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MASTER'S THESIS

MEASURING THE IMPACT OF RADICAL RIGHT ON POLICY MAKING: GERMAN CASE

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this master's thesis titled as "Measuring the Impact of Radical Right On Policy Making: German Case" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resourses in the reference list. I verify all these with my honour.

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ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

Measuring the Impact of Radical Right on Policy Making: German Case

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In the recent years, many different radical right parties in Europe achieved significant electoral success. This study investigates how these parties affect policy agendas of mainstream parties. To answer this question, we analyzed the impact in terms of the reaction of center right to the electoral success of RRPs using the Comparative Manifesto Project data. As a result of the election success of their rivals, Downs' (1957) spatial theory predicts that center right parties shift their position towards right, while Meguid's (2008) niche party competition model asserts that center right politicizes their rivals' issues by increasing the issue saliency. Selecting Alternative für Deutschland, in Germany as our case, we compared the CDU/CSU's party manifestos of 2013 and 2017 on the issues of immigration and integration. The results showed that, the CDU/CSU shifted its overall ideology towards right and became radicalized in immigration using accomodative strategy. Yet, it shifted its position toward left in integration related issues using adversarial stretagy. In terms of the issue saliency, The CDU/CSU politicized both issues by increasing their saliency. These findings demonstrate that Downs's spatial theory is still valid but needs to be modified. Although seeking votes causes parties to change their ideology by implementing the accommodation strategy, this may not be the case for each specific issue. On the other hand, our case fully supports Meguid's issue saliency hypothesis. Vote concerns push parties to politicize their rival's issues.

Keywords: AfD, CDU/CSU, Center Right, Issue Saliency, Party Behavior Radical Right, Radical Right's Impact, Spatial Theory.

ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

Radikal Sağın Politika Oluşturma Üzerindeki Etkisini Ölçmek: Almanya Örneği

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Son yıllarda Avrupa'da birçok farklı radikal sağ parti önemli seçim başarısı elde etti. Bu çalışma, bu partilerin ana akım partilerin politika gündemlerini nasıl etkilediğini araştırmıştır. Karşılaştırmalı Manifesto Projesi verileri kullanılarak, radikal sağ partilerinin etkisi merkez sağın bu partilerin seçim başarısına gösterdiği tepki açısından analiz edilmiştir. Downs'un (1957) uzamsal teorisi, rakiplerinin seçim başarısının bir sonucu olarak, merkez sağ partilerin ideolojik konumlarını sağa kaydırıp radikalleştiğini öngörürken, Meguid'in (2008) niş parti rekabet modeli, merkez sağın, rakiplerinin en çok vurguladıkları konulardaki söylemlerini artırarak bunları politize ettiğini iddia eder. Bu çalışmada Almanya için Alternatif Partisi örnek olay olarak seçilerek, Almanya'daki merkez sağ Hristiyan Demokrat Birliği'nin 2013 ve 2017 yıllarındaki parti manifestolarındaki göçmenlik ve entegrasyon hakkında olan kısımları karşılaştırılmıştır. Sonuçlar, Hristiyan Demokrat Birliği'nin genel ideolojisini sağa kaydırdığını ve akomodasyon stratejisini kullanarak göç konusunda radikalleştiğini göstermiştir. Ancak, entegrasyonla ilgili konularda muhalif stratejiyi kullanarak pozisyonunu tam tersi yöne sola kaydırmıştır. Öte yandan, her iki konu hakkında da söylemlerini artırarak bunları politize etmiştir. Bu bulgular, Downs'un uzamsal teorisinin hala geçerli olduğunu ancak revize edilmesi gerektiğini göstermektedir. Oy kaygıları, partilerin akomodasyon stratejisini uygulayarak ideolojilerini değiştirmelerine neden olsa da, bu durum tüm spesifik konular için geçerli olmayabilir. Öte yandan,

çalışmadaki örnek olay Meguid'in konuların politize edilme hipotezini tam olarak desteklemektedir. Oy kaygıları, partileri rakiplerinin en çok vurguladıkları konuları politize etmeye itmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Merkez Sağ, Almanya için Alternatif, Hristiyan Demokrat Birliği, Parti Davranışı, Radikal Sağ, Radikal Sağın Etkileri, Seçim Başarısı.

MEASURING THE IMPACT OF RADICAL RIGHT ON POLICY MAKING: GERMAN CASE

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ABBREVIATIONS

AfD	Alternative for Germany
AN	National Alliance
BfV	The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
BHE	Federation of Expellees and Disfranchaised
BND	Federal Intelligence Service
CD	Center Democrats
CDU	Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CSU	Christian Social Union in Bavaria
Cf.	in comparison
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMP	Comparative Manifestos Project
DFPd	Danish People's Party
DP	German Party
DRP	German Imperial Party
DVU	German People's Union
eg.	for example
et al.	and others
etc.	and other similar things
EU	European Union
FAP	Free German Workers' Party
FDP	Free Democratic Party
FDU	Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland
FN	National Front
FPÖ	Freedom Party of Austria
FrP	Progress Party (Denmark)
FRP	Progress Party (Norway)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDP	All-German Party
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GRECE	Research and Study Group for the European Civilisation

i.e.	specifically
LPF	Lijst Pim Fortuyn
MAD	Military Counterespionage Service
MARPOR	Manifesto Project
MGPs	mainstream government parties
MOPs	mainstream opposition parties
MSI	Italian Social Movement (*Movimento Sociale Italiano*)
n.d.	no date
ND	Nouvelle Droite
NPD	National Democratic Party of Germany
NSDAP	National Socialist German Workers Party
NyD	New Democracy Party
ÖVP	Austrian People's Party
Pegida	Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PVV	Party for Freedom
REP	The Republicans
RRPs	Radical Right Parties
SD	Swiss Democrats
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
SRP	Socialist Reich Party
SSS	Skinhead Saxonian Switzerland
UK	United Kingdom
UKIP	UK Independence Party
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WWI	World War I

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INTRODUCTION

"If you vote to remain you're voting to go into a political union with Turkey, you are voting to go into a free travel area with 77 million people and rising fast in Turkey….I used to worry that we were living in an increasingly German dominated Europe, but from what I can see it might become a Turkish dominated Europe" (UK: UKIP's Farage warns of a 'Turkish-dominated Europe', 2016). These words belong to the UK's well-known populist radical right party UKIP's former leader Nigel Farage in the Brexit campaign. No matter how crazy it sounds, almost 52% of the population were affected by these one way or the other when they voted to leave the EU. Similary, Trump promised in his election campaign in 2016 to build a 'big, beautiful wall' (Trump: We will build a great wall along the southern border, 2016) between the US and Mexico to stop the flow of illegal immigrants and drugs over the border (Rodgers and Bailey, n.d.). Although it sounds pretty unlikely and lunatic, American citizens decided to make him the US's 45th 'Mr.' President.

Leaders of populist radical right parties in Europe, just like Nigel Farage and Donald Trump, keep spreading unlikely scenarios, huge hatred and xenophobic feelings against immigrants. With the huge number of foreigners living in European countries, this creates a significant danger to peace in Europe. These parties' nationalist and anti-EU propaganda not only causes different kinds of violence against those immigrants but also damages the raison d'etre of the Union. On the other hand, their ideological characteristics challenge the Western democratic liberal values. While they want to preserve the Western culture they seek to decrease the number of immigrants and create Islamophobia. This implicitly means damaging the democratic system for the sake of the system.

These parties have become successful also in electoral arena. While some of them succeeded to form a coalition with the center right, like FPÖ in Austria, most of them continued their existence in national parliaments but with increasing electoral success. For example; the National Front in France, the Vlaams Block in Belgium, Danish People's Party in Denmark, Jobbik in Hungary and the Party for Freedom in the Netherland obtained their highest vote rates with around 15% (ParlGov · parties, elections, cabinets, n.d.). A recent important example of these is the AfD in

Germany. Having achieved almost 12% of the votes at the federal election in 2017, it became the first radical right party in the Bundestag (Germany's federal parliament) after the 1949 federal elections and the major opposition party when the Christian Democrats formed a coalition with the Social Democrats.

Although this is the case, the question is whether they really have an impact on policy making. To be able to determine a direct influence, they should run the government alone or in coalition with other parties. Since there are not many examples of this, it needs to be figured out how they affect policy making indirectly outside the government. In order to broaden our understanding regarding this impact one first needs to understand how something affects the other. Just like the Newton's third law of motion states, for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. A force is a push or a pull that acts upon an object as a result of its interaction with another object (Newton's Third Law of Motion, n.d.) Forces -or we can call it impact also- result from interactions. This means when radical right parties affect politics, there will be a reaction. Since they threaten the established parties electorally, the reaction will come from them. In our case, it is the center right because of its ideological proximity with the radical right on the political spectrum. But how will they react against the radical right? How can we analyze their reaction? What are the strategies that they employ? Do the center right parties engage with the radical right by touching upon the issues raised by them or do they disengage from the pariah by simply ignoring it? This research rests upon these questions.

There is indeed a growing body of literature about the radical right in Europe. At the beginning some scholars sought to understand the reasons why the radical right had risen (Von Beyme, 1998; Griffin, 2000; Eatwell, 2003). Then, important comparative studies were conducted to understand in which countries and under what circumstances such parties succeeded or failed (Kitschelt, 1995; Evans, 2005; De Lange, 2007; Art, 2011). More recently, research has focused on the program and ideology of these parties (Betz and Johnson, 2004; Mudde, 2014). On the other hand, there is a gap in terms of studies defining the real effects of the radical right on policy making. The aim of this research is to attempt to fill this gap.

Although there are different approaches, this study evaluates the impact on the basis of interaction and dynamism literature that focuses on the dynamics of the

party system and the radical right's interaction with the center right to exert influence. Just as Easton (1965) emphasizes the dynamic character of the systems analysis, it necessitates to take into account the competition among parties, rather than individual party actors, to create outcomes. In this manner, the literature is largely based on Anthony Downs's (1957) theory which claims that parties strategically shift their position along the left-right spectrum in order to attract more votes and ultimately win the office. Borrowing the idea from the spatial theories of economic competition in Economics, he introduces spatial models in Political Science. Similarly, and more recently, Meguid (2008) argues that the strategic responses of mainstream parties shape the fortune of niche parties which include the radical right. With her book 'Party Competition Between Unequals' she has pioneered the radical right party dynamism literature. Studies that analyze the impact on the basis of this approach (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Bilecen, 2016; Muis and Scholte, 2013; Van De Wardt, 2015; Abou-Chadi, 2014) mainly conclude that either the radical right moderates or the center right radicalizes their positions in order to gain more electoral support and compete each other (Cf. Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020). Although there is a considerable number of works, they are still in their infancy. Moreover, these studies have mostly analysed European countries in which the radical right has had electoral success. Yet, the electoral breakthrough of the populist RRP AfD in Germany in 2017 is a relatively new issue. Thus, its impact on the center right has not yet been analysed thoroughly by the scholarly community.

Between the 2013 and 2017 national elections in Germany, the AfD obtained a significant electoral success in state and EU elections. In 6 states out of 13 and in the 2014 EU parliament elections, the AfD increased their vote share while that of the CDU/CSU decreased. In the light of the Downsian spatial model, it is expected that the CDU/CSU will shift its position toward the right accommodating issues like immigration and integration in order to get back the votes it had lost to the AfD. Hence, the main purpose of this study is to deliver an empirical test to analyze whether the CDU/CSU adjusted its position in the 2017 elections in response to the AfD's election success. In other words, this research's purpose is not to build a new theory. Instead, the main objective of this research is theory testing. Its scope consists of testing namely Downs's theory regarding party competition. He argues

that the views in economics and the behavior of people in the marketplace, as well as the locational equilibrium theory in Economics, can be adapted to the political world. Political parties, he asserts, are made up of rational actors who consider their interest, which is maximizing the votes, and therefore parties may change their ideological positions.

Up until this time in the academic realm, the radical right's impact on policy making had rather been considered minor in Germany because of its repressive policies. Therefore, only the countries in which RRPs have taken part either in government or in parliament have mostly been examined in a detailed way. However, with the radical right party AfD's electoral breakthrough in the federal election, it has been understood that the radical right is no longer that marginal in Germany either. Thus, I will focus on how the CDU/CSU responded to the AfD's election success by changing its position on the political spectrum. The first hypothesis is that the CDU/CSU shifts its position toward the right in the context of immigration- and integration-related issues to become closer to its rival AfD on the political spectrum. I also test the issue saliency; thus, the second hypothesis is that the CDU/CSU increases the issue emphasis with regard to immigration- and integration-related issues to better compete with the AfD.

In the process of data collecting, quantitative research methods will be used. Specifically, I will benefit from coded manifesto data using the Manifesto Project (MARPOR). Choosing manifestos as the primary source is typical within the party literature and remains one of the most applicable data source for evaluating changes in party positions (Budge, 2001: 51). In a nutshell, the coders seperate the manifesto texts into quasi-sentences and match them with a category of policy (e.g., welfare, defence, law and order, etc.), and take the percentages of each category as a measure of the party's priorities and issue saliency. Based on the mixture of policy priorities, the authors develop an index that measures the overall ideology for the program of each party in each election year. The ideological scores range from -100 to +100, with higher scores indicating a more right-wing emphasis. Additionally, in order to assess the position of a policy on a specific issue, MARPOR calculates it based on the difference between positive and negative statements given to that specific policy dimension (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020: 5). The importance of the CMP (Comparative

Manifestos Project) data is that it allows us to determine the party positions over time in large number of postwar democracies (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009: 830).

This study will compare the CDU/CSU's party manifestos for the national elections held in 2013 and in 2017. The unit of observation here is political parties, specifically the CDU/CSU. I choose only the center right party, and not the center left, because some studies (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009) suggest that political parties are responsive to the other members of 'their' ideological families (Cf. Bale et al., 2010). Since the CDU/CSU's vote share has started to decrease while that of the AfD has increased in state elections held between 2013 and 2017, and in the EU parliament election in 2014, it is expected that the CDU/CSU will shift its position towards the right, and increase the issue emphasis with regard to immigration- and integration-related issues as dependent variables.

I operationalize the dependent variables mainly by selecting the appropriate categories from the CMP Codebook. For the immigration-related issues, I select the codes per601 'National Way of Life: Positive', and per602 'National Way of Life: Negative'. The first code refers to statements advocating the restriction of the process of immigration, i.e. accepting new immigrants, as well as -favourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation, history, and general appeals. The second one, on the other hand, refers to statements favouring new immigrants– as opposed to restrictions and quotas, with unfavourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation and history (Volkens et al., 2015: 17,18). For the integration-related issues, I choose the codes per607 'Multiculturalism: Positive', and per608 'Multiculturalism: Negative' since there is no direct category regarding integration. The first one refers to statements which favor cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies. These may include the preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country, including special educational provisions. The second code represents the statements which indicate the enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration. These address cultural homogeneity in society (Volkens et al., 2015: 19). The position is calculated subtracting the summed share of a positive category from the summed share of a negative category. Saliency is simply measured by the sum of positive and negative shares (Abou-Chadi, 2014: 425). A measure of

the position on immigration is then calculated according to the description given below:

$$Immigration\ (Pos.) = per601 - per602$$

The higher a party scores on this measure, the more it represents restrictive policies toward immigration in an election. A measure of the saliency of immigration is calculated as follows:

$$Immigration\ (Sal.) = per601 + per602$$

It should be noted that, since there is no direct code regarding immigration, the most related code will be used, and this includes statements about the manifesto country's nation and history. Measurement methods will be the same for the issue of integration. The position and saliency are calculated accordingly:

$$Integration\ (Pos.) = per608 - per607$$

$$Integration\ (Sal.) = per608 + per607$$

After the analysis, it will be demonstrated whether the CDU/CSU has shifted its position toward the right after the AfD's election success. Additionally, it will be shown whether the CDU/CSU has increased the issue emphasis on integration and immigration.

To study the impact of radical right parties on center parties is important in several ways. Once established parties start to politicize nativist issues, people may be prompted to categorize each other based on ethnicity and nationality. Moreover, it can cause those who are against the nativist struggle to be labeled, or the ideas which support multiculturalism to be stigmatized. Ultimately, these may urge mainstream parties to adjust their positions and shift further to the right, causing the ideas that were previously considered extreme and were therefore excluded -to now become legitimate and mainstream.

The first chapter presents a detailed literature review regarding conceptual and ideological framework of the radical right. 'Radical right' is not the only term which is used by authors. On the contrary, there are numerous concepts which define these groups and parties in question. Firstly, these different concepts will be visited, and then classifications will be presented based on the characteristics of these groups and parties. After that, the meaning of 'radical' and where the term 'right' comes from will be explained. After dealing with the conceptual framework, the study will

look at the ideology of the radical right. In order to understand this better, one needs to dig deep into fascist regimes. There are many works which claim that radical right ideology is related to fascism. Thus, I will first look at the characteristics of fascist ideology. Then, I will present the intellectual roots of the RRPs that have flourished after the 1980s. There are very significant intellectual groups in Western Europe that are inspired by fascism and that shape the ideology of radical right today. After examining the intellectual roots, I will present the ideological features of the RRPs and seek to define their specific characteristics.

Since this is a case study, the second chapter evaluates the radical right in Germany. It first starts with the historical development and presents the RRPs in (West) Germany between 1949 and 2013. I divide the RRPs into two groups because there are important differences between the RRPs before 2013 and those after this date. The RRPs before 2013 were more likely to be related to fascist ideology, were mostly marginalized and never obtained a significant electoral success. Yet, after the AfD entered the scene, things have started to change. Unlike the RRPs in Germany before 2013, the AfD has similar ideological characteristics to its European counterparts. More importantly, it gained a crucial electoral success in the federal elections in 2017 becoming the prominent opposition party in the *Bundestag*. Therefore, the chapter starts with the RRPs that operated between 1949 and 2013. This period is divided into waves by some important German historians, such as Pfahl-Traughber (2000) and Saalfeld (1997), a division which was later revised by Art (2011) and Williams (2006). The period is separated into 4 waves where each wave identifies a different RRP. After examining the RRPs, other radical right groups in Germany, namely the Neo-Nazi groups, Skinhead gangs, and Pegida, will be presented. Lastly, how the state responds to the radical right in the country will be discussed. These responses will be separated into legal tools and political strategies.

The last chapter presents the impact meausurement. It discusses the theoretical background of the radical right's impact and presents the research design and analysis. Firstly, approaches to measure the radical right's impact are discussed. These are institutionalist, systemic responsiveness and goal attainment approaches. The last one constitutes the subject matter of this thesis. According to this approach, parties are categorized based on their goals, and whatever these goals are, they are

always in competition. Based on Downs's spatial theory and Meguid's model of niche party competition, the party dynamism and interaction literature existed. The final chapter presents this literature and discusses the empirical works which test these theories' relevant arguments. This thesis also contributes to this literature by delivering another empirical test. Thus, the second section of this chapter outlines the research design presenting case selection, key variables, data collection and operationalization. The third section conducts the analysis as it tests the hypotheses benefiting from the CMP data. Then, it presents the findings and interprets them.

CHAPTER ONE
IDEOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. RADICAL RIGHT

1.1.1. Conceptual Framework

1.1.1.1. Terminology on Radical Right

In the literature so far, many different terms have been used by different scholars regarding the same topic. There is a great confusion and ambiguity in terms of the concepts used by the scholarly community. Some of the terms most frequently used to define the political parties and groups in question are radical right, right-wing extremist, populist radical right and far right. Cas Mudde (2014: 98), therefore, uses the word 'Motley Crew' because of these different terms.

Since 1980, authors have explored the similarities as well as dangers of different (alleged) radical right political parties (RRPs) by comparing them. Nevertheless, these studies rarely came to a consensus on terminology. Many different and original terms have been put forward both in the media and academia since then. The confusion of terminology mostly arises from the lack of a clear definition, rather than from the disagreements between authors regarding its meaning (von Beyme, 2019: 4; Mudde, 2007: 12). There are only a few authors who give a clear and straightforward definition to delineate their topic and show that the parties in question also fit this definition (Kolovos; 2003; Mudde 1995). On the other hand, however, most authors use different terminology interchangeably without giving a proper definition. It is not unusual to come across an author who uses three or more various concepts to depict the same party or group of parties in the same book, or even on the same page (Mudde, 2007: 12).

Saying that 'only something which has no history can be defined', Nietzsche (as cited in Wahl, 2020: 4) cautioned that social phenomena, their explanations, and descriptions are changeable in history. Yet, some authors sought to define RRPs and

social groups. However, the result is nothing but a “conceptual confusion” in the “messy field” of studies on the European radical right (Arzheimer, 2019: 2).

Another reason for this terminological confusion is the political parties themselves. Unlike other party families (such as Greens and socialists), RRPs do not identify themselves as populist or even (radical) right. Many reject the left–right distinction as outdated, asserting instead that they are ‘neither left, nor right’ as it was stated by Marine Le Pen in 2017 (Accetti and Bickerton, 2016). Despite using the term ‘extreme right’, Hainsworth (2008: 5) indicates that ‘it is not a label that is readily accepted or claimed by the parties and movements (or their supporters)’.

The voters and members of these parties usually describe themselves otherwise than intellectuals. While some of them define themselves as the extreme right, the others generally do not. The creators and noticeable members of RRPs are inclined to identify their movements mostly, or diversely as fronts, blocks or forces for freedom, democracy and progress. Also, some of them label their parties as unions and alliances. Despite the existence of widely different concepts out there, most authors identify the basis of the phenomena in very similar ways (Mudde, 2017: 4).

Although such terms as “Far Right” and “Extreme Right” are useful for denoting the phenomenon in question, they are less useful for defining or delimiting it. There is no broad consensus regarding where the mainstream ends and the extreme starts, and even if there was such a consensus on this, the recent change in the mainstream would question it. Terms such as “Fascism” and “neo- Nazism” are also widely used, but these refer to political parties that rose and fell in historical circumstances very different from today’s, so have limited value in contemporary context. Nazi symbolism may sometimes be used for its countercultural shock value, but there is no serious movement to reestablish the Nazi Party, and it is hard to imagine what real neo-Nazism would look like. Among contemporary writers who embrace radical right thinking, only one (Greg Johnson) openly expresses sympathy for Nazism. (Sedgwick, 2019: xiii, xiv).

The term “New Right” is also often used, and the term “Alt Right” has recently come into prominence in the US. There are also nationalists, identitarians, libertarians, neoconservatives, paleoconservatives, counter-jihadists, and

neoreactionaries. These differ in important ways, but all have something in common (Sedgwick, 2019: xiv). Historical change also explains some changes in terms. They have evolved with the changing political system. Today, with the collapse of the bipolar system of the Cold War, new terms have been included into political and academic area to better describe the issues at hand (Von Beyme, 2019: 4).

Roger Eatwell, who is an important academic- in the studies of fascism, uses the term 'extreme right' in his book 'Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right' (2004: 14) denoting that he uses the term as 'a convenient but flawed shorthand' to examine 'extremists'. He refrains from damning all who are discussed in the book, rather warning against complacent democrats. Moreover, he acknowledges the flaws of existing liberal democracy while the extreme right is often delineated with opposition or fundamental criticism to it. In his last book 'National Populism- Revolt Against Liberal Democracy' with Matthew Goodwin (2018: 62, 63), however, he employs the term 'national populism'[1] instead of using 'far right' or 'extreme right' because the latter are too broad, encompassing both racist groups and RRPs at the same time.

1.1.1.2. Classifications About the Characteristics

Although there is a huge vagueness and complexity in terms of the concepts, it can be seen that the authors have used these terms based on some similar specific criteria. Yet, there are also some scholars that have created different categories based on different chracteristics. I will present both how all these authors use various concepts and how they create different categories. It is safe to say that there are no clear-cut and strict categories regarding the issue, so this section only aims to discuss different approaches and most used distinctions to illuminate the confusion.

[1] They (2018: 69,70) define nationalism as a way of thinking going beyond mere patriotism. Nationalism is the idea of being part of a group of people with a common history and identity connected by a mission or project. This idea seeks to preserve national identity from radical changes and supports national interest. Although they accept the possibility that the leaders of these parties may hide their true intention, there is no doubt that they have a populist agenda, and their emphasis on immigration and integration should be evaluated in this context.

There are two different labels most frequently used by authors to categorize these parties and groups: extreme right and radical right. The criteria are based on these groups' approaches towards democracy and the existence of violence. The most infamous example of the former is fascism, which brought to power German *Führer* Adolf Hitler and Italian *Duce* Benito Mussolini, and was responsible for the most destructive war in history. Both subgroups opposed the postwar liberal democratic consensus, but in essentially different ways. The extreme right is revolutionary and anti-democratic as it opposes the fundemental principles of sovereignty of the people, whereas the radical right is more reformist and (commonly) democratic even if they oppose the fundamental values of liberal democracy (Mudde, 2006). Basically, the radical right endorses the power of the people, the extreme right does not (Mudde 2019).[2]

Until the 1980s, the concept of the extreme right was regarded as identical to neo-fascism (Ignazi, 2003: 1).[3] However, after the 1980s the situation has changed. These parties have renewed themselves and gained legitimacy, and they have also been successful in elections. Ignazi (2003: 33) defined the parties in question before the 1980s as old, traditional neo-fascist type, and those after the 1980s as new, post-industrial[4] type. The latter has an anti-system profile, yet without any link to fascism[5]. Although none of these new parties point to a corporatist society or a new order, they offer irrational mixtures of free enterprise and social protection (only for the native) and of contemporary characteristics and traditional remembrances (Ignazi, 2003: 34). Kitschelt (cited in Eatwell, 2004: 7) made a similar distinction between the new and old types, although he used the term 'radical right'. According to his winning formula, the new radical right supports liberal economics but

[2] Mudde (2019) uses the term 'Far Right' to encompass both radical and extreme right.

