

T.C.  
DOKUZ EYLÜL ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ  
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI  
İNGİLİZCE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER PROGRAMI  
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

**THE IMPACT OF THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND  
NORTHERN AFRICA PROJECT IN SECURITY OF  
TURKEY**

**Gültekin Selçuk YILDIRAN**

Danışman

**Doç.Dr. Nilüfer KARACASULU**

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## Yemin Metni

Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak sunduğum “ **The Impact of the Greater Middle East and Northern Africa Project in Security of Turkey**” adlı çalışmanın, tarafımdan, bilimsel ahlak ve geleneklere aykırı düşecek bir yardıma başvurmaksızın yazıldığını ve yararlandığım eserlerin kaynakçada gösterilenlerden oluştuğunu, bunlara atıf yapılarak yararlanılmış olduğunu belirtir ve bunu onurumla doğrularım.

12/9/2007

Gültekin Selçuk YILDIRAN

**ABSTRACT**  
**Post Graduate Thesis**  
**The Impact Of The Greater Middle East And Northern Africa Project In**  
**Security Of Turkey**  
**Gültekin Selçuk YILDIRAN**

**Dokuz Eylül University**  
**Institute of Social Sciences**  
**Department of International Relations**  
**International Relations Post Graduate Program**

It is considered that the Middle East has been important, because of its socio-economic, political and strategic values during the history, it has been one of the main subjects of international agenda. September 11 has changed the international agenda which was reshaped with the end of the Cold War. Thus, under this new agenda, actors in the international relations have started to evaluate their interests again. Changing of the dynamics and interests of actors in the international relations have provided new strategies inevitably. The Greater Middle East and Northern Africa Project has been the last of these strategies.

The US has put different strategies into progress under different titles in the Middle East since the 1950s. The US has decided to initiate the Greater Middle East and Northern Africa Project, because of September 11 terrorist attacks, in order to limit the conditions which facilitate international terrorism in the Middle East. Although this project was not defined clearly; the US have aimed to solve social, economic and political problems in the Middle East, which are considered as the reasons of international terrorism mostly rooted in the Middle East.

**Turkey has also been affected by September 11. It was considered that the World would understand terrorism and Turkey's struggle against the PKK terrorism. Hence, Turkey has supported the GMEI since the President Bush's declaration at the G-8 Meeting, on June 9, 2004. It is claimed that the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the nuclear programme of Iran, the war between Hezbollah- Hamas and Israel, have coerced Turkey to reconsider its strategy in the Middle East. In this thesis the GMEI is analyzed and its impact in security of Turkey is evaluated.**

**Key Words:** The Middle East, Security, The GMEI, The US, Turkey

## **ÖZET**

**Yüksek Lisans Tezi**  
**Büyük Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika Projesi'nin Türkiye'nin**  
**Güvenliğine Etkisi**

**Gültekin Selçuk YILDIRAN**

**Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi**  
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**Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı**  
**İngilizce Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı**

Tarih boyunca Ortadoğu'nun sosyo-ekonomik, siyasal ve stratejik değerlerinden dolayı önemli olduğu, uluslararası gündemin ana konularından birini oluşturduğu değerlendirilmektedir. 11 Eylül, Soğuk Savaşın sonunda yeniden şekillendirilen uluslararası gündemi değiştirmiştir. Bu yüzden, uluslararası ilişkilerdeki aktörler menfaatlerini yeniden gözden geçirmeye başlamışlardır. Uluslararası ilişkilerdeki aktörlerin dinamik ve menfaatlerindeki değişim kaçınılmaz olarak yeni stratejilerin doğmasını sağlamıştır. Büyük Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika Projesi bu stratejilerin sonuncusudur.

Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, 1950'lerden beri Ortadoğu'da çeşitli başlıklar altında çeşitli stratejileri uygulamaya koymuştur. 11 Eylül terörist saldırıları sebebiyle ABD, Ortadoğu'da uluslararası terörizmi geliştiren kaynakları sonlandırmak için Büyük Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika Projesini ortaya atmıştır. Bu proje tamamen tanımlanmamış olmasına rağmen, ABD çoğunlukla Ortadoğu'dan kaynaklandığı değerlendirilen ve uluslararası

terörizmin nedenleri olarak görülen Ortadoğu'nun sosyal, ekonomik ve siyasal problemlerini çözmeyi amaçlamıştır.

11 Eylül'den Türkiye'de etkilenmektedir. Dünyanın terörizmi ve Türkiye'nin PKK ile olan mücadelesini anlayacağı değerlendirildiğinden Türkiye, Başkan Bush'un 9 Temmuz 2004 tarihinde G-8 toplantısından deklare ettiği Büyük Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika Projesini desteklemektedir. Irak ve Afganistan'ın işgalleri, İran'ın nükleer programı ve Hizbullah-Hamas-İsrail savaşı, Türkiye'yi Ortadoğu'daki stratejisini yeniden gözden geçirmeye zorlamıştır. Bu tezde, Büyük Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika Projesi analiz edilmekte ve bu projenin Türkiye'nin güvenliğine etkisi değerlendirilmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Ortadoğu, Güvenlik, BOP, ABD, Türkiye



## **OUTLINE**

### **THE IMPACT OF THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA PROJECT IN SECURITY OF TURKEY**

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## INTRODUCTION

This thesis is on “*the impact of the Greater Middle East and Northern Africa Project in security of Turkey*” is analyzed because the GMEI project has been considered “practically” new and not “clearly” defined. This project was designed by the United States after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which has increased debates about morality, legality and justification in the US foreign policies. Although this project was not defined clearly by the US officials (The US explained that this project emerged for supporting reforms and developments in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>); it has aimed to solve social, economical and political problems in the region. The main argument of this thesis is this project does not help to solve the security problems in the Middle East.

### **a. The aim of the study:**

The Post Cold War era brought new problems such as security, economic and political that countries were not prepared on how to deal. Robert Jervis and John Mearsheimer<sup>2</sup> argue that the Cold War Era was more stable than the Post Cold War era. In the Post Cold War Era, regional conflicts, economic problems and international terrorism are the main problems. In addition, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has increasingly threatened humankind since obtaining these weapons became easier in the Post Cold War era.

Furthermore, Terrorism started to be one of the main problems after the end of the Cold War. Turkey has faced this problem since the 1970s but the Western states have not seriously considered before September 11 but September 11 changed the ideas about terrorism and international terrorism has emerged as an important global problem for the world. In addition September 11, terrorist attacks led to a new kind of terrorism for which the West has not been prepared for. Thus, the US decided to initiate the Greater Middle East project in order to limit the conditions which

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<sup>1</sup> <http://mepi.state.gov/mepi/>, 26.6.2007

<sup>2</sup> John Mearsheimer, “Why We will soon miss the Cold War”, **The Atlantic Monthly**, Volume 266, No. 2, August, pp. 35-50, 1990; Robert Jervis, “We Know How, Rethinking the Cold War History”, **The National Interest**, Winter, 1997

facilitate international terrorism in the Middle East. The Greater Middle East project was first declared at the G-8 Meeting, in Sea Island Georgia on June 9, 2004, by the US. This project aims to democratize the Middle East, to bring peace and human rights and help the Middle East countries to build an open-market system. This project was established to stop the rogue states to support terrorism and terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah. At first, the Greater Middle East project was limited to the Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East but later included the Northern African states and is called as the Greater Middle East and Northern Africa Project.

This project brought some questions on issues such as how it will establish open-market system, how it will change the regimes and bring human rights and equality to the Middle East, and how it will be financed. Furthermore, there are questions on how this project will affect regional and global security, what the role of Turkey in that project will be and how Turkey's security will be affected with this project. This thesis aims to analyze these issues. The main argument of this thesis is this project will increase the security problems of Turkey and will not stop instabilities in the Middle East.

**b. The limits of the study:**

The Greater Middle East and Northern African project raised many questions as mentioned above. There are different dimensions of this project such as social, economical and political. This thesis mainly focuses on security aspects and briefly explains political, social and economical aspects which help us to explain security dimension.

**c. The method and plan of the study:**

In this thesis, secondary resources are used for literature survey. In the first chapter, the impetus behind the GMEI is analyzed, beginning with the explanation of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The main principles of US foreign policy between the “New World Order”(1990) and Bush Doctrine(2001) are

emphasized. Then, the debate about US power and foreign policies is reviewed including the criticisms on US power and foreign policies. The first chapter also included the evolution of GMEI, giving the definition of the Middle East and the historical background of the GMEI. Military/security, political and socio-economic aspects of GMEI are explained from different vantage points to explain different dimensions of the project.

In the beginning the EU was seen supporting the GMEI, but later, it has changed its attitude. As an international actor, the EU's approach to the GMEI is considered important in this thesis. Thus, in the second chapter, the GMEI from the European vantage point is analyzed. After explaining the EU's approach, a comparison is made with the American one. Again security/military, political and socio-economic perspective are explained to understand and compare with the American vantage point.

In the third chapter; the GMEI analysis is made from the Turkish perspective. A brief the US-Turkish historical relation is given to background. Second, the US-Turkish relations after September 11 and the Iraq War are reviewed to understand the main issues such as the refusal of opening a battlefield in the Northern Iraq and the approval for the use of airspace by US air forces in Turkey. The US has given a role for Turkey in the GMEI as a model state. Turkey's role in the Middle East after the Iraq war is analyzed. In the final section, possible problems for Turkey are mentioned such as nuclear programme of Iran, the Northern Iraq and the PKK issue. These problems are explained in chronology because it is necessary to see the beginning and evolution of the problems since the declaration of the GMEI.

In conclusion it is argued that the GMEI has increased the security problems of Turkey as well as the Middle East. The tensions on the PKK terrorism and on nuclear programme of Iran have been increasing and Turkey may face related security dilemmas in the future. It is also argued that Turkey does not fit its role in the GMEI because Turkey is not a moderate Islamic state as considered by the US.

## CHAPTER ONE

### IMPETUS BEHIND THE GMEI

#### 1.1 US Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era.

##### 1.1.1 The Main Principles.

At the end of the Cold War, the US has become the only superpower and has started to behave according to its own interests. As Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in the “The Grand ChessBoard”<sup>3</sup>, the US has become a global power in the four areas. It has a magnificent military power, it has been a railway engine in the world economy, it has used the latest technology, although its culture has some excessiveness and it attracts the young people of the world. Brzezinski argued that the hegemonic power of the US has been unrivalled but this can only continue with the acts of the US especially in the Euro-Asia chessboard<sup>4</sup>. With the presidential elections in 1988, George Bush had become the president of the US. During the era of Bush administration, the Eastern bloc has collapsed and the Gulf war is observed. These events increased the importance of foreign affairs for the Bush administration. During the Bush administration’s era, the capabilities of the US were not directed for solving the problems such as providing health care, controlling street crime and environmental politics in the US, because mobilizing masses and resources by supporting the national security was easier than declaring a global war on drugs and environmental atrocities<sup>5</sup>.

At the end of the Cold War, the main idea behind the new strategies of the US is to declare itself as the only superpower in the world. Yet, American analysts disagree over whether there is a main strategy guiding US foreign policy in the post-Cold War Era.

The analyses give the wide range of views that fall in the whole spectrum between neo-isolationism and “*unmitigated pursuit of global primacy*”<sup>6</sup>. Some scholars listed seven alternative strategies for the US such as “*dominion, regional collective security, global collective security, cooperative security, containment, isolationism and selective engagement*”<sup>7</sup>. Debates on the new US strategy have presented four choices: 1) Neo-isolationism, 2) Primacy, 3) Cooperative Security, 4)

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<sup>3</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, **The Grand Chessboard** (Translated by Yelda Türedi), İstanbul, İnkilap Kitabevi, 2005,p:43

<sup>4</sup> Brzezinski, *ibid*,p:50

<sup>5</sup> Daniel Deudney-G. John Ikenberry, “After the Long War”, **Foreign Policy**, Spring 1994, p:33

<sup>6</sup> Yong Deng, **Is There A US Global Strategy**, Prepared for the conference, “The Global Role of the US and Implications for the PRC: A Dialogue between the New Generation of International Relations Analysts in the PRC and US,” July 21-23, 2000, Hotel Edgewater, Seattle, Washington, US, [www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0006deng.pdf](http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0006deng.pdf), 9.5.2007

<sup>7</sup> Robert J.Art, “Geopolitics Updated: the Strategy of Selective Engagement”, **International Security**, Vol.23,No.3, Winter 1998/99, p: 85

Selective Engagement<sup>8</sup>. The US has used these altogether since there was no preference as to which strategy best suits its interests<sup>9</sup>.

First, neo-isolationism argues that the US has won the Cold War and managed to perform its duty, so could consider its internal problems. Yet, neo-isolationism became meaningless with the Gulf War. Indeed neo-isolationism does not mean disengaging from the world, it supports anti-interventionism but neo-isolationists differ in motivation. Some believe that the US had to increase its arm build up during the Cold War, but now it is over and the US must decrease the budget. The others believe that the US did not have to increase its arm build up so administrations put the US into an unnecessary risk<sup>10</sup>.

Secondly, primacy is the strategy to convince the world in the benign hegemony of the US. Joseph Nye explains “*Primacy*” by mentioning the role of soft power<sup>11</sup>. Nye argues that if the most powerful country fails to lead in a world of growing interdependence, the consequences for the international stability will be disastrous. The military force has remained the best form of power in a self-help system of realism; the use of military force has started to cost a lot in modern times. The other forms such as communicational, organizational and institutional skills have started to be more important. Private actors and small states have started to increase their efficiency in the international relations. The US has to use these new forms of power to continue its hegemony instead of using military force. “*The second aspect of power which occurs when one country gets other countries to want what it wants might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants*”<sup>12</sup>. This strategy may avoid that the return of Germany and Russia to the classic alliance patterns of the nineteenth-century<sup>13</sup>.

Thirdly, cooperative security was the strategy that the US will share its responsibilities with the allies in order to use international organizations such as the UN, NATO etc. In the national security strategy document, which has been declared in 1996, it is written, “*The U.S. government is responsible for protecting the lives and personal safety of Americans, maintaining our political freedom and independence as a nation and promoting the well-being and prosperity of our nation*”<sup>14</sup>. It is argued that the US could not secure these goals unilaterally, however the strongest state has been

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<sup>8</sup> Oran, Baskın, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt-II: 1980-2001* (Turkish Foreign Policy, From the Independence War till today, comments, documents and events, volume 2, 1980-2001), İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2002,p:246.

<sup>9</sup> Deng, *ibid*.

<sup>10</sup> “American Foreign Policy”, [www.academic.umf.maine.edu](http://www.academic.umf.maine.edu), 12.5.2006

<sup>11</sup> Oran, *ibid*, p:247

<sup>12</sup> Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power”, *Foreign Policy*, Autumn 80, p:166

<sup>13</sup> John Mearsheimer, 1990, “Back to the Future: Instability in the Europe after the Cold war”, *International Security*, No:1, Summer 1990, p:15

<sup>14</sup> **A National Security Strategy Of Engagement and Enlargement**, The White House, 1996, <http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm>, 13.5.2007

the US. Some problems need cooperation and multinational solutions. This strategy promotes cooperation between the US and international organizations on security issues.

Lastly, the strategy of selective engagement means that the US must deal only with the current and possible threats against itself. The selective engagement strategy has been supported by the Clinton's administration. The use of force must focus on challenges and resources. The US can send the American troops abroad only when its interests and values are sufficiently at stake<sup>15</sup>. It is argued that the use of force must be accepted in cases where the U.S. humanitarian interests are reinforced by the existence of other strong national interests<sup>16</sup>. Clinton has argued, "*No outside force can create a stable and legitimate domestic order for another society -- that work can only be accomplished by the society itself*"<sup>17</sup>. The founders of this strategy have seen the Middle East and Balkans as the areas for intervention because of their strategic importance in a possible conflict. The US has declared a presidential decision on May 1994. According to this, a possible US intervention could only happen in two ways. The first one is against a direct threat for its national interests. In that situation, the US will intervene by itself. The second one is; if there is threat against its allies, the US will intervene with the supports of its allies<sup>18</sup>.

According to Gilpin; when the Soviet Union collapsed, a new world order has started to be put into progress by the former Bush Government because of a unique characteristic effort of the victorious. Historically, new international systems have been established at the end of great devastating wars. This is called "*tabula rasa*". Victorious powers create the international order after wars according to their interests<sup>19</sup>. With the New World Order, the US and NATO have redesigned their interests, interdependence has increased, liberalization was spread throughout the world<sup>20</sup>. New rules, institutions and regimes to govern international economic, diplomatic activities are formulated.

*"This new world order was formulated with three bases. First, a liberal international economy is not zero-sum because every nation, regardless of its natural endowments, can benefit economically, although not every nation will gain equally. Second, economic competition in open and free markets leads to an efficient utilization of the World's scarce resources and hence to a maximization of global wealth. Third, every economic actor will be rewarded in accordance with that actor's marginal contribution to the overall global economic product"*<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Joseph Nye, "Redefining the National Interest", **Foreign Affairs** Vol. 78, No:4, July-September 1999, p:33

<sup>17</sup> **A National Security Strategy Of Engagement and Enlargement**, The White House, 1996, <http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm>, 20.5.2007

<sup>18</sup> Oran, *ibid.*250

<sup>19</sup> Robert Gilpin, "APEC in a new international order", **NBR Analysis**, Volume:6, No:5, 1995, p:6

<sup>20</sup> Stephen M. Walt, "The Ties that Fray. Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart," **Foreign Policy**, No. 54, Winter

<sup>21</sup> Roberto Dominguez, "Organic Intellectuals in the US Foreign policy towards Europe", **Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series**, Vol.6, No.16, June 2006, [www.miami.edu/eucenter/Dominguez\\_Organic%20Intellectuals.pdf](http://www.miami.edu/eucenter/Dominguez_Organic%20Intellectuals.pdf) , 9.5.2007



The deep political structure of the international system did not change. Anarchy remained as the organizing principle in the international relations and states have remained as primary units in the game. Not only the disintegration of the Soviet Union looked like the disintegrations of Austria-Hungary and Roman Empire but also the economic worries of the US looked like experiences of ancient Athens and nineteenth-century Britain<sup>22</sup>. These similar views have been observed in the history for many times between the ancient Greeks and Persians, the US and the Soviet Union and finally between the West and both China and parts of the Islamic world as “*the barbarians at the Gates*”.

