional dimensions, all became issues of concern in Serbia.<sup>593</sup> However, the old elites were unable to agree on the fundamental norms for the new

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<sup>591</sup> Othon Anastakis, "Post-1989 Political Change in the Balkan States: The Legacy of the Early Illiberal Transition Years", **Perceptions**, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2013, pp. 91-112.

<sup>592</sup> Irena Pejic, "Constitutional Design and Viability of Semi-presidentialism in Serbia", **Centre for the Study of Global Governance**, Discussion Paper No. 43, 2007, p. 8.

<sup>593</sup> Věra Stojarová, "Legacy of Communist and Socialist Parties in the Western Balkans", **Party Politics in the Western Balkans**, (Eds. Věra Stojarová and Peter Emerson), Routledge, London, 2009, p. 26.

regime nor on a new constitution. Serbia still suffers from the establishment of a constitution that promotes the consolidation of democracy in the country.<sup>594</sup>

In the post-Yugoslav context, party politics in Serbia fundamentally reflects the dominance of identity issues, including wars, the ICTY, and Kosovo.<sup>595</sup> Social attitudes and the ethos of conflict are significant indicators for the analysis of party politics and voting patterns in Serbia.<sup>596</sup> Parties are polarized between the moderates in favour of EU membership and the construction of a “new” Serbia, on one hand, and traditionalists and nationalists focusing more on history and the narrative of victimhood, as detailed in the second chapter. Serbian self-victimization is one of the leading narratives<sup>597</sup> that is used as a persuasive tactic by political parties with more exclusive national identity orientations. As described in the third chapter, the Koštunica-led nationalists continued their loyalty to Milošević’s discourse. Meanwhile, certain elites and a few political parties positioned themselves with the nationalist pro-Koštunica bloc and used their veto power against transitional justice and resolving past issues.

The anti-Milošević coalition was short-lived, although some parties from that coalition remained in power until 2012. Following elections in 2000, the opposition movements dispersed, which led to the emergence of a host of new parties, from nationalist hardliners to pro-EU reformists. During this new era, Serbia emerged as a country of new, yet often short-lived parties (divan or taxi parties) due to their membership sizes and election results.<sup>598</sup> The Law on Political Parties,<sup>599</sup> adopted in 2009, required 10,000 signatures from citizens to register a new party. Currently, there

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<sup>594</sup> Matevž Tomšič, **Elites in the New Democracies**, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 2016, p. 79.

<sup>595</sup> Marko Stojić, **Party Responses to the EU in the Western Balkans: Transformation, Opposition or Defiance?**, Springer, Cham, 2017, p. 237.

<sup>596</sup> Janko Međedović and Boban D. Petrović, "Predictors of Party Evaluation in post-Conflict Society: The Case of Serbia", **Psihologija**, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2013, pp. 27-43.

<sup>597</sup> İlhan Bilici and Sinem Çelik, “Ulusal Kimliğin Batı Balkanlarda AB Üyelik Koşullarının Geçerliliği Üzerindeki Etkisi”, **Turkish Studies**, Vol. 12, No. 31, 2017, p. 36.


<sup>598</sup> Elisabeth Bakke, “Central and East European Party Systems since 1989”, **Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989**, (Ed. Sabrina Ramet), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 73.

<sup>599</sup> For details see: “The Law on Political Parties”, **Legislativeonline**, May 2009, <http://www.parliament.am/library/Political%20parties/serbia.pdf>, (20.12.2017).

are more than 107 political parties, of which the majority are irrelevant to political life, including those established before 2000.<sup>600</sup>

This statistic provides further insight into Serbia's party politics and shows its lack of party institutionalization. Firstly, it hinders stability and inhibits the core organizations with governing or opposition roles in a particular polity; secondly, it maintains a sense of unpredictability in Serbian politics. As a result, party programs are still underdeveloped,<sup>601</sup> having the features of "catch-all" parties that strive to attract as many votes as they can.<sup>602</sup> Serbian party politics has undergone a long process of positioning and re-positioning due to this catch-all strategy. The prime example is attitude change among political parties towards the EU following the 2008 elections, as exemplified in the Figure 8 below (also detailed in third chapter). For example, while SNS shifted from a hard-Eurosceptic position (left-hand side of the Figure 8) to a more moderate one, DSS re-positioned itself as a Eurosceptic party, while DS had to soften its pro-European discourse.

**Figure 8:** Moderate Pluralism and Catch-all Strategies after 2008



Source: Spasojević, *Europeanization of Serbian Party System*, p. 13.

Teokarević shares the following observation on the weak and unstable dimensions of party politics in Serbia:

<sup>600</sup> "Serbia's Registered Political Party Count Reaches 107", **B92**, 05.01.2016, [http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2016&mm=01&dd=05&nav\\_id=96601](http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2016&mm=01&dd=05&nav_id=96601), (20.12.2017).

<sup>601</sup> Spasojević, *Europeanization of Serbian Party System*, p. 5.

<sup>602</sup> Lenard J. Cohen and John R. Lampe, **Embracing Democracy in the Western Balkans: From Postconflict Struggles toward European Integration**, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, 2011, p. 270.

*The first problem is still an unconsolidated party system, i.e. the absence of closer affiliation of voters to certain parties during a longer period that is during several successive elections. Many parties disappear from political life, even after preceding successes, when some of them even formed governments, whereas other parties and coalitions are formed, with no firm guarantees for long-term survival.*<sup>603</sup>

Ramet frames Serbia's political parties as the elite-dominated cadre parties of the 19<sup>th</sup> century underlying broader appeal, smaller organizations, fewer members, and stronger leadership.<sup>604</sup> First, voters view and evaluate political parties more in terms of the party leader,<sup>605</sup> so that voting behaviour is highly correlated with leadership charisma, regardless of the party programme or debates during election campaigns. This leader-centric party politics creates a democratic deficit for intra-party affairs in that candidacies and ensured positions are largely dependent on party leaders.<sup>606</sup> These leader-based characteristics of parties also prevent a more sustainable and institutionalized party politics in Belgrade. In essence, political parties become ineffective if party leaders lose his/her legitimacy and charisma among the wider masses. This is what happened to Koštunica's DSS and Serbia's third president, Boris Tadić, and his ruling party - DS.

The charisma, persuasiveness, and legitimacy of party leaders are the main motivational factors that shape elections. For example, Prelec claims that voters in the most recent presidential election were split between two distinct groups: pro and anti-Vučić.<sup>607</sup> Regarding elections and voting behaviours, Pantić and Pavlović claim that the most important indicator of voting behaviour is the influence of situation-contextual factors, which subsequently influence Serbia's political culture.<sup>608</sup> One exception, Milanović concludes, is that in those regions where Serbian refugees and

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<sup>603</sup> Jovan Teokarević, "Democratization of the Balkan Post-Communist Political Systems", **State and Democracy**, (Ed. Milan Podunavac), Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade, 2010, p. 23.

<sup>604</sup> Elisabeth, p. 67.

<sup>605</sup> Dušan Pavlović, "Political Parties and the Party System in Serbia after 2000", **Reshaping the Broken Image of Political Parties. Internal Party Democracy in South East Europe**, (Ed. Georgi Karasimeonov), Gorex Press, Sofia, 2006, pp. 173-200.

<sup>606</sup> Jelena Lončar and Boban Stojanović, "The Influence of Electoral System on Candidates' Election Campaign Strategies and the Work of Members of Parliament", **Voters, Parties, Elections – How to Democratize Political Parties in Montenegro and Serbia?**, (Eds. Zoran Stojiljković and Dušan Spasojević), University of Belgrade, Belgrade, 2016, p. 69.

<sup>607</sup> "Experts React: Aleksandar Vučić Wins Serbia's Presidential Election", **European Politics and Policy**, 03.04.2017, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/04/03/experts-react-aleksandar-vucic-wins-serbias-presidential-election/#Four>, (25.12.2017).

<sup>608</sup> Dragomir Pantić and Zoran M. Pavlović, **Political Cultures of Voters in Serbia**, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, 2009, p. 122.

ethnic minorities are highly represented, the majority of people with lower levels of education vote for extreme parties.<sup>609</sup>

Party politics in Serbia is primarily perceived as elite work, conducted mostly behind closed doors centered in Belgrade. Despite having a large proportion of its population residing in rural areas (55.6% in 2016),<sup>610</sup> politicians are criticized for being present only during election campaigns, and that any changes in Serbia are felt only in Belgrade.<sup>611</sup> Secondly, political institutions, including political parties, suffer from low legitimacy in the countryside. As in neighbouring countries, between 32% and 60% of the citizenry have abstained from voting in elections since 2000.<sup>612</sup> A significant proportion (23%) see themselves as “losers” of the transition,<sup>613</sup> while levels of trust in parliament remain very low (25%),<sup>614</sup> in which politicians are blamed for maximizing their own personal gains (56%).<sup>615</sup>

Most parties in Serbia are oriented more towards personalities with catch-all strategies, seeking power rather than proposing ideologies and programmes. Ideology is still manifest in extremist left-wing parties, which are particularly supported by the masses, through a convergence of nationalist and pro-communist attitudes.<sup>616</sup> The creation of an ideological perspective has not been the prime concern of any parties in Serbia. According to Cohen: “Most parties, both on the left and right ends of the political spectrum, are really leader-centered organizations, in which the attachments and loyalties of both voters and party elites are directed less to ideology or party programs and more to a charismatic or dominant personality.”<sup>617</sup>

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<sup>609</sup> Branko Milanović, “Who Voted for the Radicals?”, **Prizma**, Vol. 4, 2004, pp. 10-18.

<sup>610</sup> “Serbia – Urban Population”, **Trading Economics**, 2017, <https://tradingeconomics.com/serbia/urban-population-percent-of-total-wb-data.html>, (22.12.2017).

<sup>611</sup> Tamara Lukić, et al., “Politics in the Balkan Countryside: Case Study in Serbia”, **East European Countryside**, Vol. 20, 2014, p. 121.

<sup>612</sup> “Republic of Serbia”, **Election Guide**, 2018, <http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/242/>, (22.12.2017).

<sup>613</sup> “Political Engagement of Serbian Citizens”, **CESID - Public Opinion Poll**, June 2017, <http://www.cesid.rs/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/POLITICAL-ENGAGEMENT-2017.pdf>, (25.12.2017).

<sup>614</sup> “Balkan Barometer 2017: Public Opinion Survey”, **Regional Cooperation Council**, 2017, [http://www.rcc.int/seeds/files/RCC\\_BalkanBarometer\\_PublicOpinion\\_2017.pdf](http://www.rcc.int/seeds/files/RCC_BalkanBarometer_PublicOpinion_2017.pdf), (25.12.2017)

<sup>615</sup> “Political Engagement of Serbian Citizens”, p. 19.

<sup>616</sup> Bojan Todosijević, “The Structure of Political Attitudes in Hungary and Serbia”, **East European Politics and Societies**, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp. 879-900.

<sup>617</sup> Cohen, p. 226.



## B. Institutional and Legislative Framework

Serbia follows a semi-presidential system, with executive power divided between an elected president and the government, approved by parliament. According to the Constitution,<sup>618</sup> the President of Republic represents state unity (article-112), is responsible for foreign and security policies (article-113), and is elected for five-year terms in a two-round simple majority system of popular elections. However, the government, which is defined as the holder of executive power (article-122), is elected by the National Assembly (article-124) every four years in through parliamentary elections.

Serbia's semi-presidential system has been "rationalized" to have more of a parliamentary character. In 2006, a new constitution was adopted that strengthened the roles of parliament and Prime Minister, compared to the relatively weak, although directly elected President.<sup>619</sup> Serbia's legislative power is exercised by a unicameral National Assembly with 250 MPs.

Critics argue the current proportional electoral system has created a fragmented parliament, first due to pre-election coalitions and second because of weakened geographical (territorial) representation due to the national-level constituency. In addition, the system is disproportionally represented by a higher number of minority parties and small parties, which also fragments the party system and makes coalition government inevitable.<sup>620</sup>

Despite a 5% threshold that is supposed to ensure a stable and institutionalized party system, smaller parties have developed a strategy of pre-election coalition building to secure their parliamentary seats. Although this strategy creates a parliament that is more representative, it causes fragmentation that morphs into a "polarized" pluralistic system.<sup>621</sup> Parliamentary seats are allocated based on the number of votes gained by each electoral list, using the D'Hondt method quotient system. The

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<sup>618</sup> "Constitution of the Republic of Serbia", **Government of the Republic of Serbia**, 2017, [http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice\\_o\\_srbiji/ustav\\_odredbe.php?id=222](http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav_odredbe.php?id=222), (10.12.2017).

<sup>619</sup> "Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia", **Venice Commission**, 2007, [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2007\)004-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2007)004-e), (05.12.2017), p. 11.

<sup>620</sup> Slaviša Orlović, "The Influence of Electoral System on Party Fragmentation in Serbian Parliament", **Serbian Political Thought**, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2015, p. 96.

<sup>621</sup> Orlovic, p. 94.

nationwide threshold does not apply to parties of national minorities. According to the Law on Political Parties,<sup>622</sup> minority parties are only required to find 1,000 signatures to register, instead of the 10,000 as a general rule. Hungarians in Vojvodina and Bosniaks in Sandžak are demographically larger minorities that are represented via their organized parties. In the current parliament, Albanian and Slovak minorities are also represented by their own parties.

In Serbia, political parties are always considered to be somehow involved in corruption. According to Pesic, political party financing does not meet even minimum democratic standards.<sup>623</sup> The underdeveloped legislation and non-enforcement tactics create a system in which political parties act as “capturing” agents. Despite the introduction of an Anti-Corruption Agency and the passage of the Law on Financing of Political Activities in 2011, widespread political corruption, specifically regarding party funding, continues.<sup>624</sup> The OSCE/ODIHR continually reports that the existing regulations cannot ensure accountability, transparency and integrity of party finances during the campaigns.<sup>625</sup> Likewise, the EU annually recommends that international observers are allowed access to ensure that campaign financing and voter registration are transparent.<sup>626</sup>

The list of criticisms directed against Serbia’s path towards democratic reform is long: misappropriation of administrative resources for campaigning, inadequate regulation of campaign finance, pressuring of voters by ruling parties, and widespread self-censorship from political influence over the media.<sup>627</sup> Lastly, civil society, which should in theory encourage the public to demand higher standards in elections and access to unbiased information, is still very weak in Serbia and lacking international support.<sup>628</sup>

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<sup>622</sup> “The Law on Political Parties.”

<sup>623</sup> Vesna Pesic, “State Capture and Widespread Corruption in Serbia”, **CEPS**, Working Document No. 262, March 2007, <http://aei.pitt.edu/11664/1/1478.pdf>, (10.11.2017), pp. 7-8.

<sup>624</sup> “Corruption: Assessment Report Serbia”, **SELDI.net**, 2014, [http://seldi.net/fileadmin/public/PDF/Publications/CAR\\_Serbia/CAR\\_Serbia\\_EN\\_final.pdf](http://seldi.net/fileadmin/public/PDF/Publications/CAR_Serbia/CAR_Serbia_EN_final.pdf), (10.11.2017), p. 17.

<sup>625</sup> “Republic of Serbia Early Parliamentary Elections 24 April 2016”, **OSCE - Final Report**, 29.07.2016, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia/256926?download=true>, (10.11.2017), p. 2.

<sup>626</sup> European Commission, 2016 Progress Report, p. 4.

<sup>627</sup> European Commission, 2016 Progress Report, pp. 2-4.

<sup>628</sup> Kmezić, p. 23.

### C. The Early Parliamentary Election in 2016

The lack of a more functional and stable parliament does not stem solely from the electoral system, but also because of early elections that have frequently been called by Serbian leaders over the past two decades. Following the transition in 2000, Serbia held early parliamentary elections in 2003, 2008, 2014, and 2016.<sup>629</sup>

**Table 3:** Results of Parliamentary Elections in Serbia since 2003

|        | 2003       |                 | 2007       |                 | 2008       |                 | 2012       |                 | 2014       |                 |
|--------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|
|        | % of Votes | Number of Seats | % of Votes | Number of Seats | % of Votes | Number of Seats | % of Votes | Number of Seats | % of Votes | Number of Seats |
| SNS    | -          | -               | -          | -               | -          | -               | 24         | 73              | 48         | 158             |
| SRS    | 27         | 82              | 28         | 81              | 29         | 78              | -          | -               | -          | -               |
| DSS    | 17         | 53              | 16         | 47              | 11         | 30              | 7          | 21              | -          | -               |
| DS     | 12         | 37              | 22         | 64              | 38         | 102             | 22         | 67              | 6          | 19              |
| G17+   | 11         | 34              | 6          | 19              | -          | -               | -          | -               | -          | -               |
| SPO-NS | 7          | 22              | -          | -               | -          | -               | -          | -               | -          | -               |
| SPS    | 7          | 22              | -          | -               | 7          | 20              | -          | -               | 13         | 43              |
| SPS    | -          | -               | 5          | 16              | -          | -               | 14         | 44              | -          | -               |
| LDP    | -          | -               | 5          | 16              | 5          | 13              | 6          | 19              | -          | -               |
| URS    | -          | -               | -          | -               | -          | -               | 5          | 16              | -          | -               |
| SDS    | -          | -               | -          | -               | -          | -               | -          | -               | 5          | 18              |

Source: “Elections”, **Republic Electoral Commission**, 2018, <http://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/english/index.php>, (20.08.2018).

The Prime Minister of the time, Vučić, decided to hold the last early elections in 2016 in order to enhance and guarantee four more years of (his) rule to achieve EU accession.<sup>630</sup> There were 20 pre-election coalitions, 12 of which were comprised of 29 political parties. A total of 5 minority parties won 10 seats representing Hungarians, Bosniaks, Albanians, and Slovaks. As the day of the election drew nearer, he repeatedly called on the electorate to vote for the “European path” so that Serbia could carry on with EU integration.<sup>631</sup> The early parliamentary elections on April 24, 2016 gave a landslide victory for Vučić’s party, SNS.<sup>632</sup> They ensured their parliamentary

<sup>629</sup> Serbia held early elections in 2003 due to Đinđić’s death, because of an inability to govern in 2008, and without any specific reason in 2012 and 2016.

<sup>630</sup> “Elections in Serbia - 2016 Early Parliamentary Elections: Frequently Asked Questions”, **IFES**, 22.04.2016, [https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/2016\\_ifes\\_serbia\\_parliamentary\\_elections\\_faqs.pdf](https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/2016_ifes_serbia_parliamentary_elections_faqs.pdf), (10.11.2017), p. 1.

<sup>631</sup> “Serbia Election: Pro-EU Prime Minister Vucic Claims Victory”, **BBC**, 24.04.2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36122928>, (10.10.2017).

<sup>632</sup> ‘Serbia is Winning’ was a pre-election coalition led by SNS including certain small parties such as SDP, PUPS, NS and SNP

majority with 48% of the votes (see Table 4). Since this last election, Serbia's party system has become a predominantly one-party system controlled by the SNS.

According to the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), voters were mainly concerned with issues surrounding socio-economic factors, such as poverty, unemployment, and corruption, although support for EU membership tended to decrease (45-50%) whereas support for the partnership with Russia (75%) increased.<sup>633</sup> In addition, the election campaign focused on the issue of EU membership. There was even a division between those political parties supporting EU accession and those calling for closer co-operation with Russia during the pre-election coalitions.<sup>634</sup> Even though the voters decided to support the government, the extreme-right SRS and DVERI made significant gains in the election with the support of those favouring closer ties with Russia.<sup>635</sup>

**Table 4:** Results of the Early Parliamentary Election in 2016

| NAME OF ELECTORAL LIST  | Number of votes | % of votes | Number of seats |
|---|-----------------|------------|-----------------|
| Aleksandar Vučić – Serbia is Winning  | 1,823,147       | 48.25      | 131             |
| Ivica Dačić & Dragan Marković - Palma, Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), United Serbia (JS)  | 413,770         | 10.95      | 29              |
| Dr. Vojislav Šešelj – Serbian Radical Party   | 306,052         | 8.10       | 22              |
| Saša Radulović - Enough is Enough   | 227,626         | 6.02       | 16              |
| For a Just Serbia – Democratic Party (NOVA, DSHV, ZZS)  | 227,589         | 6.02       | 16              |
| Sanda Rašković Ivić & Boško Obradović - DVERI – Democratic Party of Serbia  | 190,530         | 5.04       | 13              |
| Boris Tadić & Čedomir Jovanović – Alliance for a Better Serbia – Liberal Democratic Party, League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, Social Democratic Party | 189,564         | 5.02       | 13              |
| István Pásztor - Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians   | 56,620          | 1.50       | 4               |
| Muamer Zukorlić – Bosniak Democratic Community of Sandžak   | 32,526          | 0.86       | 2               |
| Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin - SDA Sandžak   | 30,092          | 0.80       | 2               |
| Green Party   | 23,890          | 0.63       | 1               |
| Ardita Sinani - Party of Democratic Action  | 16,262          | 0.43       | 1               |

Source: “Number of Mandates Won - XI National Assembly Convocation”, **National Assembly of Republic of Serbia**, 2017, <http://www.parlament.gov.rs/national-assembly/national-assembly-in-numbers.1743.html>, (10.09.2017).

In April of 2017, Prime Minister Vučić was elected as the new President with 55% of the votes in the first round of the election. Ana Brnabić, who emerged on the

<sup>633</sup> “Serbia: 2016 Parliamentary Elections and Beyond”, **NDI**, 21.09.2016, <https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/SB2016report.pdf>, (10.11.2017), p. 2.

<sup>634</sup> OSCE, p. 10.

<sup>635</sup> “Serbia Election: PM Aleksandar Vucic Claims Victory”, **Al Jazeera**, 25.04.2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/serbia-election-aleksandar-vucic-claims-victory-160425035224604.html>, (10.10.2017).

political scene with her appointment as Minister of Public Administration and Local Self-Government in 2016, became the first woman and openly LGBT Prime Minister with Vučić's support. This change shifted the executive power to the presidency again in terms of leadership. Based on patron–client relations, legislative and executive powers in the country today remains with President Vučić.

#### D. Leading Political Parties in Serbia

The following chapter analyses the various factors and rationales by which party positions are based, developed and become legitimized. A thematic content analysis was conducted on documents relevant to eight political parties – the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), Serbian Radical Party (SRS), Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Enough is Enough (DJB), Democratic Party (DS), Social Democratic Party of Serbia (SDP), DVERI, and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). Since this study concerns the approach of Serbian political parties towards EU membership, it is important to analyse each political party playing leading roles in Serbia since 2000.

**Figure 9:** Leading Political Parties in Serbia

| Party Name   | Year | Ideology        | Leader               |
|--|------|-----------------|----------------------|
| <b>Serbian Progressive Party</b><br>( <i>Srpska napredna stranka - SNS</i> )               | 2008 | Centre-right    | Aleksandar Vučić     |
| <b>Social Democrat Party of Serbia</b><br>( <i>Socijaldemokratska partija Srbije-SDP</i> ) | 2008 | Centre-left     | Rasim Ljajić         |
| <b>Serbian Radical Party</b><br>( <i>Srpska radikalna stranka - SRS</i> )                  | 1991 | Far-right       | Vojislav Šešelj      |
| <b>Socialist Party of Serbia</b><br>( <i>Socijalistička partija Srbije - SPS</i> )         | 1990 | Left-wing       | Ivica Dačić          |
| <b>Enough is Enough</b><br>( <i>Dosta je bilo - DJB</i> )                                  | 2014 | Centre-right    | Branislav Mihajlović |
| <b>Democratic Party</b><br>( <i>Demokratska stranka - DS</i> )                             | 1990 | Centre-left     | Zoran Lutovac        |
| <b>Democratic Party of Serbia</b><br>( <i>Demokratska stranka Srbije - DSS</i> )           | 1992 | Right-wing      | Miloš Jovanović      |
| <b>DVERI</b>   | 2015 | Christian-right | Boško Obradović      |

**Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka - SNS):** In 2008, Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić established the SNS as the latest reformist party, following a split within the SRS. Nikolić and Vučić had certain disagreement and conflict of vision for SRS with the top party members, controlled by the ICTY

indictée Šešelj, and then decided to form a new right-wing party - SNS. A large majority of party members and voters aligned with the SNS. This central right-wing party has remained the ruling party in Belgrade since 2012.

During the early transition years, the founders of the party have concluded that, in order to remain a relevant actor in politics, they had to abandon the party's nationalist line, framing its old discourse and veto position against European reforms.<sup>636</sup> The nationalists who opposed the EU eventually lost the support of the electorate or began to be side-lined by their domestic counterparts (2008 elections). Thus, the shift in their position amounted as a strategic adaptation to new political realities for the purpose of survival.<sup>637</sup> In addition to that, for governing positions, the party leaders softened the nationalistic rhetoric and formulated moderate, achievable and acceptable party goals in order to make themselves a desirable coalition partner.<sup>638</sup>

However, the party leaders' past and SRS-originated background regarding their roles and responsibilities during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, are often brought up during discussions and interviews by the international media. President Vučić served as the spokesperson of the radical SRS and Minister of Information during the Milošević era. His aggressive declaration that, "For every killed Serb we will kill 100 Muslims" in 1995 still appears in the media. The political leaders reacted to those criticisms by stating that the "new" SNS had learned its lessons from the past and they were now setting off on a new path to build a "new" Serbia:

*After 1999 we saw the result of our politics – it was very bad in all social spheres. We had as many ruined bridges and buildings as you can imagine. We cannot say it was all the fault of Serbia – but that was the result of our politics. We needed to change our aims and our unsuccessful and harmful politics.*<sup>639</sup>

**Social Democrat Party of Serbia (Socijaldemokratska partija Srbije - SDP):** Rasim Ljajić, from the Bosniak minority, was born in Novi Pazar and educated in Sarajevo. At the beginning of his political career, he was associated with the Democratic Action Party for Sandžak. In 1994, he formed the coalition "Sandžak," before transforming it into the Democratic Party of Sandžak in 2000. During the same

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<sup>636</sup> Bandović and Vujači, p. 61.

<sup>637</sup> Bandović and Vujači, p. 61.

<sup>638</sup> Bandović and Vujači, pp. 61-62.

<sup>639</sup> "Monocle: Interview with Aleksandar Vucic", SNS, 05.02.2014, <https://www.sns.org.rs/en/novosti/vesti/monocle-interview-aleksandar-vucic>, (12.04.2018), (Monocle).

year, he became vice-president of the Coordination Body for Solving the Crisis in Southern Serbia and vice-president of the Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija. In 2008, Ljajić founded the SDP as a new social-democratic political party.

During the critical years when transitional justice was occupied with the country's agenda, Ljajić chaired Serbia's National Council for Cooperation with The Hague Tribunal. For this reason, he focused heavily on dealing with the past, cooperation with the ICTY, and regional issues. The SDP thereby took political risks by taking an active role in these costly matters (although Serbia's cooperation with the ICTY was always too late and too little), so much so that even Ljajić was unable to leave his house for two weeks out of fear of assassination after the extradition of Radovan Karadžić: "Accepting the function of the president of the National Council for Cooperation with The Hague Tribunal was my biggest political risk."<sup>640</sup>

Ljajić and his party appealed to mainstream parties to establish a coalition, given his relatively more moderate position and rhetoric. Since then, the party has been a partner in the ruling coalition. Currently, he is Minister of Trade, Tourism, and Telecommunications.

**Socialist Party of Serbia (*Socijalistička partija Srbije* - SPS):** The Socialist Party of Serbia was founded by Slobodan Milošević in 1990. Since then it took the legislative and executive power in Belgrade, using an authoritarian style of rule ended up in 2000's Bulldozer Revolution. From 1992 they build coalitions with the SRS, and from 1993 with the New Democracy Party. Both socialist and nationalist discourses and policies continued during the dissolution of Yugoslavia till 2000 when SPS and its candidate for presidency, Milošević lost the election against the DOS. Following Milošević's transfer to the ICTY, Ivica Dačić was elected as the new party leader.

The SPS has partnership with SNS in the government since 2012. The ideological re-positioning remains intact for the SPS, which today, is based more on pragmatism than ideology. Acting as both First Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivica Dačić, delivers statements not only on foreign policy issues, but also on the SPS's shifts on positions. The leader complains that the party

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<sup>640</sup> "Interview with Rasim Ljajic: The Only way to Gain someone's Confidence is to Tell the Truth", **Office of War Crimes Prosecutor**, No Date, [http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/pravda\\_u\\_tranziciji/ENG/ENG03/873.pdf](http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/pravda_u_tranziciji/ENG/ENG03/873.pdf), (13.04.2018), (Interview).

still lives in the past; therefore, it cannot gain enough support from the voters in today's modern Serbia due to the negative reflections from the history.<sup>641</sup>

**Democratic Party (*Demokratska stranka* - DS):** The DS was established as a centre-left party in 1990 by a group of Serbian intellectuals' ties with Yugoslav Democratic Party. It struggled against the Milošević regime for many years. In 2000, it was a leading actor within the DOS, and played an active role during and after the fall of Milošević. Following the election in 2000, party leader Zoran Đinđić took over as Prime Minister till his assassination in 2003. The DS gained strength again after Boris Tadić rose to power as the new president, ruling between 2004 and 2012. During this period, the DS and DSS emerged as the leading actors and winners from the transition.

Subsequently, however, the DS lost a significant proportion of its votes in 2012. A strategy of changing the leadership (Dragan Đilas, Bojan Pajtić, and finally Dragan Šutanovac) was not able to prevent this decline, such that the party received only 6% of the votes in the 2016 elections, gaining just 12 parliamentary deputies. Thus, while the DS was a post-transition winner, it later became a loser.

**Enough is Enough (*Dosta je bilo* - DJB):** Saša Radulović, who returned from the USA in 2005, served as a consultant to various international organizations and was later appointed by Vučić as a non-partisan Minister of the Economy in 2013. However, due to a disagreement within the coalition regarding his new labour law package, he resigned. Before the 2014 election, he founded a centre-right movement called Dosta je Bilo (Enough is Enough), which failed to cross the electoral threshold. In 2016, however, DJB received 6% of the votes to gain 16 parliamentary seats.

**Serbian Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka* - SRS):** As a far-right political party, the SRS's central mission in contemporary Balkan politics has been to achieve a "Greater" Serbia. Thus, in 1997, SRS statements recalled Serbia's centuries old project regarding Croats, Bosniaks, and Albanians: "We shall realize the boundaries of Greater Serbia when we assume power at the federal level ... As a

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<sup>641</sup> "Interview by Ivica Dacic to Kurir", **MFA - Interviews**, 08.04.2018, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/about-the-ministry/minister/minister-interviews/13091-interview-by-ivica-dacic-to-kurir>, (14.04.2018), (Interview to Kurir).



political party, we shall never give up this goal.”<sup>642</sup> Vojislav Šešelj, the party’s leader, was not alone while uttering these threats since Nikolić and Vučić remained in the SRS until 2008. During its early years, the SRS and Milosevic’s regime collaborated so that the SRS portrayed itself as a fake opposition group – an informal coalition within the regime.<sup>643</sup> After Milošević began peace negotiations with the BiH, which clashed with their dream of a Greater Serbia, the SRS emerged as Milošević’s loudest critic. Šešelj and Nikolić spent two months in jail for their harsh criticisms of the peace process. Indeed, the Party Programme still contains their “Greater Serbia” project under the title, Unification of Serbian Countries:

*The aim of the SRS is to unify the entire Serbian nation and to educate the state community in the entire Serbian national territory, which will include Serbia, Montenegro, the Republika Srpska and the Republic of Srpska Krajina. The desire of Serbian Radicals is that this unique Serbian state is called Great Serbia... The unity of the Serbian people, in order to achieve a more complete and better realization of national goals ... We will try to nourish new generations that will be proud of belonging to the Serbian people and give their country of birth, or the ancestor's existence.*<sup>644</sup>

Acting as a revisionist hard-line nationalist party during the 2000s, the SRS threatened against both Đinđić and Koštunica for abandoning the SRS’ dream of a Greater Serbia and cooperating with the international community. “Anyone who works for the Americans must suffer the consequences.”<sup>645</sup> When Belgrade turned to The Hague, Šešelj helplessly demanded, “Do not give [them] any Serb after me; don’t give them Radovan Karadžić; don’t give them Ratko Mladić.”<sup>646</sup> After Šešelj turned back from the Hague in 2014, SRS gained the 8.10% of the votes represents now with 22 MPs in the parliament.