[3] We can only see an example of this in the Italian MSI –after its abolishment, it re-entered the political scene as AN. Neo-fascism is used to define parties and/or groups which explicitly want to restore the Third Reich or the Italian Social Republic, or which refer historical fascism as their ideological origin (Mudde, 1996: 230).

[4] Ignazi (2003: 34) uses the label 'post-industrial' because he argues that these parties are the product of the conflicts of post-industrial society where material interests are no longer significant. In this period, non-material issues, such as self-realization and identity, are emphasized.

[5] He explains this link as follows; "The heritage of fascism can be seen in terms of references to myths, symbols, slogans of the interwar fascist experience, often veiled as nostalgia, or in terms of a more explicit reference to at least part of the ideological corpus of fascism.'' (Ignazi cited in Mudde, 1996: 238).

conservative social values (anti-immigrant policies), while the old right failed to achieve electoral success and adhered more to the fascist tradition.

These (alleged) extreme right parties of the 1980s[6] were no longer neo-fascists, yet they still represented a type of the extreme right since they were anti-system and undermined the legitimacy of the democratic system, if not with a systematic ideology as in fascism. They opposed parliamentary representation and sought more direct mechanisms of democracy. They were also against pluralism and the universal idea of equality as they thought that pluralism would endanger the societal harmony and that rights must be distributed according to biologically attributed situations and national preference (race, language, ethnicity). Moreover, these parties are authoritarian because they think supraindividual and collective authority is superior to individual authority. All these holistic and monistic views create a contradicton with the essential elements of contemporary liberal democracy (Ignazi, 2003: 2).

An extremist political organization demands an important transformation of the society either with a future vision or with the idea of returning back to an idealized past (Powell, 1986: 358). It has anti-pluralist and monist values aiming to repress difference and dissent of different ideas, and treating divisions and confusion as illegitimate (Lipset and Raab, 1970: 6). The extreme right's political monism has two basic features; it rejects the democratic political system altogether and/or the universalist and egalitarian values (Rydgren, 2018: 24).

With regard to the rejection of the democratic political system, a distinction shoud be made between direct and indirect democracy. In the Western thought's long tradition, direct democracy[7] is associated with forms of extremism. John Stuart Mill warned in the 19th century that this could become the tyranny of the majority and menace minority rights and create effective government extremism (Eatwell, 2004: 8). Indeed, associating themselves with direct democracy, 'alleged' extremist parties

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6 Ignazi (2003: 32) argues that the largest part of the 'extreme right', the newly born or refounded parties such as the French FN, the German Republikaner, the Belgian FN, the Dutch CD, the Austrian FPÖ, the Swiss SD, FDU, and Autopartei, the Danish FRP and DFPd, the Norwegian FRPn, the Swedish 'flash' party, NyD as well as the Italian Northern League deny any links to historical fascism.

7 This type of democracy is seen in ancient Greece. However, it is highly different from the current liberal democracy and its ideas of pluralism and internationalism. It demonized the 'other', emphasizing the Greek identity and holistic society (Eatwell, 2003: 8). Hence, extremists are sometimes labeled as anti-parliamentarians (Fennema, 1996: 7).

argue that they represent true democracy and the true will of the people as opposed to sham democracy which, they believe, operates in contemporary societies. In the postwar period, they usually attack parliamentary governments because, in their view, this type of government represents weakness, separation, division, and especially separation from the real people (Eatwell, 2004: 8). Yet, today the extreme right mostly works with the parliamentary system to obtain power, and their definite views regarding democracy are hard to identify clearly because they have to hide their anti-democratic sentiments in the Europen political system. Even if they accept procedural democracy, the ideal society is ethnocracy, which is at odds with the pluralistic values of liberal democracy in many ways (Betz cited in Rydgren, 2018: 24; Minkenberg, 2000: 174). Moreover, many representatives and activists from some RRPs and movements preserve their contact with the extreme right (Copsey, 2018: 180).

The second aspect of monism, which is the rejection of universalist and egalitarian values, comes with authoritarianism. It declares those who do not share the same opinion either fools, or worse, evil people. Although today's extreme right does not say this explicitly, their policies show it. Some of the FN municipalities removed left-wing the books containing left-wing views from libraries and withdrew aid from unwanted groups (Eatwell, 2004: 9). The radical right supports authoritarian social policies, strongly emphasizing law and order issues. They also favor more referendums to strengthen the link between the rulers and the ruled. Moreover, they seek to redefine national sovereignty independently of organizations such as the EU. This generally points to the security problems arising from the EU's freedom of movement principle. Combined with the refuge crisis, the radical right claims that the EU does not fulfill its duty to protect internal and external borders (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2019: 63)

When it comes to racism, one can clearly see that it is different now than it was in the past for extremists. They assert that races are not superior or inferior, but different. Thus, they should stay in their own home, respecting others (Taguieff cited in Eatwell, 2004: 10). This belief is held particularly by the FN as evident in their rhetoric ‘right to difference’. Nevertheless, sometimes their masks can slip as they speak (for instance, Le Pen’s reference to the Holocaust as a detail of history) and

their real thoughts are revealed. Hence, old racism is far from dead (Eatwell, 2004: 10).

Betz (1993: 680) also separates the radical right from the extremist (i.e., neo-fascist and Neo-Nazi) right because of the latter's backward-looking, reactionary politics and inclination to violence as he argues that these parties are posing the most significant challenge to the established structure and politics of West European democracy today. Moreover, he divides the radical right into two categories as 'neo-liberal', or 'libertarian' populism, and 'authoritarian', or 'national' populism. He (1994: 108) makes this distinction based on the weight of these elements in their party programs. Husbands (1992: 268) makes yet another similar distinction, dividing the extreme right into four categories as populist national parties, neo-fascist parties, national extreme-right parties, and traditional xenophobic parties. However, he does not explain what the basis of this classification is. Except for the last two categories, this classification is almost identical to the Betz's distinction, though Betz could offer a clear explanation for it.

Despite the fact that they frequently use the term 'populist', it is argued that the majority of researchers agree that right-wing populism is different from both conservatism and right-wing extremism (Stöss cited in von Beyme, 2019: 4). In the 19th century, the extreme right was called the reactionary right. Still, current definitions utilized by conservatives and the extreme right are based on the traditional criteria. While conservatives try to maintain the status quo, the extreme right wants to restore it. Today's extreme right denies that they have ties with fascist ideology and does not even accept the term 'extremist'. In their official documents, they usually do not favor a new political system (von Beyme, 2017: 143).

Similarly, Eatwell and Goodwin (2018: 62,63) make the same distinction, although they label the parties in question as 'national populist'. They assert that the term 'far right' is too broad as it includes fascists who want to overturn democracy and those who operate under the democratic rules, as well as some openly racist groups that employ violence. Partly because of this reason, these authors divide the 'far right' into two groupings: extreme right and radical right. According to this approach, the extremist right rejects democracy and pluralism. It also includes terrorists like Anders Breivik who murdered almost eighty people in bombings and

shootings in Norway in 2011 and racist groups like the Ku Klux Klan in the US. On the other hand, the radical right, though not being against democracy itself, is critical only of certain aspects of liberal democracy, and advocates direct democracy seeking more referandums in order to diminish the gap between the rulers and the ruled. It includes a wide range of political parties, like the National Front in France, the Freedom Parties (FPÖ) in Austria, the Italian League and the AfD in Germany.

Apart from academics, the government in Germany also makes a distinction between the radical and extreme right as stated by the Verfassungschutz (the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution). According to it, the term 'radical' is *verfassungfeindlich,* which involves only those organizations in opposition to the principles of the constitution, while 'extreme' is *verfassungsvidrig,* which denotes completely unconstitutional organizations. These parties are extensively monitored by the Verfassungschutz, and while the extreme right parties can be banned, the radical ones are free from this danger (Mudde, 1996: 231).[8]

As it is widely used among academics, the term 'radical right' was sometimes utilized after 1945 to depict a wider ideology that encompasses the reactionary right, which is completely opposed to change and wants to return to the old order, and the more flexible resistant right, which is also referred to as pragmatic conservatism (Weber cited in Eatwell, 2004: 7). According to this view, the radical right does not necessarily have to be violent or demand dictatorship. Moreover, 'radical right' has a rather different meaning in the American context. Yet, the term falls short of covering all instances. When we consider both the John Birch Society[9],

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[8] Von Beyme (2019: 7) states that with the aim of protecting the democratic constitution, the German Federal Constitutional Court found it obligatory to implement limitations on the political freedom of action of the opposition. Yet, this approach is not universally accepted by the scholarly community of political science because it means that the state decides how a political movement should be defined. Beyme finds this dangerous because it prevents the development of new concepts in democracy. The Verfassungsschutz also decided not to vilify the term 'radicalism' because there was no evidence of a unified extremist ideology. Therefore, it began to use the term 'radical political critique' (Kailitz, 2004: 16). Based on this distinction, the Republikaner Party was first put in the radical party group, and then was transferred to the extreme group. Although the party did not make many changes in its program, this reclassification is due to the fear that the party will affect the mainstream. Yet, it is not easy to fully decipher the ideology of parties where ''democracy is the only game in town'' (Eatwell, 2004: 7,8).

[9] It's a right-wing private organization founded in the US by a retired candy entrepreneur Robert Welch in 1958 against communists; the organization advocates various ultraconservative causes with the motto ''less government, more responsibility, - and with God's help – a better world''. It is generally regarded as a far right, or radical right organization. As their motto indicates, they seek less or limited government, and more personal responsibility with God's help. They are

which claims to support the democratic order and constitution, and the extremist group Ku Klux Klan[10] that openly uses violence in the US, it is not easy to put them all in the same group. It is also the case with some democratic developments, such as the post-1960s Anglo-American 'New Right' which advocates liberal economy and a limited government and is associated with politicians like Margaret Thatcher. The only thing that binds this large group together is that in one way or another they reject the consensus, or the status quo (Eatwell, 2004: 7).

Another important term used by many authors (Evans, 2005; Betz, 1994) is 'radical right populism' as these authors argue that populism is a crucial element in their ideology and style. Yet, Cas Mudde (2007: 26) prefers to use the term 'populist radical right' due to semantic reasons. When it is called 'radical right populism', the main concept is populism and 'radical right' is only an ideological emphasis making it a specific form of populism. 'Populist radical right', on the other hand, signifies the populist form of the radical right. That is, nativism is the ultimate core of the ideology, not populism.

Besides scholars who make a seperation between the radical and extreme right, there are some others who use 'radical right'[11] as a general term. For instance,

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against communists because they believe that the communists are totalitarian, and in communism, government controls everything, so there are no individual rights and freedoms, which is not moral. They also oppose blocks such as the United Nations, arguing that it is also totalitarian and seeks a world government, and NATO, which, in their view, advocates Fortress America (Tikkanen, n.d; John Birch Society, n.d; R. Shafer, 2020).

[10] The Ku Klax Klan is a white supremacist hate group founded in the US in two different time periods. The first group was set up right after the civil war and operated until the 1870s, and the second one was initiated in 1915 and has continued to the present time. It has recently -split into many different groups forming collaborations with the Neo-Nazi and other extremist groups (Augustyn, n.d.). The Loyal White Knights is the largest and most active Klan group in the country. They assert that races must be protected against race mixing. They are also against black people, black people's rights, and people who have pro-black sentiments. Other groups and people they are opposed to are the Catholic Church, Jews and foreign-born immigrants (Loyal White Knights of the Ku Klax Klan, n.d.). Wearing white robes and hoods they gather for their ceremonies during which cross burning is an important element. They are held responsible for a series of murders in the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, it is also argued that the Oklahoma Government Building Bombing in 1995, which is the largest domestic terror act in the country causing almost 170 casualties, was the result of decades of activism by the white-power movement, a coalition of the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, skinheads and militias, that intended to organize a guerrilla war on the federal government and its other enemies (Belew, 2018). Indeed, the perpetrator of the bombing, Timothy McVeigh, defended the bombing as a legitimate tactic against the federal government, especially after the Ruby Ridge Incident in 1992 and Waco Siege in 1993 in the US (CNN.com - Timothy McVeigh dead - June 11, 2001, 2001).

[11] He defines radical right as an ideology that emhasizes the social and economic threats such as globalization and immigration in modern and post-modern world and promises the protection of

Wahl (2020: 14) scales the radical right parties and groups based on different degrees of militancy and aggressiveness that they demonstrate, using the subheadings ranging from right-wing populism to racism and totalitarianism. Likewise, Feldman et al. (2018: 2) use radical right as an umbrealla term and divide it into two parts as fascist and non-fascist authoritarian regimes[12]. Their common characteristics are the perception of shared enemies (such as Jews, left-wingers, other social 'undesirebles' like gays and Freemasons), and extreme forms of nationalism and overt paramilitarism. The difference, on the other hand, lies in their attitude towards constitutionalism. Revolutionary fascists seek to overthrow the existing order and install a new totalitarian community of the 'elect', while the more reactionary radical right favors the status quo aiming to keep the previous constitutional order more or less intact.

1.1.1.3. Conceptual Clarification on 'Radical' and 'Right'

The concept of 'right' is also problematic and needs to be explained. The left-right dichotomy dates back to the French Revolution. On 29 August 1789, the Assemblee Constituante gathered to decide whether to give the King the right of veto on Assembly Acts. The chairman asked the assembly to move to his right if they wanted to give the veto power to King, or to his left if they rejected it. In this way, the concepts of 'right' and 'left' emerged. It was accepted immediately by the authors of the time as a political distinction between traditionalists and conservatives (right) on the one hand, and modernisers and renovators (left) on the other (Ignazi; 2003: 4).

Later, these two concepts were redefined as owners/bourgeoisie constituting the right, and workers and proletariat the left. It is now claimed that this dichotomy has become a materialist (defending the socio-economic achievements, and law and order enforcement) and post-materialist (the desire to participate more in the

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ethnicities and the construction of a homogenous society by excluding immigrants and other minorities (Wahl, 2020: 14).

[12] Roger Griffin (1993: 117) also mentions the existence of 'nonfascist radical right', which is undoubtedly anti-communist, anti-liberal, but somewhat lacking in palingenetic and ultranationalist inspiration. The authoritarian regimes in Latin America and the Iberian peninsula are examples of this. These hybrid regimes lack fascism's revolutionary idea, although they have a lot in common with fascism's other features (Pinto and Kalli, 2014: 2).

decision-making process and to enjoy more freedom) dilemma with the silent revolution (Inglehart, 1977). Although contemporary developments, such as the fall of communism, globalization, the crisis of social democracy, have undermined the notions of Left and Right, it still survives in the context of party politics (Giddens, 1994: 251).

In post-war Europe, the left-right dichotomy represented merely the distinction between state intervention and laissez faire economy (Downs, 1957; Schwartz, 1993). Likewise, Budge et al. (1987: 394-5) argue that left and right identify government regulation versus free enterprise, individual freedom and incentives. However, recent analyses have downplayed the importance of the economic side of the dichotomy and have emphasized the cultural aspect. The post-materialist agenda was especially effective to present the new 'non-material' ideas and values, and this changed the view of electorates and their image of the right-left dichotomy (Flanagan and Inglehart 1987; Minkenberg and Inglehart 1989). After that, the right started to be associated with authoritarian, anti-libertarian issues.

Emphasizing only the socioeconomic aspect of the right-wing ideology is neither sufficient nor truly suitable to explain contemporary radical right because of two reasons. First, economy is not a core issue for these parties' ideology. Second, they are not right-wing in this sense because they favor a (chauvinist) welfare state[13] and protectionist policies (Cas Mudde, 2007: 25). Therefore, instead of the socioeconomic aspect, the sociocultural dimension of the right, namely (the propensity to) egalitarianism, is highlighted (Bobbio, 1994). While the left argues that the inequalities among people are artificial and must be overcomeby the state; the right asserts that inequality is quite normal and falls outside of the state's action. Since economic politics is not prioritized by radical right-wing parties, they do not engage in a fight against class inequalities based on economy (Mudde, 2007: 26).

Their main hostility, however, concerns the measures aiming to decrease inequalities based on ethnicity, immigration status, and even gender. These parties seek to maintain and even increase inequalities in the interest of 'natives' (Rydgren, 2018: 25). They oppose the social integration of marginalized groups and have an inclination towards xenophobia, yet not in the form of overt racism and anti-

[13] Yet, it is argued that, according to RRPs, only natives should benefit from the fruits of the national economy (Eatwell, 2004: 11).

Semitism (Betz, 1994: 4). Therefore, we should place these parties on the right of the political spectrum not because of their socioeconomic position, but because of their sociocultural politics.

Regarding their radical[14] position, there are not many contentions. These parties are radical because they reject the existing socio-cultural and political system without clearly questioning the legitimacy of democracy (Betz, 1994; Betz & Johnson, 2004; Ignazi, 2003). It is also argued that they are radical because they have radical, non-centrist positions on issues which constitute the core of their ideology (Akkerman et al., 2016: 5). Mudde (2007: 25), on the other hand, argues that they are radical since they oppose some key elements of liberal democracy, primarily political pluralism and constitutional protection of minorities.

1.1.2. Ideological Framework

As it is highlighted in the previous section, there is a huge confusion about the terminology. Although there is a lack of consensus on a generally accepted definition, authors agree on defining the radical right as an ideology (Herz, 1975, Mudde, 1995).[15] However, there exists a huge debate as to what the ideology consists of. Before turning to the contemporary RRPs' ideology, it is important to examine its historical roots. As it is stated by Von Beyme (1988: 145), in order to comprehend the radical right movements today, one should go back to the fascist movements mainly in Germany and Italy which flourished in the interwar period. Although fascism as a political end ceased to exist after World War II, its ideas barely vanished. As it is argued in the previous section, contemporary RRPs lack a direct connection to the fascist legacy, yet it is important to discuss the basic premises of fascist ideology so that one can see the differences and similarities between these two movements.

[14] The term 'radical' is often linked to the right. However it originates from the other side of the political spectrum. This term was used for defining the advocates of the French Revolution, i.e. the 'left'. Yet, today it is mostly used in connection with the right (Mudde, 2007: 24).

[15] Yet, some other authors add another dimension, i.e. the use of violence (Von Beyme, 1988; Benz, 1989), and particular party strategy (De Schampheleire 1991 cited in Mudde, 2000; Jäger cited in Mudde, 2000).

1.1.2.1. Fascist Ideology and Its Intellectual Roots

As a prominent figure in the studies of fascism, Roger Griffin (1991: 48) offers the following definition: 'Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism.' Palingenetic[16] is not a concept which is unique to fascism. It denotes renewal and rebirth, and symbolizes rising from one's ashes like a phoenix, or rebirth after death as in Christianity and in Islam. It also reflects the idea that a new and better order will be established once again after a collapse. It occasionally symbolizes the return to the past. This concept and the idea behind it have been used in many different countries and contexts, and by various individuals, yet it is its combination with ultra-nationalism which makes it peculiar to fascism (Griffin, 1991: 56-60).

Griffin (1991: 60) defines the terms 'populism' and 'ultra-nationalism' as follows;

> *... as a generic term for political forces which, even if led by small elite cadres or self-appointed 'vanguards', in practice or in principle (and not merely for show) depend on 'people power' as the basis of their legitimacy. I am using 'ultra-nationalism', which already has some currency in the political sciences, to refer to forms of nationalism which 'go beyond', and hence reject, anything compatible with liberal institutions or with the tradition of Enlightenment humanism which underpins them.*

He states (1991: 61) that populist ultra-nationalism wants neither dynastic rulers nor imperial powers nor a nationalism that aspires to overthrow a colonial power to establish representative democracy. Put differently, ultra-nationalism wants neither absolutism nor pluralistic representative democracy. In Weber's terms (as cited in Griffin, 1991: 61), it rejects both 'traditional' and 'legal/rational' forms of politics in favor of 'charismatic' ones. In this form of politics, he argues, the cohesion and dynamics of a social movement depend on the ability of the charismatic leaders to create loyalty and prompt people to take action. In other words, it differs from the dynastic and imperial period in its power to convince communities to

[16] Etymologically, the term 'palingenesis' derives from palin (again, anew) and genesis (creation, birth) (Griffin, 1991: 56). See Roger Griffin, the Nature of Fascism, Chapter 2 for detailed information regarding its usage.

believe in itself and to get their consent and push them to action. However, in the 'ancien' regime, i.e. the dynastic and imperial period, there was no such thing as taking the consent of the people and urging them to take action. Nation in the term 'populist ultra-nationalism' refers to an ethical community which is vulnerable to many different dangers supposedly posed by immigrants to the values of liberal, modern society. As Griffin (1991: 61) states;

> *It tends to be associated with a concept of the nation as a 'higher' racial, historical, spiritual or organic reality which embraces all the members of the ethical community who belong to it. Such a community is regarded by its protagonists as a natural order which can be contaminated by miscegenation and immigration, by the anarchic, unpatriotic mentality encouraged by liberal individualism, internationalist socialism, and by any number of 'alien' forces allegedly unleashed by 'modern' society, for example the rise of the 'masses', the decay of moral values, the 'levelling' of society, cosmopolitanism, feminism, and consumerism.*

Described in these terms, ultranationalism can be seen in different forms; in movements of racism and xenophobia, in separatist movements and in nationalistic authoritarian regimes (eg. the regimes of Vargas, Peron and Qadhafi) (Griffin, 1991: 61).

According to Eatwell (2003: 28), in order to trace the birth of the fascist ideology, it is most fruitful to begin by looking briefly at the Enlightenment—the great intellectual movement that swept over the eighteenth century Europe. He (2003: 29) argues that fascism was a negation of the Enlightenment, part of a counterrevolution that rejected the basic assumptions of "modernity." Paradoxically, in terms of ideas, fascism was both a product of the Enlightenment and a reaction to it. In this sense, some (Nolte cited in Eatwell, 2003; Talmon, 1952) refer to the Swiss political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau asserts that people may not always be able to detect the true 'general will', thus there may be situations where they are forced to be free. Therefore, some authors see the seeds of the eliticide dictatorship in Rousseau's ideas.[17] Hegel is also pointed out because of his views that are against open society which is based on tolerance and diversity (Popper, 1962).

[17] Yet, Eatwell (2003: 29) states that it would be misleading to portray Rousseau as the first fascist. His general body of thought was multifaceted, and there were other central elements that were very different from later fascism—most notably his emphasis on universal rules applying to all peoples.

Eatwell (2003: 30) argues that Hegel saw Enlightenment philosophy, especially liberalism, as severing people from tradition—a trend that was producing alienation rather than liberation.

Similarly, according to Ozouf (as cited in Feldman et al., 1989: 3), the watershed event in this regard was the French Revolution which paved the way for a new sense of politics in Europe allowing the creation of 'New Man'. Yet, this transition was not simple. Arguments against Enlightenment emerged. Around 1850, many writers, artists, intellectuals and politicians interpreted this as a period of decline in which beauty, meaning and health were lost, and such situations provided a favorable environment for the rise of the radical right producing palingenetic reactions (Griffin, 2007). All these created a fertile ground to bring about an illiberal environment around the beginning of the 1900s. The need to create a new man emerged, requiring a break with the past. There was the danger of falling into communism or the materialist spirit of liberal democracies. Despite its brutality and horror, World War I symbolized the end of an old system only to give way to a new one and allowed access to previosly unknown lands (Feldman et al., 2018: 4).

Apart from these thinkers, there are two important movements which shape the fascist ideology; the German romantic movement and the holistic nationalism movement (Eatwell, 2003: 30). The writers of the first movement oppose the hyperrationalism of the Enlightenment. Against universal and timeless values, they support national and historical ones. Their hostility towards material values transformed into political anti-Semitism during the late nineteenth century. The Jew was pilloried as the epitome of capitalist materialism – a view particularly prevalent in the German völkisch movement, which railed against the evils of urban, industrial society (Mosse, 1964; Stem, 1961). The holistic nationalism movement, on the other hand, criticizes liberal universalism. Although hostility to outsiders emerged in ancient Greece, and Greek philosophy demonized barbarian 'others', what emerged in the late nineteenth century was a more systematic form of racial thinking. With these two movements, the nationalist and racist foundations of fascist ideology began to emerge more clearly. (Eatwell, 2003: 31). Although fascism is mostly against Enlightenment, many of its central arguments were based on reason and benefited

from emerging positive social sciences. Darwinism provided the basis for Nazi eugenism with its idea of social selection (Eatwell, 2003: 32).