Although the winner was the US, the Cold War has damaged its economy. This damage was not as bad as the damage that led the Soviet Union’s collapse, but interventionist policies of the US increased this damage in the post-Cold War era. Clinton has aimed to change this situation by adopting new economic policies and by decreasing the interventionist strategy of the US. Clinton has aimed to promote democracy abroad with cooperation between the US and international organizations. The Clinton administration and its Republican opponents discussed over two choices of politics, which were being the global policeman or isolationist. Clinton supported that the US should not be global policeman of the world since interventionist policies could damage the economy of the US. If it were necessary, the US should intervene with international cooperation and legitimacy<sup>23</sup>. Clinton has decreased the budget of military expenditures and invested in health, economy and education. The priority was given to internal issues such as social problems. Furthermore, economic movements led the US to make trade agreements with the other emerging economies. He considered that the US must increase its economic power to deal with its external problems. Clinton has aimed to create a union between trading states, because he believed that a new world order could only be established with such a system. Yet, according to Republicans, the reduced defense budget affected the combat readiness of the US army. It is argued that the 1990s had been a decade of defense neglect<sup>24</sup>. The Clinton administration adopted a hybrid strategy which included the elements of “*power aggrandizement, opportunistic maneuvers, and liberal impulse*”<sup>25</sup>. Walt called Clinton’s strategy as “*half-hearted hegemon, hegemony on the cheap*”<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>22</sup> Barry Buzan, “Security, State, the New World Order, and Beyond”, Chapter 7, *On Security*, by Ronnie D. Lipschutz, New York, Colombia University Press, 1995, p: 193

<sup>23</sup> Earl C. Ravenal, “Isolationism as the denial of intervention-What foreign policy is and is not”, **Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing**, No:57, 27 April 2000. p:7

<sup>24</sup> “Rebuilding America’s defences, Strategy, Forces and Resources for a new century”, A report of The Project For The New American Century, September 2000, [www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf](http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf) 11.5.2007

<sup>25</sup> Deng, *ibid*.

<sup>26</sup> Stephen M. Walt, “Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.79, No.2, March-April 2000, p:75.

With the George W. Bush administration, neo-conservative approach became dominant in the US foreign policy. This approach has been a kind of liberal militarism which has supported to spread democracy and markets “*but not via international institutions and “by example” alone, but also through the use of military power where necessary*”<sup>27</sup>. The neo-conservative approach argues that the US should not be afraid to use its military power to shape the international order. Neo-conservatives often mix their Wilsonian rhetoric with a Hobbesian world view about politics, engaging in a more pure power politics approach<sup>28</sup>. The neo-conservative approach has been increasingly influential during the Bush administration after September 11 terrorist attacks.

The US president is required to submit a comprehensive report on the national security strategy to US Congress by law. In September 2002, the White House sent a report entitled “*The National Security of the United States*”<sup>29</sup>. US national security strategy of September 2002 was the point where the Bush doctrine was put into progress. This document explained that Washington has a “*sovereign right to use force to defend the US*” from the states that own weapons of mass destruction and cooperate with the terrorist organizations<sup>30</sup>.

The Bush administration adopted a new security policy after September 11. The response of the Bush administration to September 11 is known as the Bush doctrine<sup>31</sup>. The new security doctrine of the US has moralist rhetoric. According to this doctrine, the US will decide what is right or wrong. The war against terrorism is the war of democratic values and the order of democratic life. According to Robert and Keir Lieber, Bush’s national security strategy has four key themes. These are; pre-emptive military action, no toleration for any challenger against the US global military power, no hesitation to act alone if there is necessary, spreading democracy and the human rights to the world especially in Muslim states<sup>32</sup>. Similarly, Jervis argues that Bush doctrine has four elements.

*“First, there is a strong belief in the importance of domestic regime in determining its foreign policy and the related judgment that this is an opportune time to transform international politics. Second, there is perception of great threats that can be defeated only by new and efficient policies such as preventive war. Third, there is a willingness to act unilaterally when necessary. Fourth, there is an overriding sense that peace and stability in the world require the US to assert its primacy in world politics”*<sup>33</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> “American Foreign Policy”, <http://academic.umf.maine.edu/~erb/classes/4fp3.htm>, 20.5.2006

<sup>28</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> The American Society of International Law, “The Us Adoption Of New Doctrine On Use Of Force”, **The American Journal of International Law**, Volume 97, No 1, January 2003, p:203

<sup>30</sup> Noam Chomsky, Understanding Bush Doctrine, October 2, 2004, **Information Clearing House**, <http://207.44.245.159/article6996.htm>, 17.5.2007

<sup>31</sup> Conversation with Robert Jervis, <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people5/Jervis/jervis-con4.html>, 17.5.2007

<sup>32</sup> Keir A.Lieber and Robert Lieber, “The Bush National Security Strategy”, **U.S Foreign Policy Agenda**, Volume 7, Number 4, December 2002, p:32

<sup>33</sup> Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine”, **Political Science Quarterly**, September 2003, Volume 118, Number 3, p:365

The duty of protecting the peace in the world against the enemies of the modern world belongs to the US. This classification seems as a recipe of Samuel Huntington's thesis "*clash of civilizations*". Huntington argued that the enemies of the Western civilization would be Islam and Confucianism<sup>34</sup>. Axis of evil which was mentioned by Bush belongs to these civilizations that Huntington underlined. The Northern Korea for Bush and China for Huntington are guilty for supporting the Islamic civilization against the Western civilization. This leads to a conflict between the West and Islam<sup>35</sup>. Bush told that he was understood wrong, but "*crusade*" can show his subconscious. Some fundamentalist Protestants bless the policies of Bush. Bush explained that the military of the US will have the power to avoid the military developments of the other states to beat their power. A probable military development will make another state as an enemy for the US.

During the Clinton administration, the US supported multilateralism and wanted to continue to be hegemonic power by economy. On the other hand, Bush has supported unilateralism. Bush security doctrine tries to combine moralist rhetoric with realism<sup>36</sup>. The difference between realism and the Bush doctrine is morality because realism does not include moral values<sup>37</sup>.

There is an argument about the issue that there are several things in the Bush doctrine that fit with realism. Preventive war strategy has been a realist concept but spreading democracy does not completely fit with realism. Bush argued that "*we must demolish the evil*" but realists argue that the evil is inside of human nature so we cannot demolish ourselves<sup>38</sup>. According to Wright, the foreign policy of the Bush administration can be considered as "*progressive realism*".<sup>39</sup> Progressive realism starts with a doctrine of traditional realism where the main aim of the foreign policy is to serve American interests. "*But in these days, serving American interests means abandoning another traditional belief of realists — that so long as foreign governments don't endanger American interests on the geopolitical chess board, their domestic affairs don't concern us*"<sup>40</sup>. Wright argues that when Americans have been threatened by the Arab governments that support radical Islam, by the African states which could turn into terrorist havens, classical realism's indifference to the internal issues of

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<sup>34</sup> For more information: Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash Of Civilizations", Foreign Affairs, Volume 72, No:3, Summer 1993, pp:22-49

<sup>35</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban, November 2002, Yeni Amerikan Güvenlik Doktrini ve Uluslararası İlişkiler(The new security doctrine of the US and international relations), **2023 Dergisi**, p:36

<sup>36</sup> John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", **International Security** Vol.19 No.3, 1994/95 p:21.

<sup>37</sup> Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and The Limits of Cooperation. A Realist Critique of The Newest Liberal Institutionalism", **International Organization**, 42:3, 1988, p:498

<sup>38</sup> Conversation with Robert Jervis, *ibid*

<sup>39</sup> It is now possible to build a foreign policy paradigm that comes close to squaring the circle — reconciling the humanitarian aims of idealists with the powerful logic of realists.

<sup>40</sup> Robert Wright, 16.07.2006, An American Foreign Policy that Both Realists and Idealists Should Fall in Love With, [www.nytimes.com/2006/07/16/opinion/16wright.html?ex=1310702400&en=a15083fa1cff3536&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/16/opinion/16wright.html?ex=1310702400&en=a15083fa1cff3536&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss)

the nations have been invalid. According to Wright, this does not mean acceptance of international law and not to fight a war without the approval of the United Nations Security Council. It means it has a cost. As it can be seen in Iraq, ignoring the Security Council and international opinion can lead to deterioration of the image. This situation decreases the reliability of the US on promoting justification in invasions by self-defense or imminent threat and strengthening the United Nations' power as a weapon inspector<sup>41</sup>.

The Bush Doctrine supported US foreign policy called "*selective engagement*"<sup>42</sup>,<sup>43</sup> Briefly, it means to engage with the national interests. A probable US intervention has been based on national interests, economic costs, a potential loss and a suitable coalition. At the beginning of his duty, the Bush administration didn't pay attention to foreign relations, especially in the electoral campaigns. He considered the main problems in the inner politics such as unemployment, social rights, education, taxes etc.<sup>44</sup>. However, September 11 has changed the agenda of the Bush administration. The administration has realised that there were conflicts in the world and this might spread to their homeland<sup>45</sup>. Yet, the US administration started to apply unilateral policies after September 11. Colin Powell (Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the US) rejected unilateralism, but after this rejection the US ceased from the anti ballistic missile treaty. However, unilateralism has started long before September 11. The Bush administration ceased from the Kyoto treaty and rejected establishing an international common court of war crimes<sup>46</sup>. In addition, the US didn't try to find international legitimacy for their intervention as it has tried to find during the first Gulf War. President Bush has stated that "*if you are not with us, you're against us*".

### 1.1.2 Debate about American Power and Foreign Policies:

*"God has not been preparing the English speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self contemplation and self-admiration. No! He has made us the master organizers of the world . . . He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead the regeneration of the world"*

Senator Albert Beveridge, January 9, 1900<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> Ali İhsan Gürler, 2005, **Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi ve Bush Doktrini**(The Greater Middle East Project and the Bush Doctrine), IQ Kültür Sanat ve Yayıncılık, İstanbul, p:317.

<sup>43</sup> Selective engagement means the process you choose should be based on the out you seek to achieve coupled with expectations and the best interests of the audiences and constituents you intend to affect. More can be found at Jim Lukaszewski, 20 March 2000, "Selective Engagement; A Powerful Strategy For Managing Your Communications Destiny", **Strategy**, No:9.  
[http://www.e911.com/strategy/Synopsis-PR\\_Reporter-Strategy-9\\_Selective\\_Engagement..](http://www.e911.com/strategy/Synopsis-PR_Reporter-Strategy-9_Selective_Engagement..)

<sup>44</sup> Gürler, *ibid*, p:318

<sup>45</sup> Oğuz Yılmaz, "Terör ve Yeni Dünya Düzeni(Terror and the New World Order)", **Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi**, October 2002, No:374, p:10

<sup>46</sup> Gürler, *ibid*, p:322

<sup>47</sup> *Congressional Record*(56th Cong., 1st Session) Vol. XXXIII,  
[www2.wwnorton.com/college/history/ralph/workbook/ralprs30.htm](http://www2.wwnorton.com/college/history/ralph/workbook/ralprs30.htm)

Today, the debate on US power and foreign policies includes the questions of legalization, justification and morality. In March 2003, the UN Security Council vetoed the resolution for an intervention to Iraq. Wallerstein argued that it was a political humiliation and universally regarded as such. According to him, the US has lost legitimacy so it cannot be called hegemonic power anymore. There is no legitimacy now and that is crucial<sup>48</sup>. According to Robert Jervis, getting consensus on such actions can be difficult because the US is much stronger than its allies. The US must be prepared to act unilaterally<sup>49</sup>. Jervis argued that John Adams was correct in explaining to Thomas Jefferson that “*Power always sincerely, conscientiously, de tres bonne Foi (well-intentioned) believes itself Right. Power always thinks it has a great Soul, and vast Views, beyond the Comprehension of the Weak; and that it is doing God’s Service, when it is violating all his Laws*”<sup>50</sup>. Eventually, the US unilateralist actions in Iraq War have shown that the US has become the major threat to peace and George Bush has been disliked more than Bin Laden in many countries<sup>51</sup>. According to Stephen M. Walt, the US position of primacy fosters fear and resistance because the US is so strong and its impact on others so pervasive, “*it inevitably attracts suspicion from other states and finds it difficult to elicit their full and enthusiastic cooperation*”<sup>52</sup>. Not only have the others’ fears about the US power but also the US unilateralist actions decreased cooperation between the US and the World. The US rejection of policies which were endorsed by the rest of the international community, include the Ottawa Convention banning land mines, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, the verification protocol for the 1972 Biological Weapons convention, and the new International Criminal Court has decreased the reliability of the US cooperation. “*Only the United States and Somalia have not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the United States is the only advanced industrialized state not to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women*”<sup>53</sup>.

The US has not been able to justify its unilateralist policies in Iraq. “*War on Terrorism*” emerged with great support and goes on until unilateralist and unjustified policies of the US were established in the Middle East. Although Bush and his colleagues may have cynically exaggerated the

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<sup>48</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, “US Weakness and the Struggle for Hegemony”, **Monthly Review**, Volume 55, No 3, July-August 2003, [www.monthlyreview.org/0703wallerstein.htm](http://www.monthlyreview.org/0703wallerstein.htm), 19.5.2007

<sup>49</sup> Robert Jervis, “Why the Bush Doctrine can not be Sustained?”, **Political Science Quarterly**, Volume 120, No 3, Fall 2005, p:351

<sup>50</sup> Adams to Jefferson, 2 February 1816, In Lester Cappan, ed. **The Adams-Jefferson Letters**, Volume 2, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina press, 1959, p:463 as cited in Jervis, *ibid*, p:353

<sup>51</sup> Susan Sachs, “Poll Finds Hostility Hardening Towards US Policies”, March 17 2004, The New York Times, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res=9A06E0DD1431F934A25750C0A9629C8B63>, 19.5.2007

<sup>52</sup> Stephen M. Walt, “In the National Interest”, **Boston Review**, February-March 2005, [www.bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.html](http://www.bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.html), 19.5.2007

<sup>53</sup> Ralph Carter, “Leadership at Risk: The Perils of Unilateralism”, **PS: Political Science and Politics**, Volume 36, No 1, January 2003, p:17

ties between Saddam and Al Qaeda, they do appear to believe that only non-democratic regimes, if not all, will sponsor terrorism and that without state support, terrorism will disappear.

Use of force has also been discussed in the US for a long time. At the height of the Cold War, in 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger developed six criteria for deciding when to use the US forces abroad. These criteria, which became known as the Weinberger doctrine, outlined specific tests, which should be met before deploying the US army. This doctrine asks: Is a vital national interest at stake? Will we commit enough forces to win? Do we have clearly defined political and military objectives? Will we reassess and adjust our forces as necessary? Will congress and the American people support the action? Is the use of force our last resort? This doctrine was established because of the failure in Vietnam, and terrorist bombing of the US marines in Lebanon in 1983<sup>54</sup>. Colin Powell, presented the military view of four propositions on when it is appropriate to use force: *“Force should be used only as a last resort, military force should be used only when there is a clear-cut military objective, military force should be used only when we can measure that the military objective has been achieved, military force should be used only in an overwhelming fashion”*<sup>55</sup>.

The former President George Bush described four principles on the decisions to use military force:

*“The relative importance of an interest is not a guide. Military force may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important, but less than vital. Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice. A desire for international support is not a prerequisite for acting, although acting in concert with allies and friends is preferred. It will be essential to have a clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing US forces once the mission is completed”*<sup>56</sup>

According to Jervis, applying *“Preventive War”* as a security policy can only be a hegemonic power’s behavior. Yet, whereas a legal system applies the same rules to all actors, a hegemonic system is quite differentiated, with the hegemon having a role distinct from that of other states<sup>57</sup>. Bush’s attempt to broaden the *“war on terrorism”* by characterizing Iran, Iraq and Northern Korea as an *“Axis of Evil”* produced strong opposition in Europe, from both people and leaders. The

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<sup>54</sup> Kathy L. Johnson, “The Post Cold War Era and the Weinberger Doctrine”, Research Project, The Industrial College of Armed Forces, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington D.C., 1994, p:1, [www.ndu.edu/library/ic6/94S16.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/library/ic6/94S16.pdf), 28.5.2007

<sup>55</sup> Edwin J. Arnold, Jr, “The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interests”, **Parameters**, Spring 1994, p:8,

<sup>56</sup> George Bush, “The Use of Military Force: The President's Difficult Choice,” **Defense Issues**, 8 (No. 1, 1993), p: 2. as cited in Edwin J. Arnold, Jr, “The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interests”, **Parameters**, Spring 1994, p:8

<sup>57</sup> Robert Jervis, “The Remaking of A Unipolar World”, **The Washington Quarterly**, Volume 29, No 3, Summer 2006, p:14.

evidences that were put forward by the US to link the “*axis of Evil*” with September 11 were not valid for the World<sup>58</sup>. The political process leading up to the Iraq war shows the importance of justificatory strategies. Before and during the Iraq war, the Bush administration has changed the previously dominant justification (Saddam’s direct threat to the region) to a new justification (Saddam’s direct threat to the US homeland). The latter emerged with the popular declarations such as Saddam’s linkage with transnational terrorism and obtainment of weapons of mass destruction. In 1990s, the US supported humanitarian motives for justifying interventions in Iraq. It was difficult for the US to go to war in 2003 because it changed its strategy. The US put Iraq’s military threat forward to justify war but this strategy was not as popular as humanitarian motives.<sup>59</sup> Goodman argues that the humanitarian rationale for invading Iraq was generally not believed or accepted, because the administration’s humanitarian rationale for the conflict came to the fore only after the military defeat of the Hussein regime and the realization that Iraq had no WMDs. “*The human rights conditions in Iraq were conspicuously unlike previous cases in which humanitarian intervention was considered appropriate*”<sup>60</sup>. According to Richard Falk, the US as the dominant state in a unipolar world, enjoys an exemption from legal accountability with respect to uses of force irreconcilable with the UN Charter system; other states, in contrast, would be generally held to account unless directly protected under the United States exemption<sup>61</sup>. Richard Falk argues that humanitarian motives in interventions are used to justify the intentions for the national interests. No state dares to intervene the Chechenians, Tibetans and Kashmiris with humanitarian intentions<sup>62</sup>. Sometimes the target for humanitarian intervention can be selected according to political interests. This selection contradicts with moral values that are supported by the aggressor as in case of Iraq. John Mearsheimer argues that the war was motivated in good part by a desire to make Israel more secure. The “*real threat*” from Iraq was not a threat to the US, it was against Israel.<sup>63</sup>

The US strategy of war against terrorism was stated as follows:

*“Our strategy also recognizes that the War on Terror is a different kind of war. From the beginning, it has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. Not only do we fight our terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule. The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our national power and influence. Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities to*

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<sup>58</sup> Carter, *Ibid*, p:18

<sup>59</sup> Ryan Goodman, “Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War”, *The American Journal of Law*, Volume 100, No 1, January 2006, p:132

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, p:133

<sup>61</sup> Richard Falk, “What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?”, *The American Journal of International Law*, Volume 97, No 3, July 2003, p:593

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, p:597

<sup>63</sup> John Mearsheimer- Stephen M. Walt, “The Israel Lobby and the US Foreign Policy”, March 2006, [www.ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011/\\$File/rwp\\_06\\_011\\_walt.pdf](http://www.ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011/$File/rwp_06_011_walt.pdf), 23.5.2007, p:30,

*protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive”<sup>64</sup>.*

In the US strategy of war against terrorism, it is argued that the US would advance effective democracies as the long term antidote to the ideology of terrorism. In addition, it would prevent attacks by terrorist networks and it would deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use of them. Furthermore, it would deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states and it would deny terrorists control of any nation and it would lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures that the US need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure its ultimate success.