<sup>642</sup> Michael J. Jordan, “Rising Ultranationalist Poised to be a Powerbroker in Serbia”, **The Christian Science Monitor**, 08.10.1997, <https://www.csmonitor.com/1997/1008/100897.intl.intl.3.html>, (18.04.2018).

<sup>643</sup> Marlene Spoorri, **Engineering Revolution: The Paradox of Democracy Promotion in Serbia**, University of Pennsylvania Press, Pennsylvania, 2015, p. 35.

<sup>644</sup> “ПРОГРАМ СРПСКЕ РАДИКАЛНЕ СТРАНКЕ”, **SRS**, no date, <http://www.nova1.srpskaradikalnastranka.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/SRSprogram.pdf>, (18.04.2018), (Program Serbian Radical Party).

<sup>645</sup> “Serbian Deputy Minister Threatens Independent Media with Violence“, **Human Rights Watch, Country Serbia/Kosovo**, 10.02.2000, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/10/serbian-deputy-minister-threatens-independent-media-violence>, (18.04.2018).

<sup>646</sup> Marija Ristic, “Vojislav Seselj: Fallen Leader of Great Serbia”, **BIRN**, 15.03.2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/vojislav-seselj-fallen-leader-of-the-great-serbia/1458/171>, (18.04.2018).

**Democratic Party of Serbia (*Demokratska stranka Srbije* - DSS):** The DDS was established by a group of DS members that left under the leadership of Vojislav Koštunica in 1992. It emerged as a vital actor in the transition years. Following the electoral victory of the DOS, who presented Koštunica as their joint candidate, the DSS helped shaped Belgrade's future, especially in the early transition years. Following his Yugoslav presidency, Koštunica became prime minister between 2004 and 2008. With the rise of DS and their charismatic leader Tadić in the 2008 elections, DSS lost a significant proportion of its votes. In 2014 election they didn't pass the election threshold and received only 5% of the votes in 2016 election that ensured six seats in the parliament.

**DVERI:** (which means doors in Serbian) was established in 1999 as a right-wing Christian youth organization. Later, it acted as a civil society before becoming a political party in 2012, led by Boško Obradović. After failing to pass the election threshold in the 2012 and 2014 elections, the party received 5.04% of the votes, which gave DVERI six parliamentary seats in. It appears to be both a kind of movement and a political party in that, when you visit the party headquarters, you get the impression that they are group of young, dynamic, and hardworking politicians.

## II. METHODOLOGY FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF PARTY POSITIONS

As already stated, the first question this study aims to answer concerns the position of Serbian political parties regarding EU, EU membership, and Europeanization. Once this question is answered, the chapter can then concentrate on why some political parties support membership while others do not. For that purpose, a questionnaire was administered to specialists in Serbia-EU Relations and/or party politics.<sup>647</sup> The survey instrument,<sup>648</sup> which was originally developed by Prof. Dr. Liesbet Hooghe,<sup>649</sup> was slightly modified for this study following six pilot cases (three

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<sup>647</sup> Having received a 2214-A International Research Fellowship for Doctoral Students, funded TUBITAK, this study was carried out at the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Sciences, under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Slobodan Samardžić.

<sup>648</sup> Liesbet Hooghe, et al., "Reliability and Validity of Measuring Party Positions: The Chapel Hill Expert Surveys of 2002 and 2006", **European Journal of Political Research**, Vol. 49, 2010, pp. 684-703.

<sup>649</sup> For this purpose, permission was obtained via e-mail – see Appendix 1.

in Turkey and three in Serbia) after the approval by Ethic Committee at Dokuz Eylul University (Appendix 2). Specifically, three questions were added to the survey:

- *Considering NATO membership for Serbia, where does the party stand?*
- *What is the position of the party on the deepening relations with Russia as an alternative to the EU?*
- *How important are the regional stability and good neighbourly relations to the parties?*

The questionnaire was administered to 24 participants, chosen by purposive sampling,<sup>650</sup> all of whom are experts in their respected fields, and work in academia, think-tanks, or research institutes in Serbia (see Appendix 3). All participants were highly proficient in English. The majority of the surveys were conducted face to face, with only six participants submitting their answers via e-mail. Lastly, snowball sampling was employed to ensure a representative sample size after a few targets did not participate or respond to my initial e-mail.

**Figure 10: Survey Questions**

| <b>PARTY POSITION</b>  |
|--|
| 1. How would you describe the general party position on the EU?  |
| 2. Considering EU membership for Serbia, where does the party stand on?  |
| 3. How would you describe the party position on the possibility of Serbia's EU membership in the near future?  |
| 4. We would like you to think about the significance and agenda of Europeanization for a party. How important is the Europeanization to the parties in their public stance?  |
| 5. What about conflict or dissent within parties over the Europeanization as a process and the membership?   |
| 6. We would like you to evaluate the parties on whether they consider EU membership beneficial. Taking everything in consideration, does the party think that Serbia will gain advantage or disadvantage from being a member of the EU?  |
| <b>EUROPEANIZATION AND EU CONDITIONALITY (COPENHAGEN CRITERIA)</b>   |
| 7. We now turn to the economic requirements of EU membership (including deregulation, privatization, and restructuring the state's involvement in the economy). Where does the party stand on?   |
| 8. If we turn to the political requirements of EU membership (such as fight against corruption, rule of law, human rights & democratic consolidation), where does the party stand on?  |
| 9. Where do they stand on the pre-condition, normalization of the relations with Kosovo?   |
| 10. Where do they stand on the 'good governance' requirements for EU membership (including administrative transparency, accountability, civil service reform, and judicial reform)?  |
| 11. Where do they stand on the EU Harmonization Package(s) in the parliament?  |
| <b>IDEOLOGY</b>  |
| 12. Please tick the box that best describes each party's political ideology on a scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 7 (extreme right).   |
| 13. Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less |

<sup>650</sup> Known also as 'judgmental, selective, or subjective sampling,' purposive sampling is a non-probability method in which the sample relies on the characteristics decided by the researcher (in our study expertise and language).

government spending, and a leaner welfare state. Please tick the box that best describes each party's overall position.

14. Position on reducing taxes.

15. Party position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor.

#### **IDENTITY POLITICS**

16. Position on the role of religious principles in politics.

17. Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights.

“Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favour expanded personal freedoms, for example access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.

18. Position on nationalism vs. multiculturalism.

19. Position towards more rights for ethnic/religious minorities.

20. Where do they stand on the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and traditionalism?

21. Considering EU membership for Serbia, where does the voters of the party stand on?

#### **ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS**

22. Considering NATO membership for Serbia, where does the party stand on?

23. What is the position of the party on deepening relations with Russia as an alternative to the EU?

24. *How important are the regional stability and good neighbourly relations to the parties.*


The survey instrument used a 7-point Likert scale. Responses ranged between 1 to 7: 1 (strongly opposed), 2 (opposed), 3 (somewhat opposed), 4 (neutral), 5 (somewhat in favour), 6 (in favour), and 7 (strongly in favour). Political parties were categorized into three separate groups according to their median values: 1-2 (Hard Eurosceptic), 3-5 (Soft-Eurosceptic), and 6-7 (Pro-European). A similar method was operationalized for the independent variables, categorizing the political parties along the following dimensions: left versus right, extreme versus moderate, inclusive supranational versus national exclusive identity orientation.

All responses were coded, categorized and analysed using the statistical software IBM SPSS. Firstly, Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation analysis was run to measure the strength and direction of associations to determine which questions were appropriate to recode for the related variables. Secondly, correlated questions were recoded according to their median values to ensure statistical readiness for the comparative tests. Thirdly, a non-parametric 2-Independent Sample Test for two categorical groups, and a K-Independent Sample Test for triple categorical groups were performed to explain the causal factors accounting for the inter-party variations. Finally, a correlation analysis associated with all the accepted hypotheses was carried out to determine which model(s) and hypotheses were more effectively correlated in explaining party positions and inter-party alterations.

The following two questions on the survey provide insight into the main assumptions of the analysis: (I) I would like you to think about the significance and

agenda of Europeanization for a party. How important is the Europeanization to the parties in their public stance) (II) What about conflict or dissent within parties over the Europeanization as a process and the membership? Table 5 clearly illustrates a defined pattern, namely that Serbia-EU relations is one of the leading agendas for political parties. Statistically speaking, there was no error in taking political parties as the unit of analysis.

**Table 5:** Descriptive Analysis of the Research Assumptions



The table demonstrates that the vast majority of the parties are strongly united (7) or united (6) in their position towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization. However, the data also suggests that four parties (the SRS, DVERI, DSS and SNP) do not support this position. Intra-party factionalism is a general and observable characteristic in the SRS, as detailed in the previous chapter. Intra-party factionalism in the SNP, which is also an anti-EU actor, stems from the fact that it is one of the ruling government partners that has conducted negotiations with the EU.

### III. DEPENDENT VARIABLES: PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS THE EU, EU MEMBERSHIP, AND EUROPEANIZATION

Party positions regarding the EU were measured in two ways. First, with regard to the attitudes of political parties towards the EU in general, including Serbia's bid for EU membership, the median values of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 6th survey questions

were run as Transform-Compute Variables in SPSS to identify the party positions, recoded as *Position on EU & EU membership*. To determine whether or not forming a new variable for the dependent variables was statistically justified, Spearman's Rank-Order analysis, a nonparametric test, was conducted. Firstly, p-values for all dual questions were measured as  $0.00 < 0.05$ , as shown in Table 6. The table presents all correlation coefficient values above 0.747, which indicates a very strong positive correlation between the questions.<sup>651</sup>

**Table 6:** Correlation Coefficients: Positions towards the EU and EU Membership

| Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation  |   | Q-1    | Q-2    | Q-3    | Q-6 |
|--|---|--------|--------|--------|-----|
| <b>Q-1:</b> How would you describe the general party position on the EU?   | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | -      |        |        |     |
| <b>Q-2:</b> Considering EU membership for Serbia, where does the party stand on?                                       | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .925** | -      |        |     |
| <b>Q-3:</b> How would you describe the party position on the possibility of Serbia's EU membership in the near future? | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .728** | .788** | -      |     |
| <b>Q-6:</b> Does the party think that Serbia will gain advantage or disadvantage from being a member of the EU?        | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .937** | .942** | .803** | -   |

\*\* Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Second, party *position on Europeanization* (compliance with the EU conditionality: the Copenhagen Criteria) as the main pre-condition of the accession negotiations was computed in the same way. A new variable, based on the median scores of questions 7 through 11, was coded as *Position on Europeanization* (see Table 7).

<sup>651</sup> A correlation coefficient is distributed in between -1 and 1. Scores close to 1 refer to a (very) strong-positive correlation, scores close to -1 refer to a (very) strong-negative correlation and scores around 0 refer that the two are not correlate with each other.

**Table 7:** Correlation Coefficients: Positions towards Europeanization

| <i>Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation</i>   |   | Q-7                  | Q-8                  | Q-9                  | Q-10                 | Q-11                 | Q-24 |
|--|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------|
| <b>Q-7:</b> Where does the party stand on the economic requirements of EU membership?  | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | ■                    |                      |                      |                      |                      |      |
| <b>Q-8:</b> Where does the party stand on the political requirements of EU membership?   | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .871**<br>.000<br>29 | ■                    |                      |                      |                      |      |
| <b>Q-9:</b> Where do they stand on the pre-condition, normalization of the relations with Kosovo?  | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .921**<br>.000<br>29 | .846**<br>.000<br>29 | ■                    |                      |                      |      |
| <b>Q-10:</b> Where do they stand on the 'good governance' requirements for EU membership (including administrative transparency, accountability, civil service reform, and judicial reform)? | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .747**<br>.000<br>29 | .845**<br>.000<br>29 | .754**<br>.000<br>29 | ■                    |                      |      |
| <b>Q-11:</b> Where do they stand on the EU Harmonization Package(s) in the parliament?   | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .817**<br>.000<br>29 | .770**<br>.000<br>29 | .762**<br>.000<br>29 | .697**<br>.000<br>29 | ■                    |      |
| <b>Q-24:</b> How important are the regional stability and good neighbourly relations to the parties  | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .878**<br>.000<br>29 | .924**<br>.000<br>29 | .899**<br>.000<br>29 | .807**<br>.000<br>29 | .761**<br>.000<br>29 | ■    |

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

As shown in Table 8, there are strong (0.924) positive linear correlations between the dependent variables, level of support for the EU and EU membership, and level of support for Europeanization. After grouping the political parties in terms of their categorical positions on the two parameters of the dependent variable, the median values remain constant in each category: 1.00 and 1.50 for Hard-Eurosceptic, 4.50 and 3.50 for Soft-Eurosceptic, and 7.00 and 6.00 for Pro-European.


**Table 8:** Correlation Coefficients between the Dependent Variables

| <i>K-Independent Sample Test</i>                 | Correlation Coefficients between the Dependent Variables |                                  | Group            | N  | Mean Ranks | Median Rank | Chi-Square | Asymp. Sig. |
|--|--|----------------------------------|------------------|----|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| <b>Position towards the EU and EU MEMBERSHIP</b> | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N          | .924 <sup>**</sup><br>.000<br>29 | Hard Eurosceptic | 3  | 2.33       | 1.00        | 21.243     | .000        |
|  |  |                                  | Soft Eurosceptic | 11 | 9.45       | 4.50        |            |             |
|  |  |                                  | Pro-European     | 15 | 21.60      | 7.00        |            |             |
| <b>Position towards EUROPEANIZATION</b>          |  |                                  | Hard Eurosceptic | 3  | 2.33       | 1.50        | 22.692     | .000        |
|  |  |                                  | Soft Eurosceptic | 9  | 8.00       | 3.50        |            |             |
|  |  |                                  | Pro-European     | 17 | 20.94      | 6.00        |            |             |

Regarding positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization, the data reveals that 17 political parties have a pro-European position: SNS, SPS, DJB, DS, SDPS, SDS, LSV, LDP, SVM, SPO, BDZS, SDA, ZZS, NOVA, PDD, and ZES. Four political parties are categorized as Hard-Eurosceptic: the SRS, DVERI, DSS, and KP. The remaining eight parties are Soft-Eurosceptic: the PUPS, JS, NS, PS, SNP, PSS, NSS, and USS (see Table 9).



**Table 9:** Party Positions towards the EU and EU Membership, and Europeanization



#### IV. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: POLITICAL COMPETITION, IDEOLOGY, AND IDENTITY POLITICS

To further explore our research question (party positions concerning the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization), we classified the political parties into three groups to determine their stance towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization: *Hard Eurosceptic* (1.00-2.00), *Soft-Eurosceptic* (3.00-5.00), and *Pro-European* (6.00-7.00). We formulated the following hypotheses regarding the reasons, and to identify any causal explanations for the party positions and differentiations among the three models: *political competition*, *ideology*, and *identity politics*:

*H-1: Left versus Right parties are likely to adopt polar positions towards the EU and Europeanization.*

*H-2: Moderate parties are apt to be (more) pro-European in comparison to extreme parties.*

*H-3: Government and Opposition Parties are likely to adopt polar positions towards the EU and Europeanization.*

*H-4: Political parties are apt to follow their electoral' position towards the EU and Europeanization.*

*H-5: Minority parties are apt to be (more) pro-European compared to majority parties.*

*H-6: Political parties with more inclusive supranational identity orientation are apt to be (more) pro-European compared to those with national exclusive identity orientation.*

The following four questions were added to the survey to test the first two hypotheses originating from the ideology model. Three of the questions were aligned from extreme left to extreme right, while the last question was added to reformulate the scale.

*Q-12: Please tick the box that best describes each party's political ideology on a scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 7 (extreme right).*

*Q-13: Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state. Please tick the box that best describes each party's overall position.*

*Q-14: Position on reducing taxes.*

*Q-15: Party position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor.*

We repeated the Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation before running the analysis (Table 10). In the first analysis, p-values for the correlation between the

question 12 and the others were not significant ( $p > .05$ ). To measure the ideological spectrum of political parties, they were placed in order according to the median values by two categorical groups: first via economy-related questions; second via general question 12, concerning political dimension of ideology.

**Table 10:** The Correlation Coefficients: Ideology Model

| <i>Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation</i>   |   | Q-13   | Q-14   | Q-15 |
|--|---|--------|--------|------|
| <b>Q-13:</b> Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower | Pearson Correlation<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | -      |        |      |
| <b>Q-14:</b> Position on reducing taxes.   | Pearson Correlation<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .605** | -      |      |
| <b>Q-15:</b> Party position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor.   | Pearson Correlation<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .627** | .497** | -    |

\*\* Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Figure 11 shows that the results was problematic in that positioning political parties according to their ideological position only via economy-related questions situated SRS, DSS, and DVERI as centrist parties, which contradicts the literature that locates them as extreme - right.<sup>652</sup>

<sup>652</sup> For details see: Jovo Bakić, "Extreme-right Ideology, Practice and Supporters: Case Study of the Serbian Radical Party", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 17. No. 2, 2009, pp. 193-207; Barbara N. Wiesinger, "The Continuing Presence of the Extreme Right in Post-Milošević Serbia", *Balkanologie. Revue d'études Pluridisciplinaires*, Vol. 11, No. 1-2, 2008, pp. 1-15.

**Figure 11:** Ideological Spectrum Excluded from the Analysis

| Extreme Left |   | Center                                   |   |                    | Extreme Right |   |
|--------------|---|--|---|--------------------|---------------|---|
| 1            | 2 | 3  | 4   | 5                  | 6             | 7 |
| KP           |   | SNS<br>SPS<br>PUPS<br>DVERI<br>SDS<br>PS | SRS<br>DS<br>SDPS<br>DSS<br>JS<br>NS<br>LSV<br>SVM<br>ZS<br>PSS<br>BDZS<br>SDA<br>ZZS<br>PDD<br>ZES<br>NSS<br>USS | SPO<br>SNP<br>NOVA | DJB<br>LDP    |   |

Based on the conceptualization by Mudde,<sup>653</sup> the analysis excluded economy-related questions and categorized the political parties according to the 12<sup>th</sup> question in the survey. Political parties in Serbia are predominantly concentrated in the centre of the ideological spectrum. Neither right versus left nor moderate versus extreme segregations are dominant (Figure 12). The exception is the far right, with DVERI, DSS, SPO, SNP, SDA, and SRS (extreme right) and the KP alone on the extreme left. These indicate a general observation towards ideology and party politics in Serbia; however, these findings make it hard to accept the two related hypotheses.

**Figure 12:** Ideological Spectrum of Political Parties

| Extreme Left |   | Centre  |                         |  | Extreme Right                     |     |
|--------------|---|---|-------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|-----|
| 1            | 2 | 3   | 4                       | 5  | 6                                 | 7   |
| KP           |   | SPS<br>DS<br>SDP<br>PUPS<br>SDS<br>LSV<br>ZS<br>NOVA<br>ZES | DJB<br>LDP<br>PS<br>ZZS | SNS<br>JS<br>NS<br>SVM<br>PSS<br>BDZS<br>PDD<br>NSS<br>USS | DVERI<br>DSS<br>SPO<br>SNP<br>SDA | SRS |


As with the dependent variable, the political parties were then categorized (left versus right and moderate versus extreme), based on their median values. Parties with

<sup>653</sup> Cas Mudde, "The War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party Family", **West European Politics**, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1996, pp. 225-248.

a median score from 1 to 3 were designated as left-wing whereas parties with median scores from 5 to 7 were designated as right-wing parties. Parties with median scores between 1 and 2 or 6 and 7 were designated as extreme while parties with median values between 3 and 5 were moderate.

Regarding the first hypothesis (government versus opposition) of the second model (political competition), political parties were coded based on whether they were in a ruling coalition (1) or in opposition (2). Table 10 shows that political parties in the ruling coalition are fragmented and do not share a common position towards the EU, EU membership, or Europeanization. Furthermore, considering the heterogeneous distribution of the 21 opposition parties, this hypothesis is likely to be rejected.

**Table 11: Party Positions within the Ruling Coalition**



Leader-centric and interest-oriented party politics in Serbia show that government relies on a wide coalition, uninfluenced by ideological differentiation or disagreement regarding EU membership.<sup>654</sup> For the anti-EU parties in the coalition, it is more important to have political power as a ruling partner than to have several disagreements within the ruling coalition, including on the accession negotiations. From the SNS's viewpoint, it is both rational and instrumental to have a wider coalition that allows a two-thirds parliamentary majority for passing constitutional amendments.

The second hypothesis originated from the political competition model, which assumes that political parties identify their position(s) and discourse according to voter demands and expectations (bottom-up). Thus, the following question was incorporated

<sup>654</sup> Peter Matić, **Interview**, 25.01.2017, Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade, Belgrade.

into the survey to compare party positions with their voters: Q-21: Considering EU membership for Serbia, where does the voters of the party stand on?

There was a strong correlation between the positions of political parties and their voters' (Table 12) in that the categorical positions of the political parties (hard, soft, pro) and their voters were the same across the sample. Nevertheless, it also appears that voter support for the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization is slightly less than that of their parties. For example, the average level of support from voters of the SNS, SPS, PUPS, JS, NS, PS, SNP, PSS, ZS, and USS was one point less on the 7-point Likert scale.


**Table 12:** Correlation Coefficients between the Dependent Variables and Voters' Positions

| <i>Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation</i>  |                         | Party Position<br>towards the EU &<br>EU Membership | Party Position<br>towards<br>Europeanization |
|---|-------------------------|---|--|
| <b>Q-21:</b> Considering EU membership for Serbia, where does the voters of the party stand on? | Correlation Coefficient | .891**  | .886**                                       |
|   | Sig. (2-tailed)         | .000  | .000   |
|   | N                       | 29  | 29   |

\*\* Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).


As Table 12 shows, all the correlation coefficient values exceeded 0.800, indicating a very strong, positive correlations. This result supports our hypothesis on *parties versus voters*. Like the other variables, we divided the positions of the voters into three categorical groups before running the comparison tests: 1.00 - 2.00 = Hard Eurosceptic, 3.00 - 5.00 = Soft Eurosceptic, and 6.00 - 7.00 = Pro-European.

**Table 13:** Comparison between Political Parties and Voters: Level of Support for the EU, EU Membership, and Europeanization



Five minority parties are represented in the Serbian Parliament: the BDZS and SDA (Bosniaks), the SVM (Hungarians), the PDD (Albanians), and the ZES (Slovaks). The fifth hypothesis tested measures whether there is significant fractionation between minority and majority parties in Serbia. The minority parties were coded as (1) and majority parties as (2). As Table 14 shows, and in accordance with the relevant literature, minority parties in Serbia have strongly favourable position towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization.

**Table 14:** Party Positions among Minority Parties



The following survey questions below tested the final hypothesis originating from the last model of the analysis - identity politics: “Political parties with a more inclusive supranational identity orientation are apt to be (more) pro-European than those with national exclusive identity orientation.” One question, which referred to the normalization of relations with Kosovo, was also inserted into the model due to its direct relation with identity politics in terms of sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Serbia.

*Q-9: Where do they stand on the pre-condition, normalization of the relations with Kosovo?*

*Q-16: Position on the role of religious principles in politics.*

*Q-17: Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. “Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favour expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic system.*

*Q-18: Position on nationalism vs. multiculturalism.*

*Q-19: Position towards more rights for ethnic/religious minorities.*

*Q-20: Where do they stand on the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and traditionalism?*



To prepare the variables for the comparison tests, a correlation analysis was run (Table 15). Among the correlated questions, we altered the Kosovo question by recoding it into a different variable to reverse the order from supranationalism to nationalism. The majority of p-values were less than 0.001. No significant correlation was found between the question on the role of religious principles in politics and pre-conditions regarding Kosovo ( $p = 0.110 > 0.05$ ). Secondly, the p-value was 0.028 for the question on the role of religious principles in politics and party position towards more rights for minorities. The correlation coefficient values were all positive and strong, greater than 0.500.

**Table 15:** Correlation Coefficients: Identity Politics Model

| <i>Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation</i>   |   | Q-16   | Q-17   | Q-18   | Q-19   | Q-20   | Q-9 |
|--|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----|
| <b>Q-16:</b> Position on the role of religious principles in politics.   | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | -      |        |        |        |        |     |
| <b>Q-17:</b> Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. "Libertarian" or "postmaterialist" parties favour expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .914** |        |        |        |        |     |
| <b>Q-18:</b> Position on nationalism vs. multiculturalism.   | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .894** | .955** |        |        |        |     |
| <b>Q-19:</b> Position towards more rights for ethnic/religious minorities.   | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .407*  | .572** | .575** |        |        |     |
| <b>Q-20:</b> Where do they stand on the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and traditionalism?  | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .515** | .645** | .624** | .876** |        |     |
| <b>Q-9:</b> Where do they stand on the pre-condition, normalization of the relations with Kosovo?  | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .303   | .507** | .504** | .911** | .797** | -   |

\*\* Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* Correlation significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Identity orientations of political parties emerged as the most dispersed and heterogeneous variable in the analysis, with parties being widely dispersed from strongly supranational inclusive identity orientations (1) to strongly national exclusive ones (7), as shown in Figure 13. To categorize the parties according to their identity orientations, their positions were determined based on median values. Next, political parties with scores between 1.00 and 2.50 were coded as having a supranational inclusive identity orientation while parties with scores between 5.50 and 7.00 were national exclusive ones.


**Figure 13:** Identity Orientations among Political Parties

| Supranational Inclusive |     |                      |             | Centre             |                      |  |                 | National Exclusive             |                   |                                |                  |
|-------------------------|-----|----------------------|-------------|--------------------|----------------------|--|-----------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|
| 1                       | 2   |                      |             | 3                  | 4                    |  | 5               |                                | 6                 |                                | 7                |
| LDP                     | LSV | DS<br>KP<br>NOV<br>A | SDPS<br>SDS | DJ<br>B<br>ZE<br>S | SV<br>M<br>ZS<br>ZZS |  | SPS<br>PUP<br>S | SNS<br>SPO<br>PS<br>PSS<br>USS | SNP<br>PDD<br>NSS | DSS<br>JS<br>NS<br>BDZS<br>SDA | SRS<br>DVE<br>RI |

## V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PARTY POSITIONS

Data generated from the survey analysed party orientations towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization in Serbia. The first 11 questions were relevant to associations regarding party positions while the remaining questions tested the hypotheses developed across three models. Figure 14 details potential causal explanations for party positions and inter-party divisions. The additional questions enabled us to formulate a new hypothesis regarding party positions on NATO membership and deepening relations with Russia as an alternative to EU membership.

**Figure 14:** Research Models



The analysis revealed that the weakest model in explaining inter-party fractions was party competition, with two of the three related hypotheses being rejected. First, the segregated positions of political parties within the ruling coalition led to the rejection of the first hypothesis: *government versus opposition*. The hypothesis regarding *minority versus majority* comparison was also rejected due to similar median values. However, the third hypothesis, derived from a bottom-up approach to party positions, *voters versus political parties*, was accepted.

Moderate versus extreme categorization of political parties emerged as the variable affecting party positions. Regarding the sixth hypothesis for the last model, Identity Politics, there was a significant difference in party positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization between those actors with a more inclusive supranational identity orientation and those with a more national exclusive identity orientation.

Regarding the additional questions and their relationship to the dependent variables, there was a very strong negative relationship between level of support for the EU and seeing Russia as an alternative. Political parties with anti-EU orientations likewise resisted NATO membership and advocated deepening relations with Russia as a priority instead of EU membership.

Four of the six hypotheses formulated for party positions towards the EU and EU membership were accepted: *left versus right*; *moderate versus extreme*; *identity politics* and *voters versus political parties*. For the second dependent variable,

Europeanization, the hypotheses for *moderate versus extreme; identity politics and voters versus political parties* were accepted. Lastly, the hypothesis of Russia as an alternative was accepted for both dependent variables.

### A. Ideology Model

*H-1: Left versus Right parties are likely to adopt polar positions towards the EU and Europeanization.*

The first hypothesis, that there is a meaningful difference between right-wing and left-wing parties, gained one acceptance and one rejection. The ideological schism did not cause a meaningful change in party positions towards Europeanization ( $p = 0.119 > 0.05$ ). However, the ideological spectrum of the political parties was meaningful in terms of their positions towards the EU and EU membership ( $p = 0.040 < 0.05$ ). Support for the EU and EU membership was significantly higher from right-wing parties (Sum of Ranks: 163.0 & Median: 3.00) than the left-wing parties (Sum of Ranks: 162.0 & Median: 2.00).

**Table 16:** Comparative Analysis: Left-wing versus Right-wing

| <i>2-Independent Sample Test</i>                   | Group | N  | Sum of Ranks | Median Rank | Mann Whitney U Test | Z      | Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) |
|--|-------|----|--------------|-------------|---------------------|--------|------------------------|
| <b>Position towards the EU &amp; EU MEMBERSHIP</b> | Left  | 10 | 163.0        | 3.00        | 42.000              | -2.058 | .040                   |
|  | Right | 15 | 162.0        | 2.00        |                     |        |                        |
| <b>Position towards EUROPEANIZATION</b>            | Left  | 10 | 155.5        | 3.00        | 49.500              | -1.557 | .119                   |
|  | Right | 15 | 169.5        | 2.00        |                     |        |                        |

*H-2: Moderate parties are apt to be (more) pro-European in comparison to extreme parties.*

The second hypothesis of the model, which assumes that moderate parties take a more pro-European position than extreme parties, was accepted. ( $p = 0.017 < 0.05$  &  $p = 0.036 < 0.05$ ). This finding is extensively emphasized in the literature, especially in relation to the rising extreme right-wing in Europe. It is mainly attributed to the effectiveness of the model, not from an economic viewpoint, but from the viewpoint of identity and normative terms, observable also in the Serbian case.

**Table 17:** Comparative Analysis: Moderate versus Extreme

| <i>2-Independent Sample Test</i>                   | Group    | N  | Sum of Ranks | Median Rank | Mann Whitney U Test | Z      | Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) |
|--|----------|----|--------------|-------------|---------------------|--------|------------------------|
| <b>Position towards the EU &amp; EU MEMBERSHIP</b> | Moderate | 22 | 371.0        | 3.00        | 36.0                | -2.384 | .017                   |
|  | Extreme  | 7  | 64.0         | 2.00        |                     |        |                        |
| <b>Position towards EUROPEANIZATION</b>            | Moderate | 22 | 367.0        | 3.00        | 40.0                | -2.099 | .036                   |
|  | Extreme  | 7  | 68.0         | 2.00        |                     |        |                        |

### B. Political Competition Model

*H-3: Government and Opposition Parties are likely to adopt polar positions towards the EU and Europeanization.*

Although a meaningful difference between the parties in the ruling coalition and opposition parties was predicted, this hypothesis was not confirmed ( $p = 0.855 > 0.05$  and  $p = 0.491 > 0.05$ ). One explanation is that because the parties in the ruling coalition were fragmented, they shared no common position on EU affairs. This heterogeneity in the ruling coalition led to the rejection of the hypothesis.

**Table 18:** Comparative Analysis: Ruling Coalition versus Opposition

| <i>2-Independent Sample Test</i>                | Group      | N  | Sum of Ranks | Median Rank | Mann Whitney U Test | Z      | Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) |
|---|------------|----|--------------|-------------|---------------------|--------|------------------------|
| <b>Position towards the EU &amp; MEMBERSHIP</b> | Government | 7  | 101.5        | 5.00        | 73.5                | -0.182 | .855                   |
|   | Opposition | 22 | 333.5        | 6.00        |                     |        |                        |
| <b>Position towards EUROPEANIZATION</b>         | Government | 7  | 92.0         | 5.00        | 64.0                | -0.689 | .491                   |
|   | Opposition | 22 | 343.0        | 6.00        |                     |        |                        |

*H-4: Political parties are apt to follow their electoral' position towards the EU and Europeanization.*

This hypothesis, that the party agenda is determined via a bottom-up method in accordance with the general trends and expectations of its voters, was accepted. In this case, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used because voter positions were divided into three categories: Hard-Eurosceptic, Soft-Eurosceptic, and Pro-European. P-values ( $0.000 < 0.05$ ) were the strongest and the most significant results of all the hypotheses. Comparing median values demonstrated a substantial correlation between the

positions of voters' positions (hard, soft and pro) and party positions, as shown in Table 19.