Fascism's emphasis on leadership, on the other hand, arises from two key developments in social sciences (Eatwell, 2003: 32). The first one is the emergence of elite theory, put forward by leading sociologists Italian Vilfredo Pareto and German Robert Michels, which claims that societies are necessarily ruled by elites. The second development came about in the field of psychology with the studies of Sigmund Freud. His idea of unconscious drives erodes the idea of Enlightenment which presupposes that individuals act rationally and consciously. Its immediate political impact became apparent in the French philosopher Gustave Le Bon's work 'the Psychology of Crowds' (1895) where he argued that people as an emotive mass are easily swayed by charismatic leaders and are open to manipulation. The book was a best-seller, and Mussolini and Hitler were well aware of its arguments (Eatwell, 2003: 33).

Eatwell (2003: 33) asserts that these ideas were further consolidated by Friedrich Nietzsche and Georges Sorel. Despite the ambiguity in Nietzsche's writing, three points are central; first, irrational and unconscious side of human nature as put by Freud; second, the decadence of the West because of individualistic and material values; and third, the importance of charismatic and great leaders and their necessity in certain exceptional times. Sorel, on the other hand, emphasizes two important points. First, socialism should be compatible with private property; second, working class could only be brought to revolutionary consciousness by the use of 'myths'.

Fascist ideology owes more to Sorel because he combined private property with socialist ideology. This made possible a synthesis between the right and the left. Sorel was not a nationalist though; he did not have a belief in the superiority of his own nation, but instead was concerned with the fate of European civilization. Yet, after the outbreak of World War I, he understood that nationalism could be used to mobilize the society and create a new action. At first, he supported Italian fascism, but later turned against it because of Mussolini's diluted fascist ideology with his support for the rich and powerful. He died before he could comment on Nazism, but his opposition to biological racism would probably prompt him to condemn Nazism (Eatwell, 2003: 35).

The position of fascist ideology before World War I among intellectuals and political activists was a complex ideological synthesis of the old and the new, the right and the left. Therefore, rather than being a well-established ideology, it was in the earlier stages of its formation. Although it was not named yet, the foundation of fascist ideology was already apparent. The concept of rebirth was a crucial element in this process. Fascism seeks to create a new society, but it also wants to keep important old values. The ideological aim of fascism is to create a 'New Man' based on national roots. Women have a limited place in this thought. It aimed to make people a whole again by bridging the collective and individual aspects of modernity (Eatwell, 2003: 36).

Fascist ideology has two basic ideas. The first one concerns the fundamental nature of the community. Fascism wants to rebuild the nation, yet seeks a holistic one, so it tries to reduce differences and establish a strong common purpose. The second is related to socioeconomic policy. Intellectual fascists call themselves advocates of the 'Third Way', which means they are neither right-wing nor left-wing, neither capitalists nor communists. They try to obtain individual prosperity, but tie this to communal goals. Although, in theory, fascist ideology seeks social rebirth in order to create a holistic-national radical Third Way, in practice it mostly tended to emphasize the style, the charismatic leader and the demonization of enemies instead of a detailed program (Eatwell, 2003: 37).

There are four major features of the newly emerging fascist ideology. The first one is about human nature. Fascism asserts that people are normally defined as being constrained by nature and by their own abilities, but assumes that man can be reshaped in a new, more communal and virile society. The second feature is its view on geopolitics; fascism sees the nation and race as the driving forces of history. Therefore, military preparedness and aggression are required. Third, fascism defines what kind of a political and economic system is desired. It criticizes democracy and capitalism, and argues that they are weak and create social dissension. Finally, it emphasizes the necessity of propaganda and the importance of charismatic leaders in order to instill new ideas into people (Eatwell, 2003: 37).

World War I played a very important role in the formation of the first fascist movements. Although certain generalizations can be made, their effects on different

countries vary depending on national traditions. Therefore, in order to investigate the origins of fascist movements, it is necessary to focus on concrete national and historical conditions rather than on abstract ideas of fascist ideology (Eatwell, 2003: 38).

For those who fought in World War I, Mussolini and Hitler in particular, this was a therapeutic and regenerative experience that would renew the human mind and body. The aristocrats of the future would bring down the existing social, political and cultural order and replace it with the new political order that would turn people into revolutionary minded citizens (Mussolini, as cited in Feldman et al., 2018: 4). Likewise, the catastrophic defeat of Germany in World War I was very effective in creating the New Man vision. The soldier epitomized the reborn nation and rejected the failed past adopting the aggressive modernity to fulfill his duties for the future of the country. The Weimar republic could not have achieved this (Wildt, 2009).

Feldman et al. (2018: 5) argue that the interwar period's fascist spirit formed the foundations of fascist regimes. Recreating the nation and personal identity and believing in it in a uncompromising way were important characteristics of the New Man. Especially, the sacralization of the nation was a common feature of many right-wing groups in Europe after the Great War (Griffin et al., 2008). In Germany, the notion of *Volksgemeinschaft* was crucial to create and cultivate the New Man. Kuhne (2010) claims that by committing genocide perpetrators of the Holocaust built a collective identity. The concepts of common homogeneous society, belonging to the *Volk*, the collectivity, formed the basis of the mass murder. The ideas of pure, physically powerful and alert *volk* were to protect them against ethnic degeneration. It would take a long time to create the New Aryan Man, so the Nazis made it faster raising the SS as a political and racial elite group to maintain this New Man ideology systematically (Ingrao cited in Feldman et al., 2018: 6). Also, young people were very important in instilling new doctrines, since they were not contaminated with old cultural and political traditions (Alessio, 2015). They were symbols of purity, vitality, virility, and sociopolitical change, and played an important role in creating the New Man (Feldman et al., 2018: 6).

1.1.2.2. Radical Right After the Cold War

Until the 1980s, radical right ideology could not produce anything different than fascist and counter-revolutionist ideology. This period was dominated by the Italian MSI (Italian Social Movement) and the German NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany) (Ignazi, 2003: 21). A turning point occurred for the radical right in the 1980s (Ignazi, 2003: 22). Until that time, the ideology of the radical right had mostly been irrational and diffuse; there were more divisions and disputes within these parties compared to other ones (Walker, 1979: 198). Hence, its ideology needed to become scientific. Von Beyme (2017: 147) argues that scientification of the right-wing extremist ideology turned these ideas into a danger for the first time since WWII, with Nouvelle Droite in France and Tendenzwende in Germany.

According to Ignazi (2003: 22), two significant sources which allowed the radical right ideology to develop are new-conservatism, and more importantly, the Nouvelle Droite (ND) movement. Both currents affected the radical right, and as a result, fascism and its variations no longer remained a cultural resource. The ND movement originated in France and Italy, and then spread to Belgium, Germany, and Austria. This intellectual movement separated itself from fascist ideology and claimed to be the new thinking of the right (Tassani and Taguieff as cited in Ignazi, 2003: 22). Its intellectual origins were formed in the Groupment de Recherches et d'Etudes pour la Civilisation Européenne (GRECE) (Research and Study Group for the European Civilisation) and in the journal "Nouvelle Ecole". This journal was founded in 1968 by the French philosopher Alain de Benoist. Later, de Benoist became the editor of the Figaro Magazine, which was a conservative magazine with a huge number of readers. Within a few years, the research group GRECE gained a large audience and spread throughout France, and then to Italy, and later to other places (Ignazi, 2003: 22).

Ideologically, the ND was discontented with liberalism's reduction of everything to material product and with the American political-cultural hegemony. As authoritarianism and coercion were absent in the ideology, the followers of this movement only sought to obtain an organic, harmonic and non-conflicting society with an anti-liberal thinking. (Ignazi, 2003: 23). As de Benoist (1992: 46) indicates,

political liberalism is not an ideology or system that better guarantees authentic individual liberties. Especially, the ‘right to difference’ argument created the new racist propaganda of the radical right. Exclusionary politics started to emerge (Taguieff as cited in Ignazi, 2003: 24) emphasizing the idea of a natural, homogenous community.

Another body of ideas contributing to the new ideology of the radical right is neo-conservatism. It is argued that the reformulation of (mainly) American and British conservatism in the 1980s was pivotal in the change of Western societies’ cultural mood (Steinfels 1979; Bell 1980; Girvin 1988; O’Sullivan 1989; Devigne 1993). As Ignazi (2003: 24) states, ‘the neo-conservatives, in fact, insert this new individualism within the 'package' of social order, hierarchy, and submission to authority’. This became a cultural hegemony in the US in the 1980s, and then spread to all Europe. Its followers opposed the welfare policies and the expansion of the state, as well as multicultural society (Ignazi, 2003: 25).

To sum up from the beginning of the 1980s, these two new lines of thought, namely the Nouvelle Droite and neo-conservatism, helped the radical right create their own ideas and discourse. Especially, the idea of the right to difference formed the basis of exclusionary politics. Besides, nationalistic themes created out-group hostility while state enforcement produced law and order provisions (Ignazi, 2003: 26). Although radical right favors the traditional social and cultural structures, it is not against modern technology, and does not have a specific econonomic policy. While some of the RRPs support liberal, free-market policy, others tend to embrace welfare state policy. In brief, despite not being against all forms of economic and technical modernity, it is a contradictory anti-modern ideology since it can be seen as a revolt against only specific aspects of social modernity (Wahl, 2020: 14).

1.1.2.3. The Ideological Features of the Radical Right Parties

Extreme right parties were not properly classified until the 1980s. In the first comparative analysis of these parties, Von Beyme (1988) acknowledged the difficulty to evaluate these parties on a common ground. In order to classify these parties, scholars sought to determine their ideological characteristics (Mair and

Mudde, 1998). Some of the early characteristics identified were anti-democratic tendencies (Backes &Jesse, 1993: 474), the rejection of the equality principle (Backes as cited in Ignazi, 2003: 27), the 'rejection of socio-cultural and socio-political systems' (Betz, 1994: 413), and ethnic nationalism (Fennema, 1997: 483-6). Mudde (1996) undertook the most comprehensive of these attempts by specifying 58 different characteristics among 28 authors. After him, Druwe and Mantino (1996) identified 42 features out of 11 German studies. According to Mudde (1996, 2000), there are 5 common features almost all the authors agree on; nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and strong state.

Mudde (2014) later revised his own definition. He defines the radical right ideology as a combination of three characteristics. The first is nativism, a concept that refers to nationalism and xenophobia. The second one is authoritarianism in the sense of supporting a strictly ordered society and emphasizing law and order issues. The final characteristic is populism defined by its opposition to the corrupt elite and its support for the expression of the general will of the people. Ignazi (2003: 202) defines characteristics of the radical right ideology in a similar way. He stated:

> *Only more radical parties could fully voice sentiments that reflected the demands of identity (hence nationalism), of homogeneity (hence xenophobia), of order, hierarchy and strong leadership (authoritarianism). And finally, only non-established parties could assault the democratic representative system by undermining its legitimacy because of failings, unaccountability, corruption, mismanagement, selfishness, etc.*

There is a great emphasis on culture, values and identity rather than on a patriotic nationalism. It is mainly ethnic nationalism that seeks the dominance of the main ethnic group, and wishes for the creation of homogeneous states (Bar-on, 2018: 44). Defending diversity, RRPs oppose universalism and multiculturalism. Instead of explicitly declaring that they are racists, they support the idea of the 'right' to identity and difference, and respect for cultural diversity as in the discourse of the Nouvelle Droite., Filip Dewinter, an important figure in Vlaams Belang (as cited in Betz and Johnson, 2004: 316), expresses that "racism means a belief that on the basis of racial features, a group of people is superior or inferior to another. This is not what we believe; everyone is equal but not all the same." The former UKIP leader Nigel Farage (Sparrow, 2014) also opposed multiculturalism fiercely, and stated, "This

country in a short space of time has frankly become unrecognisable… Whether it is the impact on local schools and hospitals, whether it is the fact in many parts of England you don't hear English spoken any more. This is not the kind of community we want to leave to our children and grandchildren". Taguieff (1993: 122, 124) advocates that the differentialist racism signifies the preservation of the identity of the group. Thus, he notes, exclusion can be justifiable under the general demand of the right to difference.

Radical right ideology discusses who the 'people' are and who should be a part of it, and endorses the idea that ethnic minorities should be assimilated. One can find important features of contemporary radical right ideology in the German Conservative Revolution, including the idea of Europe as a unique cultural homeland with pre-Christian mythic roots. While it celebrates ethnic diversity and difference, it is against multi-racial society (presented as genocidal) and American cultural imperialism (Griffin, 2000: 170, 171). This may seem contradictory, but radical right idology supports that unique cultures should be protected in their own countries. In this sense, it opposes immigration and multiculturalism. Contrary to charges of racism, RRPs assert that they are the ones that truly support diversity. In a report published in 2002, the Italian Lega Nord (cited in Betz & Johnson 2004: 317) asserted that they support tightening of the immigration laws because they fight for the survival of their nations, and are on the side of diversity of cultures, true tolerance, and freedom, unlike American multiculturalism which represents the real camp of sameness, deracination and enslavement.

It is argued that they are not anti-immigrant, but rather support selective exclusion because they believe that some groups cannot be integrated. Since they damage the homogeneity of the nation, Muslims are viewed as "enemies" of the "true nation" (Bar-On, 2018: 56). In addition to these core issues, it must also be said that the RRPs have developed an ethno-religious discourse against Muslims. They argue that Islam is fundamentally anti-democratic and illiberal, thus it is not compatible with Western culture (Betz and Johnson, 2004: 317). Although they accept that the home-born immigrants cannot be forced to go back to their countries of origin, they want these immigrants to assimilate and denounce their religion (Zuquete, 2008: 113). The leader of the Dutch RRP (PVV; the Party for Freedom)

Geert Wilders stated that his party believes that Islam is not comparable to other world religions such as Christianity or Judaism, but rather to totalitarian ideologies like communism and fascism. Hence, Muslims, in his view, are not entitled to the same constitutional and international protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief as enjoyed by other believers (ten Napel, 2017). Besides, with the policy of 'national preference', they aim to reserve 'citizenship', social rights and access to work first and foremost for the "own people" of the nation, thereby proposing an ethnocratic alternative (Betz and Johnson, 2004: 322).

Although RRPs borrow some of their characteristics from fascist ideology, characteristics that are not compatible with liberal democratic systems, these parties may not give any reference to these. Even if they do not assert that they are fascists, common themes can be found. Although they express in their official documents their respect for democratic principles, they undermine the legitimacy of the system. Even if they do not have ties to interwar fascism and they reject any reference to it, they embody anti-system values (Ignazi, 2003: 32). Similarly, Schleder (1996: 304) states that while 'these actors profess to accept the basic rules of the constitutional game', they may 'wrap their antidemocratic attacks in democratic clothes, fashionable and presentable'. As Ignazi (2003: 32) puts it, 'the disloyal opposition tries to 'mask' its inner drive'. Although they reject violence and support freedom and democratic institutional representation, it is in contrast with their 'esoteric' discourse and real behaviour (Betz and Immerfall, 1998: 3).

Griffin (2000: 173,174) makes one of the most striking warnings against the radical right arguing that its ideology reflects democratic fascism and ethnocratic perversions of liberalism:

> *It is a type of party politics which is not technically a form of fascism, even a disguised form of it, for it lacks the core palingenetic vision of a 'new order' totally replacing the liberal system. Rather it enthusiastically embraces the liberal system, but considers only one ethnic group full members of civil society… and most can sincerely claim to have nothing to do with historic fascism in the conventional sense of the word. Yet in a world inoculated against openly revolutionary varieties of palingenetic ultranationalism, their axiomatic rejection of multi-culturalism, their longing for 'purity', their nostalgia for a mythical world of racial homogeneity and clearly demarcated boundaries of cultural differentiation, their celebration of the ties of blood and history over reason and a common humanity, their rejection of ius soli for ius sanguinis, their solvent-like abuse of history represent a reformist version of the same basic myth.*

Since no country in Europe has the equivalent of the American First Amendment[18], extremists face important problems regarding free speech. Democratic systems are protected in constitutions in Western Europe in particular, and they have the right to ban non-democratic movements and parties (e.g., *Vervassungschutz* in Germany). Especially, the speech is restricted for acts like Holocaust Denial. Similarly, the Front National's leader Le Pen had been charged due to photographs she posted on Twitter displaying disturbing and appalling images of the atrocities that Isis committed. The pictures were posted a few weeks after the Paris terror attacks in November 2015, in which 130 people were killed. Also in September, the French Parliament had lifted the immunity of another Front National MP, Gilbert Collard, because of similar tweets containing Isis images (Marine Le Pen charged for posting violent Isis images on Twitter, 2018). Likewise, in the Netherlands the leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV) Geert Wilders was accused of leading calls for "fewer Moroccans" in the Netherlands at a rally in 2014. In 2016, he was convicted of insulting a group and inciting discrimination. He had also been previously prosecuted in 2011, over anti-Islam comments as he compared the religion to Nazism and called for a ban on the Koran (Geert Wilders, 2016). These kinds of incidents may explain why radical right parties in Europe try to appear democratic. While they pay homage to the democratic system, they want to reform the society in other issue areas. This seems to explain the difference between their front and back stage behavior.

The second important aspect of radical right ideology is law and order, and security policies. Their security understanding is not only limited to individual security, but it also involves the security of the nation, race and 'natives'. Especially, crime rates are emphasized by the RRP members and are mostly associated with immigrants. In fact, people who have different national roots but were born and grew up in these countries are still falsely referred to as immigrants by the members of radical right parties (Mudde, 2019: 18). These 'immigrants' and especially the Muslim community are seen as the major source of crimes. Thus, RRP members

[18] The Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. (U.S. Constitution - First Amendment | Resources | Constitution Annotated | Congress.gov | Library of Congress, n.d.)

propose more strict law and order policies and call for a higher number of police officers on streets and for tougher sentences.

A website had been launced by Filip Dewinter's Vlaams Belang to encourage the community to snitch on migrants suspected of illegal activity, such as not paying taxes or exploiting social security assistance. The scheme intended to gather warning calls from unnamed people and convey them to the police (Nielsen, 2012a). A prize of €250 was also proposed by Dewinter to be given to anybody who would denounce women who wear Burqas to the Belgian police after the police had captured a Burqa-wearing woman in Brussels on the grounds that she had rejected to show her face (Nielsen, 2012b). Moreover, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) launched a website called 'Neutral Schools' which encourages pupils and parents to report teachers breaching the country's neutrality law that prohibits them from advocating their political opinions in classroom (Eddy, 2018).

It is also suggested that the youth should be given in schools more discipline, respect and traditional values, especially regarding the importance of the heterosexual family (Mudde, 2019: 20). Offering a policy paper regarding the sexual education curriculum, the AfD announced the traditional family model and the heterosexual marriage as the main goal of life and sought to limit the information given on homo-, trans-, and bisexuality in lessons (AfD publishes sex education proposal focusing on 'classical family values' | DW | 15.11.2016, 2016).

The last aspect of radical right ideology is populism, a term which has started to be used commonly for defining contemporary radical right parties. As an important feature of radical right ideology, Mudde (2019: 5) describes populism "as a (thin) ideology that conceives society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure people and the corrupt elite, and which asserts that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people". At least in theory, he argues, populism is pro-democracy, but anti-liberal democracy.

Eatwell (2004: 11,12) identifies four important features of populist radical right parties. First, they reflect the true wishes of the people; second, they are anti-establishment and are against the corrupted elite; third, they use low concepts, such as street language, rather than high ones; and fourth, they emphasize charismatic

leaders who express what people really think. Canovan (1981) argues that it is perceived more of a style than a distinct body of thought. It is a strong ideology and tends to be negative (Eatwell, 2003: 12). There is also populism on the left side of the political spectrum. Hence, academics use compound terms, such as national populism (Taguieff, cited in Eatwell, 2004: 12).

Arguing that right-wing populism is an element of neodemocracy[19], Von Beyme (2019: 6) asserts that populism is not actually such a hazardous thing as some suspect it to be. On the contrary, an average citizen shares populists' opinion. Indeed, in some cases the contributions of populists to new issues become an inspiration and resource for center parties to implement their plans more effectively. More importantly, right-wing populists help restrain the effect of radical right-wing extremism, according to Beyme. He (2019: 7) underlines that coalition opportunities with these parties should definitely be taken into consideration by center parties. This allows for the invisible stabilization of democracy, which he describes as neo-democracy, because it can offer an entirely new perspective in policy making. In other words, erosion of councils, administrations and some organizations can be prevented in this way.

On the other hand, Eatwell (2003: 12) warns against populism. Labelling radical right parties as populist creates a danger because it legitimizes them by having the opposite effect of when these groups are called extreme. Besides, he argues, populism poses significant dangers to liberal democracy. First, populism has a proclivity to divide issues as black and white, or good and evil. This makes compromise and bargaining, which are important features of liberal democracy, more difficult. Second, populism has an emphasis on strong leader with a sense of mission as opposed to having a specific party program. This creates a sort of attack on parties as the basis of democracy. Third, populists oppose many individual rights. They support the idea that the rights should belong to the majority. Immigrants or asylum seekers should have limited or no rights. Fourth, they see structures like the EU as the best examples of backroom deals and the United Nations as corrupt and the

[19] As a term suggested by the populism debate, 'neodemocracy' is used by Von Beyme (2019: 3) instead of the rather negative term 'post-democracy'. While post-democracy implies the collapse of democracy, and right-wing populism analyses only the negative consequences of this decline, the term 'neo-democracy' suggests that democracy has not been completely ruined by recent developments.

center of many conspiracies. Especially in the US, it is associated with the New World Order as it is claimed that the UN will occupy the US. Fifth, they pose a danger to the unbiased judicial discourse that is central to the concept of reason. They develop a language against liberalism's value neutrality and pluralism. Especially in the US, populist groups endorsed a fundamentalist Christian attitude and created a challenge to dominant liberal ideas on abortion or on the teaching of the Creation. Finally, populist parties have a significant impact on other parties, especially in the context of issues like immigration and integration. This can be seen in the 1980s and 1990s when the impact of Le Pen's FN led even the left-wing parties to adopt some elements of its agenda and rhetoric. Similarly, Berlusconi's conservative government in Italy was affected by the Northern League and Alleanza in terms of immigration policy (Eatwell, 2003: 13).

In this study, the concept of radical right will be referred to as an ideology in line with Cas Mudde's radical right ideology definition which consists of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. This definition is chosen not only because it is a well-accepted argument among the scholarly community, but also because it is perfectly applicable to this study's subject matter, the radical right party AfD. One can clearly see the sentiments of the radical right ideology in their party manifestos.

CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

2.1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RADICAL RIGHT IN GERMANY

Radical right is a very serious phenomenon for Germany because of apparent reasons. The international community is also highly sensitive to the smallest radical right movement in Germany for the same obvious reasons. Therefore, the subject has brought forth a huge academic literature (Art, 2011:191). Yet, one has to remember that until the AfD gained seats in the *Bundestag* in 2017, not a single RRP could obtain a single seat at the national level since 1945. Although many authors have tried to explain why the radical right has risen in Germany, it also makes sense to look at the reasons why they have repeatedly failed.

Three dynamics can be identified that have prevented the radical right from becoming a significant political force (Art, 2011: 191)[20]. The first one is the intra-party conflicts. When we look at the NPD (National Democratic Party), we can observe the tensions between the middle-aged administration of the NPD and its young governed members. These tensions began when the head of the NPD, Udo Voigt, claimed that the survival of the party could only be achieved by opening up to the Neo-Nazis. Although Voigt's strategy was successful in many ways, this led to a conflict of interest between the party elite and new members. While the first group supported electoral competition and tried to take seats in parliament, the other group sought camaraderie and constituency representation. Although the NPD did not support parliamentary democracy and adopted biological racism, it can be said that

[20] Yet, Minkenberg (2006: 44) argues that state repression may contribute to the empowerment of the radical right, instead of weakening it. As a result of these measures, RRPs reorganize their party structure, build up and adopt new strategies in this repressive environment. The failed attempt to ban the NDP in 2002 and its electoral success in the state of Saxony only after two years reveal that the radical right can advance under the right social circumstances and with effective development of party organization despite the threat of state repression. Furthermore, repression strengthens the ties inside the 'victim' party and hardens its ideological position. Social psychologists like Friedhelm Neidhardt (1989) and Charles Tilly (2004) also confirm that the consolidation of identities comes forward as an unintended result of repression and social exclusion.

there was also a moderate section within the party. During the post-war years, disputes arose with the extremist Neo-Nazi base because the moderate section sought to establish a democratic party to the right of the CDU/CSU. These disagreements started to damage the party in the 1960s and were the cause of electoral failure in the subsequent years (Art, 2011: 191).

The second dynamic is state control. In this regard, the police force was effective. When radical right groups or parties demonstrated, the police had to protect both groups from each other. At the same time, the German government tightly controlled the activities of parties and organizations, and sometimes banned them. The government converted members of radical right parties and organizations with state programs and integrated them into the society. In the 1950s, Adenauer's government decided to take the former Nazis back to the elite positions in politics and society, in return for promising to commit to parliamentary democracy and not attempt to revive their old ideology (Art, 2011: 192).

