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MASTER’S THESIS**

**THE CONFLICT BETWEEN GREECE AND
MACEDONIA AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION**

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ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

The Conflict Between Greece and Macedonia and the Limits of International Mediation

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The bilateral relations between Greece and Macedonia have been problematic since Macedonia's declaration of independence, and got more strained following Greece's objections to Macedonia's integration to Euro-Atlantic institutions with its constitutional name. Greece has repeatedly claimed that Macedonia's using its constitutional name, the "Republic of Macedonia", implies territorial claims against its northern province. The relations got more strained once Macedonia's leaders began promoting the national identity through historical symbols of ancient Macedonian kingdom, whereas Greece asserts that those symbols essentially belong to its own heritage.

Although Macedonia reiterated that it has no territorial claims against Greece and, as a sign of goodwill, revised the provisions of its constitution, and altered its national flag, Greece continues to block Macedonia's admission to the EU and NATO membership by using its veto power. The International Court of Justice, ICJ, ruled that Greece breached its obligations stipulated in the 1995 Interim Accord by blocking Macedonia's accession to the EU and NATO. Although the UN brokered mediation efforts, the resolution of the name conflict has been a stalemate due to the parties' intransigence even after two decades. The main strategy of the EU and NATO for stabilizing the Western Balkans through enlargement was derailed due to the name dispute. Settlement of the conflict becomes a priority for international community due to its potential to affect wider regional stability, given the recent developments in geopolitical setting.

This study primarily aims at unfolding the limits of international mediation as a mainstream conflict resolution approach. The case study under review suggests that the sole use of international mediation remains dysfunctional in value-based conflicts, particularly that of national identity.

Keywords: Conflict Resolution, International Mediation, Interim Accord.

ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

Yunanistan ile Makedonya Arasındaki Çatışma ve Uluslararası

Arabuluculuğun Sınırları

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Makedonya ile Yunanistan arasındaki ilişkiler Makedonya'nın bağımsızlığını ilan etmesinden itibaren sorunlu olagelmiş, Yunanistan'nın, Makedonya'nın anayasal ismi (Makedonya Cumhuriyeti) ile Avrupa-Atlantik kurumlarına entegrasyonuna karşı çıkması üzerine ilişkiler daha da gerginleşmiştir. Yunanistan, Makedonya'nın anayasal ismini kullanmasının ülkesinin kuzey bölgesi üzerinde toprak talebinde bulunacağı anlamına geldiğini devamlı surette iddia etmektedir. Makedon liderlerin, Yunanistan'nın kendi kültürel mirasına ait olduğunu iddia ettiği antik Makedon Krallığı sembollerini kullanarak milli kimlik siyaseti yapmaya başlaması üzerine ilişkiler daha gergin hale gelmiştir.

Makedonya, Yunanistan'ın ülkesi üzerinde hak iddia etmediğini devamlı surette belirtmesine ve iyi niyet göstergesi olarak anayasasının ilgili maddelerini ve bayrağını değiştirmesine rağmen, Yunanistan veto hakkını kullanmak suretiyle Makedonya'nın AB ve NATO üyeliğinin kabulünü engellemeye devam etmektedir. Uluslararası Adalet Divanı Yunanistan'ın, Makedonya'nın AB ve NATO'ya üyeliğini engellemek suretiyle 1995 tarihli Anlaşma gereklerini ihlal ettiğine hükmetmiştir. BM nezdinde yirmi yıl sürdürülen arabuluculuk çabaları tarafların uyuşmazlığı nedeniyle tıkanma noktasına gelmiştir. Bu çatışma nedeniyle AB ve NATO'nun genişleme suretiyle Batı Balkanların istikrara kavuşturulması stratejisi sekteye uğramıştır. Jeopolitik gelişmeler gözönüne alındığında, çatışmanın çözülmesi bölgesel istikrarı etkilemesi potansiyeli nedeniyle uluslararası toplumun bir önceliği haline gelmiştir.

Bu alıřma, ncelikle bir atıřma zmlene yaklařımı olan uluslararası arabuluculuęın sınırlarını gstermeyi amalamaktadır. İncelenen rneklem, sadece uluslararası arabuluculuęa bařvurulmasının milli kimlik gibi deęer bazı uyuřmazlıklarda iřlevsiz kaldıęını gstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: atıřma zmlene, Uluslararası Arabuluculuk, Geici Andlařma.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
ARM	Army of the Republic of Macedonia
ASNOM	Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia
AVNOJ	Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CFSP	EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC	European Commission
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HAF	Hellenic Armed Forces
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMRO	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
IMRO-DPMNU	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization— Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity
JNA	Yugoslav National Army
KKE	Greek Communist Party
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army

MAAK	Movement for All-Macedonian Action
MAP	NATO's Membership Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ND	New Democracy Party
NLA	National Liberation Army
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PASOK	Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement
PDP	Party for Democratic Prosperity
PfP	NATO's Partnership for Peace Program
PRM	People's Republic of Macedonia
SAA	Stabilization and Association Agreement
SDR	Strategic Defense Review
SDSM	Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia
SEECF	Southeast European Cooperation Process
SKM	League of Communists of Macedonia
SPIDR	Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution
SNOF	Slavo-Macedonian People's Liberation Front (Slavianomakedonski Narodno Osloboditelen Front)
UMO Ilinden	United Macedonian Organization/Ilinden (in Bulgaria)
UN	United Nations
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
VMRO	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
VMRO-DPMNE	Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	World Trade Organization

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INTRODUCTION

In this study “The Conflict between Greece and Macedonia and the Limits of International Mediation” is analyzed. Anchored in the Balkans, almost at the geographical center of the ancient world, the history of Macedonia is filled with waves of conquest and colonization. Legendary in antiquity as the birthplace of Alexander the Great, with some sense of irony, “Macedonia” has got entrapped in an interstate conflict with Greece since the last two decades.

The past half century has witnessed violent and protracted conflicts between identity groups, defined in cultural, ethnic, ideological, racial, or religious terms which have been increasingly challenging the peace of the international community. The conflicts around the globe can unsurprisingly vary considerably in their nature. Therefore the challenge is to identify these quite different types of conflicts and the different sets of factors affecting those conflicts. Nevertheless, the search for a single factor or set of factors that give an account for every conflict seems futile. The conflict between Greece and Macedonia is not exceptional and it comprises a wide variety of issues including historical, political, economic, social, and cultural factors. The conflict between Greece and Macedonia has significant implications over the parties, particularly Macedonia, and has been on the international agenda for almost two decades. This study involves an overview of the critical junctures of the Greek-Macedonian conflict, incorporating international mediation efforts since early 1990s. In this study I shall explore the root-causes associated with the conflict and ongoing international mediation efforts for a lasting peaceful settlement of the conflict, with a special emphasis on the prospect of Macedonia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures and eradication of latent risk of proliferation of the conflict in the region and thus promoting peace and stability in South East Europe. Before assessing the conflict and numerous negotiation and mediation efforts, an analysis will be made, including theories of conflict resolution in order to shed light on the reasons of the nature of the conflict, to scrutinize where and how conflict resolution techniques have fallen short so-far and finally to provide insight on appropriate and effective ways to resolve this conflict.

Conceptual Definition of Conflict

The term “conflict” is generally used to denote an incompatibility or opposition of interests or ideas over values and issues, although it may be used to refer to physical confrontation suggesting a fight or battle narrowly. Burton describes conflict as “a relationship in which each party perceives the other’s goals, values, interests, or behavior as antithetical to its own.”¹ Similarly, Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim define conflict as a “perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the current parties’ aspirations cannot be met simultaneously.”²

Moffitt and Bordone argue that some intellectuals prefer to use the word “dispute” instead of “conflict”, as others see significant differences between the two and the divergences originate from disciplinary differences. While legal experts prefer to focus on “disputes,” social scientists are more prone to study “conflicts”. Nonetheless, neither discipline has decided to use a single definition of either term. Most observers would agree that a quarrel among people is a dispute while a border war is a conflict. The conflicts are often considered as deeper (accommodating issues beyond surface into matters of value, identity, fear, or need), broader (including more people), and more systematic (reaching beyond a single interaction or claim).³ Wallensteen argues that “conflict” has different meanings in daily life, and according to some scholars it refers to a “behavior” or “action”, and that if merely the “actions” constitute the conflict, then the conflict should be over once this behavior comes to an end. According to him, a cease-fire is not the end of a conflict as the “actions” may resume at some later stage, because there may still be dissatisfied parties. Wallensteen claims that conflict is more than the behavior of the parties, and it contains a serious incompatibility between at least two sides, where their requirements cannot be met by the scarce resources at the same time. He argues that the “incompatibility” can be solved, but if there are limited resources problems are likely to arise. However as the parties adjust their demands so that there is no longer scarcity, then the conflict

¹ John W. Burton, “Conflict Resolution as a Political System,” **Working Paper No.:1**, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Fairfax, 1989, (No.:1), p.11.

² Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Dean G. Pruitt, and Sung Hee Kim, **Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement**, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1994, p.7.

³ Michael L. Moffitt, and Robert C. Bordone, **The Handbook of Dispute Resolution**, Harvard Law School, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2005, pp.2, 3.

disappears. According to Wallensteen, the “incompatibility” is key to the existence of conflict. Even though there are no “actions”, the “incompatibility” is still possible, hence a latent conflict. He claims that the conflict includes both the “action” and “incompatibility”. Wallensteen argues that for comprehending the concept of conflict, it is crucial to understand the roles of the actors, and the conflict exists even if there are no “actions” taken or demands formulated.⁴ It is generally accepted that sovereign states are inevitably engaged in a conflict with one another. According to Wallensteen, the existence of one state could be a danger to any other state, and as long as there is unpredictability in the international system, there will be fear and, thus, conflict. He argues that “actors” or “parties” are essential for conflict to occur, and the conflict is inevitable if the actors consider that their requirements for survival are at risk. Wallensteen asserts that the history of the actors, the actors’ understanding of their own role, and their resources are fundamental components in conflict analysis. One can conclude that conflict comprises three elements: “action”, “incompatibility”, and “actors”. In this context, Wallensteen suggested a complete definition of a conflict. According to him, a conflict is “a social situation in which a minimum of two actors strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources.”⁵

Boulding argues that abundance of conflicts in the world enabled the field of conflict resolution to evolve into a science of its own, with its highly interdisciplinary character “drawing its discourse from all the social sciences and even further”, during the birth of the field in the 1950s.⁶

Distinctions within Conflict Studies

Schellenberg explains that there are many different levels at which the phenomena of conflict may be studied, and some scholars are especially interested in the study of conflict processes that may be analyzed at the various levels, “macro” and “micro”, as well as in between. According to him, the field of conflict studies can be divided mainly into two categories, and one important distinction is between focusing

⁴ Peter Wallensteen, **Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace, and the Global System**, SAGE, London, 2002, p.15.

⁵ Wallensteen, p.16.

⁶ Kenneth Boulding and a small group of academics, which included Anatol Rapoport and Herbert Kelman, initiated the Journal of Conflict Resolution (JCR) at the University of Michigan in 1957.

on broad conflicts (such as wars and revolutions), or focusing on smaller conflicts (such as conflicts within small groups or disputes between neighbors). Schellenberg informs that most social conflict researchers work either at the “macro” or the “micro” level, though they sometimes try to generalize. He argues that the term “peace studies” (or “peace and conflict studies” or “peace science”) is the study of scholars who work at the broader levels of conflict studies, and those who work at the “micro” level often identify their field by the terms “conflict resolution” or “dispute management”.⁷

Conceptual Definition of Conflict Resolution

Wallensteen argues that in specific terms, the conflict resolution might be conceived as “a significant decrease in social conflict as a result of a conscious settlement of problems in discord,” and as more narrowly it is regarded as “a process of conscious settlement of the issues between parties.” It is necessary to distinguish conflict resolution from “conflict transformation” and “conflict management”. According to Wallensteen in terms of international relations, the definition of conflict resolution reads as “a social situation where the armed conflicting parties in a (voluntary) agreement resolve to peacefully live with, and/or dissolve their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against one another.” Wallensteen claims that “the conflict is transformed from violent to non-violent behavior by the parties themselves, not by somebody else, for instance, an outsider or third party.”⁸ Wallensteen’s definition stipulates that the parties’ entering into agreement means that the primary parties take responsibility for the accords, and commit themselves to their implementation and legitimation.

Mainstream Approaches in Conflict Resolution

Although the possibilities of further variation in approaches to conflict resolution are endless, most practitioners emphasize one or another of these five approaches. Main approaches in the field of conflict resolution are “coercion”,

⁷ James A. Schellenberg, **Conflict Resolution Theory, Research and Practice**, State University of New York, Albany, 1996, p.10.

⁸ Wallensteen, p.50.

“negotiation”, “adjudication”, “mediation”, and “arbitration”. According to Schellenberg, the “coercion” refers to force that conflicting parties deploy to accomplish a particular conclusion, while “negotiation” means involving the parties in a process of discussion that tries to bring them into voluntary agreement. He argues that the term “adjudication” refers to power of a state, and its legal system to yield an authoritative resolution, and the concept of “mediation” involves using a third party to assist the conflicting parties to reach a mutually acceptable settlement. Finally, “arbitration” refers to using a third party (generally the ICJ in international relations) to decide, through prior mutual consent of the parties, the issues in discord.⁹

Institutionalization of Conflict Resolution

The “conflict management” has evolved in North America and Europe in recent decades largely as a result of judicial processes, and the demand for processes less mandatory than arbitration. While governments created their own agencies, most of the work in this area is performed by small professional groups, such as the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) in the U.S.¹⁰

The “conflict resolution” originated from a necessity of creating accord in the society. As a field of study, it embraces both academic studies and practical work, and has seen many contributions from scholars, practitioners, international and non-governmental organizations. Many factors affected the evolution of the discipline while some others slowed down the process.

The discipline of “international relations” approached the conflict resolution on the basis of the insights generated in contemporary peace research that encompass drawing conclusions from the study of causes of war, issues of disarmament and arms control or conflict dynamics. The methodological approach taken by most scholars is comparative. The history-oriented methods have dominated the field and systematic quantitative research has begun to emerge.¹¹

⁹ Schellenberg, p.15.

¹⁰ John W. Burton, **Conflict: Resolution and Provention**, St. Martin’s, New York, 1990, (Provention), pp.272-273.

¹¹ Wallenstein, p.5.

Conflict Analysis

The conflict analysis was developed during the Cold War to understand the East–West conflict. Some scholars asserted that conflict theory could also be used for conflict resolution studies.¹² The threats of the nuclear confrontation and the global reach of the Cold War made it urgent to understand the dynamics of conflict. There was a need to focus on grievances that could drive conflicts. In this regard, scholars saw a role in solving conflicts in forms of workshops and seminars. In the late 1980s and 1990s the experience of settlement of local conflicts, as well as the ending of the Cold War increased the interest in conflict resolution.¹³

The conflict analysis is based on three mainstream approaches: the “conflict dynamics”, the “needs-based”, and the “rational calculations” approaches. In the following paragraphs I shall give an account for the insights of these three mainstream approaches briefly.

Conflict Dynamics Approach

The work by Johan Galtung in the 1960s is a good example of the “dynamic” perspective on conflict analysis. It represents an early perspective in the development of conflict analysis and emphasizes the dynamics of conflict. Wallensteen argues that conflict resolution expected to break the dynamics of conflict, a change in the direction of the flow of events, so that escalation is turned into de-escalation and positive interaction. According to Wallensteen, Galtung depicted “incompatibility” as central to the dynamics of conflict.¹⁴ Galtung argues that resolution of conflict, conflict transformation, is a “never-ending process” and the conflict is transformed through “transcendence” (where the goals are met fully for the conflict parties), “compromise” (goals are met less than fully for the sides), and “withdrawals” (goals are given up).¹⁵ The dynamic approach to conflict analysis demonstrates the importance of forming a “dialogue” between the parties. Wallensteen claims that this

¹² Louis Kriesberg, “The Development of Conflict Resolution Field“, **Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques**, Ed. I. William Zartman, and J. Lewis Rasmussen, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1997, pp.51-77.

¹³ Wallensteen, pp.33, 34.

¹⁴ Wallensteen, p.36.

¹⁵ Johan Galtung, **Peace by Peaceful Means, Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization**, SAGE, London, 1996, pp.72, 81-90, 96.

approach requires the participation of parties together with mediators and the introduction of issues that may unlock the conflicting parties' positions. He also indicates the significance of "confidence building measures" in military, social, cultural, economic, and other areas, as a tool to alter the dynamics of a conflict. Conferences and confidence building regimes are materialized mostly in multilateral environments. According to Wallensteen, in "dynamic approach", assigning mediators is especially important and third parties take a particular role in such undertakings.¹⁶

Needs Based Approach

Wallensteen argues that if the basis of a conflict is the denial of particular needs, then the conflict resolution process must identify and address those needs.¹⁷ Azar suggested that conflict resolution needs decentralized structures and ways in which psychological, economic and relational requirements can be satisfied.¹⁸ There are distinct conflict resolution techniques, no matter what the origins of the conflict.¹⁹ The idea of using conflict resolution in international relations found its place in problem-solving workshops. The framework was to isolate the parties' representatives in an informal setting so that they can communicate without the public pressure and under the guidance of conflict resolution scholars. The problem-solving workshops set an agenda and, thus, inform the parties on the needs of the other side. So that all parties can act on a more complete understanding of each other's preferences. The "needs-based approach" refers to the difficulty of meeting an individual party's need that is the origin of the conflict and the key to its solution. The analysis aims at locating unmet needs. It may then be more important to work with one particular actor than another, although both sides are represented. Although the actors are treated in a similar, symmetric fashion, as all parties have some responsibility for the conflict and its resolution in the "conflict dynamics approach" only the unsatisfied actor is elaborated in the "needs-based approach."²⁰

¹⁶ Wallensteen, pp.37, 38.

¹⁷ Wallensteen, p.39.

¹⁸ Edward E. Azar, **International Conflict Resolution, Theory and Practice**, Ed. Edward E. Azar, and John W. Burton, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1986, pp.30-39.

¹⁹ Wallensteen, pp.39-44.

²⁰ Wallensteen, p.44.

Burton introduced the term “provention” to indicate taking action to eliminate sources of conflict, and to promote conditions in which collaborative and valued relationships control behaviors. According to Burton, the main objective of conflict resolution is not only to eliminate causes of the discord (conflict prevention), but also to set the conditions for cooperative relationships (conflict provention). He argues that the “conflict resolution” differs from the “conflict settlement” in that it tries to forecast future relationships and formulate policies that address the satisfaction of needs.²¹

Rational Calculations Approach

Wallensteen argues that the “rational calculations” approach assumes that actors have their own rationality, form their own judgments, and make decisions, pursue strategies and, thus, initiate the chain of events that lead to a war. The reversal of this is ending wars and reaching agreements. He claims that actors are able to make calculations that can end a conflict; however, ending a war is not the actor’s only interest. Wallensteen explains that the details of this approach are available through the works of I. William Zartman, but other scholars have also worked in similar directions.²² Zartman argues that the idea that wars rise from a rational calculation is part of established realist and neorealist thinking about the origins of wars. He formulated his ideas that brought the approach prior to the cessation of the Cold War.²³ According to Wallensteen, the aim is to understand the real interests of the parties and thus to look beyond their stated positions.²⁴

More than the other two approaches, in the rational calculations approach the international community has an active role, especially regarding the conflicts in smaller countries. It seems legitimate to influence the parties in the direction of conflict management and resolution. Outsiders may be influencing the calculation rather than the dynamics or the needs. The calculus for conflict and conflict resolution can be affected, for instance, by “rewards and punishment”. Assistance to one or both sides may be a credible promise made by the outside world. This can be done on condition that the primary parties end the war. It is likely that reconstruction programs

²¹ Burton, No.:1, p.11: Burton, Provention, pp.v

²² Wallensteen, p.44.

²³ I. William Zartman, **Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa**, Oxford University, New York, and Oxford, 1989.

²⁴ Wallensteen, p.45.

interest the fighting sides. There can also be “sanctions” for not going into negotiations or for not compromising. Such steps are generally seen to be legitimate for achieving conflict resolution. However their effects on the parties may be counter-productive and the success record of explicit uses of sanctions is not impressive. Even more controversial is whether “rewards and punishment” can or should be administered by military means, in the form of direct military attacks on one party, aiming at tipping the military balance in favor of the other. NATO’s airstrikes in Bosnia in 1995 and in Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 are in this category.²⁵

Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

The conflict resolution is a comprehensive approach based on mutual problem-sharing between the conflicting parties. Resolving a conflict means that the sources of conflict are addressed, reversing attitude, so it is no longer violent, and hostile, and the structures are no longer exploitative. The process of conflict resolution encompass conflict awareness, understanding its nature and applying appropriate methods to relieve the negative emotional energy involved; enable the conflicting parties to understand and resolve their differences so as to achieve solutions that are not imposed, which have been concurred by all the parties, and which address the root causes of the conflict.²⁶ Wallensteen argues that the “conflict resolution mechanisms” refer to creation of independent procedures in which the parties can have confidence. He claims that these are formal or informal arrangements to which they can agree to transfer their conflict, whose solution they can accept, and which can define the termination of a conflict.²⁷

According to Wallensteen, there are seven distinct ways in which the conflicting parties can live with or eradicate their disagreement. First, the “change of a basic position”, a party may change its goals and shift its priorities. It is rare that a party will completely change its basic positions; however, it can demonstrate a change in what it attributes highest priority to. This may open ways in which the other side

²⁵ Wallensteen, pp.47-49.

²⁶ University of Bradford, Centre for Conflict Resolution, www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/body_unit1.html, (20 October 2010).

²⁷ Wallensteen, pp.38, 53.

can reciprocate. The second way is “dividing the contested values”. The parties stick to their goals but find a point at which resources can be divided. It is sometimes seen as the essence of compromise, but it is only one form of compromise. It may mean that both sides change priority. To meet halfway, at some point which has a symbolic value, is easier for the parties. It may appear reasonable and be in accordance with values in the society.²⁸ A third way is “horse-trading”, where one side has all of its demands met on one issue, while the other has all of its goals met on another issue. Fourth way is “creating shared rule” or “shared control”. In this case the parties decide to rule together over the disputed resource. Even if agreed to only for a predetermined period, it can mean that a conflict is successfully transcended, and that at the end of the period the conflict situation is very different from what it was at the beginning. In international affairs such arrangements may mean the beginning of regional integration.²⁹ A fifth way is to “leave control to somebody else”, which means externalizing control, so that the conflict parties agree not to rule the resources themselves. This is a frequently used form in interstate relations. Sixth, there is the possibility of resorting to conflict resolution mechanisms, notably “arbitration” or other legal procedures that the parties can accept. It may mean that conflicts are handed from a political to a legal level and the parties do not have to invent the solution themselves. The most important issue is whether a mechanism has legitimacy with the international system and the parties. “Arbitration” may not solve matters of power directly, but can have an impact indirectly.³⁰ Seventh, “left to the future”, without the parties changing their views on the preferred outcome, issues can be left to later or even be forgotten. By appointing a commission, parties can gain time, and when the commission reports, political conditions, and popular attitudes may have changed. Some issues may gain from being delayed, as their significance may decrease.³¹

The governments are responsible for concluding agreements and treaties between the states. The negotiation among instructed representatives of sovereign

²⁸ Wallensteen, pp.54, 55.

²⁹ Wallensteen, p.55.

³⁰ Wallensteen, p.56.

³¹ Wallensteen, p.57.

states is referred to as “Track-One diplomacy”.³² The conflict resolution efforts carried out by professional conflict resolution practitioners’ and theorists’ are referred as “Track Two diplomacy”.³³ According to Montville and Davidson, the “Track Two diplomacy” is unofficial, non-structured interaction, and the conflict can be resolved by goodwill and plausibility. He cites that scientific and cultural exchanges as examples of “Track Two diplomacy”.³⁴ McDonald argues that “Track Two diplomacy” encompass facilitated workshops that bring members of the parties together to establish personal relationships, to understand the conflict from other’s perspective, and develop mutual strategies for resolving the conflict, and shifting public opinion.³⁵ However, gathering all “Track Two diplomacy” activities under one label was unable to address the complexity or extent of unofficial diplomacy, and led to the rise of “Multi-track diplomacy”. The tracks comprise conflict resolution professionals, business, private citizens, media, religion, activism, research, training, education, and philanthropy, or the funding community. These unofficial tracks operate with the aim of affecting or changing the direction of “Track-One diplomacy”. They work together as a system, and work more effectively when used together.³⁶

As far as the Greece and Macedonia name conflict is concerned, the international intervention occurs in the form of “mediation” and “Track-One diplomacy” that has been the familiar form of conflict resolution initiative in the Balkans. In this regard, I argue that “negotiation” and “international mediation” play a crucial role in resolving the conflict. In this study I will survey the positions of the conflicting parties in the negotiation process and contribution of the international mediation efforts in resolving the conflict.

³² Jacob Bercovitch, **Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation**, Ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1995, p.167.

³³ John W. McDonald, and Diana B. Bendahmane, **Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy**, Foreign Service Institute, The U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1987, p.1.

³⁴ Joseph V. Montville, and William D. Davidson, “Foreign Policy According to Freud”, **Foreign Policy**, No.:45, Winter 1981-82, pp.145-157.

³⁵ McDonald, Bendahmane, p.10.

³⁶ Institute for Muti-Track Diplomacy, “Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice”, <http://www.imtd.org/index.php/publications/papers-and-articles/81-publications/144-occasional-paper-building-peace-and-transforming-conflict-multi-track-diplomacy-in-practice>, (8 May 2015).

Third Parties and Mediation

After the Cold War, third parties have been involved in conflict resolution processes widely. It is increasingly difficult for countries to refuse access for the outside community into the conflicts. Parties are increasingly aware of the possibilities of settling their conflict. The decisions are now even more strongly connected to their interest in a settlement. The excuses for not engaging in a peace process are increasingly limited. However, it is still common that countries refuse offers of using the good offices of international secretariats, other governments, or even non-government organizations, NGOs. In some conflicts it might still be possible to find third parties from the country itself. This has sometimes been an assignment taken on by distinct persons that can transcend the conflict, such as individuals with religious roles, retired statesmen, or even businessmen.³⁷ The work of religious figures as third parties in conflict resolution played a good deal in the development of the field. Quakers and Mennonites especially perceived the institutionalization of conflict resolution as part of their religious mission. Adam Curle was a pioneer bringing a differentiation between official mediator and unofficial mediator as it relates to the level of impartiality.³⁸

The third party, firstly, has to appoint a mediator with a valid mandate; and secondly, it should identify the approach to deal with the primary and secondary parties. The traditional form is nomination of a mediator by the UN Security Council, or the Secretary General. This is a procedure which ensures the impartiality of the mediator, if the Council or the Secretary General is viewed as impartial. Nomination of a third party is quite an important issue, and the conflicting parties should have a chance to express their opinion on the nomination. International organizations refrain from appointing a person for mediation if there is no interest among the parties to talk to this particular individual. Thus, the UN appointment procedure gives parties an influence on the decision. The UN Secretary General has appointed a number of Special and Personal Representatives for particular issues or conflicts.³⁹ This is done with consent from the parties. Thus, the outside world can impact the actions taken.

³⁷ Wallensteen, pp.280-285.

³⁸ Wallensteen, pp.39-44.

³⁹ Cameron R. Hume, "A Diplomats' View", **Peacemaking in International Conflict**, Ed. I. William Zartman, and J. Lewis Rasmussen, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1997, pp.319-336.

Also a new development is that countries interested in the promotion of conflict resolution have begun to appoint their own “envoys” for conflicts of particular interest. There are groups of “Friends of the Secretary General” for various conflicts.⁴⁰ The parties may, if they are in direct contact with one another, agree on an appointment without involving the UN or any others. The direct contacts can result in secret negotiations or open ones. In principle, nothing prevents the parties from making an arrangement of their own.⁴¹ In other instances the mediator is appointed by an outside party, with or without consultation. The U.S. administration acted as a mediator in a number of conflicts. The actors may have been the President, the Secretary of State or high-ranking officials of the administration. Nevertheless, as the U.S. might appear to be a normal third party, it often has its own interest in the outcomes.⁴²

There are distinct forms of mediation. One is done “without power”, the other one “with power”. The first approach encompasses persuasion, building confidence with the parties, finding smart propositions, and therefore attempting to “transcend” some of the difficulties. It is more than deal-making and appears as a search for a common agreement. This approach usually takes time. The second approach requires considerable creativity as well. The conflicting parties would not endorse an arrangement which they fear. However, the use of force or the threat of the use of force changes the dynamic, particularly when the force used by the outside targets one side only. A process of the second type requires considerable and constant pressure, in the end exhausting the participants. However, the chance of failure is high. For both processes the benefit from success may still be considerable, and change their priorities for the future.⁴³

There are some basic principles that lead to successful “negotiation” and “mediation”, one of which is symmetry. As the word itself implies, symmetry in negotiations means that negotiating parties have veto powers and this condition provides the situation of power equality.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Wallensteen, p.280.

⁴¹ Wallensteen, p.281.

⁴² Wallensteen, p.282.

⁴³ Wallensteen, p.284.

⁴⁴ Jeffry Rubin, and Bert R. Brown, **The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation**, Academic, New York, 1975, p.27.

In this study, one will see that a state of power asymmetry is dominant in the name conflict between Greece and Macedonia. In my final analysis, I shall also refer to other factors that influence the negotiation process and mediation efforts. I will discuss the leverages used by third parties and try to define their role in the conflict. This study involves an overview of the critical junctures, and significant resolution-seeking efforts in the conflict between Greece and Macedonia. In assessing these junctures, I shall also touch upon both the objective and subjective aspects of the conflict. However, first I shall give an account for identity building venture of Macedonia in historical context, since conflict analysis and resolution requires a history-centric approach. Without understanding the grassroots of the conflict, its resolution would be far from achievable.

The aim of the study

This thesis aims to evaluate the effectiveness of international mediation, as one of the mainstream approaches in conflict resolution, in value-based inter-state conflicts such as the Greece-Macedonia name conflict. This study argues that efforts to reach a mutually acceptable solution in value-based inter-state conflicts, where national identity matters are complicated, require long-term engagements. It also asserts that these efforts may not necessarily yield a solution without applying proper conflict resolution mechanisms and approaches in support of international mediation. The probability of success of the international mediation is on a knife edge, when countries like Greece and Macedonia that are at odds, is locked in a constant paradox between Macedonia's aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration and the national identity as a matter of existence.

This study brought to the fore some questions on the subject matter, such as why the international mediation under the UN auspices did not resolve the name conflict between Greece and Macedonian after the two decades; why Macedonia did not make the necessary concessions during the UN-mediated negotiations to overcome Greece's use of its veto power to block its admission to the EU and NATO; and whether the traditional conflict resolution perspectives such as international mediation can resolve the inter-state conflicts by all means.

The main argument of this study is that traditional conflict resolution mechanisms such as international mediation are far less effective to resolve value-based inter-state conflicts than interest-based conflicts.

The limits of the study

This study mainly focuses on the historical, political, socio-physiological, and economic factors affecting the relations between Greece and Macedonia in an effort to give an account for the root causes concerning why international mediation efforts as conflict resolution mechanism have not worked so well despite the involvement of the intergovernmental institutions and extra-regional global actors.

The method and plan of the study

In this study “process tracing” method is used to test the viability of conflict resolution theory vis-à-vis the name conflict between Greece and Macedonia. By looking at the facts and sequence of events in the case and applying them against the theory, the aim is to interpret the relevance or limits of the theory. The process tracing is deployed to establish causation between the observed variables in the case study, the causation between the independent variable (international mediation) and the dependent variable (outcome of value based inter-state conflicts). It is used to reveal the factors that led to the deviation from the expected course (resolution of the conflict) in the case. In this thesis, primary and secondary resources such as printed and electronic domestic and foreign scholarly textbooks and essays as well as transcripts of the international treaties and news releases are used for literature survey. In the first chapter, factual information on the geography, anthropology, and history of the Macedonia is offered for comprehension of the root causes beneath the conflict between Greece and Macedonia. In the second chapter, the peculiarities of the conflicting parties and root causes of the conflict are elaborated by taking into consideration the material interests, values, objectives, policies, internal subgroups, and political parties as well as the relationship between both countries in terms of

asymmetries.⁴⁵ In the third chapter, the first section elaborates the current behavior of the conflicting parties including nature of the state apparatuses, the institutions that serve as legitimate channels for managing the conflict and the economic development policies that facilitate resolving the conflict. In the second section, the negotiation process is elaborated by taking into consideration the roles of the conflicting parties in direct talks and the external regional actors as trusted agents for arbitration and mediation as well as the efforts for mitigation of negative effects of the external global factors that fuel the conflict and the Western countries' influence on the negotiation process. In the third section, the process for concluding the 1995 Interim Accord between the parties in an effort to resolve the conflict is explained.