**Table 19:** Comparative Analysis: Party Positions versus Voters

| <i>K-Independent Sample Test</i>                   | Group                   | N  | Mean Ranks | Median Rank | Chi-Square | Asymp. Sig. |
|--|-------------------------|----|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| <b>Position towards the EU &amp; EU MEMBERSHIP</b> | Hard Eurosceptic Voters | 5  | 3.00       | 2.00        | 22.307     | .000        |
|  | Soft Eurosceptic Voters | 11 | 11.73      | 5.00        |            |             |
|  | Pro-European Voters     | 13 | 22.38      | 7.00        |            |             |
| <b>Position towards EUROPEANIZATION</b>            | Hard Eurosceptic Voters | 5  | 3.30       | 2.00        | 18.363     | .000        |
|  | Soft Eurosceptic Voters | 11 | 11.77      | 5.00        |            |             |
|  | Pro-European Voters     | 13 | 22.33      | 6.00        |            |             |

*H-5: Minority parties are apt to be (more) pro-European compared to majority parties.*

**Table 20:** Comparative Analysis: Minority versus Majority

| <i>2-Independent Sample Test</i>                   | Group    | N  | Sum of Ranks | Median Rank | Mann Whitney U Test | Z      | Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) |
|--|----------|----|--------------|-------------|---------------------|--------|------------------------|
| <b>Position towards the EU &amp; EU MEMBERSHIP</b> | Minority | 5  | 96.0         | 6.00        | 39.000              | -1.240 | .215                   |
|  | Majority | 24 | 339.0        | 5.50        |                     |        |                        |
| <b>Position towards EUROPEANIZATION</b>            | Minority | 5  | 102.5        | 6.00        | 32.500              | -1.650 | .099                   |
|  | Majority | 24 | 332.5        | 5.00        |                     |        |                        |

The two Bosniak minority parties (BDZS and SDA), the Hungarian minority party (SVM), the Albanian party (PDD), and the Slovak minority party (ZES) were all represented in parliament. As previously stated, these parties show a high level of support for the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization. However, there was no significant difference between minority and majority parties in the survey data ( $p = 0.215 > 0.05$ ). This is understandable due to the similar median values of the two groups (6.00 and 5.50). The result was similar when examining the question of position

towards Europeanization, in that similar median values (6.00 and 5.00 respectively) showed no significant difference between the two groups ( $p = 0.099 > 0.05$ ).

### C. Identity Politics Model

*H-6: Political parties with more inclusive supranational identity orientation are apt to be (more) pro-European compared to those with national exclusive identity orientation.*

The analysis showed that the identity dimension was a critical influence on the political parties' positions. A meaningful difference was found between the political parties comparing an inclusive supranational identity orientation and with a national exclusive identity orientation ( $p = 0.004 < 0.05$  and  $p = 0.007 < 0.05$ ). For both parameters, the sums of ranks for the first group was 32.0 and 33.0 respectively, while the second group had a higher level of 88.0 and 87.0. Similarly, comparing the median values showed that parties with an inclusive supranational identity orientation had a more favourable position on both dependent variables (7.00/6.00 and 3.00/3.50 respectively).

**Table 21:** Comparative Analysis: Identity Orientations

| <i>2-Independent Sample Test</i>                   | Group                   | N | Sum of Ranks | Median Rank | Mann Whitney U Test | Z      | Asymp. Sig. (2-Tailed) |
|--|-------------------------|---|--------------|-------------|---------------------|--------|------------------------|
| <b>Position towards the EU &amp; EU MEMBERSHIP</b> | Inclusive Supranational | 7 | 32.0         | 7.00        | 4.000               | -2.874 | .004                   |
|  | National Exclusive      | 8 | 88.0         | 3.00        |                     |        |                        |
| <b>Position towards EUROPEANIZATION</b>            | Inclusive Supranational | 7 | 33.0         | 6.00        | 5.000               | -2.696 | .007                   |
|  | National Exclusive      | 8 | 87.0         | 3.50        |                     |        |                        |

### D. Alternative Models: The Question of NATO Membership and Russian Alternative

After the pilot surveys were administered, two questions were added to reveal party orientations towards the question of NATO membership and deepening relations with Russia as an alternative to EU membership. Although EU membership negotiations do not require NATO membership, it has become a tradition for Europe's

post-communist countries to reflect their foreign policy orientation as part of the so-called Euro-Atlantic integration.

*Q-22: Considering NATO membership for Serbia, where does the party stand on?*

*Q-23: What is the position of the party on deepening relations with Russia as an alternative to the EU?*

**Table 22:** Correlation Coefficients between the Dependent Variables and the Alternative Models

| Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation   |   | NATO Membership | Russia as an alternative | EU & membership | Conditionality & Europeanization |
|---|---|-----------------|--------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| Considering NATO membership for Serbia, where does the party stand on?                            | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | -               |                          |                 |                                  |
| What is the position of the party on deepening relations with Russia as an alternative to the EU? | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .929**          | -                        |                 |                                  |
| Position towards the EU & EU membership   | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .877**          | .905**                   | -               |                                  |
| Position towards Europeanization  | Correlation Coefficient<br>Sig. (2-tailed)<br>N | .909**          | .923**                   | .924**          | -                                |

\*\* Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The correlation analysis revealed a very strong negative relationship between party positions and deepening of relations with Russia as an alternative to EU membership (Table 22). High correlation coefficient values of -0.929 and -0.905 suggest that the level of support for the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization, and the level of support for deepening relations with Russia are negatively correlated. High values, such as 0.924 and 0.877, indicate a very strong positive relationship between the level of support for the EU and NATO membership. In other words, anti-EU parties in Serbia oppose NATO membership and propose deepening relations with Russia as an alternative to the EU membership.



**Table 23:** Comparative Analysis of Party Positions (EU and EU Membership): The Question of NATO and Russian Alternative

| <i>K-Independent Sample Test</i>                 | Group            | N  | Mean Ranks | Median Rank | Chi-Square | Asymp. Sig. |
|--|------------------|----|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| <b>Position towards the NATO Membership</b>      | Hard Eurosceptic | 3  | 4.50       | 1.00        | 19.511     | .000        |
|  | Soft Eurosceptic | 9  | 7.72       | 1.00        |            |             |
|  | Pro-European     | 17 | 20.71      | 5.00        |            |             |
| <b>Position towards RUSSIA as an Alternative</b> | Hard Eurosceptic | 3  | 27.50      | 7.00        | 19.845     | .000        |
|  | Soft Eurosceptic | 9  | 21.56      | 6.00        |            |             |
|  | Pro-European     | 17 | 9.32       | 2.00        |            |             |

For comparative analysis, the political parties were divided into three categorical groups based on median values: 1.00 - 2.00 Hard-Eurosceptic; 3.00 – 5.00 Soft-Eurosceptic; and 6.00 – 7.00 Pro-European. According to the Kruskal-Wallis test, the inter-party comparisons are significant (p-values were  $0.00 < 0.05$ ).

**Table 24:** Comparative Analysis of Party Positions (Europeanization): The Question of NATO and Russian Alternative

| <i>K-Independent Sample Test</i>                 | Group            | N  | Mean Ranks | Median Rank | Chi-Square | Asymp. Sig. |
|--|------------------|----|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| <b>Position towards the NATO Membership</b>      | Hard Eurosceptic | 3  | 4.50       | 1.00        | 22.321     | .000        |
|  | Soft Eurosceptic | 11 | 8.32       | 2.00        |            |             |
|  | Pro-European     | 15 | 22.00      | 6.00        |            |             |
| <b>Position towards RUSSIA as an Alternative</b> | Hard Eurosceptic | 3  | 26.17      | 7.00        | 22.066     | .000        |
|  | Soft Eurosceptic | 11 | 21.45      | 5.00        |            |             |
|  | Pro-European     | 15 | 8.03       | 2.00        |            |             |

Comparing the median values for support for NATO membership, both the Hard-Eurosceptic and Soft-Eurosceptic parties took a hard-line position, with a median value of 1.00, whereas the Pro-Europeans took a more moderate position (5.00). The opposite was found regarding Russia as an alternative. Pro-Europeans were against this (2.00) while both the Hard-Eurosceptic (7.00) and Soft-Eurosceptic (6.00) parties shared a close position, advocating deepening the relations with Moscow.

## **VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS**

Following a detailed analysis of the main pillars of party politics in Serbia, this chapter explained the statistical analysis of the expert survey based on the data collected. For this purpose, comparative tests were carried out for party positions via eight hypotheses developed through the research models. The hypothesis of moderate versus extreme from ideology model and voters' versus party positions hypothesis from political competition model revealed a statistically significant difference in comparative tests.

The hypothesis of identity politics and hypotheses modelled via additional questions (NATO membership and Russia as an alternative) were concluded to be effective in understanding and explaining party positions towards the EU, EU membership and Europeanization in Serbia. Expert survey found out that “state of identity” is the strongest model in understanding and explaining the party orientations towards the EU in Serbia as critically analysed in detail in the sixth chapter.

The next chapter will analyse the various factors and rationales on which party positions are based, developed, and thereby legitimized through a thematic content analysis of party documents.

**CHAPTER FIVE**  
**AN ANALYSIS OF PARTY ORIENTATIONS:**  
**PRO-EUROPEANISM FOR A “NEW” SERBIA**  
**VERSUS EUROSCEPTICISM UNDER THE SHADOW OF “HISTORY”**

*A new, modern Serbia is ready to play a full part in Europe to the benefit of all...*  
President Aleksandar Vučić, 2014

*I would like to change the slogan: Europe has no alternative! Because it is fatal. I don't want Serbia to be a member of the EU at the cost of leaving Kosovo and Metohija, The EU is a deadline project.*

Miloš Jovanović, President of the DSS, 2016

While addressing Serbian deputies during an Assembly in March 2017, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, repeatedly underlined, “We (the EU) care about Serbia.”<sup>655</sup> However, neither the deputies nor the television viewers were able to hear Mogherini’s words. During Mogherini’s 20-minute speech, her voice was drowned out by the chanting from members by the members of the SRS and DVERI, two far right Serbian parties that entered Parliament in the 2016 election. Deputies from both parties shouted, “Serbia, Russia! We do not need EU! Serbia does not trust Brussels!”<sup>656</sup>

Ironically, as Mogherini was inside the parliamentary chambers declaring, “we care about Serbia,” outside the building, a wave of chanting protestors held banners that read “Stolen Kosovo!” In addition, activists holding signs with anti-NATO phrases and anti-EU slogans and a list of the people who had lost their lives during the 1990 NATO bombing campaign were present in the protests. President Vučić, who served as the Minister of Information during the Milošević era, was present during the assembly. As the head of state and also the head of negotiations with the EU, he too, seemed to be disturbed by the hostility demonstrated by the members of the two opposition parties. Although their numbers were small, their protestive actions were effective.

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<sup>655</sup> “Speech of the HRVP Federica Mogherini at the Parliament of Serbia”, **European Union External Action**, 03.03.2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/21954/speech-hrvp-federica-mogherini-parliament-serbia\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/21954/speech-hrvp-federica-mogherini-parliament-serbia_en), (10.04.2018).

<sup>656</sup> “‘We don’t Need EU!’ Mogherini Met with anti-EU Chants in Serbian Parliament (Video)”, **Russia Today**, 03.03.2017, <https://www.rt.com/news/379374-serbia-parliament-mogherini-protest/>, (10.04.2018).

This protest, which was dominated by historical rhetoric referencing Kosovo, Russia and the EU, provides a brief, yet concise example of the political segmentation and altered party orientations towards the EU and EU membership in Serbia. The recent history of the NATO bombing in 1999 and the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in 2008 remains at the center of anti-EU verbosity by these far-right parties.

This chapter of the dissertation will analyse various factors and rationales by which party positions (towards EU, EU membership and Europeanization) are based, developed and thus, become legitimized. For this purpose, a thematic content analysis was conducted associated with documents relevant to eight political parties – the SNS, SRS, SPS, DJB, DS, SDP, DVERI and DSS.<sup>657</sup> The political parties under examined were suggested by Prof. Samardžić during my field-work in Belgrade. The study will take the impact of these political parties in Serbian politics since 2000.

In order to do this research first, a total number of 154 documents were collected. Among these documents included party programs, statements, election campaigns, press releases and interviews (74 primary sources and 80 secondary sources). In addition to the rational, normative and identity dimensions, which deductively constitutes the theoretical framework of the dissertation, a thematic analysis of the documents using MAXQDA software program was carried out that specifically focused on Serbian issues, in particularly, Russia as a partner versus Russia as alternative and Kosovo. A new thematic code did not emerge within the “others” that we extracted, mostly on issues such as domestic politics, ICTY, dealing with the past, NATO and the Ukrainian Crisis.

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
<sup>657</sup> Currently, out of the 250 seats in Serbia’s parliament, 195 seats are held by members representing these parties.

**Figure 15:** Thematic Codes of the Analysis

| Codes from the Research Model | Serbia-Specific Codes    |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Normative (+)                 | Russia as a Partner      |
| Normative (-)                 | Russia as an Alternative |
| Security (+)                  | Kosovo (+)               |
| Security (-)                  | Kosovo (-)               |
| Benefit                       | Others                   |
| Cost                          |                          |
| Identity (+)                  |                          |
| Identity (-)                  |                          |

The ruling coalition's political parties (SNS, SPS, and SDP) are analysed from the viewpoint of three models for domestic change in Europeanization literature: External Incentives Model (Rational Institutionalism), the Social Learning Model (Sociological Institutionalism), and the Lesson-Drawing Model (Historical Institutionalism). Moreover, Eurosceptic parties are examined based on their range between Hard-Eurosceptic versus Soft-Eurosceptic in order to determine their position(s) in relations with rational, identity or normative references for political justification. To ensure validity and reliability of the analysis, the coding procedure was repeated with the help of Mateja Agatonović, colleague at University of Belgrade Faculty of Political Sciences during my field-work in Serbia.

**Table 25:** Distributions of the Codes (%)




The distribution of the codes amongst the political parties are examined in Table 25. It reveals the maximum number of references in total of 793 codes that is given to benefit (15.1%), Kosovo- (13.7%), followed by normative+ (11.9%) and

security+ (9.2%). Identity is the least referenced model for legitimizing party positions. While the parties in the ruling coalition concentrate on the possible benefits of EU membership, the DVERI is focused on the negative dimension of normativity. The SRS references all types of negative dimensions, while the DJB and DSS concentrate on the damaging outcome of the process for Kosovo (see Table 26).

**Table 26:** Distributions of the Codes among the Parties

|       | Normative |    | Security |    | Rationality |         | Identity |    | Russia      |         | Kosovo |    | Total |
|-------|-----------|----|----------|----|-------------|---------|----------|----|-------------|---------|--------|----|-------|
|       | -         | +  | -        | +  | Cost        | Benefit | -        | +  | Alternative | Partner | -      | +  |       |
| DSS   | 8         | 1  | 14       | -  | 21          | -       | 7        | 3  | 10          | -       | 31     | 0  | 99    |
| DVERI | 37        | 1  | 23       | -  | 8           | -       | 9        | 3  | 7           | 1       | 14     | 0  | 109   |
| SDP   | -         | 8  | 2        | 5  | 2           | 12      | -        | 2  | -           | 1       | 5      | 5  | 50    |
| DS    | -         | 13 | 1        | 8  | -           | 19      | -        | 6  | -           | 6       | 4      | 9  | 70    |
| DJB   | 2         | 6  | 3        | 1  | 7           | 6       | 3        | -  | 1           | -       | 20     | 1  | 66    |
| SPS   | -         | 48 | -        | 47 | 0           | 61      | 0        | 15 | -           | 27      | 23     | 4  | 244   |
| SRS   | 6         | -  | 13       | -  | 6           | -       | 11       | -  | 10          | -       | 9      | 0  | 67    |
| SNS   | -         | 17 | -        | 12 | -           | 22      | 0        | 7  | -           | 9       | 3      | 5  | 88    |
| Total | 53        | 94 | 56       | 73 | 44          | 120     | 30       | 36 | 28          | 44      | 109    | 24 | 793   |

**Figure 16:** Co-occurrence of the Codes



The co-occurrence of the codes figure illustrates that pro-EU actors orient their positions by combining security+, normative+, and benefit dimensions. Within all the documents, there are a total number of 38 codes that represent normative-security co-

occurrence, a total number of 36 codes that depict normative-benefit, and lastly, a total number of 32 codes that fall under security-benefit.

**Table 27:** Correlation Analyses (Pearson)

|            | Normative -                  | Normative +                  | Security+                    |
|------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Security - | 0,619<br>(p=0,0000)<br>N=154 |                              |                              |
| Security + |                              | 0,735<br>(p=0,0000)<br>N=154 |                              |
| Benefit    |                              | 0,730<br>(p=0,0000)<br>N=154 | 0,694<br>(p=0,0000)<br>N=154 |

When the correlation-coefficients between codes with a p-value ( $< 0.05$ ) are examined (Table 27), a strong and positive linear relationship is correlated amongst Eurosceptic parties' security- and normative- references (0.619). Further, a strong and positive relationship is also correlated between security+ and normative+ (0.735), benefits and normative+ (0.730) and benefits and security+ (0.694). All other correlation coefficients were statistically insignificant.

When taking reliability analysis for Eurosceptic codes into account (Table 28), a poor internal consistency appears among the anti-EU parties (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.611$ ). Moreover, the Eurosceptic parties' orientation towards the EU and EU membership suffered internal consistency because they followed an altered strategy of varied legitimacy which prevented us from obtaining a generalized result. For this reason, we used the expression, "Under the Shadow History" in the title.

**Table 28:** Reliability Analysis for Eurosceptic Codes (Cronbach's alpha: 0.611)

| Nr. | Item                     | Mean scale w/o item | Std.dev. scale w/o item | Corrected item scale corr. | Alpha w/o item |
|-----|--------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|
| 1   | Normative -              | 1,73                | 2,815                   | 0,320                      | 0,596          |
| 2   | Security -               | 1,71                | 2,781                   | 0,635                      | 0,440          |
| 3   | Cost                     | 1,79                | 3,099                   | 0,392                      | 0,555          |
| 4   | Identity -               | 1,88                | 3,215                   | 0,428                      | 0,564          |
| 5   | Russia as an Alternative | 1,90                | 3,310                   | 0,258                      | 0,601          |
| 6   | Kosovo -                 | 1,37                | 2,901                   | 0,252                      | 0,632          |

According to the analysis, in contrast to the internal inconsistency of the Eurosceptic discourse, pro-European rhetoric exhibited a stronger internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.736 > 0.7). When we exclude Russian dimension from the analysis, Cronbach's alpha = 0.752. The internal consistency rises to 0.810 when we remove the Kosovo+ dimension, which is difficult for pro-European parties to politisize.

**Table 29:** Reliability Analysis for pro-European Codes (Cronbach's alpha: 0.736)

| Nr. | Item        | Mean<br>scale w/o<br>item | Std.dev.<br>scale w/o<br>item | Corrected<br>item scale<br>corr. | Alpha w/o<br>item |
|-----|-------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1   | Normative + | 1,64                      | 2,668                         | 0,790                            | 0,591             |
| 2   | Security +  | 1,78                      | 2,675                         | 0,689                            | 0,635             |
| 3   | Benefit     | 1,47                      | 2,434                         | 0,781                            | 0,591             |
| 4   | Identity +  | 2,02                      | 3,440                         | 0,300                            | 0,772             |
| 5   | Kosovo +    | 2,10                      | 3,573                         | 0,051                            | 0,810             |

In addition, it proved that both the normative and the security-related codes were instrumentalized as benefits under the frame of the rational actor model when the co-occurrence and correlation tables are taken into account (see Tables above). This instrumentalization of normative and security dimensions for strategic-rational gains of the membership enabled us to generalize pro-Europeanism for the building of a “new” Serbia.

The most frequently repeated words in the 154 documents examined were Kosovo (857), government (506), political (472), foreign (443), cooperation (341) and economic (347), followed by Russia (306), social (301), region (288), security (232), economy (198), democratic (189), Balkans (177), interest (171), law (169), NATO (141). Likewise, the most frequently repeated words within the codes were Kosovo (192), political (118), Russia (112), economic (111), region (101), cooperation (86), stability (82), values (81) and interests (69).

Serbia's ruling parties (the SNS, SPS and SDP) are confronted as strategic utility-maximizes and goal-oriented actors (Rational Institutionalism). EU membership is rationally justified by the ruling coalition. To this end, they primarily



focus on the benefits of EU membership, which are then instrumentalized in ways of building a “new” Serbia. Almost every single pragmatic argument(s) regarding foreign direct investments to modernization, from economic growth to the change of Serbia’s negative image in international relations, is politicized by the government to legitimize their pro-European position.

Nevertheless, post-conflict transitions and regional issues remain on the agenda of the two ruling coalition partners - the SPS and SDP. At this point, Europeanization processes are linked to the establishment of peace and stability in the region. However, contrary to the normative dimension, peace-building is again transformed into a more rational discourse. In particular, Dačić, the SPS leader and Serbia’s Foreign Minister, portrays EU membership as a means to gain international acceptance, legitimacy and positive image for the ultimate goals of investment, trade and economic development (Social Learning Model in a more Rationalized term).

The government does not take the identity dimension as a necessity, that is, to underline their pro-EU stance in terms of developing their discourses on the assumption that historically and sociologically Serbia is part of the continent. Lastly, the political dimension of the Copenhagen criteria, for example, how the political liberalization processes are addressed, remain unestablished in their rhetoric.

The ruling coalition are faced with two clashing lines of criticism from the opposition parties. While the Eurosceptic parties (the SRS, DVERI & DSS) blast the government for being a puppet of the West/Europe, the pro-European oppositions continue to criticize the government for not being European enough. The Pro-European DS and soft-Eurosceptic DJB are primarily concerned with domestic politics; the majority of their statements (policies) can be framed as government versus opposition competition.

They portray the state government as an entity that is both unable and unwilling to resolve the structural problems and fulfil quested reforms. Because of their domestic-driven and normative-oriented discourse, they have used the EU accession as their main source of criticism towards the government. However, the DSS, SRS and DVERI portray the leaders of the government as “traitors,” lurking beneath the shadows of history that include identity, the NATO bombardment and the Kosovo issue. Their approach helps to shape their political arena towards Euroscepticism

(National-interest Euroscepticism). Moreover, Russia emerges as an alternative to the EU membership, especially amongst these Eurosceptic parties.

The agenda of the Serbian government's foreign policy is laden with highly complex issues, such as the relations with NATO, Kosovo, the Ukrainian Crisis and the embargo on Russia. Nevertheless, Belgrade consistently points out that they have implemented a multifaceted foreign policy and considers a more balanced approach towards Russia as a strategic partner, all the while, defining EU membership as their top priority. A new factionalism is also emerging in Belgrade within the scope of Serbia-NATO relations. The direction and dimensions of the relations with NATO have begun to be discussed through the parameters of Russia, military neutrality, and once again, Kosovo.

## **I. INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE EU ACCESSION FOR A “NEW” SERBIA: SERBIAN PROGRESSIVE PARTY**

When you step inside the party headquarters located in the New Belgrade district, a picture of President Vučić with German Chancellor Angela Merkel immediately greets you on the left. The government's official website uses headings titled “strategic goal” for EU membership spattered with descriptive text detailing successful cooperation, further development on the relations, and improving overall bilateral relations. The SNS justifies EU membership as the path for the building of a new future for Serbia (social learning mechanism), that is according to them a new and modern Serbia which is ready to play a full part in Europe to the benefit of all.<sup>658</sup>

From their perspective, the new Serbia is a stable, predictable and serious partner, making the most progress of the EU accession in the region,<sup>659</sup> as a trusted candidate in its European orientation.<sup>660</sup> In parallel with this new vision for the

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<sup>658</sup> “Vucic: Serbia is Poised for a New Future”, **SNS**, 29.04.2014, <https://www.sns.org.rs/en/novosti/vesti/vucic-serbia-poised-new-future>, (12.04.2018).

<sup>659</sup> “Serbia Proves to be Predictable, Serious Partner”, **Serbian Government**, 19.11.2017, <http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=125797>, (12.04.2018).

<sup>660</sup> “Serbia Opens Chapters 6 and 30 in EU Accession Talks”, **B92**, 12.11.2017, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=12&dd=12&nav\\_id=103005](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=12&dd=12&nav_id=103005), (12.04.2018), (Chapters 6 and 30).

country, the Party Program defines the SNS as a state-building political force.<sup>661</sup> The Party Program re-formulates Serbia's foreign policy in a way so that Belgrade is responsibly committed to a national peaceful foreign policy based on the following principles: (I) Serbia's membership in the EU, (II) military neutrality, (III) intensified cooperation with the Russian Federation, China and Japan, developing the best possible relationship with the USA, both the strengthening and deepening of relations with all countries from the corps of developing countries, (IV) the respectful and full implementation of Dayton and all other international agreements and resolutions, (V) the constant effort(s) and engagement in order to improve the position of the Serbian people in neighbouring countries (primarily in the countries of the former Yugoslavia).<sup>662</sup>

EU membership is framed and legitimized within the foreign policy agenda. Again, it is often repeated that EU integration is the main strategic goal and the key to Serbia's foreign policy priority. This "strategy" intensive expression demonstrates a political discourse to legitimize EU membership more by possible benefits of the accession (logic of consequences). It is possible to categorize the expected gains via three systematic and interdependent sources of references: (I) Europeanization as a path for security and stability in the region, (II) EU membership as a path for economic growth and development, (III) EU membership as a path for modernization.

**(I) Europeanization as the path for security and stability in the region:** The EU enlargement is framed as a strategic investment in security and prosperity in the Balkans, which also contributes to the stability of Europe.<sup>663</sup> Serbia's bid for membership is frequently interpreted because of its agenda surrounding peace building, for which the SNS believes Serbia has an indispensable and inalienable role. At this point, Serbia is affirmed to be the source of stability in the region; therefore, from their perspective, Belgrade is a strong and credible partner of the EU.<sup>664</sup> In this respect, the peace and stability objectives are formulated not only for the EU and the

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<sup>661</sup> "Program SNS", SNS, October 2011, <https://www.sns.org.rs/lat/o-nama/program-sns>, (12.04.2018), (Program).

<sup>662</sup> SNS, Program.

<sup>663</sup> "EU Enlargement Investment in Security, Prosperity of Europe", Serbian Government, 19.01.2018, <http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=126084>, (12.04.2018).

<sup>664</sup> "Serbia Makes Good Progress towards EU", Serbian Government, 11.10.2017, <http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=124712>, (12.04.2018).

Western Balkans, but also for Belgrade as a win-win situation, in spite of a more careful language on transitional justice.

In terms of dealing with the past and transitional justice, a more defensive, reactionary and revisionist discourse is taken that is posited in “double standards,” “Why not see Serb guilt in the Nineties and wonder why the EU and the West have punished only our sins and atrocities, not the others...”<sup>665</sup> When asked about Milošević, President Vučić responded that such issues should be left to historians. He stated, “I do not want to participate in a theme of confrontation that still divides Serbia.”<sup>666</sup> A second criticism that is raised from the double standard narrative is associated with the Kosovo issue. Prime Minister Brnabić, giving Ukraine and Spain as examples, raised the question, whether there is a separate international law valid for the EU and another one valid for all non-EU countries.<sup>667</sup> On this point, the SNS follows tradition: “political solution for Kosovo crisis” based on the UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) reaffirms “sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [now Republic of Serbia] and the other States of the region.”<sup>668</sup>

In spite of all these double standards and political costs, the SNS continues to relay messages to Brussels by stating, Serbia made brave but unpopular constructive steps to normalize relations with Kosovo.<sup>669</sup> In response to internal critics concerning Serbia’s Kosovo policy, the SNS quickly points out that without stability in the region, no state will be able to advance towards the EU.<sup>670</sup> Moreover, the SNS’ goals are the improvement of economic development, living conditions and economic empowerment of the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija and continuing to

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<sup>665</sup> “Aleksandar Vucic: Here in the Balkans has Returned Hatred, only Europe can Save the Peace”, **SNS**, 27.09.2016, <https://www.sns.org.rs/en/novosti/vesti/aleksandar-vucic-here-balkans-has-returned-hatred-only-europe-can-save-peace>, (12.04.2018).

<sup>666</sup> SNS, “Aleksandar Vucic: Here in the Balkans has Returned Hatred, only Europe can Save the Peace.”

<sup>667</sup> “Letter to European Commission regarding Issues of Catalonia, Kosovo”, **Serbian Government**, 2.10.2017, <http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=124543> (12.04.2018).

<sup>668</sup> “PM Vucic's Open Letter to Member States of UNESCO”, **SNS**, 11.10.2015, <https://www.sns.org.rs/en/novosti/vesti/vucic-open-letter-member-states-unesco>, (12.04.2018).

<sup>669</sup> “Serbia was ‘Almost Bankrupt’ – PM”, **B92**, 11.11.2017, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=12&dd=11&nav\\_id=103012](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=12&dd=11&nav_id=103012), (12.04.2018).

<sup>670</sup> “Intensive and Meaningful Political Dialogue with Bulgaria”, **B92**, 07.11.2017, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=12&dd=07&nav\\_id=102990](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=12&dd=07&nav_id=102990), (12.04.2018).

support sustainable return.<sup>671</sup> In the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, without any final plan of recognition, “Stefan Fule, after the meeting with Nikolić said that the well-known opinion of the European Commission of recognition of Kosovo was not a formal requirement for the process of European integration of Serbia.”<sup>672</sup>

**(II) EU membership as the path for economic growth and development:**

Normalizing relations with neighboring countries, including negotiations with Kosovo, is alleged to be associated with the economic and development agenda of Serbia, guised in the assumption that regional stability will provide economic growth. The Prime Minister emphasizes that Serbia’s economic growth and development will not be possible without preserving regional stability and promoting good neighbourly relations.<sup>673</sup> The SNS believes that a stable Serbia sends a concrete message to all potential investors,<sup>674</sup> primarily in the interest of citizens, businessmen and investors.<sup>675</sup> Stating that Serbia is a small market,<sup>676</sup> the SNS is in line with the reforms encouraging progress in industry, agriculture and foreign investment with the aim of making Serbia the regional power.<sup>677</sup> In other words, the government seems to adopt EU rules as a way of responding to its domestic needs, thus overcoming economic challenges (lesson-drawing model).

**(III) EU membership as the path for modernization:**

Under the lesson-drawing model, the SNS justifies the EU accession process as a modernization project underscoring the ultimate outcome of building a “modern” and “European” Serbia that is beneficial to the country and its citizens. From this point of view, modernization

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<sup>671</sup> “Keynote Address by Serbian Prime Minister Designate Ana Brnabić”, **National Assembly**, 28.06.2017,

<http://www.parlament.rs/upload/documents/activities/28.06.2017.%20KEYNOTE%20ADDRESS%20BY%20SERBIAN%20PM%20DESIGNATE%20ANA%20BRNABIC.pdf>, (12.04.2018), (Keynote).

<sup>672</sup> “The Recognition of Kosovo is not a Precondition for EU”, **SNS**, 20.09.2011, <https://www.sns.org.rs/en/novosti/vesti/recognition-kosovo-not-precondition-eu>, (12.04.2018).

<sup>673</sup> “EU Commissioner for Regional Policy Visits Belgrade”, **B92**, 19.01.2018, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2018&mm=01&dd=19&nav\\_id=103311](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2018&mm=01&dd=19&nav_id=103311), (12.04.2018).

<sup>674</sup> **B92**, Chapters 6 and 30.

<sup>675</sup> “EU Membership most Important Foreign Policy Goal”, **B92**, 16.11.2017, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=11&dd=16&nav\\_id=102823](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=11&dd=16&nav_id=102823), (12.04.2018).

<sup>676</sup> “Regional Stability Important for European Integration of Serbia”, **Serbian Government**, 12.10.2017, <http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=124743>, (12.04.2018).