Jim Lobe argues that the US has been losing war against terrorism. Afghanistan and Iraq have not been secured. The war between Lebanon, Hezbollah, Hamas and Israel has shown that new instabilities will occur in the region. The US has started to talk about withdrawing troops from Iraq<sup>65</sup>. According to Jim Lobe, the neo-Conservatives (Neo-Cons) have stated that this was Saddam’s will and effort to get nuclear weapons before the Iraq invasion (Shortly stated as such as Richard Perle and Dick Cheney), later the US accepted that there were no nuclear weapons, but have brought chaos to Iraq<sup>66</sup>. The erroneous intelligence about the Iraq’s pre-war WMD programme destroyed the reliability of the US motives on war against terrorism. The CIA was blamed for the wrong intelligence about the Iraq’s nuclear programme<sup>67</sup>. Jeffrey Blankort argues that Israel was a ‘*full partner*’ in the U.S. and British intelligence failures that exaggerated former president Saddam Hussein’s nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq<sup>68</sup>. Thus, the invasion of Iraq has not been justified since the nuclear weapons were not found in Iraq, on the contrary to the aims of invasion. Moral values are damaged and terrorism has increased its violence since September 11.

## **1.2 Evolution of the GMEI:**

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<sup>64</sup> “National Strategy For Combating Terrorism”, September 2006, [www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf), 23.5.2007, p:1

<sup>65</sup> Jim Lobe, 2006, “US:9/11 Five Years in, Bush is losing Terror War”, [www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34667](http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34667), 22.5.2007

<sup>66</sup> Jim Lobe, “Nuclear Drumbeat, Saddam Hussein, Yellow Cake, Joe Wilson, Valeri Plame and The Lies that Started A War”, [www.coldtype.net/Assets.07/Essays/0407.Cheney.pdf](http://www.coldtype.net/Assets.07/Essays/0407.Cheney.pdf), p:10, 23.5.2007

<sup>67</sup> Jim Lobe, “Tenet Resignation Exposes Accelerating Intrigue Within Bush Administration”, June 9 2004, [www.fpiif.org/pdf/gac/0406tenet.pdf](http://www.fpiif.org/pdf/gac/0406tenet.pdf), 21.5.2007

<sup>68</sup> Jeffrey Blankort, “A War For Israel”, [www.ifamericansknew.org/download/warforisrael.pdf](http://www.ifamericansknew.org/download/warforisrael.pdf), p:31, 21.5.2007



### 1.2.1 The Definition of the Middle East

The Middle East has included nearly all the threats to the modern world, since the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century<sup>69</sup>. The contemporary Middle East has been portrayed as a mysterious region of intrigue and war; also as the cradle of terrorism, religious fundamentalism and barbaric rule. Media regularly reports stories of continuous conflicts and crimes from this region<sup>70</sup>. Not only its political and security problems but also its geography and economy, have made the Middle East as one of the most important regions in the world. The mixture of relations, problems and political conflicts, betrayals and friendships, poverty and economic prosperity has been included in the Middle East. The developments, which have directed the historical events, occurred in this region. Furthermore, the Middle East has been considered as a precious region by the traditional and modern empires. These empires have fought to gain the control over the Middle East for centuries<sup>71</sup>. In short, the Middle East has always been considered as an important geographic area. It has attracted many civilizations such as Persians, Macedonians, Mongols, Egyptians, Crusaders, the Ottoman Empire and European states for various reasons. One reason is the richness of the natural resources in this region<sup>72</sup>. The Middle East has the 2/3 of the world's oil resources in addition to great gas resources and work force. Seventy percentages of world's oil resources, thirty-five percentages of world natural gas resources are found in this region. Thus, this region has been the center of world energy resources. In addition, seventy percentages of world's armament import occurs in this region. Thus, controlling this region provides hegemony, control of world economy and ability to decide on production and consumption in the world<sup>73</sup>. Also especially, Mesopotamia, which lies between the rivers (Tigris and Euphrates), is noted as the most productive land in the world which includes the heritages of the ancient civilizations of Sumerians, Acadians, Persians, Babylonians and Assyrians.

Secondly, it has a rich culture. The most famous scholars of Islam civilization have lived in the Middle East. This region mostly consists of Turks, Arabs and Persians. Kurds and Jews have played important role in the historical and political development of the region<sup>74</sup>. The other ethnic groups are Caucasians, Berbers, Marsh Arabs, and Bedouins. There are also many religious groups in the region. This has given a multicultural structure to the region. The religious groups are Sunni, Shi'a, Sufi, Alawite, Wahabi, Druze, Catholics, and Greek orthodox, Maronites, Armenians, Coptics, Assyrians, Protestants, Anglicans, Melkites and Jews. The first and the biggest libraries of the world history was established in this region. The rich heritage of literature through poetry and story telling

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<sup>69</sup> Bülent Aras, **Irak Savaşı Sonrası Ortadoğu** (The Middle East after the Iraq War), İstanbul, Tasam Yayınları, 2004, p:9

<sup>70</sup> Beverly Milton-Edwards, **Contemporary Politics in the Middle East**, Oxford, , 2000 p:1

<sup>71</sup> Tayyar Arı, **Geçmişten Günümüze Ortadoğu Siyaset Savaş ve Diplomasi** (From past to Future, The Middle East, Politics, War and Diplomacy), İstanbul, Alfa Yayıncılık, 2004, p:9

<sup>72</sup> Fatih Balcı ve Hüdaverdi Balcı , “Tarihsel Süreç İçerisinde Ortadoğu” (The Middle East in the Historical Period), <http://www.turkishweekly.net/turkce/makale.php?id=73> (18.5.2006).

<sup>73</sup> Arı, *Ibid*, p:27

<sup>74</sup> Arı, *Ibid*, p:25

give us the knowledge about the great empires such as Umayyad, Abbasids and the Ottomans. Throughout the history the great empire builders, diplomats, religious leaders, poets and scientists have emerged from the Middle East to influence and inform European Cultures<sup>75</sup>. Most of the wonders of world such as Pyramids, Gardens of Babylonia are also found in the Middle East<sup>76</sup>.

Thirdly, the Middle East has strategic importance based on its geography. The Middle East has been a bridge among Asia, Europe and Africa. Water routes and passageways are connected with each other at this region<sup>77</sup>. This region has been the center of interests of geopolitical strategists. The region that was defined as “*World Island*” by Mackinder is situated in this region<sup>78</sup>. Spykman’s “*Rimland*” includes the Middle East. Spykman argued that “*Rimland*” has been important because of its demographic weight and natural resources<sup>79</sup>. Mahan mentioned about the importance of controlling important sea trade routes. If a state wants to be the world power, it must control the trade routes at sea<sup>80</sup>. The key that leads to world sovereignty lies under controlling these routes. The Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal are situated in that region. The power of any state is indisputable when it controls this region. In the past the Ottoman Empire, than the United Kingdom and finally the US became the world power by controlling this region<sup>81</sup>. Finally, the most important holy places are located in the Middle East such as Jerusalem, Makkah and Medina in relation to three different religions; Islam, Christianity and Judaism. The prophets such as Moses, Jesus, Mohammad, and Abraham were born and lived in this region<sup>82</sup>.

Considering the use of the term, “*Middle East*”, the British intelligence agent Sir Thomas Gordon<sup>83</sup> first mentioned “*the Middle East*” during a speech about the Russian threat for the British interests in India, which Thomas Gordon<sup>84</sup> meant actually Persia (present-day Iran, and Afghanistan)<sup>85</sup>. Yet Al-Borsan argues that in academic literature, this term is first used in Alfred

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<sup>75</sup> Milton-Edwards, *Ibid.* p:3

<sup>76</sup> Balcı, *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> Atilla Sandıklı, “Küresel Gelişmeler Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi ve Türkiye’ye Yansımaları (Global Developments, The Greater Middle East Project and its impacts over Turkey)”, **Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi: Yeni Oluşumlar ve Değişen Dengeler**, İstanbul, Tasam Yayınları, 2006, p:17

<sup>78</sup> Halford John Mackinder, **Democratic Ideals and Reality: A study in the politics of Reconstruction**, Newyork, 1919, p:90

<sup>79</sup> G. Oral, “Silahlı Kuvvetler Dış politika ilişkisinde Jeopolitiğin yeri, Rolü ve etkisi” (The place, role and influence of Geopolitics in the relations between the Armed forces and foreign policy), <http://www.habusulu.com/makale56.htm>, 9.5.2007

<sup>80</sup> Oral, *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> Arı, *Ibid.* p:27

<sup>82</sup> Arı, *Ibid.* p:26

<sup>83</sup> Dr. Ahmet Selim Al-Borsan, “*The Broader Middle East, Political and Strategical Dimensions*”, **The International Political Journal, Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya**, ,October 2004, <http://www.siyassa.org.eg/esiyassa/search/getpage.asp?PageType=NORM&CVPath=%2Fesiyassa%2Fahram%2F2004%2F10%2F1%2Fessa2%2Ehtm&CWord=broader+middle+east>, 20.5.2007

<sup>84</sup> A British Intelligence Officer and Director of the Imperial Bank of Persia. He wrote an article in 1900.

<sup>85</sup> Brian Whitaker, “From Turkey to Tibet”, [www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,1154165,00.html](http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,1154165,00.html), 20.5.2007

Mahan's article "*The Persian Gulf and International Relations*," written in 1902. In this article, Mahan<sup>86</sup> mentions the importance of the "*Middle East*" for the British Empire and the British interests in India<sup>87</sup>. It is argued that "*Despite Gordon's earlier article, Mahan is usually credited with coining the term, and as an enthusiastic advocate of sea power*", since Mahan used the term for Gulf region<sup>88</sup>. Twenty articles can be found which were on the Middle Eastern question between the years 1902 and 1903 in Times magazine. Valentine Cherol, the head of a magazine's foreign department, enlarged the meaning of the term by including India - Persia, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, the east coast of Arabia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. "*In London, the Royal Geographical Society proposed extending the Middle East westwards to include all the Arabic-speaking lands, plus Turkey - an idea that was readily adopted in Britain*"<sup>89</sup>. Hence, in the beginning of the First World War, the British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill started a new development in the British foreign policy by establishing a new department to analyze the developments in the Middle East<sup>90</sup>. The studies in this department included the area of Palestine, trans-Jordan and Iraq, which is known to be the Near East in geography books. Unlike Britain, the US preferred to use the term "*Near East*". In 1909, a state department was established in the US called the Near East bureau. This department has been interested in affairs of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Abyssinia, Persia, Egypt and colonies belonging to those countries<sup>91</sup>. In this consideration, the British scholars developed the term "*Middle East*" and American scholars developed the term "*Near East*". Yet these two terms have indicated nearly the same region. However, the British scholars included the Arabic countries, Israel, Cyprus Island, Turkey and Iran, whereas American scholars included Israel and her Arabic neighbors<sup>92</sup>. The American strategists declared still there are different definitions of the Middle East region<sup>93</sup>. Some argue that the Middle East includes Egypt, Turkey, Iran in addition to Libya, Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, and Arab countries. Others argue that the Middle East includes the Arabic peninsula, Egypt, Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan. In the post Cold War era, again a new argument emerged about wider or greater Middle East "*to cover all the Asian countries from Tajikistan and Afghanistan at the borders of China to the central Asian states, the Caucasus and the Balkan as well as the North African countries!*"<sup>94</sup>.

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<sup>86</sup> [Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan \(27 September 1840 - 1 December 1914\)](#) was a [United States Navy](#) officer, naval strategist, and educator, widely considered the foremost theorist of [sea power](#). For more information please look at <http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Alfred%20Thayer%20Mahan>, 19.7.2006

<sup>87</sup> Al-Borsan, *Ibid*.

<sup>88</sup> Whitaker, *Ibid*.

<sup>89</sup> Whitaker, *Ibid*

<sup>90</sup> Fouad Ben Mahmud Yassen, "Possible Responsibilities and Advantages of The Greater Middle East and Norhtern Africa - GMP Project", <http://www.iksv.org/english/detay.asp?id=29>, 21.07.2006

<sup>91</sup> Whitaker, *Ibid*

<sup>92</sup> Oral Sander, *Anka'nın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü(The Fall of Phoenix)*, Ankara, Genkur Basımevi, , 1987, p:5

<sup>93</sup> Whitaker, *Ibid*

<sup>94</sup> Yassen, *Ibid*

The Middle East is considered as the “*Region in western [Asia](#) and northeast [Africa](#) that includes the nations on the Arabian Peninsula, [Egypt](#), [Iran](#), [Iraq](#), [Israel](#), [Jordan](#), [Lebanon](#), [Syria](#), and [Turkey](#)*”<sup>95</sup>. The definitions given indicate that there is no stable and rigid boundary for the Middle East. Thus, there is no consensus between the scholars on the states to be included in the Middle East<sup>96</sup>. Still, there is no a clear definition of the Middle East.

### 1.2.2 Historical Background of the GMEI:

The GMEI has started after the WW II with the competitive policies of the US and the Soviet Union in the Middle East. As it was explained in George Kennan’s article “*The Sources of Soviet Conduct*” as in well known name “*X article*” in the Foreign Affairs in 1947, “*the primary goal of the United States should be to prevent the spread of Communism to non-Communist nations; that is, to “contain” Communism within its borders*”<sup>97</sup>. In this connection, the Truman doctrine has given support to all regimes, in order to resist Communism. According to Daniel Pipes, the Middle East stands outside the great debate of American Foreign Policy since WW II, because foreign policy conservatives saw the Soviet Union danger as preeminent and viewed almost every facet of international relations through the prism of Soviet Union, thus conservatives based the US foreign policy against heavily armed and expansionist Soviet Union. Liberals argued for the primacy of local concerns such as tyranny, poverty, local wars, overpopulation, ecology and runaway technology. Liberals needed less spending on US military forces and gave more importance on domestic concerns<sup>98</sup>. According to Pipes;

*“Conservative looking at the Middle East hold that the Soviets have long been pursuing relentlessly a strategy aimed at driving the US out of the Middle East, dominating its people and bring the West to its knees. To the contrary, liberals discount both the Soviet aim of dominating the Middle East and the soviet capability of determining what happens there. The motive forces on the local scene are national and regional, so runs the argument, and the Soviet leaders, while winning friends when and where they can, are primarily concerned with security and stability on their frontiers and with keeping rival powers at a safe distance”*<sup>99</sup>.

Efimenco argues that the US would not hold the position of disinterested source of aspiration for the Arab world that it enjoyed in the era before 1939, because world conditions have changed and the impact of the US over the Middle East has changed accordingly. With the shifts in the balance of power, the US government has acquired definite political, economic and strategic interests in the region. National interest rather than idealistic principles, has guided the US administrations in the

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<sup>95</sup> *Middle East*, [http://www.answers.com/library/Britannica+Concise+Encyclopedia-cid-1390769092\\_22.7.2006](http://www.answers.com/library/Britannica+Concise+Encyclopedia-cid-1390769092_22.7.2006)

<sup>96</sup> Yassen, *Ibid*

<sup>97</sup> X, *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*, July, 1947 <http://bsalanie.blogs.com/Kennan.pdf>, 23.5.2007

<sup>98</sup> Daniel Pipes, “Breaking All the Rules, American Debate Over the Middle East”, **International Security**, Volume 9, No 2, Autumn 1984, p:124

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid*, p: 126

Middle East politics<sup>100</sup>. On the other hand, Charles A. Kupchan argues that the US interests in the Middle East have remained stable since the early postwar years. These have been maintaining access to oil, containing direct and indirect Soviet advances and protecting Israel's security<sup>101</sup>. Barry Rubin argues that the US has created a contemporary empire by controlling over a high proportion of the world's resources since 1945. This manifestation of imperialism has been based not upon the traditional imperialist practice of obtaining formal sovereignty over other countries, but rather upon the all-pervasive penetration. It has shaped and controlled political and economic structures of countries which still retain nominal independence providing military aid, training and equipment to build up armed forces loyal to US supported oligarchies and dictatorships, using foreign aid to facilitate the modernization of the infrastructures of these countries, cultivating elites which are eager for the benefits acquiring from the neo-colonial relations that allow them to tap the flow of the US capital into their countries for preventing emergence of the radical ideas and finally with CIA networks which provide intelligence and propaganda for the US<sup>102</sup>. At the same time, the US corporations have obtained control in developing markets, secured investments opportunities and provided cheap raw-materials/resources in the Middle East. The inevitable involvement and presence of the US in the Middle East started with the Suez Crisis. Peter L.Hahn argues that the Suez Crisis in 1956 was seen as a possible showdown between the US and the Soviet Union and therefore the allies of the US, Britain and France, were warned and had to withdraw their forces<sup>103</sup>. After this event, the US presence in the Middle East increased proportionally. Hahn continues:

*"In reaction to these consequences of the Suez War, the president declared the Eisenhower Doctrine, a major new regional security policy in early 1957. Proposed in January and approved by Congress in March, the doctrine pledged that the United States would distribute economic and military aid and, if necessary, use military force to contain communism in the Middle East. To implement the plan, presidential envoy James P. Richards toured the region, dispensing tens of millions of dollars in economic and military aid to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Libya.. The Suez Crisis stands as a watershed event in the history of American foreign policy. By overturning traditional assumptions in the West about Anglo-French hegemony in the Middle East, by exacerbating the problems of revolutionary nationalism personified by Nasser, by stoking Arab-Israeli conflict, and by threatening to offer the Soviet Union a pretext for penetrating the region, the Suez Crisis drew the United States toward substantial, significant, and enduring involvement in the Middle East<sup>104</sup>".*

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<sup>100</sup> N. Marbury Efimenco, "American Impact Upon Middle East Leadership", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 69, No. 2. (June, 1954), p:205.

<sup>101</sup> Charles A.Kupchan, "American Globalism in the Middle East: The Roots of Regional Security Policy", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 103, No. 4. (Winter, 1988-1989), p:587.

<sup>102</sup> Barry Rubin, "America's Mid-East Policy: A Marxist Perspective", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol. 2, No. 3. (Spring, 1973), p:51

<sup>103</sup> Peter L. Hahn "The Suez Crisis A Crisis That Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East", **Foreign Policy Agenda**, April 2006 , E-journal USA, Significant Events in US Foreign Policy 1900-2001, <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0406/iipe/iipe0406.pdf>, p:29

<sup>104</sup> Peter L. Hahn, *ibid*.

The US President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated a plan on January 5 1957 which abounded in anti-Soviet remarks, described the present situation in the Middle East as "*critical*," demanded the authority to use the armed forces of the United States in the Middle East at any moment he might consider it necessary, without asking for the consent of Congress<sup>105</sup>. Eisenhower demanded to be empowered to render military and economic "*aid*" to the countries of the Middle East. This plan was later called as "*the Eisenhower Doctrine*". Ali İhsan Gürler argues that the US administration needed to redefine its foreign policy in the Middle East with "*Eisenhower Doctrine*" after ten years from declaration of Truman doctrine. Eisenhower doctrine was aimed to reduce the Soviet influence over the Middle East and it was put into practice with the presence of the US troops in Lebanon<sup>106</sup>.