State repression against the radical right has been one of the significant components of the political environment in Germany. One can find a wide arsenal of legal means which could be used to limit the radical right both in terms of diffusion of ideas and opinions, and in terms of actions of groups and individuals (Minkenberg, 2006: 36). It is argued that the repressive tools used not only serve to restrict the activities and events of radical right parties, groups and individuals, but also reflect the limits of tolerance of the constitutional state. Especially, the much famous failed attempt to ban the NPD can attest to the difficulties of using these repressive tools to defend democracy. Yet, the experience of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazis have compelled the Federal Republic to implement these repressive tools, thus causing this model to be defined as a militant democracy in Germany. (Michael and Minkenberg, 2007: 1115).

In order to hinder the expression of anti-democratic ideas, Germany set up an agency called *Verfassungschutz* (the Office of the Protection of the Constitution) which may recommend to the judiciary the dissolution of extremist groups. Yet, the authorities that can legally decide about non-party organizations and about political parties are separate. While the former can be banned by the Ministry of Interior, it is the Federal Constitutional Court which can ban a political party as stated in both

Article 21(2) of the German Basic Law and Articles 13(2) and 43(1) of the Federal Constitutional Court Act[21]. Nevertheless, there is still a possibility that these measures may create dangers. Such repressive tools incite counter-reactions and damage the reputation of democracy. Moreover, using these instruments too often, as in Germany, make them ineffective over time. Extreme groups and RRPs will develop the necessary maneuver to escape from these tools (Michael and Minkenberg, 2007: 1115). As it is stated by Van Donselaar (2017: 556), the more government puts pressure on the radical right, the more they need to adapt themselves to this repressive environment. Moreover, and maybe more importantly, he indicates that this increased adaptation causes a difference between how these radical right organizations present themselves to the outside environment *(front-stage behaviour)* and how they actually are behind the scenes (back-stage behaviour). In other words, the RRP leaders deal with and convincingly control image management. Indeed, Art (2007: 345) has argued that the electoral success of the DVU and the NPD in the 2004 state elections in Brandenburg and Saxony shows that the radical right has started to become a political force in Germany despite state repression. Especially the NPD transformed itself and consolidated its party organization so that they were able to hold representation.[22]

The last dynamic is the anti-fascist groups which are mobilized against the activities of the NPD in the post-war years. Altough organization-building certainly became difficult for a number of RRPs in Germany due to the activities of these anti-fascist groups in the past four decades, the main reason is the reaction of German society and politics to the radical right which restricted the necessary environment for the parties to recruit and develop (Art, 2011: 192). One should consider these three dynamics when analyzing the radical right in Germany because these make

[21] 21(2) Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional (Federal Law Gazette, 2019a). 13(2) The Federal Constitutional Court shall decide on the unconstitutionality of political parties (Art. 21 sec. 2 of the Basic Law), 43(1)The Bundestag, the Bundesrat, or the Federal Government may apply for a decision on whether a political party is unconstitutional (Art. 21 sec. 2 of the Basic Law) (Federal Law Gazette, 2015b).

[22] Yet, he (2007: 346) argues that it has been primarily an Eastern phenomenon and the NDP has legitimacy mainly in specific places in the East. The contradiction between the attitude of the West and the East to the radical right and its electoral success in the latter signals that Germany still lacks ‘inner unity’.

more sense in the context of the analysis of the “four waves” of radical right political activity in post-war Germany, the first one of which started in the late 1940s and 1950s.

2.1.1. The Radical Right Parties in (West) Germany, 1949-2013

In the literature, authors divided the history of the radical right in Germany into waves. For instance, Pfahl-Traughber (2000) and Saalfeld (1997) identified three waves in order to describe this period. Later, Art (2011) and Williams (2006) benefited from this categorization, and divided the period into four waves. While Pfahl-Traughber and Saalfed evaluate the REP and the DVU within the same wave, which is the third wave, Art and Williams assess these parties in different waves putting the DVU into the fourth wave. In this study, I will use Art and Williams’s categorization and analyze the period in four waves. In each wave, a different RRP rises and then falls. The first wave is marked by the short-lived success of the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) between 1950 and 1952. The second wave took place between 1966 and 1969 when the NPD achieved limited electoral success. The third wave began in the middle of the 1980s with the rise of the Republican Party in Germany. It finished in 1993 when the popular support for the radical right fell sharply after the adoption of the legislation limiting the right to political asylum in Germany. The fourth wave began with the 1997–1998 state level electoral successes of the German People’s Union (DVU).

2.1.1.1. The First Wave, 1950-1952

The SRP was the continuation of the - Nazi party, the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP). They clearly expressed their admiration for Hitler and praised the idea of German people’s privileged blood community. The SRP sought to continue what Hitler had started, including the implementation of the "social revolution" (Zimmerman and Saalfeld, 1993: 52). The SRP's electoral success came in 1951, when they gained 11% of the votes in Lower Saxony and almost 8% in Bremen. Subsequent to these results, West Germany's Chancellor Konrad

Adenauer encouraged the banning of the party through the Federal Constitutional Court as the party posed a threat to post-war democracy. The government implemented Article 21 of the Constitution, and as a result, the SRP was dissolved in 1952 (Williams, 2006: 116). Most members of the party moved to the German Reich Party (DRP). However, in the years of the 'economic miracle' and under the increasing pressure of state prosecution, the RRPs suffered electoral failure, fractionalization and political isolation (Saalfeld, 1997: 1). In all three elections held in 1953, 1957 and 1961, the DRP received no more than 1.1% of the votes.

As previously mentioned, there are various factors that caused RRPs' failure in the first wave. The first reason is the conflicts inside the right, specifically the conflict between national socialists and conservative nationalists (Art, 2011: 193). Because of these conflicts, National Socialists in the DRP broke off to form the SRP. Similarly, within the BHE (Federation of Expellees and Disfranchaised), which was another RRP, there was a moderate group that did not want to endanger the alliance with the CDU, as well as extremists who wanted to return to the period before the defeat of Nazi Germany. Likewise, the DP (German Party) leader expelled party members who supported pro-fascist statements in 1950, and then closed the party in 1953 for being sabotaged by Nazi elements (Nagle, 1970: 25).

Adenauer's integration policy was the second major factor that helped the radical right's fall. As many historians (Friedrich 1984; Frei 1999) have shown, one of Adenauer's priorities was to reverse the denazification process and allow the old Nazis to return to their duties in the government. As an example of this policy, Adenauer appointed the former Nazi officer Hans Globke as his chief of staff in 1949. There was an unwritten but broadly accepted rule in this bargain: the former Nazis were allowed to return to the government, yet they would neither defend their past nor challenge the new democratic system. The mainstream parties, especially the CDU and FDP, also opened their doors to these people. Adenauer prepared to make a coalition with the DP and BHE because he knew that this would cause conflict between the extremists and moderates within the party. For example, in the 1953 elections, Adenauer offered several ministries to the BHE, even though it received only 5.6% of the votes. While the moderates wanted to accept this, the extremists resisted staying in opposition. As a result, people in the party's leadership left the

party in 1955 to join the CDU. As Nagle (1970: 24) states, “this process eventually deprived the BHE of its most respected and able leaders and hastened the already apparent decline of the party.” The DP experienced a similar process, as many of its prominent figures converted to the CDU in the late 1950s.

The third reason for the radical right’s failure in the first wave was the repressive apparatus of the state. The Federal Republic was specifically founded as a “militant democracy” (*streitbare Demokratie*) in which the Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*) could ban any political party that was hostile to the Basic Law of 1949 (Art, 2011: 194). In 1952, the Federal Constitutional Court announced the SRP illegal and put a sudden end to the party's rise. It was obvious that the SRP was founded by and for the Nazis, and they did little to hide it. After the party was banned, many members of the SRP moved to other parties, especially to the DRP. Faced with the threat of party banning, many moderates within the radical right were prompted to seek security and greater stability in the CDU and FDP. The arrest of the former Nazi state secretary Werner Naumann, who created a power base within the FDP, also showed that the state would not allow the Nazis to regain power (Frei, 1999). In sum, the German government used the carrot (integration) and stick (repression) method to hinder the radical right.

Last but not least, the fourth important factor which reduced the radical right’s electoral appeal was the *Wirtschaftswunder* (Economic Miracle). This was not a fertile environment for parties that advocated a return to the past. It would take almost fifteen years before economic growth stalled for the first time and allowed the radical right to enter its second wave (Art, 2011: 195).

2.1.1.2. The Second Wave, 1966-1969

The failure of the RRPs brought them together in the early 1960s. The BHE merged with the DP and became the *Gesamtdeutsche Partei* (All-German Party, GDP). However, it did not succeed in the 1961 *Bundestag* elections. Similarly, with only 0.8% of the vote, the party leader of the DRP Adolf von Thadden felt that a change of strategy was needed to save the party and survive in the 1965 *Bundestag*

elections. Therefore, after a few months of negotiations, the NPD was established in 1964.

Although the NPD included the former members of the BHE and DP, it was actually a renamed DRP. With the banning of the SRP, one of the most important conclusions that von Thadden drew was the need to moderate the party (Kühnl et al., 1969: 29). Therefore, he allowed Fritz Thielen, who was previously in the CDU and DP parties, to become the party leader. In addition, new names were added to state-level units to hide the party's former DRP supremacy (Smoydzin, 1969: 23). In addition, von Thadden sought to control the public statements of party members. Thus, he forbade them to discuss the so-called Jewish question and prepared sample speeches (Dittmer, 1969: 83). As many of its members were former Nazi party members, the NPD's propaganda chief Hess warned them to adjust the tone of their speeches. Model speeches created a common discourse. In fact, this was applied so tightly by party members that the candidates sometimes gave exactly the same answers to the questions posed to them (Kühnl et al., 1969: 41).

Despite the active election campaign and an estimate of 15% of the votes, the NPD was able to garner only 2% of the votes in the 1965 *Bundestag* elections and was doomed to become another fringe party among the RRPs. However, two exogenous reasons caused the party to revive again (Art, 2011: 197). The first was the economic downturn that caused the Federal Republic to suffer in 1966 the highest unemployment in its history. The second reason was the Grand Coalition established between the SPD and CDU. Many conservatives did not support the CDU's coalition with the left, and their discontent led the voters to vote for the radical right. The NPD gained significant success in the state elections in March 1966 and in April 1968 receiving the highest vote in the state of Baden Württemberg with 9.8%.

Consequently, the NPD was expected to pass the 5% threshold in the 1969 *Bundestag* elections. When the party obtained only 4.3% of the votes (and 0 seats), this was the beginning of a very long period of election failures. Some of the reasons why the party achieved this result were beyond its control. The Grand Coalition ended before the 1969 elections, and conservatives who had voted for the radical right in previous election returned to the CDU. The recovery in the economy also led to a decrease in the unemployment rate. Yet, the main reason for the party's failure

was the conflict within the party (Art, 2011: 197). The party was suffering from the internal divisions over whether it should employ more extreme and militant methods or should cooperate with mainstream right parties in order to make coalition partnerships. Many advocates left the NPD in the early 1970s and militants joined radical right movements and Neo-Nazi groups in order to express their beliefs and frustration because of the lack of representation of their interests in the German federal parliament. (Williams, 2006: 117).

2.1.1.3. The Third Wave, 1980-1993

The rise of the RRP Republikaner (REP) before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was one of the most important political developments for West Germany (Art, 2011: 199). The Republican Party was founded in 1983 by three discontented members within the CSU. Two of them were the CSU's former *Bundestag* deputies Franz Hanlos and Ekkehard Voigt, and the other was the leading television journalist Fanz Schönhuber. The three were prompted to leave the CSU and start a new party after the Bavarian leader of the state legislature from the CSU, Franz-Josef Strauss, negotiated a controversial loan of several thousand million Deutschmarks for the German Democratic Republic (Stöss, 1991: 198). The policy was considered to be overly "reconciliatory" in a climate where great tension between the two Germanies persisted (Zimmermann and Saalfeld, 1993: 55).

The REP also experienced a conflict between extremists and conservatives, which split the NPD in the 1960s. If it could attract more moderates, the REP could have handled this conflict with success. However, the political, social and legal reactions to the REP not only hindered the party's ability to attract new members but also caused the existing members to leave the party (Art, 2006; 2007). Besides, all parties represented in the parliament applied cordon sanitaire against the REP at all political levels. Anti-fascists routinely vandalized the property of REP politicians and threatened their physical security. It became very difficult for REP members to obtain a leadership position in the voluntary associations and clubs, which play an important role in German society. One of the state leaders of the REP claimed that he lost a third of his friends after joining the party (cited in Art, 2011: 202). After the

party's first election success in 1989, the REP lost 40% of its members within a year. Many REP members attributed this decline to the social pressures that they faced.

Although these factors are undoubtedly important, the reaction of the state played a central role in increasing the cost of membership in radical right organizations (Art, 2011: 202). In 1972, the West German government of Willy Brand passed the Decree Against Radicals which prohibited people with radical political views from becoming civil servants. Although the main target of this law was initially the left-wing terrorist group Red Army Faction, it was also applied to radical right-wingers. Since such groups as teachers and the police are placed in the category of civil servants in addition to government bureaucrats, acting upon this law, the authorities could check the loyalty of around 3.5 million people to the state. (Braunthal, 1990). Besides, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution began monitoring the REP in many German states. This gave employers the right to ask their potential and existing workers whether they are members of the REP. The former Bavarian leader of the REP claimed that he had advised white-collar workers to leave the party so they would not endanger their careers, and also noted that in the late 1990s the party was almost full of those who had nothing else to lose (Gardner as cited in Art, 2007: 341).

2.1.1.4. The Fourth Wave, 1997-2006

Since the fall of the radical right party REP in the mid-1990s marking the end of the third wave, two parties have dominated the German radical right: the German People's Union (*Deutsche Volksunion*, DVU) and the regenerated NPD. The DVU was the personal electoral vehicle of the millionaire Gerhard Frey, who was owner of the weekly radical right newspaper Deutsche National-Zeitung. Founded in 1987, the DVU could not develop anything close to a party organization (Art, 2011: 203). Nevertheless, Frey, who spent a large amount of money on party propaganda to obtain parliamentary representation, managed to achieve votes in some state elections. For example, in 1987, Frey spent 2 million marks on the Bremen state elections, an amount more than the election budgets of all parties combined, and achieved 3.4% of the votes (Winkler and Schumann, 1998: 99-100). Moreover, Frey

spent 17 million marks in the 1989 European elections, and obtained only 1.6% of the votes. However, at the beginning of the 1990s the party managed to pass the 5% threshold in the states of Bremen and Schleswig-Holstein.

The DVU's greatest success was in the state election of Saxony-Anhalt in 1998. Although the party organization was not very strong in this state (there were only 30 members in the whole state), the party received 12.9% of the votes, thanks to huge mass-mailing campaigns, which shocked the observers (Backes and Mudde, 2000: 53). However, as in other states, the parliamentary group quickly collapsed there due to the incompetence of the representatives. In the first year, one-fourth of the group left the party to join the other parties, and the DVU won no more than 2% of the votes in the 2002 state elections (Rensmann, 2006: 73). In 2004, it won 6 seats in parliament in the state elections, with 6.1% of the votes in Brandenburg. But five years later, this parliamentary group also collapsed and received only 1.2% of the votes in the next state elections. Throughout its history, the DVU has been a very weak party, with limited successes in state elections and failures in parliament. However, the new NPD really proved to be a different type of party (Art, 2011: 204).

There are two fundamental differences between the NPD in the 1960s and the NDP in the 2000s. First, the old NPD is the party of the old Nazis, while the new NPD mostly consists of the youth. Second, the old NPD operated in West Germany, while the new one was deployed in East Germany. After the unification of Germany, the extremists went east and established local organizations. The collapse of the social institutions of East Germany provided a suitable environment for Neo-Nazi organizations to recruit people. Many youth organizations there provided activities for young people after school. These possibilities disappeared after the Wall had fallen and the NPD acted to fill this vacuum. The party shared many common features with the communists, like their emphasis on order and discipline, and therefore the legacy of East Germany contributed to the party's success. Since then, the high unemployment rate and pessimism about their lives brought many young males to the party (Art, 2011: 204).

Yet, if Günther Deckert, who was the leader of the party between 1991 and 1996, had not been removed, it might not have been possible to take advantage of these opportunities as Deckert's Holocaust revision discourse marginalized the party

in the east. That changed in 1996 with the election of Udo Voigt as the leader. The party slowly began to adopt an anti-capitalist rhetoric and highlight socio-economic problems. This was part of the NPD's efforts to moderate (at least on paper) its extremist ideology and create a more respectable image in the eyes of the electorate. This strategy yielded its results in Saxony in the 2004 state elections. While the NPD emphasized social security and justice in its slogans, it opposed the German government's concept of the welfare state. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's liberal labor market reforms also provided the NPD with the ideal political opportunity. Although the party did not hide its xenophobic rhetoric, it tried to present itself to the voters as respectable as possible. After thirty-six years in its political life the party was able to obtain 9.2% of the votes and 12 seats in Saxony. In 2006, it was able to achieve 7.3% of the votes and 6 seats in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (Art, 2011: 204-205).

Unlike the DVU, the NPD had broad networks in many eastern German provinces, particularly in Saxony and Brandenburg, which later became dangerous. Toralf Staud (cited in Art, 2011: 206), a journalist from Zeit, wrote that the NPD became acceptable in many eastern provinces. In 2001, he wrote that the radical right is not just an eastern phenomenon of marginal groups, nor a subculture. Instead, it was dominated by young people in many cities in which racism and anti-semitism were in fashion. The NPD’s control in some provinces was very high. The Neo-Nazis declared some areas as nationally liberated zones. It was hard to determine how many of these zones existed. The Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the federal state of Brandenburg registered 17, yet it did not consider them to be 'national liberation zones', in the way the right-wing extremists did, but thought of them as 'fear zones' (Novotny, 2009: 597).

This situation spurred elites in many small cities in the east to try to reduce the influence of the radical right. Concerned about the reputation of their cities, mayors accepted Neo-Nazism as a temporary phenomenon, and denied that young people were ideologically attached to it. Local media did not make radical right violence an issue as much as those in the west did[23]. Similarly, the police didn’t fight Neo-Nazi groups as harshly as the law allowed. There were two crucially different

[23] Art (2011: 207) states in his book that this point emerged in dozens of interviews with members of the German Bundestag.

perceptions regarding the radical right in the west and east side of Germany: in the west a clear climate against right-wing extremism dominated, while in the east fear and indifference prevailed (Staud, 2001).

2.1.2. Radical Right Parties after 2013

2.1.2.1. The AfD, 2013-2015

At the beginning of the 2000s, neither the NPD nor the DVU was able to garner an important electoral breakthrough in federal elections, although they obtained some success in state elections. This would change with the establishment of a new party called the AfD. When some discontented members of the CDU, including Konrad Adam, Alexander Gauland, and Bernd Lucke formed a political movement called the '*Wahlalternative 2013'*, the AfD started its political life in September 2012. Although none of these members played an executive role within the CDU, they had been in the party for many years and were eminent figures: Adam and Gauland were significant conservative journalists, and Lucke was a professor of economics who played a leading role in organizing two petitions by academics against the financial support packages for Greece (Arzheimer, 2015: 540).

However, the AfD should not be considered a party which separated from the CDU because its founding members come from a wider center-right base. Among them are entrepreneurs and managers, the former president of the FDP (the Liberal Party) and 28 university professors (mostly economists), earning the party the nickname 'professors' party (Arzheimer and Berning, 2019: 2).[24] The brief manifesto of the *Wahlalternative* stated that Germany should not guarantee any loans to foreign countries, while members of the Eurozone could claim their own national currency or join new currency zones, and Germany should ask the public about these issues through referendums (Arzheimer, 2015: 541).

At the beginning, the *Wahlalternative* was founded as a pressure group in order to support the "Federation of Independent Voters", which was a newly

[24] The detailed list of founding members can be reached at https://web.archive.org/web/20120923000256/http://www.wa2013.de:80/index.php?id=200#c563 (January 16, 2021).

established umbrella organization for community-based voter associations, often governed by small local business owners. Both organizations jointly prepared a list of candidates in January 2013 for the state election in Lower Saxony. Yet, the list did not garner the 5 percent required for parliamentary representation. Afterwards, the two groups divided, and on February 21, the *Wahlalternative* administration officially established the AfD as a political party and stated that the party would compete in the next federal elections to be held in September 2013. Adam, Lucke and another party member Frauke Petry (a chemist and entrepreneur from the state of Saxony) were chosen to run the party together (Arzheimer, 2015: 541).

Considering its ideological and social profile, the AfD could be depicted as a conservative challenge to the center right (Dilling, 2018: 86). With some of its policies, including abolishing nuclear energy, introducing a national minimum wage, financial help for young parents and legalising same-sex marriage, the CDU had shifted its position towards the center, and the AfD filled the position that the CDU had left (Arzheimer, 2019: 94). The AfD's candidates for the 2013 federal election were rather market-oriented liberals, and were no more authoritarian than their rivals from the CDU (Jankowski et al., 2016). Nevertheless, although the party's first short manifesto emphasized the need to attract large numbers of qualified immigrants, the AfD's candidates were more willing to control the number of immigrants arriving in the country than their competitors in the CDU (Ceyhan, 2016). Most authors concur that the AfD during its first two years could be defined as a soft-eurosceptic party, but not (yet) a populist or radical right one (Berbuir et al., 2014; Arzheimer, 2015; Grimm, 2015; Schmitt-Beck, 2017). The AfD received 4.7% of the votes in the 2013 federal elections, narrowly missing the 5% threshold, and was unable to enter the *Bundestag*.

2.1.2.2. The AfD, 2015-2017

Until the end of 2014, there was no evidence of radical or populist tendencies either in the manifesto prepared for the European parliamentary elections, or in general attitudes and behavior of the AfD (Arzheimer, 2015). However, the course of events was about to change. After acting indecisive for a while, Bernd Lucke, the

most important name in the party at that time, decided to stand up against the eurosceptic, populist, and even extremist factions of the party (Arzheimer, 2019). The issue of populism became controversial and the struggle between the moderate and more radical forces in the party began. The leading members of the moderate faction, including Bernd Lucke and 5 of the 7 members of the EU Parliament, left the party on July 15, when Lucke lost his power struggle against co-leader Frauke Petry who was supported by the radical faction (Dilling, 2018: 98). Even before this split, the party had fallen even below the critical 5 percent threshold in opinion polls, and the party was about to disappear completely.

After this split, the AfD radicalized quickly. Xenophobic and extremist positions, which were controversial within the party before, became mainstream. The bans against collaboration with the Islamophobic Pegida were relaxed and then completely lifted. The so-called refugee crisis in 2015 also reinforced these attitudes within the party. Even racist expressions were openly displayed by party members, and attempts to minimise the Holocaust became acceptable (Art, 2018: 81). Lucke's successor Frauke Petry, who came to power with the implicit support of the most radical sections of the AfD, hit the headlines when she stated that refugees could be shot at the border (BBC, 2016). She also made her profile more visible by collaborating with such RRPs as the Austrian FPÖ, Dutch PVV, Italian Lega, and French FN.

Yet, her policies later became different than the party's general stance. As the party was getting more radical, Petry's long term strategy of advancing the AfD's coalition capability with the center-right was not even discussed at the 2017 party conference (Dilling, 2018: 99) and the party did not accept her as its top candidate for the federal elections in September. Instead, Alexander Gauland and Alice Weidel led the AfD's national campaign. Weidel, formerly an ally of Frauke Petry and a prominent moderate, began to take a radical stance by adopting the opinion of the party base once the party decided that she would run the election campaign (Arzheimer, 2019: 93). As a result of these developments, there is now a growing scholarly consensus that the AfD fits into the populist RRP group (Hansen and Olsen, 2018, 3).

Electorally, the AfD started to be successful in state elections and in the European Parliament elections. In the 2014 European Parliament elections, the party won 7 out of 96 seats in Germany. It had its first representation in the state parliaments in Thuringia, Brandenburg and Saxony with the vote share of 10.6%, 12.2%, and 9.7% respectively in 2014. In the 2017 German federal elections, it received 12.6% of the votes and was eligible to enter the federal parliament *Bundestag* winning 94 seats for the first time.

In this section, the development of the radical right in Germany has been summarized. The history of the radical right in Germany until the period when the AfD achieved its electoral success has been divided into four waves and each wave has been described with one radical right party's rise and fall. One of them, the SRP, was banned and dissolved by the government, and the others continued to be investigated and controlled in a similar vein. The NPD was also attempted to be banned, but this attempt failed. None of these parties garnered a significant electoral success in federal elections; they were able to obtain seats only in state parliaments. Most of the time, intra-party conflicts between moderates and extremes, and state control and repression have hindered these parties on their way to success. Nevertheless, with the AfD this situation changed. After having achieved seats in state parliaments between 2013 and 2017, it was able to enter the *Bundestag* in the 2017 federal elections. After all the above-mentioned failures of other RRPs, it is logical to ask how the center right will respond to the AfD's electoral breakthrough. Setting out from this point, the next chapter will attempt to analyze the impact of the AfD on the center right. But before this, it is necessary to present other radical right groups in Germany.