<sup>677</sup> “PM: Serbia is Poised for New, Exciting Future”, **B92**, 30.04.2014, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2014&mm=04&dd=30&nav\\_id=90154](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2014&mm=04&dd=30&nav_id=90154), (12.04.2018).

through Europeanization is reduced to a rational dimension through many acquisitions from the normative dimension, as well as its positive contributions to the image of the country from the identity dimension:

*All of the above is actually corroborated by our strategic orientation towards the EU, which constitutes the values we stand for, and they are innovation, creativeness, knowledge and overall modernisation that leads to a higher standard and the quality of life. By joining the EU, we will become a part of society in which there are more equitable, accessible, richer countries, and that is the place where Serbia should actually be.*<sup>678</sup>

The SNS can be categorized as a pro-EU party purely because of economic and practical reasons, rather than the assumption that it shares EU values.<sup>679</sup> According to Spasojević, the SNS frames a populist discourse reflective of their stance on democratic-normative dimensions, such as democratic rules/practices, the role of opposition actors and state independent (regulatory and oversight) institutions.<sup>680</sup> In spite of this legitimization strategy, achieved mainly by gaining membership, it is observed that there are references to the normative dimension to a lesser extent. The following statements emerge as alternative-normative justifications by the SNS: “We will have to change our mind-sets, our habits, ourselves – and that is the most important thing.”<sup>681</sup> Serbian European path is not only promoted because of money, but also because of system of values,<sup>682</sup> which Serbia is implementing reforms primarily because of themselves<sup>683</sup> to improve the quality of life of all their citizens.”<sup>684</sup> Similarly, Serbia’s structural problems are covered normatively in the lesson-drawing perspective:

*Without reform of the judiciary, the police, the fight against organized crime, the fight against corruption, respect of human and minority rights and freedom of the media, it is not possible to carry out reforms in any area of social life... European*

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<sup>678</sup> National Assembly, Keynote.

<sup>679</sup> Dušan Spasojević, “Populists’ Influence on the State of Democracy in Transitional post-Communist Countries”, forthcoming.

<sup>680</sup> Dušan Spasojević, “Transforming Populism – from Protest Vote to Ruling Ideology”, forthcoming.

<sup>681</sup> SNS, Monocle.

<sup>682</sup> “Finding Permanent Solution to Kosovo Issue”, **Serbian Government**, 12.01.2017, <http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=125956>, (12.04.2018).

<sup>683</sup> “PM Speaks at World in 2018 Gala in Hong Kong”, **B92**, 01.12.2017, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=12&dd=01&nav\\_id=102936](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=12&dd=01&nav_id=102936), (12.04.2018).

<sup>684</sup> “Serbian and Albanian PMs Speak at Panel in Morocco”, **B92**, 03.11.2017, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=11&dd=03&nav\\_id=102723](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=11&dd=03&nav_id=102723), (12.04.2018).

*integration is a tool available to each new member and its government and society.*<sup>685</sup>

The identity dimension is the least referential element in their documents. In the following two sentences, it is claimed that Serbia is part of Europe from historical and sociological perspectives: “We are not linked only by geography, but also by history, culture and the common roots. The EU is our common homeland;<sup>686</sup> Serbia is currently, within the entire Europe...”<sup>687</sup>

## **II. THE ACTOR OF DIFFICULT TASKS WITHIN PRO-EUROPEAN COALITIONS: SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SERBIA**

The SDP’s political program portrays Serbia’s 20th century as an “unfinished” state building process.<sup>688</sup> It holds post-Tito leaders responsible, due to their authoritarian and nationalistic platforms. Post-Tito era is framed as a missing opportunity for the building “a stable state system and state institutions, thought out socio-economic reforms and involvement in European integration.” The analogy of “Serbia in Crisis” often appears in documents, with a political rhetoric of social democracy as the main solution. The SDP defines its political vision through the basic values and ideas of social democracy - equality, freedom, solidarity and social justice as follows:

*Social-democrats of Serbia want to correct the injustice created by the great gap between those who have and the have-nots. We stand for the redistributive role of the state which will ensure equality of opportunity. Even our impoverished state must find the mechanisms for enabling the disadvantaged citizens’ access to opportunities for their own benefit and that of the society. In such a society the citizens are in the first place. That is the basic aim of the SDP.*<sup>689</sup>

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<sup>685</sup> “EWB Interviews: Jadranka Joksimović, Serbian Minister”, **SNS**, 18.06.2014, <https://www.sns.org.rs/en/novosti/vesti/ewb-interviews-jadranka-joksimovic-serbian-minister>, (12.04.2018).

<sup>686</sup> “Statement Following Meeting with the Prime Minister of Serbia”, **European Parliament**, 11.10.2017, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en/newsroom/statement-following-meeting-with-the-prime-minister-of-serbia>, (12.04.2018).

<sup>687</sup> National Assembly, Keynote.

<sup>688</sup> “Political Programme”, **SDP**, 12.11.2012, <http://www.SDPbije.rs/english-lang/political-programme/>, (13.04.2018), (Political Programme).

<sup>689</sup> “About Social Democratic Party of Serbia”, **SDP**, 2016, <http://www.sdpsrbije.rs/english/>, (13.04.2018).

The SDP exemplifies the party with the outermost statements parallel to lesson-drawing and the social learning models within the ruling coalition. There is a clear line between the past and present, and Europeanization is framed as a way of responding to domestic needs and overcoming political challenges in post-conflict Serbia. Although the term genocide is not used, it is clearly stated that crimes were committed in the past: “Srebrenica is a very special story, a horrible crime that was committed. There is no dilemma in this regard, no bidding, and I think that the marking of the tenth anniversary was a good opportunity for the public in Serbia to face a horrible crime which was committed there.”<sup>690</sup>

In response to the question as to why it took so long to cooperate with the ICTY, Ljajić states: “we were worried that if they were arrested, there would be a conflict between the military and the police.”<sup>691</sup> However, despite the ICTY's negative image in public opinion and criticism of the double standards, he feels Serbia has done enough to cooperate: “Aren't his (Karadžić) arrest and the arrests of 43 other defendants enough to demonstrate our willingness to cooperate? We are threatened in our own country because we cooperate with the tribunal, and at the same time some EU countries want us to be contrite.”<sup>692</sup>

In response to criticisms against the DS government by opposition groups in 2009, he remarked “This is the first time that we have received acknowledgement as well as absolute support for what we have done so far...”<sup>693</sup> The cooperation with the ICTY is justified for the reward, that is the candidate status for membership: “I am completely convinced that if we bring this work to an end and if we put an end to The Hague problems, this country will have a very close European perspective.”<sup>694</sup> In addition, Ljajić also speaks of Serbia's moral responsibility, “...But I would not say that the cooperation with The Hague Tribunal consists only of fulfilment of political obligations, it is also our moral obligation to cooperate with this court.”<sup>695</sup>

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<sup>690</sup> Office of War Crimes Prosecutor, Interview.

<sup>691</sup> “Interview with Serbian Cabinet Minister: Mladic 'should Finally Turn Himself in’”, **Der Spiegel**, 13.08.2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-serbian-cabinet-minister-mladic-should-finally-turn-himself-in-a-571665.html>, (13.04.2018).

<sup>692</sup> Der Spiegel, “Interview with Serbian Cabinet Minister: Mladic 'should Finally Turn Himself in.’”

<sup>693</sup> “Ljajić: U.S. Trusts Serbia”, **B92**, 10.02.2009, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2009&mm=02&dd=10&nav\\_id=57051](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2009&mm=02&dd=10&nav_id=57051), (13.04.2018).

<sup>694</sup> Office of War Crimes Prosecutor, Interview.

<sup>695</sup> Office of War Crimes Prosecutor, Interview.



Settling disputes with neighbouring states by peaceful means and establishing good relations is also reflected in his agenda. Croatia is especially at the forefront concerning this point and it is Ljajić's intent to have good relations with Zagreb. He states, "I am confident that we will not lose the dispute and we do not want to disrupt our relations with Croatia, but rather want the best possible relations with all neighbors, including Croatia."<sup>696</sup> Although Croatia is a member state of the EU, there are doubts to claims that the negotiating period can be halted due to Zagreb's veto power. On this point, the Minister counters against the Eurosceptic actors: "Croatia will not be able to block Serbia's European path if Belgrade cooperates with Brussels and has the other EU member states as its allies."<sup>697</sup>

Similar to other coalition partners, the SDP follows the strategy to frame EU membership within the context of Serbian foreign policy: "The basic foreign policy interest of Serbia is to become a full member of the EU, with further improvement of relations with the United States and the extension of economic cooperation with Russia."<sup>698</sup> It is foreseen that this multifaceted foreign policy will serve the interests of the country, while at the same time, provide a long-term stability in the Balkans.<sup>699</sup> With the same vision of building a more stable and functional state, the membership goal is legitimized pragmatically from the domestic perspective:

*There will be none of Serbia's European integration, good relations with Russia, and with the USA and strengthen the regional role of Serbia if the state does not devoted to itself, or if it is not in a position that time, energy and resources direct towards solving the economic and social crisis and towards building a stable, functional and less expensive institutions. The stabilization of the situation in Serbia will increase the possibility of Serbia for the answers to the possible security risks and to achieve the primary and most important goal of internal and foreign policy—the preservation of territorial integrity and Kosovo within Serbia.*<sup>700</sup>

According to Ljajić, for this newly formulated vision of foreign policy to be instrumented in the building of a "new" Serbia, the ways of thinking must be changed, above all else, in order to achieve this goal:

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<sup>696</sup> "Rasim Ljajic Believes Serbia will not lose Dispute with Croatia", **In Serbia Today**, 03.03.2014, <https://inserbia.info/today/2014/03/rasim-Ljajic-believes-serbia-will-not-lose-dispute-with-croatia/>, (14.04.2018).

<sup>697</sup> "Ljajic: Croatia cannot Block Serbia", **In Serbia Today**, 21.07.2016, <https://inserbia.info/today/2016/07/Ljajic-croatia-cannot-block-serbia/>, (13.04.2018).

<sup>698</sup> SDP, Political Programme.

<sup>699</sup> SDP, Political Programme.

<sup>700</sup> SDP, Political Programme.

*For this to happen, the logic and dynamics of the political scene and the philosophy of the actors in it have to be changed in a way that will fight for the interests of the state and its citizens, while respecting the rule of law, become more important than the struggle for power and care of incompetent, unprepared, and unusable personnel.*<sup>701</sup>

A substantial part of the ongoing dialogues with Kosovo pertain to issues regarding the Ministry for Foreign and Domestic Trade and Telecommunications. On this point, he often phrases “talks in Brussels is difficult.” However, both confusing and conflicting statements on Kosovo emerged within the documents. The first theme is parallel with the traditional stance of Serbia: “Serbia will never and cannot accept the independence of Kosovo and Metohia.”<sup>702</sup> Nevertheless, the second theme suggests the decentralization of Kosovo and Metohija as the solution, stating that the current status-quo is unsustainable. In another statement, he differs from the previous statements by asserting, “A frozen conflict related to the Kosovo issue does not suit Serbia, and proposes ‘normalization without recognition’ as a solution.”<sup>703</sup>

Evaluating the dispute through the real-politic perspective, Ljajić shares the observation, “Albanians always sought strong international support, especially from the EU and the US, while the Serbs defied both, and very often made to their own detriment.”<sup>704</sup> He also believes that returning to previous positions are unrealistic. For all the listed reasons, he discordantly states, “We do not think this is the best solution, because it does not exist... We do not expect this to be the most just solution, because that too is an illusion. We are looking for a solution that is the least unfair.”<sup>705</sup>

To this end, he proposes a three-stage normalisation plan for Kosovo:

*(I) The first phase would involve the removal of all barriers to full economic and trade cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo, as well as free movement, without existing administrative restrictions on people, goods and capital: To that end, we propose that a free economic zone be established in the north of Kosovo, which would be open to investment from both central Serbia and Kosovo. (II) The second phase would include the opening of negotiations on the property of Serbia in Kosovo, the cultural heritage and the establishment of the Community of Serb Municipalities. (III) The third phase would open negotiations on Kosovo’s membership in all international organizations except the UN. For each consent of Serbia for Kosovo’s accession to a single organization, we would ask for*

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<sup>701</sup> SDP, Political Programme.

<sup>702</sup> SDP, Political Programme.

<sup>703</sup> “We should Ask for EU's Concessions to Stop Blocking Kosovo”, **B92**, 21.08.2017, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=08&dd=21&nav\\_id=102115](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=08&dd=21&nav_id=102115), (13.04.2018).

<sup>704</sup> “We should Ask for EU's Concessions to Stop Blocking Kosovo.”

<sup>705</sup> “We should Ask for EU's Concessions to Stop Blocking Kosovo.”

*concrete concessions from the EU in terms of implementing large infrastructure projects, but also concessions that imply a faster path to the EU.*<sup>706</sup>

### **III. EU MEMBERSHIP AS A RATIONAL-STRATEGIC PRIORITY IN A MULTI-FACETED FOREIGN POLICY: SOCIALIST PARTY OF SERBIA**

There were gradual attitudinal changes amongst the political parties in Belgrade following the 2008 elections. However, the ideological re-positioning remains intact for the SPS, which is based more on pragmatism than ideology today. Acting as both First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivica Dačić, delivers statements not only on foreign policy issues, but also on the SPS's shifts on positions. Intra-party discussions have focused on re-positioning the SPS from a socialist to a more social democratic line. The leader complains that the party still lives in the past; therefore, it cannot gain enough support from voters in today's modern Serbia due to negative reflections from the history.<sup>707</sup> He specifically focused on manifesto and organizational changes: "The manifesto should draw closer to social democracy. Organizational changes are also needed. We need people who will work on familiarizing people with our ideology, who will work with them."<sup>708</sup>

This call, which clearly indicates the position shift and addresses the past, is also reflected in his foreign policy discourse. Thus, Dačić repeatedly emphasizes that lessons have been learned from the mistakes of the past. So much so that he repeats, "We do work hard to help them not to repeat the same mistakes we made in the past."<sup>709</sup> Similarly, he has declared, "We have paid and continue to pay today a high price for our mistakes, for our sinful ambitions and our crimes,"<sup>710</sup> adding that, "Serbia

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<sup>706</sup> "We should Ask for EU's Concessions to Stop Blocking Kosovo."

<sup>707</sup> MFA, "Interview to Kurir."

<sup>708</sup> "Interview by Ivica Dacic Given to Politika: Ambassadors must Help", **MFA - Interviews**, 11.05.2014, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/about-the-ministry/minister/minister-interviews/13119-interview-by-ivica-dacic-given-to-politika-ambassadors-must-help>, (14.04.2018).

<sup>709</sup> "Address by Minister Dacic at the Summit on the Western Balkans", **MFA - Statements**, 04.07.2016, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/press-service/statements/15499-address-by-minister-dacic-at-the-summit-on-the-western-balkans>, (14.04.2018).

<sup>710</sup> "Our Job is Peace – Minister Dačić to Nedeljnik", **MFA - Interviews**, 07.08.2014, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/about-the-ministry/minister/minister-interviews/13451-our-job-is-peace-minister-dai-to-nedeljnik->, (14.04.2018), (Our Job is Peace).

is making efforts and is not returning to the past.”<sup>711</sup> Thus, the state has become peace loving while the nation is problem solving (Lesson-learning Model):

*When you are sitting on a powder keg, which is what the Balkans is, and when you have nowhere else to go, then there are only two options before you. One is to set it on fire and burn in flames together with all others, and the other is to solve all outstanding issues and potential disputes, in a timely manner. And we clearly chose the second option ... Serbia as the most peace-loving country.*<sup>712</sup>

SPS by stating that EU integration is a peace and stability project, outlines Western Balkans enlargement as, “The EU, as the greatest peace project in modern history, cannot be considered complete without the Balkan region, which is its integral part geographically, historically, politically and, above all, in terms of shared values and culture.”<sup>713</sup> Dačić is well aware of the direct link between portraying Serbia as peace-lover and the conditions for EU membership. He proclaims, “Serbia is a stabilizing force in the region. The Serbian leadership is committed to peace and regional stability. It is working for the continuation of the process of reconciliation and searching for common interests.”<sup>714</sup>

It can be argued that Serbia’s foreign policy discourse has been Europeanized in order to be more consistent with EU expectations. Underlining Serbia’s current discourse is its full cooperation and solidarity with the EU, especially in terms of the migration crisis, as well as in fighting against terrorism, radicalization, violent extremism and xenophobia.<sup>715</sup> This Europeanized discourse provides the impression that Belgrade is satisfying the EU’s expectations and illustrates that Serbia is a vital candidate for their enlargement perspective, “the EU knows it only too well that the stability of our region is key to the stability and security of the EU.”<sup>716</sup>

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<sup>711</sup> “Serbia Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic: ‘I hope the EU will Survive until We’re Ready to Join’”, **Deutsche Welle**, 09.09.2016, <http://www.dw.com/en/serbia-foreign-minister-ivica-dacic-i-hope-the-eu-will-survive-until-were-ready-to-join/a-19539484>, (14.04.2018), (We are Ready to Join).

<sup>712</sup> “Interview with Ivica Dačić, First Vice President and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia”, **MFA - Interviews**, 20.03.2017, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/about-the-ministry/minister/minister-interviews/16326-interview-with-ivica-dai-first-vice-president-and-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-serbia>, (14.04.2018), (Interview with First Vice President).

<sup>713</sup> “Dacic: The European Union is not Complete without the Balkan Region”, **MFA - Speeches**, 12.07.2017, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/component/content/article/16667-dacic-qthe-european-union-is-not-complete-without-the-balkan-regionq>, (14.04.2018), (EU without the Balkan Region).

<sup>714</sup> Deutsche Welle, We are Ready to Join.

<sup>715</sup> MFA, EU without the Balkan Region.

<sup>716</sup> MFA, EU without the Balkan Region.

Further, this “new” Serbian rhetoric is instrumentalized for domestic considerations. Dačić plays against anti-government groups, arguing that the government has reversed the negative images of the country as a great success. He claims, “I think that Serbia has made, at least, a strategic step forward, which means that today it is no longer the bad guy on the international political scene.”<sup>717</sup> The Minister of Foreign Affairs records that their foreign policy has resurrected the respect and equality Serbia needed in international community.<sup>718</sup> This approach to foreign policy with regard to the accession negotiation has been received warmly, “After all, this commitment to peace and dialogue has opened to us the door to the EU and made accession negotiations possible.”<sup>719</sup>

The Minister lists the main agenda of Serbia's new foreign policy as follows:

*After realistically reviewing the security and political challenges that we are facing today, and respecting international law, the Republic of Serbia has defined the following as its key foreign policy priorities: (I) principled fight for the preservation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty; (II) continuation of the negotiating process with the EU pending full membership; (III) further development of good-neighbourly relations; (IV) strengthening economic bonds with major countries; and military neutrality.*<sup>720</sup>

As a clear and unwavering message, it is repeated explicitly that Belgrade will not recognize Kosovo, “The essential and foremost priority in its foreign policy action is to preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country, with Kosovo and Metohija as an integral part of Serbia.”<sup>721</sup> At this point, UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999), which ensures Kosovo as part of Serbia, is the main focus on all documents and statements.<sup>722</sup>

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<sup>717</sup> “Interview by Minister Dacic to Blic”, **MFA - Interviews**, 16.11.2014, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/about-the-ministry/minister/minister-interviews/13704-interview-by-minister-dacic-to-qblicq>, (14.04.2018), (Interview 16.11.2014).

<sup>718</sup> MFA, Interview with First Vice President.

<sup>719</sup> MFA, Our Job is Peace.

<sup>720</sup> “Minister of Foreign Affairs Dacic Held a Lecture “Serbian Foreign Policy Priorities” for the Attendees of the Diplomatic Academy Programme”, **MFA - Statements**, 11.01.2018, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/press-service/statements/17348-minister-of-foreign-affairs-dacic-held-a-lecture-serbian-foreign-policy-priorities-for-the-attendees-of-the-diplomatic-academy-programme>, (14.04.2018), (Serbian Foreign Policy Priorities).

<sup>721</sup> MFA, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dacic Held a Lecture.

<sup>722</sup> “Statement by Minister Dacic at the 17th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement”, **MFA - Speeches**, 19.09.2016, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/about-the-ministry/minister/ministry-speeches/15726-statement-by-minister-dacic-at-the-17th-summit-of-the-non-aligned-movement>, (14.04.2018), (Non-Aligned Movement).

The internal actors, who oppose EU membership due to the Kosovo issue, adamantly feel the EU doesn't have a claim for recognition, "I believe that today no one expects us to make a 'U-turn' and recognise an illegal entity."<sup>723</sup> But 'normalization' of our relations does not include that we even think of recognizing the independence of Kosovo."<sup>724</sup> Of the 28 member states of the EU, only 5 do not recognize Kosovo. The Minister asserts that as long as there are countries that exhibit this behavior, the EU cannot make a decision on the independence of Kosovo.<sup>725</sup> In response to criticisms against the treaty Serbia signed with Pristina in 2015, which underlies the perspective of a real-politic, Dačić states, "I thought about the interests of the country and what to do next. If Serbia had not signed the Brussels Agreement, we would have not been negotiating EU membership today."<sup>726</sup> In the meantime, he called for more empathy and respect from Brussels:

*There should be more understanding for issues of crucial importance to Serbia, such as the preservation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty. In the absence of that, it is difficult for Serbs to recognize the EU... For this reason, some others seem to be more visible in our public, while the issue of EU accession is increasingly seen by our people as a highly politicized process, where the same rules do not apply to all.*<sup>727</sup>

Listing EU membership as one of the main foreign policy priorities, ascertains that the negotiations are formulated under Serbia's foreign policy. As both party leader and foreign minister, Dačić portrays the EU as a peace, prosperity and freedom project, referring to its post-war origins. The EU, above all, is the highest level of integration achieved in modern political history, which has enabled long-term reconciliation among European nations and countries.<sup>728</sup> In addition, the EU is a global example of cooperation and integration, which has achieved high living standards as an economic

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<sup>723</sup> MFA, Interview with First Vice President.

<sup>724</sup> Deutsche Welle, We are Ready to Join.

<sup>725</sup> "Ivica Dacic's Interview for Sputnik", **MFA - Interviews**, 03.04.2016, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/about-the-ministry/minister/minister-interviews/15884-ivica-dacics-interview-for-sputnjik>, (14.04.2018), (Interview for Sputnik).

<sup>726</sup> MFA, Interview 16.11.2014.

<sup>727</sup> "Minister Dacic Participated in the Conference: Multi-speed Europe: Deepening the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy", **MFA - Statements**, 06.06.2017, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/press-service/statements/16635-minister-dacic-participated-in-the-conference-multi-speed-europe-deepening-the-eus-common-security-and-defence-policy>, (14.04.2018), (Deepening EU's CSDP).

<sup>728</sup> "Minister Dacic at the Conference: New International Reality – Challenges and Prospects", **MFA-Speeches**, 28.06.2017, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/about-the-ministry/minister/ministry-speeches/16674-minister-dacic-at-the-conference-new-international-reality-challenges-and-prospects>, (14.04.2018).

and social integration model.<sup>729</sup> This economic integration is accompanied by ensured peace and stability on the continent by overcoming crises.<sup>730</sup> According to Minister Dačić, the Union has also strengthened democracies and redefined the freedom-loving tradition over ethical values, after the demolitions of Nazism and Fascism.<sup>731</sup> The EU's anti-Fascist and anti-Nazism character was also shared by Serbia during and after the World War II. "That is why it is important to recall that it was owing precisely to the outcome of the anti-fascism struggle that Europe and the world regained their dignity, liberty and the right of diversity."<sup>732</sup>

Concerning issues surrounding Serbia's EU membership, the normative justifications that arise from these historical-sociological readings evolve into more pragmatic bases. Before discussing the economy-weighted pragmatic legitimization strategy, it will be useful to address the relatively less-evident identity and normative dimensions within the documents. The Party Program defines the accession process as the "building of a common European home," which enables Serbia to harmonize its political, economic and social systems.<sup>733</sup> In their 2020 Strategy Paper, the SPS announced their priority as to build a modern, European, democratic, legal, civic, free, economically prosperous, socially just - strong state and society.<sup>734</sup>

According to the Minister, Serbia is European and belongs to the European family of nations,<sup>735</sup> more so than those, who are already members.<sup>736</sup> In terms of values, geography, policy and security,<sup>737</sup> Serbia is European and belongs to the European family of nations: "We have got no identity issues or problems with a sense

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<sup>729</sup> MFA, Minister Dacic at the Conference: New International Reality – Challenges and Prospects.

<sup>730</sup> MFA, Minister Dacic at the Conference: New International Reality – Challenges and Prospects.

<sup>731</sup> "Minister Dacic at the Informal Meeting of EU Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Candidate Countries", **MFA - Statements**, 03.09.2016, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/press-service/statements/15654-minister-dacic-at-the-informal-meeting-of-eu-foreign-ministers-and-ministers-of-candidate-countries>, (14.04.2018).

<sup>732</sup> "Address by Ivica Dacic at the Opening of the Conference WW II: Remembrance and Public Policies", **MFA - Conference**, 08.09.2015, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/conference/14839-address-by-ivica-dacic-at-the-opening-of-the-conference-ww-ii-remembrance-and-public-policies>, (14.04.2018).

<sup>733</sup> "ПРОГРАМ СОЦИЈАЛИСТИЧКЕ ПАРТИЈЕ СРБИЈЕ", **SPS - Dokumenta**, 11.12.2010, <http://www.sps.org.rs/documents/PROGRAM%20SPS.pdf?lang=lat>, (14.04.2018), (Socialist Party of Serbia Program).

<sup>734</sup> "ВИЗИЈА СРБИЈЕ 2020", **SPS - Dokumenta**, 14.12.2014, <http://www.sps.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Programska-deklaracija-Vizija-Srbije-2020.pdf?lang=lat>, (14.04.2018), (Vision for Serbia 2020).

<sup>735</sup> MFA, Non-Aligned Movement.

<sup>736</sup> Deutsche Welle, We are Ready to Join.

<sup>737</sup> MFA, Deepening EU's CSDP.

of belonging. We are a European people, we are geographically situated there, and the history and blood spilt in the two world wars we share with Europe, as our sacrifice is built into its foundations.”<sup>738</sup>

The normative themes observed in the documents are representative with the logic of consequences as a more “rationalized” form, underlying its contributions to regional peace and stability. According to the SPS, at the end of this process, Serbia will become stable, successful and secure, by all standards, including legislatively and economically, a true European state.<sup>739</sup> In this regard, the process is interpreted as the path for change and modernization, via adopting European values and standards<sup>740</sup> which will “improve the quality of life of our citizens and, at the same time, establish strong institutions with their work grounded in democratic principles and full adherence to the rule of law.”<sup>741</sup>

Serbia's economic interdependence with the EU and the possible achievements after membership are centered in their justifications. For this purpose, it is claimed that economic and financial problems will be solved during and after the accession and European Serbia will enhance and empower living standards.<sup>742</sup> In response to concerns and criticism that such predictions may not come to light, Dačić says, "Let us join first, and then we'll see. If it doesn't work for us, we'll leave without a hitch.”<sup>743</sup> The economic agenda of the relations is clearly expressed as follows:

*Take a pen and calculate. What is Serbia's GDP and how much should it give if it became an EU member, and how much should it get from the EU budget. At this point, Germany is the one that should be against the EU because it gives much more than it receives from the EU. Therefore, Serbia has an interest to be a member till it becomes a developed EU country because it would get non-refundable money. Only a dumb man does not understand this.*<sup>744</sup>

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<sup>738</sup> MFA, Interview with First Vice President.

<sup>739</sup> MFA, Interview with First Vice President.

<sup>740</sup> “First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia Ivica Dacic addressed at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of EU Member States and Candidate Countries”, **MFA - Speeches**, 07.03.2015, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/component/content/article/13935-first-deputy-prime-minister-and-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-serbia-ivica-dacic-addressed-at-the-meeting-of-foreign-ministers-of-eu-member-states-and-candidate-countries>, (14.04.2018).

<sup>741</sup> MFA, EU without the Balkan Region.

<sup>742</sup> “Berlin Process is a Push for the Promotion of Common Economic, Political and Security Interests of the Western Balkans”, **MFA - Statements**, 30.05.2017, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/press-service/statements/16558-berlin-process-is-a-push-for-the-promotion-of-common-economic-political-and-security-interests-of-the-western-balkans>, (14.04.2018).

<sup>743</sup> MFA, Interview for Sputnjik.

<sup>744</sup> MFA, Interview 16.11.2014.



The remaining two items on the foreign policy agendas are (I) military neutrality, and (II) strengthening economic relations with major countries. For military neutrality, the Minister has stated every possible grounds for justification. First, as the legacy for Serbia from Yugoslavia,<sup>745</sup> and secondly, the parliamentary decision on military neutrality in 2008,<sup>746</sup> which according to him, serves the national interests: “Keep in mind that we are a small country, largely dependent on both sides... Our friends, and when I say friends I mean Europe and the U.S. as well as Russia, are major stakeholders and have major opportunities to offer.”<sup>747</sup>

Today, military neutrality designates both the direction and dimension of the relation and cooperation with NATO. It is portrayed as a “partner,” as opposed to an ‘enemy’ image by Eurosceptic actors (active neutrality). “Serbia is pursuing its policy of military neutrality, reflecting its desire not to join any military alliance. However, military neutrality is not an obstacle to the promotion of its partner cooperation with NATO.”<sup>748</sup> The Minister points out the negative public opinion and reminds of the 1999 bombardment as causes why the relations could not go beyond partnership.<sup>749</sup> As a counter to the anti-NATO sediments, he alleges that this partnership is necessary first, for Serbs in Kosovo and secondly, for military modernization:

*(I) If the safety of Kosovo Serbs hinges on NATO, we will talk with NATO 24/7 and enable them to arrive to Kosovo, where they have been protecting our people, as soon as possible without any impediments (II) We will do our best to get the most out of this cooperation for the benefit of our country – spanning from new technologies to new forms of cooperation in areas of significance for our economy and creation of new jobs.*<sup>750</sup>

The SPS attaches particular importance to improving relations with Russia. Historically and sociologically, Russia is defined as an age-old friend for Serbia<sup>751</sup>

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<sup>745</sup> MFA, Interview for Sputnjik.

<sup>746</sup> MFA, Interview for Sputnjik.

<sup>747</sup> “Interview: Ivica Dacic Speaks for Danas Daily”, **MFA - Interviews**, 12.01.2015, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/about-the-ministry/minister/minister-interviews/16073-interview-ivica-dacic-speaks-for-danas-daily>, (14.04.2018).

<sup>748</sup> MFA, Serbian Foreign Policy Priorities.

<sup>749</sup> MFA, Interview for Sputnjik.

<sup>750</sup> “Article Signed by Ivica Dacic (Politika, 21 February 2016)”, **MFA - Interviews**, 21.02.2016, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/about-the-ministry/minister/minister-interviews/15841-article-signed-by-ivica-dacic-politika-21-february-2016>, (14.04.2018).

<sup>751</sup> MFA, Interview with First Vice President.

with unbreakable ties.<sup>752</sup> From the rational dimensions perspective, Moscow is identified as one of the leading foreign trade partners,<sup>753</sup> in the fields of energy, culture, science, as well as many other areas.<sup>754</sup> Finally, in connection to the Kosovo issue, Russia (and China) is reminded of their support to Serbia.<sup>755</sup> It is emphasized that the dilemma between the East (Russia) and the West (EU), in context to Serbia, is artificial.<sup>756</sup> The minister continues detailing political versus military division in Serbian foreign policy: “Our fraternal ties with Russia are traditional. We want to be neutral militarily, but politically our interest is to be an EU member.”<sup>757</sup> It is further underlined that this segregation in foreign policy is understandable and normal:

*We further believe that it would be irresponsible to jeopardize our relations with some of the major world economies or hamper our energy supplies. We wish to pursue a policy that would contribute to Serbia's better positioning on the regional, European, multilateral and broader international level. In this context, we see no obstacles to Serbia's cooperation with a wide range of countries, in different areas, in the same way as we cooperate with EU Member States or with our neighbours.*<sup>758</sup>

Such meanings attributed to Russia have become particularly debatable since the Ukrainian Crisis. Serbia didn't follow the EU's path and unimposed sanctions against Russia after the annexation of the Crimea. According to Dačić, the EU's decision under the CFSP are not binding on Serbia since they are not an EU member,<sup>759</sup> thus demonstrating that Russia is a friend that has never imposed sanctions on Serbia.<sup>760</sup> It is also repeated that the Ukrainian Crisis was further proof of the member

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<sup>752</sup> “Minister Dacic’s Interview for Vecernje Novosti”, **MFA - Interviews**, 28.02.2015, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/about-the-ministry/minister/minister-interviews/15807-minister-dacics-interview-for-vecernje-novosti->, (14.04.2018).