*"Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a country could request American economic assistance and/or aid from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state. Eisenhower singled out the Soviet threat in his doctrine by authorizing the commitment of U.S. forces "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." President Eisenhower believed that, as a result of the Suez conflict, a power vacuum had formed in the Middle East due to the loss of prestige of Great Britain and France. Eisenhower feared that this had allowed Nasser to spread his pan-Arab policies and form dangerous alliances with Jordan and Syria, and had opened the Middle East to Soviet influence. Eisenhower wanted this vacuum filled by the United States before the Soviets could step in to fill the void. Because Eisenhower feared that radical nationalism would combine with international communism in the region and threaten Western interests, he was willing to commit to sending U.S. troops to the Middle East under certain circumstances."*<sup>107</sup>.

When Richard Nixon became the president in 1969, considering the costs of Vietnam War, he has changed the US strategies in the Persian Gulf after the UK statement on leaving region. President Nixon concluded that the radicals and the Soviet Union had to be failed for the national interests of the US by establishing modern Arab governments<sup>108</sup>. The US would not intervene alone to make the states free in the region, it asked for support of its allies<sup>109</sup>. In the beginning, the US did not want to take the UK's position in the region. It aimed to provide military and economic aid to the

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<sup>105</sup> "The Eisenhower Doctrine", [www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1957eisenhowerdoctrine.html](http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1957eisenhowerdoctrine.html), 25.5.2007

<sup>106</sup> Gürler, *Ibid*, p:220

<sup>107</sup> "The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957", [www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/82548.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/82548.htm), 25.5.2007

<sup>108</sup> Shibley Telhami, **The Stakes: The America and The Middle East**, Westview Pres, Colorado, 2002, p:51 as cited in Ali İhsan Gürler, *Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi ve Bush Doctrine* (The Greater Middle East Project and The Bush Doctrine), IQ Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2005, P:221

<sup>109</sup> Henry Kissinger, **Years of Upheaval**, Little, Brown and Company, 1982 as cited in Ali İhsan Gürler, *Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi ve Bush Doctrine* (The Greater Middle East Project and The Bush Doctrine), IQ Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2005, P:221

states in the Persian Gulf. Especially Nixon aimed to strengthen Iran and Saudi Arabia by providing military aid to protect the Persian Gulf from the influence of the Soviet Union. This doctrine was cancelled with the Islam revolution and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Iran Islam Revolution and the Soviet invasion have shown that the US would not protect its interests by supporting the states in the region. The president Jimmy Carter declared the new Middle East policy of the US in January 23, 1980.

Carter stated that ;

*“An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. We are prepared to work with other countries in the region to share a cooperative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet which enhances the independence, security, and prosperity of all.”<sup>110</sup>*

Joe Stork argues that the Carter Doctrine underscored the stake of US capital in the Middle East. One manifestation of the preeminence of the region is the US military relationship with regimes there<sup>111</sup>. The Carter doctrine organized a rapid deployment joint task force to deter a possible Soviet intervention in the region and negotiated with the states to establish new military bases in the region. This policy was sustained under the Reagan administration. The US supported Mojahiddins against the Soviet invasion and Iraq against Iran during the 1980s<sup>112</sup>.

According to Avi Schlaim, when Reagan became the president, he immediately emphasized the East-West axis of all international conflicts and declared a new foreign policy over the Middle East based on four main assumptions. The first was that the threat to the security of the oil-producing states. Second, the Arab-Israel conflict area and the Gulf are two different areas which have different dynamics and different rules. Third, it was assumed that Arab-Israeli conflict had become less acute and less significant and that it could therefore safely be left on the back burner. Fourth, all the states in the region must be defended against the Soviet Union<sup>113</sup>.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War ended but new instabilities emerged in the World. The Gulf crisis was the first in which the superpowers on the same side. Saddam provided the first major challenge to the post Cold War international order in which the US is the hegemonic political and military power. This is why the US reacted immediately and decisively to the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait. Not only would Iraq's invasion in Kuwait allow Baghdad to control half of the

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<sup>110</sup> Jimmy Carter, “State of the Union Address 1980”,

<http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml>, 26.5.2007

<sup>111</sup> Joe Stork, “The Carter Doctrine and US Bases in the Middle East”, **MERIP Reports**, No. 90, The Vietnam Syndrome. (Sep., 1980), p:3

<sup>112</sup> Gürler, *Ibid*, p:223

<sup>113</sup> Avi Shlaim, “The Impact of U.S. Policy in the Middle East”, **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol. 17, No. 2. (Winter, 1988), p:20

world's oil reserves and dictate oil prices, but also it was also a direct challenge to the global leadership of the US<sup>114</sup>.

The euphoria caused by the drawing down of the Cold War was dramatically overshadowed by the August 2, 1990, invasion of the small nation of Kuwait by Iraq. President Bush strongly condemned the Iraqi action, called for Iraq's unconditional withdrawal, and sent a major deployment of U.S. troops to the Middle East. He united one of the most powerful military and political coalitions of modern times, with military forces from Asia, Europe, and Africa, as well as the Middle East. In the days and weeks following the invasion, the U.N. Security Council passed 12 resolutions condemning the Iraqi invasion and imposing wide-ranging economic sanctions on Iraq. On November 29, it approved the use of force if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991. Gorbachev's Soviet Union, once Iraq's major arms supplier, made no effort to protect its former client. The United States, in coalition with Great Britain, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other countries, succeeded in liberating Kuwait with a devastating, U.S.-led air campaign that lasted slightly more than a month. It was followed by a massive invasion of Kuwait and Iraq by armored and airborne infantry forces. With their superior speed, mobility, and firepower, the allied forces overwhelmed the Iraqi forces in a land campaign lasting only 100 hours.

*“The victory, however, was incomplete and unsatisfying. The U.N. resolution, which Bush enforced to the letter, called only for the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. Saddam Hussein remained in power, savagely repressing the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south, both of whom the United States had encouraged to rebel. Hundreds of oil-well fires, deliberately set in Kuwait by the Iraqis, took until November 1991 to extinguish. Saddam's regime also apparently thwarted U.N. inspectors who, operating in accordance with Security Council resolutions, worked to locate and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear facilities more advanced than had previously been suspected and huge stocks of chemical weapons<sup>115</sup>.”*

Georger Corm argues that with the end of Gulf War, the Arab world turned its place where it left a century ago, when the UK was the uncontested master of Arab's destiny. Today the US dominates the region. It deploys an extraordinary armada to destroy Iraq in the Gulf War and maintains an immense military presence in the region<sup>116</sup>. On November 3, 1992, when Clinton became the president of the US, he

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<sup>114</sup> Fawaz A. Gerges, “Regional Security after the Gulf Crisis: The American Role”, **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol. 20, No. 4. (Summer, 1991), p:62

<sup>115</sup> “The New Conservatism and the New World Order”,  
<http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/histryotln/order.htm> , 26.5.2007

<sup>116</sup> Georger Corm, “Avoiding the Obvious: Arab Perspectives on US Hegemony in the Middle East”, **Middle East Report**, No. 208, US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Critical Assessments,(Autumn, 1998) ,p:23



established “*Dual Containment*” policy against Iran and Iraq to protect the national interests of the US. Stephen Hubbell argues that conventional balance of power theory that had held that region’s natural leaders, Iraq and Iran, should be pitted against one another to prevent either from becoming dominant and jeopardizing the flow of the oil to the West<sup>117</sup>. This policy was not successful because Saddam continued its power and Iran did not change its attitude to the US<sup>118</sup>. A United Nations-administered economic sanctions regime, designed to allow Iraq to sell enough oil to meet humanitarian needs, proved relatively ineffective. Saddam funneled much of the proceeds to himself, leaving large masses of his people in misery. Military “*no-fly zones*,” imposed to prevent the Iraqi government from deploying its air power against rebellious Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south, required constant U.S. and British air patrols, which regularly fended off anti-aircraft missiles<sup>119</sup>. The United States also provided the main backing for the U.N. weapons inspection teams, whose mission was to ferret out Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear programs, verify the destruction of existing weapons of mass destruction, and suppress ongoing programs to manufacture them. Increasingly obstructed, the U.N. inspectors were finally expelled in 1998. On this, as well as earlier occasions of provocation, the United States responded with limited missile strikes. Saddam, Secretary of State Madeline Albright declared that, Saddam was still “*in his box*.”<sup>120</sup> According to Leon T.Haddar, Clinton’s Middle East policy can be described as a “*Bush plus, Bush Minus*” approach, or a cost-free Pax Americana: trying to continue his predecessor’s Middle East policies without investing any major military and diplomatic resources in the form of Desert Storm or the Madrid peace conference<sup>121</sup>.

Osama Bin Laden emerged as threat during the Clinton administration organizing huge car bomb near World Trade Center in February 1993. This attack can be understood as the first action of Al-Queda.

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<sup>117</sup> Stephen Hubbell, “The Containment Myth: US Middle East Policy in Theory and Practice”, **Middle East Report**, No. 208, US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Critical Assessments (Autumn, 1998), p:9

<sup>118</sup> Gürler, *Ibid*, p:225

<sup>119</sup> “Bridge to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/histryotln/bridge.htm>, 26.5.2007

<sup>120</sup> “Bridge to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/histryotln/bridge.htm>, 26.5.2007

<sup>121</sup> Leon T.Hadar, “Muddling Through in the New World Disorder-And in the Middle East”, **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol. 23, No. 4. (Summer, 1994),p:64

In 2000, when George W. Bush was elected as the president of the US, he was expected to deal with domestic problems. He wanted to reform educational system and social security system for the US but the Bush presidency changed its policy after September 11, 2001, because the United States suffered the most devastating foreign attack ever against its mainland. The Bush administration obtained passage of the US Patriot Act on October 26, 2001. This was designed to fight domestic terrorism. The new law considerably broadened the search, seizure, and detention powers of the federal government. Furthermore, the president Bush established a global war on terrorism and attacked Osama bin Laden and the fundamentalist Muslim Taliban government of Afghanistan. The president Bush identified the sources of terrorism and explained the precautions against terrorism on his state of union 2002. The president named an "axis of evil" that he thought threatened the nation; Iraq, Iran, and North Korea<sup>122</sup>. Especially one of them was the most dangerous threat for the US. This is Iraq.

Saddam Hussein had successfully ejected U.N. weapons inspectors.

*"It was widely believed, not just in the United States but throughout the world, that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and might be working to acquire a nuclear capability. In November 2002, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 requiring Iraq to afford U.N. inspectors the unconditional right to search anywhere in Iraq for banned weapons."<sup>123</sup>*

Nevertheless, in January 2003, the chief inspector Hans Blix presented a report to the United Nations declaring that Iraq had failed to account for its weapons of mass destruction.

Despite Saddam's unwilling and unsatisfactory cooperation with the UN weapon inspectors, the US plans to topple him encountered unusually strong opposition in much of the Europe. France, Russia and Germany opposed the use of force and they made impossible the passage of a new Security Council Resolution that would authorize the use of force against Iraq. On the other hand, the UK became the major ally to the US in the war against terrorism, and then Australia, most of the

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<sup>122</sup> "Bridge to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/histryotln/bridge.htm>, 26.5.2007

<sup>123</sup> "Bridge to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/histryotln/bridge.htm>, 26.5.2007

newly independent Eastern European nations followed the US. In addition, Italy and Spain supported the US. Turkey has declined to do so. On March 19, 2003, the US and UK troops, supported by small contingents from several other countries, began an invasion in the Southern Iraq. Small groups airlifted into the Northern Iraq to join the Kurdish Militia. There were resistances on both fronts but the invaders managed to deal with them. Saddam toppled on April 9 and the Pentagon officials announced that the military campaign was over on April 14. Toppling Saddam was easier than administrating Iraq because the country experienced pervasive looting after the end of major combat.

*“In the first days after the end of major combat, Hit-and-run attacks on allied troops followed and became increasingly organized, despite the capture of Saddam Hussein and the deaths of his two sons and heirs. Different Iraqi factions at times seemed on the verge of war with each other. New weapons inspection teams were unable to find the expected stockpiles of chemical and biological weaponry. Although neither explanation made much sense, it increasingly seemed that Saddam Hussein had either engaged in a gigantic and puzzling bluff, or possibly that the weapons had been moved to another country. After the fall of Baghdad, the United States and Britain, with increasing cooperation from the United Nations, moved ahead with establishment of a provisional government that would assume sovereignty over Iraq. The effort occurred amidst increasing violence that included attacks not simply on allied troops but also Iraqis connected in any way with the new government. Most of the insurgents appeared to be Saddam loyalists; some were indigenous Muslim sectarians; a fair number likely were foreign fighters. It was not clear whether a liberal democratic nation could be created out of such chaos, but certain that the United States could not impose one if Iraqis did not want it<sup>124</sup>.”*

This situation brought the problem of “*use of force*” without appropriate legitimacy and the UN justification in the international relations. Nevertheless, despite the unparalleled military force of the US had no military rival; it was not able to end chaos in the Middle East. Heavy tanks, latest technological missiles, stealth aircrafts and ships, well-trained operational special commandos have not been able to finish the terrorism in Iraq. The Saddam regime was toppled, but new emerging US-made administration has not been successful to bring democracy and social rights to Iraq. Increasing chaos has led to criticism on US policy in the region. The Bush administration understood that the Middle East require more than military control in order to develop reforms which the US wanted to adopt. Reforms on economy, democracy and social rights are needed. Hence, the GMEI was declared to develop the conditions where the reforms can be adopted. Although the GMEI was announced under different labels before, the Bush administration put the GMEI into progress as a new partnership initiative that can to make reforms in the Middle East in 2004.

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<sup>124</sup> “Bridge to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/histryotln/bridge.htm>, 26.5.2007

### 1.2.3 Military and Security Aspects of GMEI:

*“On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars — but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war— but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks — but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day — and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack...This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces, intelligence services, and banking systems around the world. The United States is grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded — with sympathy and with support. Nations from Latin America, to Asia, to Africa, to Europe, to the Islamic world. Perhaps the NATO Charter reflects best the attitude of the world: An attack on one is an attack on all. The civilized world is rallying to America's side. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, cannot only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. We're not going to allow it...The course is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them”<sup>125</sup>.*

The Middle East is a place where the US interests are at stake, conflict is frequent and demands on US military forces are high. Developments in the Middle East have influenced the demands and constraints imposed on the use of American military power, including air and space power, in and around the Middle East. The Greater Middle East has been the region where U.S. intervention in both frequency and scale<sup>126</sup>. As argued by Fawaz A. Gerges, US security concerns in the Middle East are not new. The Gulf War is interpreted as a temporary crisis, yet it is another experiment for Pax-Americana<sup>127</sup>. Although Secretary Baker promised that, US administration would not try to impose a Pax-Americana, Arabs have remained

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<sup>125</sup> George W. Bush, “Preface”, *Terrorism: Threat Assessment, Countermeasures And Policy*, US **Foreign Policy Agenda**, Volume 6, Number 3, November 2001, p:2

<sup>126</sup> (The 1979 Iran hostage rescue effort, deployments to Lebanon in 1982, the 1986 El Dorado Canyon strikes against Libya, the 1987–1988 reflagging and escort of tankers in the Gulf, the 1990 Gulf War, missile attack on Iraq 1998), Ian O. Lesser, Bruce R. Nardulli, and Lory A. Arghavan, “Sources of Conflict in the Greater Middle East”, Chapter 4, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR897/MR897.chap4.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR897/MR897.chap4.pdf), 27.5.2007

<sup>127</sup> Fawaz A. Gerges, “Regional Security after the Gulf Crisis: The American Role”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 4. (Summer, 1991), p:64

skeptical of US security designs in the Middle East. A number of Arab commentators warned about a new era of Western colonization in the Middle East. Fawas A. Gerges argues that these Arab commentators pointed to the unwillingness of former G.H. Bush administration to recognize the urgency of region's other problems. There is evidence of Washington's duplicity and "*double standards*". Hence, to many Arabs, secretary Baker's proposed security structures are no more than old prototypes updated<sup>128</sup>. According to Gerges, the modern Middle East has never been controlled by a single great power, and it can never be ruled or controlled from outside; thus, imposing security pacts will ultimately fail<sup>129</sup>. The Gulf War has not led to US hegemony in the Middle East. Nevertheless, September 11 gave another chance to control the region. The US military and security concerns in the Middle East increased with September 11 and the US invaded Afghanistan and Iraq with the coalition forces<sup>130</sup>. Especially, terrorism became the main target of the US.

William J. Burns argues that the US has targeted and expanded its military and economic assistance throughout the Middle East to bring terrorists to justice and to deny them, their financiers, and their supporters' refuge, aid, and comfort<sup>131</sup>. In addition, Colin L. Powell states that the US continues to pursue a full international agenda –from promoting good governance to cooperating with other countries to stem the HIV/AIDS pandemic, establish a post Cold War strategic framework, launch a new trade round, and foster peace in the Middle East<sup>132</sup>. On the other hand, Francis X. Taylor argues that September 11 might have been conceived as a blow against America, but in reality they were attacks against all of humanity and civilization itself and war against terrorism is going to be a long struggle with many dimensions. He further states that the US aimed to eliminate the international terrorist threat to people, installations and other interests by smoking out terrorists from their hiding places, draining the swamp where terrorists find safe haven, pressuring states to stop supporting terrorism, preventing planned terrorist attacks

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<sup>128</sup> *Ibid*, p:65

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>130</sup> Lesser, Nardulli, and Arghavan, *Ibid*.

<sup>131</sup> William J. Burns, "Priorities in the Middle East and North Africa", March 26, 2003, <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/19320.htm>, 22.5.2007

<sup>132</sup> Colin L. Powell, "Seizing the Moment", Terrorism: Threat Assessment, Countermeasures And Policy, **US Foreign Policy Agenda**, Volume 6, Number 3, November 2001, p:5

and bolstering the capabilities of friends and allies of the US in combating terrorism<sup>133</sup>.

According to Donald Steinbeck, September 11 has taught that the American primacy did not mean the American invulnerability. Even a country with its unprecedented economic, military, political and cultural power, and nestled behind vast oceans cannot be fully insulated from every threat, particularly in a world which was marked by globalization<sup>134</sup>. As Samir Amin argues,

*“The American public needs to know that this is the reason why the attacks on the United States have not met with universal and unqualified opprobrium as it has been led to believe. The strategic choice of targets—New York’s financial center and the Pentagon—has even been applauded and not only by a handful of Islamic fanatics but by a large majority of public opinion in Africa and Asia and a sizeable sector of European opinion”*<sup>135</sup>.

Richard Haas argues that the primary aim of American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with U.S. interests and values, and thereby promote peace, prosperity, and justice as widely as possible to deal with transnational threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction<sup>136</sup>.