⁴⁵ Biographies of the influential Greek and Macedonian political leaders such as presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and the negotiators of the two countries, and their identified strengths, weaknesses, and foreign policy orientations are outlined in Appendix 1.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT AND ITS EVOLUTION

1.1. ORIGINS OF THE TERRITORY AND CONFLICTING PARTIES

Balkan Peninsula has been a center of instability in Europe for a long period of time and the grassroots of this instability dates back to the establishment of nation states in the region. In the 19th century, revolts against the Ottoman rule combined with the rise of nationalist ideologies turned into national liberation movements in the Balkans. However, the power vacuum as a result of decline of the Ottoman Empire encouraged the neighboring expansionist Balkan countries to aspire the annexation of the Macedonian territory and therefore fostered irredentism in the region. In this chapter, I shall give an account for the evolution of national identity-building process of Macedonians and recognition endeavor of the Republic of Macedonia in historical context. In this regard, firstly I shall scrutinize the geographic definition and geopolitical significance of the region, and the origin of Macedonians to help better understand the underlying factors of the conflict.

1.1.1. The Geographic Location of Macedonia

In the Introduction part of his book, *Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia*, Henry R. Wilkinson asserts “Macedonia defies definition”. Macedonia is usually defined as somewhat ambiguously a geographical region located in the Balkans. The Oxford English Dictionary defines Macedonia as “a geographical area in the central Balkans situated across the boundaries of southern Yugoslavia, northern Greece and southwestern Bulgaria.” Encyclopedia Britannica defines Macedonia as “a traditional region of Greece comprising northern and northeastern portions of that country.” It is often final entry that Macedonia defined as “the Socialist Republic of Macedonia”, the most southern of the six constituent republics of the federal state of Yugoslavia.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Loring M. Danforth, **The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World**, Princeton University, Princeton, 1995, (World), p.4.

In accordance with the generally accepted definition of the geographic area, Macedonia is bounded to the north by the Skopska Crna Gora and the Shar Planina mountains, to the east by the Rila and Rhodope mountains, to the south by the Aegean coast around Thessaloniki, Mount Olympus and the Pindus mountains, and to the west by the lakes of Ohrid and Prespa. It comprises approximately 67.000 square kilometers and is currently divided between Macedonia, Greece, and Bulgaria. This area forms a geographic unit based around the Vardar/Axios, Struma/Strimon and the Mesta/Nestos river valleys, and is generally referred to as “geographic Macedonia”. This geographic area is often subdivided either into two units, “lower Macedonia” that comprise today’s “Greek Macedonia” and “upper Macedonia”, or into three units equating to the political division of geographic Macedonia in the Balkan Wars. These three units have been named either after the respective country, Yugoslav Macedonia or Greek Macedonia, or after the main geographic features of each, “Vardar Macedonia” for the portion which is now the Republic of Macedonia, “Aegean Macedonia” for the Greek portion, and “Pirin Macedonia” for the Bulgarian part.⁴⁷ Danforth argues that defining Macedonia as a geographic region eliminates it from contemporary maps of the Balkans and makes Macedonia “an area without boundaries that lies between countries, without being either side or outside them.”⁴⁸

The territory of Macedonia controls the north-south route from central Europe to Mediterranean Sea along the Morava and Vardar valleys. This territory accommodates fertile agricultural lands in its river valleys and plains, as well as the port of Salonika (Thessaloniki). Its geostrategic location and economic value explains its turbulent history. Throughout the centuries, all the empires that aspired to dominate Balkans deemed it necessary to subjugate this crucial crossroads between Europe, Asia, and Africa, and therefore embarked on controlling it. After collapse of the ancient Macedonian kingdom, the Romans, Goths, Huns, Slavs, and Ottomans conquered the area and incorporated it into their respective empires. The Ottomans ruled Macedonia for over five hundred years until the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.⁴⁹ Whilst the territory of Macedonia remained under the Ottoman reign, it was referred to as a geographical concept for many years. During the decline of the Ottoman Empire

⁴⁷ Hugh Poulton, **Who are the Macedonians?** Indiana University, Bloomington, 2000, pp.1, 2.

⁴⁸ Danforth, *World*, p.5.

⁴⁹ Andrew Rossos, **Macedonia and Macedonians: A History**, Hoover Institution, Stanford, 2008, p.xvii.

the region became a target of ruthless competition among Greece that was founded at the first half of 19th century, Serbia that was established at the second half of the same century, and Bulgaria that gained independence at the early 20th century.⁵⁰

1.1.2. Ethnic Roots of the Macedonians

The first signs of continuous occupation dates back to the early Neolithic period, 6200 B.C. in the Macedonian coastal plain. During the Neolithic period, Macedonia and Thrace were occupied by different cultures in the south of the Balkan Peninsula. The population of these areas was hybrid with Mediterranean region and the Upper Macedonia and northern Epirus.⁵¹ Historians still debate true origin of the Macedonians. Rossos argues that the most recent archaeological, linguistic, and toponomic evidence indicates gradual formation of the Macedonian tribes and a distinct Macedonian identity through mingling, amalgamation, and assimilation of various ethnic elements. According to him, the Macedonians invaded the native peoples of the lower Danube (Illyrians, Thracians, and later Greek ethnic elements), and they were the Thracians that probably dominated the ethno-genesis of Macedonian identity. Rossos also claims that the Macedonians developed into a distinct ethnic people with a language or dialects, and customs of their own. According to him, the Macedonians were different from the Illyrians to the north and northwest, the Thracians to the east and northeast, and the Greeks to the south, in the city-states. By the 4th century B.C., official language was Greek, and elites gradually became Hellenistic by embracing the Greek culture.⁵² However, the Macedonians remained themselves as “they were generally perceived in their own time by Greeks and themselves not to be Greeks.”⁵³ Macedonians used “philhellenism” to attain their own interests.⁵⁴ Borza argues that although many Macedonian elites talked and were dressed like the Greeks, they lived and acted like Macedonians. He also added that the

⁵⁰ M. Murat Hatipoğlu, “Kuruluşundan Günümüze Makedonya Cumhuriyeti’nin Dış Politikası ve Balkan Ülkeleriyle İlişkileri (1991-2000)”, **Balkan Diplomasisi**, Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, Ankara, 2001, (1991), p.165.

⁵¹ Poulton, p.11.

⁵² Rossos, pp.11, 12.

⁵³ Eugene Borza, **In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon**, Princeton University, Princeton, 1990, p.96.

⁵⁴ Nicholas G. L. Hammond, and Guy Thomson Griffith, **A History of Macedonia-/Vol.:II/ 550-336 B.C.**, Clarendon, Oxford, 1979, p.150.

political and social system of Macedonia was different than what most Greeks believed about. According to Borza, exact ethnic composition of ancient Macedonians historically is not explicit, but they were a distinctive ethnic group, not a tribe of Greeks or any other Balkan peoples.⁵⁵ Poulton claims that the concept of “Who the Macedonians are?” is highly a controversial issue and often somewhat confusing.⁵⁶

Greek nationalists argue that “Macedonia is, was and always will be Greek,” that all Macedonians are Greeks and that only Greeks can be Macedonians. On the other hand, Macedonians assert that they are not Greeks, but are distinct people with their own language, culture, history, and a national identity. Neither side accepts the legitimacy of the other’s claims to Macedonian identity. From an anthropological standpoint, “Macedonia” can have many different meanings. The term Macedonian retains three basic meanings. It is used generally in a national sense to refer to the people with a Macedonian national identity. Although Greek nationalists object to this use, this type of usage is in line with the anthropological practice of referring to cultural groups of any kind. The word “Macedonian” is also used in a regional sense to refer to people with a Greek national identity who come from Macedonia. Nevertheless, some Macedonian nationalists are discontented with this usage. In northern Greece the word “Macedonian” is used in a much narrower sense with an ethnic meaning to refer to the native people of Macedonia, who may speak Greek or Macedonian language or both. Most local Macedonians have developed a Greek national identity, while some have developed Macedonian national identity. Ethnic nationalism lies at the heart of the Macedonian conflict.⁵⁷

1.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

1.2.1.Past Conflicts in Macedonia

The territory of Macedonia accommodated many civilizations and conflicts. It was conquered by the ancient Macedonian kingdom, Romans, Goths, Huns, Bulgarian kingdom, Byzantine Empire, Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia and finally the Republic of Macedonia. In the following paragraphs, I shall give an account for previous conflicts

⁵⁵ Borza, p.73.

⁵⁶ Poulton, p.1.

⁵⁷ Danforth, World, pp.6, 7.

in the region in historical context to reveal the true nature of the incompatibility between Greece and Macedonia.

1.2.1.1. The Early Macedonian Kingdom, Bulgarian Kingdom and Roman Empire (7th century B.C. – A.D. 14th century)

The ancient Macedonian Kingdom was established in early 7th century by King Perdiccas I. The kingdom's territory covered almost all of Aegean (Greek) Macedonia, and most of Vardar Macedonia (today's Macedonia) and Pirin (Bulgarian) Macedonia under the rule of Philip II (359–336 B.C.). Macedonian Kingdom dominated the Macedonian mountain tribes and conquered, assimilated, or expelled the Thracian, Greek, and other indigenous peoples of the region.⁵⁸

The Roman Empire subverted the ancient Macedonian Kingdom, and transformed it into a province of its own empire. The geographic and administrative definition and ethnic structure of Macedonia changed often between 168 BC and 6th century. During this period the higher classes of Macedonians, Thracians, and Illyrians were culturally Hellenized. Settlement of the officials and colonists of the empire in Macedonia initiated Romanization of the region. In the empire's last centuries, Macedonia experienced the Barbarian migrations and invasions. In the 3rd to 5th centuries, Goths invaded and destroyed Macedonia; in the 4th and 5th centuries the Huns did the same.⁵⁹

Between the 3rd and 6th centuries, Slavs from northeastern Europe moved and settled in Balkans, challenging the Byzantine rule. They crossed the Danube river and looted Byzantine possessions from the Adriatic to the Black Sea in 6th century. Since the Byzantine emperors were heavily engaged with Persia in the east, they could not prevent the Slav infiltrations into the Balkans.⁶⁰ Finally, in A.D. 629 Emperor Heraclius permitted them to settle in certain areas. The Slavs colonized in entire region during the 7th century, except for some of the larger cities and most of the Mediterranean coast, which retained a Greek character. They controlled the Adriatic coast and became dominant in the central Balkans, between the Aegean, the Danube, and the Black Sea. Slav colonization changed the region's ethnic character. The original inhabitants suffered losses in battles and assimilation by Slavs, who displaced them and forced them into smaller, safer areas. Illyrians escaped or were forced into

⁵⁸ Rossos, p.12.

⁵⁹ Rossos, p.17.

⁶⁰ Rossos, p.23.

the remote areas of present day Albania. Thracians and Dacians had to retreat and found safety in the mountains.⁶¹

The Bulgars crossed the Danube and conquered the lands at north of the Balkan Mountains which had been home to Slavic tribes, and founded their own state in A.D. 679. Although the Bulgar conquerors were militarily powerful, the far more numerous and culturally more advanced Slavs absorbed and assimilated them by the 9th century.⁶² At the outset the Bulgar rulers aimed to expand south and southwest directions at the expense of the Byzantine Empire. The first Bulgarian empire, reached its zenith under Tsar Simeon (A.D. 893–927) who aspired to the imperial throne in Constantinople. However, his attempts against Byzantium Emperor failed, and his son Tsar Peter returned some Byzantine territories, and the empire recognized Peter as “Tsar of the Bulgarians” in A.D. 927. Nevertheless, Bulgaria did not return the Macedonian territories and Byzantium recognized them as Bulgarian possessions.⁶³

After death of Tsar Peter, four sons of Comes Nikola, governor of Macedonia, seized power in Macedonia. The brothers controlled the Macedonian territories of the former Bulgarian Empire. At first the brothers ruled jointly, but in the end Samuil became founder of the empire, which had its center first at Prespa and later at Ohrid in Macedonia. Samuil proclaimed himself tsar of the “Macedonian Kingdom.” He also established the archbishopric of Ohrid. However, for reasons of legitimacy Samuil sought recognition and acceptance as a direct successor of the Bulgarian Empire. Samuil’s “Macedonian Kingdom” survived relatively short time. After establishing internal order and stability in the empire, the Byzantine Emperor Basil II waged a war against Samuil for control of the Balkans.⁶⁴ The tsar’s army was defeated by Basil on 6 October 1014.⁶⁵ In mid-1018, Macedonia was totally conquered by Byzantine Empire and remained under its rule for two centuries.⁶⁶

Basil divided Samuil’s empire and integrated it into his imperial administration. Although he reduced it to an archbishopric, he ensured its special status within the Byzantine Orthodox church. However later Hellenization and

⁶¹ Rossos, p.24.

⁶² Rossos, p.26.

⁶³ Rossos, pp.26, 27.

⁶⁴ Rossos, pp.28-30.

⁶⁵ Michael B. Cosmopoulos, **Macedonia, an Introduction to Its Political History**, Manitoba Studies in Classical Civilization, Winnipeg, 1992, p.92.

⁶⁶ Rossos, p.32.

suffering provoked unrest, opposition, and even rebellions in Macedonia. The imperial government was too weak, and local or regional feudal lords seized the authority, and followed the Bulgarian and Serbian examples and declared their own independence from Byzantium.⁶⁷ In 1280, the Nicaean Empire challenged Bulgaria's dominance in Macedonia. Nicaea, Epirus, Bulgaria, and Serbia struggled over the rest of Macedonia until the Nicaeans reestablished the Byzantine Empire. The Serbian King Milutin (A.D. 1282–1321) began to challenge Byzantium and he invaded northern Macedonia. Tsar Stefan Uros's (A.D. 1355–71) authority was on the decline and power passed to regional feudal lords, and finally they were defeated by the Ottoman army in Chernomen, on 26 September 1371.⁶⁸

1.2.1.2. Ottoman Rule (A.D. 1400 – 1800)

Macedonia was one of the initial territories Ottoman Empire conquered in the Balkans. The Ottomans abolished the former Byzantine states and dynasties in the Balkans and integrated this area into their administrative system.⁶⁹ After 1400, the Balkans constituted one of the Ottoman Empire's two large administrative areas, in addition to Anatolia. The Ottoman Empire made the Macedonian territory as part of the "Rumeli Beylerbeyliği" and subdivided it into "sancaks". The largest part of Macedonia belonged to one of the oldest and largest Balkan sancaks. Ottoman authorities considered Macedonia as their strategically most important sancak.⁷⁰ The empire divided and organized its multilingual population not by ethnic group or previous territorial division, but by religious community, or millet. Islam was the dominant religion, and the Muslims were the dominant community. The Orthodox Christians was the largest millet in the Balkans. The Orthodox millet's secular and spiritual head was the Patriarch of Istanbul.⁷¹ The Ottomans commenced suppression of the Serbian Archbishop, established in 1346, by replacing it with the Bulgarian Patriarchate in Ohrid. In 1777 with a state decree declaring that Greek Patriarchate represented all the Orthodox subjects of the empire, the influence of the Greeks increased in 1870, the date when the supremacy of the Phanar Patriarchate came to be

⁶⁷ Rossos, pp.35-38.

⁶⁸ Rossos, pp.39, 40.

⁶⁹ Rossos, p.41.

⁷⁰ Rossos, pp.43, 44.

⁷¹ Rossos, p.44.

challenged by non-Greek religious institutions like the Bulgarian Church. Article 10 of the 1870 Ottoman decree permitted founding an autocephalous Bulgarian Church, which then acquired the eparchies of Skopje and Ohrid ecclesiastical districts in 1872. Some scholars adopted these dates as the start of the modern Macedonian conflict.⁷²

During the first two centuries of Ottoman rule in the Balkans the autocratic and theocratic system worked quite well.⁷³ The Ottoman conquest and the rule altered ethnic composition and distribution in Macedonia. During the empire's decline, deteriorating economic conditions led to many conversions among a large number of Christian peasants, the "rayas", the most eastern and western regions, as well as some urban inhabitants. In towns, conversion often meant linguistic and cultural assimilation as well, although the converts preserved their language, and many folk and religious customs.⁷⁴ Until the late 16th century, the Muslim population in larger towns was increasing, and the Orthodox Christian population was declining. The conversion of landholding into farms as well as the poverty of the "rayas" during the 17th and 18th centuries escalated opposition and provoked armed resistance.⁷⁵ The military defeats and territorial losses weakened the central government's authority and anarchy emerged in the Balkans in the 18th century. The Orthodox Church was the source of all culture for "rayas," religious culture, and "Greek" became increasingly the language of the Orthodox Church and also of education.⁷⁶ In the 18th century, the empire's decline facilitated the spread of nationalist ideas among its Christian population, whose acceptance further undermined the Ottoman rule and legitimacy in the Balkans.⁷⁷

Bulgaria was about to realize its aspirations for "Grand Bulgaria" including Macedonia after the Russo-Ottoman war in 1878. However, the region was returned to the Ottoman Empire by the Berlin Treaty. With the spread of nationalist ideologies in the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th century, the significance of Orthodoxy in the empire declined.⁷⁸ Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia claimed the Macedonian territory and

⁷² Elisabeth Barker, **Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics**, Greenwood, Westport, 1980, pp.9-12.

⁷³ Rossos, p.45.

⁷⁴ Rossos, pp.51, 52.

⁷⁵ Rossos, p.53.

⁷⁶ Rossos, p.56.

⁷⁷ Rossos, p.60.

⁷⁸ Danforth, World, p.47.

its people. The competition, which began as a clash of propagandas, of educational, cultural, and religious institutions, became a war of armed bands prior to 1900 and, a war, during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Its outcome was subjugation and partition of Macedonia during the Second Balkan War in 1913.⁷⁹

1.2.1.3. Macedonian National Awakening (A.D. 1814–1870)

The national awakening process of Macedonians lasted longer than most of the other nations in Europe and continued until the mid-20th century.⁸⁰ Slav phase in the Macedonian awakening began in the first quarter of the 19th century. And by the 1860s, there was clear evidence of the formation of a distinct Macedonian identity, of Macedonian nationalism. Unlike other nationalisms in the Balkans and Europe, Macedonian nationalism developed without the assistance of legal, political, church, educational, or cultural institutions. Indeed, the emerging Macedonian nationalism waged a struggle for survival against the expansionist Balkan states and their respective supporters among the Great Powers. There was no prevailing national consciousness during the first period of the Macedonian awakening, from 1814 to 1870. Although the first book in the Macedonian language was published in 1814 most Macedonians identified themselves as Orthodox Christians and Slavs.⁸¹ Nevertheless, until the mid-19th century, many wealthy Macedonians tended to regard themselves, especially abroad, as Hellenes, for prestige and material gain. With the Slav awakening in Macedonia, however, “Greek” began to decline gradually. “Serbian” was common among persons and small groups in certain areas. Until adoption of “Macedonian” as a national name and symbol in mid-19th century, “Bulgarian” prevailed especially in religious institutions.⁸²

The Ottoman Empire’s decline paved the way for the Macedonian nationalists and they began to organize and working more systematically. The long-standing strong “Greek” influence was now facing a challenge from Serbian and the Bulgarian national movements. Macedonian intellectuals established closer ties with their Slav neighbors and they joined forces with the Bulgarians in a common struggle against

⁷⁹ Rossos, pp.74-78.

⁸⁰ Rossos, p.79.

⁸¹ Rossos, p.83.

⁸² Rossos, p.84.

Hellenism. There was influx into Macedonia of Bulgarian schoolbooks, newspapers, and teachers, and use of the Bulgarian language started in schools and churches. On the other hand, these developments provoked strong reaction from educated Macedonians in the 1860s and, Macedonian intellectuals claimed Macedonians as the “purest Slavs” and “descendants of the ancient Macedonians” of Philip and Alexander and those adopted the name of their territory as a national name and symbol.⁸³ By the late 1860s, “Makedonisti” become a prominent Macedonian nationalist movement that alarmed the Bulgarians. In mid-1870s, there was a growing sentiment against the Bulgarian Church, the exarchate, and the Macedonians insisted that they were not Bulgarian, and asked for their own separate church, and resisted the Bulgarian language in their literature. The Bulgarian Church became a steering force behind Bulgarian nationalism especially in Macedonia. The friction between Bulgarianism and Macedonianism contributed to the national awakening of the Macedonians and the shaping of their distinct national identity.⁸⁴ In 1880s Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria tried to control Macedonia’s cultural and religious life through domination of schools, churches, press, and public organizations. They initially used propaganda, and later political pressure and financial means. Bulgaria aimed to annex Macedonian territory, as Greece and Serbia aimed to partition it eventually. Under strong pressure, the Macedonian nationalism could operate illegally in isolation from its population and lacked resources and institutional bases.⁸⁵

After 1870, Macedonian intellectuals were divided into three main orientations “Philisms”, “Macedono-Bulgarianism”, and “Macedonianism” (nasizam). The “philisms” had few advocates but tended to represent the richer elements in the middle class. Though initially being the strongest, “Grecophilism” was not able to attract many advocates, and later “Serbophilism”, though it attracted few people, never spread widely. The “Bulgarophiles” unlike “Grecophiles” and “Serbophiles”, preserved their Macedonian connection, and called themselves “Macedonian Bulgarians.”⁸⁶ Nevertheless, the “philisms” have strongly hampered the evolution of

⁸³ Rossos, p.85.

⁸⁴ Rossos, pp.86, 87.

⁸⁵ Rossos, p.88.

⁸⁶ Rossos, pp.91, 92.

Macedonian national consciousness.⁸⁷ In contrast to the “philisms”, “Macedono-Bulgarianism”, and “Macedonianism” constituted duplicity and somewhat different developments of Macedonian national consciousness. The former represented a political and territorial sensibility, and the latter ethnic and cultural.⁸⁸ They condemned all external interference, advocated full political separation from the Bulgarians, and began a long struggle for an autonomous or independent Macedonia.⁸⁹ In the 1890s, Macedonian consciousness turned into a powerful movement under the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) which provided leadership and organization in the struggle for liberation of Macedonia from the Ottoman rule. Its ultimate aims were autonomy, independence, and eventually a place in a Slav or a wider Balkan federation.⁹⁰ Unlike the VMRO, “Makedonisti” movement developed through refusal of external propaganda. Development of “Macedono-Bulgarianism” and “Macedonianism” as expressions of Macedonian national consciousness weakened the national liberation movement. The three major versions of Macedonian political movements, “Macedono-Bulgarianism” and “Macedonianism” and popular “Macedonianism (nasizam)”, would come together in the 1930s, under different conditions.⁹¹

1.2.1.4. The VMRO and Ilinden Uprising (A.D. 1880–1904)

Macedonia’s economic hardships, political instability, insecurity, and the threat of annexation or partition led Macedonian intellectuals to begin defending the interests of their territory and people. In the 1880s and early 1890s they organized in towns in Macedonia, as well as in Bulgaria, Serbia, and outside the Balkans, and they got united under the VMRO. Its main aim was the liberation of Macedonia and its people and the establishment of an autonomous and eventually an independent homeland or an equal partnership like Balkan federation.⁹² The VMRO’s leaders believed in autonomy and had an idea about territorial boundaries to include all of geographic Macedonia, but

⁸⁷ Duncan M. Perry, **The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Liberation Movements, 1893-1903**, Duke University, Durham, 1988, pp.31-106.

⁸⁸ Rossos, p.92.

⁸⁹ Rossos, p.93.

⁹⁰ Rossos, pp.91, 92.

⁹¹ Rossos, p.97.

⁹² Rossos, p.103.

not about terms such as “Macedonian people” and “Macedonians”. Despite considerable organizational accomplishments, the VMRO was far from ready for the popular revolt, and had no political or diplomatic allies. Greece and Serbia were overtly hostile to it. The Great Powers of Europe did not want to see unrest and disorder in the remaining Ottoman territories in the Balkans.⁹³

In January 1902, Ottoman authorities arrested all the members of the central committee and leader of the VRMO in Salonika.⁹⁴ During the spring of 1903, the situation in Macedonia was more tense and violent. In this atmosphere, the majority of delegates at congress of the Bitola (Manastir) revolutionary region convened on 2-7 May 1903, agreed upon inception of the revolution after the harvest.⁹⁵ The revolution broke out in the evening of 2 August 1903 (St.Elias’s Day) at Ilinden in Bitola. On 3 August 1903, rebels captured Krusevo, established a provisional government, and declared the Krusevo Republic. However after defeating the insurgents at Krusevo, the Ottoman army moved against the other centers of the revolution in Bitola “vilayet” and elsewhere in Macedonia and suppressed the revolt entirely in October 1903.⁹⁶

The consequences of rebellion were disastrous, and the VMRO fragmented into hostile factions and never regained its pre-Ilinden strength, prestige, and unity of purpose. Nonetheless, the Ilinden uprising represented a landmark in the history of the Macedonians. It helped to redefine the so-called Macedonian question at home and in the rest of the Balkans and Europe. The uprising and its catastrophic end changed the national movement and long helped shape national identity. “Makedonisti” movement claimed that the revolt was a huge mistake, since it involved only the “Macedono-Bulgarians”. The rebellion and its aftermath affected the “Macedono-Bulgarians”, who expected Bulgarian aid during the revolt. In 1904, Bulgaria appeared to consider in principle a Serbian proposal to divide Macedonia into spheres of influence. This came as a shock to the pro-Bulgarians, who seek allegiance to Bulgaria and expected it to protect Macedonian interests. Those on the Macedonian left had to acknowledge that the “Makedonisti” were right and Macedonian patriots could not rely on Bulgaria. This failed revolt divided the VMRO between its Macedonian left and its pro-

⁹³ Rossos, pp.105, 106.

⁹⁴ Rossos, pp.106-108.

⁹⁵ Rossos, p.108.

⁹⁶ Rossos, pp.108-110.

Bulgarian right, and initiated the end of “Macedono-Bulgarianism”. These events made Macedonian nationalists more conscious of the idea of Macedonia.⁹⁷

1.2.1.5. Macedonia during the Balkan Wars

Decline of the VMRO created a political vacuum in Macedonia and facilitated intervention by the Great Powers and the neighboring kingdoms. The Balkan Wars of 1912–13 led to the partition of Macedonia; a third during the First World War repartitioned Macedonia; and the postwar settlement ratified partition.⁹⁸ The Greeks and the Serbs occupied most of the Ottoman Empire’s territory in the Balkans, primarily Macedonia, and claimed most of the area under their control. The Bulgarians occupied only a small part of Macedonia, but claimed most if on the basis of the alliance with Serbia. The territorial conflict deepened the dispute in Macedonia between Bulgaria and Greece, which in turn aggravated competition between Bulgaria and Serbia.⁹⁹

1.2.1.6. Macedonia during the World Wars Period

The Bucharest Treaty signed in August 1913 led to another war over Macedonia, which broke out during the First World War. The treaty was not acceptable to the Macedonians, and Bulgaria was eager to abolish it. In September 1915, Bulgaria intervened on the side of the Central Powers (Austria-Hungary and Germany) by attacking Serbia mainly due to its ambitions in Macedonia. Since the Serbian army was busy with Austro-Hungarian front, the Bulgarians promptly occupied Macedonia. Although the Central Powers just handed over Macedonia to Bulgaria for their control, the Bulgarians treated it as their own.¹⁰⁰ The peace conferences and treaties of 1919, which allowed self-determination for many other Eastern European nations, denied this right to the Macedonians.¹⁰¹ In the aftermath of the First World War, Serbia captured all Slav Macedonia and began a “Serbinization” policy among the inhabitants of the region and the region started to be called “South

⁹⁷ Rossos, pp.111, 112.

⁹⁸ Rossos, pp.121, 122.

⁹⁹ Rossos, pp.125, 126.

¹⁰⁰ Rossos, p.127.

¹⁰¹ Rossos, p.131.

Serbia”. IMRO responded to Serbia by conducting terrorist attacks along the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border.¹⁰²

On the brink of World War II, Comintern advocated establishment of a communist Balkan Federation involving Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks, Albanians and Macedonians as separate nations having right of the self-determination. However, the Greek communists rejected this plan. The 1941 Jajce Declaration revealed the intentions of Yugoslav communist party to establish an independent Macedonia within Yugoslavia. In addition, Yugoslav communists intensified their efforts to incorporate the Aegean Macedonia to Macedonian state. The Yugoslav-oriented Slav Macedonians began to form resistance organizations such as Slav Macedonian People’s Liberation Front (SNOF).¹⁰³ Nonetheless, Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Macedonia (AVNOJ) declared the “People’s Republic of Macedonia” on 2 August 1944. Following the Bulgaria’s changing sides in September 1944, leaders of Leagues of Communists of Yugoslavia achieved to convince the members of Bulgarian Communist Party to assist them for persuading the people of Pirin for integration with the Yugoslav Macedonia.¹⁰⁴ The negotiations between Bulgarians and Yugoslavs aimed at founding a South Slav Federation in which Yugoslavia would be represented with six federal units, Macedonia, and Bulgaria one each. Bulgarian government recognized the ethnic rights of the people of Pirin Macedonia in Bled on 2 August 1947. Nonetheless, Bulgaria failed to fulfill its commitments due to the Stalin’s antagonism with Yugoslavs. In Greece, communist guerillas who received the support of Yugoslavia seized the control of Aegean Macedonia including Thessaloniki until their defeat and signature of the Varkiza Agreement in February 1945. On 25 June 1945, Greek Communist Party (KKE) decided to launch an attack, but they did not demand the integration of Aegean Macedonia with Yugoslav Macedonia. They demanded recognition of a separate Macedonian nation similar to those living in Vardar and Pirin Macedonia. Although Bulgaria was able to hold Pirin Macedonia, Greek communists had to surrender Aegean Macedonia to Greece upon the objections of Britain and the U.S.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Nazif Mandacı. “Macedonia: A New Epicenter of the Balkan Turmoil”, **Balkan Studies**, No.:1, Trakya Üniversitesi Balkan Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi, 1998, p.15.

¹⁰³ Mandacı, p.16.

¹⁰⁴ Barker, p.25.

¹⁰⁵ Mandacı, pp.17, 18.

1.2.1.7. Macedonia during the Yugoslav Period

The Yugoslav communist regime succeeded to lessen ethnic tensions by founding republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia within the political structure of Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁶ According to Danforth, the Yugoslav Communist Party mobilized all available means at its disposal to support Macedonia's nation building process. Danforth argues that the Yugoslav Communist Party was able to gain the control of Vardar Macedonia, and justify keeping it as a part of the Yugoslav Federation by recognizing the existence of a distinct Macedonian nation.¹⁰⁷ Barker claims that Tito's policy was maintaining Yugoslav Macedonia and pursuing a new enlarged Macedonia. She asserted that the former represented his minimalist and short-term, and the latter represented his maximalist and long-term goals.¹⁰⁸ With Jajce Decision, Macedonia obtained equal rights with the other five federal entities on 29 September 1943, even though in certain respects it was still behind of some other federal units. According to Kofos, the Yugoslav Communist Party granted jurisdiction to the leaders of the "People's Republic of Macedonia" to develop a Macedonian national consciousness among pro-Bulgarian inhabitants of the region.¹⁰⁹ As a proponent of this idea, Barker claims that it was necessary to abolish the sense of Bulgarian identity shared by many inhabitants of the area to achieve this goal.¹¹⁰ Cosmopoulos argues that Tito designed the structure of Yugoslavia as six republics, so as to include "People's Republic of Macedonia." He asserts Tito was aware that the Bulgarians would never give up claiming this part of Yugoslavia as its population was overwhelmingly akin to the Bulgarians.¹¹¹

Geertz argues that for the survival of a nation-state, the "primordial attachments" such as race, ethnicity, language, and religion, and civil politics such as political culture, institutions, and leadership should be integrated meticulously and he

¹⁰⁶ Sabrina P. Ramet, **Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia: 1962-1991**, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1992, p.2.

¹⁰⁷ Danforth, *World*, p.66.

¹⁰⁸ Barker, p.94.

¹⁰⁹ Evangelos Kofos, **Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, Civil Conflict Politics, and Mutations, National Identity**, Aristide D Caratzas, New York, 1993, (Identity), p.137.

¹¹⁰ Barker, pp.82, 83; Danforth, *World*, p.66.