<sup>753</sup> “Minister Dacic at the Meeting of the Working Group for the Promotion of Trade and Economic Cooperation and Improvement of the Trade Mechanism between Serbia and Russia”, **MFA - Statements**, 25.09.2015, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/press-service/statements/14681-minister-dacic-at-the-meeting-of-the-working-group-for-the-promotion-of-trade-and-economic-cooperation-and-improvement-of-the-trade-mechanism-between-serbia-and-russia>, (14.04.2018).

<sup>754</sup> MFA, Serbian Foreign Policy Priorities.

<sup>755</sup> MFA, Interview for Sputnjik.

<sup>756</sup> “Ivica Dacic’s Interview for Blic”, **MFA - Interviews**, 28.02.2015, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/about-the-ministry/minister/minister-interviews/15806-ivica-dacics-interview-for-blic>, (14.04.2018).

<sup>757</sup> MFA, Interview 16.11.2014.

<sup>758</sup> MFA, Deepening EU’s CSDP.

<sup>759</sup> MFA, Interview 16.11.2014.

<sup>760</sup> “Dacic: Never Sanctions against Russia”, **MFA - Statements**, 29.04.2014, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/press-service/statements/13079-dacic-never-sanctions-against-russia>, (14.04.2018).

states' double standards, for those that did not adopt a similar position to Kosovo.<sup>761</sup> Today, Belgrade pursues a foreign policy framework that maintains traditional relations with Russia, but regards EU membership as its key-strategic objective:

*For example, it seems to be a problem if Serbia annually has two military exercises with Russia and Belarus, although the remaining 14 are held with the US (9), NATO (2), Balkan countries (2), or with Hungary (1). Please note that in the past five years, there we had 44 exercises with the United States, and only 6 with the Russian Federation. I believe that numbers clearly demonstrate Serbia's basic orientation, and therefore believe that putting its cooperation with other partners in a negative context, reflects an exclusive and erroneous approach...*<sup>762</sup>

#### **IV. A NORMATIVE PRO-EUROPEAN CHALLENGE AGAINST THE RULING GOVERNMENT: DEMOCRATIC PARTY**

Is the DS responsible for the fact that after 18 years of the Bulldozer Revolution, Serbia has not reached the desired level of economic and political liberalization? There are considerable criticisms that the DS lacked the political will to solve Serbia's structural problems. Bojan Pajtić, the party's previous President, stressed that under their rule, Serbia made significant progress towards developing good neighbourly relations, abiding to a transitional justice system (judiciary), cooperation with the ICTY and creating democratic institutions.<sup>763</sup> Under the influence of the anti-DS campaign by the SNS government and intra-party division in 2014, DS and his leader Tadić were exposed to heavy criticism; rejected today by DS:

*It was so difficult to change things in the small part of time... Our prime minister and he was also the president of DS, so after that Serbia just went down. One year after we elected the new president Boris Tadić, he was from DS, he was president from 2004 -2012 two mandates. So we did such a good things during that time. If you ask anybody, you cannot find anything good that happened in Serbia that doesn't include DS, you know because we have idea, we have political view that we have a lot of people that they know how to work on the staff.*<sup>764</sup>

Different theses have been brought forward regarding the DS's decline. Velibor Pavlović, President of Democratic Youth of the DS, links the poll defeat in 2012 to "both the EU and Kosovo" policy, which he believed was unsuccessful in gaining wide

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<sup>761</sup> MFA, Interview for Sputnik.

<sup>762</sup> MFA, Deepening EU's CSDP.

<sup>763</sup> Prof. Dr. Bojan Pajtić, Previous President of the DSS, **Interview**, April 23, 2018, Novi Sad.

<sup>764</sup> Velibor Pavlović, President of the Democratic Youth of Serbia, **Interview**, March 23, 2018, Belgrade

support. Serbian voters punished the one (Tadić) they felt was the most responsible for their bad economic and social conditions.<sup>765</sup> Simić, who attributed the socio-economic deterioration due to the Euro-zone crisis, claims the DS lost votes due to the developments in Kosovo that had been raging against the Serbian minority since 2010.<sup>766</sup> The party today counters all the criticism and the lack of growth of the country in terms of democratization and development as the legacies of previous regime:

*My personal opinion is that Serbia lost so much in 1990s that we stand no chance of joining EU unless we take major leaps ahead. I am also aware that we bear a large burden of responsibility and that there are Euro-sceptics who would rather that the reforms did not succeed, and to take us back into older times, but I am certain that these reforms are absolutely necessary.*<sup>767</sup>

The DS is the forerunner of pro-Europeanism in Serbia that first framed the EU membership as a mission, developing a strong discourse. In the early years of transition, Prime Minister Đinđić sought to create a new vision for Serbia that included facing the past, but revealed a new idea of a country under the perspective of the EU integration:

*We have had two big dreams during 19th and 20th century, and both were very costly for the nation, whilst eventually they proved wrong: the communism and nationalism... Those were two huge driving ideologies that in the end provoked negative forces among the people.... European integration may take upon itself such role, if it develops into a vision, instead of remaining just a bureaucratic concept; if a visionary and capable management takes lead in Europe, the management that will understand that European future will depend on the way the entire European continent shapes up, instead of focusing on several European countries only; if we soon start with building up the comprehensive vision of Europe, than we will be have that powerful tool I spoke of, in our hands...*<sup>768</sup>

The Party Program defines EU accession as the main priority of foreign policy and encourages good neighbourly relations, Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and international economic cooperation.<sup>769</sup> This visionary position and pro-European discourses have remained strongly within the DS over the years. Having embraced this

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<sup>765</sup> Ognjen Pribicevic, "A Big Change: The 2012 Elections in Serbia and their Impact on the Western Balkans", **Teorija in Praksa**, Vol. 50, No. 3-4, 2013, p. 660.

<sup>766</sup> Predrag Simić, "Serbia: Continuity and Change after 2012 Elections", **International Relations Quarterly**, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2013, p. 5.

<sup>767</sup> "Interview of Minister Sutanovac to Akter", **Ministry of Defence - Interviews**, 27.12.2010, <http://www.mod.gov.rs/eng/2564/intervju-ministra-sutanovca-za-akter-2564>, (16.04.2018).

<sup>768</sup> "Europe with Soul", **Zoran Djindjic Virtual Museum**, 10.10.2002, <http://www.zorandjindjic.org/en/speeches/europe-soul?format=simple>, (16.04.2018).

<sup>769</sup> "Program", **DS - Dokumenti**, no date, <http://www.ds.org.rs/fajlovi/dokumenta/ds-program.pdf> (16.04.2018).

mission from Đinđić, President Tadić later framed the country's EU membership process as one of the most important national interest, main strategic direction and goal for Serbia's future that is “only in EU.”<sup>770</sup> The Europeanization in the region for the President means purification from the past and building a new future together: “Only a few years ago, the region of Southeast Europe was viewed as an area at the margins of the European and the world's mainstream, ridden with clashes and conflicts, divided into weak countries with feeble or non-existing economic perspectives.”<sup>771</sup>

From this point of view, one may argue that the current government's discourse towards EU membership is merely a continuation of the DS. During their time in power, the DS also politicized EU membership as a beneficial process that would provide new jobs for the citizens and resolve many of the problems that plagued the country.<sup>772</sup> In order to convince Brussels of the enlargement policy, a similar emphasis is placed, yet underlined with the establishment of peace and stability in the region and the continent: “The EU has to understand that leaving the Balkans outside the EU borders has its price... we are creating greater stability in Europe.”<sup>773</sup> In addition to resolving the disputes through peaceful means, it is claimed that Belgrade is also working on the critical domestic issues that is necessary for membership:

*When it comes to cross-border cooperation, one of Serbia's main priorities is the fight against organized crime. In terms of economic and political goals, the priority is an uncompromising and systematic eradication of corruption, which is a prerequisite for the strengthening of the rule of law and encouraging new investments in the coming years.*<sup>774</sup>

Between 2000 – 2008, the political climate in Belgrade was polarized between the modernist/reformist and traditional/conservative as a great value war.<sup>775</sup> This differences subsided when the DS carried the elections in 2008. The DS during and

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<sup>770</sup> “Serbia's Future “only in EU”, Says Tadić”, **B92**, 12.12.2011, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2011&mm=12&dd=12&nav\\_id=77743](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2011&mm=12&dd=12&nav_id=77743), (16.04.2018).

<sup>771</sup> “Tadić: EU Membership is Strategic Goal”, **B92**, 26.10.2010, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2010&mm=10&dd=26&nav\\_id=70509](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2010&mm=10&dd=26&nav_id=70509), (16.04.2018), (EU Strategic Goal).

<sup>772</sup> “Tadić Says There's no Alternative to EU”, **B92**, 13.05.2011, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=13&nav\\_id=74316](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=13&nav_id=74316), (16.04.2018).

<sup>773</sup> B92, Tadić Says There's no Alternative to EU.

<sup>774</sup> B92, EU Strategic Goal.

<sup>775</sup> Dušan Spasojević, “Serbian Political Parties and the Kosovo Question”, **Kosovo and Serbia: Contested Options and Shared Consequences**, (Eds. Leandrit I. Mehmeti and Branislav Radeljić), University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2016, (Kosovo Question), p. 111.

after the election pursued a policy entitled “both the EU and Kosovo” in order to reduce the costs of its pro-European position in domestic politics. To this end, President Tadić often indicated that Serbia wanted both Kosovo and EU,<sup>776</sup> adding that Serbia could only defend Kosovo through European integration.<sup>777</sup> During this period, he argued that European integration would not distance Serbia from Kosovo, as a counter to the oppositions who were in favor of the Kosovo first policy.<sup>778</sup> He repeated that Serbia would not give up Kosovo in exchange for EU membership. “I will not send any open messages to both domestic politics and to Brussels at this point through the expressions of no one in Serbia would accept such trade.”<sup>779</sup> The DS’s way of framing Kosovo on the path towards EU membership is inherited today for Vučić’s government:

*Not all EU member-states support Kosovo independence. Not Cyprus, not Greece, Romania, Spain, and not even Holland, who are exerting pressure on us to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal because of the terrible crimes in Srebrenica that led to the fall of their government, but who would never recognize an independent Kosovo without a UN Security Council decision.*<sup>780</sup>

Neither a change in leadership nor electoral defeats have not altered their position towards the EU membership. Nestled in the center of the party today, the flags of Serbia and the EU fly side by side. According to the DS, Serbia deserves a new system based on EU standards. “Every citizen of Serbia who is devoted to freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law is the best European man.”<sup>781</sup> However, the DS also attaches significant concern to public opinion. “The DS doesn’t want to participate in manipulating European values at a time when the EU has the lowest support of citizens since 2000.”<sup>782</sup> In addition, the EU’s absorption capacity, the Euro-

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<sup>776</sup> “Tadić: Serbia Wants both Kosovo and EU”, **B92**, 10.01.2008, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=10&nav\\_id=46814](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=10&nav_id=46814), (16.04.2018).

<sup>777</sup> “Tadić: EU Integration must Continue”, **B92**, 29.01.2008, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=29&nav\\_id=47301](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=29&nav_id=47301), (16.04.2018).

<sup>778</sup> “Tadić: EU doesn't Want to Steal Kosovo”, **B92**, 25.01.2008, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=25&nav\\_id=47218](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=25&nav_id=47218), (16.04.2018), (Steal Kosovo).

<sup>779</sup> “Tadić Rejects Possibility of “Kosovo for EU” Trade”, **B92**, 18.10.2007, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2007&mm=10&dd=18&nav\\_id=44682](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2007&mm=10&dd=18&nav_id=44682), (16.04.2018).

<sup>780</sup> B92, Steal Kosovo.

<sup>781</sup> “Dragan Šutanovac Vratio Nagradu Najevropljanin“, **DS**, 12.12.2017, <http://www.ds.org.rs/vest/dragan-sutanovac-vratio-nagradu-najevropljanin>, (16.04.2018), (Dragan Šutanovac Turned back the Award ‘European Best Man’).

<sup>782</sup> DS, Dragan Šutanovac Vratio Nagradu Najevropljanin.

crisis, Brexit and negative images of the Balkans are also noted as current challenges that problematize Europeanization in the region.<sup>783</sup>

Referencing both Hungary and Turkey,<sup>784</sup> the DS defines the current government, as an autocratic one-man rule.<sup>785</sup> Recalling the “black” past of the ruling leaders, they argue that the government resembles the authoritarian regime from 1990s: “We have similar situation owing to oppression of independent institutions and media freedom as well as the collapse of the economy. We are moving toward a quasi-institutional system characterized by the fact that one man decides about everything.”<sup>786</sup>

Today, the DS politicizes the Europeanization process in Serbia as a political instrument against the government that it cannot fulfil. Contrary to what is claimed, the current government is criticized because they refuse to break from their old mentality: “This government is a collection of people who have just changed their rhetoric but not substantially and also haven’t changed its policies concerning the EU values and this will be a big challenge for the government and for the country.”<sup>787</sup>

Parallel to the current leadership’s foreign policy orientation, the DS, during its rule, also initiated a new foreign policy based on four pillars - the EU, USA, China, and Russia; hence it was called the “four pillars of foreign policy.” The importance of Russia is expressed, “Russia has been a great friend in its support for Serbia's defense of our country's territorial integrity in Kosovo and Metohija, which, apart from our historic friendship, has led us without a doubt into particularly close ties with Russia.”<sup>788</sup> Similarly, by pointing out the economic relations and energy agenda, President Tadić argued that “Serbia’s join to the EU represents no danger to Russia,

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<sup>783</sup> Prof. Dr. Bojan Pajtić, Previous President of the DSS, **Interview**, April 23, 2018, Novi Sad.

<sup>784</sup> Velibor Pavlović, President of Democratic Youth of DS, Interview, March, 23 2018.

<sup>785</sup> “Democratic Party Takes Aim at Serbia’s ‘Autocracy’”, **Balkan Insight**, 02.06.2016, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/democratic-party-takes-aim-at-serbia-s-autocracy--05-31-2016>, (16.04.2018).

<sup>786</sup> Milos Mitrovic, “IBNA / Interview: DS only True Opposition in Serbia”, **IBNA**, 04.02.2014, <http://www.balkaneu.com/ibna-interview-ds-true-opposition-serbia/>, (16.04.2018).

<sup>787</sup> “Dragan Sutanovac: Serbia Needs Better Government”, **CNN iReport**, 10.08.2014, <http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-1160193>, (16.04.2018).

<sup>788</sup> “Tadić on Serbia's Four Pillars of Diplomacy”, **B92**, 30.08.2009, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2009&mm=08&dd=30&nav\\_id=61454](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2009&mm=08&dd=30&nav_id=61454), (16.04.2018).

adding that such a development can only be positive for Moscow in a way that Serbia will be Russia's best friend in the EU."<sup>789</sup>

Finally, the most audacious statements on NATO are expressed by the DS:

*Serbia will be an island in NATO soon, because all the surrounding countries will be in NATO or have NATO forces on their territory. What kind of relations should we have with traditionally friendly countries like Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain, from whom we are expecting help and which are providing us with strong support? It is unlikely that there would be a debate on this any time soon, but a time would come when this important question would be asked of Serbia. In that moment, we will have to demonstrate a lot of courage to explain the benefits of such security integrations.*<sup>790</sup>

## V. PLAYING THE CARD OF EU NEGOTIATIONS AGAINST THE RULING GOVERNMENT: ENOUGH IS ENOUGH

It is worth noting that this party is the most difficult to understand, even when attempting to explain their orientation towards the EU and EU membership. The membership issue emerges from a more intense domestic policy perspective under the shadow of government versus opposition competition. Although the DJB isn't against EU membership in principle, both the government and Brussels receive a lot of flak from the DJB, which we formulated as a soft-Eurosceptic party. In the Party Program, the DJB creates conditional support, also calling for a referendum on Serbia's EU accession, not as the ultimate aim but as a means, that if Serbians are diligent, the countries of the EU will help Serbia. If not, they will take what is in their interest.<sup>791</sup>

The DJB defines the government as "autocratic," an entity that is destroying Serbia. Radulović complains that the government does not have the capacity or political will to solve the structural problems. He states, "I think that the ruling party has no answers to the challenges that lie ahead of Serbia, especially the economic ones. It is obvious that the preservice of the parasitic system is much more important to

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<sup>789</sup> "Tadić: Serbia in EU Helps Russia", **B92**, 19.10.2009, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2009&mm=10&dd=19&nav\\_id=62448](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2009&mm=10&dd=19&nav_id=62448), (16.04.2018).

<sup>790</sup> "Interview of Minister Sutanovac to Vreme", **Ministry of Defence - Interviews**, 01.10.2009, <http://www.mod.gov.rs/eng/1589/intervju-ministra-odbrane-dragana-sutanovca-nedeljniku-vreme-1589>, (16.04.2018).

<sup>791</sup> "Evropska Unija", **DJB - Program**, 15.01.2016, <http://dostajebilo.rs/blog/2016/01/15/pravi-odnos-prema-evropskoj-uniji/>, (17.04.2018), (European Union).



them than reforms.”<sup>792</sup> The political propaganda of the DJB targeting the black versus white conceptualization politicizes a new Serbia with a wholesale amendment of existing unsustainable political order:

*We are entering (politics) because it is the only way to have things changed. There is no political will in the parties to shake the foundations of this faulty system... We have to fight for the establishment of a new system and we will be open for cooperation with all who accept these principles.*<sup>793</sup>

The following statements detail their projection of a “new” Serbia. When their statements are examined, one can argue that European norms and values are internalized and emerge as policy priorities by the DJB:

*Serbia needs a fair system and rules which are the same for everyone. It needs laws that are respected, independent institutions, and the undoing of ‘partitocracy’, which is the structure we have now – a system in which the government de facto controls all three powers. This system has created its own state within our state. Our mission is to bring it down, and our aim is to build a system in which there are the same rules for everyone.*<sup>794</sup>

The main observations that distinguish the DJB from other opposition parties is that the communication, legitimacy and Serbia’s representative power in the ongoing negotiation processes are on their agenda; however, again, they state their disapprovals against the government. It is alleged that the government is unable to articulate Serbia’s interests in the negotiations. According to Radulović, “Brussels needs negotiators to protect the rights and property of the Serbs and Serbia, and not a disgraced Prime Minister who endangers security of all of us.”<sup>795</sup> A similar pattern of criticism is quoted for the treaty signed with Pristina in 2015, “Prime Minister signed the agreement in Brussels, under which he pledged that Serbia would not interfere with Kosovo's membership international institutions. Did he suffer a sudden amnesia

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<sup>792</sup> Tamara Spaić, “Interview with Mr Saša Radulović, Outgoing Minister of Economy”, **CEAS**, February 2014, [https://www.ceas-serbia.org/images/2015-i-pre/The\\_New\\_Century\\_No\\_06-CEAS-Interview.pdf](https://www.ceas-serbia.org/images/2015-i-pre/The_New_Century_No_06-CEAS-Interview.pdf), (17.04.2018), (Interview).

<sup>793</sup> Tamara Spaić, Interview with Mr Saša Radulović.

<sup>794</sup> Biagio Carrano, “Saša Radulović: My plan is to Become Mayor of Belgrade and Use that Platform to Win Serbia’s Next Parliamentary Election”, **Serbian Monitor**, 13.10.2016, <http://serbianmonitor.com/en/opinions/25877/sasa-radulovic-my-plan-is-to-become-mayor-of-belgrade-and-use-that-platform-to-win-serbias-next-parliamentary-election/>, (17.04.2018), (Next Election).

<sup>795</sup> “Наставак лажи председника Владе о Косову“, **DJB - Косово и Метохија**, 04.02.2017, <http://dostajebilo.rs/blog/2017/02/04/nastavak-lazi-predsednika-vlade-o-kosovu/>, (17.04.2018), (The Prime Minister Continuous to Lie about Kosovo).

attack?”<sup>796</sup> The DJB claims, inclusive of the EU negotiations, that the current government does not protect Serbian national interests in foreign policy at all:

*The West sees Serbia as a wild, immature state, with immature corrupt politicians who are not even able to run their own households, then how do we expect them to make a regulated state. The East sees us as fools. As such, immature, sees us like the instability factor in the region... East uses subventions, mineral and energy resources and wisely does not speak. We cannot deny this either to the West either to the East. It's time for Serbian citizens to understand that in the foreign policy there is no friendship, there are only interests. The interests of foreign powers cannot be we changed, but we can finally start to we work for the benefit of our own and to act like adults.*<sup>797</sup>

Addressing the global community from a critical perspective, Radulović complains that Serbia is a small and weak state, claiming that Kosovo is the output of this reality: “Even Russia, or any other country in the world, cannot do anything about it. Russia is not present in Kosovo. Nor are Brazil, India, Spain or Argentina. Western powers are creating an independent state in Kosovo today. Nobody cares what we think.”<sup>798</sup>

Following the traditional rhetoric about Kosovo, the DJB underlines that “Serbia will never recognize Kosovo independence is a mantra, not a policy. This is running away from responsibility and amounts to procrastination.”<sup>799</sup> They propose essential autonomy as the only solution for Kosovo. Accordingly, Serbia should follow a policy to target the following achievements: “(I) protection of all human rights of Serbs and other non-Albanians in Kosovo, (II) the jurisdiction of Serbia over Serbian cultural monuments in Kosovo, (III) protection of property rights of natural citizens, as well as of all legal persons and of the church, (IV) preserve and strengthen economic and all other ties with Kosovo.”<sup>800</sup> Unlike other parties, it is manifested that not only the West, but also Russia, (as great power) are ultimately responsible for the issues surrounding Kosovo.

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<sup>796</sup> “Saša Radulović o Kosovu: Šta nam je Činiti?”, **Frontal**, 20.12.2015, <http://www.frontal.ba/novost/84085/sasa-radulovic-o-kosovu-sta-nam-je-ciniti>, (17.04.2018), (Sasa Radulovic on Kosovo: What is it for us to do?).

<sup>797</sup> “ДЈБ неће учествовати у фарси о промени Устава”, **DJB - Косово и Метохија**, 08.09.2017, <http://dostajebilo.rs/blog/2017/09/08/djb-nece-ucestvovati-u-farsi-o-promeni-ustava/>, (17.04.2018), (DJB will not Participate in the Farce about the Change of the Constitution).

<sup>798</sup> “Serbia Needs Kosovo Politics that is Based on Interests”, **DJB - Politika**, 05.03.2016, <http://dostajebilo.rs/blog/2016/03/05/serbia-needs-kosovo-politics-that-is-based-on-interests/?lang=lat>, (17.04.2018), (Kosovo Politics).

<sup>799</sup> DJB, Kosovo Politics.

<sup>800</sup> “Kosovo i Metohija”, **DJB - Program**, 17.12.2015, <http://dostajebilo.rs/blog/2015/12/17/srbiji-je-potrebna-politika-na-kosovu-zasnovana-na-interesima/>, (17.04.2018), (Kosovo and Metohija).

*It is also true that in practice, Serbia has no influence in Kosovo, except in the northern part. What history is teaching us, and what is a real problem, is the fact that big powers always make an agreement in the end. The price of that agreement is always paid by small countries. We are a small country.*<sup>801</sup>

The DJB presents a new vision of foreign policy that they believe will make Serbia a regional power in order to protect their own interests. To achieve this, the party leader mainly places emphasis on political economy:

*The basis and prerequisite of any successful politics in the 21st century is economic strength. Only economically powerful countries can have a meaningful foreign policy. For decades, Serbia has had incapable governments that were unable to take care of their own citizens, not to mention anybody else's.*<sup>802</sup>

It is assumed that if Serbia were economically developed, it would become a regional power. EU membership is proposed as the way to achieve this goal, “The strategic path towards the EU and the values that exist in the EU is the best<sup>803</sup>.... We should not break contracts with the EU, we should improve them.”<sup>804</sup> However, this support is neither unconditional nor unquestionable. Because Brussels backs the current government, it is often the target of the DJB’s criticism. “Western institutions have placed their faith in Vučić as their man in Serbia – something which still continues, as evidenced by the many congratulations that came Vučić’s way after the April elections.”<sup>805</sup> The party inter-related this support by a non-national character of the government that does not conduct a real negotiation under the patron-client relationship. “The EU policy towards Serbia is hypocritical. The PM Vučić and his government have the EU’s support only because he does the job for them.”<sup>806</sup> Regarding the accession, the soft-Eurosceptic Radulović blames the EU for supporting “autocrats” in Serbia.<sup>807</sup>

Finally, the DJB argues the negotiation chapters do not solve any existing problems in Serbia as is claimed. “I think that Serbia’s accession to the EU is a failed

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<sup>801</sup> DJB, Kosovo Politics.

<sup>802</sup> DJB, Kosovo Politics.

<sup>803</sup> Tamara Spaić, Interview.

<sup>804</sup> “Presidential Candidate Radulovic: The Main Motivation is to Defeat PM Vucic in the Presidential Race”, **Insajder**, 27.03.2017, <https://insajder.net/en/site/news/3828/Presidential-candidate-Radulovic-The-main-motivation-is-to-defeat-PM-Vucic-in-the-presidential-race.htm>, (17.04.2018), (Defeat PM Vucic).

<sup>805</sup> Biagio Carrano, Next Election.

<sup>806</sup> Insajder, Defeat PM Vucic.

<sup>807</sup> “Radulović: Predsednički Izbori put ka Demontaži Sistema “, **N1 Vesti**, 28.03.2017, <http://rs.n1info.com/a238389/Vesti/Vesti/Sasa-Radulovic-intervju.html>, (17.04.2018), (Radulovic: Presidential Elections way to Destruction of the System).

project. The Chapters are opening and some have even been closed, but nothing has changed in Serbia's system. That shows the hypocrisy of the EU."<sup>808</sup>

## **VI. PORTRAYING THE EU AS ENEMY CAMP: HARD EUROSCEPTICISM BY SERBIAN RADICAL PARTY**

An ultranationalist and Greater Serbia ideologue, Šešelj voluntarily appeared before the ICTY in 2003, after the Tribunal had brought charges against him. He denied all charges including the murder, torture and persecution of Croats, Bosniaks and other non-Serbs during the 1990s. The Tribunal first ruled Šešelj to be released, citing the lack of sufficient evidence to prove that he had committed the alleged crimes.<sup>809</sup> Šešelj was tried without detention due to his health problems and didn't attend the last session. Victoriously, he declared, "I proved that [ICTY] is a fake court, which is just an instrument of NATO that focuses on falsifying the historical record."<sup>810</sup> He pointed out that he would not give up his vision and that he would reveal the "truths,"

*I am going to spite them, to tell them that the Serbian people will never give up the liberation of Serb Dubrovnik, Serb Dalmatia, Serb Lika, Serb Banija, Serb Kordun, Serb Slavonija, Serb Baranja, Serb Bosnia, Serb Hercegovina, Serb Kosovo and Serb Metohija... I preached my nationalist ideology that I am proud of...*<sup>811</sup>

However, in April 2018, the UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals partially overturned Šešelj's acquittal on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity; he was sentenced to 10 years in prison.<sup>812</sup> Back in Belgrade in 2014, Šešelj continued his political life as party leader. His hard-liner friends (Vučić and Nikolić) who had struggled with him for many years has already deserted his party line in 2008. The new party they established had now come to power. According to his

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<sup>808</sup> Insajder, Defeat PM Vucic.

<sup>809</sup> "Trial Judgement Summary for Vojislav Šešelj", **ICTY - Trial Chamber**, 31.03.2016, [http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tjug/en/160331\\_judgement\\_summary.pdf](http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tjug/en/160331_judgement_summary.pdf), (18.04.2018).

<sup>810</sup> "Šešelj: ICTY is Fake anti-Serbian Court", **In Serbia Today**, 28.03.2016, <https://inserbia.info/today/2016/03/seselj-icty-is-fake-anti-serbian-court/>, (18.04.2018).

<sup>811</sup> "Vojislav Seselj in his own Words", **BBC**, 07.11.2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2793899.stm>, (18.04.2018), (Seselj in his own Words).

<sup>812</sup> "The Appeal Chamber Judgement Vojislav Seselj", **UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals**, 11.04.2018, <http://www.unmict.org/sites/default/files/casedocuments/mict-16-99/appeals-chamber-judgements/en/180411-vojislav-seselj-judgement-en.pdf>, (18.04.2018).

world-view based on *us versus them*, Šešelj accuses all internal actors who cooperate with external enemies that fall into “them” category with “treachery.” He considers Nikolić and Vučić to be “traitors.” According to Šešelj, Serbia cannot achieve its goals, he feels that the enemies have conquered the country by purchasing the rulers. He declares, “The problem consists of Western politicians, who have the means to buy or intimidate our current politicians.”<sup>813</sup>

The SRS’ popularity in Serbia was boosted once again, by Šešelj return from The Hague.<sup>814</sup> The Serbian hero Šešelj was depicted in the ICTY as the person who knew the law better than the judges, who acted as the voice of Serbs, and lastly, as someone who did not lose on the table. During his stay in jail, Prof. Šešelj had multiple publications on Serbian history and contemporary politics. The titles of his publications, translated into English, expose his world-view and SRS’ political orientation. *The Roman Catholic Criminal Project of the Artificial Croatian Nation* (2007), *The Ideology of Serbian Nationalism* (2011).

In his book on Serbian Nationalism, Šešelj argues, that despite the fall of communism, Serbia’s enemies have essentially remained the same, only the degree of their cruelty and hate has multiplied under the American world order, Croatian hate and Catholic bestiality.<sup>815</sup> Referring to the Crusades, he compares Pope John Paul to Satan, and Tuđman as a modern Ustaša Fascist, whose ancestors collaborated with Hitler’s Germany in committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. He says that they can tie him down, but they cannot stop him from defying whenever and wherever. Defiance, according to the leader, is what keeps him going, that and an infinite faith in God, the Serbian people and Russia is what gives him strength.<sup>816</sup>

After failing to enter into Parliament in both the 2012 and 2014 elections, the SRS received 8% of the votes in 2016 and is currently represented in the Parliament with 22 deputies. Their return to the Parliament has brought back unpleasant images

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<sup>813</sup> “Hague Tribunal is ‘Fake anti-Serbian Court’ – Radical Party Leader Seselj “, **Russia Today**, 28.03.2016, <https://www.rt.com/news/337387-hague-tribunal-serbs-seselj/>, (18.04.2018), (Fake anti-Serbian Court).

<sup>814</sup> Ivana Sekularac, “Ultra-nationalist Resurgence could Complicate Serbia’s EU path”, **Reuters**, 18.04.2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-election-ultranationalists/ultra-nationalist-resurgence-could-complicate-serbias-eu-path-idUSKCN0XF0LR>, (18.04.2018), (Ultra-nationalist).

<sup>815</sup> Vojislav Šešelj, **The Ideology of Serbian Nationalism**, Serbian Radical Party, Belgrade, 2011, p. 9.

<sup>816</sup> Vojislav Šešelj, **The Roman Catholic Criminal Project of the Artificial Croatian Nation**, Serbian Radical Party, Belgrade, 2011, p. 10.

of the past that Serbia's leaders would soon prefer to forget.<sup>817</sup> In the presidential election, Šešelj asseverated, "Nobody attacks Vučić more strongly than I do, although I have insulted Nikolić more."<sup>818</sup>

Their position towards the West, including the EU, is clearly articulated - *The Enemy Camp*. This position isn't new, but have increased since the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Based on the assumption that history repeats itself, the entire discourse is shaped by this "enemy" image. The SRS proclaims the head of the snake is the USA, "Between Hitler and Clinton, there is no principal difference."<sup>819</sup> They claim the countries that comprise the EU today are no more than bloody enemies, bombing the Serbs. "The EU is made up of NATO countries. They bombed us, they took Kosovo away from us..."<sup>820</sup> Because of being Serbia's enemy, the idea of EU membership is nothing more than a plagiarism and treachery for Serbia.<sup>821</sup> For all of these reasons, Serbia's relations with the EU and the ongoing accession negotiations have not even been put on the agenda in the party program.