2.1.2. Other Radical Right Groups in Germany

2.1.2.1. Neo-Nazi Groups

Neo-Nazis are the militant social and political groups around the world that try to revive and promote the Nazi ideology after World War II. Neo-Nazis incite hatred in society, attack racial or ethnic minorities, and support white supremacy.

Neo-Nazism is a global phenomenon and has networks and groups in different countries. They defend the Nazi ideology elements such as ultranationalism, racism, and xenophobia, and sometimes resort to violence in their demonstrations (Wikipedia, n.d.)

From 1949 onwards, those who did not want to take part in RRPs formed many militant groups composed of old Nazis, Neo-Nazis and the bored youth. These groups sought to take action against the democratic system. Some of the leaders of these groups glorify violence and terrorism. An analysis found that 39% of the leaders and members of these groups who committed crime between 1975 and 1985 were between the ages of 14 and 20, and 32% were between 21 and 30. In 1989, authorities estimated that there were 220 Neo-Nazi militants who committed political crimes ranging from use of force to terrorist acts (Stöss, 1991:168).

Paradoxically, in a period when the votes of RRPs fell due to economic development in the early 1970s, the Neo-Nazi scene began to stir. In response to the rise of leftist groups towards the end of the 1960s, many new right-wing groups emerged. Members of the NPD's former youth branches, the Young National Democrats, often formed rival groups (Wagner cited in Braunthal, 2009: 29).

In 1979, right-wing activist Martin Pape founded the Free German Workers' Party (FAP). Founded as a separate group in Stuttgart, the party soon spread throughout West Germany. Ceasing to be a party in 1984, it became one of the leading Neo-Nazi groups in western Germany with more than 400 members. Its leaders included Ewald Althans, who was highly intelligent and fanatic, and his disciple, Michael Kühnen, who was captured in 1985 and was fined for offending the democratic system. A year later, Althans was also tried for wearing a Nazi uniform and was fined $ 6,000 for shouting "Sieg Heil" in public. In the early 1990s he opened a small public relations office in Munich, distributing many right-wing brochures, books and videotapes. According to Althans, police raided his home and office sixty-three times within a year and confiscated many of the Neo-Nazi materials he had archived (Braunthal, 2009: 29-30).

While some rival Neo-Nazi groups claimed that right-wing policy should be renewed, others stressed the need to use violence to achieve their goals. In 1982, there were about a total of 2,000 members belonging to all Neo-Nazi groups. These

groups often organized actions together to harass foreigners and leftists. At other times, they organized demonstrations to honor people like Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy, who had been tried at the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal and had been sentenced to life imprisonment (Braunthal, 2009: 30).

As fanatical members glorified the Nazi state and Hitler, they claimed that the Holocaust was a lie, that not a single Jew was killed in the gas chambers, and that only the pure Aryan race, and not foreigners, could be German citizens. Neo-Nazi groups that advocated using violence and terrorism to oppose the state had a large arsenal of weapons ranging from explosives to bazookas and from hand grenades to automatic firearms. In 1970, some Neo-Nazi groups planned to conduct a military operation in Kassel to prevent talks between Chancellor Willy Brandt and the GDR's prime minister, Willi Stoph, who wanted détente between the two states. A year later, in 1971, a former NPD member attempted to assassinate Gustav Heinemann, the prime minister of the federal state (SPD) who supported *Ostpolitik*. In short, any liberalization in West Germany's foreign policy towards and rapprochement with East Germany were among the main concerns of Neo-Nazis (Braunthal, 2009: 30).

Violence increased gradually after 1980. According to the Interior Ministry in West Germany, 6 bomb attacks, 2 murders, 15 arson attacks, 2 hold-ups, 27 cases of bodily harm and 61 cases of malicious damage to property took place in 1980. As a result of these attacks, 17 people lost their lives (Stöss, 1991: 167). In 1992, 2,639 violent crimes were recorded. This number was 70% less compared to 1996 figures, according to the internal security service. The number of non-violent crimes dropped 5% as opposed to the highest figures in 1993 (8,329) (Verfassungsschutzbericht 1996 cited in Brinks, 2000: 27). However, these numbers may actually be much higher, as the victims may have been afraid to report the attack to the police due to fear of reprisal. According to the newspaper Der Tagesspiegel, German security services reported the highest figure of offences with the right-wing and xenophobic background after German unification with 11,720 in 1997. The number of violent crimes was estimated at 1,092 (Tagesspiegel cited in Brinks, 2000: 27). But according to some officials, Interior Minister Manfred Kanther delayed the publication of these figures (Süddeutsche Zeitung cited in Brinks, 2000: 27).

At the end of 1996, the number of persons with right-wing extremist views was 45,300 (in 1995: 46,100), and there were 108 (in 1995: 96) organisations and groups. According to the German authorities, 6,400 people were prepared to employ violence (in 1995: 6,200) (Verfassungsschutzbericht 1996 cited in Brinks, 2000: 29). Between 1992 and 2000, the German government banned 12 Neo-Nazi organisations, including the *Nationalistische Front*, the *Deutsche Alternative*, the *Wiking Jugend* and the *Nationale Offensive*. Nevertheless, the members of these groups, especially former *Freiheitliche Arbeiter Partei* (FAP) supporters, soon reorganised into so-called *Kameradschaften*, mainly in Berlin, Brandenburg and Sachsen-Anhalt. Because these dispersed organisations had no rules of association, address lists or members' lists, it was very difficult for the German authorities to handle them (Süddeutsche Zeitung cited in Brinks, 2000: 27).

Many groups that were formed, separated, and reformed were not bound by democratic rules. For example, towards the end of the 1970s, a group called a "defense sport group" began shooting exercises and raided a military arsenal depot in northern Germany. They also tried to seize two banks to stockpile weapons and put money for future use. Among those caught as a result of these incidents was Michael Kühnen, a figure mentioned above. The further development of Neo-Nazism is closely connected with Kühnen, who was born in 1955 and came to have a central importance in the 1980s as an ideologist as well as an organizer and strategist of the Neo-Nazi scene (Pfahl-Traughber, 2000: 58). He was active in the youth unit of the NPD and later transferred to the Communist Party of Germany. Kühnen learned there about left ideology and revolutionary tactics.

Later, he returned to the right-wing scene, influenced by one of the prominent figures of the right, former SS agent Thies Christophersen. He founded the Action Front of National Socialists (ANS). This revolutioanary group, made up of young members who had left the NPD, also communicated with fascist groups in other countries. This group is considered by observers to be the most important Neo-Nazi organization in West Germany. After being in prison between 1979 and1982, Kühnen merged his group with the National Activists. However, in 1983 the Interior Ministry banned this group for their illegal activities, and Kühnen was again imprisoned only to be released in 1988 (Braunthal, 2009: 31). Although he attracted

much attention from the media and gave interviews to television channels, magazines and newspapers, he did not succeed in turning many separate groups on the right into a single powerful organization (Pfahl-Traughber, 1993: 83-86).

To conclude, in the 1970s and 1980s there were active Neo-Nazi groups which were prone to violence. These groups used military methods, did field exercises and consisted of armed members wearing uniforms. They robbed the banks in order to raise money to obtain weapons. As a result, the state raided these groups' stores and seized a large amount of ammunition. In the early 1980s, as a result of the increased terrorist attacks, the government banned and closed many Neo-Nazi groups (Stöss, 1991: 178).

2.1.2.2. Skinhead Gangs

First of all, skinhead groups are not genuinely political associations of persons, and not every skinhead can be described as right-wing extremist. Skinhead is a subculture that emerged in Great Britain in the 1960s and consisted mainly of unemployed youth from London's east side (Pfahl-Traughber, 2000: 71). Later, these groups spread to the US and other parts of western Europe including Germany. 'Blood and Honor' and 'Hammer Skinheads' were the most active skinhead groups in Germany. These groups often resort to violence and terroristic underground activities. Some of the skinheads living in West Germany moved to the east after the 1990s. Because the decaying Western culture was less apparent on the east side which had a more authoritarian culture as opposed to the west. Yet, these skinheads turned west again when they witnessed their counterparts' heavy attacks on their enemies in eastern Germany (Braunthal, 2009: 91).

In September 2000, the Federal Ministry of the Interior banned the Blood and Honor group and its White Youth division for violent incidents. Yet, the nationalist and racist Hammer Skinhead group and a few more still operated. Another skinhead group, Fearless and True (*Furchtlos und True*), tried to recruit young members at various concerts, events, and ballad evenings (BMI, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2003 cited in Braunthal, 2009: 91). These groups tried to gather all skinhead groups under one populist umbrella. However, regional skinhead groups could rarely be formed.

For example, the Bavarian Skinhead Allgau group was formed in September 1995, yet it was banned and shut down by the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior in July 1996.

Another major skinhead group was Skinhead Saxonian Switzerland (SSS). This group was formed after the banning of another skinhead group, the Viking Youth, in 1996 and was closely associated with the NPD (Der Spiegel cited in Braunthal, 2009: 92). However, when members of this group were involved in violent attacks against their political opponents, 42 members were tried and sentenced to up to 2 years in prison. In April 2001, the Saxonian State Minister of the Interior disbanded the group in order to protect the foreigners in so-called liberated zones, and to prevent the dissemination of the military-nationalist ideology. For the skinhead groups, the victims were generally the foreigners, leftists, gays, the homeless and Jews. They were ready to engage in violence or yell racist slogans at soccer matches. When a black soccer player stepped onto the field, they would throw bananas as a symbol of their hatred. But they had no interest in getting involved in a long-term political life, leaving that to Neo-Nazi groups.

From a sociological point of view, skinheads mostly came from the lower social classes with little formal education and were not successful in school or at work. The purpose of coming together in groups was to compensate for these shortcomings through social bonds that became possible in such groups and conveyed a feeling of self-worth and strength. This happened mainly through the common excessive consumption of alcohol and cult of masculinity. In general, the skinhead scene was primarily characterized by male adolescents with only a small number of female skinheads. In addition, openly represented chauvinism and the contemptuous treatment of women were typical of this youthful subculture. Another peculiarity was that skinheads were all very young people: over two thirds were under 20 years old and almost half of them operated in the eastern German states. These groups lacked more solid and tighter organizational structures, and were mostly loosely organized personal associations. Nevertheless, the demarcation between other radical right groups and skinheads was increasingly dwindling as the latter helped organizations such as the NPD and the Neo-Nazi groups in mobilization

so that they could carry out actions and demonstrations much more easily (Pfahl-Traughber, 2000: 73-74).

Yet, the violence was not perpetrated only by right-wing groups. There was also violent conflicts between left-wing and right-wing groups. In April 1992, a violent fight, which took place between leftist groups and almost 600 skinheads, ended with police intervention in Halberstadt in eastern Germany. In 1998, such conflicts were no exception and became a part of the daily routine, especially in eastern Germany (Brinks, 2000: 28). These young people had their special skinhead costumes. They wore a bomber jacket, rolled-up jeans and Doc Marten shoes or boots (so-called *Springerstiefel*). Usually, they had crew-cut hair or shaven heads. The exchange of information and communication was usually achieved through 'fanzines' (fan magazines) or during concerts. In 1997, there was a huge influx into the UK-based skinhead groups 'Hammer Skins' and 'Blood and Honor'. At that time, the dissemination of right-wing views was achieved through CDs and music cassettes. In addition, the internet became very important. Rock bands also became a significant tool for propaganda (Brinks, 2000: 30).

2.1.2.3. Pegida

Pegida (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes; Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident) began, in October 2014, as a Facebook initiative by Lutz Bachman[25] and a few others who share similar opinions and captured an excessive amount of attention across Germany within just two months. As opposed to other protest movements, it was just a medium-sized one. According to police data, Pegida gathered 25,000 supporters on the streets of Dresden, its place of origin, just once. Except for the protests held in Leipzig, Suhl and Munich, they could assemble fewer than 1000 in other places while counter-demos, especially in the western part of the republic, obtained more people than Pegida branches did several times over (Rucht and Teune, 2015: 12).

[25] Bachman was tried and sentenced in 1998 for several crimes, including burglaries and assault. Initially, he fled to South Africa in order to avoid going to jail. When the country deported him, Bachman served his sentence in Germany starting from 2001. Later, he worked as a bratwurst vendor and in two advertising firms (Machowecz, 2015).

In an interview, Lutz Bachman explained the purpose of the group's establishment as the result of a demonstration by the Kurdish People's Party (PKK) supporters in Dresden, and ethnic and religious conflicts among immigrants living in Germany (Junge Freiheit, 2014). Simultaneously, the successes of the Islamic state (IS) in Syria and Iraq were being reported and videos of targeted killings were shown in the group. These sparked a discussion about a possible German aid to the Kurdish peshmerga militias (Leithäuser and Bickel cited in Vorländer et al., 2014: 3). After these, a group demonstrated in Dresden to support the sending of weapons to the PKK, which is banned in Germany. Meanwhile, in the autumn of 2014, the authorities at the local level had already planned about the shelters for refugees. According to the plan, around 2000 places would be allocated in Dresden. This immediately caused public opposition in local media and on social platforms, and the opposition was consolidated through protest initiatives. What was criticized here was the authoritarian regime that failed to take the opinion of the local community into consideration, and the lack of a concrete strategy for the housing of refugees and their integration into the society (Baumann-Hartwig et al. cited in Vorländer et al., 2018: 3).

As a result of these developments, national debates and local conflicts, Lutz Bachmann initiated the Facebook group to take the public's outrage to the streets in a protest. They chose the label 'Patriotic Europeans' in order to create an image of a middle-class initiative (Popp and Wassermann, 2015). The first call for the protest was shared on Facebook by Pegida members mostly among friends and acquaintances and reached around 300-350 people. In the following weeks, the number of protesters increased exponentially (Durchgezählt, n.d.)

Following their initial success, these protests in Dresden started to spread in other big cities of Germany, and protests were held in Kassel, Bonn, Munich and Düsseldorf in early December 2015. After that, Pegida's international groups were formed outside of Germany in Britain, Spain, Austria, Poland, the Netherlands and even Australia (Bernzen and Weisskircher, 2016). But for the most part, Pegida has achieved the highest success only in Dresden. It reached the highest number with 25,000 people at the protest organized on January 12, 2015 (Vorländer et al., 2018: 5). One week later, Pegida-related events in Dresden were canceled by the security

forces due to the threat of a concrete attack planned against a member of Pegida's organisational team. Later, the number of the people attending the protests gradually decreased except when the Dutch populist party leader Geert Wilder attended and spoke at a rally in Dresden (Hürriyet, 2015).

The 12 founding members of the group that organized the first demonstrations in 2014 were between 37 and 55 years old. At least 9 of them were entrepreneurs of small businesses, mostly in the service sector. Only 3 of the founding members were women. 3 people were active in political parties before Pegida. Some of them were supporters of local hockey and football teams. In one way or another, these members were individuals who knew each other before (Vorländer et al., 2018: 7). However, an internal dispute took place within the organisational team in Dresden leading to a break-up. More moderate, middle-class conservative members turned their back on Pegida. The apparent reason for this separation was the printing of text and photographic materials containing Lutz Bachman's anti-foreign comments and Adolf Hitler imitation (Withnall, 2015), which caused him to be tried (Zeit, 2016). However, this split actually occurred when some of the Pegida members came into contact with the AfD members and the media. Until this time, the media had been criticized as "lying press" and had been refused to be contacted. As a result, 12 members left the group and formed their own organisation, which remained insignificant (Vorländer et al., 2018: 9).

Although the organisational members of Pegida made some attempts to increase the participation to the protests, such as inviting Geert Wilders to speak and nominating a member (Tatjana Festerling) for the Dresden mayoral election (DW, 2015), none of these worked. The number of people who attended the protests fell steadily. Pegida clearly lost its initial momentum and observers expected the protest movement to soon come to an end (Schenk, 2015). Later, this decline was exacerbated by the arrival of refugees in Germany in August 2015. Violent attacks on both refugees and their accommodations have occurred in many different parts of Germany (Gensing, 2015; Leubecher, 2015; Locke, 2015). Pegida took advantage of this political situation and created a new reason for the demonstrations. The founders of the group transformed Pegida into a leading platform against Germany's refugee

policy. For this reason, from the end of September 2015, Pegida has turned into an openly anti-immigrant movement (Vorländer et al., 2018: 10).

Pegida adopts an anti-immigrant position especially against Muslim immigrants. They do not want Sharia and Islamization in Europe. Activists also demand more rational immigration policies based on the rule of law, more civil rights, and broader democratization. Immigration policies, they advocate, need to be in parallel with economic needs and cultural absorbability. They state that their protests are humane, non-racist and non-violent. Pegida activists try to appear less radical by distancing themselves from racism and accepting immigrants to some extent (Weisskircher and Berntzen, 2016: 559). Yet, Pegida was not successful to achieve this image. In line with the anti-Islamic radical right movements today, Pegida regards Islam and Muslims as external enemies, and politicians, the press, academia and human rights activists as internal enemies (Berntzen and Sandberg, 2014: 764). Besides, their calls for direct democracy and their harsh criticism of the mainstream media reflect the fact that these actors, like other radical right players, are not committed to a single issue (Mudde, 1999).

On the other hand, Önnerfors (2017) argues that the driving force behind Pegida, Lutz Bachman, is an unlikely frontman for the movement and the group lacks a consistent worldview, a dominant leader and a concrete ideology. Similar to the European Counter-Jihad Movement, Pegida adheres to the idea that Europe is experiencing the unhealthy and devastating impact of 'Islamization, incited by corrupt sociopolitical elites'. Moreover, Önnerfors (2017: 160) asserts that since there is no clear and distinct ideology, the Pegida movement can be associated with lone-wolf terrorism like in the case of Anders Breivik in Norway in 2011. Neither Breivik nor Pegida is driven by an ideology formed by a particular ideologue. This creates ideological fuzziness. Although there is anti-Islamization in the group's name, it is not a priority issue for Pegida supporters (Nye, 2015). Instead, the main reason of Pegida's establishment is the distance between the politicians and the public.[26] They are discontented with the refugee policy, the media and the political system of

[26] Nye (2015) also mentions that some people at the rallies are naturally xenophobic because of their previous life in Dresden during the times of the GDR. At the time of the GDR, the city was completely closed to communication and outside information, so the people there did not have any ideas about what was happening on the west side because it was not possible for them to receive West German broadcasting.

the ‘German Federal Republic’. This fuzziness and conceptual vagueness in Pegida makes it difficult to find a suitable program or ideology for analysis (Önnerfors, 2017: 173).

Bachmann repeatedly emphasized in an interview (Kassam, 2016) that he is neither on the left nor on the right, stating: ‘As long as left and right hate me, I am on the right path.’ Although he supports ethno-pluralism, he states that Islam is incompatible with Europe. Instead of a Euro-bureaucracy, Bachmann emphasizes a vision of ‘an organic Europe of fatherlands’, and thus he is contented with Brexit. In his own words, ‘the European Union is a bunch of alcoholics in Brussels who rule with no knowledge of the ideology of each country’ (Kassam, 2016).

Pegida’s supporters mostly come from the middle-classes of Dresden and Saxony, and are primarily males between 30 and 60 years of age and are employed (or self-employed) with a relatively high level of education and income. Possession of a higher degree in natural sciences or engineering is remarkably common. Another significant feature of this demographic is its lack of religious or party affiliation. Yet, supporters mostly advocate the populist AfD (Önnerfors, 2017: 173).

2.2. STATE RESPONSE TO THE RADICAL RIGHT IN GERMANY

2.2.1. Legal Tools

2.2.1.1. The Office Responsible for Defending the Constitution: ‘*Verfassungschutz*’

In Germany, the duty of managing national security is seperated between the intelligence and the law enforcement and police agencies. Since Germany is a federation, there are federal as well as state agencies. Besides, there is a rigid division between intelligence and police agencies, even though their spheres of responsibility might overlap. The strict separation was established after World War II in order to prevent an accumulation of police and intelligence powers in a single agency as it happened with the Nazis’ Secret State Police (Gestapo). The Allied Occupation Forces made the separation a precondition of approval of the German

Basic Law, the country's constitution, which provides for the establishment of police and law enforcement agencies as well as an intelligence agency (Office of the Historian, n.d.). The law, therefore, states that the intelligence agencies are not authorized to use force or other types of police powers to gather information (Gesley, 2016).

In Germany, there are 3 agencies which are responsible for carrying out intelligence operations. These are the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Amt für Verfassungsschutz*), the Federal Intelligence Service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*, or BND) and the Military Counterespionage Service (*Militärischer Abschirmdienst*, or MAD). The BND's duty is collecting intelligence outside Germany. Like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States, the BND is forbidden to conduct domestic operations. The MAD is reponsible for protecting the security of the armed forces (Richter, 1998:1).

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) started to operate after the approval of the Verfassungsschutz Law of 1950. It is a federal executive agency under the authority of the Federal Minister of the Interior. The head of the *Verfassungsschutz* reports directly to the Federal Minister, to whom all intelligence information and assessments must be submitted. The ministry controls the BfV's budget, personnel, operative rules, and administrative regulations (Richter, 1998: 9).

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) is an indispensable body in terms of protecting the internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is responsible for protecting the country, the free democratic basic order, and the population against all dangers. In order to do this, the BfV gathers and investigates information about extremist, terrorist, and any other attempts posing a threat to public safety, and about foreign intelligence services' activities directed against Germany. The central aim of archiving all collected information is to keep the Federal Government informed about the security situation.

There are some highly significant tasks carried out by the BfV. Firstly, it aims to collect and analyse the information on efforts directed against the free democratic basic order, and the existence and security of the Federation or one of its States. Secondly, it aims to collect information on attempts aimed at unlawfully hampering

constitutional bodies of the Federation or one of its States. Thirdly, it gathers information on efforts jeopardizing foreign interests of the Federal Republic of Germany by the use of violence or the preparation thereof. Fourthly, the BfV investigates the associations which are against the idea of international understanding (article 9, para. 2 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG[27])), and are specifically against the peaceful coexistence of people. Lastly, the BfV gathers information on intelligence activities carried out on behalf of a foreign power (counter-intelligence) (Oscepolis, n.d.).

On the other hand, however, it is important to recognize that monitoring and surveillance do not of themselves equate to combating, and the BfV itself does not have a primary prosecuting responsibility (Husbands, 2002: 60). Instead, it is the Federal Constitutional Court that has the power to ban a political party. On the other hand, the federal and the states' interior ministries can enforce bans on associations.

2.2.1.2. German Laws

There are some other legal instruments that can as well be employed to keep the radical right under control. In this regard, one can refer to 3 particular articles in the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch-StGB) (Federal Law Gazette I, 2019: 844). The first one is on the 'dissemination of propaganda material of unconstitutional organisations' (Section 86). This provision prohibits the dissemination of any propaganda material of a political party or an organisation which has been banned or declared unconstitutional or of the former National Socialist organisation. The second one concerns the 'use of symbols of unconstitutional organisations' (Section 86a). It prohibits the dissemination or the public use of the symbols of unconstitutional parties or organisations. These include flags, insignia, uniforms, slogans, and forms of greeting. Thirdly, the provision entitled 'Incitement of masses' (Section 130) prohibits actions which cause a disturbance of the public peace, such as incitement of hatred against a national, racial, religious group or a group defined by their ethnic origin, and violation of

[27] Associations whose aims or activities contravene the criminal laws or that are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding shall be prohibited (Federal Law Gazette I, 2019).

human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning or defaming one of the aforementioned groups. In addition, this provision forbids citizens from approving, denying or downplaying, publicly or in a meeting, an act committed under the rule of National Socialism. Moreover, it proscribes actions that disturb the public peace in a manner which violates the dignity of the victims by approving of, glorifying or justifying National Socialist tyranny and arbitrary rule[28].

2.2.2. Political Strategies

2.2.2.1. Co-optation Strategy

When center parties lose their votes to niche parties, they employ different strategies to cope with this. If they decide to engage the niche parties directly, they make changes in their political agendas. The purpose is to regain the lost votes by touching upon issues that RRPs emphasize. Extending the party's programmatic agenda rightwards, center right parties start to more frequently bring up issues such as immigration, taxes, welfare, culture, and crime. By co-opting the RRPs, moderate parties shift–their positions towards the right and become more radical (Downs, 2001: 27) as can be seen in many countries in Western Europe, including Germany.

In September 1987, when the DVU achieved %5.4 of the votes in Bremen, it became the first RRP in Germany in 20 years to win a seat in a state parliament. And winning 6 seats in the Parliament of Bremen in 1991, it became the third-largest party there. The next year it obtained 6.3% of the votes in the state elections in Schleswig-Holstein. In 1998, the party achieved its greatest election success in Saxony-Anhalt with 12.8% of the votes, 16 seats, , and a quarter of all votes of the young voters aged 18 to 25. In 2004, the DVU made a non-competition agreement with the other RRP, namely the NPD, for the state elections in Brandenburg and Saxony. Both parties passed the five-percent threshold in their respective states. The DVU gathered 6.1% of the votes in the Brandenburg state elections, and the NPD won 9.2 % in the Saxony state elections (Wikipedia, n.d.)