While the US tries to reach its aims, its method and strategy is important. Security concerns of the US has increased since September 11 and its behaviors have increased the critics. Especially the pre-emptive war doctrine attracts criticisms of the international society. The present transnational danger for the US is considered as the religious terrorism. To deal with it, a broad political-military strategy which included attacking terrorists and their organizations, preventing the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, protecting against and preparing for terrorist attacks; is needed. This strategy is broader than war because it needs complicated strategies. For the long-term success, this strategy demands the use of all elements of national power:

<sup>133</sup> Francis X. Taylor, “Terrorism:US Policies and CounterTerrorism Measures”, **US Foreign Policy Agenda**, Volume 6, Number 3, November 2001, p:7

<sup>134</sup> Donald Steinbeck, “Foreign Policy Post-September 11: Learning the Right Lessons”, 2003, <http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/18762.htm>, 31.5.2007

<sup>135</sup> Samir Amin, “U.S. Hegemony and the Response to Terror”, **Monthly Review**, Volume 53, No 6, November 2001, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/1101amin.htm>, 28.5.2007

<sup>136</sup> Richard N. Haass, “Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World”, <http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/9632.htm>, 28.5.2007

diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. This strategy should also include offensive strategies to counter terrorism. The US argues that their effort should be accompanied by a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military and this strategy has to focus clearly on the Arab and Muslim world<sup>137</sup>. Furthermore, in the “*National Strategy For Combatting Terrorism 2006*”, it is argued that “*War on terror*” is a different kind of war. “*From the beginning, it has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. Not only do the US fight with its terrorist enemies on the battlefield, it promotes freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule*”. According to this strategy, aims of the US against terrorism are as followed:

“•*Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism;*  
 •*Prevent attacks by terrorist networks;*  
 •*Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them;*  
 •*Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states;*  
 •*Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and*  
 •*Lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward*  
*against terror and help ensure our ultimate success*”<sup>138</sup>.

On the other hand, there are arguments against US strategies. For instance, Fidel Castro argues that policies of the US president about the war against terrorism are unacceptable. He says that;

“*An objective and calm friend should advise the United States government against throwing young American soldiers into an uncertain war in remote, isolated, and inaccessible places, like a fight against phantoms, not knowing where they are or even if they exist or not, nor whether the people they kill are or are not responsible for the deaths of their innocent fellow countrymen killed in the United States*”<sup>139</sup>.

Noam Chomsky as a leading criticizer of the US foreign policy told that the US was condemned by the World Court for international terrorism, should be condemned by the Security Council. This condemnation occurred because of the US acts in the terrorist war against Nicaragua.

<sup>137</sup> 9/11 Commission Report, “What to do? A Global Strategy”, Chapter 12, p:364

<sup>138</sup> “National Strategy For Combatting Terrorism 2006”,  
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/71936.pdf>, (31.5.2007), p:1

<sup>139</sup> Fidel Castro, “Terrorism and the War Crisis”, **Monthly Review**, Volume 53, No 6, November 2001, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/1101castro.htm>, 28.5.2007

The US attacked civilian targets so Chomsky called the US as a massive terrorist and he believed that how a terrorist state can start a war against terrorism<sup>140</sup>. Donald Rumsfeld says “*draining the swamps*”, which means eradication terrorist groups of global reach and reducing the chance of taking their places by similar groups<sup>141</sup>. Many people such as Chomsky have criticized the phrase of draining the swamps because they believe that the US administration declared the rogue states, which support terrorism, and stand against democracy but it has been a rogue state because of its behaviors in Colombia, Nicaragua, Panama, Sudan and Turkey<sup>142</sup>.

According to Timothy Wirth, again being against US strategies, agrees that the United States must have sufficient military power to protect its national interests, but argues that pre-emption should not be elevated to the status of a cardinal norm or doctrine. While always a tactic for exceptional circumstances, making preemption a basic US doctrine may encourage other states to legitimize their own aggression by camouflaging it as defensive measures. Worse, the expectation of pre-emptive US actions coupled with the impossibility of confronting the huge and hugely competent US military, may trigger an even more assertive scramble to acquire weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weaponry. He finally argues that the primary purpose of national security policy should be to help manage inevitable change in ways that do not generate massive upheaval and violent unrest. This unrest may lead to the overextension of US capabilities, dragging it into peripheral conflicts, causing battle fatigue at home, and promoting a global backlash against perceived US empire-building<sup>143</sup>.

*“Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us? Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions”<sup>144</sup>.*

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<sup>140</sup>“Noam Chomsky debates Bill Bennet on 9-11”, *CNN 30 May 2002*, <http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0205/30/ltm.01.html>), 28.5.2007

<sup>141</sup> Edward Gresser, “Draining The Swamp: A Middle East Trade Policy to Win the Peace”, **Progressive Policy Institute, Policy report**, 18 January 2002, [http://www.ppionline.org/documents/draining\\_swamp.pdf](http://www.ppionline.org/documents/draining_swamp.pdf) ,28.5.2007

<sup>142</sup> Noam Chomsky, “Drain the Swamp and There Will Be No More Mosquitoes”, [www.chomsky.info/articles/20020909.htm](http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20020909.htm), 28.5.2007

<sup>143</sup> Timothy E.Wirth, “American Foreign Policy: Debate at the Crossroads”, The Council on Foundations Annual Meeting, April 28, 2003, Dallas, Texas, p:7, [www.un.org/unfip/docs/TEWspeech\\_AmericanForeignPolicy.pdf](http://www.un.org/unfip/docs/TEWspeech_AmericanForeignPolicy.pdf) , 28.5.2007

<sup>144</sup> 9/11 Commission Report, “What to do? A Global Strategy”, Chapter 12, p:374



As supporter of US strategy, Richard Haas argues that the US is a realistic sheriff of the world because it understands that only it can play such a role in the world with its enormous power. According to him, the US need to evolve into a resolute sheriff who is confident, clear-eyed and strong enough for sustained international engagement because if it does not engage with the world, the world will engage with it<sup>145</sup>.

According to Hagel<sup>146</sup>, armed struggle and military operations cannot stabilize the region. Failed or failing states cannot be reborn by military conflicts. Without democracy and human rights, the region will continue to be an instable region. According to him, to have security and stability, rebuilding must be with democracy, good governance and human rights. At the same time, the Presidential Study Group in the Washington Institute also argues that security agenda is the most important part, but it is not sufficient because if the US tries to avoid threats, it must change the regional dynamics that produce these threats<sup>147</sup>. The US administration has to bring political, social and economic reforms in the Middle East countries<sup>148</sup>.

While the US has tried to impose reforms in the Middle East, some questions emerged. Who will determine the rules in this complex world? Can there be a collective security in globalizing world or can there only be security of superpowers? Villepin argued that uncontrolled use of force might only increase global threats such as terrorism, radicalism, international crime, human rights violations and racism. According to Villepin, pre-emptive strike can only open Pandora's Box and if necessary use of force must be established with international cooperation and legitimacy<sup>149</sup>. The US had tried to adopt the pre-emptive strike doctrine into its foreign policies to deal with terrorism and its sources. Many people such as Anup Shah have also criticized the US methods against global terrorism. Anup Shah argues,

*“The Middle East is the most militarized region in the world and most arms sales head there. A suppressed people that sees US influence as a major root cause of the current problems in the Middle East has led to a rise in Islamic militancy, acts of terrorism and anti-west sentiment, anti-US in particular. When looking at some of the actions of the US, it can often be seen why this is unfortunately so”*<sup>150</sup>.

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<sup>145</sup> Richard Haas, “From Reluctant to Resolute: American Foreign Policy after September 11”, <http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/11445.htm>, 31.5.2007

<sup>146</sup> Chuck Hagel, “The United States, NATO, And The Greater Middle East”, Press Release, 23 January 2004 [www.nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/200401023\\_Hagel.htm](http://www.nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/200401023_Hagel.htm), 28.5.2007

<sup>147</sup> The Presidential Study Group, “Security, Reform and Peace; The Three Strategic Pillars of The US in the Middle East”, 22 February 2005, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=220>, 28.5.2007

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>149</sup> Villepin, Dominique De, 27 March 2003

<http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/France/MFA/france-mfa-villepin-032703.htm>, 28.5.2007

<sup>150</sup> Anup Shah, “The Middle East”, [www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/MiddleEast.asp](http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/MiddleEast.asp), 22.5.2007

According to R.L. Norman, US military industry has created Muslim freedom fighters during the Cold War against the Soviet Communism. The US strengthened Taliban to fight with Soviet Union. CIA based Bin Laden was born from that power which was given to Taliban by the US. He further argues, *“Thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers died in that war to contain Islamic expansion, while the American intelligence agencies laughed”*<sup>151</sup>. As explained by George Tenet, Former CIA Director, *“Islamic militancy is expanding, and the worldwide pool of potential recruits for terrorist networks is growing. In central Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia, Islamic terrorist organizations are trying to attract new recruits, including under the banner of anti-Americanism”*<sup>152</sup>. Terrorism has also been bolstered with proliferation of conventional weapons and arm-trade.

*“The United States has the largest homogenous internal defense market in the world. It owns over half of the global arms export market, with total sales larger than the aggregate sum of the next five countries. It has the strongest commercial information technology sector, the strongest university science base, and the most commercial experience in the global economy”*<sup>153</sup>.

According to Samir Amin;

*“The Taliban (like Osama bin Laden ) have been described as “freedom fighters.” Their “rage” against the dreadful “Communists” (in actual fact modernizing national populists) whose chief transgression—in their view—had been the opening of the schools to girls, drew no censure from the Western diplomatic circles of the time nor was it denounced by their feminist movements. Those referred to as “Afghans”—that is, Algerians, Egyptians and others who were trained for assassination in U.S.-funded camps and were coached by experts from the CIA and allied Pakistan—are now exercising their “terrorist” skills in Algeria and elsewhere. Not only has Washington never had the least objection to them but it has supported and continues to support them to this day, saving its disapproval only for those who struggle against Israeli occupation.”*<sup>154</sup>

Samuel Huntington wrote in 1999: *“While the US regularly denounces various countries as ‘rogue states,’ in the eyes of many countries it is becoming the rogue superpower ... the single greatest external threat to their societies.”*<sup>155</sup> Samir Amin argues that whether the US kill Osama Bin Laden or not, a redoubled hate for Washington will generate thousands of new candidates ready for

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<sup>151</sup> Norman, R.L, “The Cold War and the Middle East From 1945 to 2001, 911 in Historical Perspective: Bureaucratic Governmental Secrecy and Failed Foreign Policy”, 14 July 2002 <http://www.southerndomains.com/SouthernBanks/cwar.html>, 28.5.2007

<sup>152</sup> George Tenet, “Worldwide threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World”, 7 February 2001, [www.iwar.org.uk/cyberterror/resources/tenet/02-07-01.htm](http://www.iwar.org.uk/cyberterror/resources/tenet/02-07-01.htm), 28.5.2007

<sup>153</sup> Transformations in Defense Markets and Industries, Section seven: Transformations in Defense Markets and Industries, [www.odci.gov/nic/PDF\\_GIF\\_research/defensemkt/transformations\\_summary.html#seven](http://www.odci.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_research/defensemkt/transformations_summary.html#seven), 28.5.2007

<sup>154</sup> Amin, *Ibid*

<sup>155</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower”, *The Foreign Affairs*, Volume 78, Issue 2, March-April 1999, [homepages.stmartin.edu/Fac\\_Staff/rlangill/PLS%20300/The%20Lonely%20Superpower.htm](http://homepages.stmartin.edu/Fac_Staff/rlangill/PLS%20300/The%20Lonely%20Superpower.htm), 28.5.2007

revenge against American targets because of massive bombings and the killing of thousands of civilians have been made by the US<sup>156</sup>.

Bruce Hoffman argues that the US needs to create a more positive image change in the Muslim World because it has failed to establish a good communication with Muslim World. Before the invasion of the Iraq, stillborn and maladroit efforts of the US to justify the war and the revelations about the treatment of Iraqi detainees at Abu-Guraip damaged the image of the US badly. For the success of the war on terrorism, fixing these efforts and, repairing the damage has accordingly become critical. The US has become a malignant force among the Muslims throughout the world<sup>157</sup>. In the National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism 2006, it is argued that terrorism is not simply a result of hostility to the US policies in Iraq and Israeli-Palestinian issues because Al-Qaida plotting for the September 11 attacks began in the 1990s, during an active peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian issues<sup>158</sup>. GMEI with its security and military aspects is damaged because of increasing in the violence in the Middle East. Until now, the US has not managed to bring instability and security to the region.

#### 1.2.4 Political Aspects of the GMEI:

*“The MEPI political pillar seeks to develop institutions and processes that are essential to active citizenries and accountable, representative government. Programs bring non-government organizations, governments, and citizens together to push the boundaries of change with programs tailored to the specific needs of each country. Within the political pillar, MEPI is concentrating in the following four goal areas:*

- **Elections and Political Processes:** *Strengthen democratic practices, electoral systems, including political parties and parliamentarians.*
- **Civil Society and Reform Advocacy:** *Support an expanded public space where democratic voices can be heard in the political process.*
- **Media:** *Strengthen the role of free and independent media in society.*

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<sup>156</sup> Amin, *Ibid*.

<sup>157</sup> Bruce Hoffman, “The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism”, **Studies in Conflict & Terrorism**, Volume 27, No 6, Taylor & Francis Publications, London 2007, p:557

<sup>158</sup> “National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism”, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/71936.pdf>, (31.5.2007), p:9,

- **Rule of Law:** *Promote the rule of law and accountable, effective government and judicial institutions.*<sup>159</sup>

The US Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs stated that the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) would support the expansion of political opportunity throughout the Middle East. According to them, this initiative was designed to support men, women, and youth in the Middle East in their bid for democracy, civil liberties, and the rule of law. The MEPI started programs, which has encouraged democratic reform, free press and free expression, good governance, and free and fair judiciaries in the Middle East<sup>160</sup>. President Bush stated that the US supported the advance of freedom in the Middle East because this was the US national interest. According to him, although the hateful ideology of terrorism was shaped, nurtured and protected by oppressive regimes, free nations, in contrast, encouraged creativity, tolerance and enterprise, which prevented terrorism to be established. In this idea, free governments do not build weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of mass terror. The expansion of liberty in the world will guarantee global security. Bush further argued that the Middle East has presented many obstacles to the advance of freedom but with the US efforts in MEPI, freedom would be established in the region<sup>161</sup>. Kim Holmes argues that neither protectionist nor expansionist, American internationalism seek to preserve liberty and to promote opportunity, human dignity, freedom, prosperity, and peace, not only in the US but also in the World<sup>162</sup>. Christian Hobson argues that despite the global movement towards democracy, one region that remained stubbornly resistant to this trend was the Middle East. In the region, “*an almost unthinkable reversal of a global pattern has occurred where almost every Arab country is less free than it was forty years ago*”.<sup>163</sup> Paula J. Dobriansky argues that promoting democracy has been central to the US foreign policy priorities, such as the US-Middle East Partnership Initiative and the engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US recognized that it would be the best hope for lifting people out of poverty, ending human right abuses, and allowing people to claim their futures<sup>164</sup>.

After September 11, this lack of freedom has become a concern of the modern world because a belief has emerged that one of the root causes of Islamic extremism lies in the repressive nature of the regimes that populate the Middle East. Thus, the spread of democracy has become a major

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<sup>159</sup> <http://mepi.state.gov/c10125.htm>, 31.5.2007

<sup>160</sup> “The US-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI): Expanding Political Opportunity”, **Fact Sheet**, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Washington- DC, June 18, 2003, <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22251.htm>, 31.5.2007

<sup>161</sup> George Bush, “Presses for Peace in the Middle East”, May 9, 2003, <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/20497.htm>, 31.5.2007

<sup>162</sup> Kim R. Holmes, “American Internationalism: Promoting Freedom, Democracy and Development”, **U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda: American Internationalism**, Volume 8, No 1, August 2003, p:5

<sup>163</sup> Christian Hobson, “A forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East: US democracy promotion and the ‘war on terror’”, **Australian Journal of International Affairs**, Volume 59, No 1, March 2005, p:39

<sup>164</sup> Paula J. Dobriansky, “Shining a Light: U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Democracy Worldwide”, **U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda: American Internationalism**, Volume 8, No 1, August 2003, p:27

component of the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.<sup>165</sup> The Bush administration has turned back Wilsonian idealism, which was previously dismissed, since the promotion of democracy has been considered as a strategic method to prevent terrorism. John Mearsheimer argues that the Bush doctrine has been essentially Wilsonianism with teeth because this doctrine included idealist strand and a power strand: Wilsonianism provided the idealism and an emphasis on military power provided the teeth. The US has used its military power to promote democracy in the Middle East. According to him, *"The idealist or Wilsonian strand of the neoconservatives' theory of international politics focuses on promoting democracy, which they believe is the most powerful political ideology on the face of the earth. Moreover, they believe that the world divides into good states and bad states, and that the democracies are the white hats."*<sup>166</sup>

The Bush administration has put its military forces in this theory. The US military forces have not managed to bring security. In an effort to overcome the challenges posed by the events of September 11, 2001, to mitigate the failure of the global war on terrorism, to eradicate the transnational terrorist Networks, and to manage the fallout from the war in Iraq, Bush administration have found it expedient to cite the lack of democracy in the Middle East as both reason for policy failures in the past and the justification for policies being implemented in the present<sup>167</sup>.

The belief that the primary source of the Islamic radicalism is the lack of the freedom in the region is a debate because it should be remembered that the Middle East has not held a monopoly on terrorism. The examples of the UK, Spain, Germany and Italy show that established democracies have not been immune from creating terrorist organizations and extremist movements. The rise in terrorism and Islamic radicalism can not be explained by the lack of democracy in the Middle East completely because some factors such as economic malaise and pressures of globalization have provided the sources of terrorism and Islamic radicalism. It can be correct that democratic governments are able handle with these challenges better than undemocratic governments but in considering this argument, it can be necessary to look and investigate the actual types of democracies that could emerge in the region<sup>168</sup>. Iraq as a strategic prize in the heart of the Arab World with the World's second largest known reserves of oil is very important for the US because a client regime in Baghdad will be of inestimable value to the US<sup>169</sup>.

It can be argued that the US uses the strategy or the so-called aim for promoting democracy in the region to continue its influence and presence in the region because promoting democracy seems

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<sup>165</sup> Hobson, *Ibid*, p:40

<sup>166</sup> John Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq war: realism versus neo-conservatism", [www.mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0037.pdf](http://www.mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0037.pdf), p:1, (31.5.2007)

<sup>167</sup> Daniel Neep, "Dilemmas of Democratization in the Middle East: The Forward Strategy of Freedom", **Middle East Policy**, Vol. XI, No. 3, Fall 2004, p:74

<sup>168</sup> Hobson, *Ibid*, p:43

<sup>169</sup> Noam Chomsky, "The "War on Terrorism" and the New Rules of World Order", [www.chomsky.info/talks/20041013.htm](http://www.chomsky.info/talks/20041013.htm), 31.5.2007

as unlikely to succeed in helping to combat terrorism. Thinking of democracy that it can bring security to the region is rather optimistic because the ability of the US cannot be enough to make such fundamental changes in the region. Considering examples of Central America and Caribbean, which are primarily influenced by the US, it is seen that one genuine and stable democracy has not emerged as in Iraq and Afghanistan<sup>170</sup>. Daniel Neep argues that democracy has always had its place in the US foreign policy.