Kosovo lies in the center of their opposition; the EU is presented as the enemy. The EU, who has already recognized Kosovo's unilateral independence, is a "union of enemies"<sup>822</sup> to the radicals. Moreover, Šešelj also hasn't abandoned the Croatian case alongside Kosovo. The Serbian media periodically reports flag burning activities as a tradition of their political activism. The most frequently flagged flag after the USA, NATO, Germany, and the UK is the Croatian one, which radicals define as artificial.

The majority of the current dynamics and micro-developments are disguised under this "enemy" discourse as the root cause of all of Serbia's problems. When debates arose about the latest election results, Šešelj accused the Electoral Commission

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<sup>817</sup> Antonela Riha, "Why Serbia's Leaders Fear Vojislav Seselj", **Balkan Insight**, 05.12.2014, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/why-serbia-s-leaders-fear-vojislav-seselj-1>, (18.04.2018).

<sup>818</sup> "Seselj Says he Feels Open Hatred toward Tomislav Nikolic", **B92**, 24.03.2016, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2016&mm=03&dd=24&nav\\_id=97469](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2016&mm=03&dd=24&nav_id=97469), (18.04.2018).

<sup>819</sup> BBC, Seselj in his own Words.

<sup>820</sup> Sekularac, Ultra-nationalist.

<sup>821</sup> "Seselj Hopes EU will End Negotiations over his Behavior", **B92**, 02.04.2015, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2015&mm=04&dd=02&nav\\_id=93683](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2015&mm=04&dd=02&nav_id=93683), (18.04.2018).

<sup>822</sup> "SRS Holds Rally in Belgrade to Celebrate Seselj's Return", **In Serbia Today**, 15.11.2014, <https://inserbia.info/today/2014/11/srs-holds-rally-in-belgrade-to-celebrate-seseljs-return/>, (18.04.2018).

of doing America's bidding.<sup>823</sup> Likewise, the migration crisis is portrayed as a destabilizing policy by the USA. "Commenting on the influx of Iraqi and Afghani refugees going through Serbia, the United States' desire to install Western-style democracy leads to bloodbaths."<sup>824</sup> The government's failed policies are often subject to his criticism due to their pro-Western orientation. "Vučić's difficulties come from his inability to resolve issues in Kosovo because of his pro-EU stance, that the government's pro-western policy had completely failed and that the government had renounced Kosovo."<sup>825</sup>

The SRS believes the future of Serbia lies in Euro-Asia. They call the current foreign policy orientation between East and West as absurd and demand for a replacement by full political, economic and military integration with Russia. "We in the Serbian Radical Party hold clear positions: integration with Russia, military integration with the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization] and other Eurasian integration, including BRICS."<sup>826</sup> Taking from the Belarusian example to frame Serbia's position in international politics, Šešelj proposes, "We would like to rely on Russia, and have a status like Belarus, that is, to be an independent state, firmly tied to Russia politically, economically and militarily."<sup>827</sup>

In order to legitimize this foreign policy priority, a populist course is being pursued, which places emphasis, first and foremost, on public opinion. "For the majority of Serbs, Russian President Vladimir Putin is a popular figure with a high approval rating..."<sup>828</sup> Although the Russian myth seems to be an emotional alternative in Serbia, it is not strong enough to undermine the pragmatic justifications for the

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<sup>823</sup> "Šešelj: Electoral Commission Doing America's Bidding", **B92**, 27.04.2016, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2016&mm=04&dd=27&nav\\_id=97833](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2016&mm=04&dd=27&nav_id=97833), (18.04.2018).

<sup>824</sup> "Godfather of Modern Serbia's Politics, Vojislav Šešelj is Back and with a Vengeance", **NRT24**, No date, <http://nrt24.ru/es/godfather-of-modern-serbia-s-politics-vojislav-seselj-is-back-and-with-a-vengeance>, (18.04.2018).

<sup>825</sup> "SRS Holds Protest against EU Integration", **B92**, 12.10.2011, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2011&mm=10&dd=12&nav\\_id=76818](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2011&mm=10&dd=12&nav_id=76818), (18.04.2018).

<sup>826</sup> "EU Integration 'Destructive' for Serbia - Acquitted Radical Party Leader", **Sputnik International**, 01.04.2016, <https://sputniknews.com/politics/201604011037305313-serbia-eu-integration/>, (18.04.2018).

<sup>827</sup> "'Greater Serbia' Architect Reveals Plans for Country's Future", **Sputnik International**, 25.01.2016, <https://sputniknews.com/europe/201601251033687728-seselj-serbia-political-campaign/>, (18.04.2018).

<sup>828</sup> Russia Today, Fake anti-Serbian Court.

EU.<sup>829</sup> Nevertheless, Šešelj also lists alternative pragmatic reasons for strengthening his argument. Integration with Russia, is politicized as the solution to the current structural problems of the Serbian economy. Moreover, by advancing the argument, Moscow is recommended as the alternative, not only to Belgrade, but also to other Slav-Orthodox nations in the region. While reading the following statement, you are confronted with a Huntingtonian Šešelj: “The economic situation in the country will change only when we give up on the process of EU integration, and, together with Bulgarians, Macedonians, and Greeks, turn to integration with the Russian Federation.”<sup>830</sup>

## VII. KOSOVO FIRST POLICY: HARD-EUROSCEPTIC STANCE BY DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SERBIA

After Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence was recognized by the majority of western states in 2008, the DSS took a hard-Eurosceptic position that prioritized the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia. Their interpretation was that EU integration and the Kosovo negotiations were not separate processes, and that Serbia would eventually be asked by the EU to recognize Kosovo for full EU membership.<sup>831</sup>

*Since 2008 the DSS has positioned itself as a staunch defender of the premise that Kosovo should remain within Serbia (in some shape or form) and that further negotiations must take place to determine a workable political outcome regarding Kosovo and Serbia. Because of this approach, the DSS is against Serbia joining the EU if in return it is bound to acknowledge the legitimacy of the self-proclaimed independent Kosovo. The party left the European People’s Party in February 2012.*<sup>832</sup>

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<sup>829</sup> Dusan Spasojevic, Ph.D., University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Sciences, **Interview**, November 28, 2017.

<sup>830</sup> "Russia's Returning to Balkans, and Nobody can Stop it", **B92**, 14.03.2017, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=03&dd=14&nav\\_id=100765](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=03&dd=14&nav_id=100765), (18.04.2018).

<sup>831</sup> Spasojević, Kosovo Question, p.116.

<sup>832</sup> “Fact about DSS”, **DSS**, 2016, <http://www.dss.rs/fact-about-dss/>, (18.04.2018).



Koštunica defined the pathway to the EU as “fatal” and called for the riddance of this delusion.<sup>833</sup> Further, he claimed that pro-EU ideals were not popular among ordinary Serbs and that those who were pro-Europeans, whom he portrayed as “Euro-fanatics,” their efforts were nothing more than suicidal.<sup>834</sup> Serbia’s membership is the path to “become a colony that wouldn’t have its own national interests and would simply follow orders from Brussels.”<sup>835</sup>

According to the DSS, Kosovo is an indispensable and non-transferable territory for Serbian identity: “Kosovo is not just the matter of wholeness of Serbia and its territorial integrity; it's a very important part of Serbia and it's something that has to do with Serbian identity.” In other words, as long as Serbs exist as a nation, Kosovo will be a part of Serbia forever.<sup>836</sup> Koštunica stated that the DSS would do all it could to make sure that the agreements with Pristina, reached in Brussels remained a dead letter.<sup>837</sup> As the ruling party in Belgrade during the critical years from 2000-2008, the types of policies proposed by the DSS and what they achieved is often a point of discussion. According to Milan Lapčević, an MP of the DSS,

*The mistake and misunderstandings from the early start after coming to power of democratic coalition in 2000. Serbia had to insist to place 1000 soldiers according to Resolution 1244 (UNSC) on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, primarily in the regions where Serbs live, around cultural and historical cities and monuments, churches and monasteries, and on the borders with Albania and Macedonia, together with international forces. Mistake was because it wasn't made as state and national strategy for Kosovo and Metohija which would support all or majority and which would be realized by the Government. Then, there were more manoeuvring space with Western powers to support such idea. As time passed, we were more passive, and Western powers have divided Serbian political space on them who will cooperate with them and forget, and on ones who would do nothing important about strengthening sovereignty in Kosovo and Metohija, and on third group who fought for survival of whole Serbia and reintegration of Kosovo and Metohija. EU and Western powers were in parallel working on undermining State union of Serbia and Montenegro because their strategy was to divide the Balkans on small, subordinate and docile states with they could manipulate easy.*<sup>838</sup>

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<sup>833</sup> “EU is Destroying Serbia – Vojislav Kostunica”, **In Serbia Today**, 07.08.2013, <https://inserbia.info/today/2013/08/eu-is-destroying-serbia-vojislav-kostunica/>, (18.04.2018), (EU is Destroying Serbia).

<sup>834</sup> “Serbian Sanctions against Russia would be Political Suicide”, **Sputnik International**, 17.10.2015, <https://sputniknews.com/politics/201510171028683405-serbia-sanctions-against-russia-suicide/>, (18.04.2018), (Sanctions against Russia).

<sup>835</sup> Sputnik International, Sanctions against Russia.

<sup>836</sup> “Interview with Vojislav Kostunica”, **Russia Today**, 26.02.2008, <https://www.rt.com/politics/interview-with-vojislav-kostunica/>, (18.04.2018).

<sup>837</sup> In Serbia Today, EU is Destroying Serbia.

<sup>838</sup> Milan Lapčević, MP-DSS, **Interview**, May 4, 2018, Belgrade.

The DSS defines itself ideologically as national-conservative and Eurosceptic.<sup>839</sup> MP Milan Pavlevic defined the EU as a bureaucratic and authoritarian creation to undermine national values of small nations and to represent a modern form of colonial slavery; to divide the Balkans into small, subordinate and docile states with they could manipulate easy. Pro-European actors in Serbia are portrayed as irresponsibly obedient to the West, which is harmful to Serbia's interests while Serbia's entry into the EU has very little benefit. EU integration is detrimental in a way that Europe openly says that Serbia must recognize secession of its southern province - the destruction of the sovereignty of Serbia by the EU ultimatum.<sup>840</sup> For all of these reasons, Miloš Jovanović harshly critiques groups in the government. He declares, "It's a shame to mention the shame. I remember how much you hated and slaughtered Aleksandar Vučić and called him a traitor. Explain how he became the father of the Serbian nation from the traitor. Shame on you!"<sup>841</sup>

According to the Party Program, (independent, free and neutral) Serbia, which formulated the politics of neutrality in 2007 under their rule, has never belonged to the West, either militarily or politically in its history. The current pro-European approach endangers its territory, constitutional order, economic development, demography, as well as moral and traditional values. The EU is the main cause of the state, national and economic crises in Serbia.<sup>842</sup> Accordingly, EU membership will not only abolish territorial integrity and the independence of the country, but contrary to what the government claims, also the economy will greatly suffer.

*Since Serbia signed the SAA in 2008, it developed a very poor economic results. Since 2009, Serbia has been in constant economic recession, as well as the Union itself, with a constantly growing public debt, budget deficit and unemployment... It is misleading of the public that Serbia has economic benefits from the SAA, although the facts say that the country is suffering a direct loss of hundreds of millions of euros due to it. It is certain that our state on the European road will have bigger and bigger economic damages, which will also put under a question the survival of the Serbian economy, and at the very end of Serbia itself.*<sup>843</sup>

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<sup>839</sup> DSS, Fact about DSS.

<sup>840</sup> Milan Lapčević, MP-DSS, **Interview**, May 4, 2018.

<sup>841</sup> "ЛИДЕР ДСС ЈОВАНОВИЋ ЖЕСТОКО ПО ФУНКЦИОНЕРУ СНС-а Срам Вас било, издали сте Косово!", **Srbinfo**, 08.11.2017, <https://srbin.info/2017/11/08/lider-dss-jovanovic-zestoko-po-funkcioneru-sns-a-sram-vas-bilo-izdali-ste-kosovo/>, (18.04.2018), (The Leader of DSS Jovanović Attacks SNS 'Functioner': Shame on You, You have Betrayed Kosovo!).

<sup>842</sup> "Program Stranke", **DSS**, 19.01.2014, <http://www.dss.rs/program-stranke/>, (18.04.2018), (Party Program).

<sup>843</sup> DSS, Party Program.

Unlike EU membership for Serbia, which is geographically on the European continent, it is recommended to have a new strategy for European countries via bilateral relations. “The fact that Serbia is a European country sends our country to cooperation with European countries and participation in the work of European organizations (CoE and OSCE) that do not endanger state sovereignty.”<sup>844</sup> When comparing the East and West, Moscow is framed in friendly terms for “Russia never took territories from us, never bombed us. But now we’re trying to please those who did it and continue to humiliate us to this day...”<sup>845</sup> Similar to the other parties, relations with Russia are categorized as strategic. “Serbia benefits both politically [Russia doesn’t recognize Kosovo’s independence] and economically [Moscow and Belgrade signed a free trade agreement] from friendly relations with Moscow.”<sup>846</sup>

That is the main reason why the DSS is opposed to any kind of sanctions against Moscow, which they believe otherwise Serbia has lost its independence and turned into a colony.<sup>847</sup> The party, which defines the relationship with Moscow as extremely important for attracting foreign investments and to increase of Serbian exports, claims that the current negotiations process will also harm Belgrade-Moscow relations in the near future:

*Chapter 30 in the negotiations between Serbia and the EU implies that Serbia provides free circulation of genetically modified products and terminates all free trade agreements with non-EU countries, including the most important free trade agreement with the Russian Federation. These are extremely negative consequences of the European path of Serbia... The agreement has great economic and diplomatic significance, but it will have to be broken if Serbia continues on the European path, and this is clearly provided for in Chapter 30. When the chapter on a common foreign and security policy is opened, Serbia will be obliged to impose sanctions.*<sup>848</sup>

Finally, the DDS counters all associations of any kind with NATO, because the country could not join an alliance whose interests were directly opposed to its

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<sup>844</sup> DSS, Party Program.

<sup>845</sup> Sputnik International, Sanctions against Russia.

<sup>846</sup> Sputnik International, Sanctions against Russia.

<sup>847</sup> Sputnik International, Sanctions against Russia.

<sup>848</sup> “Jovanović: Poglavlje 30. Obavezaće Srbiju da Uvede Sankcije Rusiji”, **Pravda**, 12.12.2017, <http://www.pravda.rs/lat/2017/12/12/jovanovic-poglavlje-30-obavezace-srbiju-da-uvede-sankcije-rusiji-video/>, (18.04.2018), (Jovanović: Chapter 30. It will Oblige Serbia to Impose Sanctions on Russia).

own.<sup>849</sup> In this respect, they adopt the politics of neutrality, taken by the Parliament. "It is high time for Serbia to take the path of political and military neutrality free of fear or complexes because it is the only way in which it can protect the country's interests."<sup>850</sup>

## VIII. A NORMATIVE EUROSCEPTIC CIRCLE: DVERI

Referring to the annexation of Kosovo and the NATO bombing, DVERI claims the main agenda of Serbia's politics is "Occupation or Life." The main slogan of the party is "You have Serbia only - without you there is no SERBIA!" The party defines itself as "DVERI in the domestic and international public became recognizable by family politics - as the first political movement that has put the family at the capital city of the state and society."<sup>851</sup> Portraying the government as "corrupt" and "worn-out," they list their political promises for Serbia respectively: "the family as the nucleus of society, a responsible stewardship-based economy and social patriotism, a sustainable development, the culture of national identity and a strong Serbia."<sup>852</sup>

DVERI's party program lists all possible justifications for their anti-EU stance, including the costs of the accession, normative and identity dimensions in negative terms and relations with Russia, all presented in the following expressions:

*For more than 15 years, we are on a fatal road to reach the EU at our national cost. During this period, we lost over a half million citizens, our production and economy were destroyed, and Serbia became an economic and political colony of those who bombed it in 1999. At this EU stall, we are also required to have legal recognition of Kosovo, import of GMO food, introduce sanctions to Russia and entry into NATO, destruction of family values and transfer of our last natural and economic resources...*<sup>853</sup>

Perceiving Serbia to be a part of Europe and approving the country to develop economic relations with the continent, DVERI opposes EU membership due to its

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<sup>849</sup> "Ruling Coalition is Acting like Opposition", **B92**, 30.04.2012, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2012&mm=04&dd=30&nav\\_id=80027](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2012&mm=04&dd=30&nav_id=80027), (18.04.2018).

<sup>850</sup> "Future PM Criticized for Suggesting he Asked for Approval", **B92**, 13.07.2012, [https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2012&mm=07&dd=13&nav\\_id=81257](https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2012&mm=07&dd=13&nav_id=81257), (19.04.2018).

<sup>851</sup> "About us", **DVERI**, 2017, <https://dveri.rs/index-en>, (20.04.2018).

<sup>852</sup> "New Power of Serbia: DVERI", **ARTerEgo**, March 1999, [http://www.arterego.rs/New\\_Power\\_of\\_Serbia.pdf](http://www.arterego.rs/New_Power_of_Serbia.pdf), (20.04.2018).

<sup>853</sup> "Србија Ван ЕУ и у савез са Русијом", **DVERI - Програм**, 2017, <https://dveri.rs/van-eu-savez-sa-rusijom>, (20.04.2018), (Serbia out of the EU and Allied to Russia).

current ideological and normative orientations. “From our standpoint, Serbia should be a part of European economic integration, but not a part of European political integration as long as liberalism is the dominant ideology.”<sup>854</sup>

DVERI portrays liberal ideology as a global threat, which constitutes political propaganda through the presence of a battle situation on a normative scale with securitizing discourses. The EU-originated liberal ideology is central to their Eurosceptic discourse and politics of multiculturalism, migration policy and LGBT rights are their main targets of criticism. The EU is being criticized for it imposes all these threatening policies on Serbia: “We are witnessing major global geopolitical changes. The liberal side is still very strong, well organized, well-funded, and in control of virtually all governments and mainstream medias in the world.”<sup>855</sup>

The LGBT “threat” is often emphasized in the name of the protection and strengthening of the family institution, as the main agenda of the party, associated with the Christian doctrine. For this purpose, both the government and the EU, with their “ideology of homosexuality,” are criticized as liberal imposition: “The ideology of homosexuality as a totalitarian one against our religious beliefs and traditions: do not force your ideology of homosexuality on us. You have a gay prime minister.”<sup>856</sup>

Taking a Eurosceptic position due to the LGBT issue does not seem to surprise activists in Serbia. The LGBT community in Belgrade, which evaluates the presence of having a LGBT prime minister both positively and negatively, points out that the opposition and anti-EU groups have reduced their concerns of the whole process on LGBT rights.<sup>857</sup> In this regard, DVERI as an opportunist party, plays to the feelings of the larger population, sparking homophobia in Serbia, with aims to establish a new source of political discourse and space for itself.<sup>858</sup>

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<sup>854</sup> “Boško Obradović: Europe Needs a Return to its True Values”, **DVERI - News**, 30.01.2018, <https://dveri.rs/clanci/bosko-obradovic-europe-needs-a-return-to-its-true-values#lat>, (20.04.2018).

<sup>855</sup> “The Serbian Movement Dveri: A Family-Centered Political Organization”, **DVERI - News**, 30.01.2018, <https://dveri.rs/clanci/the-serbian-movement-dveri-a-family-centered-political-organization#lat>, (20.04.2018), (A Family-Centered Political Organization).

<sup>856</sup> “Bosko Obradovic (MP Serbia) on LGBT Rights: Where are the Rights of the Majority in this Country?”, **DVERI - News**, 28.09.2017, <https://dveri.rs/clanci/bosko-obradovic-mp-serbia-on-lgbt-rights-where-are-the-rights-of-the-majority-in-this-country#lat>, (20.04.2018).

<sup>857</sup> Predrag Azdejković, GayEcho, **Interview**, October 11, 2018, Belgrade.

<sup>858</sup> Dragana Todorović, LGBTI ERA, **Interview**, March 13, 2018, Belgrade.

By taking a normative position, the current liberal dominance in the EU project is centered on the debate by the analogy of “Brussels bureaucratic machinery.”<sup>859</sup> The following emphasis is a call by DVERI for structural changes for the current paradigm and political orientation of the EU:

*Liberalism is now paying the price for its extreme positions, for forcing multiculturalism and political correctness around the world. Serbia is a part of the European geopolitical sphere, and we are looking forward to major changes in mainstream politics that the euro-sceptic parties are bringing to the table.*<sup>860</sup>

Despite their position, which is based on threat perceptions and securitization, optimistic discourses for the future also draw attention. In terms of eliminating liberal ideology and the rising and strengthening of other actors with similar positions, have been welcomed as remarkable steps:

*The victory of Donald Trump in the and the first steps of his administration; strong political movements in France, Italy, Austria, and Germany that could reshape the EU; Brexit; the victories of pro-Russian, and more importantly, anti-Brussels-EU and anti-NATO politicians in Moldova and Bulgaria; a pro-family Hungary - these are clear examples giving us all hope in better futures for our families, hope that we could not even imagine possible just a few years ago.*<sup>861</sup>

Similar to other anti-EU parties, DVERI also politicizes the Kosovo agenda. In their Party Declaration for Kosovo, as a historical, state-building, spiritual and cultural headquarters of the Republic of Serbia and its citizens, they define the administration in Pristina as illegal and the region as Serbia’s autonomous province. The Party calls for the government to immediately terminate the dialogue for the normalisation of the relations in the name of EU membership and establish a new strategy under the UN mediation for a final solution, based on UNSC Resolution 1244:

*We believe that no citizen of the Republic of Serbia who is in public office has the right to sign a document that will legally alienate the Kosovo and Metohija as part of the territory of the Republic of Serbia. Any formal recognition of the self-proclaimed state, in the illegal organs in Pristina, would be a permanent loss of the headquarters of Serbian statehood and the cultural and historical identity of the Serbian people. We believe that the Government of the Republic of Serbia should end all forms of communication and negotiations in Brussels with representatives of Pristina's illegal authorities, which are led by the EU. The EU, whose leading states committed aggression against the SRJ, whose armed forces are the backbone of the occupying troops on the territory of the Kosovo and*

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<sup>859</sup> DVERI, A Family-Centered Political Organization.

<sup>860</sup> DVERI, A Family-Centered Political Organization.

<sup>861</sup> DVERI, A Family-Centered Political Organization.

*Metohija, can by no means be an intermediary in the talks on resolving the problem of the Kosovo and Metohija.*<sup>862</sup>

The DVERI frames the current negotiations with the EU as the new political blackmail, ultimatums and pressures from Brussels,<sup>863</sup> repeating that Kosovo's independence is a condition for Serbia's admission to the EU.<sup>864</sup> DVERI clearly targets President Vučić with hard criticism because of his position towards the Kosovo issue. Vučić's (who followed Tadić) tendencies are listed as to recognize an independent Kosovo, and to impose Protestant individualistic ethics - completely foreign to the spirit and tradition of Serbian people.<sup>865</sup> The Party Leader, once again, sat with the media holding a stone he had brought to the Parliament from Kosovo, in order to distinguish their party and himself from other "fake" opposition parties:

*What is the difference between Saša Janković and Vučić when it comes to Serbia's foreign policy? If both Čedomir Jovanović, Nenad Čanak and Dragan Šutanovac and Saša Janković openly agree with Vučić's idea of recognition. So called. Independent Kosovo, then they are not the opposition and would work in power obviously all the same as Vučić. Are they then part of the same Western team to recognize the fake state of Kosovo? To finally understand one thing: If we are going to change Vučić, and we will - then we must change both his policy and the whole system, and not bring new Western officials to power again, the same circle of crime and corruption remains and the same policy towards Kosovo and Metohija.*<sup>866</sup>

Finally, Russia must be Belgrade's foreign policy priority for DVERI. Defining Serbia-Russia relations as "falling in love," signals that the ties between the two are inevitable and that the most important task is to work on expanding this strategic

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<sup>862</sup> "Декларација о одбрани АП Косова и Метохије", **DVERI - Новости**, 02.10.2017, <https://dveri.rs/uploads/pdf/Deklaracija-KiM-Dveri-Otadzina-Stamatovic.pdf>, (20.04.2018), (Declaration on Defence of AP Kosovo and Metohija).

<sup>863</sup> "ДВЕРИ: ТРАЖИМО ХИТНУ СЕДНИЦУ СКУПШТИНЕ ЗБОГ УЦЕНА ЕУ", **DVERI - Новости**, 06.10.2016, <https://dveri.rs/clanci/trazimo-hitnu-sednicu-skupstine-zbog-ucena-eu>, (20.04.2018), (DVERI: We Demand for the Immediate Meeting at the Assembly for the EU Accession).

<sup>864</sup> "СКАНДАЛ: БОШКУ ОБРАДОВИЋУ ЗАБРАЊЕН УЛАЗАК НА КОСОВО И МЕТОХИЈУ", **DVERI - Новости**, 13.04.2016, <https://dveri.rs/clanci/bosku-obradovicu-zabranjen-ulazak-na-kosovo-i-metohiju>, (20.04.2018), (Scandal: Boško Obradović Banned from Entering Kosovo and Metohija).

<sup>865</sup> "ДВЕРИ ПОДРЖАВАЈУ АПЕЛ ЗА ОДБРАНУ КОСОВА И МЕТОХИЈЕ", **DVERI - Новости**, 28.12.2017, <https://dveri.rs/clanci/dveri-podrzavaju-apel-za-odbranu-kosova-i-metohije#cyr>, (20.04.2018), (DVERI Supports Appeal for Defense of Kosovo and Metohija).

<sup>866</sup> "БОШКО ОБРАДОВИЋ: КОСОВСКИ КАМЕН СПОТИЦАЊА УНУТАР ОПОЗИЦИЈЕ", **DVERI - Новости**, 21.11.2017, <https://dveri.rs/clanci/bosko-obradovic-kosovski-kamen-spoticanja-unutar-opozicije>, (20.04.2018), (Boško Obradović: The Kosovo Stone of the Obstacle inside Opposition).

cooperation, whose time is coming: “Time to cooperate with Russia is coming - this is the most important task of future.”<sup>867</sup>

## IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The SNS, SDP, and SPS, as ruling parties in Belgrade, all reduced the ongoing negotiation with the EU into their foreign policy agenda. Thus, in accordance with the logic of consequences they follow a strategy of legitimizing EU membership, through focusing on the gains of membership. Their addresses on past wrongdoings and issues of transitional justice, are motivated to gain international acceptance, legitimacy, and a positive image. However, related statements are also politicized by possible advantages for economic development and becoming a regional power.

The lack of normative dimension within the government’s discourse has created a central space for pro-European opposition parties, the DS and DJB (soft-Eurosceptic), for their anti-government rhetoric. These two parties target the ruling government by claiming that the negotiations have not resolved structural problems, and that the EU also shares responsibility because it backs the current government. Comparing Serbia’s hard Eurosceptic parties, the analysis indicates that DVERI’s opposition is more normative whereas SRS’s relies more on threat perception and identity. For DSS, the third Eurosceptic party, Kosovo is the main focus.

The next chapter will examine data analysis and findings of the expert survey and thematic content analysis with a critical reading.

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<sup>867</sup> “ОБРАДОВИЋ ИЗ МОСКВЕ: ВРЕМЕ САРАДЊЕ СА РУСИЈОМ ТЕК ДОЛАЗИ – ТО ЈЕ НАЈВАЖНИЈИ ЗАДАТАК БУДУЋЕГ СРПСКОГ ПРЕДСЕДНИКА”, **DVERI - Новости**, 15.03.2017, <https://dveri.rs/clanci/obradovic-iz-moskve-vreme-saradnje-sa-rusijom-tek-dolazi>, (20.04.2018), (Obradović in Moscow: Time to Cooperate with Russia is Coming - This is the most Important Task of the Future Serbian President).



**CHAPTER SIX**  
**PARTY ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS THE EU IN SERBIA:**  
**DATA ANALYSIS AND THE FINDINGS**

*No one, who means well to the Serbian people, wants the country to join the EU, because that is where our enemies are...*

Prof. Dr. Vojislav Šešelj, President of the SRS, 2014

The complexities of Europeanization processes and policy implementations are interrelated and largely depend upon the actors' position in where their interests are formulated. In addition, these actors include the national elites because it is them who select, frame and institutionalize the ideas that Europeanization fits with the country's institutions and political culture. Political elites amongst varied domestic actors have substantial influence on defining the perspective (if Europeanization is a leading subject as both meaningful and significant in domestic politics), and the content of the relations involving the operation of the processes (reforms and policy implementations).

The future of the relations between Serbia and the EU are largely dependent on domestic-driven dynamics. In spite of Serbia's EU candidate status in 2012, the relationship between the two has not always been harmonious; in fact, it has been complicated and slow. This is the reason why the direction, scope, and future of the relations will be determined most certainly by Serbia's domestic dynamics rather than the EU conditionality mechanisms.

Political parties represent critical actors in such important processes. They are monitored in order to understand whether they can provide an effective bridge between their country and the EU. Since the concerns and preferences of political parties play a greater role in the changing dynamics of EU politics, it is an important dimension to analyse whether party mechanisms meet EU expectations, whether their discourses contain pro-European themes, and whether their party orientations lie within EU norms and values.

In Serbia's case, characterized by dysfunctional institutions, still formal and certain informal gate keeper national elites continue to dominate the state as a struggle to domain their own interests and status quo via political power. Therefore, it remains unclear whether or not Serbian elites fully support EU integration. Belgrade portrays

a heterogeneous picture within alternative approaches and discourses. As a general observation, Serbian domestic actors have yet to adopt a common position towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization.

In light of these general observations, this dissertation analysed Serbia-EU relations primarily focusing on its political parties and domestic politics and identity dimension within the parameters of Europeanization. Following an examination of party positions concerning the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization; the study attempted to identify the factors most impacted on party positions and the differentiations between the parties comparatively. Taking Europeanization literature into consideration, political parties are categorized into three positional groups: *pro-Europeanism*, *soft* and *hard Euroscepticism*.

The research problematized, not only the factors effecting party positions, but also the strategies they introduce to legitimize their orientations. To identify the causal explanation and factors that lead to the positive and negative approaches among the Serbian political parties, this dissertation introduced a new technique that synthesized data from both the quantitative expert survey and qualitative content analysis during the nine months of field-work in Belgrade.

The expert survey examined causal explanations by drawing on altered comparative hypotheses based on three models of party politics: *ideology*, *political competition*, and *identity politics*. Using purposive sampling, a 7-point Likert scale questionnaire was distributed to twenty-four participants; all of whom are experts and work in Serbia's academia, think tanks, and/or research institutes. All responses were coded, categorized and analysed via the statistical software IBM SPSS. Firstly, Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation analysis was run to measure the strength and direction of associations to determine appropriate questions to recode for the variables. Secondly, using their median values, correlated questions were recoded for comparative tests. Thirdly, a non-parametric 2-Independent Sample Test for two categorical groups and a K-Independent Sample Test for triple categorical groups were run to see if any causal factors accounted for the party positions and inter-party variations. Finally, a correlation analysis associated with all the accepted hypotheses was carried out to determine which hypotheses and model(s) explain party positions and inter-party alterations more effectively.

In order to provide a more detailed analysis of the various factors and rationales by which party positions are based, developed, and thereby legitimized, a thematic content analysis was conducted on party documents relevant to the following eight political parties: SNS, SRS, SPS, DJB, DS, SDP, DVERI, and DSS.

The content analysis consisted of 154 party documents. The documents included party programs, statements, election campaigns, press releases and interviews (74 primary sources and 80 secondary sources); the use of MAXQDA software assisted in the analysis. The analysis examined party strategies legitimizing their orientations via thematic codes modelled by the Europeanization literature (normativity, identity, rationality), and next according to Serbia-specific issues (Kosovo, and the Russian alternative).

The question(s) surrounding EU affairs in Serbia remains prominent in the “state of identity.” Pro-European government, whose main slogan is building a “new” Serbia, legitimizes Serbia’s bid for EU membership on rational grounds via gaining membership to the EU. However, in terms of norms and values, Serbian political parties are far from being an example of socialization and social learning for a better and goal-oriented process. On the contrary, Serbian Euroscepticism resembles the previous regime and its prominent legacies of victimhood and denial syndrome. Exploiting the recent past, the Kosovo problem and the Russian alternative, Euroscepticism still frame the West/EU as Serbians’ “other/enemy.” Remaining in the shadows of its heavy past and dilemmas, the “new” Belgrade and current political conjecture continuously over the altered orientations in-between history/identity and rationality, thus creating rifts in the political arena.