¹¹¹ Cosmopoulos, p.90.

calls this construction “integrative revolution”.¹¹² Cosmopoulos claims that the emergence of Macedonia was associated with the implementation of socialist principles in the Yugoslav state. According to him, the establishment of an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church in 1958 could be viewed as a response to Bulgaria’s denial of the existence of a Macedonian nation and language. Cosmopoulos asserts that Macedonian nationality and culture was promoted by the Yugoslav government through the establishment of the church and, as Geertz argued it was a successful integration of primordial attachments with civil politics.¹¹³ Mandacı argues that Greeks, Serbs, and other Orthodox communities criticized that the church was established against all Orthodoxy rules and did not recognize it. According to Mandacı, the Macedonian Church appeared to serve a different objective, and the formation of the church by a “decree” in spite of the objections of the Patriarchate of Serbia cut the spiritual ties between the Slavs in Macedonia and Serbia. He argues that Macedonia was thus able to protect itself against one of the most effective tools of the expansionist Balkan states.¹¹⁴

According to Danforth, the Yugoslav communists’ decision granting large degree of autonomy to Macedonia in the cultural realm was a great thrust for promotion of the Macedonian national identity. He also asserts that designation of Macedonian literary as the official language of Macedonia in 1944 was a major contribution to the creation of a distinct Macedonian nationality, and the Yugoslav governments regarded it as a robust protection against the Bulgarian irredentism.¹¹⁵ Cosmopoulos claims that the new Macedonian literary language was based on the west-central Macedonian dialect “Perlepos”, since it was the most different than the Serbian and Bulgarian and the most common. The Yugoslav constitution recognized this language as one of the three official languages of the Yugoslav state. Cosmopoulos argues that in the Yugoslav period, the most important steps towards the nation-building was the creation of Macedonian theater and opening of educational institutions such as national history institute, and a university in December 1948.

¹¹² Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Politics in the New States”, **Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa**, Ed. Clifford Geertz, Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1963, pp.105-157.

¹¹³ Cosmopoulos, p.91.

¹¹⁴ Mandacı, p.20.

¹¹⁵ Danforth, World, p.67.

According to him, Macedonian experts began correcting or rewriting some historical events during the study of the official version of Macedonian history.¹¹⁶ Mandacı argues that during the Yugoslav period the Macedonian question had been downgraded to a problem which mostly the economy experts had to deal with. The tensions that originated from this lessened by the break out of the Cold War. According to him, the Greeks referred to it as just the name of a geographic entity, while the Bulgarians refrained from provoking the Yugoslavs as the Soviets tried to repair the damages on the relations as a result of Stalin's policies.¹¹⁷

1.2.2. Present Conflict on Macedonia since Its Declaration of Independence

1.2.2.1. Declaration of the Republic of Macedonia

Political developments in Macedonia gained impetus simultaneously with the dissolution process of Yugoslavia. Whilst Macedonia welcomed a federal system, it feared of Milosevic's strict centralist and hegemonic federalism, and thus was also in favor of a confederation system based on republics' sovereignty.¹¹⁸ Until the very end of Yugoslavia, Macedonia's leaders tried to bring together the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and preserve a reformed, looser, democratic federation or confederation. However, the Yugoslav National Army's (JNA) attacks in north of the country in June 1991 and war in Slovenia and Croatia indicated that the federation had ceased to exist. The Macedonia needed alternative ways for survival.¹¹⁹ Macedonian nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) promised to work for the principal aims of the Ilinden Uprising of 1903 and called for independence in Skopje on 17 June 1990. The Movement for All-Macedonian Action (MAAK) announced its support for secession from the federation in August 1990. The MAAK's aim was to defend Macedonian

¹¹⁶ Cosmopoulos, p.92.

¹¹⁷ Mandacı, p.21.

¹¹⁸ İhsan Gürkan, "İkinci Dünya Savaşından Günümüze Değın Balkanlar (1945-1989)", **Balkanlar**, Ed. İsmail Soysal, Ortadoğı ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı (OBİV), İstanbul, 1993, pp.169, 170.

¹¹⁹ Rossos, p.261.

interests in Yugoslavia as well as in neighboring states, but it disclaimed any territorial ambitions.¹²⁰

After the JNA's waging war against Slovenia and Croatia, the Macedonian national assembly discussed independence on 26 June 1991.¹²¹ During a referendum on 8 September 1991 the vast majority of the electorates, 95.08 per cent, voted in favor of independence. On 17 September 1991, the national assembly passed the declaration of independence, and on 17 November it adopted a new constitution. The official proclamation of independence occurred on 20 November 1991.¹²² Following the declaration of independence, the government moved to secure and safeguard the new state. Macedonian President Gligorov initiated negotiations with Slobodan Milosevic, and Serbia agreed to withdraw all JNA troops from Macedonia by 15 April 1992. The JNA completed its withdrawal by 26 March 1992. Macedonia was the only one of the four republics to withdraw from Yugoslavia and attain independence peacefully. Subsequently Macedonia initiated the international recognition process, which was more difficult than expected.¹²³

Declaration of the new republic received different reactions by the regional countries, and world public opinion. In this regard, Macedonia faced an intense opposition from Greece particularly until September 1995.¹²⁴ Greece declared that it would not recognize this new state as long as it used the name of "Macedonia" by launching a series of initiatives at various international forums and organizations, particularly at the EU.¹²⁵ According to Hatipoğlu, Greece's discontent with the developments in Macedonia originated from the events that had occurred in 1913 and the trauma caused by the deportation of 40.000 Macedonians who favored the communist front during World War II. This hysteria aroused once again after Macedonia's declaration of independence in 1991. Hatipoğlu argues that the emergence of new borders in the region and the founding of Macedonian state, with its

¹²⁰ Rossos, p.262.

¹²¹ Rossos, pp.265, 266.

¹²² Hatipoğlu, 1991, p.169.

¹²³ Rossos, p.267.

¹²⁴ Evangelos Kofos, **The Vision of "Greater Macedonia": Remarks on FYROM's New School Textbooks** (lecture given at the Thessaloniki Chamber of Commerce and Industry Hall on 23 March 1994 under the auspices of the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle and the Institute for Balkan Studies), The Friends of the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, Thessaloniki, 1994, (Textbooks), pp.1-34.

¹²⁵ İsmail Soysal, "Günümüzde Balkanlar ve Türkiye'nin Tutumu (1989-1992)", **Balkanlar**, Orta Doğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı (OBİV) Yayınları, İstanbul, 1993, p.185.

national consciousness, state's name, flag, and the constitution annoyed Greece. He claims that Greece was particularly worried that Macedonia's declaration of independence might encourage irredentist sentiments among its Macedonian minority.¹²⁶

Macedonia tried to resist the antagonistic policies of Greece as well as other economical, strategic, and political difficulties originating from the former establishment. While Macedonia continued its efforts for international recognition, Greek government launched an intensive diplomatic initiative by claiming that the new state threatens its security, and tried to isolate Macedonia in international relations.¹²⁷ On the other hand, Macedonia inherited and associated its past with the historical personality of Alexander the Great and insisted on the name of the newly born state. However, Greek government and intelligentsia claimed that they retain the exclusive right of ownership of Alexander the Great, and the name of Macedonia and Macedonians. While Greece was in favor of other names as proposed by itself and others such as "Republic of Skopje", "Dardania", "Central Balkan Republic", "Vardar Republic", "Republic of Northern Macedonia", "Republic of New Macedonia", and "Republic of Slavic Macedonia", the adamant stance of Macedonian government prevented any change in its constitutional name.¹²⁸ Whilst claiming the ownership of legacy of Alexander the Great, Macedonia tried to find ways to maintain constitutional name of the state as adopted and declared during the establishment phase, and to maintain its flag with sun of Vergina.¹²⁹

1.2.2.2. Macedonia's Recognition Endeavor (A.D. 1991–1995)

Macedonia's neighbors denied the existence of a distinct Macedonian nationality, and its right to found a state by claiming its people and territory as their own. The expansionist countries viewed Macedonia as a threat to their previous gains or future aspirations and deemed it as an artificial creation. Therefore swift recognition

¹²⁶ Hatipoğlu, 1991, pp.169-170.

¹²⁷ İsmail Soysal, and Şule Kut, **Dağılan Yugoslavya ve Bosna-Hersek Sorunu: Olaylar-Belgeler (1990-1996)**, Orta Doğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı (OBİV) Yayınları, İstanbul, 1997, pp.278-288.

¹²⁸ Loring M. Danforth, "National Conflict in a Transnational World: Greeks and Macedonians at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe", 1993, http://www.gate.net/~mango/Danforth_National_Conflict.htm, (3 November 2010).

¹²⁹ Jonathan Kaufman. "Name War over Macedonia Widens Into Political Crisis", Boston Globe, 5 January 1993.

by other powers, particularly by the EC and U.S. was crucial for the survival of Macedonia. Following the adoption of a new constitution on 29 November 1991, Macedonia began seeking recognition from the EC. Although the EC's arbitration commission (Badinter Commission) declared that only Slovenia and Macedonia had met the requirements for recognition on 15 January 1992, the EC recognized only Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992. The EC's decision deeply disappointed the Macedonian government and its people. Greece claimed that Macedonia constitutes a threat to itself, and objected to Articles 3 and 49 of its constitution. Article 3 that read as "the borders may be changed only in accordance with the constitution" led Greece to be suspicious of irredentist ambitions of Macedonia. Article 49 stipulating that Macedonia has interest in "the status and rights" of Macedonians in the neighboring countries was perceived by Greece as interference in its internal affairs. Although it is paradoxical that Greece had always denied the existence of Macedonians in its country, the EC conceded Greece's demands and insisted a revision of those Articles as its condition for recognition. Macedonian national assembly met in early January 1992 and adopted the required changes.¹³⁰

Rossos argues that Greece's claim of the sole ownership of Macedonia's geography, history, traditions, and symbols, and most importantly, the Macedonian name itself lies at core of the Greek-Macedonian conflict. He claims that Greece's romantic-nationalist mythology is linked with the heritage of the ancient Macedonian kingdom, empire and the Byzantine Orthodox Commonwealth. According to Rossos, this mythology shaped the "Megali Idea" (Great Idea), the ideology of modern Greek imperialism. For Macedonians, the Greek claim was not only irrational but also unacceptable. The Greeks were insisting that Macedonians had to sacrifice their national name, their national identity, and their nation formed in the 19th century.¹³¹

The decision of the EC and the U.S. to delay recognition till the conflict was resolved influenced other states as well. Moreover, the positions of the EC and U.S. on this issue encouraged Greece to become even more rigid and aggressive. Greece resorted to a campaign of intimidation, and organized large scale demonstrations in Salonika and in Athens. The Greek military conducted exercises on Macedonia's border and repeatedly violated its airspace. Greece interfered with shipments to

¹³⁰ Rossos, pp.267, 268.

¹³¹ Rossos, p.269.

Macedonia, including foreign aid passing through the port of Salonika, and in August 1992 imposed a partial economic embargo, which it lifted in early 1993. But by late 1993, the Greek PM Papandreou imposed a more comprehensive embargo, which lasted eighteen months. As a result of Greece's embargoes Macedonia lost about 60 per cent of its trade, and came near to an economic collapse. Greece and Serbia also launched a joint political campaign against Macedonia.¹³²

Macedonia's international recognition process began with its admission to the UN on 8 April 1993 with the provisional name, the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)". Most European countries, including Britain, France, and Germany, as well as Japan, recognized the FYROM in December 1993. On 9 February 1994, the U.S. announced its intention to recognize Macedonia. However, a month later, after Papandreou's imposing trade embargo, the Greek lobby forced President Clinton to change its position. The U.S. did not recognize the republic until early 1996, but made up for this policy change under President George W. Bush. On 8 November 2004, the U.S. became the first major Western power to recognize Macedonia under its constitutional name the "Republic of Macedonia".¹³³

Greece finally recognized Macedonia under increasing pressure from the U.S. and its EC partners. Greece continued to protest, mostly for domestic consumption, and insisted on a mutually acceptable name. In this context, Greece continues to use "FYROM". However, most countries, including Russia and China, and more recently the U.S., recognized Macedonia by its constitutional name. Many other nations, including EC members, referred to the "Republic of Macedonia" in bilateral relations and to "Macedonia" in other contexts.¹³⁴

¹³² Rossos, p.270.

¹³³ Rossos, pp.271, 272.

¹³⁴ Rossos, p.272.

CHAPTER II

ANALYSIS OF GREECE-MACEDONIA CONFLICT

2.1. ANALYSIS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONFLICTING PARTIES

In this chapter, I shall analyze characteristics and relationship of the conflict parties so as to generate an accurate definition of the conflict in terms of basic motivations and needs of the parties. Attributes of the parties and root causes of the conflict shall be elaborated by taking into consideration the parties' material interests, values, objectives, policies, internal subgroups, strengths, and weaknesses of the political elites. In this chapter, my primary objective is to explore the asymmetry between the two countries that affect their courses of action in the UN-mediated negotiation process.

2.1.1. Positions, Interests, and Values of the Conflicting Parties:

From a realist viewpoint, material interests of the parties play quite an essential role in the conflict. However, the doctrine may suggest otherwise. Even if the material interests of the parties are at risk, they may choose to preserve their values. For instance, although Macedonia's integration to Euro-Atlantic institutions is at risk due to Greece's blockage, Macedonia still continues to pursue its identity cause. Vice versa, although Greece is a powerful regional actor in the Balkans with extensive military capabilities, it perceives Macedonia as a serious threat to its territorial integrity. But how can this happen? This dilemma clearly demonstrates that the parties' chief national interests may not necessarily always be material-based, but also value-based. In the following paragraphs, I seek to show how material interests and values both simultaneously play a role in the conflict between the two countries.

2.1.1.1. Positions of the Conflicting Parties

The Greek Standpoint

Greece's antipathy towards Macedonia has several reasons. These reasons involve, among others, the active role of the Slavs in the Greek civil war; the vulnerability of "Aegean Macedonia" to irredentism, and the concern of segregation between Greece and its northern provinces; and, the challenge to modern Greece's ancestry. Kofos argues that for Greeks the Macedonian question has transcended from a "national security problem" to an "issue of identity", and eventually to a "human rights problem", that of the Greeks' right to their cultural heritage. Greece claims that Macedonia's use of its constitutional name is a rejection of the Greek identity and an assertion of irredentist intent. Greece's official position on this matter is to reach an agreement over a compound name such as "Upper Macedonia."¹³⁵

According to the International Crisis Group's (ICG) Balkan Report, Greek officials were anxious that giving up on the name issue would not only yield political consequences for the government, but would also lead to claims. The report claims that Greek officials are afraid that Macedonia may exploit recognition of its name to create legal difficulties to Greece's using the name "Macedonia" and to the present and emigrant ethnic Macedonians' instituting legal claims. In short, the Greeks see "irredentism" less as a territorial issue than as a gradually growing legal and financial challenge. The report also argues that Greeks believe that non-Greek Macedonians do not exist, and Slav Macedonians are actually "Bulgarian." Greek intelligentsia asserts that Macedonian national identity is a Titoist creation, and they claim that Macedonia's use of its constitutional name is a rejection of their own identity. Nevertheless, the Greek government declared that they have changed their initial position by accepting the idea of a compound name that include the term "Macedonia" on the conditions that there is also going to be a geographical qualifier for all purposes, *erga omnes*, and that the Macedonia is going to give up its claims over the

¹³⁵ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Macedonia's Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It - ICG Balkan Report (No.122)", 10 December 2001, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/Macedonia%2014.pdf>, (12 June 2015), (No.:122), p.14.

historical and national heritage of Greeks, and accept the final settlement by the UN, and ensure full respect for its implementation.¹³⁶

The Macedonian Standpoint

According to the ICG Balkan Report, Macedonians believe that the term “Macedonia” functions as a unique name for both the state and the nation, and the name of the state should be relevant to the identity of its people. The report argues that Macedonians’ refraining to use their state’s name would aggravate the critics’ position that their state and language are “pseudo” as some Greeks and Bulgarians assert. In short, the name conflict is not only a matter of identity, but also a matter of existence for Macedonians. Nonetheless, the Macedonian government expressed their readiness to concur a name (e.g. Upper Macedonia) for exclusive use by Greece to differentiate the republic from the northern province of Greece (Aegean Macedonia). Macedonia seems to be reluctant to give more concessions on the identity issue after having given already significant identity-related concessions to the ethnic Albanian minority by the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001.¹³⁷

2.1.1.2. Material Interests of the Conflicting Parties

It would be sensible to review foreign policy objectives of Macedonia to fully comprehend Macedonia’s level of ambition in the UN-mediated name talks. Macedonia’s aspirations for integration to Europe-Atlantic structures, particularly the prerequisites for accession to EU membership, dictate promoting good neighborly relations. Although Macedonia’s admission to the EU and NATO membership still remains a high priority foreign policy objective, the Macedonian leadership made it clear that pursuing identity politics has far more importance for the nation, and no concessions are to be given on that issue during the accession process to the EU.

Barker explains that Macedonia controls the main north-south direction from central Europe to Thessaloniki and the Aegean down the Morava and Vardar Valleys and that whoever controlled this land would attain a strategic advantage in the balance of power in the region. She asserts that this territory has the potential either to

¹³⁶ ICG, No.122, p.15.

¹³⁷ ICG, No.122, pp.15, 16.

strengthen or lessen the dominant central European powers' influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.¹³⁸ Jelavich argues that the significance of Macedonia originates from its strategic venue as it is located in the heart of the Balkans.¹³⁹ Wilkinson claims that the former imperial states were well aware that controlling Macedonia would allow access to the Near East.¹⁴⁰ The geo-strategic significance of Macedonia has long become a concern for its immediate neighbors. The recurring outcome of the struggle for control of the territory of Macedonia has been hyper-nationalism, which still prevails nowadays.¹⁴¹

Katsiyiannis argues that Greece suspects that Macedonia has a hidden agenda to annex the northern province of Greece, and therefore perceives it as a threat. According to him, Macedonia is looking for assurances for its territorial integrity, since it feels threatened by its neighbors. In his opinion it is reasonable that Macedonia is seeking allies since militarily and economically it is extremely weak, and Macedonia's entering into an alliance with Turkey has to do with its perception of threats to its territorial integrity. Katsiyiannis claims that Macedonia's allying itself with a Balkan country after Yugoslavia's break up changed the regional balance of power. According to him, Greece views Turkey as a country aspiring to become a regional power in the Balkans. Katsiyiannis asserts that Greece's perception that Turkey is attacking "Orthodoxy and Hellenism" through Macedonia and Albania, and of a negative shift in the balance of power in the Balkans created the "Macedonian syndrome." He also argues that Greece overestimates the relations between Turkey and Macedonia and that Greece's concerns are due to its misperception of Turkey's intentions in the Balkans and Macedonia's intention in Greece.¹⁴²

Nonetheless, Rossos adopts a quite different perspective on the matter. He asserts that there are more immediate and pragmatic internal and external considerations behind the Greece's stance. According to Rossos, the recognition of Macedonia would imply that Greece could then hardly continue to deny the existence

¹³⁸ Barker, pp.9-12.

¹³⁹ Barbara Jelavich, **History of Balkans: Twentieth Century**, Cambridge University, Cambridge, 1983, p.89.

¹⁴⁰ Henry R. Wilkinson, **Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia**, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, 1951, pp.3-6.

¹⁴¹ Dean Katsiyiannis, "Hyper-Nationalism and Irredentism in the Macedonia Region: Implications for US Policy-Part I", **European Security**, Vol.:5, No.:2, Summer 1996, (No.:2), pp.324-360.

¹⁴² Katsiyiannis, No.:2, pp.324-360.

of the Macedonian minority in Aegean Macedonia with implications for national identity. He thinks that recognition of Macedonia would in turn exert pressure on Greece to accept its other minorities, which would undermine its longstanding assumption of its ethnic homogeneity. According to him, Greece wished to preserve a common border with its traditional ally Serbia and believes that the control of land routes to Serbia and the rest of Europe by a potentially unreliable new republic is unacceptable.¹⁴³

Greece aims to avoid the so-called “irredentist policy and territorial aspirations” of Macedonia by blocking its integration to Euro-Atlantic structures with its veto power. In terms of power politics, it appears that Greece seeks a rapprochement with Macedonia in an effort to eliminate basis of an alliance between Macedonia and Turkey, which upsets the balance of power for itself.

2.1.1.3. Values of the Conflicting Parties

Understanding core values of the parties is essential to comprehend the true nature of the conflict prior to embarking on settling the incompatibilities between the parties. I argue that promotion of national identity by means of historical symbols is a contested value and hence an underlying factor of the conflict between Greece and Macedonia. In this regard, firstly I shall give an account for the definition of nationalism in this section.

Smith argues that “nationalism” is a crucial component in connecting different individuals together to form a nation.¹⁴⁴ According to Poulton, the nationalism phenomenon is an ideological activity that aims to unite all members of a group in the pot of a common culture.¹⁴⁵ According to Kellas, the nation is a group of people, who share a collective sentiment that features ties of history, culture, and common ancestry.¹⁴⁶

During the decline of the Ottoman Empire in 19th century, Macedonians suffered long by the expansionist policies of the neighboring countries, and claimed their nation and national identity in order to prevent annexation or partition of its

¹⁴³ Rossos, p.269.

¹⁴⁴ Anthony D. Smith, **Theories of Nationalism**, Holmes and Meier, New York, May 1983, p.171.

¹⁴⁵ Poulton, pp.6-10.

¹⁴⁶ James G. Kellas, **The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity**, St. Martin's, New York, 1991, p.2.

territory. By the mid-19th century, during the course of promotion of national identity, Macedonia's intelligentsia claimed Macedonians as the "descendants of the ancient Macedonians" of Philip and Alexander, and those adopted the name of their territory as a national name and symbol. However, some scholars argue that the modern Macedonian identity could be seen only in the 1940s contrary to the Macedonians' claim of immediate descent of Alexander the Great.¹⁴⁷ According to Poulton, the idea of Macedonia as a territory, and a Macedonian nation was even available before 1945, and Tito only provided political, social, and economic basis to this idea. The proponents of this argument claim that Tito had devised the Macedonian Church and the Macedonian language to separate Macedonia from Bulgaria.¹⁴⁸

As Yugoslavia was about to dissolve from 1990 to 1991, Macedonia's first President Gligorov argued that dissolution of Yugoslav federation would create serious consequences for the Macedonian national consciousness, and he suggested solutions to recover the federation. Gligorov proposed to form an "active equidistance" to its neighbors in order to create a new equilibrium in the region where Macedonia's national identity was central to this policy. Since any compromise on the provisional name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)" might open the possibility of Macedonia's rejoining to Serbia-dominated Yugoslavia, Macedonia's leaders strongly opposed keeping "Yugoslav" in the country's name.¹⁴⁹

Greek intelligentsia asserts that Macedonia's government preferred to revive the new republic with Macedonian national identity to attract all ethnic Macedonians, including those living in Greece, because its Yugoslav republic identity was not suitable to ensure the support of all Macedonian nationalists. According to proponents of this argument, Macedonia's leaders' approach aggravated the relations with Greece, and they tried to exploit classical Greek identity to warrant meaning and legitimacy to the new republic.¹⁵⁰ Poulton argues that ethnic Albanian minority is satisfied with the name of the republic, because it does not refer to a merely ethnic Slav nation, and ethnic Albanians do not oppose it is referring to antiquity at all. Although using the country's constitutional name had already provoked Greek embargoes, and caused

¹⁴⁷ Stephane M. Saideman, Beth K. Dougherty, and Erin K. Jenne. "Dilemmas of Divorce: How Secessionist Identities Cut Both Ways", *Security Studies*, Vol.:14, No.:4, Summer 2005, p.627.

¹⁴⁸ Poulton, pp.117, 118.

¹⁴⁹ ICG, No.122, pp.15, 16.

¹⁵⁰ ICG, No.122, pp.15, 16.

delays in country's recognition, Macedonia's leaders embraced Macedonian national identity due to its success in domestic politics.¹⁵¹

Whilst Macedonia promoted its national identity by means of contested historical symbols, Greece has been deeply concerned about Macedonian irredentism and territorial claims. Obviously contested values of the parties underlay the conflict between Greece-Macedonia over the Macedonia's constitutional name.

2.1.2. Internal Subgroups of the Parties and the Constituencies They Depend

2.1.2.1. Ethnic and Religious Groups in Greece

Greece has a population of 10,816,286 according to 2011 census.¹⁵² In terms of ethnic groups Greek citizens can be divided into two sub-groups. The first group makes up 98 per cent of the population, and includes descendants of Anatolian Greek refugees, Pontian refugees, Vlachs, Arvanites, and Sarakatsani. Although some of these groups once also spoke their own language or a Greek dialect, they are Greek Orthodox Christians and inseparable from the main body of the Greeks. The other group consists of ethnic minorities such as "Makedonski" or Slavo-Macedonians, Turks, Pomaks and Roma. Greece officially recognized the Muslim minority by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Greece failed to recognize the existence of non-Muslim ethnic groups, though it was declared that "Slavaphones" (ethnic Macedonian minority) could identify themselves as belonging to a diverse ethnic group in August 1999. The Muslim minorities (more than half of them are ethnically Turkish and live in the Western Thrace) also consist of Pomaks and Roma, and those have a Turkish cultural consciousness. Many Greek Muslims, including Pomaks, identify themselves as Turks. Northwestern Greece, particularly Florina province, is a home to Slav-speaking citizens.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ ICG, No.122, pp.125, 126.

¹⁵² Hellenic Statistic Authority (ELSTAT), "Greece in Figures 2014", http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/General/GREECE_IN_FIGURES_2014_EN.pdf, (11 April 2015).

¹⁵³ Jane's Sentinel, **Security Assessment: The Balkans**, Issue: 14, Jane's Information Group, Surrey, 2004, p.263.

According to Greece's 2011 census, 2,773,979 citizens live in eastern, center and western regions of the Greek Macedonia.¹⁵⁴ According to 2001 census, 58,998 citizens live in Florin province, where predominantly Macedonian language-speaking Greek citizens reside.¹⁵⁵ Greece's statistical agency (ELSTAT) provides population figures in terms of geographically, but not demographically. Hatipoğlu claims that overall the population of Greece's ethnic Macedonian minority is around 350,000-400,000, including urban and rural residents of Florina, Edessa, Kastoria, Thessaloniki and Kilkis.¹⁵⁶ Greece's ethnic Macedonian minority claims that the government implements a policy aimed at discouraging the use of their dialect. The 2001 census does not take into account the estimated 500,000 and more illegal immigrants, mostly from Albania, living and working in Greece. Religious freedom is recognized by Article II of the 1968 Constitution. The religion of most Greek citizens is Greek Orthodox (94 to 97 per cent) with the exception of Muslim community. In Western Thrace, there are around 115,000 (1,3 per cent in overall population) Muslims (50 per cent Turk, 35 per cent Greek and 15 per cent Roma). The church has significant influence over the political and economic life in the country. The Greek government provides considerable financial support to the church and a ministry supervises it. Other religions in the country are Protestants, including Evangelicals, Jehovah's Witnesses, Catholics, Jews, and other faiths.¹⁵⁷

2.1.2.2. Ethnic and Religious Groups in Macedonia

According to the data from the last census in 2002, Macedonia's population is around 2.022 million (estimated 2,064 million on 30 June 2013), including the Macedonians (64.2 per cent), Albanians (25.2 per cent), Turks (3.9 per cent), Roma (2.7 per cent), Serbs (1.8 per cent), Bosniaks (0.8 per cent), Vlachs (0.5 per cent) and 1

¹⁵⁴ Hellenic Statistical Authority, "2011 Population and Housing Census", Sept. 2014, http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/A1602/PressReleases/A1602_SAM03_DT_DC_00_2011_01_F_EN.pdf, p.1.

¹⁵⁵ Hellenic Statistical Authority, "Statistical Yearbook of Greece 2009&2010" http://dlib.statistics.gr/Book/GRESYE_01_0002_00061.pdf, (11 April 2015).

¹⁵⁶ M. Murat Hatipoğlu. "Yunanistan'ın Dış Politikası ve Balkanlar (1990-2000)", **Balkan Diplomasisi**, Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, Ankara, 2001, (1990-2000), p.38.

¹⁵⁷ Jane's Sentinel, p.263.

per cent others.¹⁵⁸ In Macedonia, the ethnic Macedonians are mostly members of the Christian Orthodox faith (65 per cent of the population), whereas the 33 per cent of the population are Muslim including ethnic Turks, Roma and Albanians. The next largest religious group in Macedonia belongs to the Catholic faith (0,4 per cent of the population).¹⁵⁹ In 1967, Orthodox Church in Macedonia split from the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church, which continued to claim spiritual domination over the Macedonian Orthodox Church. In 2000 a small breakthrough, mediated by the Greek Orthodox Church, resulted in the Serb Orthodox Church and Macedonian Orthodox Church starting direct negotiations on the future nature of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. It is likely to lead to canonical recognition under the name of Ohrid Archbishopric. New rounds of negotiations were held in 2000 and 2001 but have so far remained uncertain, and the dispute continues.¹⁶⁰

Greece's population is almost five times larger than Macedonia's population, and the ethnic Greek Macedonian population is relatively low (3-4 per cent) taking into account the country's overall population. Moreover, vast majority of the population in Greece has a Greek Orthodox heritage. On the other hand, more than a little half (64.2 per cent) of Macedonia's population is composed of ethnic Macedonians, and the rest (35.8 per cent) of other nationalities. Particularly, more than a quarter of Macedonian's population is composed of ethnic Albanians. These figures clearly demonstrate that as far as national ethnicities are concerned; Greece is overwhelmingly homogeneous compared to Macedonia. It is also worthwhile to remind that Macedonia suffered much from the territorial and identity claims of the neighboring countries in the past. Internal political stability of Macedonia rests on a delicate equilibrium, and it is probably more sensitive to subversion than Greece. The magnitude of intra-state conflict between the ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian government forces in 2001 supports this argument well. Comparative analysis of both countries' demographic facts suggests that Greece's argument that "Macedonia has territorial claims over northern provinces of Greece" is irrational. The Macedonian

¹⁵⁸ Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, "Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002 - Book XIII", May 2005, <http://www.stat.gov.mk/Publikacii/knigaXIII.pdf>, (10 June 2015), p.35.

¹⁵⁹ World Population Review, "Macedonia Demographics", <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/macedonia-population/>, (10 June 2015).

¹⁶⁰ Jane's Sentinel, p.392.

government fears much the spread of ideology of “Greater Albania” among the ethnic Albanian minority, and therefore it is unlikely that it would interfere with the Greek Macedonia that might in turn set a precedent for its ethnic Albanian population. Moreover, the amendment effected by the Macedonian government in the constitution of those provisions that implied territorial claims against Greece, and the political commitments made to the EU by the same token in 1992 are strong assurances that demonstrate the true intentions of Macedonia.

2.1.3. The Relationship between the Conflicting Parties

In this part, I shall analyze parties’ main instruments of power such as political, economy, and military domains in order to disclose potential asymmetries between the two countries to comprehend the role of proximity factors affecting the positions of parties in the conflict. Since the demography of the constituent groups of the parties is analyzed under Paragraph 2.2.3, I shall not elaborate on the social domain in this section.

2.1.3.1. Political Domain

Political System of Greece

Greece is a parliamentary democracy headed by a president, based on the 1975 Constitution which came into being after a nationwide referendum resulted in the abolition of the monarchy. Extensive powers were given to the parliament and the Prime Minister (PM) with the President retaining some authority, especially at times of government instability. The constitution governs important political affairs and was revised in 1986 to further strengthen the position of parliament and the PM. The most recent amendment was in 2001. The president, who is elected by the parliament, may hold office for a maximum of two five-year terms and now has primarily ceremonial functions. He appoints PM, the head of the party with a majority in the Greek Parliament, which exercises executive and legislative powers and duties. There are

300 members in the parliament, elected through mandatory voting by those over the age of 18. Parliamentary sessions normally last for four years.¹⁶¹

Political System of Macedonia

Macedonia's national assembly comprises 120 members that are elected by popular vote from party lists. Members of the parliament are elected in accordance with the percentage that parties obtain of the overall vote in each of the election districts (six) of 20 seats each, and have a four years mandate. Head of the government is Prime Minister, and is nominated by the party that possesses the majority of MPs in the parliament. The members of government, PM and ministers, do not have to be members of the parliament.¹⁶² The state is represented by the President. President is the commander in chief, and chairs the Security Council, appoints the Chief of the Defense Staff (CHOD) and chief of intelligence service. The president is elected by a popular vote (for only one re-election), and has a term of duty for five years.

Political stability of Macedonia primarily rests on consensus of the constituent ethnic groups in the country. The constitutional power sharing between Albanian and Macedonian political establishments is based on Ohrid Framework Agreement that was concluded in the aftermath of the violent ethnic Albanian insurgency in 2001. Being a nascent state, Macedonia is still in the process of nation building. Macedonian governments' ability to pursue identity policies very much depends on its domestic political stability. It is anticipated that as long as the spirit of Ohrid consensus prevails, Albanian political parties will likely continue to support Macedonian government's policies in the name conflict with Greece.

¹⁶¹ Jane's Sentinel, p.271.