*“The cri de Coeur (deeply-felt, passionate request or complaint) of freedom has long provided Washington with justification to battle political enemies across the globe who typically invoked that same right to freedom and self-determination in favor of their own cause. The traditional commitment to freedom was usually instrumental in nature, adopted as a way to provide an ideological basis for America’s sometimes grubby Realpolitik.”*<sup>171</sup>

Chomsky argues, “Stability means the US control, devoted guardian of control of master. Radicalism means “misunderstanding of who the first beneficiaries of countries resources are”<sup>172</sup>. The US new wave supporting of democratization is fed by more immediate concerns. Although neoconservative most notably pushed the idea of a democratic Iraq prior to the war as based on a new regional security design, it is likely to stay in the US policy on Iraq even after the neo-con influence dies away. Democracy in Iraq allows the US to bestow legitimacy on the Iraq war and provides political cover to remain in the country. It cannot be true to argue that Iraq was better under the Saddam’s regime because a well-developed democracy can bring modernity to Iraq and other states in the region. Increasing of the terrorism in today’s Iraq can be explained as terrorists see new development as a threat for their system so instability increased due to spread of democracy in Iraq but this argument does not stop debates about the US foreign policies on Iraq and the Middle East. There are questions that emerge because of the democracy promotion in Iraq such as whether the US pressure help or hinder the process of democratization? According to Neep, the involvement of an external power – especially the United States, which has lost any moral standing in the eyes of most Arabs following its uncritical support for Israeli repression of the Palestinians, its invasion of Iraq and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghuraib – will complicate an already exceedingly difficult and often volatile situation<sup>173</sup>. Some groups, such as Muqtada Al-Sadr and his supporters realize they can generate greater political capital by remaining outside the US-sponsored Governing Council and the Interim Government than they can from being on the inside. According to many Arabs in Iraq the US has been dictating the interim government’s agenda and delimiting the sovereignty of Iraq. This idea decreases the chances of new development for democracy and pluralist political system. The US has to convince the Iraqi people and the rest of the Middle East that it does not have any plans except promoting democracy and establishing stability in the region. This is very difficult to obtain because

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<sup>170</sup> Hobson, *Ibid*, p:51

<sup>171</sup> Neep, *Ibid*, p:74

<sup>172</sup> Noam Chomsky, “US Middle East Policy”, Columbia University, 4 April 1999, <http://www.chomsky.info/talks/19990404.htm>, (31.5.2007)

<sup>173</sup> Neep, *Ibid*, p:79

the US almost lost its reliability in the region by attacking Iraq with linking WMDs and terrorism. The US ignored Saddam's use of chemical weapons in the Northern Iraq in 1980s and shielded Saddam's Iraq in the UN Security Council. The US has seen itself as the "white hats" and the enemy as the "black hats" during the 1900s.

*"Its bombers pulverized German and Japanese cities in the second world war, killing about a million Japanese civilians in the process. Moreover, the United States is the only country in the world that has used nuclear weapons against another country. Of course, most Americans believe that there was nothing wrong with bombing Germany and Japan or using nuclear weapons against Japanese civilians, because we are the white hats and the victims were the black hats."*<sup>174</sup>

Unless the US changes its point of view on white and black hats, justification and legalization for its acts will be impossible. Achcar<sup>175</sup> argues that Moslems have been fed up with such hypocrisies. Moslems do not trust the US and its promises. As well as Moslems, many people in the US do not trust the Bush administration.

Thomas Carothers, researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, criticized the split personality of Bush and his team:

*"Bush the realist actively cultivates warm relations with friendly tyrants in many parts of the world, while Bush the neo-Reaganite makes ringing calls for a vigorous new democracy campaign in the Middle East. How the administration resolves this uncomfortable dualism is central not only to the future of the war on terrorism but also to the shape and character of Bush's foreign policy as a whole."*<sup>176</sup>

There are also more critics about the political pillar in the GMEI such as some argue that the premature liberalization in the Arab and Muslim world would increase the benefit of well-organized fundamentalist movements, who would use the democratization to impose fundamentalism as it was seen in the Algerian example. According to Schwenninger, the fear that democracy may produce Islamic governments in itself should not be a reason not to support democracy in the Arab world but it means that Washington may face a difficult dilemma of either accepting an Islamicist government or turning its back on democracy, which would only further damage the US legitimacy in the region in the future<sup>177</sup>. Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev argue that the problem was not the rise of fundamentalism for the US imperum, but the fact that nearly every political tendency stand against region's absorption into the Pax-Americana.

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<sup>174</sup> John Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq war: realism versus neo-conservatism", [www.mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0037.pdf](http://www.mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0037.pdf), p:5, (31.5.2007)

<sup>175</sup> Gilbert Achcar, "Greater Middle East: The US Plan, Fantasy Of A Region That Doesn't Exist", **Le Monde Diplomatique**, <http://mondediplo.com/2004/04/04world>, (31.5.2007)

<sup>176</sup> Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror", **Foreign Affairs**, January/February 2003, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20030101faessay10224/thomas-carothers/promoting-democracy-and-fighting-terror.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030101faessay10224/thomas-carothers/promoting-democracy-and-fighting-terror.html), (31.5.2007)

<sup>177</sup> Sherle Schwenninger, "Revamping American Grand Strategy", **World Policy Journal**, Fall 2003, p:30

*“For the Islamists, both radical and progressive moderate, America is a civilizational challenge and a moral affront. For Pan-Arabists, it is a source of regional fragmentation and the benefactor of Israeli Zionism. Even among the secular liberals—the supposed mainstays of any future Arab democracy—the United States is viewed as an aggressive imperial power and the protector of Arab reactionary regimes in the Arab world. The opposition to the U.S. imperial presence cuts across various ideological boundaries to unite seemingly disparate strands of Arab political thought”<sup>178</sup>.*

Sherle R. Schwenninger argued that the Bush administration was correct to argue that the current order in the Middle East was both unhealthy and ultimately unsustainable but it was wrong to assume that a more heavy-handed the US dominance of the Middle East would produce democratic reform or a more stable order because it might only cause a greater upheaval and further radicalization of the region<sup>179</sup>. According to Schwenninger, the occupation of Iraq has established the US legitimacy problems in the region because to most people of the region, it has only reinforced their view that the US is more interested in oil and its dominant military position than it is in the welfare of the Iraqi people. The reluctance of the US to turn over power and authority to the United Nations or to the Iraqi people cannot be explained to the Arabs with speeches about freedom and democracy. For the Arabs, the true test of the US commitment to democracy is not Iraq but a Palestinian state. If the US really cared about Arab self-determination and democracy, why has it been so slow in coming to the aid of the Palestinian people? Why has it allowed Ariel Sharon to undermine the Palestinian Authority, the only elected government in the Arab world? These unanswered questions make the Arabs take an anti-US direction in every democratic impulse in the region<sup>180</sup>. Another belief is about the region lacks the experience and institutions needed to make a rapid transition to democracy. Political pillar of the GMEI has also been problematic as well as security and military aspects of the GMEI. Current US politics are not enough to deal with this problem because anti-Americanism has been increasing day by day.

### 1.2.5 Socio-Economic Aspects of the GMEI:

*“We will defeat [the terrorists] by expanding and encouraging world trade.”*  
*President Bush*<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>178</sup> Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Democratic Impulses versus Imperial Interests: America’s New Mid-East Conundrum”, **Orbis- A Journal of World Affairs**, Volume 47, No 3, Summer 2003, p:419

<sup>179</sup> Schwenninger, *Ibid*, p:29

<sup>180</sup> Schwenninger, *Ibid*, p:30

<sup>181</sup> “President Outlines War Effort”, October 17, 2001,  
[www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011017-15.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011017-15.html), 31.5.2007



Robert Looney argues that the events of September 11 made it painfully clear that the political, social and economic problems of other countries have a direct impact on American national security<sup>182</sup>. While the roots of terrorism are complex, it is safe to say that the United States was attacked by a terrorist organization that in large part has had great success in recruiting new members in nations which offer young men little political voice and limited economic opportunity<sup>183</sup>. Robert Zoellick argues that global trade liberalization has been a central plank of the counter-offensive against terrorism. According to him;

*“America’s trade leadership can build a coalition of countries, Open Markets are vital for developing nations, many of them fragile democracies that rely on the international economy to overcome poverty and create opportunity; we need answers for those who ask for economic hope to counter internal threats to our common values. To address the relationship between trade agreements and other international objectives, the president has proposed that we build on openness and growth in developing countries with a toolbox of cooperative policies. There is no “one size fits all” formula that can deal with environment, labor, health and other challenges.”*<sup>184</sup>

A strong world economy would increase the US national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the World. With economic growth, which is supported by free trade and free markets, creates new jobs and higher incomes, which can stand against poverty and corruption<sup>185</sup>. Angel M. Rabasa argues that the condition that perhaps more than any other has shaped the political environment of the Muslim world and the Arab world in particular is the widespread failure of the post-independence political and economic models. Although revolutions were made, regimes were established with great hope for developments in the region, ideologies and regimes were notoriously unsuccessful in fulfilling their promises of economic growth, social justice and international strength. These failures brought extremism to the region<sup>186</sup>.

Looney argues that current US economic policies towards the region has appeared to increase trade, lower unemployment rates, reduce poverty and attractiveness of terrorism amongst the youth but most of the countries in the Middle East have not been ready for US economic policy towards the region because their government structures have not been capable of sustaining and expanding growth

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<sup>182</sup> Robert Looney, “U.S. Middle East Economic Policy: Are Trade-Based Initiatives an Effective Tool in the War on Terrorism?”, **Strategic Insights**, Volume IV, Issue 1 (January 2005), p:1

<sup>183</sup> For more information please see, Paul R Ehrlich; Jianguo Liu, “Some Roots of Terrorism”, **Population and Environment**; Nov 2002; Volume 24, No 2, pp:183-192

<sup>184</sup> Robert B. Zoellick, “Countering Terror With Trade”, Washington Post, Thursday, September 20, 2001, [www.peacenowar.net/Corporation-1.htm](http://www.peacenowar.net/Corporation-1.htm), 31.5.2007

<sup>185</sup> “U.S. National Security Strategy: Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade”, [www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15427.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15427.htm), 31.5.2007

<sup>186</sup> Angel M. Rabasa, “Overview: Sources of Islamic Radicalism”, **The Muslim World After 9/11**, Rand Corporation, 2004, p:37

and trade. Poverty, Corruption, anti-Americanism has been the obstacles for the success of the US economic policy especially in MEPI<sup>187</sup>. Thus, MEPI started to put economic precautions into progress to make these states capable for the US economic policy.

*“The MEPI economic pillar is focused on region-wide economic and employment growth driven by private sector expansion and entrepreneurship. Within the economic pillar, MEPI is concentrating on the following goal areas:*

- **Investment:** Encourage mobilization of foreign direct and domestic investment and facilitate revenue and employment growth of micro-enterprises and SMEs.
- **Entrepreneurship:** Advancing private sector job creation.
- **Trade/Transparency:** Enhance MEPI partner countries' global competitiveness”<sup>188</sup>.

The economic aspects of Middle Eastern geopolitics have always received considerable attention because of the region's energy resources. Peter R. Odell argues that the Middle East without oil would be a very different region because oil has shaped the policies and alignments of not only all the countries in the Middle East but also great powers. According to him, these outside powers have found their oil interests and ambitions in the Middle East spilling over into their more general relationships with each other, thus helping a process, which has made the region a centre of international tension over long periods of time<sup>189</sup>. Oil has been very important for the world economies. Global world needs oil for its economic system. As a hegemonic power, the US put strategies into progress to control oil for its economic development. Accessing to Middle Eastern oil in adequate amounts and at reasonable prices remains as a vital interest for the US economy because a large proportion of world petroleum reserves are to be found in the Greater Middle East. The world's oil production has continued to grow rapidly, world reserved have grown even faster and the bulk of these new additions have been in the Middle East which has increased its importance for the global political economy so the US has been unlikely to abandon its current role as the ultimate guarantor of world access to Middle Eastern oil<sup>190</sup>.

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<sup>187</sup> Robert Looney, “U.S. Middle East Economic Policy: Are Trade-Based Initiatives an Effective Tool in the War on Terrorism?”, **Strategic Insights**, Volume IV, Issue 1 (January 2005), p:8

<sup>188</sup> <http://mepi.state.gov/c10122.htm>, 3.6.2007

<sup>189</sup> Peter R.Odell, “The Significance of Oil”, **Journal of Contemporary History**, Vol. 3, No. 3, The Middle East. (Jul., 1968), p:93

<sup>190</sup> Ian O. Lesser, Bruce R. Nardulli, and Lory A. Arghavan, “Sources of Conflict In The Greater Middle East”, Chapter Four, [www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR897/MR897.chap4.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR897/MR897.chap4.pdf), p:174, (31.5.2007)

Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Byman argue that the Persian Gulf has been a particularly critical region for the United States given its importance to the world oil market. Although the degree of their dominance will depend heavily on the price of oil, the states in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf will remain the leading oil exporters in the next decade<sup>191</sup>. According to Ian O. Lesser, Energy has been a leading factor in Western strategic perceptions regarding the Middle East, and a factor in the region's view of itself. It has also been key variable in the prosperity and stability of regimes and an unavoidable part of the regional security calculus. The most important critical problems of the US and its allies in the Middle East have been terrorism, the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and containment policies toward Iran and Libya which have an energy dimension. Energy questions and Middle Eastern affairs have inextricably been linked in Western strategic perception.

*"To a considerable extent, policymakers and strategists are influenced by the legacy of two previous energy crises in the early 1970s and the early 1980s. These experiences left indelible images of the use of oil for political coercion, and the vulnerability of modern industrial (and post-industrial) economies to disruptions in the energy market."*<sup>192</sup>

The countries of the Middle East have faced an economic trouble such as high levels of unemployment, inflation and external debt. Because of the political turmoil and declining oil revenues, some states, including Afghanistan, Algeria and the leading oil producers have experienced a decline in GNP over the last decade. Political instabilities have increased the military spending instead of developments in education, economy and social rights. By virtue of either their political instability, their proximity to the Soviet Union, or their location in a region of vast oil wealth, many of the countries in the Middle East became the recipients of large amounts of US military aid in the post-World War II era. Chris Paine argued that Arab nationalism and the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal of 1955, ended the exclusive dominance of aid and trade by the Western powers, and opened the way for the development of radical nationalist regimes. Nixon tried to overcome the problems which emerged after the US withdrawal from Vietnam with economic solutions such as arm sales.

*"In the Middle East, the prolonged struggle with an aggressively armed Israel has had the effect of slowing the pace of radical Arab nationalism, while furthering US and Soviet influence. Rapidly increasing oil revenues have buttressed the reactionary monarchs of the Persian Gulf and enhanced their roles as arms purchasers and guarantors of capitalist stability"*<sup>193</sup>.

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<sup>191</sup>Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Byman, "Introduction: Maintaining Stable Oil Supplies and Prices", Chapter 1, The Future Security Environment in the Middle East Conflict, Stability, and Political Change, Edited by Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Byman, **RAND Corporation**, 2004, p:3

<sup>192</sup>Ian O. Lesser, "Energy and Middle Eastern Security: New Dimensions and Strategic Implications", Chapter 6, The Future Security Environment in the Middle East Conflict, Stability, and Political Change, Edited by Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Byman, **RAND Corporation**, 2004, p:197

<sup>193</sup>Chris Paine, "The Political Economy of Arms Transfers To the Middle East", **MERIP Reports**, No. 30. (Aug., 1974), p:24

According to Paine, all these trends were part of the process which has brought about the present high level of arm sales in the region. Because of the Gulf War, the Arabian Peninsula has become an almost exclusively American preserve in the domain of military sales. Joe Stork argued that there were reasons for the US dominant position as arms supplier in the region. First, arms sales represent an aspect of political alliance, particularly with the military leaderships in buyer countries. Second, there is a strategic benefit in military terms, to having the US manufactured systems on the ground, systems on which US technicians and troops have been trained. This has increased the military capabilities such as air battle warfare doctrine of the US as it was seen in the Gulf War because the communication and integration between the US and Saudi Arabian forces were more successful than communication and integration between the US and NATO forces. Third, the competition for the sales of the major weapons systems relates to sharp downturn not just of weapons exports markets but also of Western countries' defense sectors across the board<sup>194</sup>.

There are different dimensions of economic pillar in MEPI. MEPI has aimed to fight terrorism with trade too. Angel M. Rabasa argues that the US can reduce the perceptions about it has only military interest in the Middle East, by promoting economic expansion and self sufficiency. Promoting economic developments and improving social conditions may not guarantee an end to terrorism or extremism but it could reduce the support of extremist movements in the Middle East<sup>195</sup>. This is also a long way for the success of the MEPI. The US has increased its problems in the Middle East by invading Iraq. Ian O. Lesser argues that war in Iraq has raised enormous uncertainties regarding prices, supply security, and regional stability, with a wide range of potential outcomes such as a long period of international control over Iraqi oil production and exports would place very significant control over production and pricing in the hands of consuming countries in the West and Asia, and also a dominance in the arm trade in the Middle East.