[28] Other provisions regarding how a political party is declared unconstitutional and who decides it can be found in German Basic Law (21(2)) and Federal Constitutional Court Act (13(2) and 43(1)). These provisions are specifically mentioned under the first heading in this chapter. See note 30.

Likewise, *Die Republikaner* (REP, the Republicans) achieved 7.8% of the votes in the January 1989 election in West Berlin, obtaining 11 local seats. In the European Parliament election in June later that year, it won 7.1% of the votes and 6 seats. Its most important success was in Bavaria with the 14.6% of the votes. Although the party lost its significance at the beginning of the 1990s, it achieved an unexpected result in the April 1992 state election in Baden-Württemberg. In the election, with the leadership of Schlierer, the Republicans obtained 10.9% of the votes and 15 seats, making it the third largest party in the state (Wikipedia, n.d.)

As a response to the success of RRPs DVU and REP, the center right attempted to curb their impact. Instead of opposing this success, the CDU/CSU, as well as the center left SPD, co-opted the RRPs by moving their ideology towards the right on the left-right political spectrum with the New Politics dimension. The way that center parties dealt with the asylum debate in 1992-1993 clearly demonstrated this shift (Minkenberg, 1998: 17).

Since the beginning of the 1980s, some neo-conservative cultural and political elites began to stress the traditional aspects of German national identity against the ideas of the left, such as post-national identity and 'constitutional patriotism'. Therefore, neo-conservatives revived the idea of German *Kulturnation*, which included the *völkisch* ideas, and especially the ethnic meaning of the German nation. These efforts were similar in content and strategy to the efforts of the *Neue Rechte* intellectual movement and some radical right-wing groups (Minkenberg, 1998: 16).

At the same time, the conservative CDU/CSU realized that the problems of "foreigners" and immigration can be an advantageous apparatus for obtaining electoral success. Christian democrats accused social democrats for not being able to control and solve immigration-related problems well, and they took advantage of the citizens' concerns about these issues. Although the then SPD/FDP government stopped all foreign recruitment in 1973, they were already being criticized for receiving too many immigrants and not being selective in recruiting at a time of economic crisis and unemployment. Therefore, when the CDU/CSU was elected and Helmut Kohl became chancellor in 1982, he announced the *Ausländerpolitik* (policy framework for foreigners), stating that it would be one of the cornerstones of the new

government and that they would primarily deal with these issues (Schmidtke, 2004: 166).

The political situation in Europe also prompted conservatives in Germany to take action on immigration issues. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, a massive influx of immigration to Germany started in the early 1990s. With the opening of the Eastern European borders, Germany became the most important destination for refugees and asylum-seekers. In 1992 alone, 438,000 people applied for asylum. In addition, many ethnic Germans living in the former Soviet bloc decided to immigrate to Germany. This situation was politically viewed as a 'crisis of immigration', and Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated in his own words that it was a 'crisis of the state' (Staatkrise). The conservative-liberal coalition began to pressure for a change in Germany's liberal asylum policy, since the German government failed to protect its borders against an enormous number of immigrants. However, the support of the opposition was also required to make changes to the Basic Law and to the right to asylum provision within it. At the end of the negotiations, with the support of the SPD, Article 16 of the Basic Law was amended in 1993. This, for the first time, showed that issues related to immigration played a decisive role in domestic politics. In order to persuade the SPD for the so-called asylum compromise, the coalition government carried out a huge campaign calling for stricter legislation to control immigration using anti-foreigner hints (Koopman 1996, 1999). The center right, in particular, presented asylum seekers as an alarming and destabilizing danger to German society. Even the quality press consistently reported concerns about too many immigrants from foreign cultures (Schmidtke, 2004: 169).

According to the Basic Law, everyone had the right to seek political asylum until June 30, 1993. This meant that Germany would accept all the people who asked for political asylum at the German border. After the laws on immigration and refugees had been reviewed and changed, obtaining an immigration and refugee status became more restricted. This amendment was supported not only by the center-right, but also by the center-left SPD. In order to make changes to the Constitution in Germany, the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament must have a two-thirds majority. According to the 1993 amendments, some people are no longer

automatically entitled to file for political asylum in Germany. These include people who came to Germany across its land border and/or through another EU country and people who have fled from or through a safe country (Achakzai, 2018). In this way, the center parties attempted to hinder the success of the RRPs through co-opting as they also took advantage of issues like immigration which became automatically popular after the end of the Cold War.

This chapter seeks to describe the radical right in Germany historically with a focus on how the state has responded to it. Even though the denazification process started in Germany after World War II, activities of the radical right have continued. These activites initially continued through the political parties. Historians divided this period into four waves. The most important RRPs in this period were the NPD, REP, and DVU. The common features of these parties were the intra-party conflicts, mostly between radicals and moderates, and their electoral failures. These parties could only achieve some success at the state level; they were never be able to gain seats in the federal parliament *Bundestag*. The AfD is not evaluated in these 4 waves because it is highly different compared to other RRPs before 2013. The RRPs in Germany between 1945 and 2013 were electorally marginal, mostly having ties with Neo-Nazis, and were responsible for violent activities. The AfD, on the other hand, did not have such a profile and its ideology was pretty similar to that of its counterparts in Western Europe. Besides, it achieved a significant electoral success and secured seats in the *Bundestag* in the federal elections held in 2017, becoming the first RRP that was able to gain seats in the *Bundestag* since 1945. Yet, the RRPs were not the only organizations that carried out radical activities. There were Neo-Nazis, Skinheads, and lastly, Pegida which all had international ties. While Neo-Nazis and Skinheads embraced the Nazi ideology and committed crimes and violent acts, Pegida merely had an anti-immigrant stance and never supported Nazism overtly.

Nevertheless, the German government has always been vigilant against all radical right activities due to its history and has always had many different apparatus to deal with it, which are legal tools and political strategies. In terms of the latter, the center-right and center-left used co-optation strategy in order to compete with the RRPs. At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the DVU, NPD and

REP gained some electoral success at the state levels. Thus, the CDU/CSU and SDP sought to curb their success. The shift and changes in the immigration and asylum policies in 1993 clearly show that the center-right and center left radicalized its position in order to better compete with the radical right. This fact is significant when analyzing the impact of the AfD on the CDU/CSU since it obtained a huge electoral success in 2017. The next chapter will present the theoretical background of this impact and give an empirical test of how the center right responds to the success of the AfD.

CHAPTER THREE
IMPACT MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

In this section, I will discuss what the meaning of impact is and explain different approaches regarding the RRPs' impact. Focusing on goal attainment approach, Downs's and Meguid's theories will be presented in a detailed way and many studies which test their arguments will be visited. Then, research design will be given and analysis will be employed. After the hypotheses will have been tested, findings will be presented and then interpreted.

3.1. APPROACHES TO MEASURE THE RADICAL RIGHT'S IMPACT

Impact can mean to convey a message or erode democratic liberal system. It may be either direct or indirect. In order to see direct impact, radical right parties need to operate inside the government and make the policies themselves. In this situation, we can say that they have a direct impact. However, in many cases, the radical right operates outside the government or in coalition with other parties. Thus, radical right parties will attempt to have an impact inside the party system. This makes analyzing the impact difficult because we cannot measure the impact directly. In this case, we need to discuss approaches which analyze the impact in different perspectives. Although there are various approaches in the literature, hypothesis are formulated in this study according to the party interaction and party competition perspectives mainly based on Downs's (1957) spatial theory and Meguid's (2008) model of niche party competition. Yet, other assumptions will be reviewed, as well.

Although there are not many studies which attempt to classify the approaches about impact, Williams's (2018) and Pirro's (2015) works are significant. Williams classifies the impact of political parties in three different approaches: institutionalist approach, systemic responsiveness approach, and goal attainment approach. Pirro later revisits Williams's classification and evaluates the impact. In this section, these three different approaches will be explained, yet goal attainment approach will be the main focus because Downs's and Meguid's works fall under this category.

Explaining political phenomena is not a trivial task as it requires us to consider many different factors. With Easton's (1965) well-known concept 'black box', the dynamic nature of the systems needs to be comprehended so that one can assess the impact of the radical right within the context of their interaction with other political parties. In this sense, Easton's systems analysis model will also be touched upon. Firstly, the institutionalist and systemic responsiveness approaches will be explained. After that, the goal attainment approach will be discussed touching upon mainly the works of Easton, Downs and Meguid. As a common point, this section argues that RRP impacts manifest in governmental and public anti-immigrant positions either directly or indirectly through interaction effects (William, 2018: 440)[29].

3.1.1. Institutionalist and Systemic Responsiveness Approaches

The institutionalist approach contends that some parties are more beneficial than the others because of the characteristics of the system, such as the party system, the electoral system, and other rules that identify the political competition (Riker, 1962; Duverger, 1964). For example, large, catch-all, mainstream parties exert more impact compared to small, narrow issue and fringe parties. Once a RRP is electorally successful, it has impact, and winning enough votes and seats to be a part of a governing coalition may be crucial to exert impact (Zaslove, 2012)[30].

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[29] However, on the other side of the causal arrow, there are arguments which assert that states' reaction, namely repression policies, have important effects on radical right parties. It causes them to adopt themselves to political environment and consolidate their party structure instead of weakening them (Art, 2007; Van Donselaar, 2017). Notwithstanding these arguments, in this research, the impact on the radical right of government reaction, such as state repression or other strategies, will not be examined. Instead, the government response will be taken as dependent variable.

[30] Yet, Akkerman (2012) argues that it is difficult to measure RRPs' real impact in coalition government since they operate together as a coalition. They often hold relatively weaker ministries and their leaders stay outside the government altogether. It is argued that their direct influence on government policies has remained fairly limited, which quite often also led to disappointment and withdrawal from the coalition (Mudde, 2007). Moreover, radical right parties are not so effective in parliament as well since they are opposition and have a relatively small number of seats. Thus, they only have a minor impact. Other parties in parliament often employ isolation strategy mostly rejecting their initiatives even about mundane issues. The parliamentary presence of right-wing radical parties alone does not result in any impact as long as other parties preserve the radical right's pariah status (Minkenberg, 2001). However, in some cases as in Austria, it is possible to see that radical right parties, most notably the FPÖ, have a real impact in law-making on immigration and culture.

The systemic responsiveness approach is, on the other hand, related with democratic theory. It asserts that political parties shift their positions in order to answer citizens' demands. Although it is related to the goal attainment approach, it explains the shift of the parties in a different way. Norris (2005) argues that RRPs have the greatest impact when they represent disfranchised voters who think center parties do not represent them well. Thus, supply-side effects are the key for the RRP impact. The authors who support this perspective assert that RRPs are significant in the sense that they represent the opinions of the citizens which center parties fail to address. Some works (Minkenberg, 2013; Schain, 2006) have demonstrated that even when they are not an important competitor to center parties, RRPs may have an indirect impact influencing the public mood especially on immigration policy. This creates pressure on center right parties to co-opt RRPs and causes them to adjust their positions to win the votes back, which in turn may result in a hardened anti-immigrant policy[31].

Examining France and Germany as case studies, Minkenberg (1998) creates a broad causal chain drawing on the interaction model. He argues that the radical right's impact on policy-making is shaped by other parties' or government's reactions in accordance with the nation specific opportunity structures, such as the German government's alertness against anti-democratic forces. Instead of repressing the radical right, Germany uses co-optation strategy. This strategy is employed by government parties in two steps. The first step involves the strategic interaction between the center right and the radical right. Center right political elites embrace the

[31] Nevertheless, there are some scholars (Akkerman, 2012; Bale, 2003; Boswell, Christian and Hough, 2008; Money, 1999; Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008) who argue that the center-right itself is responsible for the changes in immigration and integration policies. Examining the British Conservative Party's stance on immigration and asylum, Bale (2013) contends that the conservative right is getting more restrictive than ever in the UK because their ideology is inherently so, which means that this is what they truly believe, and on the other hand, this is also a strategy to compete with its rival, the center left. Likewise, in Akkerman's influential comparative study (2012), it is claimed that the major and real policy changes regarding immigration are made by the center right. There is not a huge ideological difference between the radical and center right. In fact, the difference has decreased with regard to immigration and integration policies starting from the end of the 1990s. Once the radical right comes to power, they are more likely to fail in terms of policy-making because of organizational weaknesses. Thus, significant policy changes, she argues, mainly come from center right cabinets, although coalitions with the radical right have some impact as well. Yet, the latter is less powerful because of intra-party problems. Radical right parties are generally junior partners in coalition governments. Since they lack experience and power, their role in government is mostly limited.

radical right's ideological elements regarding national identity. By doing that, the center right strategically uses the radical right card against the SPD to preclude its policies. On this level, they may legislate laws regarding immigration, asylum, citizenship, or integration. The second step is agenda setting, which involves framing by the government of the agenda on asylum, immigration, and foreigners. In so doing, the center right, he argues, both hampers the rise of the radical right and helps to de-legitimize the projects of left-wing parties regarding multiculturalism and integration.

Pirro (2015) also follows this tradition asserting that the influence of RRPs is determined regardless of the results of their votes. Although he analyzes only the parties in eastern and central Europe, he emphasizes that when both successful and unsuccessful RRPs are taken into consideration, it is seen that mainstream parties adopt some part of the radical right's agenda. In order to have an impact, a RRP must politicize the issues of its core agenda. As a response, he argues, mainstream parties adopt two different strategies: co-optation[32] and opposition. RRPs exert the greatest influence on issues related to ethnic minorities, affecting nearby rivals (i.e., the center right) and challenging their electoral success.

3.1.2. Goal Attainment Approach

The goal attainment approach argues that a political party can exert an impact if it achieves its goals. In this context, a party will have an impact if it gets enough votes to lead the government and make the policies. This implicitly means that most of the time only one party can achieve its goals in the system. However, studies on this approach have widened the party behavior understanding by describing new goals of the parties. It is significant to discuss these different goals because this approach assesses the impact based on the fact that a party achieves what it seeks.

[32] According to Pirro (2015; 142), with co-optation strategy, "mainstream parties adapt the standards set by the populist radical right and progressively try to incorporate nativist issues in their agenda''.

3.1.2.1. Party Types Based on the Goals

Müller and Strom (1999) presents a strong theoretical work identifying three different types of parties based on their goals. The first one is the office-seeking party. The aim of office-seeking parties is to win and control the executive branch, or as many branches as possible in parliamentary democracies. They 'maximize their control over political office benefits, that is, private goods bestowed on recipients of politically discretionary governmental or subgovernmental appointments' (Müller and Strom, 1999: 5). This is generally derived from the studies of government coalitions. However, this approach does not explain the motivations of party members - that is, whether they seek the office for personal interests or to have an impact on policy outputs. A distinction is not made between intrinsic and instrumental value of the goals (Budge and Laver, 1986: 490).

The second type is the policy-seeking party which tries to maximize its impact on public policy. This also originates from the coalition theory as in the previous type. The success of the party comes from its ability to implement a policy or to prevent undesirable policy change. Sometimes they experience policy sacrifices, either deviating from their commitments or when they bargain with other parties over cabinet or legislative coalitions. Yet, just as in the office-seeking party model, the policy-seeking one may also have intrinsic or intrumental value. As Müller and Strom (1999: 8) put it, "party leaders may seek certain policy goals because they think they can benefit in other ways or because they sincerely believe in them". This model is a supplement for the office-seeking model, rather than a substitute. For this model implicitly assumes that office-seeking parties seek the office, at least in part, for instrumental reasons, i.e. for policy. Therefore, this category is the least developed one in the literature on competitive party behavior for Müller and Strom.

The third type is the vote-seeking party. As described in an excellent way in the seminal work of Downs (1957), political parties are vote seekers that wish to obtain power, prestige, income, etc. Their main goal is to be elected and to run the government, which implicitly means that they seek to achieve the highest percentage of the votes that they can possibly garner. This model's implications have later been

improved and extended in spatial models of electoral competition, which will be explained in the following parts in this section. Unlike the other two models, the vote-seeking party model can clearly have instrumental value in achieving either policy influence, or office, or both.

In their book, Müller and Strom (1999) propose a perspective between the radically created formal theories and arduous empirical literature. They offer 'a middle road between extremes' (Müller and Strom, 1999: 280). Political parties can be affected by all three goals: office, policy, and vote. These can all be sought instrumentally as a means for another end. However, office and policy can have intrinsic value as the ends themselves. Parties may not always be in an appropriate position to achieve all the goals that they seek at the same time. Therefore, goal conflicts may sometimes occur and parties may experience trade-offs. In such situations, difficult decisions have to be made and party leaders may have to choose between their goals.

For example, on the basis of their empirical analysis, Müller and Strom indicate that 'French parliamentarians are amazingly frank in their admission that electoral concerns often overrode their professed policy goals' (Müller&Strom, 1999: 282). Similarly, in the early 1970s the Swedish Social Democratic Party also had to make a decision between electoral goals and their official policy goal to make Sweden a republic when designing a new constitution. Since the majority of the electorate support monarchy, they decided not to propose republic in order to prevent loss of votes and possible government positions.

Based on the results of the analysis obtained from ten different countries in Western Europe, Müller and Strom conclude that parties can be either vote seekers or policy seeking organizations depending on the case. Moreover, party priorities are sometimes not clear. Instead of reaching a generalization for all parts of Europe, these authors look at the dynamics which cause these differences. For example, vote pursuit is high in France, but low in Denmark. They identify four factors in order to explain the reasons for such differences: 1) institutional elements, such as the electoral system; 2) properties of the party system, such as competitiveness or the number of spatial dimensions; 3) organizational charateristics of the parties; and 4)

exogenous or endogenous determinants, such as international or national economy, personal characteristics of the party leaders and and so on.

3.1.2.2. Party Dynamism and Interaction Literature

Goal attainment studies have later progressed towards an increased focus on the dynamics of the party system for understanding impact (Williams, 2018: 443). There are valid theoretical reasons not to believe that only one party which runs the government has an impact on policies or producing outcomes. David Easton (1965) made a huge contribution in this respect to our understanding of how political systems work. As he states in his book:

> *If we know how systems manage to cope with stress[33], how they manage to persist in the face of either stable or changing environments, other theories or sets of ideas aspiring to theoretical status that deal with various aspects of political life -decision-making, coalition strategies, game theories, power, and group analysis- all fit into place. (p.475) ... Even a theory of a static system will also reveal the interactions among the parts of the system (p.477) .... a system is a means whereby the inputs of demands and support are converted into outputs (p.478).*

Easton (1965: 478) argues that even if the political structures in the political system change (e.g., transition from democratic rule to totalitarianism), this process does not change. The transformation of inputs into outputs is not specific to a particular political system. Thus, this model explains the underlying process of all systems. When the impact of parties in the party system is considered in the light of this understanding, the following statements become more illuminating:

> *It revealed the complicated relationships among all parts of a system. They form a continuous flow of action and reaction, from production of outputs as stimuli to feedback response, to information feedback about the response, and to output reactions on the part of the authorities in a truly seamless web of activities (Easton, 1965: 478) ... It encourages us to interpret political life as a dynamic system of behavior, both as an interacting set and as a body of activities which, in their totality, are able to do work by converting inputs into outputs (Easton, 1965: 479).*

It may also be asked what motivation lies behind this process and how all these systems endure despite the existence of many dangers. Easton's explanation reminds us of Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' in market economy. When the system

[33] Easton (1965: 24) defines stress as one of the forces that cause significant changes in systems.

encounters a change, it adapts itself to absorb these effects. Or when an impact is felt, the system takes some precautions to prevent situations that would put it in more danger. This is the fundamental coping behavior of political systems (Easton, 1965: 480). When we apply Easton's view to party behaviour, it plausibly explains why center-right parties change their position in the face of the radical right threat. This has some implications for Downs's (1957) theory, as well. He states that parties change their position to obtain more votes and secure party members' personal interests. People in office try to protect themselves and maintain their continuity, but they do not do it intentionally to ensure the continuity of the system; they rather do it to pursue their own personal interests. Yet, it serves to maintain the party system's stability at the end of the day. This relates to how democratic systems manage to persist under conditions of change (Easton, 1965: 481).

Keeping in mind the dynamic nature of the political systems, it is considered that, to create political outcomes, political parties interact with each other. This is also valid for assessing the impact of radical right parties. If they hold office in government, we can see their impact on policies in the most clear way, but there are very few empirical case studies in this area. Pointing out the Austrian case and the FPÖ in coalition, Duncan (2010) argues that their presence in government obviously creates more restrictionist policies compared to their absence. Yet, when we consider the fact that RRPs do not usually obtain enough votes to run the government, it would make sense to assume that they will seek to make an impact in the party system to achieve their goals.

In order to compete better in the legislation process, parties push and pull each other in specific, and sometimes unlikely policy directions. The party interaction model holds that assessing actions in party systems is more logical than focusing on individual party actors. In other words, it is expected that the party system, rather than a single party, is responsible for policy outcomes. However, these studies are not very confident in giving the causal arrow of the effect which asks who affects who. Based on Meguid's (2008) model of niche party competition, more studies on dynamism and interaction have developed. This literature is based on examining party positioning and party system competition (Van de Wardt, 2015; Muis and Scholte, 2013; de Lange, 2007; Abou-Chadi, 2014; Bale et al., 2010;

Loxbo, 2010; Rydgren, 2010; Zeynep Topcu, 2009; Bilecen, 2016). With regard to party positioning, the literature mostly benefits from Downs's spatial theory and focuses on how RRPs and center parties change their positions on the left-right spectrum regarding mainly the topics that RRPs dominate, such as immigration, integration, and related cultural issues. Party system competition concerns strategies employed by center parties against RRPs. In order to assess the impact, measures of party competition, including particular strategies and manifesto analysis of party position shifts, might be employed to identify the push and pull (co-optation) effect of RRPs within the party system.

3.1.2.3. Downs's Spatial Theory

Being one of the basic pillars of this study, Downs's theory has very important implications for the party positioning and party competition literature. Defining the concept of 'self-interest' as the foundation of his analysis, Downs (1957: 28) notes:

> *They (politicians) treat policies purely as means to the attainment of their private ends*[34]*, which they can reach only by being elected. Upon this reasoning rests the fundamental hypothesis of our model: parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies.*

The formal purpose of political parties, namely to design and implement policies, is no longer the only goal when they take executive positions. In addition, the informal structure, i.e., the private purposes of those who manage these parties, should also be taken into account. Downs's model offers to combine both factors in its theoretical framework (Downs, 1957: 30). As Downs states:

> *Thus, our reasoning has led us from the self-interest axiom to the vote-maximizing government… The party which runs the government manipulates its policies and actions in whatever way it believes and gain the most votes without violating constitutional rules (1957: 31).*

Therefore, the main purpose of all parties is to win the elections in order to obtain their private ends. They do all their actions to maximize their votes, and see policies as a means to this end (Downs, 1957: 35). In order to emphasize the

[34] He defines private ends as the 'personal desire for the income, prestige and power which come from holding office' (1957: 34).

competition, he contends that parties should take into account the proposals made by their opponents as well (1957: 52). Parties should choose the policy the majority of the voters demand, or else the opposition can defeat them. For example, the opposition determines a policy that the government opposes but the majority of the voters prefer, and then presents it with other policies in the same way that the government does. Consequently, voters tend to choose the opposition party. To avoid this, the majority of parties in the government are forced to support all the issues that the majority demands, in order not to lose votes (Downs, 1957: 54).

Perhaps, the most striking part of Downs's seminal work 'An Economic Theory of Democracy' is the chapter where he elaborates on 'the development of political ideologies as means of getting votes'. As noted by Downs (1957: 96); 'our basic hypothesis states that political parties are interested in gaining office per se, not in promoting a better or an ideal society'. Then, one may reasonably ask how we can explain the presence of political ideologies. His answer to this question is as follows:

> *Our answer is that uncertainty[35] allows parties to develop ideologies as weapons in the struggle for office. In this role, ideologies are assigned specific functions that shape their nature and development. ... In keeping with this view, we also treat ideologies as means to power. However, in our model, political parties are not agents of specific social groups or classes; rather, they are autonomous teams seeking office per se and using group support to attain that end (1957: 96,97).*

Regarding how competition among parties affects ideologies, Downs (1957: 102, 113) proposes the important argument cited below:

> *When policies change significantly, ideologies must also change; otherwise they are not effective signals and the citizens in our model will not use them. Thus, whatever factors influence the development of policies also influence the development of ideologies…. In this way, conflicts arise between the maintenance of ideological purity and the winning of elections. The former may occasionally take precedence over the latter, but our hypothesis is upheld as long as parties behave most of the time as though election is their primary objective.*

However, Downs's theory did not predict that its suppositions are applicable also to the multi-party systems. The reason for this is his argument that 'parties in a multiparty system try to remain as ideologically distinct from each other as possible'

[35] Uncertainty represents the situation in which citizens cannot know every detail of the policies that the government makes. Even if they knew, it would not always be possible for them to forecast where a decision would lead and trace the results of all decisions accurately. Under these conditions, many voters find ideologies useful (1957: 98).