¹⁶² Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Sobranie (Assembly of the Republic)-Electoral System", http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2313_B.htm, (14 June 2015).

2.1.3.2. Economy Domain

Greece's Economy

Greece's economy is based on capitalist system, and its public sector accounts for about 40 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Greece enjoys the biggest share of EU aid, which is equivalent to 3.3% of its annual GDP. Whilst Greece's average annual growth was about 4 per cent from 2003 to 2007, its economy underwent a recession in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis, narrowing credit conditions, and its failure to tackle with a mounting budget deficit.¹⁶³

In its first term, New Democracy (ND) government successfully increased revenues from taxes, and attained 4 per cent annual growth rate from 2003 to 2007. During this period, unemployment declined, but the poverty level remained high (20 per cent of the population). During the second term of ND government, Greece affected the global financial crisis and recession that impaired all key sectors.¹⁶⁴ As Greece's income decreased, its public debt, inflation, and unemployment substantially increased in 2009. A major credit rating agency lowered Greece's international debt rating in late 2009, due to its decreasing public finances, credibility gap resulting from inaccurate statistics, and low economic performance.¹⁶⁵ The Greek ministry of finance declared that its debt reached €300 billion (\$442 billion) in December 2009. Greece's unemployment reached 9.6 per cent in July 2010, and budget deficit of more than 12 per cent of its GDP, and public debt of more than 125 per cent of GDP in 2010.¹⁶⁶

In April 2010, Greece was in desperate need of considerable fiscal financing, and therefore asked for financial aid from Eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). On 21 April 2010, delegation of EC, European Central Bank, ECB, and IMF arrived in Athens to negotiate the way ahead to reestablish country's macroeconomic stability. On 2 May 2010, an agreement was reached between Greece and the joint delegation on a bailout plan for the period 2010-2013 that was supported

¹⁶³ CIA, "The World Factbook," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html>, (27 April 2015).

¹⁶⁴ Carol Migdalovitz. "Greece Update – CRS Report for Congress (7-5700- RS2185)", 16 December 2009, file:///C:/Users/Admin%20PC/Downloads/2009-12-16_Greece-Update%20(1).pdf, (12 June 2015), pp.5, 6.

¹⁶⁵ CIA, The World Factbook.

¹⁶⁶ Migdalovitz, p.5.

by financing for a total sum of EUR 110 billion. The Eurogroup immediately approved loans from Eurozone countries to the sum of EUR 80 billion. On 9 May 2010, the IMF also endorsed financing Greece for EUR 30 billion.¹⁶⁷ The Greek government had to accept to implement austerity measures due to strong pressure by the EU and international markets.¹⁶⁸ However, the economic recession continued and tax revenues decreased due to the severe austerity terms. Greece's creditors have continually asked the government to accelerate efforts to raise tax revenues, decrease public workers, increase privatization, and decrease health spending. Investor confidence began to improve by the end of 2013, and the decline in GDP slowed to 3.9% in 2013. In 2013 external debt reached \$568.7 billion, in 2014 unemployment reached 26 per cent and public debt 174.5% of GDP (GDP purchasing power parity being \$284.3 billion in 2014). In 2014, Greece made substantial progresses by balancing its 2013 budget, re-entering financial markets in April 2014 for the first time since 2010, and attaining its first positive growth since 2008. In October 2014, PM Samaras's announcement of plans to exit its bailout program early led to a drop in the Greek stock and debt markets that forced Greece to renegotiate with its creditors and conclude an agreement to extend the EU portion of Greece's bailout program until February 2015.¹⁶⁹ On 18 February 2015, after intense negotiations between the newly-elected SYRIZA government, and Eurozone member states, assisted by the EC, ECB, and IMF, the government requested an extension of the Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement (MFAFA). Following the agreement of the Eurogroup to extend the program by 4 months (until 30 June 2015), supported by the commitment of the Greek government for reforms, the extension was decided by the board of directors of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) on 27 February 2015. So far, the Eurogroup has disbursed €141.8 billion in financial assistance to Greece¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ European Commission, "The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece", May 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp61_en.pdf, (20 Oct 2010).

¹⁶⁸ CIA, The World Factbook.

¹⁶⁹ CIA, The World Factbook.

¹⁷⁰ European Commission, "Financial Assistance to Greece-Latest Status", http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/index_en.htm, (22 April 2015).

Macedonia's Economy

Macedonia was the most underdeveloped republic of the federation before declaration of independence in September 1991, generating a 5 per cent of the total production of goods and services. An absence of infrastructure, the UN sanctions over Yugoslavia, and Greek economic embargoes due to the name issue curtailed the economic growth of Macedonia until 1996. Although Macedonia's GDP steadily increased each year through 2000, its economy melted 4.5 per cent during the civil conflict in 2001. Macedonia's annual average growth was 4 per cent from 2003 to 2006, and more than 5 per cent from 2007 to 2008. Although Macedonia's official statistics suggest that its unemployment was more than 30 per cent since 2008, it could be between 20 per cent and 45 per cent of GDP due to extensive gray market. During the global financial crisis, Macedonia upheld its macro-economic stability by implementing tight monetary policy. On 4 April 2003, Macedonia became a member of World Trade Organization (WTO), and implemented an extensive liberalization of trade regimes. However, it stayed behind its neighbors in attracting foreign investment in recent years, despite its intensive efforts in liberalizing its economy and improving the business conditions.¹⁷¹ Macedonia exports to Europe and sees it as a source of investment, and therefore is affected by the protracted weakness in the euro zone. Macedonia's budget deficit reached 4.2 per cent of its GDP in 2013 which is low by regional comparison but is significant for a small economy. Macedonia is likely to face a growing debt in 2015.¹⁷² Macedonia is likely to be affected by the economic developments in Europe, subject to regional integration, and EU membership for continued economic growth.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ Balkan Insight, "Latest Facts and Figures on Macedonia", <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia>, (29 September 2010).

¹⁷² CIA, The World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mk.html>, (27 April 2015).

¹⁷³ CIA, The World Factbook.

2.1.3.3. Military Domain

Greece's Armed Forces

Hellenic Armed Forces (HAF), consists of army, navy, and air force service that are subordinate to the chief of general staff. There are a total of 161.000 personnel in the HAF, of whom nearly 100,000 are conscripts. In addition to regular force, Greece has 235,000 reservists; this figure includes Territorial Guard force. The duration of national service (19-45 ages) stood at 9 months in the army, 12 months in the air force and navy, and 17 months for reserve duty. The president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and empowered to declare war and to negotiate treaties. Greece's armed forces' doctrine is based on the defense of its territorial integrity, namely against Turkey, but there is also apprehension regarding developments in the former Yugoslavia and the Albanian irredentism.¹⁷⁴

Hellenic Army, including the field army and territorial defense, consisted of 110,000 service members. Majority of the army has been deployed in Greek Thrace which borders Turkey. Greece has also deployed forces on the Aegean islands and in Cyprus. The Army also has active duty on the borders with Albania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria.¹⁷⁵ The army is administered in 3 military regions and 4 corps, an armored and a mechanized divisional headquarters are both subordinate. Organization of the army is composed of 6 infantry divisions and 5 independent infantry brigades, 3 mechanized infantry division and 7 independent mechanized infantry brigades, an armored division and 5 independent armored brigades, an amphibious brigade, a regiment of commandos. Greek Special Forces comprise 3 regiments of commando, paratroop and amphibious commando units. The Greek National Guard (Territorial Defense) has strength of 35,000 to 36,000 personnel, the operational control of which is vested in Higher Military Command of the Interior and Islands Headquarters,. The personnel strength of reserves is 200,000 for the army, and 35,000 for the Territorial Defense forces.¹⁷⁶ Hellenic Army inventory consist of 2153 main battle tanks, 2857 armored personnel carriers, 600 armored infantry fighting vehicles, 4007 artillery

¹⁷⁴ Jane's Sentinel, pp.292, 293.

¹⁷⁵ Jane's Sentinel, p.295.

¹⁷⁶ Jane's Sentinel, p.294.

pieces, 20 attack helicopters and 219 airframes, 1150 man portable air defense system (MANPADs), 128 SAM systems, 1082 anti-aircraft artillery guns.¹⁷⁷

Navy consists of strike units and support vessels to conduct naval operations that insure protection of national territorial waters and Greek islands. The navy has 19,000 personnel, including 9,800 conscripts and is subordinated to the Chief of Hellenic Navy and is administered within 3 naval districts: Aegean, Ionian and Northern Greece. The Navy possess many aging vessels, some of which need to be replaced. Greek navy operates; 14 frigates (Kortenaer, MEKO 200HN Class), a destroyer, 11 submarines, 5 Corvettes, 26 fast attack-missile/patrol craft, 8 large patrol craft, 112 landing craft, oiler, mine layer, sweeper, hovercraft, 67 naval vessels for other purposes, 31 airframes, and 2 guided missile batteries. The Greek Coast Guard is a subsidiary of the navy, but comes under the control of the Ministry of Merchant Marine in peacetime. The Coast Guard has 139 patrol craft, 24 various inflatable, and has aviation wing of 8 airframes for search and rescue (SAR) duties.¹⁷⁸ Greece's naval ship power ranks 17th in the world with a fleet of estimated at 122 ships as of 2015.¹⁷⁹

Hellenic Air Force incorporates a modern air fleet as well as a modern airspace control system, which cooperates with a widespread net of anti-aircraft defense. The Air Force personnel strength is 30,170. Hellenic Air Force is structured under Air Force General Staff with subordinated Tactical Air Force, Air Support Command, and Air Training Command. Tactical Air Force headquarters is located in Larissa and organized into 7 combat wings and a transportation wing, each wing comprising of 2 to 3 squadrons with a normal establishment of 16 aircraft. Hellenic Air Force inventory consist of 308 fighter/fighter bomber aircraft (F-16, Mirage 2000 and F-1, F-4E, A-7), 36 reconnaissance, 158 training aircraft, 4 Airborne Early Warning & Control System (EMB-145H), 104 transport aircraft, 57 general purpose helicopters, and 79 aircraft for other purposes. F-16, Mirage 2000 and F-1C, and F-4E have been allocated air defense roles, but also have secondary ground attack capabilities, and A-7 strike force undertakes maritime operations in addition to tactical air support. There are modern long-range missiles that are based on the "fire and forget" philosophy in the inventory of the Air Force. The arsenal also incorporates 119 modern air defense

¹⁷⁷ Jane's Sentinel, pp.297-299.

¹⁷⁸ Jane's Sentinel, pp.306, 308.

¹⁷⁹ Global Firepower, <http://www.globalfirepower.com/navy-ships.asp>, (26 April 2015).

systems to augment air defenses at low to high altitude. Greece's airspace control system is organized into 3 Control Reporting Centers.¹⁸⁰ The air-defense fighter aircraft, together with the SAM systems, constitute a security umbrella over the country aimed at the protection of entire territory and population centers. In terms of aircraft strength, Greece currently ranks 19th in the world.¹⁸¹

Macedonia's Armed Forces

Macedonia's security institutions are weak and largely unreformed. Macedonia's government has decided that there is no conventional threat to Macedonia; instead threats are assessed as deriving primarily from terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime. In addition, multilateral operations under the UN and NATO are seen as important, as is collective security in the NATO framework, and in particular NATO's Adriatic Charter.¹⁸²

Macedonia formed its armed forces by adopting the Defense Law on 14 February 1992, following declaration of independence, and withdrawal of the JNA. The Macedonian Armed Forces is organized as the Land Forces, and Air Force and Air Defense Force.¹⁸³ The Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) personnel strength is 15,000 active duty soldiers, 60,000 reserves, and 7,500 paramilitary police.¹⁸⁴ Under the joint operational command, General Staff of ARM, the Land Forces Command, the Air Force and Air Defense Command, the Special Forces Command, the Logistic Command and the Training Command takes place.

Macedonia's armed forces' training and equipment is at low level. Macedonia's armed forces are unlikely to resist against a capable aggressor no longer than a few hours, due to limited number of troops and heavy weaponry.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁰ Jane's Sentinel, pp.300-305.

¹⁸¹ Global Firepower, <http://www.globalfirepower.com/aircraft-total.asp>, (26 April 2015).

¹⁸² Jane's Sentinel, pp.417, 418.

¹⁸³ Jane's Sentinel, p.417.

¹⁸⁴ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Moving Macedonia toward Self-Sufficiency: A New Security Approach for NATO and the EU - ICG Balkans Report (No.135)", 15 November 2002, file:///C:/Users/Admin%20PC/Downloads/135_macedonia_security_approach.pdf, (12 June 2015), (No.:135), p.6.

¹⁸⁵ Jane's Sentinel, p.420.

The Macedonian forces have been re-equipped in a rapid, ad hoc, fashion during and immediately after the 2001 crisis. The Land Forces is organized into three independent brigades stationed in Kumanova, near Serbian border, Bitola near Greek border and Stip in central part overlooking Bulgarian border. According to new reform plan the ARM's ground forces combat capability is to base on 2 infantry brigades and an armored battalion equipped with T-72 main battle tanks (MBTs). The units planned to be stationed in Kicevo in western Macedonia and Stip in central Macedonia. It is planned that 70 per cent of the army to be professional with conscription to be abolished. The JNA either towed or vandalized almost all heavy weaponry, leaving only limited number of small arms, mortars, anti-tank weapons, multiple rocket launchers, and MANPADS. During the 2001 ethnic Albanian insurgency, the army procured 31 T-72s MBTs from Ukraine as well as T-55s, BTR armored personnel carriers, Oganj and Plamen multiple rocket launchers, automatic and semiautomatic rifles and mortars of various caliber, ammunitions and MANPADS.¹⁸⁶

Macedonian Air Force and Air Defense Force personnel strength is 600 troops, with only a handful of helicopters and trainer aircraft. The main role of the air force is to support Land Forces, and secondary roles include air traffic management, air evacuation, transport, search, and rescue with lack of air defense capability. These roles are purely defensive, with structure and training tailored for anti-insurgency operations. Macedonian Air Force's organizational structure consisted of 3 helicopter squadrons (combat, transport, and VIP), a training squadron, and an aircraft maintenance squadron. Its airframes composed of 4 Su-25s (currently out of inventory), 4 trainer aircraft (Zlin 242L, Zlin 143L) and 21 (Mi-24V/K, Mi-17, Mi-8MT, UH-1H) attack and utility helicopters based at Petrovec airport near Skopje. Macedonian Air Defense forces possess more than 140 anti-aircraft artillery guns (20-40 mm.) and unknown number of SA-13/16 type MANPADS.¹⁸⁷

The Macedonian armed forces do not maintain a navy, but there are 400 personnel strength Lake Service, which is an independent service of the ARM, but in practice integrated into the Land Forces. Macedonia has also a police force under the

¹⁸⁶ Jane's Sentinel, pp.420-423.

¹⁸⁷ Jane's Sentinel, pp.424, 425.

Ministry of Interior. The total strength of Macedonia's police is 7,600 with a reserve of 15,000.¹⁸⁸

Macedonia has aspirations for NATO membership, and therefore joined its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program on 15 November 1995, NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP), and PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1999. After the military conflict in 2001, Macedonia's Ministry of Defense initiated a process of reforms and restructuring in the defense sector.¹⁸⁹ The restructuring in question aims to create a capable rapid-reaction force, preserving conscription as basis for reserves.¹⁹⁰ However, it is unlikely that the reforms would resolve the limited counterinsurgency and border interdiction capabilities.¹⁹¹

Greece possesses extensive military capabilities compared to Macedonia. Moreover, Macedonia's armed forces are weak and largely unreformed. It is obvious that there is an asymmetry between the military capabilities of the two countries. The role of Macedonian armed force is purely defensive, with structure and training tailored for anti-insurgency operations. Macedonia does not possess a credible air defense capability for its airspace against potential aggressors, and solely relies on prospective collective security commitments of the NATO membership. Macedonian armed forces are incapable of defending national borders against a capable aggressor due to inadequate number of troops and heavy weaponry. The current military balance of power suggests that Macedonia does not pose a conventional threat to Greece. However, should Greece opt to resort to the use of force, it can overwhelmingly defeat Macedonian armed forces in a relatively short period of time.

2.2. CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

In this part, I shall explore the parties' perceptions for likely causes and nature of the conflict; geopolitical interests of the global actors in the region; relations of the parties with other Balkan states affecting the conflict; and the implications of

¹⁸⁸ Jane's Sentinel, p.427.

¹⁸⁹ Julie Kim, "Macedonia (FYROM): Post-Conflict Situation and U.S. Policy - CRS Report for Congress (RL32172)", 17 June 2005, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32172.pdf>, (12 June 2015), (RL32172), p.13.

¹⁹⁰ Jane's Sentinel, p.418.

¹⁹¹ ICG, No.135, p.7.

interrelated conflicts for the Greece-Macedonia conflict in order to reveal the external factors fuelling the conflict.

2.2.1. The Conflicting Parties' Perceptions of the Causes and Nature of the Conflict

2.2.1.1. From Greek Perspective

Prior to the 1990s, for Greece Macedonia was just a geographic term regardless of those living in the region, and this term did not refer to a single ethnic group and particularly to a group of Slavs. From the Greek perspective the area known as Macedonia never constituted a unified entity.¹⁹²

According to Greek nationalists, Greeks have exclusive right to identify themselves as Macedonians, because Alexander the Great and ancient Macedonians were Greek,¹⁹³ and the classical and modern Greece are interconnected with each other in terms of race and culture. They argue that the Slavs of southern Yugoslavia, who are descendants of the Slavic tribes that lived in Macedonia in the 6th century, called themselves "Bulgarians" until the 1940s, and thus are not entitled to recognize themselves as Macedonians. According to proponents of this argument, they are mostly referred to as "Skopians," "so-called Macedonians" and "Macedonians."¹⁹⁴ The Greek nationalists' arguments focus on three issues: the presence of a Macedonian nation, language, and minority in Greece.¹⁹⁵ In the eyes of the Greeks, Tito's aspirations are the reason of the antipathy felt against Macedonians. Therefore, the Greek scholars generally use the term "Slavspeakers"¹⁹⁶ or "Slavophones" when they imply the Slavic population living in Macedonia during the Yugoslavia period. Greek nationalists argue that the Macedonian nation is a "pseudo" nation, and it is a creation of Tito, who in 1944 created a set of nationalities, (i.e., Albanians, Serbs, Turks,

¹⁹² Danforth, World, p.31.

¹⁹³ Nikolas P. Andriotes, "History of the Name 'Macedonia'", **Balkan Studies**, Vol.:1, 1960, pp.143-148 : Nikolas P. Andriotes, "The Language and Greek Origin of the Ancient Macedonians", **Macedonia Past and Present**, Institute for Balkan Studies, No.:231, Thessaloniki, 1992.

¹⁹⁴ Spyridon Sfetas, and Kyriakos Kentrotis, "Skopje: In Search of an Identity and International Recognition", **Balkan Studies**, Vol.:35, No.2, 1994, p.373.

¹⁹⁵ Danford, World, pp.32, 33.

¹⁹⁶ Athanasios Angelopoulos, "Population in Greece Today According to Language, National Consciousness, and Religion", **Balkan Studies**, Vol.:20, 1979, pp.123-132.

Greeks, Vlachs, Roman) and gave all of them the name Macedonians. They claim Macedonian nationality was created by a government decree.¹⁹⁷ According to Greek nationalists, the ancient Macedonian language has relationship with some different Greek dialects that Cretans or Laconians or Phrygians had spoken. Andriotes argues that single phonetic difference which distinguishes ancient Macedonian from the other Greek dialects can be explained only within the framework of the Greek dialectology.¹⁹⁸ From Greek nationalist perspective, by using the name and the symbol of Macedonia (Sun of Vergina), Macedonians both steal the Greek national property and expose their irredentist claims on the Greek territory.

The Greek government claims that several passages of the Macedonian Constitution imply territorial claims on the northern province of Greece. Greek officials claim that the Preamble of the Constitution linked the recent founding of Macedonian state with the creation of “People’s Republic of Macedonia” on 2 August 1944. The Preamble of the Constitution reads as “resolution of the Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) provided part of the historical legacy on which the present Macedonian state was founded”. Greek objections to this passage are based on the fact that one of the goals articulated by ASNOM in 1944 was “the unification of the entire Macedonian nation” through “the liberation of other two segments of Macedonia.”¹⁹⁹ The Greek government also objected to Article 3 of the Constitution that stipulates “the borders of the Republic of Macedonia may be changed only in accordance with the constitution.” Additionally, the Greek government objected to Article 49 that stipulates “the republic shall care the status and the rights of Macedonians living in the neighboring countries and assist them in their cultural development and promote ties with them.”²⁰⁰

Zahariadis claims that the Greek reaction results from the anticommunist sentiments at home, and by threat perception originating at the global and regional levels. According to Zahariadis, Tito and the communist party paved the way for transforming the ethnic Slavs into ethnic Macedonians to eliminate the pro-Bulgarian feelings of the population of Yugoslav Macedonia. He argues that the transformation process relied on an interpretation of Macedonia's history to satisfy the political

¹⁹⁷ Danford, World, p.33.

¹⁹⁸ Andriotes, p.27.

¹⁹⁹ Danford, World, p.147.

²⁰⁰ Danford, World, p.148.

requirements of the communist party. Zahariadis claims that this process required the creation of essential elements of a nascent national identity that encompass a distinct language and church affiliation, a name, and a history.²⁰¹ He argues that the communist party policy makers embraced the idea of uniting three Macedonian regions in one state, and promoting national identity and cultural uniqueness of ethnic Macedonian minorities. According to Zahariadis, the communist party's adoption of the name "Macedonia" was the most convenient way to attain political legitimacy of the nascent state. He also argues that Macedonia's government following independence increased its propaganda by adopting historical symbols, such as using the sun of Vergina on its national flag. Zahariadis claims that Greece rejected Macedonia's proposal to sign an agreement over the inviolability of borders, and insisted on removal of the sun of Vergina on Macedonia's flag, since it perceived these actions as acts of hostile intentions.²⁰² Subsequently, Greece launched an aggressive policy against Macedonia following its declaration of independence, and commenced blocking Macedonia's membership aspirations in international organizations by using its veto right.²⁰³

2.2.1.2. From Macedonian Perspective

Frusetta argues that according to the first generation of Macedonian historians, the emergence of the Macedonian nation goes back to the 19th century. However, the second generation included the ancient Macedonians in the national narrative in the early 1990s. According to him, Macedonian historians challenged Greece's exclusive ownership of the symbols and territory of the ancient Macedonians by advocating their claims to the name and the territory of Macedonia, and creating their own ancient national heritage. Macedonian historians' main claim was that the ancient Macedonians were not Greeks but a distinct nation, i.e. non-Hellenic people who joined the ethno genesis of the Macedonians by melting into the Slavs who had come to the region in the 6th century. According to him, Macedonian historians' referring to

²⁰¹ Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Macedonian Issue", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol.:109, No.:4, Autumn 1994, (Issue), pp.661-666.

²⁰² For the official Greek position, see the article by the former Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Virginia Tsouderos, "Greek Policy and the Yugoslav Turmoil", **Mediterranean Quarterly**, Vol. 4, Spring 1993, pp.1-13.

²⁰³ Danford, World, p.152.

the ancient Macedonians was intended to prove their claim to a long national heritage and also to a homeland. He argues that such alternative theories of national origin minimize the VMRO and the Ilinden uprising and are therefore controversial.²⁰⁴ Danforth argues that confirming the existence of an authentic Macedonian language is vital due to fact that Bulgarian, Albanian and Greek minorities exist within the boundaries of the republic. According to Danforth, Macedonia's policy makers try to prove that the Macedonian language has a history although that was created through the official means at the disposal of the Yugoslav state in 1944.²⁰⁵

2.2.2. External Factors Fueling the Conflict

2.2.2.1. Geopolitical Interests of the Global Actors

The developments in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s brought to an end the Cold War that in turn led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and to new geopolitical realities in the Balkans.²⁰⁶ For more than a decade the Balkans became a priority for the U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. militarily intervened in Bosnia and Serbia to redraw the Balkan map and allocated enormous sums of financial assets and made diplomatic efforts reengineering countries and territories.²⁰⁷ The U.S. administration proclaimed that peace and security in Macedonia is crucial for the stability of Balkans and the U.S. interests. In the 1990s, the U.S. was actively engaged in multilateral efforts to prevent the expansion of ethnic conflict to Macedonia, to strengthen its independence and viability, and to manage bilateral conflicts between Macedonia and Greece. The U.S. and other international leaders feared that any protracted conflict involving Macedonia could quickly become internationalized and involve neighboring states, including NATO allies. Therefore the U.S. leadership repeatedly expressed support for Macedonia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.²⁰⁸ According to Kim, the U.S.

²⁰⁴ James Frusetta, "Common Heroes, Divided Claims: IMRO between Macedonia and Bulgaria", **Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeast Europe**, Ed. Lampe, John R. and Mark Mazower, Budapest and New York, Central European University, 2006, pp.110-130.

²⁰⁵ Danford, World, pp.37-44.

²⁰⁶ Zahariadis, Issue, pp.661-666.

²⁰⁷ Doug Bandow, "U.S. Policy in the Balkans- Cato Handbook for Policy Makers - 7th Edition", 2009, <http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-56.pdf>, (12 June 2015), pp.579-587.

²⁰⁸ Kim, RL32172, pp.3-6.

foreign policy regarding Macedonia constitutes a part of its broader policy in southeastern Europe, which is based on advocating European integration and NATO's enlargement, and urging regional cooperation. She argues that preventing the spread of conflict in the southern Balkans remains a vital U.S. interest, and the U.S. troop deployment in Macedonia since 1993, as part of the U.N. force, demonstrates the determination of the U.S. to maintain stability in Macedonia and the Balkans. Kim claims that after establishing full diplomatic relations with Macedonia on 13 September 1995, the U.S. began supporting its efforts restructuring and stabilizing its economy through bilateral aid and multilateral development programs, strengthening its democratic institutions, and integrating it into European structures.²⁰⁹ According to her, the U.S. interests overlap with the rest of the international community in preventing a reversal of progress in Macedonia. While the failure of developments in Macedonia does not pose any strategic threat to the U.S., it would be contrary to its goals for maintaining greater stability in the region and peaceful integration of Macedonia into the rest of Europe. Another interest for the U.S. was that Macedonia is a precedent for development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). According to Kim, Macedonia was an example of a constructive U.S. and EU partnership in the Balkans, and both the EU and U.S. were likely to continue stabilizing Macedonia and promote its integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions.²¹⁰

Nevertheless, not all analysts advocate these arguments. Bandow suggests that the U.S. interests in the Balkans were minimal at best and that the U.S. did not take into account the Russian interests while managing its Balkan affairs. According to Bandow, Balkan policy of the U.S. administration was one of many issues that paved the way to the military incursion of Russian Federation into Georgia. According to Bandow, a violent breakdown of the present order seems unlikely despite the fact that the region is divided ethnically, politically, and religiously. He argues that ethnic nationalism continues to affect Macedonia, and ethnic tension remains a dangerous threat in Macedonia.²¹¹ Bandow argues that the U.S.'s attention to the region has been disproportionate considering the peripheral nature of its interests there and the

²⁰⁹ Julie Kim, "Macedonia: Conflict Spillover Prevention - CRS Report for Congress (98-333F)", 23 July 1998, file:///C:/Users/Admin%20PC/Downloads/nps15-040804-15.pdf, (12 June 2015), (98-333F).

²¹⁰ Kim, RL32172, pp.4, 5.

²¹¹ Bandow, pp.579-580.

proximity of rich and powerful allies. According to Bandow, the U.S. should not advocate the enlargement of NATO in Balkans, as it should urge the two countries to resolve their differences on the name issue. He claims that Balkan states constitute security black holes by bringing potential conflicts and ancient hatreds, and the region is not a security concern for the U.S. Bandow suggests that the U.S. should extricate itself from the region, but should make clear that the Balkans are the first region in which the EU should assume the responsibility of the security of Europe.²¹²

According to Zahariadis, the U.S. presence in Macedonia changed the balance of power in the region by reinforcing Macedonia's position in the negotiations that gave the impression that the U.S. was on its side. He asserts that recognition of Macedonia by EU members, and the U.S. under its constitutional name, and establishing diplomatic relations with Macedonia in 1993 and 1994 has further affected the regional balance of power. Zahariadis claims that these developments undermined Greece's plans of exploiting the EU's common foreign and security policy, CFSP, as leverage against Macedonia, and triggered the Greek trade embargo on 16 February 1994 as a response.²¹³

The ICG Balkans Report argues that the international community would like to stabilize Macedonia, and urge Greece resolving the name issue as a matter of regional stability, and ensure that Macedonia continues implementing the reforms agreed at Ohrid in 2001.²¹⁴

2.2.2.2. Relations with the Neighboring States and Societies

Greece's Relations with Balkan Countries

The bilateral relations between Greece and Serbia are based on economic interdependence, shared religion (Orthodox Christianity), and traditional antagonism against Turkey. Greece was eager to act as a broker between Serbia and the Western world, and gave consent to a federation that would unite all regional countries under Serbia's hegemony. However, in order to avoid the EU's criticism that its position

²¹² Bandow, p.586.

²¹³ Zahariadis, Issue, p.665.

²¹⁴ ICG, No.:122, pp.17, 18.

disrupted the first practice in EU's common foreign and security policy after Maastricht, Greece had to agree to impose a trade ban on Montenegro and Serbia. Greece also complied with the UN sanctions imposed in May 1992. Although the intensification of diplomatic relations between Greece and Serbia during the Yugoslav civil war increased concerns that the two countries were collaborating to maintain the presence of Serbia in the Balkans, Greece reported to the EU that it rejected Milosevic's proposal for the partition of Macedonia between the two countries.²¹⁵

Bulgaria's recognition of Macedonia and the pro-Turkish policies of Bulgaria's first post-communist government deteriorated its relations with Greece. In this regard, Greece postponed a \$50 million sum of credit to Bulgaria after its recognition of Macedonia; however, relations between the two countries steadily improved eventually, particularly in the economic field.²¹⁶

Macedonia's Relations with Balkan Countries

Although Bulgaria was the first country to recognize Macedonia in 1991, it did not recognize Macedonians as a distinct nation or their language, and even insists that this region is Bulgarian in terms of its territory and ethnicity. Occasionally the relations between the two countries were strained due to the ethnic Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. The political movement OMO "Ilinden"-PIRIN of ethnic Macedonian minority living predominantly in Blagoevgrad province was outlawed and its activities were banned by the constitutional court of Bulgaria on 28 February 2000.²¹⁷ In the 1990s, Macedonia's government pursued a policy of "active equidistance" to its neighbors, as a result of threats originating from the Albanian nationalism and traditional Orthodox pretensions. However, PM Georgievski gave up this policy in favor of a new "principle of positive energy" after taking office in 1998. This shift in Macedonia's regional foreign policy orientation had implications over Macedonian identity cause. There were public concerns when Georgievski, as being a proponent of pro-Bulgarian wing of Macedonian nationalism, accepted Bulgaria to avoid officially recognizing the Macedonian language in February 1999. In June 2012 Bulgarian PM Borisov said that they were against the idea of Macedonia being

²¹⁵ Zahariadis, Issue, pp.647-667.

²¹⁶ Zahariadis, Issue, p.662.

²¹⁷ OMO - "Ilinden" - PIRIN, <http://www.omoilindenpirin.org/about.asp>, (18 November 2010).

renamed with a geographical qualifier, such as “Northern,” as it might encourage Macedonian territorial claims against Bulgaria.²¹⁸ Bulgarian government also objected to Macedonia’s obtaining a date for the EU accession talks in December 2012, and claimed that they would not back Macedonia since it had failed to nurture good neighborly relations, and blamed the Macedonian government for “manipulating historical facts and provoking ethnic hatred”.²¹⁹

Macedonia pursued an independent foreign policy until the conflict with the ethnic Albanian insurgents exposed the weaknesses of its military in the Spring of 2001. Then it established closer relations with Ukraine, Russia, Serbia, and Bulgaria to build up its military capabilities. Greece also provided two helicopters (UH-1H) to Macedonia during the conflict. Macedonia particularly established alliance with Serbia against ethnic Albanians during this period. The two countries resolved their differences over Kosovo, and concluded security agreements to cope with the “threat of Albanian terrorism.” Ethnic Albanians strongly supported Macedonia’s policy on the name issue, since they realized that the external difficulties in Macedonia’s identity issue is provoking more internal supremacy, and the external military assistance is increasing the risk of use of force.²²⁰ The status of ethnic Albanian minority living in the country affects the Macedonia-Albania relations from time to time. Furthermore, Albania’s occupation of a small part of Macedonian territory during the 1912-13 Balkan War, and the existence of ethnic Macedonian minority in Albania underlines sensitivity of the relations between the two countries.²²¹

Turkey was one of the first countries recognizing Macedonia (on 6 February 1992), and the first to open an Embassy mission in Skopje. The relations with Turkey especially improved at first half decade following the declaration of independence in September 1991. Bilateral agreements were concluded by both countries on education, culture, economy, and defense. Turkish enterprises began transferring “knowhow” and experiences to Macedonian counterparts in an effort to facilitate economic

²¹⁸ Balkan Insight, “Bulgaria Would Object to “Northern Macedonia”,” 08 June 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bulgaria-says-no-to-name-northern-macedonia>, (17 April 2015).