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<sup>194</sup> Joe Stork , "The Middle East Arms Bazaar after the Gulf War", **Middle East Report**, No. 197, Vulnerabilities in the Gulf. (Nov. - Dec., 1995), p:17

<sup>195</sup> Angel M. Rabasa, "Balance the Requirements of the War on Terrorism and of Stability and Democracy in Moderate Muslim Countries", The Muslim World After 9/11, **Rand Corporation**, 2004, p:64

## CHAPTER TWO

### ANALYSIS OF THE GMEI FROM THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

#### 2.1 Comparison Between the US and the European Approaches:

When we compare the influences of the EU and the US in the Middle East, the US has been the leader in the region since the end of WWII. The economic, military and political presence of the US in the region has been greater than the European states in the region. During the last century we have seen that the US has had major debates about its foreign policy in every forty and fifty years. The 9/11 attack brought a new US security strategy which has started to effect the region<sup>196</sup>. In making a comparison with the EU approaches, it is necessary to mention a brief knowledge about the EU's politics in the Middle East since 1972. 1972 is important for the EU politics in the Middle East, because in the summit of Paris, a global Mediterranean policy was declared. Global Mediterranean policy which was strongly supported by the EU commission and France, showed that the European Union started to be interested in the region carefully. The EU strengthened its policy over the Middle East by the declaration of partnership between Europe and Mediterranean in 1995. This partnership has been called as the Barcelona process. The Barcelona Process has started with the final declaration of Europe- Mediterranean conference, which was established between 27 and 28<sup>th</sup> of November 2006. The partnership between Europe and Mediterranean involves 35 members. Among which twenty-five of them are the members of the EU. The others are Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. The EU has started this process to prevent migration and to accomplish the strategic aims. Barcelona process has aimed to establish a social structure for peace in the region, economic developments and a democratic political structure<sup>197</sup>. The best solution for avoiding migration to Europe from the region has been thought as establishing economic welfare in the region<sup>198</sup> so the other aims such as political, security and human rights have taken less importance<sup>199</sup>. The Barcelona process brought spirit to the relations between the EU and the Middle East because this process has implied to arrange meetings to solve the common problems in the region. Co-operation in the partnership has included many subjects such as economy, political, social, human rights and culture. This process served as a new chance for regional co-operation as well as bilateral negotiations. The main goals of the Barcelona declaration are as follows:

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<sup>196</sup> Gary Sick, "International security, Middle East and Arab Reforms", Conference Report, *Arab Reforms and the Challenges for the EU policies*, Heidi Huhtanen, Philip Holzaphel, Bente Scheller, Toby Archer, **The Finnish Institute of International Relations**, 2004, [http://www.upi-fia.fi/document.php?DOC\\_ID=99](http://www.upi-fia.fi/document.php?DOC_ID=99), (1.6.2007)

<sup>197</sup> [www.ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/euromed/](http://www.ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/), 2.6.2007

<sup>198</sup> Kenan Dağcı, "AB'nin Akdeniz politikası ve Türkiye'ye etkileri (The Mediterranean policy of the EU and its impacts over Turkey)", [www.tasam.org/index.php?altid=1336](http://www.tasam.org/index.php?altid=1336), 1.6.2007

<sup>199</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/euromed/free\\_trade\\_area.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/free_trade_area.htm), 1.6.2007

*“1. The definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue.*

*2. The construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a [free-trade area](#) .*

*3. The rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies”<sup>200</sup> .*

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership includes two kinds of relations. The first is bilateral relations and the other is multilateral relations.

*“**Bilateral dimension.** The European Union carries out a number of activities bilaterally with each country. The most important are the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements that the Union negotiates with the Mediterranean Partners individually. They reflect the general principles governing the new Euro-Mediterranean relationship, although they each contain characteristics specific to the relations between the EU and each Mediterranean Partner.*

***Regional dimension.** Regional dialogue represents one of the most innovative aspects of the Partnership, covering at the same time the political, economic and cultural fields (regional co-operation). Regional co-operation has a considerable strategic impact as it deals with problems that are common to many Mediterranean Partners while it emphasises the national complementarities”<sup>201</sup> .*

In bilateral relations, the EU establishes activities with each partner. The most important part of all the activities is the EU can make partnership negotiations with each partner. This gives speciality and secrecy to the bilateral relations. Different types of relations are established according to characteristic properties of the partner. Multilateral relations has been the best side of the partnership because it implies political, cultural and social co-operations between the EU and the partners<sup>202</sup> .

Chris Patton, the EU commissioner of external relations, established a project for deepening the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region in 2004: “*The European Neighbourhood Policy*”<sup>203</sup> . This Project has offered a closer relationship with Mediterranean region in the subjects of rule of law, democracy, human rights, economic development, security threats posed by organised crime, terrorism, regional conflicts and illegal migration. According to Patton, the EU wants to see

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<sup>200</sup> “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process”, [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euromed/](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/), 1.6.2007

<sup>201</sup> “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process”, [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euromed/](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/), 1.6.2007

<sup>202</sup> Dağcı, *Ibid*.

<sup>203</sup> Humayun Chaudry, “EU strategic partnership”, 19 May 2004, <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/E4D19123-9DD3-11D1-B44E-006097071264.htm> , 2.6.2007

peace in the region especially in the Israel-Palestinian issue. Patton argues that EU supports sovereign and independent Palestinian state which exists side by side with Israel<sup>204</sup>. When the Bush administration formulated a new Middle East Partnership initiative, because of its system was based on democracy and human rights; the EU found itself obliged to respond to US initiatives and policies. The possible future of trans-atlantic cooperation on democracy promotion in the Middle East became the main issue in the international agenda. Richard Youngs argues that even though European governments supported the BMEI at Sea Island summit in the beginning, there are differences between the US policies and European policies over the Middle East. These differences can be summarized as Iraq, Iran, Syria and Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>205</sup>. The International Crisis Group recognized that the BMEI “*may at least apply some balm on a trans-Atlantic relationship rubbed raw by difference over Iraq*”<sup>206</sup>, but concluded that “*friction is almost as likely as balm...over the next few years*”<sup>207</sup>.

### 2.1.1 Security/Military Perspective:

As well as its economic resources, the Middle East has also been important for the EU because of the poverty of the region, the fast demographic growth, the presence of the undemocratic regimes, unresolved security issues and instabilities, presence and potential proliferation of the mass destruction weapons<sup>208</sup>. For the EU; the Middle East has looked like a rose with its pricks; huge economic benefits besides security problems. The European security strategy has listed five key threats to Europe: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states, and organised crime. According to this strategy, “*all of these threats are interlinked and they can be found in different combinations in situations of severe insecurity but none of the new threats has been purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means*”<sup>209</sup>.

The EU believes that fighting with terrorism needs international co-operation hence they work with all the partners in the region, for a more effective global response against terrorism. The EU tries to prevent terrorism, which comes from the region, by supporting political, economic and social developments that stand against terrorist organizations in the region. Chris Patton argues that to

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<sup>204</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>205</sup> Richard Youngs, Trans-Atlantic Cooperation on Middle East Reform: A European Mis-judgment?, **The Foreign Policy Centre, London**, November 2004, p:1

<sup>206</sup> International Crisis Group (2004), “The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: Imperilled at Birth”, Briefing, June: p.1, [www.weltpolitik.net/.../0644a930ba1074b5cca2acd4809cbcd5/6878a855da2c86761b8b80333a6cc81c/20040607\\_bmei.pdf](http://www.weltpolitik.net/.../0644a930ba1074b5cca2acd4809cbcd5/6878a855da2c86761b8b80333a6cc81c/20040607_bmei.pdf), 8.6.2007

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid*, p:12

<sup>208</sup> Roland Danreuther, “Is there room for Europe”, <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/E4D19123-9DD3-11D1-B44E-006097071264.htm>, 6.5.2007

<sup>209</sup> Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe”, Barcelona, 15 September 2004, p:8, [www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf](http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf), 9.5.2007

prevent terrorism the roots of it must be destroyed<sup>210</sup>. It is necessary to explain that the European approach about the security of the region is different from the US approach. The European approaches are far more focused on the US activities about preventing terrorism and use of force in the region. Europeans think that US behaves hard in security proclivities. Although Europeans criticize the US behaviors in security activities, the EU has also prioritized defensive measures most notably since 9/11. Europeans think that the US activities against terrorism in the Middle East have included a reactive and short-term mentality but after the Madrid bombings, the EU reacted similarly against terrorism by ignoring human rights of the minorities. The most significant areas of EU activities have been the justice and home affairs field, *“with governments agreeing tough new anti-terrorism legislation; more police and judicial cooperation; increased powers for Europol; a new Common Arrest Warrant; strengthened border controls; a new border police and external borders agency; and new anti-terrorist and readmission clauses to be included in all EU trade and cooperation agreements”*<sup>211</sup>.

Roberto Alliboni argues that although European governments have cooperated with the US on extradition and migration matters, they have continued to resist US security policies in the Middle East. The split between the EU and the US was triggered on Saddam’s Iraq. Most Europeans saw the Iraq war as a risky mistake and they thought that the war in Iraq was unnecessary. All the leaders of European states shared the same the American assessment of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the need to put it under pressure with a view to influencing its policies or making it change from inside. The Europeans opposed the doctrine of preventive war and strong unilateralist doctrine behind preventive war. According to Alliboni;

*“European countries were primarily concerned by a U.S. policy that threw into question the basis of international legality For the permanent members of the UN Security Council putting international legality into question was also an attack on their international political status. France felt this more acutely than other permanent members of the Security Council. This was one more reason why it opposed the American intervention in Iraq so fiercely. Instead, other European countries felt ideologically close to the Bush administration. Thus, they joined the U.S. coalition, like the United Kingdom, Mr. Aznar’s Spain, and Italy. Eastern European countries also joined the coalition, since they felt they had to stay close to the United States so as to acquire a real assurance against threats that could come from their powerful Russian neighbor”*<sup>212</sup>.

The diversion between the EU and the US increased after the war in Iraq and spread through the politics about the Middle East and the North Africa. The US use of force in security issues have

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<sup>210</sup> Chaudry, *Ibid*.

<sup>211</sup> Youngs, *Ibid*, p:7

<sup>212</sup> Roberto Aliboni, “Europe and the United States:Common Interests and Differences in Democracy Promotion”, **Istituto Affari Internazionali**, This paper presented in the seminar called “Le relazioni transatlantiche e l’agenda politica internazionale” which was established in Roma in 2005, p:2, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai0511.pdf> , 8.6.2007



been widely criticized by Europe. Although the US views the use of force as a normal instrument of foreign policy, Europeans reject this idea. The American philosophy as “*wrong is better than unsafe*” does not attract the EU. According to US, this instrument works if you are prepared to accept the risk and cost<sup>213</sup>.

Pinar Bilgin argues that many EU policy-makers still follow the US lead and do not rule out the threat and use of force as an instrument of policy. Although the EU has remained divided over this issue, many member states have agreed and put US conceptions (and practices) of security in the Gulf into progress, which prioritize military stability and predictability over democratization and development. According to her, the debates within the EU about war on Iraq could be explained as signaling a deepening of divisions within the EU, and between the EU and the US<sup>214</sup>. Christopher Flood argues that the US policymakers and commentators have been increasingly irritated by European criticisms of the Bush administration's approach to international relations, which the Europeans see as characterized by unilateralism, incoherence, and arrogance. According to him; “*Europeans deeply resent the alternately patronizing and hectoring tones in which they are sermonized by Washington about the need to get behind the U.S. in its unflagging defense of “freedom,” which Europeans interpret to mean defense of American interests firsthand foremost*”<sup>215</sup>.

Although EU has criticized the US policies in Iraq, EU did nothing in the war between Israel and Hezbollah. During the war between Israel and Hezbollah, the EU was expected to declare disapproval to Israel by the world. It is hard to say that the EU did this approval. Although EU defined the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as “*a strategic priority*” and stated that there would be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East<sup>216</sup>, EU also did not criticize the Israel enough. The most important reason was the US. The US had responded the declarations of Germany and France about the Iraq war strongly. The EU did not behave as a union during the war. The ones who were isolated during and after the war were France and Germany. England, Spain and Italy took the side with the US because of their national benefits from the US. Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria also supported the US during the war. This made a disapproval about the war between Israel and Hezbollah hard for France and Germany. The states that stand against a German hegemony in the EU supported the US. It is very destitute that although the EU feels itself responsible for talking about a one-century-old so-called Armenian Genocide, the EU did not declare a united declaration about the

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<sup>213</sup> Michael Brenner, “The European Union, The United States and Liberal Imperialism”, Paper delivered to the Biennial Conference of the European Union Studies Association, Austin /Texas 2005, p:8, [www.transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/Publications/brenner\\_monograph\\_2006.pdf](http://www.transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/Publications/brenner_monograph_2006.pdf), 8.6.2007

<sup>214</sup> Pinar Bilgin, “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security”, **International Relations**, Volume 18, No 25, 2004, p:34.

<sup>215</sup> Christopher Flood, “Some European Thoughts in the Wake of 9/11”, **South Central Review**, Vol. 19, No. 2/3, 9/11. (Summer - Autumn, 2002), p:50

<sup>216</sup> Volker Perthes, “Europe looks at plan for a ‘Greater Middle East’”, **The Daily Star Tuesday**, March 10, 2004., [www.pogar.org/themes/reforms/documents/04e-eu-plan.pdf](http://www.pogar.org/themes/reforms/documents/04e-eu-plan.pdf), 9.5.2007

war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon<sup>217</sup>. Javier Solana argued that they could not be selective in their call for respect of International Law. According to him, all governments in the Middle East had to abide by the rule of law. The deteriorating situation on the border between Israel and Lebanon brought with it a real risk of regional overspill. He concluded that the European foreign ministers could not agree with a consensus on the solution to conflict between Israel and Lebanon so the entire community would be judged according to its success in achieving this solution<sup>218</sup>. This situation has not been new in the EU history because lack of coherence between the policies of the member states has been seen in the past such as in the early stages of the Balkan crisis, the EU was greatly hampered by internal differences, with Germany supporting the independence of Slovenia and Croatia while France and Britain were opposed. In West-Africa in the late 1990s, the United Kingdom was supporting the Sierra Leonian NPRC government, while the German ambassador condemned its excesses, and France refused to put pressure on the leaders of Liberia and Burkina Faso who supported the Sierra Leone rebels<sup>219</sup>. Although a common European security strategy was established, the EU member states have not responded the US policies in the Middle East in the same way and they have never been able put a common security strategy into progress in the Middle East.

### 2.1.2 Political Perspective:

Although Europe and the US have competed commercially and economically in the Middle East, their vital interests in the Middle East have not competed with each other<sup>220</sup>. The European Union asserted that the promotion of democracy and human rights was an essential element of its foreign policy and a “cornerstone” of European cooperation in June 1991. At that time, a European Council declaration<sup>221</sup> stressed the role of human rights and the rule of law as critical components of its development initiatives. The council adopted a resolution<sup>222</sup> in November 1991 that established guidelines and procedures for a consistent approach toward countries attempting to democratize. Although the policy reflected Europe’s preoccupation at the time with the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, it laid the groundwork for putting democracy and human rights in a broader context—and this new approach was soon adopted toward the Arab states of the Mediterranean<sup>223</sup>.

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<sup>217</sup> Sedat Laçiner, “İsrail’in Hedefi ABD’yi Suriye ve İran’a Saldırtmak(The aim of Israel is to make the US attack Syria and Iran)”, [www.turkishweekly.net/turkce/yorum.php?id=304](http://www.turkishweekly.net/turkce/yorum.php?id=304), 8.6.2007

<sup>218</sup> Javier Solana, “Europe Counts in the Middle East”,

[ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/articles/70151.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/articles/70151.pdf), p:3, 9.6.2007,

<sup>219</sup> Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe”, Barcelona, 15 September 2004, p:17, [www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf](http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf), 9.5.2007

<sup>220</sup> Volker Perthes, “Points of Difference, Cases for Cooperation: European Critiques of US Middle East Policy”, **Middle East Report**, No. 208, US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Critical Assessments,(Autumn, 1998), p:30

<sup>221</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/human\\_rights/doc/hr\\_decl\\_91.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/doc/hr_decl_91.htm), 10.5.2007

<sup>222</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/human\\_rights/doc/cr28\\_11\\_91en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/doc/cr28_11_91en.htm), 11.5.2007

<sup>223</sup> Mona Yacoubian, “Promoting Middle East Democracy European Initiatives”, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr127.html>, p:3, 10.5.2007

Europe has a much longer view than the US whose policies has worked for four years. With more experience Europe can accept less obvious progress than the US. The US acts dangerously on democratization in the region. The US has no tolerance to the policies which can not produce quick acceptable results in the region. Ottaway argues that US's partnership has not been as valid as the EU's because it chooses acting alone behind the curtains<sup>224</sup>. According to Yacoubian;

*“The European Union’s democracy-promotion strategy has been characterized by a longterm, cautious approach adopted for the sake of preserving short-term stability. By and large, the European Union (like the United States) has not translated its calls for the promotion of democracy and human rights into concrete action. Rather than directly confronting regimes in the region, EU democracy-promotion programs have relied on more indirect methods, such as increasing support for “democratic values” and promoting cross-cultural dialogue. Indeed, of the three baskets that constitute the EMP, the political reform portfolio has registered the least success. Arab states of the Mediterranean continue to be dominated by autocratic governments that restrict political freedoms. Even in the best cases, institutional and political reform has made only limited, often fleeting progress”*<sup>225</sup>.

Europe and the US have been actively involved in promoting democratic reform in the Middle East. Although many of the goals of both actors have been the same, their policies have had differences between each other. Europe's role can be interpreted as a less grand strategy when it is compared with the US policies in the region. Barcelona process and the following partnership as Euro-Mediterranean partnership has showed less influence than the US policies in the region. The US policies in the region have been an active foreign policy that has aimed an active diplomatic engagement in the region mostly during the Bill Clinton's administration and after a diplomatic and military involvement in the region with George Bush. Pascal Boniface as a member of the French International Institute of Strategic Studies argues, *“The contribution of outsiders - Europeans and Americans – has been a mixed bag.”*<sup>226</sup> According to him Arabs think that Europe has been not interested in the Middle East enough and the US has been self interested. Europe has taken rule of law and human rights as the milestones of reforms in the region by establishing 1993 Oslo Accords between the Palestinian leadership and Israel. The US has been motivated by security and economic interests and this has hampered the developments for reforms in the region<sup>227</sup>. Yacoubian argued that there were several factors of EU failure to promote democracy in the Middle East.

*“First, The original intent of the Barcelona Process was not to promote political reform, Barcelona Process initially focused almost exclusively on trade and aid. Europe recognized that insisting on political reforms*

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<sup>224</sup> Marina Ottaway, “Consensus and Grievances on US and EU approaches to reforms, room for cooperation?”, Conference Report, Arab Reforms and the Challenges for the EU policies, Heidi Huhtanen, Philip Holzaphel, Bente Scheller, Toby Archer, **The Finnish Institute of International Relations**, 2004, [www.upi-fii.fi/document.php?DOC\\_ID=99](http://www.upi-fii.fi/document.php?DOC_ID=99), 10.6.2007

<sup>225</sup> Yacoubian, *Ibid*,

<sup>226</sup> Chaudry, *Ibid*

<sup>227</sup> Chaudry, *Ibid*

*would only irritate incumbent regimes in the Middle East and complicate Europe's near-term goals of promoting placid ties with those governments. Second, EU members have differing interests in, and differing goals for, the Middle East. Third, EU members have been deeply reluctant to use conditionality. In general, the connection between progress on reform and funding has not been made explicit. Fourth, The Barcelona Process has been encumbered by an unwieldy bureaucracy. With its multiyear budget cycles and volumes of paperwork, the EMP is exceptionally cumbersome bureaucratically. When policies and programs need to be redefined, the process is extremely difficult to redirect. Fifth, The early fate of the Barcelona Process was intimately linked with the status of the Middle East peace process. The Barcelona Process was formulated in the heady days following the negotiation of the Oslo Accords. The subsequent breakdown of the Oslo process has hobbled the Barcelona Process, impeding its ability to implement regional initiatives".<sup>228</sup>*

The Barcelona process has been based on two principles. These are differentiation and democratic conditionality. The principle of differentiation refers to treating all the countries in the same way. Funding of the developments in the countries will be same. Democratic conditionality refers to allow EU cooperating with the countries in the region in human rights and rule of law. The second principle has not been made real because of lack of definition on the notion of democracy in the region and of political among the EU member states.