## **I. PARTY POSITIONS**

The analysis first concentrated on party positions and altered causal explanations for inter-party variance via the survey. Non-institutionalization in Serbian party politics is a significant obstacle that hinders political stability and slows down the structural reforms required for EU membership. There is a similar observation regarding the political system, which is constrained between a parliamentary and presidential system. Further threats to the ongoing membership

negotiations are posed by the leader-centred culture in short-lived party politics, otherwise known as “taxi” parties. Furthermore, frequent changes in political actors within a confusing or misguided electoral system make systematic and predictable analyses harder in Serbian politics.

The electoral system and political culture in Serbia have created challenges due to the vast number (29) of diverse parties in the current parliament. Survey questions filled and returned by the participants not only sought out their expertise, but also their patience. Another limitation during the field-work was the language barrier, but thanks to the assistance of advisers, interviewed experts and faculty colleagues, a sufficient number of documents were obtained and some even translated.

Taking the two alternative models (ideology and identity politics) into account, Serbia emerges as a complex case for analysis. Serbian political parties are primarily placed in the centre of the ideological spectrum. Neither right versus left, nor moderate versus extreme segregations are dominant. The exception is the far right, with DVERI, DSS, SPO, SNP, SDA, and SRS (extreme right) and the KP alone on the extreme left. Despite the concentration of political parties in the centre of the ideological spectrum, their identity orientations emerged as the most dispersed and diverse variable, with parties being widely dispersed from strongly supranational inclusive identity orientations to strongly national exclusive.

In contrast to previous studies that have categorized Serbian political parties as binary factions between pro-European versus Eurosceptic, this study reveals that pro-Europeanism in Serbia has strengthened. The survey extrapolates that overall, the political conjuncture in Serbia favours Brussels because anti-EU parties in Serbia are weak, both in terms of numbers and strength in the parliament. Whereas 17 political parties have pro-European positions: SNS, SPS, DJB, DS, SDPS, SDS, LSV, LDP, SVM, SPO, BDZS, SDA, ZZS, NOVA, PDD, and ZES; only four parties are hard-Eurosceptic actors (the SRS, DVERI, DSS, and KP), while eight soft-Eurosceptic parties share a more suspicious position on the EU, EU membership and Europeanization: PUPS, JS, NS, PS, SNP, PSS, NSS, and USS.

The reformist/modernist versus conservative/nationalist debate that emerged following the Bulldozer Revolution (2000) favoured pro-Europeanism in Serbia. The rise of the pro-European coalition in the critical elections of 2008 canalized a fresh

start in ways that Eurosceptic actors lost both popularity and power (see: Chapter Three). The elections also resulted in splitting the radicals within the SRS, when President Vučić decided to break from the past and change their position and discourse in favour of the EU, and EU membership. However, opposition parties SRS and DVERI, along with the DSS, that entered into the parliament again in 2012, now found themselves struggling against the government with their anti-EU rhetoric and alternative foreign policy vision.

## II. THE ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH MODELS

In an attempt to explain why some Serbian parties support EU membership while others do not, three alternative approaches of party politics were implored. The models included are **ideology**, **political competition**, and **identity politics**. The following hypotheses were formulated to exploit causal explanations and inter-party differentiations via a comparative method using the survey:

*H-1: Left and right-wing parties are likely to adopt opposing positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization.*

*H-2: Moderate parties are more likely to be (more) pro-European than extreme parties.*

*H-3: Government and opposition parties are likely adopt opposite positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization.*

*H-4: Political parties are apt to follow their electoral position towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization.*

*H-5: Minority parties are apt to be (more) pro-European than majority parties.*

*H-6: Political parties with more an inclusive supranational identity orientation are apt to be (more) pro-European than those with a national exclusive identity orientation.*

*H-7: Eurosceptic parties are apt to be (more) pro-Russian than pro-European parties.*

*H-8: Eurosceptic parties are apt to be (more) anti-NATO than pro-European parties.*

### A. An Uncoupled Picture: The Ideology Model and Serbian Party Politics

The ideology model interprets party positions and political orientations by the elements of ideology (ies). The normative competition between left versus right and moderate versus extreme is constructed with differing internalized paradigms including altered norms, values and worldviews. The findings of this study indicate

that the ideology model does not effectively explain party positions and inter-party variations in the Serbian case. The left versus right hypothesis was partially accepted (the left parties are more pro-European towards the EU and EU membership). However, this partial acceptance was a direct consequence of the condensation of extreme parties on the far-right.

Contrary to Heywood's framework,<sup>868</sup> Serbia's political parties do not adopt an ideology and ideological preferences for their position towards the EU-related issues. The hypotheses by Keulman and Koóspp,<sup>869</sup> which claim that left versus right division may cause an opposite stance in party politics due to the EU's economy-related conditions, including social dimensions, was not supported in this analysis. The content analysis further revealed that the EU agenda is not discussed in Serbian party politics within a socio-economic framework.

Contrary to the hypotheses of the first model, the findings merely replicated that found in the literature: ideological affiliations do not significantly impact party positions and political orientations in Serbia.<sup>870</sup> Firstly, ideology is not a leading parameter in Serbian party politics due to the fact that the parties are concentrated more in the centre.<sup>871</sup> A large majority of them target the larger electorate in median position out of ideological orientations.<sup>872</sup> Secondly, parties carry out political competition and the processes through leadership. Party politics in Serbia is occupied by a leader-centred political culture.<sup>873</sup> Thirdly, voters view and evaluate political parties more in terms of the party leaders,<sup>874</sup> so that voting behaviour is highly correlated with leadership charisma, regardless of the party programme or ideologies.

Although the right-left distinction was not statistically significant according to party positions, the hypothesis on moderate versus extreme spectrum was accepted. The second comparative test of the model was found to be statistically significant between the moderate (more in favour) and extreme parties (Eurosceptic) towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization. However, the normative and economy-

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<sup>868</sup> Heywood, p. 12.

<sup>869</sup> Keulman and Koóspp, pp. 202-203.

<sup>870</sup> Real-Dato, Lengyel and Göncz, pp. 77-78.

<sup>871</sup> Cohen, p. 226; Cohen and Lampe, p. 270.

<sup>872</sup> Adams, 2001; Adams and Merrill III, pp. 765-791.

<sup>873</sup> Elisabeth, p. 67.

<sup>874</sup> Pavlović, pp. 173-200.

oriented dimensions of the ideology was not the causal dynamics behind this position differentiation, shaped by identity-related causes. In parallel with the modelling by Lipset and Rokkan (Horseshoe Spectrum), the moderate versus extreme categorization originated more on conflict over identity dimension, including state building, religion and sovereignty.<sup>875</sup>

Euroscepticism is widespread among extreme right-wing parties in Serbia.<sup>876</sup> Identity as a continuation of the past still dominates the public sphere with nationalist rhetoric; it emphasizes ethnicity and claims a common descent, history, religion, and territory.<sup>877</sup> It is worth referring to the following observations by Stojic, "The particular nature of European issues, closely related to crucial identity and statehood dilemmas in these post-conflict societies, largely determined party stances on the EU, feeding significant Eurosceptic sentiments."<sup>878</sup>

## **B. The Question of Political Competition in Serbia's Fragmented Party System**

The political competition model is formulated on Downs's assumptions (An Economic Theory of Democracy) towards party politics.<sup>879</sup> According to Downs, politicians are office seekers, motivated merely by the rational benefits of ruling the government. Downs argues that politicians who receive the most votes, establish the government in multi-party systems (through free and fair elections). Consequently, party politics turns into a competition among the political parties, by which the ultimate aim is to gain as many votes as possible. He asserts that political parties converge to the median voters; therefore, party position is framed to purely reflect the redistribution of powers, party pragmatism and political tactics.

In our study, we developed three hypotheses that originated from this model and ran the following comparative analyses: government versus opposition, majority versus minority, and voters versus parties. Only one hypothesis formulated from the

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<sup>875</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, pp. 91-111.

<sup>876</sup> Nezi, Sotiropoulos and Toka, pp. 1003-1020.

<sup>877</sup> Iavor Rangelov, "International Law and Local Ideology in Serbia", *Peace Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2004, pp. 331-337.

<sup>878</sup> Stojic, 2018.

<sup>879</sup> Downs, Political Action in a Democracy, pp. 135-150.

model was supported (voters versus parties). Comparative hypotheses on government versus opposition and minority versus majority were both rejected.

The main characters of party politics and the current parliamentary distribution led to the rejection of the two comparative hypotheses. The electoral system in the country and the pre-election coalition practice resulted in altered positions and heterogeneous equilibrium within the dual categorical party groups. The first hypothesis assumes a principled position and consensus towards EU affairs among the coalition partners.<sup>880</sup> Serbia emerges as a candidate country in which the coalition parties do not have a shared position on the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization. Therefore, fragmentation in the ruling coalition complicates the picture for comparative analysis. Further, Serbian post-conflict and post-communist transitions led to the emergence of a host of new parties, although often short-lived diverse parties (divan or taxi parties).<sup>881</sup> Larger opposition parties vary from far-right/hard-liner anti-EU nationalists to moderate/reformist pro-EU reformists. It is interesting to note, contrary to the literature, minority parties do not share a relatively more favourable position compared to mainstream parties.<sup>882</sup> This result questions the minority rights protection, as one of the political criteria in accession negotiations.

The supported hypothesis of the relevant model is the comparative hypothesis on voters' positions versus party positions. Party positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization are strongly correlated with public opinion in a more bottom-up procedure. Similar to the existing literature, the electoral impact is a strong indicator in Serbia. The masses designate party competition in an uploading procedure in which the EU as a topical issue,<sup>883</sup> drives voting behaviours.<sup>884</sup>

Public attitudes and the ethos of conflict are significant indicators, not only for voting behaviours,<sup>885</sup> but also on EU-related issues. Data indicated that voters were polarized the moderates in favour of EU membership on one hand, while Eurosceptic traditionalists and nationalists focused more on history under the dominance of identity

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<sup>880</sup> Sitter, p. 24.

<sup>881</sup> Bakke, p. 73.

<sup>882</sup> Dechezelles and Perottino, p. 5; Keating and McGarry, p. 4; Keating, pp. 1-22; Elias, p. 2; Hix and Lord, *Political Parties*, p. 27.

<sup>883</sup> Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu, pp. 370–382; Adams and Somer-Topcu, pp. 678-692.

<sup>884</sup> Heath, et al., p. 156; De Vries, et al., pp. 16-28.

<sup>885</sup> Međedović and Petrović, pp. 27-43.



issues, including wars, the ICTY, and Kosovo.<sup>886</sup> This explains why political parties appear to take a more bottom-up approach in deciding their positions. This finding also brings the last model of identity politics into question in a way that the reformist/moderate versus traditional/nationalist polarization among larger mass is shaped more by the sociological dimension on the basis of altered identity orientations in Serbia.

### **C. All Roads Lead to Identity Politics in Serbia**

The debate concerning the EU's agenda in Belgrade continues to focus on the "state of identity." The strongest model that explains the origin of party positions and inter-party factions is identity politics. At this point, national exclusive versus multicultural inclusive identity orientations directly identify the party positions and the differences between the parties. Although non-nationalist parties appear to support EU's agenda, the nationalist actors in Serbia continue to emerge as Eurosceptic actors.

In this respect, the findings revealed similar conclusion with studies that centralize the identity factor in the literature. Similar to Stojić's finding, the analysis uncovered that party stance is largely determined by crucial identity-related issues such as bloody disintegration, sovereignty and statehood.<sup>887</sup> Koljević's generalization that "East meets West" for Serbia is still valid and reasonable as is the competition between pro-European versus pro-Russian.<sup>888</sup>

Peskin asserts that identity politics in Serbia are distinct from the European identity due to the Euro-Asian/Russian alternative,<sup>889</sup> political parties with nationalist sentiment still propose Russia as an alternative power for enhanced cooperation. Our findings also supported this statement. Survey responses indicate that the level of support for the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization and the level of support for deepening relations with Russia are negatively correlated. Similarly, there is a positive relationship between the level of support for the EU and NATO membership. In other words, anti-EU parties in Serbia oppose NATO membership.

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<sup>886</sup> Stojić, p. 237.

<sup>887</sup> Stojić, 2018.

<sup>888</sup> Koljević, pp. 79-91.

<sup>889</sup> Peskin, pp. 263-81; Subotić, pp. 309-330.

## D. Quantitative Findings

The dependent variable, party positions, was tested within two main parameters – its position towards the EU & EU membership; and its position towards Europeanization. Of the five hypotheses tested, controlling for positions towards the EU and EU membership, voting behaviour was the strongest variable in explaining party positions (Table 25). Given the high correlation of 0.866, voters appear to be the most prominent element determining party positions towards the EU and EU membership.

**Table 30:** Correlation Coefficients: Accepted Hypotheses for Party Position towards the EU and EU Membership

| <i>Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation</i>           |                         | Russia as an Alternative | Voters' Position | Identity Orientation | Ideology | NATO Membership |
|--|-------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|----------------------|----------|-----------------|
| <b>Position towards the EU &amp; EU Membership</b> | Correlation Coefficient | -.842**                  | .866**           | -.756**              | -.439    | .877**          |
|  | Sig. (2-tailed)         | ,000                     | ,000             | ,000                 | ,000     | ,000            |
|  | N                       | 29                       | 29               | 29                   | 29       | 29              |

\*\* Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

This was followed by considering Russia as an alternative (-0.842), which anti-EU actors propose instead of EU membership. Identity politics, with a correlation of -0.756, and ideology, with a correlation of -0.439, also effected party positions. The correlation between the support for the EU, EU membership, and the support for NATO membership was positive (0.887).

**Table 31:** Correlation Coefficients: Accepted Hypotheses for Party Position towards Europeanization

| <i>Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation</i> |                         | Russia as an Alternative | Voters' Position | Identity Orientation | Ideology | NATO Membership |
|--|-------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|----------------------|----------|-----------------|
| <b>Position towards EUROPEANIZATION</b>  | Correlation Coefficient | -.885**                  | .910**           | -.738**              | -.313*   | .909**          |
|  | Sig. (2-tailed)         | ,000                     | ,000             | ,000                 | ,000     | ,000            |
|  | N                       | 29                       | 29               | 29                   | 29       | 29              |

\*\* Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* Correlation significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The second dependent variable, position towards Europeanization, which regards the negotiation process and fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria, was supported by five alternative hypotheses. The positions of political parties on Europeanization were explained further by voter behaviour (0.910), Russia as an alternative (-0.885), identity politics (-0.738), and ideology (0.313). Similar to first dependent variable, there was a positive correlation with the level of support for NATO membership (0.909).

Moreover, findings indicated that voters' positions, the idea of deepening relations with Russia as an alternative against EU membership, identity politics, and the ideological schism between moderate versus extreme parties were statistically significant when controlling for party positions. One hypothesis associated with the ideology model, *left versus right*, and two hypotheses associated with the political competition model, *government versus opposition* and *minority versus majority*, were not statistically significant. The correlation with the question of NATO membership supported the findings related to identity and Russian alternative. Overall, the analysis revealed that identity politics was the main parameter that explained party positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization in Serbia.

Since Serbian political parties adopt their positions concerning foreign policy according to the preferences of their voters, identity politics matters. In essence, this behaviour polarizes voters who favour the reformists/moderates of EU membership and the traditionalists/nationalists as Eurosceptic. Furthermore, the categorical division for the accepted hypothesis of moderate versus extreme parties is influenced by identity, including state building, religion and sovereignty in Serbia, and not necessarily linked to their competing interpretations of ideology, including political economy. Serbian nationalists oriented on the extreme right remain legacies; the continuity and reproduction of what were essentially the same institutional and ideological patterns of Milošević.<sup>890</sup> Their identity-originated extreme position(s) exhibit a foreign policy based on history, religion, nationalism and traditional forms of alliances.

The idea of deepening relations with Russia as an alternative to the EU stood out in the analysis. Anti-EU actors can and do offer an alternative alliance with Russia,

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<sup>890</sup> Lazić, Value Orientations, pp. 195-207.

prominently because of Serbia's historical and sociological ties to Moscow. This explains Serbia's foreign policy identity dilemma between the West (EU) and the East (Russia).

This dissertation reinterpreted party orientations in Serbia by synthesizing data extrapolated from a survey and content analysis. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were operationalized and analysed during nine months of fieldwork. The data was carefully scrutinized by repeating the analysis with two alternatives methods. This first strengthened both the validity and reliability of the findings and results. Secondly, the empirical data provided an opportunity to compare two alternative research techniques, which showed that the findings of both techniques supported each other in the Serbian case.

### **III. LEGITIMATION OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS**

The thematic content analysis of party documents paralleled findings with the survey: *state of identity*. While the references of the ruling government for their pro-European positions frame the process as a way of building a "new" Serbia in accordance with the logic of consequences, Eurosceptic parties politicize their positions by making references to recent history, the Kosovo issue and Russian alternative.

The maximum number of references totalling 793 codes were established to benefit (15.1%), Kosovo- (13.7%), followed by normative+ (11.9%) and security+ (9.2%). While the ruling parties focused on benefits of the accession, Eurosceptic parties associated the EU-agenda with the Kosovo issue. The normative+ and security+ related references were then rationalized by pro-European parties and depicted as possible gains. So much so that pro-European actors oriented their positions by combining security+, normative+ dimensions with benefit. On the contrary, Eurosceptic parties correlated their security- references with Kosovo- one.

### **A. Rational Instrumentalization of EU Membership by the Government as the Path for a “New” Serbia**

Serbia’s ruling parties are the SNS, SDP, and SPS. All logically frame their ongoing negotiation processes with the EU in their foreign policy perspective by focusing on the gains and achievements of EU membership. The EU perspective is instrumentalized as the path for economic development and growth; it is the main priority and agenda of the Serbian government. Paszkiewicz’s<sup>891</sup> and Šuvaković’s<sup>892</sup> express that support for EU membership is strong and primarily motivated by money and economic development; this observation remains valid among the ruling parties.

On this point, the government redefines foreign policy priorities and national interests. Their (redefined) economy oriented foreign policy agenda interrelates with the possible gains of EU membership. It is mainly concentrated on direct foreign investments, administrative modernization, sectoral gains, and foreign trade. The SNS attempts to legitimize its pro-European stance with underlying modernization arguments, not in the normative perspective, but in a rationalized logic, closely connected with the construction of a “new” Serbia. However, their “new” Serbia objective(s) and rhetoric do not include political liberalization nor democratization reforms in the domestic setting. They propose a “new” Serbia purely in their foreign policy perspective, with the ultimate aim of becoming a leading regional power by strengthening the economy with the help of the EU.

The discourse, which addresses past wrongdoings and issues of transitional justice by the SDP and SPS as the ruling partners, intends to gain international acceptance, legitimacy and positive image; this would be expected by the Social Learning Model.<sup>893</sup> However, related statements are also politicized by possible economic advantageous for development and becoming a regional power via building peace and stability in the Western Balkans. Parallel to the Social Learning Model, the SDP and the SPS attempt to re-formulate Serbian interests in accordance with Europeanization.<sup>894</sup> It is possible to explain this exceptionalism by executing the

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<sup>891</sup> Paszkiewicz, pp. 149-160.

<sup>892</sup> Šuvaković, pp. 61-79.

<sup>893</sup> Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, pp. 497-498.

<sup>894</sup> Risse, p. 210.

ministry of foreign affairs for the SPS, and Bosniak identity for SDP. Their framework also predicts that better relations with the West in general, and EU membership in specific, would best serve their foreign relations interests and strengthen Serbia's hand over the Kosovo issue.

Their arguments are far from the proposals of socialization and lesson-learning models. The normative dimension occupies a narrow space in their documents. The ruling government refrains from developing rhetoric on political criteria such as the rule of law, corruption, and judiciary. Their discourse still lies outside EU norms and standards, which supports Subotić's arguments.<sup>895</sup> As a result, it is unclear whether Serbia's ruling coalition fully internalize EU integration, given their limited references to the normative dimension of Europeanization. As underlined by Radojević, Serbia does not fully meet European standards due to the lack of consensus among the ruling elites on institutional and political reforms.<sup>896</sup> Further, Lazić concludes that Serbia's political elites have not adopted liberal values as a clearly dominant framework of orientation.<sup>897</sup> Therefore, it is not possible to talk about the Europeanization of parties and the party system in Serbia.<sup>898</sup>

Similarly, it is irrelevant to lean towards the identity dimension among pro-Europeans with the assumption that Serbia was and is part of Europe. The ruling parties reduce identity aspect of Europeanness into two dimensions for legitimization: geography and history. They focus only on the notion of sharing the same continent (geography) and a common history during the Second World War: anti-Nazism and anti-Fascism. However, this formulization and Serbia's "fit" within European identity excludes the normative dimension.

EU membership is rationalized, nationalized and instrumentalized by the pro-European government for the construction of a "new" Serbia. With the rational, interrelated security and normative references, the government's ultimate aims are to construct a new state identity and a new foreign policy orientation. The rhetoric of a "new" Serbia refers not only in their seeking of a new position in world politics, but also for a new state/national identity.

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<sup>895</sup> Subotić, pp. 595-616.

<sup>896</sup> Radojević, pp. 81-101.

<sup>897</sup> Lazić, pp. 67-83.

<sup>898</sup> Orlović, *Europeanisation and Democratisation*, p. 103.

## **B. EU Agenda as a Source of Competition between the Government and Pro-European Opposition**

Findings from the survey has indicated the model of political competition was not significant between the government versus opposition parties in Serbia. This is especially due to the fact that opposition groups are heterogeneous with their skew distribution in the analysis conducted over SPSS. The fragmented Serbian party politics did not reveal a statistically significant difference between government versus opposition parties.

However, the content analysis revealed that the EU's agenda is politicized and instrumentalized for political competition between the government and opposition groups. EU's agenda is a primary topic during elections and political campaigns.<sup>899</sup> Moreover, tension that is created between the government and opposition is shaped by the EU's agenda (mainly the criticisms against the government) and foreign policy orientations in Serbian party politics.

In as much as the normative dimension has yet to be sufficiently addressed by the government, a central space has been created for pro-European opposition parties, the DS and the DJB (soft-Eurosceptic),<sup>900</sup> as a tool of criticism. The ruling government's rationale for legitimizing EU membership via the rational actor model is targeted by these two parties. DS and DJB insist that structural problems have not been resolved under the current negotiations. In addition, the EU shares in that responsibility as well, because of Brussels's backing of the current government.

The Pro-European opposition parties openly state that the current government's negotiations, fail in creating a new Serbia due to the lack of political will to solve internal problems. Similar to the literature, key members argue that the former ruling group(s) maintain their dominant role under the shadow of historical

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<sup>899</sup> Szczerbiak and Taggart, *Theorising Euroscepticism*, p. 19; Sitter, p. 24.

<sup>900</sup> The DJB, as an opposition party, emerges as the most complicated and difficult actor for the analysis, both in terms of its position and the details of their rhetoric. Even though the DJB is not against EU membership in principle, they politicized the negotiating process, and in particular the Kosovo issue, as an instrument of opposition against the government. The party accuses the current government of insincerity and insufficiency in reforms and Serbian interests in the negotiations.

legacies<sup>901</sup> and this is why their stance on EU membership is depicted as the wearing of multiple masks.<sup>902</sup>

The main concern of the pro-European opposition is simple - Europeanization processes did not create enough progress in Serbia. The DS and soft-Eurosceptic DJB claim the current government's policies are not for creating domestic change, but for the continuity of the status-quo with their anti-democratic/illiberal practices. At times, the tone of their criticism increases when they feel as if the government is unable to conduct a real negotiation and cannot sufficiently protect Serbia's national interests. Their criticism is mostly directed at President Vučić's past and his current "one man" rule.

### **C. Euroscepticism in Serbia: It is All about Recent Past and State of Identity**

The three Eurosceptic opposition parties whose political discourse is fuelled by the EU's agenda, present differentiated rhetoric and justification methods. Upon comparing Eurosceptic parties, the data indicates that the opposition is originated more normative for DVERI, and more threat perception and identity for the SRS. Kosovo is the main issue for the third Eurosceptic party, the DSS. The first common theme for these parties is that their type of opposition against the EU, and EU membership is a principled and "national-interest" originated one.<sup>903</sup> They legitimize their objection against the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization as the only way to defend Serbia's national interests. The competition against the pro-European government increases and is more pronounced in alternative discourses developed by hard-Eurosceptic parties.

The government also frames EU affairs in a foreign policy perspective. There is a profound fractionalization between the government and Eurosceptic actors, with regard to national interest and foreign policy priorities. From this point of view, the

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<sup>901</sup> Lazić and Cvejić, pp. 97-112.

<sup>902</sup> Stojic, 2010.

<sup>903</sup> Szczerbiak and Taggart, *Opposing Europe*, p. 6; Taggart and Szczerbiak, *The Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, pp. 7-8.



EU issues emerge as a reflection of a broader structural and century-old controversy in Belgrade - Serbia's place and position in the world and West versus East.

In defining Serbian national interests, Eurosceptic actors have a similar understanding as with the previous regime and focus on the recent past. Although the discourses spouted to justify their positions are distinguished, all parties reference history. Inter-subjective interpretation of the recent past, economic embargoes, transitional justice imposed by the international community, the NATO bombing in 1999, and the recognition of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence despite the UN Resolution, have opened the way for strong and persuasive references for Euroscepticism by the opposition parties.

Legacies of the past and discourses of the Milosevic period continue to appear in Serbian party politics (see Chapter Two). The historical tendencies for victimhood and anti-Western are still very much alive for the hard-Eurosceptic parties in Belgrade. This finding echoes the current literature that links Euroscepticism in Serbia to recent history<sup>904</sup> and legacies of the previous regime.<sup>905</sup>

The political functionalization in foreign policy orientation, Eastern versus Western, is also present in the discussions on interactions with NATO. The direction and dimensions of NATO relations have begun to be discussed through the parameters of this East versus Western oriented foreign policy alternatives including Russia, military neutrality, the 1999 bombardment, and once again, Kosovo.

There is a positive relationship between the level of support for the EU and NATO membership. Today, military neutrality designates both the direction and dimension of the relation and cooperation with NATO. Pro-Europeans portrayed it as a “partner,” (active neutrality) as opposed to an “enemy,” which is the image portrayed by Eurosceptic actors. Serbia’s main political concern, according to the DVERI, is “occupation or life” since the 1999 NATO bombardment. Radical groups, such as the SRS, frequently burn flags and symbols of NATO. In reference to the annexation of Kosovo and the NATO bombing, the DSS repeats that Serbia could not join an alliance (both NATO and the EU) whose interests were directly opposed to its own.

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<sup>904</sup> Gallo, 2000; Stojic, 2010; Fink-Hafner, p. 180.

<sup>905</sup> Massari, p. 267; Lazić, Value Orientations, pp. 195-207; Ramet, The Denial Syndrome, p. 44.

Framing the ongoing negotiation solely as issues of security and existence removes any grey areas from the discussion, providing them with a political discourse over the dualism of national versus treacherous. The SRS, DSS and DVERI, all of which entered into the parliament during the last election, frame the current Serbia-EU relations under the shadow of identity politics by marginalizing the EU. Above all, the EU is Serbia's "other" according to these three parties. This approach of otherness is originated from the "enemy" image among the SRS, the Kosovo issue for the DSS, and norms and values for the DVERI. Serbia's struggle during the disintegration of Yugoslavia against the West/NATO/EU ended badly. In their own words, Serbia's land has decreased every year like Nokia's phone sales.

The Kosovo issue, which previous studies have associated as the main source of Euroscepticism in Belgrade,<sup>906</sup> also maintains a central role in our findings. Since the 1999 bombardment, the actual situation in Kosovo has proceeded against Belgrade in a way that the EU has followed an Albanian-favoured policy. Kosovo is the most delicate issue for the ruling government. The fragility of the political discussion remains strong because it is at the centre of public opinion and the strongest issue of criticism against the government by both pro-European and Eurosceptic oppositions. In addition, it is the only agenda on which EU and Brussels are subject to criticism by the pro-European government.

Today, the Serbian government follows the traditional rhetoric that Kosovo and EU membership negotiations are separate issues. There are segregated statements amongst the ruling parties on Kosovo. By referring to the following parameters, sometimes conflicting/alternative arguments and propositions emerged: (a) a pro-European and optimistic narrative underlying the five EU members who have not recognized Kosovo, (b) the protection of Kosovo Serbs and their rights as main priority, (c) the normalization of relations with Kosovo as a pre-condition for EU membership, and (d) partition of Kosovo as a final solution.

Pro-European opposition parties blame the government for not holding meaningful negotiations with the EU and for not protecting Serbia's national interests sufficiently. Not surprisingly and due to their pro-EU stance, they refrain themselves

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<sup>906</sup> Obradović-Wochnik and Wochnik, pp. 1158-1181; Kostovicova, pp. 67-87; Bandović and Vujačić, pp. 47-68; Antoni, pp. 67-96.

from targeting the EU and Serbia's bid for membership within the Kosovo context. However, neglecting the top-down and asymmetric characteristics of the negotiations, they only target and impose responsibility/guilt on the government.

Contrary to the government's (delinking both issues) and pro-Europeans' (targeting the government) approaches towards the Kosovo issue, Eurosceptic parties attribute the EU membership with Kosovo question and target the EU. According to their discursive framework, the secession of Kosovo is a pre-condition for EU membership to which they oppose as an example of national-interest Euroscepticism. By doing so, they create a Kosovo versus EU membership dilemma and adopt a "Kosovo first" position. At the same time, their main source of criticism against the government, a body that still negotiates with the enemies of Serbia, is Kosovo. For Serbian radicals, the EU/NATO is the enemy camp that bombed Serbia in 1999 and stole Kosovo from their hands. For the DSS, the recognition of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence by the EU members in 2008 is in violation of international law and UN resolutions.

Euroscepticism in Serbia is strongly opposed to the thesis that EU membership and a better relations with the West would strengthen Serbia's hand on Kosovo. Instead of EU membership, they politicize an alternative foreign policy vision with their "Kosovo first" policy. Euro-Asianism advertises that Serbia must deepen its relations with Russia instead of EU membership.<sup>907</sup> In order to legitimize the Russian alternative, there are varied references - normative and identity closeness, trade and investments, and Moscow's support for Serbian theses in the international community.

The pro-European parties, which cannot ignore the widespread public support for Moscow, replicate similar references for a different interpretation. The government does not consider the deepening of the relations with Russia as a dilemma or alternative over the main goal of EU membership. It is alleged that in their multi-faceted foreign policy perspective, membership goal will not harm nor alter their relations with Russia.

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<sup>907</sup> Fink-Hafner, p. 180; Peskin, 2008; Freyburg and Richter, pp. 263-81; Subotić, pp. 309-330; Koljević, pp. 79-91.

#### IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study main impetus sought to inquire about why some Serbian parties support EU membership while others do not. It attempts to answer this question by investigating how Serbian political parties legitimize their positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization. The analysis reveals that party orientations towards the EU as a whole, including their discursive legitimation, camouflage themselves under the shadow of “state of identity” in Serbia. The EU agenda continues to be discussed over alternative foreign policy orientations in Serbia, giving references to East versus West and old versus new.

The government frames EU membership as a foreign policy goal, primarily with rational reasons, including interrelated security and normative references. Their discourses surrounding rational dimension focus on the absolute gains of EU membership and is shaped by their rhetoric and purpose of constructing a “new” Serbia. Their path for a new state and foreign policy identity has been reduced to EU membership by redefining their national interests. In other words, EU membership is nationalized, rationalized and instrumentalized by the ruling government for the construction of a “new” Serbia.

The EU agenda appears as a reflection of government versus opposition competition for pro-European parties in the opposition. The ruling government, as of this study, has not carried out the necessary and adequate reforms. As a result, it has been criticized over normative references by these actors.