²¹⁹ Balkan Insight, “Bulgaria and Greece Block Macedonia's EU Talks”, 12 December 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bulgaria-joins-greece-in-blocking-macedonia-s-eu-bid>, (18 April 2015).

²²⁰ ICG, No.122, pp.9-11.

²²¹ Hatipoğlu, 1991-2000, p.177.

restructuring of the country, and financial credits were provided by Turkish state banks. Turkey began exerting its influence over Macedonia by means of financial sector. Macedonia relied on Turkey not only for historical and cultural ties, but also for its contribution to solution of the challenges faced in the aftermath of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Macedonia viewed Turkey as a regional benefactor and protector.²²² However, a stalemate has occurred in bilateral economic and political relations since late 1995. The western power centers opted to tip the balance of power in the region against Turkey, since the equilibrium started to get disrupted following the expansion of Turkey's sphere of influence in the region after the Dayton Peace Accords. Germany's eroding policies against Turkey, which it perceived as a rival for its economic interest line extending to Central Asia through the Balkans, played a crucial role in this regard. Steinbach claims that Turkey's aspiration to become a regional power escalated the Germany's rival stance that increasingly intensified since 1993.²²³ Failure to increase the level of relations between Turkey and Macedonia paved the way for Greek investments in Macedonia substantially.²²⁴

2.2.2.3. Analysis of the Implications of Interrelated Conflicts over Greece-Macedonia Conflict

The crisis in Kosovo in 1999 affected the ethnic relations in Macedonia. Zahariadis argues that the presence of the UN peacekeepers (UNPREDEP) demonstrated the limits of international community's assistance addressing the Albanians' dissatisfaction, as the conflict with Greece radicalized ethnic Macedonians. He claims that the Kosovo crisis led to inter-ethnic strife by serving as a precedent of bringing in external powers on the Albanians' side, creating refugee influx and arms smuggling that provide capability to radical ethnic Albanians for insurgency.²²⁵

The repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo radicalized them, and eventually caused an armed rebellion, and hence an influx of refugees into Macedonia. Macedonian officials believed that militants of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)

²²² Necati Çayırılı, "Türkiye-Makedonya İlişkileri ve Doğu-Batı Ulaşım Projesi Üzerine", **Yeni Türkiye Türk Dünyası Özel Sayısı-II**, Sayı:16, Ankara, 1997, pp.1824, 1825.

²²³ Udo Steinbach, **Die Türkei im. Jahrhundert: Schwierigen Partner Europas**, Lübbe, Bergisch Gladbach, 1996, pp.301, 302.

²²⁴ Birlik Gazetesi, No.:5562, 14 October 2000.

²²⁵ Nikolaos Zahariadis, "External Interventions and Domestic Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslav Macedonia", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol.:118, No.:2, Summer 2003, (Macedonia), pp.272-277.

were taking the advantage of refugee influx, and were using their country to attack Serbian forces in Kosovo and the officials tried to prevent this. Moreover Macedonia's government initially kept the refugees in poorly constructed camps near the border without necessary facilities, and even tried to deport them to third countries. Macedonian government eventually changed its policy towards the refugees due to international pressures, but domestic inter-ethnic relations had already been damaged. In addition to the refugee crisis that strained the inter-ethnic relations, there was no progress on ethnic Albanian minority's demands over education, language, economic and social rights.²²⁶

Kim argues that ethnic Albanian minority's support for Macedonia's coalition government began to perish, since they viewed more feasible ways to attain their objectives. She also claims that some ethnic Albanians dreamed of independence and a "Great Albania". According to her, the majority of ethnic Albanians looked for more rights, and some form of autonomy. In this context, clashes began between the National Liberation Army (NLA) militants and Macedonia's security forces in March 2001. The Albanian insurgents demanded equality between nationalities and recognition of Albanian as a formal language. On 9 July 2001, a cease-fire was brokered, and subsequently, Ohrid Framework Agreement was concluded between the parties on 13 August 2001. The agreement basically involved the cessation of hostilities, development of decentralized government, non-discrimination and equitable representation, education and use of native languages, and freedom of expression of identity. Macedonia's ethnic Albanian minority demanded ratification of the municipality law that aimed to transfer more autonomy to local governments, and the government ratified the necessary legislation in early January 2002. The ratification of the amnesty law in late January 2002 further accelerated return to normalcy in Macedonia. In short, the crisis in Kosovo became a catalyst for the outbreak of an ethnic conflict in Macedonia.²²⁷

²²⁶ Kim, 98-333F, pp.4, 5.

²²⁷ Ibid.

CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION PERSPECTIVE

3.1. CURRENT BEHAVIOR OF THE PARTIES AT STATE LEVEL

The international mediation, brokered by the U.S. Ambassador Matthew Nimetz, who is a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, to resolve the name conflict between Greece and Macedonia has turned into a stalemate after two decades. In 2007, while Macedonia reiterated willingness to accept a composite name with a geographic qualifier exclusively for relations with Greece and to use its constitutional name for other relations, the so-called “dual name formula,” Greece insisted Macedonia to use composite, geographically-qualified name for all other relations, “*erga omnes*.” Macedonia seeks to utilize the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which stipulates that Greece breached its obligations in Interim Accord by blocking Macedonia’s accession to the EU and NATO membership. However, the Greek government declared that the ICJ ruling would not affect their position in the name conflict. Greece’s policy to thwart Macedonia’s membership in EU and NATO impairs the strategies of both organizations to stabilize the Balkans through enlargement. Resolution of the conflict between the two countries requires greater willingness of the EU and NATO nations to urge Greece to implement a more constructive stance and respond to Macedonia’s concessions with concessions of its own.²²⁸ National identity struggle by means of “shared” historical symbols lies at very essence of the conflict between both countries. This case study clearly demonstrates that the sole use of international mediation to resolve the value-based conflicts is a futile attempt. Nevertheless, any compromise on Nimetz’s last proposal, i.e. the “Upper Republic of Macedonia”, coupled with external pressure on the parties might yield settlement of the protracted conflict.

In first part of this chapter, I shall elaborate on the current behavior of the conflict parties by exploring the nature of their state apparatuses. I shall also briefly

²²⁸ International Crisis Group (ICG), “Macedonia’s Name: Breaking the Deadlock - Europe Briefing (No.:52)”, 12 January 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/b52_macedonias_name___breaking_the_deadlock.pdf (13 June 2015), (No.:52), pp.13, 14.

give an account for the roles of the intergovernmental organizations serving as legitimate channels for conflict resolution. Finally, I shall analyze the economic development level of the parties to reveal their potential role for prospective settlement of the conflict.

3.1.1. The Nature of State Apparatus of the Conflicting Parties

Human rights are generally referred to in Article II of the Greek constitution. However, the mistreatment of migrants raised the human rights activism, and a new immigration law occupied the public agenda in 2001 in Greece. Reluctance for recognition of ethnic minorities and language rights remains a systematic problem in Greece.²²⁹ The Greek government has a policy of denying ethnic, national, or linguistic minorities in spite of the presence of Turks, Macedonians, Bulgarians, Albanians, and other ethnic groups living in the country. In 1999, upon public pressure the Greek government gave up the proposed reforms to facilitate “multiculturalism” for citizenship and identity issues.²³⁰

In 2009, Gay McDougall, the UN expert on minority issues reported that Greece denies the presence of ethnic Macedonian minority in central and western parts of the country. The Greek governments claim that Macedonia is historically Greek and its inhabitants are descendants of ancient Greeks, and the claims of existence of other minorities are politically motivated. The UN report argues that although the cruel treatment of ethnic Macedonian minority ended lately, the discrimination and harassment still persist. According to the report, the ethnic Macedonians were forced to change their family names with Greek names, and the Greek authorities refused appeals of the citizens to restore their Macedonian family names because of administrative reasons. The report also argues that the ethnic Macedonian minority’s right to freedom of association was denied in Greece and the Greek courts refuses to register “Home of Macedonian Culture” in Florina. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in 1998 that Greece had breached Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the freedom of association. The discriminatory laws

²²⁹ Jane’s Sentinel, p.272.

²³⁰ Johnson Carter, “The Use and Abuse of Minority Rights: Assessing Past and Future EU Policies towards Accession Countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe”, **International Journal on Minority and Group Rights**, Vol.:13, No.:1, 2006, p.34.

affect thousands of ethnic Macedonians who escaped from Greece during the civil war from 1946 to 1949, and lost their citizenship and property.²³¹ Emigrant ethnic Macedonians experience hardships while obtaining visas for Greece to visit relatives or attend funerals. The ethnic Macedonian minority also undergoes mistreatment due to exposing their national identity, or speaking Macedonian language that was earlier prohibited in some regions. Some ethnic Macedonians claim that they were harassed by aggressive interrogation at borders, or even physically attacked due to their ethnic origin and/or for being in association with the Rainbow Party which supports political recognition of the Macedonian minority in Greece. The ethnic Macedonian minority also experiences problems in performing songs in native language and traditional dances.²³² Apart from Greek government's discriminatory policies, the violent activities of members of ultra-nationalist Golden Dawn party are also a concern for the ethnic Macedonian community in Greece and abroad.

Ethnic Albanians constitute the largest ethnic minority (25.2 per cent) in Macedonia alongside Turks, Roma, Serbs, Bosnians and Vlachs.²³³ Albanians achieved wider constitutional rights following the conclusion of the Ohrid Agreement in 2001 after the Albanian insurgency. Following the reconciliation, the ethnic Albanians were integrated into the political life, and the Albanian Democratic Union for Integration, DUI, became a junior partner of the center-right VMRO-DPMNE in the ruling coalition government.²³⁴

3.1.2. Institutions Serving as Legitimate Channels for Managing the Conflict

The UN is the leading intergovernmental institution that has legitimacy for managing the Greek-Macedonian name conflict. In addition to the UN, the European Union also fulfills the function of conditioning the conflict by its admission process.

²³¹ United Nations, "Report of the Independent Expert on Minority Issues, Addendum (A/HRC/10/11/Add.3)-MISSION TO GREECE (8-16 September 2008)", 18 February 2009, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/10session/A.HRC.10.11.Add.3.pdf>, (31 May 2015), (Addendum), p.13.

²³² UN, Addendum, p.14.

²³³ Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, "Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002 - Book XIII", May 2005, http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/kniga_13.pdf, (13 June 2015), p.35.

²³⁴ Kim, 98-333F, pp.4, 5.

The UN works for the peaceful settlement of disputes as set forth in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.²³⁵ But it can also, by invoking Chapter VII,²³⁶ command the allegiance of the entire organization and its full membership. The UN may also act as an actor on its own by managing the settlement process by taking into consideration the opinions of member states. The UN gets involved in the negotiations through Special Representatives and the Secretary General as required. The only regional organization that is close to such a powerful position is the EU and its Council of Ministers. However, it has so far been granted a limited mandate on foreign affairs and defense issues. The regional organizations such as the EU and the OSCE are useful institutions in conflict resolution as well as the UN.²³⁷

3.1.3. The Effect of Economic Development Factor on the Conflict

Macedonia was the poorest republic in the Yugoslav Federation and it has suffered economic difficulties due to the lack of internal reforms, internal ethnic conflict, and external challenges.²³⁸ Following the independence, the transition from a state-owned to a free market economy was just a part of the problem for Macedonia's economic development. The regional instability aggravated the economic situation of Macedonia. The Bosnian War and international sanctions on Serbia from 1992 to 1996 worsened the Macedonian economy. Greece's trade embargoes from 1992 to 1995 also substantially led to the deterioration of the country's economy. The international sanctions against Serbia cost Macedonia about \$2.9 billion and the Greek embargoes \$1.5 billion.²³⁹ The 1999 crisis in Kosovo was destructive for the Macedonian economy as well. During the crisis, Macedonia hosted more than 350,000 refugees

²³⁵ Articles 33-38 of Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) put forth the roles of the Security Council and the General Assembly in resolving the intra-state conflicts. Particularly, Article 33 stipulates that, similar to the mainstream conflict resolution approaches, the conflicting parties are to resolve their differences by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter6.shtml>, (10 June 2015).

²³⁶ Articles 39-51 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter put forth the possible actions (the use of force) of the Security Council with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>, (10 June 2015).

²³⁷ Wallenstein, pp.231-233.

²³⁸ Julie Kim, "Macedonia: Country Background and Recent Conflict - CRS Report for Congress (RL30900)", 7 November 2001, <http://fas.org/man/crs/RL30900.pdf>, (13 June 2015), (RL30900), p.3.

²³⁹ Rossos, pp.276-278.

which negatively affected the economy and increased social pressure. The cost of Kosovo conflict for Macedonia was \$630 million in lost exports.²⁴⁰

Despite the fact that the regional crises affected Macedonia's economy and distracted the government from internal reform, the economic transition proceeded rapidly. Macedonia initiated a comprehensive program of stabilization and reform with the approval of the IMF and the World Bank. This reform program produced some positive results until the Kosovo conflict. Macedonia implemented a tight monetary policy that resulted in a quick decrease of inflation and budget deficit, but only slight economic recovery. In the first half of the 1990s, financial savings and privatization led to the closing of some industrial enterprises, increased corruption, and slow economic growth. In the late 1990s partial recovery occurred in Macedonian economy and the situation improved until the ethnic Albanian insurgency in 2001. The inter-ethnic crisis cost a loss of \$200 million of its foreign currency reserves. Macedonia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in April 2001, but the donors' conference for Macedonia was suspended due to its lack of progress in implementing the political reforms.²⁴¹ Macedonia has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2003 and an EU candidate country since December 2005.²⁴² The Macedonian government introduced economic and political reforms to stimulate the economy and attract more foreign investment following the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement.²⁴³ The European Commission's 2014 Progress Report suggested that Macedonia made some progress in the formation of a functioning market economy but had to implement structural reforms to deal with competitive markets. According to the report, the country's economic recovery continued to progress, but this had limited impact on unemployment; financial stability was maintained and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) influx improved, but the fiscal

²⁴⁰ Rossos, pp.276, 277.

²⁴¹ Kim, RL30900, pp.3, 4.

²⁴² Jens Bastian, "'Cry wolf' No More: External Anchors and Internal Dynamics in the Western Balkans", **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol.:8, No.:4, December 2008, p.325.

²⁴³ Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.mk/default1.aspx?ItemID=318&id=1022>, (17 November 2010).

discipline as well as transparency and government spending deteriorated since October 2013.²⁴⁴

On the other hand, Greece's poor economic performance during the period of 2000-2009 evolved into a financial crisis in the Euro zone due to its macroeconomic imbalances, large sums of public debt, poor external competitiveness, an unsustainable pension system, and weak institutions. In 2009, the government deficit reached to 13.6 per cent of GDP because of substantial overspending and fall in government revenue. The public debt skyrocketed up to 115 per cent of GDP at the end of the same year. The financial markets concerned about fiscal sustainability delayed the implementation of corrective measures. Eventually, global rating agencies downgraded the Greece's financial credit score in 2009. In April and May 2010, the Greek government asked for financial assistance from the Euro zone member states, and a Stand-By Arrangement from the IMF. A delegation of EU, ECB, and IMF representatives arrived in Athens on 21 April 2010 to discuss a bailout plan. On 2 May 2010 an agreement was reached on a comprehensive policy package for the period 2010-2013 supported by official financing for a total amount of EUR 110 bn. On the same day, the Eurogroup endorsed a policy program and approved bilateral loans from Euro zone members for the sum of EUR 80 bn. On 9 May 2010, the IMF approved a EUR 30 bn Stand-By Arrangement.²⁴⁵

On 18 February 2015, during intense negotiations between the newly-elected Greek government and Euro zone member states assisted by the EU, the ECB, and the IMF, the Greek government requested an extension of the Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement. After concluding an agreement with the Eurogroup to extend the program by 4 months on condition that Greece would implement reforms and complete the parliamentary procedures, the EFSF Board of Directors endorsed to extend the program on 27 February 2015.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁴ European Commission, "European Commission 2014 Progress Report", October 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-progress-report_en.pdf, (22 April 2015), (Report).

²⁴⁵ European Commission, "The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece", May 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp61_en.pdf, (20 October 2010).

²⁴⁶ European Commission, "Financial Assistance to Greece – Latest Status", http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/index_en.htm, (22 April 2015).

Severe austerity terms dictated by the bailout programs to recover the Greek economy caused turbulence in domestic politics by affecting the constituencies' behavior. The political instability caused by the failure to form functioning governments and the never-ending election polls effectively contributed to the slowing down of the pace of the UN-mediated negotiations on the name conflict for years. For the Macedonian part, in spite of a relative progress in its economic development, the government's rhetoric and promotion of nationalism by shared historical symbols for domestic consumption strained the relations with Greece, hence curtailing the prospects for settlement of the dispute.

3.2. PROSPECTS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AT THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL LEVELS (THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS)

In second part of this chapter, the role of conflict parties in negotiation process will be elaborated by taking into consideration the parties' direct talks, the mobilization of external regional actors as trusted agents for arbitration and mediation. In this part, I will also explain the influence of the intergovernmental institutions and western powers on the negotiation process.

3.2.1. The Conflicting Parties' Direct Talks

Political relations between Greece and Macedonia started to improve and the meetings between the officials of both countries took place after the conclusion of the Interim Agreement in 1995. In this regard, diplomatic delegations of both countries participated in the first round of discussions for the normalization of relations between the two countries on 3 October 1995 in Athens, and subsequently convened in Skopje in the following week. Greek PM Konstantinos Karamanlis met acting Macedonian President Jordanovski during Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP) Summit in Sarajevo on 21 April 2004. Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Valinakis met Deputy Macedonian President Mrs. Sekerinska, in Dubrovnik, Croatia on 9 June 2004. Greek Foreign Minister Molyviatis met his Macedonian counterpart Mrs. Mitreva at NATO Summit in Istanbul on 27 June 2004 and at the UN General Assembly in New York on 22 September 2004. On 3 June 2004, bilateral political negotiations took place between the officials of both countries' foreign ministries. Greek Foreign

Minister Molyviatis visited Skopje on 22-23 October 2004.²⁴⁷ On 13 March 2008, upon the U.S. Ambassador Victoria Nuland's efforts Greece's PM Karamanlis, and his Macedonian counterpart Gurevski met in Brussels as a last ditch effort to resolve the name conflict prior to the upcoming NATO Bucharest summit.²⁴⁸

The bilateral contacts intensified after Greece blocked Macedonia's membership at NATO's Bucharest summit in 2008. Greek PM George Papandreou met his Macedonian counterpart Nikola Gruevski several times in the autumn of 2009. However, their contacts were courteous and brief, without adding any new substance to the name talks.²⁴⁹

Greek PM Lucas Papademos and the head of the New Democracy (ND) party, Antonis Samaras, both replied negatively to a letter from Gruevski requesting renewed dialogue in December 2011 following the judgment of the ICJ that Greece had breached the Interim Accord. On 25 January 2012, Macedonia's Vice PM Arifi and her Greek counterpart Pangalos met in Athens to revive negotiations over the name issue.²⁵⁰

On 07 July 2012, Macedonian government spokesman Gjorgiev declared that Greece had not responded to Macedonia's proposal of a set of bilateral agreements yet, and expressed their readiness for dialogue to nurture bilateral relations and tackle open issues either directly or under the UN auspices. He also said that they offered both setting up a committee between the two countries' ministries of interior and officials to tackle the issues of double taxation and opening new border gates, and more meetings among historians of both countries to eliminate different views of history. President Gjorgiev also argued that although they offered similar proposals for years, Greece's leaders repeatedly rejected their proposals.²⁵¹

²⁴⁷ Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern+Europe/Balkans/Bilateral+Relations/FYROM/FYROM.htm>, (17 November 2010).

²⁴⁸ Balkan Insight, "No Progress in Macedonia 'Name' Talks", 13 March 2008, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/no-progress-in-macedonia-name-talks>, (10 June 2015).

²⁴⁹ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia-Greece Name Dispute: What's in a name?", 30 June 2011, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/background-what-s-in-a-name>, (13 June 2015).

²⁵⁰ Balkan Insight, "Greek and Macedonian Vice-PMs to Meet", 25 January 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/greek-macedonian-vice-prime-ministers-meet>, (17 April 2015).

²⁵¹ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia Awaits Greek Reply to Olive Branch", 10 July 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/greece-reacts-coolly-to-macedonian-friendship-call>, (17 April 2015), (Branch).

On 8 May 2013, Macedonia's Vice PM for European Affairs Besimi held talks with the Greek Foreign Minister Avramopoulos in Athens in an unusual face-to-face meeting. Besimi announced that Macedonia's European integration prospects and the name dispute with Greece that is hampering progress were discussed during his visit to Greece.²⁵² In early July 2013, Macedonian PM Nikola Gruevski sent a letter to his Greek counterpart PM Samaras requesting a meeting. Media reports speculated that Gruevski proposed tangible and sizable steps to surmount the stalemate in the talks, and suggested forming committees chaired by the respective PMs to engage in intense negotiations as mediated by Nimetz. Gruevski's latest initiative came after the EC Summit on 27-28 June 2013 in Brussels, when EU leaders decided to exclude Macedonia from their agenda due to lack of progress in the name issue.²⁵³ Although Samaras refused Gruevski's proposal for organizing series of meetings to accelerate the UN-mediated talks, the Greek Foreign Minister Venizelos met with Ahmeti, head of junior partner of the government, ethnic Albanian Democratic Union for Integration, DUI, in Athens on 03 September 2013. After the meeting Ahmeti said that the name issue was discussed, but concrete ideas had not been elaborated.²⁵⁴ On 20 February 2014, Greek Deputy PM and Foreign Minister Venizelos paid a visit to Skopje to meet Macedonian leaders in his capacity as both the chair of the EU Council of Ministers and a Greek official. Venizelos expressed his optimism on settlement of the name issue after meeting the Macedonian leaders. He added that he was under the impression that Macedonian leaders clearly understand that Greece is the gateway towards the Euro-Atlantic destiny of the country. Venizelos said that during the visit both parties had expressed willingness to intensify the talks under the auspices of the UN. He argued that the EU denied declaring a date for accession talks for Macedonia's membership not only for the name issue, but also because it failed to comply with the Copenhagen criteria of good neighborly relations. Venizelos invited

²⁵² Balkan Insight, "Macedonian, Greek Leaders Hold Rare Direct Meeting", 8 May 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonian-eu-integration-discussed-in-athens>, (18 April 2015), (Meeting).

²⁵³ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia Floats Fresh Name Dispute Initiative", 4 July 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-floats-fresh-name-initiative>, (18 April 2015).

²⁵⁴ Balkan Insight, "Fresh Macedonia Name Talks Announced", 05 September 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/fresh-macedonia-name-talks-announced>, (18 April 2015).

his Macedonian counterpart, Foreign Minister Poposki, to meet in Thessaloniki in April 2014 to schedule a new bilateral meeting either in Skopje or in Athens.²⁵⁵

Venizelos's visit to Skopje in his capacity as EU official could be interpreted as Greece's another demarche to utilize the EU accession process as leverage against Macedonia to consolidate its stance on the name issue. Although Greece's leaders repeatedly refuse to meet their Macedonian counterparts particularly in recent years, they are more prone to have dialogue with the ethnic Albanian members of the ruling coalition government. Greek officials probably perceive them either as honest brokers or they are inclined to make concessions in the UN-led talks due to their ethnic origin in order to consolidate their Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Greece's lack of willingness for nurturing relations with Macedonia, and their intransigence in the UN-mediated name negotiations once again demonstrates that the national identity issue lies at the very heart of the conflict between the two countries.

3.2.2. Mobilizing External Regional Actors as Trusted Agents for Arbitration and Mediation

After Macedonia declared its independence on 15 September 1991, the strongest reaction came from Greece. The Greeks not only refused to recognize Macedonia but also objected to its recognition by other states. Upon the pressure of Greece, the EU declared the conditions under which it would recognize the former Yugoslav republics. According to these conditions, the republics should protect the human rights of their ethnic minorities, and assure that they have no territorial claims against neighboring countries, including the "use of a name which implied territorial claims." In response to the EU's demand, the Macedonian parliament amended the provisions of their constitution on 6 January 1992 to convince the EU of its peaceful intentions.²⁵⁶

Subsequently, the EU's arbitration commission (Badinter Commission) decided that among all the former Yugoslav republics, only Slovenia and Macedonia fulfilled the conditions for the recognition. It also argued that using the name

²⁵⁵ Balkan Insight, "Venizelos Sounds Upbeat on Name Dispute with Macedonia", 21 February 2014, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/venizelos-macedonia-must-boost-friendliness-with-neighbor>, (19 April 2015), (Macedonia).

²⁵⁶ Danforth, *World*, p.149.

“Macedonia” did not imply territorial claims toward any neighbor. However, contrary to the EC’s Arbitration Commission’s (the “Badinter Commission”) decision, the EU announced that it would recognize Slovenia and Croatia, but not Macedonia on 15 January 1992.²⁵⁷ The Council of Ministers of EU agreed to recognize Macedonia but only under a name that was suitable to all the involved parties in May 1992. The EU adopted a stance that was closer to that of Greece and announced that it would recognize the republic only “under a name which would not contain the term Macedonia” in June 1992. The EU decision was viewed as an effort to mitigate the possibility of Greek rejection to ratify the Maastricht Treaty.²⁵⁸

When Russia recognized Macedonia in August 1992 with its constitutional name, it attempted to avoid provoking the Greek government. Russian Foreign Minister insisted that the name of the new state “Macedonia” and the name of the region in Greece, “Makedhonia” were in fact different names. The Greeks referred to these diplomatic measures as “incredible orthographic acrobatics.”²⁵⁹

Upon the Greek and Albanian pressure Macedonia was not admitted to the full membership in Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE accepted Macedonia only as an observer status and authorized a delegation to mediate between the parties on 19 May 1993.²⁶⁰

Once Greece closed the border gates to Macedonia by the end of 1993, it faced heavy pressure from its European partners at least to initiate a dialogue process.²⁶¹ Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov asked for an “open dialogue” and said that the problem of flag could be negotiated, but criticized the Greek embargo on Macedonia.²⁶² The EU Commissioner Hans Van den Broek warned Greece that the embargo was a clear violation of the Community rules for free trade, and therefore they had to give up this policy. Otherwise, Van den Broek warned, he would report the necessity to appeal to the European Court. The Greeks reacted angrily due to the possibility of the EU to submit to the European Court and asserted that this kind of

²⁵⁷ Danforth, *World*, p.149.

²⁵⁸ Danforth, *World*, p.150.

²⁵⁹ Danforth, *World*, p.153.

²⁶⁰ John Shea, **Macedonia and Greece: The Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation**, McFarland, Jefferson, 1 January 1997, p.218.

²⁶¹ Macedonia for the Macedonians, “General Information - Why Did Macedonia Change Its Flag?”, <http://www.makedonija.info/info.html>, (13 June 2015).

²⁶² Macedonian Press Agency, “Brief News Greek Bulletin”, 22 June 1995, <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpa/1995/95-06-23.mpa>, (13 June 2015).

statements would encourage Macedonian intransigence. While Van den Broek conducted shuttle diplomacy between Greece and Macedonia, Matthew Nimetz, the Special Representative of the U.S. President, arrived in the region, and Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias was invited to Geneva to make preparations for a bilateral meeting in early 1994.²⁶³ Meanwhile, the decision of the EU affected the Greece's stance as the Greek government announced its willingness to resolve the stalemate though with the condition that Macedonia was expected to make some goodwill gestures on the issues of flag and the constitution. Upon the Holbrooke diplomacy, the Greeks yielded to the pressure and accepted to come to the talks that would be held in New York.²⁶⁴

Greece accepted to conclude the Interim Accord in 1995 and to participate in the UN-mediated negotiations aimed at resolving the name issue. In addition to Macedonia's goodwill gestures, the EU's pressure and diplomatic efforts of the U.S. played crucial role to convince Greece to come to the negotiation table. Although the international mediation was partly fulfilled by the US and the EC as trusted external regional actors, this function was subsequently undertaken by the UN and the roles of the US and the EU evolved supporting and conditioning the mediation.

3.2.3 Influence of Intergovernmental Institutions and Western Powers on the Negotiation Process

The Bosnian conflict led to the deployment of the U.S. and European troops in Macedonia during February-May 1993. Zahariadis argues that although the purpose of these deployments was to avoid a spread of hostilities further to the south, the U.S. troops altered the balance of power in the region by strengthening Macedonia's hand in the negotiations. According to him, the decision of the EU members and the U.S. to recognize Macedonia under the name of FYROM and to establish diplomatic relations once again shifted the balance of power in the region in December 1993 and early 1994.²⁶⁵ On 9 February 1994, the U.S. administration announced its intention to recognize Macedonia. However following Greece's trade embargo on Macedonia, the

²⁶³ The Independent, "Greece ready to defy EU: US attempts to break the stalemate over Macedonia", 10 April 1994, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/greece-ready-to-defy-eu-us-attempts-to-break-the-stalemate-over-macedonia-1368972.html>, (13 June 2015).

²⁶⁴ Misha Glenny, "Reading off War in the Southern Balkans", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.:75, No.:3, May-June 1995, p.104.

²⁶⁵ Zahariadis, Issue, pp.664, 665.

Greek lobby in the U.S. exerted pressure on President Bill Clinton. The U.S. did not recognize Macedonia until early 1996, but made up for this reversal under President George W. Bush. Immediately after the reelection of President Bush on 8 November 2004, the U.S. recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name, “the Republic of Macedonia.”²⁶⁶

Zahariadis argues that the EU members’ recognition of Macedonia violated an EU decision adopted in Lisbon in 1992, which stipulates not to recognize FYROM under the name Macedonia, or its derivatives, even though they fulfilled their obligation of consulting under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). He claimed that some EU members’ mistrust deprived Greece of additional leverage through a common EU foreign policy. The U.S. position to follow that of those EU members further damaged the Greek position. According to him, Greece stiffened its stance by closing the border with Macedonia on 16 February 1994 and insisted on keeping the border closed unless Macedonia demonstrated goodwill by meeting the three conditions demanded by Greece. Zahariadis argues that Greek PM Papandreou had to carry out his threat to avert losing credibility not only in the eyes of Greeks but also Macedonia’s government. He also claims that decision of the Greek government to impose embargo on Macedonia can be partially explained as a response to the external environment.²⁶⁷

3.2.3.1. The UN Mediation Initiatives

1993-2004

The UN mediation process began with efforts of British Ambassador Robin O’Neil in 1992, and intensified after Macedonia’s admission to the UN membership on 8 April 1993 under the provisional name of “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).”²⁶⁸ Subsequently, most of the European countries, including Britain, France, and Germany, as well as Japan, recognized Macedonia under the

²⁶⁶ Rossos, pp.271, 272.

²⁶⁷ Zahariadis, Issue, pp.664, 665.

²⁶⁸ Independent, “Robin O’Neill: Nimetz’s Mediation Is Unsuccessful, Greece Refuses Resolution”, 18 November 2014, <http://www.independent.mk/articles/11515/Robin+O'Neill+Nimetz's+Mediation+Is+Unsuccessful,+Greece+Refuses+Resolution>, (13 June 2015).

provisional name “FYROM” in December 1993.²⁶⁹ Under growing pressure from its EU partners and the U.S., Greece finally had to accept the new reality and recognized Macedonia in 1995, after resolution of the flag and constitution issues. Consecutively, the UN Security Council prepared a resolution authorizing the co-chairmen of the conference on the former Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance, and Lord David Owen to mediate between Greece and Macedonia. These diplomats as the first initiative invited the parties to New York in order to discuss the name issue. The UN mediators offered adoption of the name “Nova Macedonia”. However, both sides refused the proposal and failed to reach compromise during the talks.²⁷⁰

The negotiations between Greece and Macedonia gained impetus in the summer of 1995 and produced the first outcome in September 1995. In addition to the shuttle diplomacy of Cyrus Vance, who was the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in March and June 1995, a certain degree of success was achieved by Ambassador Matthew Nimetz, the Special Representative of the U.S. President Bill Clinton.²⁷¹ On 4 September 1995, Thomas Miller, the U.S. envoy to Athens, announced that a meeting would be held in New York between foreign ministers of the two countries to conclude an agreement on establishing friendly relations.²⁷² Substantial share of the progress belonged to the U.S. which intended to resolve the Bosnian conflict that escalated simultaneously as the reactions in Greece calmed down.²⁷³ The two countries established contacts and after the negotiations partially resolved their differences. On 13 September 1995, Macedonian Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski and his Greek counterpart Papoulias with their delegations began negotiations in New York chaired by Holbrooke, and finally both ministers concluded the “Interim Accord” as a framework agreement.²⁷⁴ The document is composed of six chapters and refers to the UN Security Council Resolution 845 (1993). The document that was regarded as a significant step towards

²⁶⁹ Ian Jeffries, **The Former Yugoslavia at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century: A Guide to the Economies in Transition**, Routledge, London, and New York, 2003, p.54.