(1957: 115). Later, numerous studies tested the theory in multi-party systems, as well. In order to explain how political parties change their positions, Downs used the spatial theory[36] which had formerly been used in economics.

Downs's hypothesis has been tested by many scholars after the 2000s. For example, having analyzed 193 parties in twenty-five post-war democracies which include Western European countries, the US, Canada, Turkey, Israel, Australia, and Japan, Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) reached two important conclusions. Firstly, the political parties in these countries adjusted their policies in response to policy shifts of rival parties. In particular, they are likely to shift their policies in the same direction that the rival party had shifted in the previous election. Secondly, these parties are inclined to respond to the policy shifts undertaken by parties from a similar ideological background. For instance, socialist parties were more likely to respond to the policy shifts of communist parties, and conservative parties reacted more readily to Christian democratic parties' policy shifts. These findings are parallel to the assumptions of spatial models of party competition, substantiating the hypothesis that 'political parties in fact systematically adjust their policy positions in response to rival parties' policy strategies' (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009: 842), and their behavior.

Similarly, Bilecen (2016) explains the electoral success of political parties in spatial terms - that is, parties' ideological location on the left-right spectrum. Having analyzed 17 different parties in Turkey between 1961 and 2011, he found that the

[36] Spatiality is used as a concept for distance. It may be used either for ideologies or for the market place in economics. Originally, it derived from the concept of the equilibrium location in economics. Suppose in a linear town, the median of it refers to the optimum location in terms of spatiality. The implicit assumption is that people are mainly motivated by self interest. While firms maximize their profit, consumers maximize their utility. Borrowing the term from Hotelling (1929) and Smithies (1941), Downs established spatial theory as a conceptual tool based on this model. In economics, spatial theory is used for economic competition. The views in economics regarding actions of people in the market place, collective decision-making, and the economic concept of locational equilibrium have been applied to the political world. The tendency of competing businesses towards imitation is applied to political parties during elections. People choose the political party the ideology of which is the closest to theirs, just as in the market place where they choose the store which is located the closest to them, i.e., the center. This point is called equilibrium location. Since the main purpose of a political party is to maximize its votes, they compete to stay at the center and formulate their ideologies accordingly. Thus, the expected result will be the 'spatial equilibrium at the position of the median voter'. Political parties try to attract as many voters as possible. Hence, candidates seek to compete by positioning and repositioning themselves in n-dimensional left-right political continuum (Kurban and Henry, 2020). For more detailed information, see Chapter 8 of Downs's seminal book 'An Economic Theory of Democracy'.

center right, center left and radical right showed higher electoral success than the radical left. Communist parties, in particular, and other radical left parties have less chance of electoral success compared to other parties on the political spectrum. It shows that the more political parties moderate their position, the more likely they get electoral support.

These results seem to be supported by another case study which was done by Muis and Scholte (2012). Muis and Scholte demonstrate that political parties employ an adaptive strategy that results in large shifts from the right towards the center in order to increase their electoral strength. Having analyzed the parties in the Netherlands using simulation experiments in an effort to understand how the populist anti-immigration party PVV (Party for Freedom) obtained significant electoral success since its foundation, they reached two conclusions. First, the PVV gets successful when voters relate more to cultural issues than to socio-economic ones. In line with the agenda-setting impact approach, when the media focuses on immigration issues, voters evaluate party positions based on these concerns. Hence, party leaders start to emphasize these issues in order to exploit this situation. The second conclusion Muis and Scholte reached is that in order to understand the RRPs' electoral success, we should not take them as passive actors. As in Ignazi's (2003) hypothesis, RRPs get successful when they are strategically flexible to exploit the favourable circumstances at that moment. For them, it does not matter whether socio-economic issues come to the fore. For instance, PVV leader Wilders adapted the party to the new topics and shifted his position to a more moderate socio-economic one, as opposed to his initial liberal pro-market stance. That clearly shows that RRPs try to maximize their votes with adaptive learning, and copy the stance of supporters of other parties, which leads them to move towards a more moderate, leftist socio-economic policy position.

Likewise, de Lange (2007), aiming to test the revised idea of *Kitschelt* -the new winning formula-, argued that RRPs campaigned first on a neo-liberal and authoritarian program, however they have now come to adopt a more centrist economic position. She analyzed three RRPs in France, Belgium and the Netherlands; the Front National (FN), the Flemish Vlaams Block, and Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) respectively. Her findings show that all three parties experienced a

shift towards the center on economic issues and their authoritarian character remained intact, except for the Dutch LPF as it was a new RRP and operated in a different competitive environment.

3.1.2.4. Meguid's Model of Niche Party Competition

The second important pillar of this study is Meguid's model (2008) which explains the electoral performance of niche[37] parties from the perspective of party competition instead of traditional spatial models of party interaction. In addition to changing policy dimensions, parties can increase the attractiveness of themselves and other parties by changing saliency and ownership on certain issues to benefit from political competition. Moreover, competition is not limited to parties that are ideologically close to each other. A mainstream party can aim to reduce the votes of a mainstream opponent by increasing the voting rate of a niche party. To put it differently, niche parties can be either the target themselves or a weapon to harm other parties by the mainstream. Yet, the accomodative tactic of established parties should be employed within a certain period of time. It must be before the niche party gains reputation. If the mainstream hesitates to do this, it might increase the success of the niche party.

Based on her analysis of 149 strategic interactions between mainstream and niche parties in 17 Western European countries, especially in Great Britain and France, she confirms the prediction that the tactics of center parties are pivotal in the election success or failure of niche parties. Mainstream parties manage this "by altering the saliency of the niche party's issue and the attractiveness and ownership of its position on that issue" (Meguid, 2008: 276). Meguid also supports the idea that niche parties may still be considered successful in terms of policy goals even if they do not reach their office or vote seeking goals. The reason for this is that, as a result of accomodative tactics, the mainstream adopts the niche parties' policy objectives. This also means that the 'success' of these parties is different from electoral success. Immigration and environment have become mainstream issues in many Western

[37] In her study, niche parties are defined as green, radical right and ethnoterritorial parties. For further information on this definition, see Chapter 1 entitled 'the Niche Party Phenomenon' in Meguid's book 'Party Competition between Unequals'.

European countries, even if niche parties that raise these issues are eliminated by accommodative strategies carried out by center parties. The changes in center parties' manifestos and the inclusion of these issues in public opinion surveys, Meguid argues, may have a permanent impact on the content of mainstream political debate.

Another important theoretical implication of Meguid's work is that accomodative tactics not only increase the election strength of the mainstream party which applies them, but also affect the mainstream party dominance and party system stability in a positive way. On the other hand, adversarial strategies may produce different results, as it was observed in Austria. After three election periods of adversarial tactics, the FPÖ became the second most popular party in 1999. Although the Socialists obtained the highest percentage of votes and shifted conservative votes to the FPÖ with adversarial tactics, they were expelled from the government when they refused to make a coalition with a RRP, and eventually, the FPÖ made a coalition with the ÖVP. This case shows that adversarial tactics not only harm the electoral success of the strategizing mainstream party but also undermine its chances at office. Moreover, this situation disrupts the stability of the party system. The mainstream parties' demonization of the RRP ruptured the effectiveness and sustainability of the mainstream party-niche party government in Austria. This could even create worse consequences that would result in a realignment in the system. The mainstream opponent party could be replaced by the niche party. This means that party competition between unequals affects not only the status of the niche party, but also the most fundamental nature of competition and party politics among equals.

Van de Wardt (2015) makes a distinction between mainstream opposition (MOPs) and mainstream government parties (MGPs) to explore who actually responds to niche parties. He argues that the former is likely to be risk-accepted and follow the program of niche rivals. On the other hand, MGPs have a tendency to be risk-averse and are not willing to respond. Yet, they react when MOPs come up with an issue. This means, he asserts, that niche parties affect MGPs indirectly. The difference of this study from Meguid's work is that the latter does not distinguish mainstream parties in terms of responding to niche parties. On the basis of time-

series analyses between 1974 and 2003 in the case of Denmark, Van de Wardt's study has shown that policy shifting is mainly done by MOPs rather than MGPs. Arguing that mainstream parties are utility maximizers, Meguid's work fails to make a distinction between opposition and government parties. However, Van de Wardt's study shows that such a distinction helps us predict who will respond to niche parties. Based on the evidence, it is argued that niche parties' attention to issues raised prompts MOPs, and indirectly MGPs, to respond, which means that niche parties have an important influence in shaping the agenda and politicizing their own issues. Yet, it must be noted that this depends on the specific issue at hand. For example, the study has shown that - EU integration is the least likely issue that would lead mainstream parties to experience a shift.

Turnbull-Dugarte (2020) also tested this assumption as he compared party programs of mainstream parties in 2013 and 2017 federal elections in Germany and assessed party positions only for euroscepticism. He found that center parties did not accommodate this issue; instead, they employed an adversarial strategy as a response to the AfD's election success, which is at odds with spatial models of party competition. The center right became more pro-European. He attributes this partly to the history of the party and the fact that Germany is one of the founders of the Union, and partly to the public opinion as a large majority of the people are pro-European. Although mainstream parties did not change the saliency of the topic, they simply changed their position going more pro-European.

Located on the left side of the mainstream party groups, the Social Democrats are also threatened, besides the Christian and Conservative Democrats, by the RRPs entering the party system. Therefore, they also have responded to this danger with various strategies. Having tested the hypothesis that social democratic parties shift their position as a response to the radical right danger and employ a tougher stance on immigration and integration, Bale et. al. (2010) reached some significant conclusions. Comparing the developments in Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, they discovered that the choice of strategies –hold, defuse and adopt- employed by the social democrats depended on three factors: the behavior of the center right, the existence of consensus within the social democratic party regarding the strategy, and the reaction of parties on its left. If the center right has decided to

defuse the radical right, it makes things easier for the social democrats and they also defuse it, as in Norway. But when the center right employs the adaptation strategy, things get more difficult for the social democrats, mostly causing them to follow stricter immigration and integration policies, as happened in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Austria.

As far as all three strategies are concerned, the hold strategy is the easiest one as it does not require any innovation or create disunity within the party. The defuse strategy, on the other hand, can be an effective pre-emptive strategy, but it depends on whether the center right employs the same strategy, thus eliminating the conflict over immigration and integration issues between the left and right. It also depends on the unity and a successful leadership within the party. Lastly, the adaptive (accomodative) strategy is the most common response displayed by the center right to co-opt the radical right. However, this response may generate heavy criticism from the radical left, the greens, and even the liberals. Hence, most of the time social democratic parties take a much more difficult path, mixing elements from all strategies, because none of these strategies alone offer a remedy to the issues in question.

Abou-Chadi (2014) also assessed the impact of niche party success on mainstream parties, yet from a different perspective, demonstrating how this impact depends on the type of the niche party. His findings showed that radical right and green parties have a different impact on mainstream parties' behavior, and that this impact varies according to the ideological position and last electoral performance of the mainstream party. While the center right shifts its position towards the right and emphasizes the issues of immigration and integration, it de-emphasizes environmental issues when green parties have electoral success. In order to explain this, Abou-Chadi divides issues as positional and valence; while the former represents issues like immigration which a party can take a position on, the latter describes issues like environment which a party cannot take a position on. Since the issue ownership in environment, based on the statistics, belongs to green parties, the center right does not emphasize this issue when facing a green party electoral success. Instead, it reacts to the radical right shifting its position on immigration and integration.

Drawing on the dynamism literature, Loxbo (2010) assessed the impact of the RRP at the local level in Sweden between 2002 and 2006. The specific aim of his article was to analyze if the RRP, the Sweden Democrats (SD), affects the coalition behaviour of mainstream parties. The evidence showed that mainstream parties at the local level tend to form minority governments, rather than grand coalitions. They do not cooperate with each other to hamper the electoral success of the RRP, causing an increased bipolarization in the party system and unstable minority governments. On the other hand, Rydgren (2010) explains, in a comparative study, the differences in electoral successes of RRPs in Denmark and Sweden in terms of supply side reasons. At the national level, the RRP Danish People's Party is much more successful in Denmark compared to its counterpart in Sweden. He attributes this to the existence of different cleavage dimensions. In Sweden, the socio-economic dimension is still prevalent while, in Denmark, the socio-cultural one is more influential. Issues like immigration and integration are much more politicized in Denmark and have been controlling the political agenda for a long time.

Another research about how and why mainstream parties respond to RRPs was conducted by William M. Downs (2001). He selected Belgium and Norway as cases and distributed 50-item survey questionannaire to all the local representatives of the parties excluding the Vlaams Blok and FrP (Progress Party) in Antwerp and Oslo respectively. The evidence points to some important implications. First, there is hardly a consensus across and within parties on how to respond to RRPs. Yet, a great majority of conservatives in Oslo prefer to use the collaboration strategy. On the other hand, Antwerp's moderate right representatives choose to co-opt the Vlaams Blok's policies. Especially when there is electoral uncertainty as in Belgium, respresentatives are likely to prefer engaging tactics, which are co-optation and collaboration. But if there is no electoral concerns, members choose to disengage. Last but not least, some representatives of the left in both countries opted for following legal restrictions against RRPs.

In terms of strategies, Fallend and Heinisch (2015) examine the participation of the FPÖ in government coalitions between 2000 and 2007, and analyze the strategies used against them. As a result, it is understood that making the FPÖ a pariah is not effective. On the other hand, including it in public office was more

effective causing almost a collapse and a split within the party. Yet, this was not because of the strategy itself, but because of the party's lack of experience and incompetence of the politicians who were not familiar with the public office. Exclusionary strategies were not successful, either. These strategies gave them another means of mobilization. This analysis concludes that no strategy worked, thus demand-side causes needed to be addressed.

On the basis of the existing literature, this section has offered three different approaches to assess the RRPs' impact. It has presented examples of the assessment of impact put forward by these approaches which benefit mainly from Western European cases. Although assumptions and examples from the institutional and systemic responsiveness approach are also provided, this section suggests that the impact of the radical right will be evaluated in this study on the basis of the goal attainment approach. This approach primarily argues that the impact of a party exists when it gains the most of the votes and leads the government. One can see the direct impact of a party in this way. However, later studies have widened this view, taking into consideration the dynamic nature of the party system.

Setting out with the seminal work of Easton (1965), this section emphasizes the importance of the dynamic nature of the systems and continues with Downs's (1957) theory regarding party positioning. Downs argues that political parties shape their ideologies with the purpose of obtaining most of the votes, thus they shift their positions on the left-right continuum. Later, Meguid (2008) develops her niche party competition model and makes some modifications to Downs's theory. Adding new concepts, such as issue ownership and saliency, she emphasizes party competition. This section provides further examples from empirical studies that hinge on both Downs's and Meguid's models, combining the party positioning and party system competition assumptions.

Since RRPs generally operate outside the government, they seek to have an indirect impact in the party system. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate their impact through the lenses of these aforementioned theories. This section has made an effort to provide evidence from various empirical studies to show that the presence or electoral success of RRPs cause center parties to react through different strategies with either adversarial or accommodative tactics. In sum, even though one cannot

always identify the impact of the radical right immediately, as Williams (2018: 462) puts it, ‘other senses and sensibilities may serve to corroborate that it is there’.

3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN

3.2.1. General Approach and Strategy for Inference

The purpose of scientific research is to make descriptive or explanatory inferences based on empirical data. The goal of this research is to explain the phenomenon at hand. Yet, one should note that finding a causation is not a trivial task, but a highly challanging one. Thus, I do not argue that I present a causal relationship between the variables of this study. Instead of presenting a causal hypothesis or drawing causal inferences, correlation and association will be studied here.

Although causation and correlation can be found at the same time, the existence of a correlation does not mean that causation exists. Causation will only occur if event A causes outcome B. On the other hand, however, correlation is only a relationship. It occurs if action A is associated with action B. Yet, it does not necessarily means that one event causes the other. Correlation and causation are often confused because the human mind likes to find patterns, even though they do not exist. Usually, this happens when the two variables are closely related and one is linked to the other. It implies the existence of a cause and effect relationship in which the dependent event is the result of the independent event.

But even if two events are happening simultaneously before our eyes, we cannot claim that causation exists. First, our observations are simply anecdotal. Second, there are multiple possibilities for a relationship. For example, the opposite might be true: B actually causes A. The second possibility is that the two are correlated, and even then there is more to it: A and B are correlated, but they’re actually caused by C. The third possibility is that there is another variable involved: A does cause B—as long as D happens. Or there is a chain reaction: A causes E, which leads E to cause B (but you only witnessed with your own eyes that A causes B) (Madhavan, 2019).

After stressing that this study presents only a correlation between variables, it is neccessary to explain the methodological approach of the study. Although it acknowledges the assumptions of the qualitative approach, this is mainly a quantitative research. As a first step, it is necessary to define this method of research and examine its goals. Quantitative research is the process of investigating a particular problem based on a theory by analyzing it with statistical techniques and measuring it with numbers. In other words, quantitative research includes the analysis of numerical data (Political Science Research, n.d.). Brady and Collier (2004: 294) provide a more technical definition, defining mainstream quantitative methods as "an approach to methodology strongly oriented toward regression analysis, econometric refinements on regression, and the search for statistical alternatives to regression models in contexts where specific regression assumptions are not met". However, in this study, only basic formulas will be created and used.

In order to obtain the necessary inferences in this research, comparison will be used. Since the variables are the vote share of the radical right and the radicalization of the center right ideology, the years in which the AfD had electoral success will be compared to the period in which the AfD was not successful. In this way, we will be able to infer the impact of the radical right's vote share on the center right ideology.

3.2.2. Unit of Observation and Case Selection

Unit of observation in this research is political parties. Since the research question deals with the radical right's impact on the center right, radical right and center right parties on the political spectrum will be analyzed. While selecting the case, cases used by scholars in other studies were taken into consideration. Germany is not included in these other studies where two or more countries are generally compared. The reason for this is that the radical right in Germany has been severely restricted after World War II and has not been successful. However, with the AfD, this has changed, and for the first time at the federal level, a radical right party entered the German parliament and became the third largest party. Although the AfD did not manage to enter the parliament in the 2013 federal elections, they were able to do so in the next federal elections in 2017 when they garnered %11.5 of the votes

and occupied 94 seats in the German *Bundestag*. In addition, the fact that Christian and social democrats formed a coalition made the AfD the main opposition party.

The rise of RRPs in Western Europe has affected the behavior of other parties, leading to a change in party systems. At the same time, it started to affect immigration policies in countries with large numbers of immigrants. Numerous studies have examined cases outside Germany, and it has been found that the rise or presence of RRPs have an impact on the behavior of center parties and change the ideologies of these parties. However, since Germany is relatively a new case compared to these examples, there is no research on this country. The question of whether the electoral breakthrough of the AfD affected the immigration and integration policies of the center-right CDU/CSU in Germany matters significantly. As covered in the previous chapter, at the beginning of the 1990s, the German government made some significant changes to the Constitution regarding immigration and asylum legislation and tightened the conditions to become an asylum-seeker. Although existing studies have not analyzed this in a systematic way, some authors (Minkenberg, 1998: 13) have argued that the shift towards the right in the ideology and policy of the center right can be explained by the rise of RRPs, although this rise is confined to the state level. This compels this study to consider that the German case will once again behave as it did in the past. It is expected that the CDU/CSU will shift their ideology towards the right as a result of the significant electoral success of the AfD on the state level.

3.2.3. Presentation of Key Variables

In this research, the hypothesis is that the more RRPs gain electoral success, the more center right parties shift their ideology towards the right. In our case, this can be formulated as “the more the AfD increases its vote share, the more the CDU/CSU shifts its ideology towards the right”. Thus, the independent variable is the number of votes that the AfD and CDU/CSU achieved, while dependent variable is the ideology of the CDU/CSU. Here, the CDU/CSU’s ideological shift between the 2013 and 2017 federal elections will be measured. To this end, we will look at

the electoral successes of the AfD and CDU/CSU on the state level between these dates.

3.2.4. Data Collection

In order to test the argument of this research and collect the relevant data, a dataset, which is a new text corpus comprising of digitized and coded electoral programs, will be used (Lehmann et al., 2016). The corpus is based on the gathering and coding of the Manifesto Project data (Volkens et al., 2015). It is one of the largest human-annotated, open-access, cross-national text corpora in political science, and is the result of a long-term effort in digitizing and interpreting party manifestos.

For a long time, the Manifesto Project (known as the Manifesto Research Group from 1979 to 1989, the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) from 1989 to 2009, and Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) from 2009 onwards) has produced a dataset, by way of employing content analysis of the election manifestos of political parties mainly in OECD countries, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, and has made it available to researchers. In order to produce and generate the dataset, native-language expert coders trained in content analysis have divided the election programs into statements (also called quasi-sentences) and distributed each statement to the appropriate policy goals categories created by coders. Until now, this dataset has revealed how frequently political parties use different codes of policy issues. At the same time, it has been used extensively to calculate the left-right positions of these parties and has become highly popular among scholars. Lately, this dataset has become one of the most used corpus to provide an empirical test for party competition theories both transnationally and over time, and since its first publication, it has been used in many studies on political parties, party systems, coalition-building, agenda-setting and party strategies (Merz et al., 2016: 1).

The aim of the CMP is to measure the policy positions of political parties competing in democratic elections in the post-World War II period. Moreover, the

Manifesto Project aims to measure the policy positions of presidential candidates in Latin America. Analyzing the manifestos makes it possible to measure the policy positions of parties and presidential candidates in different countries and elections on a common ground. The manifestos are regarded as the most important authoritative policy statements of parties and presidential candidates, and therefore an indicator of the political choices of parties in a given time. Hence, manifestos were chosen as the subjects for quantitative content analysis. This content analysis aims to reveal the stances of parties and presidents by counting their statements and messages to the voters (Volkens et al., 2015).

3.2.5. Measurement (Operationalization)

As we stated above, our argument is that the more RRPs gain electoral success, the more center right parties shift their ideology towards the right. Therefore, I operationalize the independent variable as the amount of votes that the AfD and CDU garner. I measure this simply by the percentage of the votes these parties achieved. The time frame will be the period between 2013 and 2017 in order to be able to see if the CDU/CSU changes its ideological stance along the political spectrum. In the 2013 German federal elections, the AfD could not manage to enter the *Bundestag* since its vote share was below the 5% treshold. However, after the federal elections in 2013, the AfD started to gain huge success in state elections held until 2017 while the CDU/CSU lost its support in many states.

As can be seen in Table 1, in 9 states the CDU/CSU's vote share decreased compared to previous elections, while the AfD increased its votes in all states. In this case, it is expected that in the next federal elections, the CDU/CSU will seek to regain the votes that they lost. Therefore, according to Downs's theory, they will shift their position towards the right on the political spectrum.

On the other hand, I operationalize the dependent variable as the ideology of the CDU/CSU. In order to measure it, I select the issues that are significant for radical right ideology. These are immigration, integration, and national themes. Accordingly, I pick the related codes from the CMP dataset codebook (Volkens et al., 2015). For immigration-related issues, first I use the code per601 'National Way

of Life: Positive'. This code refers to statements that favor manifesto country's nation, history, and general appeals. These may include support for established national ideas; general appeals to pride of citizenship; appeals to patriotism; appeals to nationalism and suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against subversion (Volkens et al. 2015: 17). Moreover, this code contains statements defending the restriction of the process of immigration, i.e., accepting new immigrants. It may also include statements regarding immigration being a threat to national character of the manifesto country; 'the boat is full' argument; the introduction of migration quotas, including restricting immigration from specific countries or regions, etc. (Volkens et al., 2015: 26).

Table 1: The State Election Results of AfD and CDU in Germany between 2009 and 2017

		Previous Elections		**Next Elections**	
Election Years	**States**	**AfD**	**CDU/CSU %**	**AfD %**	**CDU/CSU %**
2011-2016	Baden Württemberg	-	39	15,1	27
2013-2018	Bavaria	-	47,7	10,2	37,2
2011-2016	Berlin	-	23,3	14,2	17,6
2009-2014	Brandenburg	-	19,8	12,2	23
2011-2015	Bremen	-	20,4	5,5	22,4
2011-2015	Hamburg	-	21,9	6,1	15,9
2009-2013	Hessen	-	37,2	4,1	38,3
2013-2017	Lower Saxony	-	36	6,2	33,6
2011-2016	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	-	23	20,8	19
2012-2017	Nordrhein-Westfalen	-	26,3	7,4	33
2011-2016	Rheinland-Pfalz	-	35,2	12,6	31,8
2012-2017	Saarland	-	35,2	6,2	40,7
2009-2014	Saxony	-	40,2	9,7	39,4
2011-2016	Saxony-Anhalt	-	32,5	24,3	29,8
2012-2017	Schleswig-Holstein	-	30,8	5,9	32
2009-2014	Thrungia	-	31,2	10,6	33,5

Source: Tagesschau, n.d.