Euroscepticism in Serbia is concentrated in historical contexts and identity as an example of national-interest Euroscepticism. Eurosceptic parties continue the traditional discourse(s) of the previous regime by focusing on the recent past and portraying the EU as Serbia’s enemy. However, Eurosceptic parties are small, both in size and numbers; in other words, there is no obstacle in the executive and legislative powers against harmonization packages.

## CONCLUSION

The Balkans is an area of struggle and has been the centre of conflict between Eastern and Western powers for centuries. This competition has not only transcended international relations of the region, but also influenced a wide range of regional dynamics including religion, culture, economy, norms and values. This East versus West dilemma still impacts the political culture that grounds fragmentation and conflict of visions among the domestic elites in the region.

The project of unification of the southern Slavs by the charismatic leadership of Tito was short-lived. His “brotherhood and unity” policy was replaced by nationalism that paved the way for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. During the 1990s, the Balkans became a scene of bloody conflicts and wars that necessitated the international interventions. Contrary to Serbian national expectations, “the unity of the Serbs under one state and one flag,” Milošević and his policy preferences left a heavy legacy in terms of domestic and foreign policy. Serbia has paid a heavy price under the shadow of wars and international sanctions due to his failed and unsuccessful nationalist policies. The new generation exceeded a noteworthy development for a new future with their slogans “He is done!” and “It is time!” in 2000, thus opening up a new phase with the end of his regime. Consequently, Serbia evolved into a new entity following the EU declaration of countries of Western Balkans as potential candidates in 2003.

How successful has the EU been in the ongoing political and economic liberalization processes in the region via its conditionality mechanism? Unlike other enlargement waves over the past 20 years, it is still very far from positive and hopeful outcomes for the Western Balkans. After given the worst test during the 1990s within the CFSP framework in the Balkans, today’s EU is faced with challenges in relation to the enlargement due to its own internal complications. Above all, the EU is a product of enlargement fatigue. Both public opinion polls and the rising anti-EU extremist/populist actors within the member states make the equation more complicated for Brussels. Moreover, the EU, which is portrayed as the most successful example of economic integration in the world, has had to push the enlargement agenda back; first due to the 2008 Euro crisis, and second, due to its fragile relations with

Russia and the aftermath of the refugee crisis. Brexit, whose negotiation process remains ongoing, has made the debate on the future of the EU, more intense. Finally, veto powers of member states Croatia and Greece with their unresolved disputes with the candidate countries cast additional scepticism on the future of the negotiations.

The lack of progress and the impact of reforms on the quality and responsiveness during the accession further necessitates an in-depth analysis of the candidate countries, in our case the internal dynamics of Serbia. The first general observation is that, Serbia appears as a candidate country in which post-conflict transition, that includes an identity crisis as well as post-communist transition, has all occurred in the same time span. The post-conflict transition has led to the formation of a widespread 'victimhood' narrative in Serbian society, due to the unsuccessful nationalist policies followed in the post-Tito context. Serbia has also dealt with the loss of military actions in neighbouring countries, international sanctions, the 1999 NATO bombardment, and the subsequent recognition of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence by the western countries. All of these acts have created an aura of suspicion and mistrust towards the EU.

Within alternative visions and competing discourses, domestic actors in Serbia spent years in deep discussions, polarized by the EU membership agenda and domestic Europeanization. The new Serbian leaders are remnants of Milošević's former regime and the perceptions and approaches of the past have not been fully erased by the Bulldozer Revolution. Historical legacies have also manifested themselves among the "new" political elites who once held power during the Milošević era. The issues of transitional justice and the EU's conditions during the pre-accession years came at high political costs. For instance, pro-European Đinđić paid the price with his life and the DS was defeated in the elections. It took a considerable amount of time for Brussels to convince Belgrade to cooperate with the ICTY and still today, to normalize its relations with Kosovo.

Further, the complexities of the agenda for transitional justice and peace-settlements, the political and economic dimensions of the Copenhagen criteria, and other essential reforms have yet to surface on the main agenda with regard to the relations between Serbia and the EU. This is one of the primary reasons why Serbia remains far from being a consolidated democracy. Eighteen years following the

Bulldozer Revolution, corruption, rule of law, balance of power, media freedom, and informal mechanisms – all still continue to exist as obstacles against democratic consolidation. In other words, Serbia is still a disappointing and complicated Europeanization case for Brussels.

Nevertheless, the EU cannot abandon Serbia within its enlargement strategy for the Western Balkans. Belgrade is of critical importance for the stability and the future of the Balkans, particularly in BiH and Kosovo. After peace agreements and certain progresses on transitional justice were taken, which ensured the absence of violence (negative peace) in the region, Belgrade played an irrefutable role (and responsibility) from multiple sides that ensured the peaceful re-settlement of many disputes and worked towards a constructive and collaborative future (positive peace).

This dissertation examined Serbia's relations with the EU with regard to political parties that act as the gate-keepers of both national and international relations. By combining the fields of international relations and political science, Serbian political parties were examined by their positions towards the EU, EU membership, and Europeanization. Further, they were assessed by the arguments they have developed to legitimize their responses. As detailed in Chapter Four and Five, both qualitative and quantitative research methods were employed to collect data. Survey data was analysed to determine party positions and inter-party comparisons, as well as a thematic content analysis of party documents to explore any underlying causes.

The fieldwork took place in Belgrade over a 9-month period. The research design was able to operationalize these methods because of the exploratory nature of the study and access to primary sources. First, a survey, using a 7-point Likert scale, was administered to 24 participants specialized in Serbia-EU relations and/or party politics using IBM SPSS statistical software. Based on three alternative models - ideology, political competition, and identity politics - the study tested the following eight comparative hypotheses for party positions and inter-party differentiations: left versus right, moderate versus extreme, government versus opposition, voters versus parties, minority versus majority, national exclusive versus supranational inclusive identity orientations, Russia as an alternative, and the question of NATO membership.

In order to analyse the various factors and rationales on which party positions are based, developed, and thereby legitimized, a thematic content analysis was

conducted using MAXQDA software on documents relevant to the following eight political parties: Serbian Progressive Party (*Srpska napredna stranka* - SNS), Serbian Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka* - SRS), Socialist Party of Serbia (*Socijalistička partija Srbije* - SPS), Enough is Enough (*Dosta je bilo* - DJB), Democratic Party (*Demokratska stranka* - DS), Social Democratic Party of Serbia (*Socijaldemokratska partija Srbije* - SDP), DVERI (*Doors* – Dveri), and Democratic Party of Serbia (*Demokratska stranka Srbije* - DSS).

The literature pertaining to the research topic is broad; therefore, additional hypotheses with altered models on party positions and political orientations towards the EU vary. Due to time limitation, scope of the study and the applicability of the expert survey, the analysis is limited to eight hypotheses. Taking their role and influence in Serbian politics, and the current size of the parliament into account, the content analysis was also limited to eight political parties.

Considering the current distribution of political parties and the numbers of chairs in the parliament, it turns out that the positions of political parties towards the EU, EU membership and Europeanization are in favour of Brussels. Eurosceptic parties are small both in size and numbers; in other words, there is no obstacle in the executive and legislative powers against harmonization packages.

The findings of the survey are in accord with the existing literature. First, it is difficult to interpret party positions and political orientations in Serbia from the perspective of ideology model. Serbia emerges as a case in which ideology and its instruments are not the main determinant in party politics. In other words, ideology as a whole, does not shape party politics and political orientations. Second, the main pillars of party politics in Belgrade and its legislative and institutional structures invalidate the hypotheses with regard to the political competition model. Third, the findings of the survey reveal that “state of identity” is the strongest model in understanding and explaining party positions and inter-party fractionalization.

The data indicates that the party orientations in Serbia remain under the “state of identity.” It appears that the difference between parties with an inclusive supranational identity orientation and parties with a national exclusive identity orientation is statistically different. Nationalist parties emerged as hard-Eurosceptic actors with their references to recent history, identity questions and their steadfast



vitality due to the unsolved Kosovo issue. In addition, party positions towards Russia as an alternative against the EU membership directly shaped party positions and inter-party differentiations. Next, the analysis concluded that party positions in Serbia are maintained parallel with voters' orientations. In this respect, political parties appear to have a more bottom-up approach to determine their positions. Due to the voter polarization in-between the reformist/moderates and traditional/nationalists, it is conceivable to argue that this bottom-up position-formation is directly linked to sociological outlook of contending identity orientations.

This dissertation reinterpreted party orientations in Serbia by synthesizing data extrapolated from a survey and content analysis. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were operationalized and analysed during nine months of fieldwork which enables the data to explain and evaluate party responses to the EU in Serbian case: *state of identity*.

The government adopts the strategy of rationalization for the EU membership over the possible gains. The process is assessed purely on the foreign policy agenda and Europeanization is illustrated for the construction of a "new" Serbia. The External Incentives Model appears to dominate the government's discourse, acting according to the logic of consequences. Social learning and the socialization mechanisms do not appear in their discourses. In other words, they do not seem to internalize EU norms and values.

The political motivation in Serbia is external and rational-driven; the government attempts to avoid adopting EU rules as a way of responding to domestic needs and overcoming political challenges. For that reason, structural obstacles to democratization, such as rule of law, corruption, media freedom and judiciary independence, have hardly ever come to light. Essentially, no discourse has been developed with regard to the political and economic dimensions of the Copenhagen criteria. Limited references to normative dimension of the negotiations has the motivation to gain international acceptance, legitimacy and a positive image. However, they are also correlated with the positive outcomes in a rational way. Their rhetoric towards the transitional justice and peace, for instance, are oriented more by the likely benefits of positive image and regional stability for economic growth and investments.

It is not easy to anticipate whether the government's rational expectations will be met during and after the negotiations. As the pro-European opposition approach by suspicion, will the Europeanization process create a "new" Serbia and what will this new Serbia promise to its citizens? The answers to these questions are directly related to Brussels. Firstly, the varied EU crises and intra-EU dynamics complicate the enlargement wave. Secondly, despite the fact that the progress is not sufficient, especially in the fields of political liberalization, one may suspect whether we face a new "strategic" enlargement or not. It is an issue of concern that the EU perspective should be re-formulated, which must prioritize, not only the establishment of peace and stability in the region, but also the political and economic liberalization.

The EU has also taken a relatively soft position towards domestic obstacles in spite of its slogan "Fundamentals First." Brussels, which has given priority to the post-conflict transition in the region, still cannot apply pressure for the post-communist transition. It seems that the government(s), which cooperates with the EU for the post-conflict transition, are still attractive for Brussels no matter whether they have enough and necessary political will to conscientiously transform the political and economic systems.

Furthermore, although the pro-European opposition criticisms against the government are centred on normative dimensions, that is political reforms and democratization, it is not clear whether this position is purely motivated by a Europeanized and internalized position. It may very well be the case that these parties also instrumentalize their existing discourse with purely domestic driven motivations as the reflection of being in the opposition, and for their political competition against the government.

The discourse(s) of the previous regime continue to appear in Serbian party politics as the historical legacies. The historical tendencies for victimhood and anti-Westernism are still alive for the hard-Eurosceptic parties in Belgrade. Although the discourses spouted to justify their positions are distinguished, in reality, Euroscepticism in Serbia is about recent past and state of identity. References to wars and conflicts, economic embargoes, transitional justice, the NATO bombing in 1999, and the recognition of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, opened the door for persuasive Eurosceptic references by the opposition.

Serbian Euroscepticism develops a discourse over the dualism of national versus betrayal. Framing the ongoing negotiation solely as issues of security and existence removes any grey areas from the discussion, providing them with a political discourse over the dualism of national versus treacherous. The SRS, DSS and DVERI, all of which entered into the parliament during the last election, frame the current Serbia-EU relations under the shadow of identity politics by marginalizing the EU. Above all, the EU is Serbia's "other" according to these three parties. This approach of otherness is originated from the "enemy" image among the SRS, the Kosovo issue for the DSS, and norms and values for the DVERI.

The Kosovo issue, which previous studies identify as the main source of Euroscepticism in Belgrade, still maintains a central role as the problem maker in our findings. The crises that may arise in Serbia-EU relations could still turn this scenario in favour of the opposing groups. It is necessary to recapitulate that the most fragile issue in the ongoing negotiations is Kosovo. Serbia's EU path has yet to be resolved. Does Serbia have a Kosovo policy? Does Belgrade have the capacity, capability and instruments to pass this policy to life? It is neither possible to answer Kosovo-related questions at this time, nor to foresee what will happen in ongoing negotiations with the EU in relations with the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.

The debate will continue in the coming years over what is meant by the normalization of relations with Kosovo, the power and influence of five-member states that do not recognize Kosovo, Belgrade's red line and the priorities in the negotiations and ultimately, the content of the final agreement to be signed as well as its political costs and reactions from the citizenry. All these questions create a confrontation with a climate where the existing pro-European conjuncture is risk to interruption. It is important to note that the methods of "persuasion" and the discourses to be developed in this regard are important to analyse in depth to fill the gap in the literature.

The co-existence and transitivity of Serbia between the East and the West continues in the discourse of political parties over the debate on foreign policy orientation and national priorities. While EU membership symbolizes Serbia's Western path and face, Euro-Asianism, voiced by the Eurosceptics refers to the Eastern outlook. This Euro-Asian foreign policy proposal by anti-Western actors, calling for the deepening cooperation with Russia as an alternative against EU membership, is

considered worthwhile by both the political elites and the public. Almost all parties share the idea of enhancing the cooperation and bilateral relations with Russia for varied justifications, such as Moscow's support for the Kosovo policy, economic ties, identity and brotherhood. Variation between the parties is present in the context of EU versus Russia.

The EU supporters, who do not consider Russia as an alternative, attempt to follow the foreign policy of "Serbia in two chairs:" while negotiating with the EU, they continue deepening the relations with Russia. However, the increasing tension in the relations between Russia and the West, specifically Russia and the EU in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, has created a complex situation for Belgrade. It looks as Yugoslavia's traditional foreign policy, based on developing good relations with both East and the West, is a kind of heritage for Serbia today. The EU-Russia dilemma, or "balance" from a Serbian perspective, is likely to continue to occupy the country's foreign policy agenda in the coming years.

Taking Serbia-Russia relations into account, it can be argued that a pro-Russian EU member is on its way to Brussels. Serbia, which did not follow the decision of applying an embargo on Russia following the Ukrainian crisis, appears to be in line with Moscow's interests and anticipations in the region. Is this a threat or crisis in the medium and long term? Remembering Bulgaria, Greece and Cyprus, as members of the Euro-Atlantic coalition, it is possible to anticipate that Serbia will join their pro-Russian coalition in the West in case of full membership.

There is need for a comparative analysis over Belgrade's Russia admiration and Moscow's approach to Serbia. It is difficult to answer the question whether Russia as an alternative, proposed by the opposition groups is a myth or a reality for the resolution of country's structural problems. The political parties that offer Russia as an alternative do not seem to debate Moscow's capacity and capability. The proposed Belarusian, exemplified by Šešelj, does not look like a convincing and realistic proposal. At this point, Moscow's vision and foreign policy instruments in the region are open to debate for more analyses in the literature.

Political factionalism concerning EU membership in Serbia has recently led to a new division and an issue of conflict in Belgrade over relations with NATO. NATO's Western Balkan enlargement, the 1999 bombardment, and the Kosovo issue are open

to debate over the direction, dimension and the depth of the (future) relations. Arguments over military modernization, Serbia's neutrality and relations with Russia have already complicated the picture that was already complex. It is in fact difficult to predict the level of relations and these relations need to be analysed in detail in the literature. It appears that moderate actors, including the government, along with the opposing groups, do not seem to oppose a closer cooperation and partnership with NATO, but currently excludes the membership option.

It is quite possible that China will have more space and impact on Serbian multi-faceted foreign policy in the near future. The relationship with China and the new dynamics and consequences will complicate the foreign policy equation in the Balkans. The region is critical for Beijing's "One Belt One Road Initiative" because of its geographical position. However, there is a need for further research and analysis in the literature on "China in the Balkans."

In Belgrade, the rivers flow towards Brussels, but it seems to be a long and thin stream. Both the historical context and the complex equation of the region as well as the crises and debates, both within Brussels and Belgrade, do not produce a very hopeful picture for this new enlargement. The process does not only depend on the position of the political elites, but also on their political will and socialization which Europeanization can function in post-communist and post-conflict transitions.

It is important, but not enough, for the current political elites to have a favourable position and a vision of harmonious discourse towards the EU and EU membership. It is necessary to ensure that this vision and discourse are channelled into the political and economic transition in Serbia. Otherwise, a system that has not been sufficiently Europeanized, puts the risk of peace and stability as the main goal, because the current peace in the Balkans is still troublesome and it has the potential to reverse under an un-democratized and un-institutionalized political conjuncture.

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## INTERVIEWS

Dr. Dusan Spasojevic, **Interview**, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Sciences, November 28, 2017.

Dr. Goran Nikolas, **Interview**, Belgrade, October 29, 2017.

Dr. Marko Milankovic, **Interview**, Belgrade, December 18, 2017.

Dr. Marko Savkovic, **Interview**, Belgrade, December 12, 2017.

Dragana Todorović, **Interview**, LGBTI ERA, March 13, 2018, Belgrade.

Milan Lapčević, MP-DSS, **Interview**, May 4, 2018, Belgrade.

Peter Matić, **Interview**, Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade, 25.01.2017, Belgrade.

Predrag Azdejković, **Interview**, GayEcho, October 11, 2018, Belgrade.

Prof. Dr. Bojan Pajtić, Previous President of the DSS, **Interview**, April 23, 2018, Novi Sad.

Prof. Dr. Nebojsa Vladislavljjevic, **Interview**, December 20, 2017, Belgrade.

Prof. Dr. Zoran Ćirjaković, **Interview**, Singidunum University, Belgrade, 2017.

Velibor Pavlović, President of the Democratic Youth of Serbia, **Interview**, March 23, 2018, Belgrade.






# **APPENDICES**


## APPENDIX 1: Permission for the Use of Export Survey

Prof. Dr. Liesbet Hooghe (University Of North Carolina - Chapel Hill & Freie Universität Berlin)



## APPENDIX 2: Report by Ethic Committee

(Dokuz Eylul University)

|  |   |                       |
|--|---|-----------------------|
|   | <p>T.C.<br/>DOKUZ EYLÜL ÜNİVERSİTESİ REKTÖRLÜĞÜ<br/>HUKUK MÜŞAVİRLİĞİ</p> | <p>10 Temmuz 2018</p> |
| <p>Sayı : 87347630/640 - 3208<br/>Konu : Tez Çalışması hk.</p>   |   |                       |
| <p>SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE</p>   |   |                       |
| <p>İlgi : 13.06.2017 tarih 57485104-302.01.09/4437 sayılı yazısı.</p>  |   |                       |
| <p>İlgide kayıtlı yazınız ile Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Araştırma ve Yayın Etik Kurulunca değerlendirilmek üzere dosyası gönderilen doktora öğrencisi Önder CANVEREN'in çalışması etik ilkelere uygun olduğu anlaşılmış olup;<br/>Bilgilerinizi ve gereğini rica ederim.</p> |   |                       |
| <p>Prof. Dr. Erdal ÇELİK<br/>Rektör V.</p>   |   |                       |
| <p>ASLI GİBİDİR<br/>BÜYÜK MÜHÜR<br/>Enstitü Müdürü</p>   |   |                       |
| <p>Cumhuriyet Bulvarı No:144 Alsancak/İZMİR/TÜRKİYE<br/>Telefon:+90(232) 464 80 26 Fax:+90(232) 464 81 35<br/>e-posta:hukuk@deu.edu.tr Elektronik ağı:www.deu.edu.tr</p>   |   |                       |

### APPENDIX 3: Expert Survey Participation List

|    | NAME                       | INSTITUTION   |
|----|----------------------------|---|
| 1  | Dr. Janko Mededović        | Institute of Criminological and Sociological Research |
| 2  | Dr. Boban Petrović         | Institute of Criminological and Sociological Research |
| 3  | Dr. Vladimir Medjak        | European Movement Serbia                              |
| 4  | Dr. Goran Nikolić          | Institute of European Studies                         |
| 5  | Dr. Irena Ristić           | Institute of Social Sciences                          |
| 6  | Dr. Nemanja Kostic         | University of Belgrade - Sociology                    |
| 7  | Slobodan AntoniĆ           | University of Belgrade - Sociology                    |
| 8  | Dr. Jovo Bakić             | University of Belgrade - Sociology                    |
| 9  | Dr. Dragan Đukanović       | University of Belgrade – Political Sciences           |
| 10 | Dr. Vladimir Pavićević     | University of Belgrade – Political Sciences           |
| 11 | Dejan Bursac (MA)          | University of Belgrade – Political Sciences           |
| 12 | Dr. Jovan Teokarević       | University of Belgrade – Political Sciences           |
| 13 | Dr. Veran Stančetić        | University of Belgrade – Political Sciences           |
| 14 | Dr. Dragan Trailović       | Institute for Political Studies                       |
| 15 | Bojan Klačar               | Center for Free Elections and Democracy               |
| 16 | Dr. Zoran Ćirjaković       | Singidunum University – Media and Communication       |
| 17 | Dr. Radivoje Jovović -     | Faculty of Legal and Business Studies, Novi Sad       |
| 18 | Dr. Marko Savković         | Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence                |
| 19 | Dr. Branislav Stevanović   | University of Niš - Sociology                         |
| 20 | Ana Stojiljkovic (MA)      | University of Leeds – Media and Communication         |
| 21 | Dr. Petar Matić            | Institute for Political Studies                       |
| 22 | Dr. Jelena Todorović Lazić | Institute for Political Studies                       |
| 23 | Dr. Dragan Trailović       | Institute for Political Studies                       |
| 24 | Dr. Marko Pejšković        | Institute for Political Studies                       |

## APPENDIX 4: Expert Survey

### EXPERT SURVEY

#### AN ANALYSIS OF PARTY ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNION IN SERBIA: POLITICAL COMPETITION, IDEOLOGY AND IDENTITY POLITICS

**Dear Participant,**

As a researcher at University of Belgrade Faculty of Political Sciences under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Slobodan Samardžić ( [slobodan.samardzic@fpn.bg.ac.rs](mailto:slobodan.samardzic@fpn.bg.ac.rs) ), I am grateful for your participation in our survey, covering the position and political orientation of the political parties in Serbia towards the European Union and Europeanization.

Please be informed that this expert survey is collected for my Ph.D. dissertation, entitled **“An Analysis of Party Orientations towards European Union in Serbia: Political Competition, Ideology and Identity Politics”** at Department of European Union, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Dokuz Eylul University, Izmir/Turkey under the supervision of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Müge AKNUR ( [muge.aknur@deu.edu.tr](mailto:muge.aknur@deu.edu.tr) ).

The following **24 questions** will require approximately 30 minutes completing. There is no compensation for responding nor is there any known risk. In order to ensure that all information will remain confidential, please do not include your name. If you require additional information or have questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

**Thank you in advance for sharing your expertise with us!**

Sincerely,

**Önder CANVEREN**

Research Assistant,

Department of European Union

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Dokuz Eylul University

[onder.canveren@deu.edu.tr](mailto:onder.canveren@deu.edu.tr)

<http://debis.deu.edu.tr/akademiktr/index.php?cat=3&akod=20130053>

| Abbreviation | FULL NAME   |
|--------------|---|
| <b>SNS</b>   | Serbian Progressive Party - <i>Srpska napredna stranka</i>                            |
| <b>SRS</b>   | Serbian Radical Party - <i>Srpska radikalna stranka</i>                               |
| <b>SPS</b>   | Socialist Party of Serbia - <i>Socijalistička partija Srbije</i>                      |
| <b>DJB</b>   | It's enough – Restart - <i>Dosta je bilo – Restart</i>                                |
| <b>DS</b>    | Democratic Party - <i>Demokratska stranka</i>   |
| <b>SDPS</b>  | Social Democratic Party of Serbia- <i>Socijaldemokratska partija Srbije</i>           |
| <b>PUPS</b>  | Party of United Pensioners of Serbia - <i>Partija ujedinjenih penzionera Srbije</i>   |
| <b>SPD</b>   | Dveri - <i>Srpski Pokret Dveri</i>  |
| <b>DSS</b>   | Democratic Party of Serbia - <i>Demokratska stranka Srbije</i>                        |
| <b>JS</b>    | United Serbia - <i>Jedinstvena Srbija</i>   |
| <b>NS</b>    | New Serbia - <i>Nova Srbija</i>   |
| <b>SDS</b>   | Social Democratic Party - <i>Socijaldemokratska stranka</i>                           |
| <b>LSV</b>   | League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina - <i>Liga socijaldemokrata Vojvodine</i>      |
| <b>LDP</b>   | Liberal Democratic Party - <i>Liberalno-demokratska partija</i>                       |
| <b>SVM</b>   | Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians - <i>Savez vojevodačkih Mađara</i>                   |
| <b>SPO</b>   | Serbian Renewal Movement - <i>Srpski pokret obnove</i>                                |
| <b>PS</b>    | Movement of Socialists - <i>Pokret socijalista</i>                                    |
| <b>SNP</b>   | Serbian People's Party - <i>Srpska narodna partija</i>                                |
| <b>ZS</b>    | Greens of Serbia - <i>Zeleni Srbije</i>   |
| <b>PSS</b>   | Strength of Serbia Movement - <i>Pokret snaga Srbije</i>                              |
| <b>BDZS</b>  | Bosniak Democratic Union of Sandžak - <i>Bošnjačka demokratska zajednica Sandžaka</i> |
| <b>SDA</b>   | Party of Democratic Action of Sandžak - <i>Stranka demokratske akcije Sandžaka</i>    |
| <b>KP</b>    | Communist Party - <i>Komunistička partija</i>   |
| <b>ZZS</b>   | Together for Serbia - <i>Zajedno za Srbiju</i>  |
| <b>NOVA</b>  | New Party - <i>Nova stranka</i>   |
| <b>PDD</b>   | Party for Democratic Action - <i>Partija za demokratsko delovanje</i>                 |
| <b>ZES</b>   | Green Party - <i>Zelena Stranka</i>   |
| <b>NSS</b>   | People's Peasant Party - <i>Narodna Seljačka Stranka</i>                              |
| <b>USS</b>   | United Peasant Party - <i>Ujedinjena Seljačka Stranka</i>                             |



## PARTY POSITION

### 1. How would you describe the general party position on the EU?

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Sceptical             | Neutral               | Somewhat Sceptical    | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

## 2. Considering EU membership for Serbia, where does the party stand on?

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Sceptical             | Neutral               | Somewhat Sceptical    | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
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| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
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| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
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| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
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| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

**3. How would you describe the party position on the possibility of Serbia's EU membership in the near future?**

|      | Strongly pessimist    | Pessimist             | Sceptical             | Neutral               | Somewhat Sceptical    | Optimist              | Strongly optimist     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
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| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
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| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

**4. We would like you to think about the significance and agenda of Europeanization for a party. How important is the Europeanization to the parties in their public stance?**

|      | Strongly unimportant  | Unimportant           | Somewhat unimportant  | Neutral               | Somewhat important    | Important             | Strongly important    | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
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| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
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| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
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| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
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| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
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| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

**5. What about conflict or dissent within parties over the Europeanization as a process and the membership?**

|      | Strongly divided      | Divided               | Somewhat divided      | Neutral               | Somewhat united       | United                | Strongly united       | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
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| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
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| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

6. We would like you to evaluate the parties on whether they consider EU membership beneficial. Taking everything in consideration, does the party think that Serbia will gain advantage or disadvantage from being a member of the EU?

|      | Strongly disadvantage | Disadvantage          | Somewhat disadvantage | Neutral               | Somewhat advantage    | Advantage             | Strongly advantage    | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

## EUROPEANIZATION AND THE EU CONDITIONALITY (COPENHAGEN CRITERIA)

7. We now turn to the economic requirements of EU membership (including deregulation, privatization, and restructuring the state's involvement in the economy). Where does the party stand on?

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Sceptical             | Neutral               | Somewhat Sceptical    | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

8. If we turn to the political requirements of EU membership (such as fight against corruption, rule of law, human rights & democratic consolidation), where does the party stand on?

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Sceptical             | Neutral               | Somewhat Sceptical    | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |



9. Where do they stand on the pre-condition, normalization of the relations with Kosovo?

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Sceptical             | Neutral               | Somewhat Sceptical    | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

10. Where do they stand on the 'good governance' requirements for EU membership (including administrative transparency, accountability, civil service reform, and judicial reform)?

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Sceptical             | Neutral               | Somewhat Sceptical    | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

**11. Where do they stand on the EU Harmonization Package(s) in the parliament?**

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Sceptical             | Neutral               | Somewhat Sceptical    | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

## IDEOLOGY

12. Please tick the box that best describes each party's political ideology on a scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 7 (extreme right).

|      | Extreme Left          |                       |                       | Center                |                       |                       | Extreme Right         | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
|      | 1                     | 2                     | 3                     | 4                     | 5                     | 6                     | 7                     |                       |
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

13. Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state. Please tick the box that best describes each party's overall position.

|      | Extreme Left          |                       |                       | Center                |                       |                       | Extreme Right         | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
|      | 1                     | 2                     | 3                     | 4                     | 5                     | 6                     | 7                     |                       |
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

#### 14. Position on reducing taxes.

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Somewhat opposed      | Neutral               | Somewhat in favor     | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

**15. Party position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor.**

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Somewhat opposed      | Neutral               | Somewhat in favor     | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

## IDENTITY POLITICS

### 16. Position on the role of religious principles in politics.

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Somewhat opposed      | Neutral               | Somewhat in favor     | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |



17. Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. “Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.

|      | Libertaria<br>n |   | Center |   |   |   | Traditiona<br>l | Cannot be<br>estimated |
|------|-----------------|---|--------|---|---|---|-----------------|------------------------|
|      | 1               | 2 | 3      | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7               |                        |
| SNS  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| SRS  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| SPS  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| DJB  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| DS   | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| SDPS | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| PUPS | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| SPD  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| DSS  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| JS   | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| NS   | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| SDS  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| LSV  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| LDP  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| SVM  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| SPO  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| PS   | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| SNP  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| ZS   | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| PSS  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| BDZS | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| SDA  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| KP   | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| ZZS  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| NOVA | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| PDD  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| ZES  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| NSS  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |
| USS  | ○               | ○ | ○      | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○               | ○                      |

# 18. Position on nationalism vs. multiculturalism.

|      | Strongly<br>Nationalis<br>t | Nationalis<br>t       | Somewhat<br>Nationalis<br>t | Neutra<br>l           | Somewhat<br>Multiculturalis<br>t | Multiculturalis<br>t  | Strongly<br>Multiculturalis<br>t | Cannot<br>be<br>estimate<br>d |
|------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>         |

**19. Position towards more rights for ethnic/religious minorities.**

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Somewhat opposed      | Neutral               | Somewhat in favor     | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

20. Where do they stand on the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and traditionalism?

|      | Strongly insensitive  | Insensitive           | Somewhat insensitive  | Neutral               | Somewhat sensitive    | Sensitive             | Strongly sensitive    | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

**21. Considering EU membership for Serbia, where does the voters of the party stand on?**

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Somewhat opposed      | Neutral               | Somewhat in favor     | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

## ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

22. Considering NATO membership for Serbia, where does the party stand on?

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Somewhat opposed      | Neutral               | Somewhat in favor     | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

**23. What is the position of the party on deepening relations with Russia as an alternative to the EU?**

|      | Strongly opposed      | Opposed               | Somewhat opposed      | Neutral               | Somewhat in favor     | In favor              | Strongly in favor     | Cannot be estimated   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

**24. How important are the regional stability and good neighborly relations to the parties**

|      | Strongly<br>unimportant | Unimportant           | Somewhat<br>unimportant | Neutral               | Somewhat<br>important | Important             | Strongly<br>important | Cannot be<br>estimated |
|------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| SNS  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| SRS  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| SPS  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| DJB  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| DS   | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| SDPS | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| PUPS | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| SPD  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| DSS  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| JS   | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| NS   | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| SDS  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| LSV  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| LDP  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| SVM  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| SPO  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| PS   | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| SNP  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| ZS   | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| PSS  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| BDZS | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| SDA  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| KP   | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| ZZS  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| NOVA | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| PDD  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| ZES  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| NSS  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |
| USS  | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>  |

**This is the end of our survey. Many thanks for your concern and cooperation.**