²⁷⁰ ICG, No.:52, p.13.

²⁷¹ Şule Kut, “Yugoslavya Bunalımı ve Türkiye’nin Bosna-Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası: 1990-1993”, **Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi**, Ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 1994, p.289

²⁷² Macedonian Heritage, “An on-line review of Macedonian affairs, history, and culture”, 17 February 2013, <http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/timeline.html>, (13 June 2015).

²⁷³ Evangelos Kofos, “Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition”, **The New Macedonian Question**, Ed. James Pettifer, St.Martin’s, New York, 1999, (Recognition), pp.244, 245: 247-256.

²⁷⁴ Kut, p.289.

resolving the dispute between Greece and Macedonia entered into force immediately. In accordance with the Interim Accord, Greece agreed to lift the embargo and did so on 15 October 1995, and agreed not to veto Macedonia's admission into international organizations. As promised, the Macedonian government changed their flag; they promptly replaced the Vergina star at the center with an eight-ray sun or star, and denied claims on any Greek territory (i.e., Aegean Macedonia). Macedonian leaders insisted that constitutional name of the country was not negotiable and that name of the state would stay as the "Republic of Macedonia." Greece insisted on a mutually acceptable name and kept using "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM" at the outset. Many other nations, including EU members used the name "Republic of Macedonia" in bilateral relations, and "Macedonia" in other contexts. Nevertheless, on 3 October 1995 in Athens, both countries' diplomatic delegations participated in the first round of discussions for normalization of relations between the two countries, and subsequently convened in Skopje in the following week. In line with the Interim Accord, the negotiations on the name issue continued under the new UN mediator Matthew Nimetz who took over from Cyrus Vance in 1999.²⁷⁵

2005

In March 2005, Nimetz proposed the name "Republika Makedonija –Skopje." Macedonia rejected the proposal but submitted its own proposal, the so-called "double name formula" that foresees an agreed name (FYROM) for bilateral relations with Greece, and the "Republic of Macedonia" for all other bilateral and multilateral relations. Greece did not accept the proposal entirely, and described it as a good basis for negotiations. In October 2005, Nimetz submitted a new proposal that the name "Republika Makedonija" to be used by those countries that have recognized the republic under that name, and that Greece to use the name "Republika Makedonija –Skopje", while the international institutions and organizations to use the name "Republika Makedonia." Although Macedonia conceded to the proposal, Greece rejected it.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁵ ICG, No.:52, p.5.

²⁷⁶ ICG, No.:52, p.5.

2007

In January 2007, Nimetz stated that the mediation efforts for the name issue were affected negatively after meeting the Greek officials in Athens. On 23 October 2007, Nimetz announced that the two countries agreed to initiate a new round of negotiations under the UN auspices.²⁷⁷ In early November, during the talks Nimetz proposed a draft framework envisaging Macedonia considering a possible change to its constitutional name for international usage. On 3 December 2007, Nimetz arrived in Skopje to discuss his latest draft proposal, which he had earlier provided to both countries for consideration. During Nimetz's visit, Macedonia's leaders reiterated that they would not give up using their constitutional name "Republic of Macedonia" for international relations to eliminate Greek objections. Nevertheless, Nimetz described his contacts with Macedonian President Branko Crvenkovski and PM Nikola Gruevski constructive.²⁷⁸ President Crvenkovski characterized the Nimetz's proposal as unacceptable and argued that if they had to make a selection between the constitutional name and NATO membership, they would prefer the former. Crvenkovski added that they reiterated earlier their willingness to accept the "dual name formula."²⁷⁹

Foreign ministers of both countries participated in a meeting with Nimetz during the third week of December 2007 in New York. During the consultations, Macedonia proposed to hold regular meetings with Greek officials to discuss the problematic issues. The meetings envisaged holding two regular meetings between the foreign ministers each year and at least one meeting every two years between their PMs. It also called for the setting up of a joint body, comprised of scholars and intellectuals, to discuss controversial historical questions.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia, Greece to Hold Fresh Talks on Name Dispute", 25 October 2007, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/6082/>, (18 November 2010).

²⁷⁸ Balkan Insight, "UN Name Dispute Mediator in Skopje", 03 December 2007, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/6730/>, (18 November 2010).

²⁷⁹ Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, "Macedonia 'No' to Trading its Name", 5 November 2007, <http://birm.eu.com/en/111/15/5633/>, (18 November 2010).

²⁸⁰ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia Wants More Greek Talks", 18 December 2007, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-wants-more-greek-talks>, (10 June 2015).

2008

On 3 February 2008, the media speculated that Nimetz would submit a proposal of “triple formula” that involved Macedonia’s using its constitutional name “the Republic of Macedonia” domestically and in bilateral relations with countries that have recognized it, another name for relations with Greece, and a mutually acceptable name for multilateral use in international institutions “Republika Makedonija”.²⁸¹ On 19 February 2008, Nimetz proposed five alternatives as a name for Macedonia and said that the two countries should choose one, as its constitutional name the “Republic of Macedonia” is limited for internal use. The proposals included “Democratic Republic of Macedonia”, “Constitutional Republic of Macedonia”, “Independent Republic of Macedonia”, “Republic of Upper Macedonia” or “Northern Republic of Macedonia”.²⁸² Macedonia’s leaders objected to any name proposal foreseeing change in the country’s constitution. They insisted on using their country’s constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia” in international arena and conceded to a mutually acceptable name exclusively for relations with Greece. On the other hand, Greece demanded Macedonia to use a single name for international arena as well as for domestic purposes.²⁸³

On 5 March 2008, Nimetz arrived in Skopje to begin a new round of talks. Nimetz met the Greek negotiating team after meeting Macedonian negotiators. He informed that the gap between two countries still remained during his visit to Skopje on 5 March 2008. The meeting held shortly after the last round of negotiations between both countries ended without success in New York and one day prior to NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting where a decision on Macedonia’s joining the alliance was expected.²⁸⁴

Nimetz invited both countries for a new round of UN-sponsored talks to take place in Vienna between 17 and 25 March 2008. Media reports speculated that

²⁸¹ Balkan Insight, “Third Name for Macedonia in Pipeline”, 05 February 2008, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/third-name-for-macedonia-in-pipeline>, (18 November 2010), (Pipeline).

²⁸² Balkan Insight, “Macedonia PM: People Decide Name”, 20 February 2008, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/8062/>, (18 November 2010), (Decide).

²⁸³ Balkan Insight, “Macedonia & Greece Review Compromise”, 29 February 2008, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/8263/>, (18 November 2010).

²⁸⁴ Balkan Insight, “No Compromise In Macedonia Dispute”, 05 March 2008, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/no-compromise-in-macedonia-dispute>, (18 November 2010).

Macedonia's officials might agree to an adjective to its constitutional name of "Republic of Macedonia" but only if it included an additional word in describing the state's political system, such as "Democratic" (Democratic Republic of Macedonia), rather than a territorial qualifier that Greece insisted on so far. Macedonian President Crvenkovski announced that if an adjective was found that would not impair Macedonia's national identity they would not oppose. Meanwhile, the key ruling coalition partner pulled out of Macedonian government and a minority government had to lead the country until April 2008. On 14 March 2008, Greek PM Karamanlis warned Macedonian government not to use its internal political crisis as an excuse.²⁸⁵

2009

The UN-mediated negotiations had been frozen since the end of 2008 as both countries went through elections. On 13 June 2009, the UN spokesman to the Secretary General announced that the negotiations would be held in Geneva from 22 to 23 June 2009.²⁸⁶ Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov warned that his country would not bow to the dictated terms and claimed that Greece provoked the recent Macedonian raising statues and renaming roads and sport arenas after Alexander the Great. He added that this was only a way of protest over Greece's blockade in NATO.²⁸⁷ Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis said that they expected Macedonia to shift its stance at this time, since it was urged to be more cooperative by the Western powers. On 23 June 2009, Macedonian negotiator Zoran Jolevski stated that Macedonia was ready for compromise on a name which would not undermine national identity and dignity. On the same day, Nimetz declared that although the resumed negotiations in Geneva between the two countries did not yield progress, both countries affirmed willingness to reach a compromise.²⁸⁸ On 6 July 2009, Nimetz arrived in Skopje for a new round of consultations with Macedonian officials. On 8 July 2009, Nimetz traveled to Athens to hear from Greek authorities their position.

²⁸⁵ Balkan Insight, "Fresh Talks in Macedonia 'Name' Row", 17 March 2008, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/8656/> (18 November 2010).

²⁸⁶ Balkan Insight, "Fresh Macedonia 'Name' Talks Confirmed", 15 June 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/20219/> (18 November 2010).

²⁸⁷ Balkan Insight, "Ivanov: Greece Provokes Macedonians", 22 June 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/20383/> (18 November 2010), (Provokes).

²⁸⁸ Balkan Insight, "No Progress in Macedonia Name Row", 23 June 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/20432/> (18 November 2010).

However, eventually the same proposed name for Macedonia remained on the table, and the two countries' positions remained unclear.²⁸⁹ Nimetz said that the variations of his latest proposal presented in October 2008 were discussed in detail and the aim was to have a dignified solution for both parties and preserve the identity of Macedonia.²⁹⁰ Greek Foreign Minister Bakoyannis announced that they were prepared for a deal as long as a composite name for Macedonia could be found that would contain a geographical qualifier, and would be for international use.²⁹¹ Nimetz stated that he was not optimistic about Greece's response to his recent proposals. He hoped that the prospect of resolving the issue would continue despite the Greek negotiator Vassilakis's negative response. Vassilakis told that they would not concur with the proposed formulation of "Republic of Northern Macedonia," if it was intended for use in bilateral relations with Greece exclusively. Vassilakis argued that any agreed name with a geographic qualifier had to be used internationally.²⁹² On 19 August 2009, Greece officially announced that it would not accept the Nimetz's latest proposals, if a compromise formulation of Macedonia's official name was not intended for use on the wider international stage.²⁹³

On 20 August 2009, Macedonia's negotiator Jolevski presented his country's position on a set of ideas proposed by Nimetz and confirmed that they accepted Nimetz's proposal. However, he said that the proposed name "Northern Republic of Macedonia" was more favorable to their national interests than the "Republic of Northern Macedonia". On same day, Greece's negotiator Vassilakis denied that they had largely rejected Nimetz's proposals. On 25 August 2009, Greek Foreign Minister Bakoyannis reiterated Greece's stance and red lines, and dedication to find a mutually acceptable solution.²⁹⁴

²⁸⁹ Balkan Insight, "UN 'Name' Mediator Visits Skopje", 06 July 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/20809/> (18 November 2010).

²⁹⁰ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia Name Row Solvable 'Within Months'", 07 July 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/20874/> (18 November 2010).

²⁹¹ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia to Reply to 'Name' Proposal Soon", 14 July 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/21055/> (18 November 2010).

²⁹² Balkan Insight, "Greek Naming Dispute Reply 'Not Positive'", 19 August 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/21690/> (18 November 2010).

²⁹³ Balkan Insight, "Skopje Likely to Respond on Name Proposals", 20 August 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/21713/> (18 November 2010), (Proposals).

²⁹⁴ Balkan Insight, "Skopje Reportedly Favours 'Northern Republic of Macedonia'", 21 August 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/21746/> (18 November 2010).

Macedonia's President Ivanov claimed that the proposed name with a geographic qualifier for wider international use was unacceptable.²⁹⁵ The talks between both countries were suspended and awaited the outcome of the upcoming early general elections in Greece to be held in October 2009.²⁹⁶

President Ivanov reiterated that they would persist on the "double name formula" that embraces Macedonia's using its constitutional name the "Republic of Macedonia" in all relations, except with Greece. However, observers argued that this approach did not promise hope for the resumption of talks as Greece had already rejected this formula.²⁹⁷

On 4 November 2009, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, during his visit in Athens, declared that Nimetz would resume negotiations in mid-November 2009, and hoped that both countries would resolve their differences on the name issue soon. The new initiative came at a time while both countries faced international pressure to resolve the name issue prior to the EU meeting in December 2009, where Macedonia hoped to attain a date for opening its EU accession talks.²⁹⁸ The UN Special Representative Matthew Nimetz invited the representatives of both countries on a new round of talks in November.²⁹⁹ On 12-13 November 2009, during the meetings at the UN headquarters in New York, the Greek negotiator Vassilakis demanded Macedonia's name to be changed to the "Republic of Northern Macedonia" for international use as well as for Macedonian nationality to be specified as Northern Macedonian, and insisted that the current use of the name Macedonia for commercial purposes was unacceptable. On the other hand, Macedonia's negotiator Jolevski offered no concessions, insisted on preserving the Macedonian nationality classification, and advocated the "double name formula" that was already rejected by Greece.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁵ Balkan Insight, "'Essential Progress' in Macedonia Name Spat", 24 August 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/21776/> (18 November 2010).

²⁹⁶ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia Adamant on Dual Name Formula", 15 September 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/22228/> (18 November 2010).

²⁹⁷ Balkan Insight, "Creativity Urged from Greece, Macedonia", 25 September 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/22454/> (18 November 2010).

²⁹⁸ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia, Greece to Resume 'Name' Talks", 05 November 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/23441/> (18 November 2010).

²⁹⁹ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia Ready for UN 'Name' Talks", 05 November 2009, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/23452/> (18 November 2010).

³⁰⁰ Balkan Insight, "Report: Macedonia, Greece Name Solution Sours", 16 November 2009, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/report-macedonia-greece-name-solution-sours>, (10 June 2015).

2010

On 28 January 2010, Macedonian Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki submitted a proposal for upgrading the diplomatic missions of the two countries, which were at the liaison level.³⁰¹ On 16 February 2010, Milososki stated that they wished the EU to pay more serious attention to this bilateral problem as it did to the Slovenia-Croatia border dispute, and to enable the name negotiations and the accession process to simultaneously advance.³⁰²

The UN mediator Matthew Nimetz announced that he did not have any new proposal, but just ideas for pushing the negotiation process forward prior to meeting with Macedonian Foreign Minister Milososki.³⁰³ On 26 February 2010, Nimetz traveled to Athens after having meetings with Macedonian leaders in Skopje. This became Nimetz's first direct contact with the new Greek government led by PM George Papandreou after it assumed office in October 2009. Nimetz conveyed his views from the visit to Skopje and asked for the Greek position. At this round of talks, Nimetz only heard the positions of both parties for a compromise.³⁰⁴

On 1 March 2010, Greek Foreign Minister Doutsas announced that a solution could be reached soon if there was a political will to do so, adding that they had that will. Doutsas claimed that a name with a geographic qualifier, as they proposed, would distinguish the Greek province of Macedonia from Macedonia with the same name and could mean a “win-win” situation for both countries. After visiting both capitals, Nimetz said that there was a gap between the two parties, but the talks were constructive.³⁰⁵

On 18 March 2010, Greek Foreign Minister Doutsas said that they expected the U.S. to use its influence to convince Macedonia to seriously engage in the UN-led negotiations. Doutsas also revealed that during his visit to Washington DC in March, Greek PM asked President Obama to use its influence to convince Macedonian

³⁰¹ Balkan Insight, “Athens, Skopje Agree to Boost Name Talks”, 29 January 2010, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/25320/> (18 November 2010).

³⁰² Balkan Insight, “Macedonia PM: Clear Goals for Name Solution”, 17 February 2010, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/25894/> (18 November 2010).

³⁰³ Balkan Insight, “Skopje: UN Name Mediator Cautious in Talks”, 23 February 2010, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/26038/> (18 November 2010).

³⁰⁴ Balkan Insight, “Athens, Skopje ‘Name’ Mediator Visits Greece”, 26 February 2010, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/26157/> (18 November 2010).

³⁰⁵ Balkan Insight, “Athens: Macedonia Name Deal Possible”, 01 March 2010, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/26197/> (18 November 2010).

political leadership to sit at the negotiation table in the UN with a constructive manner. He reiterated Greece's red line, a compound name with a geographic qualifier to be used by all purposes. Macedonian Foreign Minister Milososki proposed that the name dispute between both countries could be settled using the recent Croatia-Slovenia model, namely the international arbitration in Paris on 19 March 2010. Milososki added that they had interest in the manner in which Slovenia and Croatia negotiated their bilateral dispute. The model enabled both the EU-integration process and the efforts to resolve the bilateral dispute to advance simultaneously and mobilize each other, and allowed for the serious engagement of both countries.³⁰⁶

On 29 April 2010, Nimetz met with the negotiators of both countries at the UN headquarters in New York for regular consultative contacts. Macedonian PM Gruevski stated that he expected Nimetz to draft new more concrete ideas or proposal for a compromise name that would please both sides. However, Gruevski reminded that he did not advocate "Republic of Northern Macedonia" that had been publicized as one of the most likely compromises.³⁰⁷ Following the meeting Nimetz briefed the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon over the course of the negotiations. Subsequently, Martin Nesirky, the spokesman of the UN Secretary General announced that they did not urge both countries to resolve the name issue by June 2010, rather urged them to reach an agreement, one that would be the result of compromise and acceptable for both countries. On the same day, the spokesman of Greek Foreign Ministry, Grigoris Delavekouras reiterated Greece's stance that a name with geographical qualification used for all purposes would be acceptable, adding that the proposal "Republic of Northern Macedonia" fulfilled the demands of Greece if it was to be used for all purposes. He claimed that Greece was ready for a quick solution if there was political will from Macedonia, and reminded that the resolution of name issue was a precondition for Macedonia's EU and NATO integration.³⁰⁸ On 15 July 2010, Delavekouras stated that there were not conditions for anything new until Macedonia

³⁰⁶ Balkan Insight, "Skopje Suggests Croatia-Slovenia Model", 19 March 2010, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/26740/> (18 November 2010).

³⁰⁷ Balkan Insight, "Macedonian, Greek Envoys Meet in New York", 29 April 2010, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/27751/> (18 November 2010).

³⁰⁸ Balkan Insight, "Athens: Too Early to Comment on Name Meeting", 30 April 2010, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/27757/> (18 November 2010).

responded and asked Macedonia to be more resolved and constructive for a compromise.³⁰⁹

Nimetz was silent ever since the EU summit in June 2010 when the EU ministers once again failed to give a date for opening Macedonia's accession talks due to a lack of progress on the name issue. On 19 August 2010, Macedonian PM Gruevski announced that they are in contact with Nimetz to repeat their pledge resolving the name dispute, prior to meetings between both parties on sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2010.³¹⁰

On 23 September 2010, Macedonian President Ivanov, speaking at the Millennium Development Goals Summit at the 65th session of the UN General Assembly, expressed hope that the name issue would be resolved soon under the UN-led negotiations and complained that the economic development of his country was being hampered by Greece. He complained that the Greek veto preventing Macedonia's attempts to join the EU and NATO meant a trade embargo.³¹¹ Ivanov compared the current Greek blockade with the trade embargo imposed on Macedonia in 1994-95 and argued that despite different characteristics, the current blockade had the same detrimental effects on Macedonia's economy. Ivanov also met with Nimetz at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. However, Macedonian PM Grueski refused to travel New York to meet his Greek counterpart, PM Papandreou. After meeting Nimetz in New York, the Greek Foreign Minister Droutsas declared that they would accept a name with geographical qualifier for all purposes, erga omnes, but expressed his dissatisfaction with the absence of PM Gruevski.³¹² After the talks in New York on 22 September 2010, Macedonian President Ivanov explained that Nimetz did not submit any new proposal aimed at resolving the issue and instead he

³⁰⁹ Balkan Insight, "'No Progress' in Macedonia Name Talks", 16 July 2010, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/29501/> (18 November 2010).

³¹⁰ Balkan Insight, "Athens, Skopje Deny Mulling Macedonia 'Name' Proposal", 7 September 2010, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/30382/> (18 November 2010).

³¹¹ Balkan Insight, "Macedonian President Slams Greek 'Embargo'", 21 September 2010, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/30657/> (18 November 2010).

³¹² Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Foreign Minister Droutsas' statements following his meeting with the UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy for the FYROM name issue, Mr. Nimetz (New York, 20 September 2010)", 21 September 2010, http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/21092010_ALK1106.htm, (18 November 2010).

recommended both sides to build mutual confidence and understanding to reach a compromise.³¹³

Although there was a lack of progress in the talks in New York, Nimetz and the EU president Barroso made positive remarks over the prospects of resolving the name dispute³¹⁴ Nevertheless, the UN-brokered bilateral talks for resolving the dispute proved to be fruitless. Macedonia's leadership expressed their dissatisfaction that no invitation was extended to Macedonia for membership to the Alliance at NATO Lisbon summit in November 2010, and a start date for its EU accession talks was not offered due to the name issue. On 21 December 2010, President Ivanov announced that Macedonia's membership in the EU and NATO, and a compromise for the name issue with Greece remained a foreign policy priority of his country, but reiterated that it was unacceptable to discuss a solution that threatened the Macedonian identity, language, and constitution."³¹⁵

2011

In late December 2010, Macedonia's Foreign Minister Milososki reiterated their will to continue the negotiations with Greece under the UN auspices. In early January, Macedonia's Foreign Ministry announced that Nimetz would meet Macedonian negotiator Jolevski and his Greek counterpart Vassilakis in New York to revive talks. On 01 January 2011, Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov said that they were constructively taking part in negotiations because they believed a solution would be found and that Nimetz was expected to boost the process.³¹⁶ On 09 February 2011, Nimetz met with Macedonian and Greek negotiators in New York. He told that both parties expressed readiness to resume talks and presented their positions during the meetings, and that they were well aware of the conflict and its possible solutions. Jolevski said that Nimetz did not provide any concrete proposals during the meeting

³¹³ Balkan Insight, "UN Talks Fail to Yield New Macedonia Proposal", 20 September 2010, <http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/30618/> (18 November 2010).

³¹⁴ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Crisis Watch Bulletin - No.:86", 1 October 2010, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/CrisisWatch/2010/cw86.ashx>, (19 November 2010), (No.:86), p.8.

³¹⁵ Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.mk/Upload/ContentManagement/Publication/MDB-44.pdf> (19 November 2010).

³¹⁶ Balkan Insight, "Fresh Macedonia, Greece 'Name' Talks Announced", 05 January 2011, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/observers-ec-report-on-macedonia-marks-stalemate> (16 April 2015).

but several options for resolving the issue were reviewed. Jolevski reiterated Macedonia's commitment to find a solution that would protect the identity and dignity of the country's citizens. Greek negotiator Vasilakis assessed the meeting aimed at updating the process after a one-year break since the last round of talks. Nimetz announced that the date for the next meeting had not been specified yet, and it would be scheduled following mutual coordination in due course.³¹⁷

On 22 September 2011, Macedonian PM Gurevski met Nimetz at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York to discuss the name issue. On the same day, Greek Foreign Minister Stavros Lambrinidis and his Macedonian counterpart Nikola Poposki held a meeting in New York to discuss the name issue. However, except for reiterating both parties' already well-known positions, no new compromise on name proposals and initiatives were put forward during the bilateral meeting. During the conversations both ministers accepted that mutual "good will" and a "positive approach" would lead to a solution of the conflict.³¹⁸

Nimetz invited negotiators of the two countries to a new round of talks scheduled in mid-January 2012 in New York to revive the talks six weeks after the International Court of Justice, ICJ, ruled that Greece had breached its obligations in the Interim Accord.³¹⁹ On 09 January 2012, Macedonian President Ivanov stated that due to the recent actions of Greek authorities after the ICJ decision on Greece's breach of the Interim Accord, they were afraid of stagnation in the negotiation process, but ready to resume talks in good will. On the other hand, Greek Foreign Minister Stavros Dimas said that Greece was ready for and supported the re-activation of the negotiations.³²⁰

³¹⁷ Balkan Insight, "No Breakthrough after Greece, Macedonia Name Talks", 10 February 2011, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/no-results-from-greece-macedonia-name-talks> (16 April 2015).

³¹⁸ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia-Greece Name Dispute Eclipsed by Euro Crisis", 23 September 2011, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/name-dispute-discussed-at-sidelines-of-un-assembly> (16 April 2015).

³¹⁹ Balkan Insight, "Fresh Macedonia 'Name' Talks Announced", 04 January 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/calls-on-fresh-macedonia-name-talks> (17 April 2015).

³²⁰ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia Readies for Forthcoming 'Name' Talks", 09 January 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-sets-strategy-for-forthcoming-name-talks>, (17 April 2015).

2012

Nimetz met both countries' negotiators in New York on 16-17 January 2012. Both negotiators presented the most recent positions of their respective governments regarding Nimetz's proposals during the meetings. Nimetz said that both negotiators assured him that their respective governments respected the UN mediation process and a sincere finding a mutually acceptable solution.³²¹

On 20-21 February 2012, Nimetz paid a visit to Skopje for consultations with Macedonian authorities and his visit to region aimed to explore the most recent positions of the parties. His visit to the region came prior to NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012 that was the next opportunity for Macedonia's admission to NATO membership. Nimetz stated that he would not submit new proposals, but intended to find a way to accelerate the negotiations, as it was in the interest of the region and global security. Nimetz said that he was reassured by Macedonian government's determination for finding a solution and for constructive negotiations with Greece. Nimetz also commented that the ICJ judgment stood on its own, while the Interim Accord was an international agreement between the two countries that both parties had to respect. After his stay in Skopje, Nimetz headed to Athens for consultations with the Greek side.³²²

On 24 April 2012, Macedonia's Foreign Minister Poposki met Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary General in New York as a last resort attempt by Macedonia to secure its NATO membership prior to the upcoming NATO Chicago Summit. Poposki believed that the Interim Accord and the ICJ judgment were strong arguments to ensure Macedonia's bid to join NATO and the EU. Poposki also met Nimetz, some U.S. congressmen, and Macedonia's advocates during his visit.³²³

On 08 June 2012, although not being a party at the UN-mediated negotiations, Bulgarian PM Boyko Borisov declared his country's objection to the idea of

³²¹ Balkan Insight, "No Breakthrough in Macedonia Name Talks", 18 January 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/no-breakthrough-in-macedonia-name-talks>, (17 April 2015).

³²² Balkan Insight, "Macedonia 'Name' Dispute is Security Issue, Says UN Envoy", 21 February 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-name-dispute-is-security-issue-says-un-envoy>, (17 April 2015), (UN Envoy).

³²³ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia Appeals to UN Over 'Name' Dispute", 24 April 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-urges-un-over-name-ruling> (17 April 2015).

Macedonia being renamed with a geographical qualifier, such as “Northern”, as it might then encourage Macedonian territorial claims against Bulgaria.³²⁴

On 25 July 2012, Ban Ki-Moon arrived in Skopje together with Nimetz as part of a tour of the region. Earlier the same day, Ki-Moon declared that the name conflict between the two countries had lasted for a long time and thus both countries had to demonstrate more “flexibility” to resolve the conflict.³²⁵ During the visit of the Secretary General, Macedonia’s leaders reiterated their commitment to swift resolution of the conflict, and asked more engagement from Greece. President Ivanov asked Greece to demonstrate constructive attitude and a political will for a solution, and to respect the ICJ ruling. Ki-moon said that they were well aware of the ICJ ruling and took into account all aspects. He expressed his regret that the two countries did not manage to use their potentials for regional cooperation, reconciliation, and development, and promised that the UN would do its best to facilitate the mediation process. PM Gruevski stated that Macedonia was ready to intensify talks with Greece, but complained that Greece was stalling the negotiations and blocking Macedonia’s admission to NATO despite the ICJ ruling. He also urged Greece to respect the rights of ethnic Macedonian minority in Greece. On 26 July 2012, after the talks in Skopje, Nimetz visited Athens to brief Greek authorities over the contacts with Macedonia’s leaders, and met Greek negotiator Vassilakis.³²⁶ Vassilakis assured Nimetz that Greece indeed wanted a solution to the dispute. However, the Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman Delavekouras stated that Gruevski did not utilize the meeting with the UN Secretary General to make any progress, but rather exercised his familiar false propaganda, which was common throughout his term in office. He added that they were keen to see a credible and sincere interlocutor to settle the dispute. The latest exchange of accusations contrasts with what the UN Secretary General asked from

³²⁴ Balkan Insight, “Bulgaria Would Object to ‘Northern Macedonia’”, 08 June 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bulgaria-says-no-to-name-northern-macedonia>, (17 April 2015).

³²⁵ Balkan Insight, “UN Chief’s Visit Puts Macedonia ‘Name’ Dispute in Frame”, 18 July 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/name-dispute-central-as-un-head-visits-macedonia>, (17 April 2015).

³²⁶ Balkan Insight, “UN Chief Vows to Help in Macedonia ‘Name’ Dispute”, 26 July 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/ki-moon-vows-to-help-in-macedonia-name-dispute>, (18 April 2015).

both sides while in Skopje, which was to restrain from verbal duels and create a more positive atmosphere for the talks.³²⁷

On 20 September 2012, Greek Foreign Minister Avramopoulos said that he would ask the UN to increase its level of engagement in the talks. Subsequently, Macedonian Foreign Minister Poposki asserted that Greek government's request for more meetings, and greater involvement of the UN demonstrated that their message had been received. This development corresponded with Ban Ki-moon's latest initiative of urging the parties to contact each other to intensify the negotiations.³²⁸ On 24 September 2012, the Greek and Macedonian foreign ministers met in New York at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in an attempt to invigorate stalled talks. The initiative came prior to the release of the EC's Macedonia Progress Report, an essential step for the EU membership. After the meeting, Avramopoulos claimed that Greece had done its part towards resolving the dispute, and it was the Macedonian government's turn to do more. Avramopoulos argued that if Macedonia had paid more respect on sensitive issues such as history and culture that are of particular importance to Greece the relations between both countries might have been better. Poposki replied that Macedonia had no territorial claims against Greece, labeling claims to the contrary as an "artificially imposed perception."³²⁹

On 19-20 November 2012, Nimetz held separate and joint meetings with negotiators of the two countries in New York. After the meetings, Nimetz announced that he asked both negotiators to take the ideas back to their governments, and expressed his willingness to visit both capitals to elaborate his ideas or to pursue them through meetings in New York or elsewhere. Nimetz emphasized that there was a clear distinction between the UN-mediated negotiations and the idea put forward last month by the EC Enlargement Commissioner who urged opening Macedonia's accession talks even before resolving the name issue. Nimetz added that the timings and the procedures of EU and NATO were not part of his responsibility and that

³²⁷ Balkan Insight, "Greece Says Macedonia Abused UN Chief's Visit", 27 July 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/greece-macedonian-pm-abused-ki-moon-s-visit>, (18 April 2015).

³²⁸ Balkan Insight, "Greece-Macedonia 'Name' Meeting Announced", 21 September 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/greece-macedonia-name-meeting-announced>, (18 April 2015).

³²⁹ Balkan Insight, "Macedonian, Greek Ministers Meet in New York", 25 September 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonian-greek-fm-s-hold-introductory-meeting>, (18 April 2015).

despite the ICJ judgment was important, it was not strictly related to the solution of the name dispute.³³⁰ Nimetz's latest proposals came after the EU's declaration that any decision on opening accession talks for Macedonia was to be based on the EU's progress report in spring 2013 that would also assess progress towards resolving the name conflict with Greece.³³¹

2013

Macedonia's President Ivanov said that they expected new initiatives and ideas by Nimetz. Media reports speculated that Nimetz would submit proposals involving a composite name with a geographical qualifier such as "Northern", or "Vardar", placed before "Republic of Macedonia". Before Nimetz's arrival in Greece, Greek Foreign Minister Avramopoulos said that they would accept a settlement that would respect their history and culture as well as promote regional stability and security.³³²

On 11 January 2013, Nimetz said after meeting Greek leaders in Athens that Greece's leadership seemed sincere for resolving the conflict and that he presented some of his ideas and would do the same in Skopje to bring the positions of the two countries closer. The Greek foreign ministry portrayed the meetings with the UN mediator as constructive.³³³ After meeting Macedonian PM Gruevski in Skopje, Nimetz said that Macedonia's leaders assured him that resolution of the name issue remained the highest priority and felt that both parties wished to move forward and a positive conclusion was possible. Nimetz also stated that he discussed specifics about various possibilities with the parties during his visit. He told that he had received reactions to his ideas and planned to invite both negotiators to New York so that he

³³⁰ Balkan Insight, "UN Mediator Presents New Macedonia 'Name' Proposals", 21 November 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/nimetz-offers-fresh-macedonia-name-suggestions>, (18 April 2015).