Secondly, for immigration-related issues, I use the code per602 'National Way of Life: Negative'. This code implies the unfavourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation and history. It may include opposition to patriotism; nationalism; and the existing national state, national pride, and national ideas. Additionally, this code refers to statements favouring new immigrants; statements against restrictions and quotas; and statements rejecting the 'boat is full' argument. It also includes allowing new immigrants for the benefit of the manifesto country's economy (Volkens et al., 2015: 27). It should be noted that I use the code 'National Way of Life' since there is no code directly related to immigration. In brief, these codes contain, besides immigration, such themes as nationalistic feelings.

As the next important pillar of radical right ideology, I measure integration-related issues in the CDU/CSU's election programs. Just as in the previous theme, there is no code that directly measures integration-related issues. Therefore, I use the codes related to multiculturalism, which are per607 'Multiculturalism: Positive', and per608 'Multiculturalism: Negative'. The first one refers to statements that favor cultural diversity and cultural plurality in domestic societies. These may involve the preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country, including special educational provisions. The second code represents statements that indicate the enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration. These address cultural homogeneity in society (Volkens et al., 2015: 19).

3.3. ANALYSIS

3.3.1.Techniques and Procedures

In order to test the party competition arguments, lately the CMP data has been widely used. Before we start with the formulations of this study's analysis, it would make sense to look at how other authors used the CMP data to test different arguments so that we can understand how the formulations of this study are created.

Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) compared 25 countries using the data to investigate the relationship between the parties' policy positions and policy programs of their opponents and made a longitudinal and crossnational analysis. In addition,

using this data, they explored which political parties are responsive to each other, and found out that each party is responsive to policy shifts by other members of their respective ideological family. This means that left-wing parties responded to other parties on the left while right-wing parties responded to right-wing parties. At the same time, they tested the public opinion as control variable. They also reached the conclusion that central parties are more responsive compared to niche parties. These authors have analyzed all types of parties without particularly focusing on the relationship between the radical right and the center right parties. Therefore, their analysis was not limited to issues that are significant for radical right parties like immigration and integration as it rather examined - the general shifts of the parties on the left-right spectrum. Hence, unlike the present study, they did notuse specific codes in the CMP data. In their formulations, they took into account the changes in parties' policy directions to the right or the left, as well as public opinion shifts. They were not interested in issue saliency.

Bilecen (2016) also used the CMP data to investigate the relationship between the electoral success of niche parties and their policy positions in developing countries, selecting Turkey as the case. He compared national election results and policy positions of parties between 1961 and 2011. He conducted a cross-sectional time series analysis and took the niche parties as dependent variable in an effort to explain their success. While doing so, independent variables are created by using some different codes in the CMP codebook. Using certain codes, 5 main headings are created, which are democracy, political culture, economy, society and justice, and extreme issues. GDP per capita is also used as control variable in order to see if the economy has an impact on niche party success. The study revealed that although parties' emphasis on issues such as democracy, economy or society and justice matters to some extent, the main factor affecting the election success is their position on the political spectrum. They obtain more votes when they are located at the center compared to those that are in radical position.

Another author who uses the CMP data is Turnbull-Dugarte (2020). He compares the manifestos used in the 2013 and 2017 federal elections in Germany. Although he analyzes the AfD, CDU/CSU, FDP, Greens, Left Party and SDP, he particularly investigates how the center right responds to the radical right regarding

the issue of European integration. Since the AfD achieved a significant electoral success, Turnbull-Dugarte seeks to predict how the CDU/CSU will respond according to spatial theories. Thus, the dependent variables are the overall position of the center right on the issue of EU integration and the saliency given to the issue. In the state elections held between 2013 and 2017, the CDU/CSU lost most of its votes to the AfD. Given the fact that the AfD is the closest party to the CDU/CSU in ideological terms, the biggest reaction to EU integration is expected theoretically to come from the CDU/CSU to regain the votes it lost. Therefore, the author analyzes the change in the CDU/CSU's position on the left-right spectrum in general, and the change in positions only on EU integration. Secondly, he measures the issue saliencies, that is, the total number of statements, both positive and negative, in the party manifesto about the issue of EU integration. Finally, he analyzes the level of issue clarity change, which is another strategy implemented by a party that seeks to get back the votes it lost. Yet, at the end of the inquiry, he interestingly concludes that the CDU/CSU adopts a pro-EU position, which means that they employ an adversarial strategy. This contradicts Downs's spatial theory because the CDU/CSU does not accommodate the issue and rather employs adversarial strategy.

Abou-Chadi (2014) also deals with the role of niche parties in spatial theories and issue competition. He explains the change in party positions by using Downs's theory and the concept of issue competition. Using the CMP data, he explains the impact of not only the RRPs but also the green parties on the center parties. As RRPs' votes increase, center right parties respond to this success by politicizing the issue of immigration. Abou-Chadi analyzes the center parties in 16 Western European countries between 1980 and 2011 using the CMP data. He not only investigates whether established parties have changed their positions on issues related to immigration and environment, but also focuses on how much space they devote to these issues. In order to measure the positions of center parties, he uses the codes related to immigration and environment in the CMP codebook. Abou-Chadi examines not only RRPs but also green parties. For the impact of RRPs, he uses the codes per607 'Multiculturalism: Positive', and per608 'Multiculturalism: Negative' since there is no code directly related to immigration in the CMP codebook. In order to measure party position and issue saliency, Abou-Chadi (2014: 425) subtracts the

summed share of a positive category from the summed share of a negative category. Saliency is simply measured by the sum of positive and negative shares as it is formulated in this study as well.

Krause and Giebler (2020) also conduct an analysis using the CMP data. They analyse the data of elections held in 18 Western European countries since 1985. Contrary to most studies that uses the CMP data, they investigate the effect of RRPs on welfare state policies. At the end of the research, they conclude that while RRPs increase their votes, other parties take a more leftist position on welfare state policies. They argue that especially center-left parties respond this way since they see this as a good strategy to get back the votes they lost to the radical right. Krause and Giebler conduct a longitudinal and cross-national analysis to test their hypothesis. They use the codes from the CMP codebook related to government services to operationalize the welfare scale. They use ‘per504: Welfare State Expansion’ and ‘per506: Education Expansion' for the leftist positions while they use ‘per 505: Welfare State Limitation’ and ‘per507 Education Limitation’ in order to measure the right-wing positions. As the independent variable, they take the voting rates of RRPs. They also add some control variables, such as immigration-related positions of parties, for which they use the codes ‘per607: Multiculturalism Positive’ and ‘per608: Multiculturalism Negative’, as well as party size and government status. They also argue that macroeconomic variables can be effective in changing the positions of parties with regard to welfare policies, so they control the unemployment rate, the immigration rate, GDP per capita and countries' GINI-score. Although they argue that public opinion can also be effective in the strategic decisions of parties, they do not add this variable because there is no reliable data covering the complete time frame of the research, or measuring public attitude regarding the welfare state. With the existing control variables, they analyze 183 non-RRPs in 128 elections in 18 Western European countries since 1985.

3.3.2. Presentation of the Findings

Considering the above-mentioned studies that use the CMP data, this study uses the formulations that Abou-Chadi (2014) created. First of all, the position of the

center right, which is the CDU/CSU in this case, on issues related to immigration and integration is significant. Therefore, one needs to analyze if the CDU/CSU changed its position after the AfD had achieved success in numerous state elections held between 2013 and 2017. I have previously indicated that I employ the codes per601 'National Way of Life: Positive' and per602 'National Way of Life: Negative' for immigration related issues. The position is calculated by subtracting the summed share of a positive category from the summed share of a negative category:

$$Immigration\ (Pos.) = per601 - per602$$

For issues related to integration I use the codes per607 'Multiculturalism: Positive' and per608 'Multiculturalism: Negative'. Thus, the same formulation is used to measure the position of the CDU/CSU about integration related issues:

$$Integration\ (Pos.) = per608 - per607$$

After calculating the position, I will measure the issue saliency since not only party position but also issue saliency is crucial in both Meguid's (2008) and Abou-Chadi's (2014) theories. Saliency is measured by the sum of positive and negative shares. It is calculated as follows:

$$Immigration\ (Sal.) = per601 + per602$$

$$Integration\ (Sal.) = per608 + per607$$

The higher a party scores on position measurement, the more it represents restrictive policies towards immigration in an election. In order to see if the CDU/CSU has changed its position, I will compare the data for the 2013 and 2017 elections based on the results of the formulas above. Similarly, the higher a party scores on issue saliency measurement, the more it indicates the party accommodates its rival's issues, which affirms Meguid's (2008) party competition theory.

Table 2: CMP Data of the Codes per601, per602, per607 and per608

Date	Partyname	per601	per602	per607	per608
2013	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU)	2,642	0	0,816	1,36
2017	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU)	6,632	0,373	2,459	1,639

Source: Volkens et al., 2015

Based on the CMP dataset, it can be seen that the value of the code per601 increased strikingly. It rose from 2,642 in 2013 to 6,632 in 2017 as presented in Table 2. This means that the CDU/CSU more often used the discourse about nationalistic feelings and supported the idea that immigration should be limited. Positive statements regarding immigration is measured by the code per602. However, there is no important change in terms of this code. There is only an increase by 0,373. On the other hand, the CDU/CSU did not radicalize its position in terms of integration policies. This is measured by the codes per607 and per608, which involve statements about multiculturalism. While the negative statements about multiculturalism increased only from 1,36 to 1,639, positive statements almost multiplied its value from 0,816 to 2,459.

When these data are used with given formulas, the position of the CDU/CSU on immigration and integration and the issue saliency of these issues are calculated as it is seen in Table 3 below. Firstly, a crucial change can be seen in the CDU/CSU's position on immigration. Whereas its value in 2013 is 2,642, it increased to 6,259, which amounts to a significant shift in immigration policies. When we look at integration in Table 3, we can see decline by 1,364. This means that the CDU/CSU did not much change its position in terms of integration. Notwithstanding this fact, they used a more positive language about multiculturalism, which is at odds with the theoretical arguments. The results of the analysis are significant also in terms of issue saliency. We see increases in the saliency of both immigration and integration. The issue saliency on immigration rocketed from 2,26 to 7, while the issue saliency on integration doubled from 2,17 to 4,09, as can be seen in Table 3. This indicates that an important change occurred on the issue saliency and the CDU/CSU accommodated issues that are mostly used by the radical right.

3.3.3. Interpretation of the Findings

This study evaluates the indirect impact of the radical right. This is not only a matter of research scope, but also a consequence of the fact that RRPs generally do not take part in the government because they fail to achieve a sufficient level of

election success. Hence, as a first step, it is necessary to contemplate how RRPs affect government policies in an indirect way.

Table 3: Results of the Calculated Data Based on the Formulas

	2013	**2017**
Immigration (Position)	2,642	6,259
Integration (Position)	0,544	-0,82
Immigration(Saliency)	2,26	7
Integration (Saliency)	2,17	4,09
Avarage Left-Right Position Value	2,564	2,757

Source: Data are calculated by the author with the given formulas based on the CMP data

I have presented the theoretical arguments and have argued that RRPs have an impact even when they do not take part in the government or in coalitions. Evidence shows that the AfD also affects the CDU/CSU indirectly by causing a shift in their party ideology. When analyzing this impact, the institutionalist approach argues that a party will have an impact when it wins enough votes and seats in the parliament or becomes a part of a governing coalition. However, the evidence presented above shows that a party may have an impact on policy-making even if it does not obtain enough votes to run the government or become a coalition partner.

In order to evaluate this impact according to the goal attainment approach that forms the foundation of this research, one needs to consider the primary goal of a party and identify whether it is office, policy, or votes. As Müller and Strom (1999) argue, political parties will need to determine their goals among themselves because they may not be able to achieve all of these goals at once. In this case, RRPs will choose policy goals since they generally fail to achieve an important electoral success. Moreover, in this analysis, the AfD endorses policy goals, and then achieves an impact because it pushes the CDU/CSU to shift their policies towards the right and to politicize the issues of immigration and integration.

After emphasizing the indirect impact of RRPs, one needs to highlight the dynamic nature of party systems. There are significant theoretical reasons to not

believe that only one party is effective in producing the policies and outcomes in the system. David Easton is one of the most important scholars who elaborate on how political systems endure. Easton (1965) emphasizes the interaction between different parts of the system. Moreover, he applies the concepts of action and reaction when explaining the complex relationships in the political system, and acknowledges that one needs to evaluate the political life in a dynamic way. Easton's point of view is important in the context of the present study where the impact of the AfD is analyzed in terms of the reaction of the CDU/CSU.

When there is any danger to the stability of the system, the system reacts to it and tries to prevent it. Likewise, we can explain how the CDU/CSU reacts to the AfD and makes changes in its ideology to avoid the danger in this manner. On the other hand, since the CDU/CSU makes changes in its own policies, this implicitly means that the AfD affects the center right. Hence, one can see that the center right ensures the stability of the system, but the radical right is already successful because it forces the center right to accept policy goals of the radical right.

At the beginning of this study, it was stated that the strategies employed by the center right against the radical right and the shift in the former's party position can be taken as evidence when measuring the impact of the radical right. In the theoretical background chapter, Downs's theory was mentioned as one of the most important theoretical building blocks of this study. He (1957) assumes that politicians do not try to win the elections in order to construct their policies; instead, they create their policies in order to win the elections. As politicians have private goals, such as income, prestige, and power, they create policies and change them as needed.

Moreover, Downs emphasizes party competition and points out that parties should take into account the policies of their rivals. He claims that political parties can move on the left-right political spectrum to regain the votes they lost. The findings of this research also prove this hypothesis. As Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) claimed, the center-right CDU/CSU shifted its policies to the right as a response to the success of the RRP AfD. In other words, instead of contradicting the AfD by using the adversarial strategy, the CDU/CSU used the accommodative, or more precisely the co-optation strategy, and accommodated the most important

issues raised by the AfD. As it is shown in Table 3, while the CDU/CSU's position value is 2,564 in 2013, it rises to 2,757 in 2017, which means that the CDU/CSU shifted its overall ideology in its manifestos towards the right between those years. Secondly, the position values for the specific topics like immigration and integration are also important. As Table 3 indicates, the topic that shows the greatest change is immigration. Its value jumped from 2,642 to 6,259, which means that the CDU/CSU shifted its position towards the right regarding immigration.

Table 1 shows that the vote share of the CDU/CSU decreased in 9 states out of 16 while the AfD obtained a significant electoral success passing the 5% threshold in 15 states in their first state elections in the period between 2013 and 2017. We can confidently assert that, in the next elections in 2017 the CDU/CSU is expected to try to regain the votes it lost in the state elections. Therefore, as Downs argues, the CDU/CSU is expected to reconstruct its ideology in order to increase its vote share again. Indeed, the evidence shows that the CDU/CSU started to shift its general position towards the right revising its stance on immigration issues, a situation that affirms the hypothesis of this study. On the issue of integration, however, the party has shifted its position in the opposite direction. While its positional value was 0,54 in 2013, it decreased to -0,82 in 2017. This means that the party increased the number of its statements that favor cultural diversity and cultural plurality in domestic societies. We may explain this by Germany's general tradition of respect for people from other cultures who have been living within the country for decades, including the Turkish and Asian communities, and by the country's high tolerance for differences. Turnbull-Dugarte (2020) also reached similar findings reinforcing the idea that center parties do not shift their positions towards the right in each and every issue. He demonstrates that the CDU/CSU implements an adversarial strategy on Europeanization.

The second significant theory the findings of which we should evaluate is Meguid's niche party competition model. She (2008) argues that parties can compete with each other by increasing issue saliency or having issue ownership on the subjects they compete. In order to achieve this, it is not necessary for a party to change its position. By mentioning issues like immigration more often in their speeches and party manifestos, they increase the saliency of these issues, either

positively or negatively. In our case, the fact that the CDU/CSU increases the issue saliency in immigration and integration confirms Meguid's hypothesis. As seen in Table 3, the value of saliency in immigration rises extremely from 2,26 to 7. Also, we can see a significant change in the saliency of integration. Increasing from 2,17 to 4,19, it almost doubles its previous value.

This research rests on two hypotheses as presented in the Introduction section. The first hypothesis is that the more the AfD increases its vote share, the more the CDU/CSU shifts its position towards the right on issues related to immigration and integration. The second one is that the more the AfD increases its vote share, the more the CDU/CSU increases the issue emphasis on issues related to immigration and integration. The second hypothesis is completely confirmed by the empirical data which show that the CDU/CSU increases the issue saliency both in immigration and integration. Yet, the first hypothesis is only partly confirmed. While the CDU/CSU shifts its position towards the right on immigration-related issues, it shifts its position towards the left on integration-related issues. This indicates that the CDU/CSU employs the co-optation strategy on immigration-related issues, as also argued by Downs. On the other hand, the party uses the adversarial strategy when it comes to issues related to integration. Hence, the evidence supports Meguid's niche party competition model regarding issue saliency, while it points to the necessity for some improvements in Downs's spatial theory. This result is also substantiated by Turnbull-Dugarte's findings since he (2020) concludes that the CDU/CSU did not shift its position towards the right regarding the European Union when the AfD had increased its vote share. Rather, the CDU/CSU employed the adversarial strategy, going more pro-European. Thus, it can be concluded that Downs's spatial theory regarding position shift is not valid for every issue.

Although the reason why the CDU/CSU shifted its position towards the left on integration-related issues is not the subject of this study, it can be argued that this is due to the existence of a large population of different ethnic origins (mainly Turkish and Asian communities) living in Germany. But in terms of immigration, the real subject is people from different nationalities who will newly move to Germany or refugees who flee from war. Regarding integration, the general perception is that the people of Turkish or Asian origin who were born and raised in Germany do not

have serious problems in terms of integration. This may be the reason behind the CDU/CSU's attitude. Yet, as stated above, this should be the subject of another study, and a qualitative research should investigate why the center right used the adversarial strategy against the radical right in integration-related issues.

Authors that had first used the CMP data had investigated the shifts of the parties on the left-right spectrum in general, while authors who wrote later researched the shifts of the center parties in certain subjects. Although this research takes into account the general shift as well, it primarily analyzes the radical right's impact on immigration and integration. In addition, since the AfD has been a successful party only recently, there is no previous research specifically on this case. In this sense, this analysis filled this gap in the literature and presented another case for testing existing hypotheses and theories.

CONCLUSION

As long as RRPs are in the government, it is not difficult to measure their direct impact. However, they do not generally get enough votes to be in charge of the government. Thus, how these parties affect policy-making is a significant question. In order to understand this, one should start from the law of action-reaction as emphasized in the Introduction section. Because every action generates a reaction, the presence or electoral success of RRPs will also trigger a reaction. Due to their ideological closeness, the most important reaction will come from the center right. Center-right parties would try to keep their vote shares and not lose them to RRPs. To this end, they will apply certain strategies for the explanation of which I primarily resort to the theories and hypotheses put forward by Downs and Meguid. Setting out from their arguments, I propose that the center right shifts its position towards the right in order to compete better with the radical right. My argument is two-fold: the center right not only changes its position but also increases the saliency of the related issues.

However, in order to understand the effects of the radical right better, I have identified the most important issues emphasized by RRPs, which are immigration and integration. Changes in the center-right parties' positions and discourses regarding these issues will determine the real influence of the radical right. Mostly, RRPs do not achieve sufficient levels of election success to allow them to come to the government or form a coalition. Yet, if they succeed to push center-right parties to make changes in their discourse and ideologies, or to politicize the issues they emphasize, these would be the real and most important impact of the radical right because, in this way, RRPs contaminate the center right from the inside. Germany is selected, in this research, using the typical case method to deliver an empirical test and present one more case in order to test Downs's and Meguid's theories. The AfD is a new RRP and has, therefore, not been taken as a case and tested by previous authors in terms of issues of immigration and integration. In all state elections held between 2013 and 2017, the AfD passed the 5% threshold and obtained 24% of the votes at most. On the other hand, the CDU/CSU lost votes in 9 states out of 16

during this election period. In this sense, Germany is a meaningful case for the theories I seek to test.

As a result of the analysis, it is observed that the CDU/CSU has indeed shifted its overall ideology towards the right and has become radicalized in immigration. Yet, we see an opposite reaction in terms of integration. The CDU/CSU has implemented the adversarial strategy in this regard. This may be explained by the existence of many Germany-born foreigners, mostly in Turkish and Asian communities. However, a more detailed analysis of the reasons should be undertaken by another study. On the other hand, our findings completely support the second hypothesis. The CDU/CSU has politicized issues of integration and immigration by increasing the issue saliency of both. Thus, both hypotheses of the present study are confirmed, except for the fact that the center right shifted its position on integration towards the left. These findings demonstrate that Downs's spatial theory is still valid but needs to be modified. Although seeking votes causes parties to change their ideology by implementing the accommodation strategy, this may not be the case for each specific issue. On the other hand, our case fully supports Meguid's issue saliency hypothesis. Vote concerns push parties to politicize their rival's issues.

This research also provides a significant insight into what 'radical right' means and how we can define its ideology. First, it touches on the confusion about the terminology by addressing how RRPs are categorized, and what the terms 'right' and 'radical' mean. Later, it investigates the ideology of these parties and presents a detailed literature review on their intellectual origins with a particular focus on fascism. Then, it explains the ideological features of RRPs that have developed after the 1980s. This study argues that these parties are not openly fascist, yet they hide their true intentions because of the liberal democratic structure of European politics, and bear in essence the characteristics of fascist ideology as they display anti-pluralist and monist features.

Many different terms are used in the literature to denote RRPs. These parties have been given different names by different authors. The majority of scholars split these parties into two groups: the radical right and the extremist right. This distinction is generally based on the attitudes of these groups towards democracy and the presence of violence in their actions. Until the 1980s, the extremist side was anti-

democratic and was generally associated with neo-fascism. It opposed parliamentary representation because it mostly advocated the mechanisms of direct democracy. The radical right, on the other hand, was reformist and objected to the values of liberal democracy, while not completely rejecting them. However, after the 1980s, the terms ‘extremist right’ and ‘radical right’ have been used interchangeably by many authors. Although these parties are no longer neo-fascists, they undermine the legitimacy of the democratic system. They are against pluralism and have a monistic view. Since they argue that collective authority is superior to individual authority, they have an authoritarian structure. This thesis argues that the radical right is more dangerous today compared to the neo-fascist extremist right before the 1980s. It is not a trivial task to identify their true views on democracy, as the radical right today has to operate under parliamentary democracy. Thus, these parties hide their anti-democratic ideas within the liberal European political system. Since they are against pluralism, they defend societal harmony and do not tolerate different opinions, as shown by examples in the first chapter. Perhaps the FN is the best example of this as they conceal their racist tendencies behind the discourse of "right to difference", which argues that races are not superior to each other, but are just different. For this reason, each race must remain on its own lands, and must continue its existence by respecting others. This ethnocratic alternative, advocated by RRPs, poses a significant danger to liberal democracy in Europe and threatens it from the inside. On the other hand, the term ‘far right’ is mostly used in the US and includes both the extremist and radical right varieties. This umbrella term includes not only the RRPs described above, but also racist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan in the US, and extremists, such as Anders Breivikwho carried out a terrorist attack in Norway in 2011.

After having categorized radical right groups and parties, this research sought to explain the term ‘radical right’ in its historical development. The meaning of ‘right’ is especially problematic. While the left-right dichotomy initially represented the difference between traditionalists and reformists at the time of the French Revolution, its meaning has since changed over time and has come to denote the difference between the bourgeois and proletarian classes. In the post-war era, it has been used to point to the difference between state intervention and *laissez faire*

economy. Today, while the economic characteristics of the left-right dichotomy have become less pronounced, its cultural dimension has come to be emphasized. According to the post-modernist approach, the right side is associated with authoritarian and anti-liberal views.

This study indicates that RRPs are dominated more by the sociocultural aspect of the right-wing ideology than by its socioeconomic side. These parties are not hostile to economic inequality among classes, but rather to state measures which aim to reduce inequalities among people on the basis of their ethnicity, immigration status, and even gender. They advocate maintaining or even increasing these inequalities for the benefit of the natives. Therefore, this research argues that RRPs belong to the right-wing ideology not because of their socioeconomic position, but because of their sociocultural ideas.

Although there are different arguments about the effects of the radical right, there are not so many studies that systematically analyze these effects on solid theoretical foundations. In the case of the radical right, the most important authors who manage to do this are Minkenberg and Schain. These authors analyze the influence of the radical right through the systemic responsiveness approach. They argue that the radical right influences the public opinion, which in turn puts pressure on center parties and forces them to change their policies. Apart from this study, there is a gap in the literature in terms of empirically explaining how the radical right influences policy-making indirectly through the goal attainment approach. In this sense, this study not only offers a different theoretical perspective on how to analyze the impact of the radical right indirectly, and but also presents an empirical analysis on the German case. Analyzing the German case by employing numerical data, it tests the assumptions of the existing theories. In this way, it aims to fill the above-mentioned academic gap by presenting a quantitative analysis.

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