³³¹ Balkan Insight, "New Macedonia 'Name' Talks Announced", 21 December 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/fresh-round-of-macedonia-name-talks-announced>, (18 April 2015).

³³² Balkan Insight, "Nimetz Starts New Push For Macedonia 'Name' Deal", 8 January 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/nimetz-visits-athens-skopje-for-fresh-name-talks>, (18 April 2015).

³³³ Balkan Insight, "Nimetz Arrives in Skopje for 'Name' Talks", 10 January 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/nimetz-arrives-in-skopje-for-name-talks>, (18 April 2015).

could follow the “constructive” comments raised during his visits. Although Nimetz did not reveal his proposals, he claimed those were not necessarily new.³³⁴

The negotiators of the two countries agreed to meet Nimetz on 29-30 January 2013 at the UN headquarters in New York.³³⁵ Nimetz initially held meetings with the negotiators separately and then held a joint meeting to follow up on the discussions that he held previous week in Athens and Skopje. Nimetz said that substance of the ideas was discussed, positions of both parties were clarified, and there were signs of a solution coming down to reality.³³⁶

On 10 April 2013, Nimetz declared that he submitted a new proposal and was very optimistic that the two countries would find affirmative elements in it, which could open the door for serious negotiations and maybe harvest a solution following a joint discussion with the two countries’ negotiators in New York. Nimetz said that his proposal was based on the feedback from both parties and he reformulated his initial ideas by taking into account the objections of parties raised during the previous round of talks in January.³³⁷ While Nimetz did not specify what his proposal was, media reports speculated that it might have been “Upper Republic of Macedonia.” Both countries did not disclose Nimetz’s proposal and just stated that it was under review.³³⁸

On 10 July 2013, Ali Ahmeti, head of junior partner of the ruling coalition and Democratic Union for Integration, DUI, revealed during his visit in Sofia that Nimetz’s proposal submitted in April 2013 included the name of “Upper Republic of Macedonia”. It was the first time that a senior politician had disclosed Nimetz’s proposals and Macedonia’s government declined to further discuss details of the

³³⁴ Balkan Insight, “Nimetz Optimistic on Macedonia-Greece ‘Name’ Talks”, 11 January 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/nimetz-optimistic-on-macedonia-greece-name-talks>, (18 April 2015).

³³⁵ Balkan Insight, “Follow-Up Macedonia ‘Name’ Talks Agreed”, 15 January 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/follow-up-macedonia-greece-name-talks-summoned>, (18 April 2015).

³³⁶ Balkan Insight, “Mediator Hopeful after Macedonia-Greece Talks”, 31 January 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/mediator-optimistic-after-macedonia-greece-name-talks>, (18 April 2015).

³³⁷ Balkan Insight, “Nimetz Floats New Macedonia ‘Name’ Proposal”, 10 April 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/nimetz-tables-fresh-macedonia-name-proposal>, (18 April 2015).

³³⁸ Balkan Insight, “EU Reports on Macedonia as Ashton Visits”, 16 April 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/ashton-in-skopje-as-ec-issues-report-on-macedonia>, (18 April 2015).

proposal not to hinder ongoing negotiations under the UN auspices. Observers argued that Ahmeti's proclamation was likely to exert pressure on PM Gurevski to give concession, who was often blamed of being inflexible concerning the negotiation on the name conflict. They also claimed that the DUI pursued an alternative policy of dialogue that paralleled the demands of the U.S. and the EU, which was contrary to the ruling VMRO DPMNE's strategy of stalling.³³⁹ Ahmeti added that although they would like to contribute to resolving the conflict with Greece as soon as possible, they did not concur with the provisional name "FYROM" or "Slavo-Macedonia" or "National Republic of Macedonia."³⁴⁰

On 10 September 2013, Nimetz arrived in Athens to meet Greek Foreign Minister Venizelos. Nimetz aimed to visit the region prior to the EU meeting in December 2013 when the Macedonia's accession process would be elaborated. Nimetz's visit also came during tense relations between the two countries.³⁴¹ On 11 September 2013, Nimetz arrived in Skopje after visiting Athens, for consulting Macedonian leaders over a compromise and crystalizing their views on his latest proposal. Nimetz described talks in Athens with Greek Foreign Minister Venizelos as very constructive, and said that he had gained a much deeper understanding of the Greek stance during his visit. The Greek government remained silent about the proposal, but the media reports speculated that it preferred the geographical qualifier "Upper" to be used before the name "Macedonia" rather than before the word "Republic." According to the media reports, Venizelos emphasized this stance to Nimetz, adding that, in case of a settlement, Greece would be willing to support Macedonia by improving trade and supporting the country's bid to join NATO and the EU.³⁴²

³³⁹ Balkan Insight, "Junior Party's Diplomacy Annoys Macedonian Leaders", 12 July 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonian-ruling-party-feels-pressure-from-partner>, (18 April 2015), (Leaders).

³⁴⁰ Focus News Agency, "Ali Ahmeti: We back neighbourly agreement with Bulgaria", 10 July 2013, <http://www.focus-fen.net/opinion/0000/00/00/3315/>, (19 April 2015).

³⁴¹ Balkan Insight, "Fresh Macedonia Name Talks Announced", 05 September 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/fresh-macedonia-name-talks-announced>, (18 April 2015), (Announced).

³⁴² Balkan Insight, "No Fresh Macedonia 'Name' Proposal from Nimetz", 10 September 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/no-fresh-macedonia-name-proposal-from-nimetz>, (18 April 2015).

On 12 September 2013, after meeting Macedonian leaders Nimetz said that his visit could not resolve the two countries' differences on two main issues. He declared that Greece objected to the place of the geographic qualifier and the scope of use of the proposed name. His remarks confirmed earlier media speculations that Greece would prefer the geographical qualifier "Upper" to be used before the word "Macedonia," rather than before the word "Republic." Nevertheless, Nimetz revealed that the use of the word "Macedonia" in his latest proposal was not questioned. Another preference for Greece is that it wants any agreed composite name to be obligatory for all purposes, not only to be used bilaterally. Macedonia insists that any agreed composite name is to be restricted to bilateral relations with Greece, and any compromise should not involve changes to the country's constitution. After already visiting Athens and Skopje, Nimetz headed back to Athens to continue talks with the Greek officials.³⁴³

The UN spokesman Martin Nesirsky announced that Nimetz would invite the countries' negotiators for a follow-up meeting after the talks in September. The announcement of new talks came after the Greek Foreign Minister Venizelos held discussions with Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary General on 22 September 2013 in New York.³⁴⁴

On 27 September 2013, Macedonian Foreign Minister Poposki blamed Greece for the stalemate after having discussions with his Greek counterpart, Venizelos at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.³⁴⁵ On the same day, during his address at the UN General Assembly, Macedonian PM Gruevski argued that Greece was avoiding a solution to the dispute that had blocked Macedonia's NATO and EU accession bids. On 28 September 2013, Gruevski expressed his readiness for the Secretary General's

³⁴³ Balkan Insight, "Gaps Remain on Macedonia Name Deal, Nimetz", 12 September 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/substantial-differences-remain-on-macedonia-name-dispute> (18 April 2015).

³⁴⁴ Balkan Insight, "New Macedonia 'Name' Talks Planned in New York", 24 September 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/fresh-name-talks-announced-for-coming-weeks>, (18 April 2015).

³⁴⁵ Balkan Insight, "Macedonia Dashes Hope of Quick 'Name' Deal", 27 September 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bitter-taste-after-macedonia-greece-meeting>, (18 April 2015).

proposal to organize high-level meetings to resolve their differences after meeting Ban Ki-Moon in New York.³⁴⁶

On 24-25 October 2013 Nimetz met negotiators of the two countries separately and at a joint session held in New York. Observers argued that there was little chance of progress in the negotiations.³⁴⁷ Media reports speculated that Greek negotiator Vassilakis proposed “Slavo-Albanian Macedonia” as a compromise name for Macedonia at the latest round of talks in New York.³⁴⁸

On 4 December 2013, the Macedonian PM Gruevski said that the prospect of resolving the conflict was worse than ever and the situation could be unblocked if the US, Germany and France exerted pressure on Greece. He also claimed that both governments had moved forward in the negotiations when the socialist George Papandreou was the Greek PM from 2009 to 2011, but since the conservative PM Samaras took office in June 2012, matters had regressed.³⁴⁹

2014

On 27 January 2014, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hoyt Yee, visited Skopje for consultations with Macedonian leaders and representatives of major political parties. Yee stated that two countries had to look towards the future instead of the past to solve the dispute that was hampering Macedonia’s European and Atlantic integration. He confirmed that he did not discuss any name proposals with Macedonian authorities and described the role of the US or the EU in resolving the conflict as a provider of encouragement to both sides. Yee said that any decision of the government on the matter would aim to advance the country’s Euro-Atlantic

³⁴⁶ Balkan Insight, “UN Chief Offers Help in Macedonia ‘Name’ Dispute”, 30 September 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/un-chief-offers-help-in-macedonia-name-dispute>, (18 April 2015).

³⁴⁷ Balkan Insight, “Breakthrough Unlikely in New Macedonia Name Talks”, 24 October 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/fresh-macedonia-name-talks-kick-off-in-new-york>, (18 April 2015).

³⁴⁸ Balkan Insight, “Ex-Mediator Says Macedonia ‘Name’ Talks Failed”, 4 November 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/ex-mediator-deems-macedonia-name-talks-a-failure>, (18 April 2015).

³⁴⁹ Balkan Insight, “Macedonian PM Calls for Pressure on Greece”, 4 December 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonian-pm-pesimistic-on-name-dispute>, (18 April 2015).

aspirations. He reiterated that Macedonia would become member of the alliance once the name dispute with Greece was solved.³⁵⁰

Nimetz invited negotiators of the two countries for a new round of talks on 26 March 2014, and the negotiators of the two countries confirmed their attendance. Nimetz argued that the two countries reached a consensus on adding a geographical qualifier to the name “Republic of Macedonia” for international usage, but that substantial disagreement still existed regarding the positioning of this geographic qualifier, hoping that a new round of talks was likely to yield a consensus on a mutually acceptable name.³⁵¹

On 6 May 2014, Nimetz met Macedonian negotiator Jolevski and his Greek counterpart Vassilakis separately, and then both of them at a joint discussion in New York. As in March, the talks brought nothing new to the table beyond keeping the negotiations going. Macedonia held presidential elections on 13 April 2014 and general elections on 27 April 2014, and subsequently PM Gruevski formed a new government. Meanwhile, Greece held local elections in April 2014. Both countries got involved in election activities, which limited their leaders’ dedication for the UN-led talks. Observers argue that the unusual timing of both talks in 2014, which go against the usual practice of suspending talks during elections, suggests a link with the crisis in Ukraine. Those claim that it is possible that there has been renewed interest in the EU and NATO in resolving open issues in the Balkans in light of the tension with Russia.³⁵²

Nimetz announced that he expected substantial progress at the upcoming meetings with the leaders in Skopje and Athens in late July.³⁵³ Macedonian Foreign Minister Poposki found Nimetz’s statement encouraging and asked for greater international involvement so that talks could move forward. On arrival in Skopje on 28 July 2014, Nimetz said he brought no new proposal, but rather old ideas that were

³⁵⁰ Balkan Insight, “US Urges ‘Flexibility’ in Macedonia ‘Name’ Dispute”, 28 January 2014, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/flexibility-urged-in-macedonia-name-dispute>, (19 April 2015).

³⁵¹ Focus News Agency, “Matthew Nimetz Sets New Round of Name Issue Talks”, 21 March 2014, <http://www.focus-fen.net/news/2014/03/21/330532/utrinski-vesnik-macedonia-matthew-nimetz-sets-new-round-of-name-issue-talks.html>, (19 April 2015).

³⁵² Balkan Insight, “Ukraine Link Suspected to Macedonia ‘Name’ Talks”, 6 May 2014, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/fresh-macedonia-name-talks-in-new-york>, (19 April 2015).

³⁵³ Balkan Insight, “Nimetz Upbeat on Fresh Macedonia ‘Name’ Talks”, 24 July 2014, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/optimism-ahead-of-fresh-round-of-macedonia-greece-name-talks>, (19 April 2015).

worth considering. On 29 July 2014, Nimetz met Macedonian leaders and then traveled to Athens for further talks with Greek officials on 30 July 2014. The last round of talks came prior to NATO's Cardiff summit in September 2014, where Macedonia's membership would be elaborated.³⁵⁴

3.2.3.2. The Strategies of Euro-Atlantic Institutions Resolving the Conflict

Macedonia's Aspirations for EU Membership

Macedonia expected to be awarded by regional stability and economic prosperity through the EU and NATO membership for its contribution to UN sanctions imposed on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) during the Bosnia crisis. Macedonia established diplomatic relations with the EU on 29 December 1995 since its security and economic rehabilitation depended on external aid.³⁵⁵

In March 1996, the Macedonian leadership realized that the EU would look for regional cooperation of the former Yugoslav republics and Albania as a precondition for their admission into the EU. Although President Gligorov stated that they would not concur with any close connection with the former Yugoslavia or some "Euroslavia", Foreign Minister Frckovski said that they could consider economic cooperation with regional countries, but a political relationship would be unacceptable. However, the EU discarded the idea of regional cooperation as a precondition for Macedonia's EU membership. Nevertheless, during the negotiations in Paris in May 1996, Nano Ruzin, the head of Macedonian delegation, claimed that Macedonia's aspirations for the EU and NATO membership would not be materialized soon.³⁵⁶

The EU seemed as if it accepted the application due to Macedonia's intransigence. As the EU presidency prepared to receive formal application from PM Crvenkovski on 26 February 2004, the ceremony was postponed to 22 March 2004 due to Macedonian President Trajkovski's fatal plane crash. Although the EC declared

³⁵⁴ Balkan Insight, "UN Mediator Arrives Empty Handed in Macedonia", 29 July 2014, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/fresh-macedonia-name-talks-launched-in-skopje>, (19 April 2015).

³⁵⁵ Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.mk/default1.aspx?ItemID=310>, (19 November 2010).

³⁵⁶ Rusi, Iso. "Independent Parties, Fraternal Links-Banking on Brussels", **War Report**, No.:14, 1996.

a candidate status to Macedonia in 2005, no date has been provided for opening accession talks for Macedonia's EU membership. The opening of Macedonia's EU accession talks is postponed by the failure of government to meet the EU criterion as well as the name conflict with Greece.³⁵⁷

The EU's 2008 Macedonia Progress Report asserted that Macedonia did not fulfill yet the conditions to begin accession negotiations, even if it resolved the name issue with Greece. On 19-20 June 2008, at the EU Summit, against the objections of some member states, the Presidency inserted a statement into the conclusion part of the report that any progress resolving the conflict with Greece was a precondition for Macedonia's EU membership.³⁵⁸ Greece successfully turned the resolution of the conflict with Greece on the name issue into a precondition for opening accession talks for Macedonia's EU membership. Greece impaired a key prerequisite of the EU's stabilization and association process for the western Balkans by linking it to its bilateral dispute. Although the name issue was not the only factor preventing Macedonia's EU integration, its progress had to be addressed for accession. It is argued that even if the EU's progress report suggested that Macedonia had met all criteria, the EU was unlikely to open accession talks without resolving the name issue. Furthermore, the EU members seem unwilling to exert pressure on Greece to relax its stance and at least, enable the start of accession talks.

The meeting of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Nimetz in Berlin on 05 November 2013 promised that the EU might take a more active role in the mediation process. During the meeting, Nimetz informed Merkel about the ongoing negotiations while Merkel reiterated the EU's well known stance that resolving the name issue remained a prerequisite for Macedonia's EU membership and assured him that Germany continued to support his mission. Merkel and Nimetz agreed that obstacles could be overcome if there was political will in Athens and Skopje. Observers commented that the meeting was a sign that the U.S. would like to see greater EU

³⁵⁷ ICG, "Macedonia: Make or Break - Europe Briefing (No.33)", 3 August 2004, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/040803_macedonia_make_or_break.pdf, (14 June 2015), (No.:33), pp.10-12.

³⁵⁸ ICG, No.:52, p.12.

involvement resolving the conflict between the two countries. Media reports speculated that the Macedonian authorities welcomed the Germany's interest.³⁵⁹

The EU's 2014 Progress Report stated that Macedonia met the political criteria and completed most of its reforms regarding the judicial system and the public administration. The report also mentioned that Macedonia got actively involved in regional cooperation and nurtured bilateral relations with neighbors, but the name conflict with Greece had not been resolved yet; it recommended to reach a mutually acceptable solution under the UN auspices. The report also suggested that constructive approach in relations with neighbors was important, and actions and statements that negatively affected relations had to be avoided. The EU has not yet granted a date for accession talks for Macedonia, despite the recommendations of EU's Enlargement Rapporteur that there is progress concerning the fulfillment of the membership obligations, and thus to proceed to the next phase of the accession process.³⁶⁰

The stability of Macedonia and the region is going to be affected due to the delay in its integration to the EU. Failure in the UN-mediated negotiations between Greece and Macedonia on the name issue has a potential to impede the main strategy of Euro-Atlantic structures to stabilize the western Balkans through enlargement and integration.

Macedonia's Aspirations for NATO Membership

NATO membership remains a strategic priority for Macedonia, and the country certainly has legitimate security requirements that would be met only through NATO membership. Macedonia's Foreign Minister Frckovski proposed that Macedonia and Albania should have access to NATO together at the 1995 NATO Ministerial Conference by recalling the Alliance's regional interest of containing the Former Republic of Yugoslavia's (FRY) territorial ambitions. However, Macedonia's relatively stable status has been negatively affected by the anarchy in Albania in 1997.

³⁵⁹ Balkan Insight, "Germany Takes Interest in Macedonia Dispute", 8 November 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/berlin-takes-interest-in-macedonian-name-dispute>, (18 April 2015).

³⁶⁰ European Commission, "European Commission 2014 Progress Report", October 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-progress-report_en.pdf, (22 April 2015).

In fact it has been discredited by association with Albania, so that both states were not viewed as eligible for accession to the Alliance. In March 2004, Greece declared that they would veto Macedonia's accession to NATO. It was obvious that Greece sought to take advantage of Macedonia's upcoming membership aspirations for pressing a settlement of the name dispute on its behalf. Greece, as being a member of NATO, had an advantageous position due to its veto right over Macedonia's accession to the Alliance. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the NATO Secretary General visited Athens in March 2008 to convince the Greek leadership and reminded them of the likely consequences of a potential disagreement for regional stability. Upon Greece's declaration of its intention to oppose Macedonia's application for NATO membership, Daniel Fried, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State visited Skopje in March 2008. Although the use of veto power would be a breach of the 1995 Interim Accord, Fried, recognizing Greece's advantageous position, tried to encourage the Macedonian leadership to give concessions. Victoria Nuland, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO tried to resolve the conflict before NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008 as well. However, Macedonia's aspiration for NATO membership was not supported by all member nations. France supported Greece's position, and eventually rest of the members had to give up due to the Greek intransigence.³⁶¹

Although Macedonia's PM Gruevski declared that they would not give concessions over their country's name, even if their NATO membership bid was at stake, and that otherwise the Alliance itself and the region would suffer the consequences of it as the Bucharest Summit approached, his government agreed at the name "Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)" in Bucharest. Nevertheless, Greece rejected the offer feeling itself in a much stronger the position, and insisted on the adoption of a mutually acceptable name to be used in Macedonia's international, bilateral, as well as multilateral relations. The diplomatic efforts to render Macedonia's admission to the Alliance under the name "FYROM" had also failed. The Summit Declaration on 3 April 2008 concluded that Macedonia was to be invited to the Alliance as soon as the name conflict with Greece was resolved, although almost all members concurred that Macedonia had already met the criteria for membership.³⁶² Greece's resort to the use of veto power in NATO's decision making process is a clear breach of 1995 Interim

³⁶¹ ICG, No.:52, pp.6, 7.

³⁶² ICG, No.:52, pp.6, 7.

Accord which stipulated that the name issue would not delay Macedonia's integration into international organizations. Greece's Ambassador in Washington DC commented that resolving the name issue was no longer a Greek issue, but also NATO's and a multilateral matter. Greece clearly demonstrated that unless its maximal demands on name issue were met, it would continue to block Macedonia's accession to NATO.

During the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, member states reaffirmed that Macedonia would be invited for membership once a compromise with Greece was reached over the name issue.³⁶³ On 22 May 2014, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO Secretary General visited Skopje to meet Macedonian leaders. The Secretary General clarified to the Macedonian leaders that the key condition for joining the Alliance was solving the name dispute with Greece and that Macedonia would receive an invitation for NATO membership, once the name issue was resolved. After consultations with the Secretary General, PM Gruevski confirmed that Macedonia shared the same main interest in accession to NATO. Rasmussen's visit to the region came prior to the NATO Cardiff Summit in September 2014 where enlargement issues might be elaborated.³⁶⁴ On 5 September 2014, at the NATO Cardiff Summit, the leaders of the member states reiterated that the agreement at 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, as at subsequent Summits, to extend an invitation to Macedonia to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN, and they urged intensified efforts towards that end. They also called for the continuation of reform efforts within the country, and further efforts to develop good neighborly relations.³⁶⁵

³⁶³ Turkey & Macedonia, "Macedonia could expect and invitation for NATO membership in November", 30 May 2010, <https://turkeymacedonia.wordpress.com/category/nato/page/2/>, (14 June 2015).

³⁶⁴ Balkan Insight, "NATO Chief Urges Macedonia to End Name Dispute", 23 May 2014, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/nato-chief-urges-for-macedonia-name-solution>, (19 April 2015).

³⁶⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Wales Summit Declaration", 5 September 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm, (10 June 2015).

3.2.3.3. Legality of Macedonia's Recognition and Its Admission to Intergovernmental Institutions

The Security Council resolution 817 (1993) recommended Macedonia's membership in the UN, and urged Greece and Macedonia to continue to cooperate to resolve their differences on 7 April 1993. The term "difference" here refers to the conflict between the two countries over use of the Macedonia's name. Macedonia's acceptance of the provisional name of "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM) and resolving the name issue with Greece had become prerequisites for its admission to membership in the UN.³⁶⁶ On 8 April 1993, during its 98th plenary meeting the General Assembly by resolution 47/225 decided to admit Macedonia to membership in the UN, and Macedonia is being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the UN as "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" until resolving the name conflict with Greece".³⁶⁷

The conditions for admission of states to the UN were elaborated during the 1940s. Earlier there were conditions for admission to the UN, including even representation, which in some instances required recognition of a state before its accession to membership. The General Assembly requested the ICJ to provide an advisory opinion on the conditions required for admission to membership by Resolution 113 (II) on 17 November 1947. In its advisory opinion, the ICJ ruled that for admission to the UN membership the applicant had to be a state; be peaceful; admit the duties of the UN Charter; be capable to fulfill these obligations; and be willing to do so.³⁶⁸ The advisory opinion of the ICJ was presented to the General Assembly on 8 December 1948, and the General Assembly adopted resolution 197 (III) that recommended members to act in line with the advisory opinion during voting on the admission of new members.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁶ United Nations, "UN Security Council Resolution 817 (1993) - [S/RES/817(1993)]", 7 April 1993, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/203/74/IMG/N9320374.pdf?OpenElement>, (31 May 2015), (S/RES/817(1993)).

³⁶⁷ United Nations, "The General Assembly Resolution 47/225 – (A/RES/47/225)", 8 April 1993, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/240/37/IMG/N9324037.pdf?OpenElement>, (10 June 2015), (A/RES/47/225).

³⁶⁸ Igor Janev, "Legal Aspects of the Use of a Provisional Name for Macedonia in the United Nations System", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol.:93, No.:1, January 1999, pp.155-156.

³⁶⁹ Janev, p.157.

The General Assembly resolution 197 (III), and the ICJ's advisory opinion are legally valid and binding as far as the issue of Macedonia's admission to the UN membership is concerned. The preamble to the Security Council resolution 817 (1993) recognized that Macedonia met the criteria for membership stipulated in Article 4 of the UN Charter. In this regard, according to the General Assembly resolution 197 (III), since Macedonia met all the necessary conditions for admission to membership in the UN, no other conditions should be imposed. On the other hand, Paragraph 2 of resolution 817 (1993) articulates that Macedonia should be temporarily referred to for all purposes within the UN as "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the state. Although Macedonia strongly opposed the use of the provisional name, the text of the resolution remained unchanged. Janev argues that the Security Council resolution 817 (1993) imposed obligations on Macedonia to accept the provisional name and to negotiate its name as additional conditions required for its membership in the UN. According to him, these conditions are not in line with Article 4 of the UN Charter, have no legal basis, and represent political considerations. Krylov, who participated in the ICJ proceedings in 1948, claims that since admission to membership in the UN falls within the national jurisdiction of the applicant state, arguments opposing the admission of any state to the UN are totally baseless. His argument is in line with the ICJ advisory opinion and the General Assembly resolution 197 (III) that once the appropriate UN agency decides that the criteria of Article 4 of the UN Charter have been met, neither a UN organ nor a member state can place conditions for the accession of an aspirant state. Therefore, adopting the name of a country is a national issue, having no direct connection to any other state.³⁷⁰

Janev also claims that Greece's claim that the name of Macedonia implies "territorial claims" has no legal basis due to the principle of separation of national and international jurisdiction. According to him, the name of Macedonia neither generates legal rights for Macedonia, nor does it impose legal obligations on Greece or any other country; thus the name of a country does not have impact on the territorial rights of states. Moreover, Macedonia's government altered the provisions of its constitution on 6 January 1992 to remove Greece's concerns. The Macedonian government asserted

³⁷⁰ Janev, pp.157-159.

that they have no territorial claims against any neighbor, and their borders can be altered only in accordance with the constitution and international norms. Additionally, Macedonian authorities clarified that they will not interfere in the rights of other states and their internal affairs while exercising care for the status and rights of its citizens and minorities in the neighboring countries.³⁷¹

In accordance with 1933 Montevideo Convention, an entity seeking to be recognized as a state initially had to have a defined territory; a population; a government; and the capacity to enter into relations with other states in accordance with traditional international legal theory.³⁷² Murphy argues that these conditions are still considered as the basis of recognizing states, and the name of a state is a vital part of its legal personality. According to him, the principles of the immunity of their legal personality and the sovereign equality of states rule that determining the name of a country is a right of that state. Nevertheless, the issue of who decides whether these conditions have been met has been less clear. Some scholars argue that once these conditions are met an entity is a state, but some others claim vice versa.³⁷³ The recognition endeavor of Macedonia began in 1992, and 133 countries have recognized Macedonia with its constitutional name the “Republic of Macedonia” so far.³⁷⁴

3.3. CONCLUDING THE INTERIM ACCORD

In the final part of this chapter, I shall briefly elaborate on the negotiation process for concluding a formal agreement, the Interim Accord, between Greece and Macedonia, which was viewed as a major step towards resolving the conflict. It is worthwhile to mention that the Interim Accord that set the scene for international mediation between the two countries has yet to pave the way for settlement of the differences so far. Moreover, the UN-mediated negotiations between Greece and Macedonia turned into a stalemate particularly during the last couple of years due to the reciprocal demarches of the two countries, lack of dialogue, negative emotional energy, and their adherence to their basic positions in the negotiation process.

³⁷¹ Janev, p.159.

³⁷² Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (adopted 26 December 1933, and entered into force on 26 December 1934, LNTS165-49 Stat.3097), p.19.

³⁷³ Sean D. Murphy, “Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments”, **The International and Comparative Law Quarterly**, Vol.:48, No.:3, July 1999, p.547.

³⁷⁴ United Macedonian Diaspora, “Name Recognition”, <http://www.umdiaspora.org/index.php/en/issues/issues-name-recognition>, (10 June 2015).

3.3.1. Negotiating and Concluding the Interim Accord

Following Macedonia's membership to the UN under its provisional name, Greece imposed an embargo on Macedonia in February 1994. However Greece's this demarche increased the international sympathy for Macedonia. Eventually, Cyrus Vance, the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General and Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State mediated an agreement between both countries. The Greek and Macedonian Foreign Ministers concluded the Interim Accord to normalize the relations between the two countries on 13 September 1995 in New York.³⁷⁵

The Interim Accord facilitated establishing diplomatic relations, and lifting the Greece's embargo on Macedonia in 30 days. In accordance with the Interim Accord, Macedonia accepted to alter its flag and ratify a decree on 6 October 1995 to materialize it, and reaffirmed that nothing in its constitution could be interpreted as an irredentist claim against Greece. In turn, Greece accepted to unblock Macedonia's membership to international organizations. The Interim Accord also called for negotiations under the UN auspices to resolve the name issue. Following entry into force of the Interim Accord on 13 October 1995, the Greece's Foreign Minister declared that negotiations on the name issue to commence in October 1995. Nevertheless, the most important issue left unresolved since conclusion of the Interim Accord. Macedonian leaders declared they would not accept any solution that infringes the national identity of the state. Greek authorities announced the Interim Accord would not affect the Greece's demand over the name of Macedonia.³⁷⁶ Although Macedonia's government amended the provisions of their constitution, altered the national flag, and declared that they have no territorial claims against any neighbor, the Greeks remain skeptical about the real intentions of the Macedonians.³⁷⁷ The presence of "Former Yugoslav Republic of" in the name of the state concerned the Macedonian government, they reiterated that a state with the title of "Former Yugoslavia" no longer exist and demand the removal from the name. Since there has been no concrete and satisfying progress on the name issue, Macedonia has expressed its discontent in all international forums.

³⁷⁵ ICG, No.:52, pp.6, 7.

³⁷⁶ ET 1, 13 September 1995.

³⁷⁷ Spyriden, Kentrotis, p.373.

3.3.2. Aftermath of the Interim Accord

The relations between the Greeks and Macedonians have begun to improve after the conclusion of the Interim Accord on 13 September 1995. In accordance with the Accord the two countries began to nurture bilateral relations, established liaison offices in respective capitals on 20 October 1995, and officials of both countries started to hold political meetings.³⁷⁸ Consecutively, Macedonia joined the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on 12 October 1995,³⁷⁹ the Council of Europe on 9 November 1995, and NATO's PfP Program on 15 November 1995.³⁸⁰

After concluding the Interim Accord, trade relations between the two countries and flow of Greek investments in Macedonia have also started to increase. In 2003, the volume of trade between Greece and Macedonia substantially increased and reached \$460 million, making Macedonia Greece's third major trading partner in the Balkans in the same year. The foreign direct investments (FDI) in Macedonia reached up to \$1.1 billion from 1995 to 2006. Greece reserved nearly €75 million for Macedonia from 2002 to 2006 under its economic reconstruction plan for the Balkans while the Greek parliament ratified a law to facilitate the flow of financial aid to Macedonia on 6 November 2003.³⁸¹

The Greeks argue that even though they are constructive and try their best to resolve the name issue, no significant progress has been achieved in the UN-mediated negotiation process so far due to Macedonia's provocative attitude and its rejection of any name other than its constitutional name. Greece blames Macedonia for systematically breaching the Interim Accord, bypassing the obligation to work for a negotiated settlement, and by making a number of irredentist and provocative actions and rhetoric against Greece such as renaming the airport of Skopje as "Alexander the Great", distorting the historical facts of the region by printing the "Macedonian

³⁷⁸ Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", <http://www.mfa.gr/en/blog/greece-bilateral-relations/fyrom/>, (14 June 2015).

³⁷⁹ Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)", <http://www.mfa.gov.mk/index.php/en/foreign-policy-rm/multilateral-relations/multilateralni-osce>, (14 June 2015).

³⁸⁰ Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Republic of Macedonia and the Partnership for Peace", http://www.morm.gov.mk/?page_id=5207&lang=en, (14 June 2014), (Peace).

³⁸¹ Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peace.

Encyclopaedia”, and placing a statue of “Alexander the Great” at a square in Skopje. Greece also claims that Macedonia’s leaders by promoting extreme nationalism violate the principles of international law, seriously damage the good neighbourly relations and destabilize the Balkans.

NATO members concurred with Greece’s stance on the need for Macedonia to comply with the principle of good neighbourly relations, and decided that a compromise on the name issue is a prerequisite for Macedonia’s accession to Alliance during NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008. The Summit Declaration acknowledged that Macedonia would be invited as soon as it resolved the conflict with Greece. After the Alliance’s decision, the EU also declared its decision on 20 June 2008 that having good neighbourly relations, including resolution of the name issue, is essential for the opening of accession talks with Macedonia. Upon these developments, in November 2008 Macedonia instituted proceedings against Greece before the ICJ on the grounds of Greece’s breach of the Interim Accord of 1995 by blocking Macedonia's accession to international organizations, namely NATO, by using its veto power. On 05 December 2011, the ICJ ruled that Greece had breached its obligation under the Interim Accord by objecting to the admission of Macedonia to NATO. However, the ICJ did not endorse Macedonia’s request of urging Greece to refrain from blocking the accession of Macedonia to international organizations in the future.³⁸²

³⁸² Balkan Insight, “Macedonia Savours World Court Victory over Greece”, 05 December 2011, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/icj-judgment>, (17 April 2015), (Savours).

CONCLUSION

Preface

Macedonia got entrapped in an inter-state conflict with Greece since its declaration of independence in 1991 due to its constitutional name of the “Republic of Macedonia”. Greece objected to Macedonia’s using its constitutional name on the grounds that it implies territorial claims over a region in northern part of Greece, and therefore blocked Macedonia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures since 2008. The UN-mediated talks between the two countries to resolve their differences have turned into a stalemate, and the prospect for a mutually acceptable resolution of the conflict still remains uncertain.

Greece’s Objections to Macedonia’s Admission to International Organizations

During the Yugoslav crisis, upon Greece’s pressure the EU demanded Macedonia to amend the provisions of its constitution, and to provide political guarantees that it had no territorial claims against its neighbors, would refrain from hostile propaganda, and would not use a name that would imply irredentism. On 6 January 1992, Macedonia made constitutional amendments to the effect that it did not have any territorial claims against its neighbors and would not interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbors. Following the Badinter Commission’s decision on 11 January 1992 that there were no obstacles for the EU states to recognize Macedonia, the EU Presidency recommended the members to recognize Macedonia under a name that could be recognized by all the relevant parties on 4 May 1992.³⁸³

Greece’s objections to Macedonia’s using its constitutional name delayed its recognition and membership in the UN until April 1993. However, on 7 April 1993 the Security Council Resolution 817 recommended,³⁸⁴ and on 8 April 1993 the General Assembly Resolution 47/225 decided that members could admit Macedonia to the UN membership under the provisional name of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and urged both countries to cooperate to resolve the name issue.³⁸⁵ Thus,

³⁸³ Rossos, pp.267, 268

³⁸⁴ UN, S/RES/817(1993), p.1.

³⁸⁵ UN, A/RES/47/225, p.1.

resolving the name conflict with Greece has become a prerequisite for Macedonia's membership in the UN. Although resolving the name issue with Greece under the UN auspices remains a liability for Macedonia, finally it is a full member of the UN since 8 April 1993 by the General Assembly resolution 47/225.

Greece began to impose trade embargo on Macedonia on 16 February 1994 due to the latter's insistence to use its constitutional name, national flag with the sun of Vergina, and having alleged territorial claims against the northern province of Greece. The EU's challenge to the embargo over Macedonia before the European Court of Justice, coupled with pressures from the international community, convinced Greece for a compromise.³⁸⁶ Eventually both countries concluded the Interim Accord on 13 September 1995 in New York under the UN auspices.³⁸⁷ In accordance with the Interim Accord, Macedonia altered its national flag, and in turn Greece lifted embargo on Macedonia on 15 October 1995. The Interim Accord also ruled that the two countries would seek to resolve their differences over the name issue through the UN-mediated talks.³⁸⁸

Greece also blocked Macedonia's admission to NATO during the Alliance Bucharest Summit in April 2008 on the grounds of the lack of progress in the UN-mediated negotiations. NATO declared that Macedonia would be invited for membership as soon as the conflict with Greece had been resolved.³⁸⁹ Upon these developments Macedonia instituted legal proceedings against Greece before the ICJ on 17 November 2008 on the ground of Greece's breach of the Interim Accord by blocking Macedonia's accession to NATO. The ICJ ruled that Greece had breached its obligation under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord by objecting to the admission of Macedonia to NATO on 05 December 2011.³⁹⁰

Macedonia's aspiration for accession to the EU was also hampered by the Greek objection. Although Macedonia was given the status of EU candidate in 2005, no date was given for opening the accession talks. On 20 June 2008, at the EU Summit, the Presidency inserted a statement into the 2008 Progress Report to the effect that resolution of the name issue was an additional precondition for further

³⁸⁶ Glenny, p.104

³⁸⁷ Kut, p.289

³⁸⁸ ICG, No.:52, p.5.

³⁸⁹ ICG, No.:52, pp.6, 7.

³⁹⁰ Balkan Insight, Savours.

progress of Macedonia for EU membership.³⁹¹ The EU's 2014 Progress Report noted that Macedonia actively participated in regional cooperation and developed bilateral relations with its neighbors while the name issue continued to affect relations with Greece, and the UN-led talks did not yield a resolution of the conflict.³⁹²

The Conflicting Parties' Perceptions for the Causes of Incompatibility

The Greek antipathy arises from Macedonia's association itself with Greece's self-proclaimed history and heritage, which constitutes the very basis of Greek national identity. Greeks claim that Macedonia's using its constitutional name is a denial of their identity. According to Greek nationalists, since "Alexander the Great" and ancient Macedonians were Greek, only the Greeks have the right to call themselves as Macedonians.³⁹³ They argue that the Slavs of southern Yugoslavia, who are descendants of the Slavic tribes that inhabited in Macedonia in the 6th century, referred to themselves as "Bulgarians" until the 1940s. Greek nationalists claim that the Macedonian nation is an artificial creation of Tito, who in 1944 created the mosaic of nationalities, and gave all of them the name of Macedonians. In Greek nationalist ideology, the denial of Macedonian identity focuses on three main issues: being of a Macedonian nation; a Macedonian language, and an ethnic Macedonian minority in Greece.³⁹⁴ Obviously, contested values of the parties lie behind the name conflict between the two countries.

Greek officials are concerned that Macedonians may exploit their recognition of the constitutional name of Macedonia to create legal difficulties to the Greek use of the name Macedonia, and may institute proceedings and other claims concerning the current and exiled ethnic Macedonian population. Greeks viewed the name issue less as "irredentism" regarding a potential territorial issue than as gradually increasing legal and financial challenges.³⁹⁵

However, other scholars argue that recognition of Macedonia would involve the issue of national identity since Greece could then hardly continue to deny the

³⁹¹ ICG, No.:52, pp.13, 14.

³⁹² EC, Report, p.15.

³⁹³ Andriotes, pp.143-148.

³⁹⁴ Danford, World, pp.32, 33.

³⁹⁵ ICG, No.:122, pp.14, 15.

existence of the Macedonian minority in Aegean Macedonia. They suggest that the recognition of Macedonia would in turn create pressure on Greece to accept its other minorities, which would destroy its long-standing assumption of its ethnic homogeneity.³⁹⁶

Macedonia's main foreign policy orientation has been to form an "active equidistance" (equal distance)³⁹⁷ to all of its neighbors particularly during the 1990s, and its identity has been central to this "new balance" in the Balkans. Macedonians strongly opposed keeping the word "Yugoslav" in their country's name, because it may open the possibility of their country being forced to rejoin the Serbia-dominated Yugoslavia. The name of the country is tied to the Macedonian people's identity, and for Macedonians, "Macedonia" serves as the single name for both the country and people. Denying Macedonians using their national name means they, their state and their language are a "pseudo" as some Greeks and Bulgarians claim. Macedonia much suffered due to the territorial and identity claims of its immediate neighbors in the past. Thus the name issue is a question not only of identity, but of existence for Macedonians. After transforming the Albanian insurgency in 2001 by compromising with its ethnic Albanian minority following intense international initiatives, Macedonia seems to be determined about giving no more concessions on identity issues.³⁹⁸ As long as the spirit of Ohrid consensus prevails, ethnic Albanian minority is likely to continue to support the Macedonia's government efforts to resolve the name conflict with Greece.

From a realist viewpoint, material interests of the parties play an essential role, and attaining those interests is the sole underlying factor in the conflict. However, the doctrine may suggest otherwise. Even if the material interests of the parties are at risk, they may choose to preserve their values when national survival is at stake. For instance, even if Macedonia's integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures is at risk, it continues to pursue its national identity cause. Vice versa, although Greece is a powerful regional actor in the Balkans, it perceives Macedonia as a threat to its territorial integrity. This dilemma clearly demonstrates that the parties' chief national interests are not necessarily only material-based, but also value based.

³⁹⁶ Rossos, p.269.

³⁹⁷ Rossos, p.273.

³⁹⁸ ICG, No.:122, pp.15, 16.

Legal Aspect of the Conflicting Parties' Claims

The Greek claim that Macedonia's using its constitutional name implies "territorial claims" against its neighbors has no legal basis due to the principle of separation of national and international jurisdiction. The name of a country does not have impact on the territorial rights of states; thus name of the country neither generates legal rights for Macedonia, nor does it impose legal obligations on Greece or any other country. Moreover Macedonia adopted two amendments to its constitution on 6 January 1992 in order to eradicate the Greek concerns.³⁹⁹ The name of a state is an indispensable component of its legal personality. The principles of the immunity of legal personality and the sovereign equality of states rule that determining the name of a country is a right of that state.⁴⁰⁰ In short, the external interference with the basic right of a state's determining its own name is a breach of international customary law.

The UN Mediation Initiatives

In this part of the chapter, I shall give a summary account of the mediation strategy and methodology of the UN mediator, the proposals submitted by the UN mediators during the negotiations, and the initiatives of the two countries to nurture bilateral relations in an effort to resolve their differences.

The UN Mediator's Strategy and Methodology

The methodology of the UN mediation in practice included Nimetz's visits to the capitals of both countries, and holding meetings with the countries' negotiators at UN premises in New York, Vienne, and Geneva. Nimetz met leaders (presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers) and negotiators of the two countries more than 30 times during his term of duty since 1999. Nimetz's routine contacts to the region involved visits to either Skopje or Athens first to meet national leaders and negotiators, and subsequently visits to the capital of the other party. During his consultations he presented his new ideas and asked their initial responses, and then continued his visits to the capital of the other party to brief his ideas and previous

³⁹⁹ Janev, pp.155-160.

⁴⁰⁰ Murphy, pp.545-581.

contacts. Subsequently, Nimetz invited the negotiators of the two countries to the UN Headquarters in New York for follow-up meetings as a common practice. Nimetz held meetings with negotiators of the parties separately to comprehend their positions regarding his proposals, and then held joint meetings to bring the parties' positions closer. The UN mediation efforts increased particularly in 2012 and 2013. During this period Nimetz visited the capitals of both countries at least twice and invited the negotiators to the UN Headquarters four times annually. This corresponded to a double or even triple times increase in the contacts compared to the previous years. In addition to meetings between Nimetz and the countries' negotiators, foreign ministers, prime ministers, and even presidents of the parties also met each other and Nimetz on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. Additionally, the UN Secretary General established contacts with leaders of the parties, and visited capital of a party as a part of his tour of the region to revitalize the UN mediation efforts. Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary General, also personally urged leaders of the two countries to revitalize the UN-mediated negotiations.

The UN-mediated negotiations intensified particularly before the EU meetings, EU summits, or the release of EU's annual reports that assessed the progress of Macedonia since 2009. Also the talks came prior to NATO's Bucharest (2008), Strasbourg/Kehl (2009), Lisbon (2010), Chicago (2012), and Cardiff (2014) summits in an effort to ensure Macedonia's admission to the Alliance since 2008. On the other hand, the UN-mediated negotiations between the two countries were suspended and awaited the outcome of the upcoming presidential, general, and local elections of the parties in 2009, 2014, and 2015. In addition to managing the UN mediation process, Nimetz recommended both sides to build mutual confidence and understanding that would eventually lead to a compromise.

The UN Mediators' Proposals

Following Macedonia's admission to the UN on 7 April 1993, the UN Security Council drafted a resolution authorizing the co-chairmen of the conference on former Yugoslavia, David Owen, and Cyrus Vance, to mediate between Greece and Macedonia. These two diplomats as the first initiative invited the parties to New York in order to discuss the name issue. The UN mediators offered adopting the name of

“Nova Macedonia”. However, both countries refused the proposal and they failed to reach compromise during the talks.⁴⁰¹

In accordance with the 1995 Interim Accord, Greece agreed to lift the embargo, and accepted not to veto Macedonia’s admission to international organizations. Macedonia’s government had already changed their flag, and amended provisions of the constitution, and denied claims on any Greek territory. However, Macedonia’s leaders insisted that country’s constitutional name was not negotiable, and would remain as the “Republic of Macedonia”. Greece insisted on a mutually acceptable name and continues to use “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM”. Many other nations, including the EU members referred to the “Republic of Macedonia” in bilateral relations, and “Macedonia” in other contexts.

In accordance with the Interim Accord, the UN-mediated negotiations were carried out by the new UN mediator, the U.S. Ambassador Matthew Nimetz, who took over from Cyrus Vance in 1999.⁴⁰² In March 2005, Nimetz suggested using “Republika Makedonija-Skopje”. Greece described it as a good basis for negotiations; Macedonia rejected the proposal but submitted its own proposal, the “double name formula” that foresees a mutually agreed name for bilateral relations with Greece, and the constitutional name of Macedonia, the “Republic of Macedonia” for all other bilateral and multilateral relations. In October 2005, Nimetz submitted a proposal that the name “Republika Makedonija” to be used by the states that have recognized Macedonia, and Greece to use the name “Republika Makedonija-Skopje”, while the international organizations to use the name “Republika Makedonija”. Although Macedonia accepted the proposal, Greece rejected it.

On 3 February 2008, Nimetz proposed a plan of “triple formula”, according to which Macedonia would use its constitutional name of the “Republic of Macedonia” at home and in its bilateral relations with states that recognized it, another name for relations with Greece, and a mutually acceptable name “Republika Makedonija” for multilateral use in international institutions.⁴⁰³ On 19 February 2008, Nimetz provided another proposal including five options from which the two countries would choose one, while the constitutional name of “Republic of Macedonia” would be confined to

⁴⁰¹ ICG, No.:52, p.13.

⁴⁰² ICG, No.:52, p.5.

⁴⁰³ Balkan Insight, Pipeline.

internal use. The proposals were: “Democratic Republic of Macedonia”, “Constitutional Republic of Macedonia”, “Independent Republic of Macedonia”, “Republic of Upper Macedonia” or “Northern Republic of Macedonia”.⁴⁰⁴ Nimetz tried to convince parties over the name of “Republic of Northern Macedonia” during his visits to the parties’ capitals from 6 to 8 July 2009. However, Greece declared that it would not accept the proposal if a compromise formulation of Macedonia’s name was not intended for use on the wider international arena.⁴⁰⁵

On 10 April 2013, Nimetz submitted his last proposal: “Upper Republic of Macedonia”. Greece had two objections to the proposal: placing of the geographic qualifier and the scope of use of the agreed name. Greece prefers the geographical qualifier “Upper” to be used before the word “Macedonia”, rather than before the word “Republic” (Republic of Upper Macedonia). Greece insists on any agreed composite name to be mandatory for all purposes, *erga omnes*, not to be used bilaterally only. Macedonia favors “Upper Republic of Macedonia”, and insists on any agreed composite name to be restricted to use in bilateral relations with Greece, and any compromise should not involve changes to the country’s constitution.⁴⁰⁶

The Greek public seems to have little interest in foreign affairs including the name issue with Macedonia, probably due to the country’s grave debt crisis. Hence, resolving the name issue remains a low priority for the Greek government. On the other hand, Macedonia’s government is under pressure from both the international community (e.g. the EU, NATO, U.S., Germany) and the opposition parties. The public opinion in Macedonia is divided along ethnic lines. The latest public poll carried out in September 2011 in Skopje suggests that 45.3 per cent of respondents were opposed to any change (57 per cent of ethnic Macedonian, and 20 per cent of ethnic Albanians) to the country’s name, while another 40 per cent thought that a consensus with Greece that did not compromise Macedonia’s identity would be acceptable if it ensured Macedonia’s accession to the EU and NATO.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁴ Balkan Insight, Decide.

⁴⁰⁵ Balkan Insight, Proposals.

⁴⁰⁶ Balkan Insight, Leaders.

⁴⁰⁷ Balkan Insight, “Half Macedonians Oppose Deal on Country’s Name”, 21 October 2011, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/poll-macedonians-opt-for-name-preservation> (17 April 2015).

The Conflicting Parties' Bilateral Relations

After concluding the Interim Accord in 1995, both countries' prime ministers and foreign ministers held bilateral meetings in an effort to resolve the name conflict. Diplomatic delegations from both sides participated in the discussions for normalization of the relations between the two countries since 3 October 1995. In this context, both countries' leaders also met during the summits of Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and NATO, and at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.⁴⁰⁸

In December 2007, the Macedonian government proposed to hold regular meetings with Greek officials to discuss and improve bilateral relations.⁴⁰⁹ The bilateral contacts intensified after Greece's blocking Macedonia's membership at NATO's Bucharest summit in 2008, and the Greek PM Papandreou met his Macedonian counterpart Gruveski in the autumn of 2009. Although there had been good progress in bilateral relations when Papandreou was in office until November 2011, the relations and progress on the name issue started to decline when the Greek PM Samaras took office in June 2012. Gruevski's request for renewed dialogue was refused by the Greek PMs Papademos and Samaras. The Macedonian President Ivanov said that they had been proposing similar ideas for years, but they had been constantly rejected by Greece.⁴¹⁰ Macedonia's Vice Prime Ministers Arifi and Besimi met their Greek counterparts Pangalos and Avramopoulos in Athens in 2012 and 2013 to discuss the prospects for Macedonia's integration to Europe.⁴¹¹ The Greek Foreign Minister Venizelos also met Ali Ahmeti, head of junior partner of the government, DUI, in Athens on 03 September 2013.⁴¹² Greek officials seemed more willing to establish dialogue with the leaders of ethnic Albanian minority rather than Macedonian leaders. Venizelos, the Greek Deputy PM and Foreign Minister, and also the Chair of the Council of Ministers of the EU, met Macedonian leaders in Skopje in 2014, and argued that the principal obstacle for opening accession talks for

⁴⁰⁸ Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern+Europe/Balkans/Bilateral+Relations/FYROM/FYROM.htm>

⁴⁰⁹ Balkan Insight, Decide.

⁴¹⁰ Balkan Insight, Branch.

⁴¹¹ Balkan Insight, Meeting.

⁴¹² Balkan Insight, Announced.

Macedonia's membership was not the long standing name conflict only, but also Macedonia's failure to meet the Copenhagen criteria, particularly compliance with the principle of good neighborly relations.⁴¹³ Venizelos's remarks demonstrate that the Greek leaders refrain from a genuine dialogue with Macedonian leaders, and his visit was merely carried out to exert pressure on Macedonian leaders to tacitly force them to make concessions during the UN-mediated negotiation process.

Although the parties reiterated their sincerity and will to resolve the name issue, their uncompromising stance led the UN-mediated talks to a stalemate. Greece's repeatedly blocking Macedonia's accessions to the EU and NATO since 2008 strained the relations with Macedonia. Macedonia's President Ivanov claimed that Greece provoked the recent Macedonian raising statues and renaming roads and sport arenas after the Alexander the Great. He added that this was only a way of protest over Greece's blockade in NATO.⁴¹⁴ The Greek Foreign Minister Avramopoulos argued that the relations between both countries might have been better, if Macedonia had paid more respect on historically and culturally sensitive issues that were of particular importance to Greece. The bilateral relations further deteriorated when Greek border guards started placing a sticker over the plate numbers of Macedonian tourists' vehicles visiting Greece by covering MK letters and reading as "Recognized by Greece as FYROM." in 2012,⁴¹⁵ and when the Greek WWI cemetery was vandalized by unknown perpetrators in Valandovo in south-east Macedonia in 2013.⁴¹⁶

Media reports speculate that the current Greek government is unwilling to compromise on the name issue due to an agreement between the ruling left-wing SYRIZA and its junior partner nationalist Independent Greeks (IG). According to the reports, the IG accepts SYRIZA's economic program while SYRIZA takes into account the IG's nationalist demands, including settlement of the name conflict, which the IG disagrees with. If such reports are true, then this would likely further deepen the stalemate in the UN-mediated negotiation process compared to the term of duty of the

⁴¹³ Balkan Insight, Macedonia.

⁴¹⁴ Balkan Insight, Provokes.

⁴¹⁵ Balkan Insight, "Greece 'FYROM-izes' Macedonia's Car Plates", 21 June 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/greece-fyrom-izes-macedonian-car-plates> (17 April 2015)

⁴¹⁶ Balkan Insight, "Greek WWI Cemetery Vandalised in Macedonia", 15 March 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/greek-war-cemetery-vandalized-in-macedonia> (18 April 2015).

former nationalist Greek PM Samaras.⁴¹⁷ The emigrant Greek Macedonians claim that the IG is not only supporting the continuation of Greece's blocking Macedonia's accession to the EU and NATO, but also demands a tougher stance, such as a name that would not include the word "Macedonia" at all.⁴¹⁸

The Effect of Geopolitical Developments on Macedonia's Stability

On 29 January 2014, James R. Clapper, director of the U.S. National Intelligence, asserted that the enclaves in Macedonia remained volatile and that Macedonia's government promoted ethnic nationalism at the expense of the country's Euro-Atlantic integration. According to Clapper, the longer Macedonia's EU and NATO membership aspirations remained stalled due to the name conflict with Greece and poor bilateral relations with Bulgaria, the greater were the risk of increased ethnic tensions.⁴¹⁹ After the Macedonian security forces deadly cracked down on ethnic Albanian weapon smugglers, some of them allegedly KLA militants, in Kumonova on 10 May 2015 as a retaliation to ethnic Albanian militants' attacks on a police station in Gosintse in April 2015, the Russian foreign minister Lavrov argued that Macedonia was targeted due to its objection to implement sanctions over Russia, and its plans to support the "Turkish Steam" gas pipeline project.⁴²⁰

In February 2015 a political crisis erupted in Macedonia when Zoran Zaev, the leader of main opposition party, Social Democratic Union (SDSM), accused PM Gurevski for a wide range of anti-democratic practices such as illegal surveillance over his political rivals, election fraud, abuse of the justice system, and covering up murder.⁴²¹ After the EU and U.S. mediation efforts failed to ease down the tensions, the opposition parties held anti-government demonstrations demanding Gurevski's resignation on 17 May 2015, and they were countered by mass demonstrations of

⁴¹⁷ The Independent, "New Government Could Harden Greek Position on Name Dispute with Macedonia", 27 January 2015, <http://www.independent.mk/articles/13706/New+Government+Could+Harden+Greek+Position+on+Name+Dispute+with+Macedonia>, (3 May 2015).

⁴¹⁸ Jorgos Papadakis, "Can SYRIZA Succeed Where All Others Failed?", **Macedonian Human Rights (MHR) Review**, No.:22, April 2015, <http://www.mhrmi.org/news/2015/MHRMIreview22.pdf>, p.4.

⁴¹⁹ Balkan Insight, "US Intelligence Deems Macedonia, Bosnia, 'Volatile'", 31 January 2014, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/us-intelligence-deems-macedonia-bosnia-volatile>, (19 April 2015).

⁴²⁰ Sputnik News, "Events in Macedonia Linked to Turkish Stream, Sanctions Stance-Lavrov", 15 May 2015, <http://sputniknews.com/politics/20150515/1022169894.html>, (15 May 2015).

supporters of the ruling VMRO-DPMNE on 18 May 2015.⁴²² However, Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for EU Enlargement, declared that leaders of Macedonia's government and the opposition parties agreed to the early elections by the end of April 2016 to ease the political tensions in the country following the EU-brokered talks on 2 June 2015.⁴²³

The Balkans and particularly Macedonia are gradually becoming an epicenter of clash for a sphere of influence between the West and Russia. Russia claims that pro-Western opposition and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Macedonia are setting the scene for the "color revolutions" that are similar the one in Ukraine which erupted in December 2013.⁴²⁴ Whilst Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic disintegration continues due to Greece's opposition, the U.S. administration tries to convince Macedonia's leaders to give up their pro-Russian foreign policy orientation, e.g. their participation in the "Turkish Stream" natural gas pipeline project. Moreover, the U.S. Ambassador Jess Baily's criticism towards the Macedonian government on 23 April 2015 implies that resignation of government officials is a necessity, and increasing criticism of the EU and NATO may be a precursor of a government change in Macedonia soon.⁴²⁵ The protracted disintegration of Macedonia in Euro-Atlantic structures is likely to lead to its further rapprochement with Russia. NATO views that Western Balkan nations integration to Euro-Atlantic structures is the best way to ensure long-term, self-sustaining security and stability in the region.⁴²⁶ Macedonia's disintegration to Euro-Atlantic structures also risks its fragile internal stability by increasing the possibility of the inter-ethnic strife, and hence increases the risk of wider regional instability in the face of Ukraine crisis. The geopolitical realities of the

⁴²¹ Balkan Insight, "Macedonian's Stage Mass Protest for PM's Resignation", <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-braces-for-big-anti-government-protest>, (19 May 2015).

⁴²² Balkan Insight, "Macedonian PM Rallies Supporters With Defiant Speech", <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/embattled-macedonian-pm-gets-support-at-rally>, (19 May 2015).

⁴²³ Euronews, "FYROM 'to hold early elections' in effort to ease political tensions", 02 June 2015, <http://www.euronews.com/2015/06/02/fyrom-to-hold-early-elections-in-effort-to-ease-political-tensions/>, (07 June 2015).

⁴²⁴ Elnur İsmayılov, "Makedonya: Batı ile Rusya'nın Çıkarlarının Çakıştığı Yeni Bir Saha Mı?", **Avrupa Çalışmaları**, Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırma Merkezi (BİLGESAM), No.:2016, 26 May 2015, p.4.

⁴²⁵ İsmayılov, p.4.

⁴²⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO's relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - More background information / The road to integration", http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48830.htm, (14 June 2015).

region clearly dictate the urgency for resolving the name conflict between Greece and Macedonia.

Discussion

The conflict resolution requires being aware of a conflict, identifying its nature, applying appropriate methods to relieve the negative emotional energy, and enabling the parties to understand and resolve their differences to achieve a solution.⁴²⁷ The protracted Greece-Macedonia name conflict could be transformed through either “compromise” or “withdrawals”, but not necessarily through “transcendence” (where the goals are met fully) by taking into account the record of the parties’ stance in the UN-mediated talks. Since both countries are unlikely to address the root causes of the conflict (national identity and values) during the UN-mediated negotiations, then the parties must create conditions for cooperative relationships (conflict “provention”). In this regard, Greece and Macedonia must avoid escalating bilateral relations and refrain from provocations such as promoting national identity through the contested historical symbols.

The conflict resolution mechanisms involve the creation of confidence-building measures, and formal or informal arrangements to which the parties can agree to transfer their conflict. In theory, there are seven distinct ways (change of their basic position, dividing the contested values, horse-trading, arbitration, creating shared rule or shared control, leave control to somebody else, leave to the future) which the conflicting parties can live with or eradicate their incompatibility.⁴²⁸

It appears that both countries are unlikely to completely change their goals and priorities (change of their basic position), or would not meet halfway over national identity issue (dividing the contested values) since it is a matter of existence. Greece views “horse-trading” as more favorable for its national interest: if its maximalist demands are met on the name issue, then it will withdraw its objections to Macedonia’s membership to Euro-Atlantic structures. However, Macedonia’s leadership already declared that they will not give up their basic position on the name issue, even if the EU and NATO membership are at stake; so “horse-trading” seems

⁴²⁷ University of Bradford, Centre for Conflict Resolution, www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/body_unit1.html, (20 October 2010).

⁴²⁸ Wallensteen, pp.54-57.

unfeasible. Macedonia tried “arbitration” by handing over the conflict from a political to a legal level by instituting proceedings against Greece before the ICJ. However, neither the ICJ endorsed Macedonia’s request of ordering Greece not to prevent Macedonia from joining international organizations in the future,⁴²⁹ nor the Greek government declared that they would change their stance.⁴³⁰ Nimetz pointed out that the ICJ judgment stood on its own while the Interim Accord was an international agreement between the two countries that both parties had to respect.⁴³¹ Although, “arbitration” for the conflict has not yielded the desired result for Macedonia yet, this mechanism may help resolve the conflict if both parties agree to appeal for arbitration as a last resort.

It appears that conflict resolution mechanisms such as “creating shared rule” or “leave control to somebody else” seem unfeasible for national identity and value-based inter-state conflicts. Although “creating shared rule” or “shared control” successfully transcends the conflicts after a period in certain instances, Greece and Macedonia are unlikely to rule together the highly delicate contested values such as “national identity” due to its indivisible nature; therefore this mechanism has little chance of success. The parties are also unlikely to externalize or not to rule the contested value themselves (leave control to somebody else), since it is perceived as a matter of existence. Nevertheless, without the parties changing their basic positions on the preferred outcome, the name issue can be left to later or even be forgotten (left to the future), if the EU initiates membership process for Macedonia, which requires substantial pressure over Greece. The record of relations between the two countries reveals that Greece gives concessions under credible external political pressure. For instance, under international pressure Greece had to accept Macedonia’s membership to the UN on 8 April 1993, and concluded the Interim Accord in September 1995, and lifted the embargo over Macedonia in October 1995.

Although earlier Macedonia’s leaders proposed holding regular meetings at higher levels to improve relations, establishing working groups, elaborating on open issues such as resolving different views of history and revitalizing the UN-mediated talks, Greek leaders were not always enthusiastic to support these proposals. In the

⁴²⁹ Balkan Insight, Savours.

⁴³⁰ Balkan Insight, “Greece Reacts Coolly to ICJ Macedonia Ruling”, 6 December 2011, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/no-drama-in-greece-over-icj-judgment>, (30 May 2015).

⁴³¹ Balkan Insight, UN Envoy.

chronology of events of the bilateral relations of the two countries, Macedonia's aspirations for integration to Euro-Atlantic structures and the UN-mediated name talks reveal that there is a causal relationship between them. Once Greece blocked Macedonia's membership to NATO at Alliance's Bucharest summit in 2008, then Macedonian leaders began promoting national identity by using historical symbols. Macedonia's leaders' referring to contested historical symbols frustrated Greek counterparts, deteriorated the already bitter relations, and eventually led to a stalemate in the name talks. Greece continues to oppose Macedonia's membership to the EU and NATO. Greek leaders' repeated objections to Macedonia's membership to Euro-Atlantic structures are their response to Macedonian leaders' recent stance, and Greece views its veto power in international organizations as a leverage in its foreign policy practice. Greece hopes to attain a favorable outcome in the UN-mediated name talks by using this leverage. It seems as if it is not in Greece's best interest to find a swift solution to the name issue, while it enjoys advantages of being a member of the EU as its debt crisis continues and severe austerity measures are in place. Greece is unlikely to display flexibility in its stance for resolving the name issue without any credible external pressure.

This study intended to demonstrate some of the limits of international mediation. International efforts to mediate ethnic conflicts are complicated engagements requiring long-term undertakings by those interfering, and have uncertain outcomes. The protracted Greece-Macedonia name conflict signifies that the exclusive use of traditional conflict resolution perspectives such as international mediation in value-based inter-state conflicts are far less effective to resolve the source of discord. The analysis of empirical evidence suggests that the conflict could be resolved if international mediation was supported by other mainstream approaches to conflict resolution such as coercion, in the form of political pressure per se, or arbitration.

Recommendations

The international community must step up their efforts conditioning the conflict as well as the international mediation performed by the UN. In this regard, the EU might consider opening accession talks for Macedonia's membership on condition

that eventually a compromise on the name issue must be reached to motivate the parties resolving their differences. In the meantime, Greece should be exposed to credible political pressure from its influential EU and NATO partners to make it agree to withdraw its objections to Macedonia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. The assurances must be given to the parties that any solution foreseeing a change to Macedonia's name shall come into force simultaneously as Macedonia formally accedes to the EU.⁴³² Tangible results in Macedonia's accession talks with the EU are likely to motivate Macedonia's leaders to make further concessions in the negotiations, and enable them to endorse a mutually acceptable solution.

Meanwhile, the parties should be committed to resolve their differences through the UN-mediated negotiations in a constructive manner, and either apply "Track Two" or "Multi-track Diplomacy" in addition to "Track-One Diplomacy," where both countries' historians meet to resolve their different views of history, and apply appropriate methods to relieve the negative emotional energy involved in their bilateral relations. Obviously, Greece's gesture to withdraw its objection to Macedonia's accession talks with the EU would not go unanswered. The prospect for EU membership is likely to help Macedonia's leaders refrain from the nationalist rhetoric, hence nurture good neighborly relations with Greece. However, if none of the conflict resolution mechanisms prove to be useful to resolve the conflict, then the parties may consider appealing for international arbitration over the name issue as a last resort.

⁴³² Balkan Insight, "ESI Bids to Break Macedonia 'Name' Deadlock", 3 December 2012, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/esi-bids-to-break-macedonia-name-deadlock> (18 April 2015).

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