Martin Jerch argues that EU democracy promotion policy was based on two pillars; economic dimension and democratic socialization. The economic dimension refers to commercial and economic policies, which would lead to introduction of democracy. Democratic socialization has been associated with the political aspects of the Barcelona process. This dimension aimed to construct a positive consensus concerning the necessity of the introduction of democratic rule in the minds of Arab Elites. Financing NGO's in the region has been the method for institutionalization on democracy showed that EU has used bottom-up approach for promoting political reform<sup>229</sup>. GMEI and Barcelona process have had strong contents as they have led the countries in the region to face with an asymmetrical negotiation. The Barcelona Process has given priority to the policy of gap reducing on a purely hegemonic policy. EU has preferred to opt for a positive approach that has included human rights and rule of law instead of imposing reforms and penalizing the states in the region. There are ideological differences between the members of the EU. *"Germany seems ready to abandon the conditionality clause on the ground that it would prevent the implementation of the neighborhood policy, the British favor a more hegemonic approach while trying to find some common ground*

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<sup>228</sup> Yacoubian, *Ibid*

<sup>229</sup> Martin Jerch, "Reforming Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Countries: Wider Europe, Greater Middle East or Alexandria Statement, A Critical Assessment", Università Di Catania, Facoltà Di Scienze Politiche, [www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/EDRC5/eusamed03.pdf](http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/EDRC5/eusamed03.pdf), p:163, 10.5.2007

*between the US and Europe*”<sup>230</sup>. The EMP has been the only legitimate multilateral organization including Israel in the region. All the other organizations and policies lack of legitimacy and make no impacts. Officially, the EU supports the GMEI but the reactions have been much cooler privately. The Europeans have been afraid of the US plan because it will decrease the influence of their own efforts in the region. It is known that Europe does not have the global military capabilities, which the US has. When Iraq war emerged, clearly defined interests were started to be determined by the EU as a new emerging political actor but European states were divided into different groups that thinks different about possible reactions of Europe against the US activities and policy in the Middle East. “*As the EU has become a more powerful and centralised economic group, as seen in the creation of a single market and the adoption of the euro, it has sought to translate this into greater political power projection, seeking to develop a common foreign and security policy and an expeditionary defence capability*”<sup>231</sup>. Javier Solana argues that democratic change is a long-term process that happens for a variety of reasons. Domestic, regional and international factors each play a role. According to him, to succeed, democratic movements have to be homegrown and adapted to local conditions. Each society should find its own path and move forward at its own pace<sup>232</sup>.

Roberto Aliboni argues that democracy promotion policies of the West need to reassure all Muslim actors and regimes by strengthening international legality and reinforcing multilateral institutions. According to him, the use of force should be kept out of promoting democracy and Western double standards in international policies should be eliminated as much as possible, so as to bestow more credibility and effectiveness on Western democracy promotion policies in the eyes of both liberal and democratic Muslims<sup>233</sup>. Felix Neugart argues that the approach to democratization in the region needed to be rethought without recourse to simplistic blueprints. According to him, the indirect and incremental European approach applied over a decade in the framework of the Barcelona Process has yielded very few results. Yet the blunt rhetoric of the U.S.-led *Broader Middle East and North Africa* initiative and the attempt at democratization by military conquest in Iraq has alienated the main beneficiaries of democracy, the peoples of the region<sup>234</sup>. The EU has tried to put democratic reform into the progress in the Middle East but has not been effective as the US because it has given more attention to economic ties with the Middle East.

### 2.1.3 Socio-Economic Perspective:

<sup>230</sup> Dr.Jean.F Crombies. “The US, the EU and MENA countries which way to choose?”, Tripolipost, 29/5/2004, <http://www.tripolipost.com/article/detail.asp?c=5&i=124&archive=1>, 10.5.2007

<sup>231</sup> Danreuther, *Ibid*.

<sup>232</sup> Javier Solana, “Europe's leading role in the spread of democracy”, [ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/articles/84123.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/articles/84123.pdf), p:1, 2.6.2007

<sup>233</sup> Roberto Aliboni, “The Debate on Promoting Democracy: Lessons Learned and Future Challenges”, [www.euromed10.org/files/2005/10/07/1128705749800.pdf](http://www.euromed10.org/files/2005/10/07/1128705749800.pdf), p: 5, 11.6.2007

<sup>234</sup> Felix Neugart, “Europe and the Middle East – New Ways and Solutions for old Problems and Challenges?”, Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research Center for Applied Policy Research, Munich, 2006, p:3, [www.cap.lmu.de/download/2006/2006\\_europe-and-the-middle-east.pdf](http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2006/2006_europe-and-the-middle-east.pdf), 9.5.2007

The EU has had close ties with the region since 1900s such as the legacy of European colonial penetration into the region, especially since 1970s<sup>235</sup>. For example; in economic relations, the EU spends €1 billion (\$1.2 billion) a year in aid to the Mediterranean region alone, plus €2 billion in loans from the European Investment Bank. The EU has been the major trading partner and the major investor in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean<sup>236</sup>. When it is compared with the US, the EU has been known better than the US in the region. There are also 10 million Muslims living in the European countries. The Barcelona process was also a result of these connections. In the Barcelona summit, Europe and the Mediterranean partnership was established. As it was written before, the EMP aimed to make reforms in the region, improve trade between the partners, and solve the regional security problems. Kenan Dağcı argues that economic security has been one of the important facets of the security for the EU since sustainable development, new and permanent markets and securing energy supplies are essential factors for economic security. He continues, “*Europe has been the largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption and this rate will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa. Therefore, these regions have an important place in terms of the EU’s economic security*”<sup>237</sup>.

The EMP established a fund that can destroy poverty as a root of the terrorism in the region but this process was not successful because the fund, which was provided by EU, has not been generous for the Middle Eastern states.

*“For the period 2000 to 2006, these include allocations of 5.45 billion euros (\$6.4 billion) for the so-called MEDA programme and another 6.4 billion euros for loans provided by the European Investment Bank, admittedly, on a per capita basis, this is considerably less than was provided for the candidate countries from East Central Europe (ECE) but, then again, these financial incentives have not unleashed the same degree of economic dynamism as seen in ECE”*<sup>238</sup>.

There have been some succesful stories about some states such as Tunisia and Morocco. These states show economic reforms that would make them potential Middle East tiger economies in the future but in general EMP has not given so much to the Middle Eastern states because of high demographic values and oil prices. Most of the investments have gone to oil producer states. Sub-Saharan states have been given less value than oil producer states. Europeans have not given right solutions to the problems of the Middle East completely yet.

The other dimension of the Barcelona process is social and cultural relations between the EU and Mediterranean states. In April 1996, ministers of culture from 27 Euro-Mediterranean partners met in Bologna to decide a strategy that would turn cultural and social heritage between the partners

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<sup>235</sup> Danreuther, *Ibid*

<sup>236</sup> Chaudry, *Ibid*

<sup>237</sup> Kenan Dağcı, “The EU’s Middle East Policy and Its Implications to the Region”, **Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 6, No.1&2, Spring & Summer 2007, p:178

<sup>238</sup> Danreuther, *Ibid*

into a catalyst for cooperation throughout the Mediterranean. Since 1998, the Euromed heritage programme has committed over 47 millions of Euro to fund partnerships between leading conservation experts and heritage institutions in the EU and the southern Mediterranean<sup>239</sup>. This programme has aimed to help countries to appreciate their common benefits and transform cultural capital into a social and economic asset. The second phase of Euro-Med heritage programme was launched with 30 millions of Euro for funding. Cultural heritage such as knowledge, human resources and development, and public and private investment have become the main issues of the programme<sup>240</sup>.

EU established a Euromed youth programme<sup>241</sup> which has aimed to facilitate the integration of young people into social and Professional life and boost the development of a genuine civil society in all Mediterranean partners. According to EU commission, youth programme would be a key tool to promote communication, mutual tolerance and respect among young people across the region<sup>242</sup>. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has aimed to bring people and cultures together through partnership and dialogue. For this purpose, the ‘Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures’ was established in Alexandria in 2005. According to the EU, bringing people and cultures together will be done giving present and future generations the instruments of dialogue such as one foreign language and knowledge about all religions and cultural traditions that have shaped the Euro-Mediterranean region as the crossroad of civilisations<sup>243</sup>.

The EU established the regional justice and home affairs programme, which has aimed to reinforce good governance and the rule of law in the Mediterranean region by encouraging the reform of judicial systems and promoting cooperation between these systems, as well as on combating organised crime and drugs, and promoting joint approaches to the management of migratory flows with a budget of 6 Millions of Euro<sup>244</sup>. Kenan Dağcı argues that geographical proximity and historical ties have been longstanding realities underpinning the growing interdependence between the EU and the Middle East. *“These two factors have been influencing EU’s stance toward the region. Current EU members France, the UK, Italy and Spain had colonies in the Middle East in the past. At the present, this colonial past of the some EU’s member states has turned back as immigration to these*

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<sup>239</sup> EU commission, “Europe and the Mediterranean: Towards a Closer Partnership”, March 2003, p:34, [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/library/publications/04\\_01-euromed\\_covtext\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/library/publications/04_01-euromed_covtext_en.pdf), 14.6.2007

<sup>240</sup> For Further information please see, [http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/med/regional/heritage\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/med/regional/heritage_en.htm), 14.6.2007

<sup>241</sup> For Further information about youth programme: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/youth.html>, 14.6.2007

<sup>242</sup> EU commission, “Europe and the Mediterranean: Towards a Closer Partnership”, March 2003, p:35, [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/library/publications/04\\_01-euromed\\_covtext\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/library/publications/04_01-euromed_covtext_en.pdf), 14.6.2007

<sup>243</sup> “The Barcelona process Ten Years On”, p:5, [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euromed/summit1105/brochure.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/summit1105/brochure.pdf), 14.6.2007

<sup>244</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice\\_home/doc\\_centre/external/mediterranean/doc\\_external\\_mediterranean\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/external/mediterranean/doc_external_mediterranean_en.htm), 14.6.2007

*countries*”<sup>245</sup>. Javier Solana argues that deteriorating social conditions, and growing racism and xenophobia have contributed to the Europe’s anxiety about political instability and illegal immigration coming from the Southern Mediterranean <sup>246</sup>. Bessma Momani argues that the number of economic migrants from North Africa to the EU has increased dramatically due to a number of civil wars and instabilities in their home countries. The EU needed to consider renewing and strengthening its relations with Southern Mediterranean to prevent migratory<sup>247</sup>.

## CHAPTER THREE

### ANALYSIS OF THE GMEI FROM THE TURKISH PERSPECTIVE

#### 3.1 The US-Turkey Relations Before 9/11:

The first contact between the US and Turkey began in the last 20 years of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Economic relations have been developed since the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In accordance with the economic relations, diplomacy between the US and the Ottoman Empire has started with the agreement in 1830. This agreement determined the law of trade and diplomacy between the US and

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<sup>245</sup> Dağcı, *Ibid*, p:181

<sup>246</sup> “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy”, France: **The European Union Institute for Security Studies**, December 2003, p:6, <http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf>, 3.6.2007.

<sup>247</sup> Bessma Momani, “The EU the Middle East, and Regional Integration,” **World Economics**, Vol. 8, No. 1, January–March 2007, p. 5.



the Ottoman Empire. With this agreement, the rank of the most regarded nation was given to the US by the Ottoman Empire<sup>248</sup>. The relations have shown great process especially after the WWII. The Soviet demands such as land from Turkey played a determining role in the relations with the US. Turkey started to search for a balance against the Soviet Union. Becoming a member of NATO is supported by the US. Turkey sent troops to Korea with NATO and has shown its importance to the world. With the strategic implications, Turkey turned its face to West. This increased the relations between Turkey and the US. The US supported Turkey under the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The relations increased between 1945 and 1960. There were no problems in the relations during that period<sup>249</sup>. Some problems occurred with the beginning of 1960s such as on Cyprus and the relations between the Greece and Turkey. The problems caused Turkey to search for new dimensions in the international relations. Turkey improved its relations with the Soviet Union and the Middle East during that problematic period. There is an argument that Turkey played a critical role in the containment of Soviet power. Turkey tied down some 24 Soviet divisions and contributed to deterring Moscow from launching a war against NATO. It also provided a platform for the West to monitor Soviet compliance with arms control agreements and related military developments in the Soviet Union. Recognizing that it could not deal with the Soviet threat without support from the West, Ankara worked closely with the United States and key Western European powers<sup>250</sup>.

The relations between the US and Turkey had found a chance to improve itself with the military revolution in 1980. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 has increased the strategic importance of Turkey again. Collapse of the Shah in Iran and establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran provided the need of a trustable, loyal and strong ally for the US in the Middle East. This co-operation has been developed and improved since 1980. Especially Özal tried hard to improve the relations between the US and Turkey. The Gulf War in 1991 brought a new shape in the relations. Turkey supported the US against all costs. *“Turkey’s role in getting Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991 engendered strong bilateral cooperation. This was symbolized by the intimate relationship between George Bush and Turgut Özal. The leaders spoke and consulted frequently. When Bush visited Turkey, he was the first US president to do since Dwight Eisenhower in December 1959”*<sup>251</sup>. This was criticized by the states in the Middle East and cost a lot of money to Turkey because of the sanctions against Iraq. This warm period ended with the beginning of Bill Clinton’s presidency. Clinton put great emphasis on the human rights and democracy. The Clinton administration started to increase

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<sup>248</sup> Yavuz Güler, “Osmanlı Devleti Dönemi Türk Amerikan İlişkileri(The Relations between the US and Turkey During the Ottoman’s Era)”, **Gazi Üniversitesi Kırşehir Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi**, Cilt 6, Sayı 1,2005, p:227-240.

<sup>249</sup> İdris Bal, “Türkiye ABD ilişkileri ve 2003 Irak Savaşının getirdikleri(The US –Turkey relations and the bringings of 2003 Iraq war)”, 21. YY’da Türk Dış Politikası, Nobel Yayınları, 2005,p:151.

<sup>250</sup> Zalmay Khalilzad, “A Strategic Plan for Western-Turkish Relations”, **The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward A Strategic Plan**, Chapter Five, Rand Publications, 2000,p:80

<sup>251</sup> Kemal Kirişçi, “US- Turkey Relations: New Uncertainties in a Renewed Partnership”, Turkey in Wold Politics, An Emerging Multiregional Power, by Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, *Colorado, The United States of America*, 2001, p:129

criticisms about the human rights and democracy records of Turkey in the mid-90s. During the visit of Istanbul, Clinton called for democratic reforms and permission for Kurdish people to express their identity<sup>252</sup>. When we compare the relations between the US, England and Israel with the relations between the US and Turkey it can be easily seen that the relations between the US and Turkey has not been as strong as the relations between the US, England and Israel but the relations between Turkey and the US has been called as strategic partnership. This partnership has been determined by the US demands from Turkey and the Turkish demands from the US. During the 1990s, various Turkish leaders and Western diplomats as a model of a democratic, secular, free- promoted Turkey market society to the newly independent states of Central Europe and Central Asia. Advancing the Turkish model was a leading foreign policy tool and asset for Turkey in its regional rivalries with Greece, Iran and Russia<sup>253</sup>. Consequently, Turkey has one of the most complex foreign policy situations in the world<sup>254</sup>. The Caucasian energy corridors, the Middle Eastern petrol, ethnic and cultural conflicts have increased the popularity of Turkey during 1990s<sup>255</sup>. Some problems have been seen in the relations between the US and Turkey during the 90s but both states have not tried to overshadow the problems and both states have put negotiations and agreements forward in the relations for the global public opinion. These problems were as follows:

- Although the US and Turkey had shared common behaviors against radicalism and global terrorism, the US concerns about global terrorism had not included PKK as a threat for global peace clearly.<sup>256</sup>
- The US support<sup>257</sup> for the Armenians had and have confused Turkey<sup>258</sup>.
- The US neutral behaviors about Cyprus had not showed the strategic partnership's behaviors<sup>259</sup>.

During the problems that were written above Turkey started to feel insecure and lonely in the international area because Turkey thought that the importance of itself during the cold war would no more exist. Although the problems that occurred in the relations between the US and Turkey, Turkey needed a strong ally in the international relations and has tried to overcome the problems by

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<sup>252</sup> Kirişçi, *Ibid*, p:130

<sup>253</sup> Şule Kut, "The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s", Turkey in Wold Politics, An Emerging Multiregional Power ,by Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, Colorado, The United States of America,2001, p:9

<sup>254</sup> Barry Rubin, , "Turkey: A Transformed International Role", Turkey in Wold Politics, An Emerging Multiregional Power ,by Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, Colorado, The United States of America,2001, p:1

<sup>255</sup> Bal, *Ibid*, p:157

<sup>256</sup> [www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/konusma/gnkurIIncibsk\\_atckonusmasiogleyemegi\\_eng\\_06062005.htm](http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/konusma/gnkurIIncibsk_atckonusmasiogleyemegi_eng_06062005.htm), 11.3.2007

<sup>257</sup> [http://www.anca.org/press\\_releases/press\\_releases.php?prid=1003](http://www.anca.org/press_releases/press_releases.php?prid=1003), 11.6.2007

<sup>258</sup> <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5275.htm#relations> , 11.6.2007

<sup>259</sup> F. Stephen Larrabee, "Turkish Foreign and Security Policy: New Dimensions and New Challenges", **The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward A Strategic Plan**, Chapter 3, Rand Publications, 2000, p:15

negotiations with the US. It can be argued that strategic partnership did not help Turkey to overcome its security and economic problems but the chances or alternatives of Turkey were not enough to compare and choose during the 90s.

### **3.2 The US-Turkey Relations Between 9/11 and the Iraq War:**

After 9/11, Turkey believed that the Western states would understand Turkey's efforts against the Kurdish Terrorist organization (PKK) and declare that it would support global war against terrorism. The US attacked Afghanistan and Turkey sent troops under NATO forces to secure the post war conditions in the region. The second target of the US was Iraq.<sup>260</sup> Before the invasion of Iraq, Turkey supported the peaceful solutions for the Iraq, wanted Iraq to obey the UN resolutions and declared that military forces had to be used under the UN decision. Turkey had tried to persuade Iraq to negotiate with the UN and the US. On the other hand, Turkey talked with the regional states to solve the problem without using force. The US wanted support and permission from Turkey to open a northern battlefield. Although Turkey declared that opening a northern battlefield for the war must be legitimated under the international agreement, it argued that establishing a battlefield could be possible under some conditions. Thus, Turkey and the US started to negotiate over a northern battlefield<sup>261</sup>. During the negotiations, Turkey accepted that the US could modernize some ports and airports<sup>262</sup> with its own military specialists on February 6, 2003. The second official certificate for opening the battlefield was refused in the Turkish Council on March 1, 2003 and this established a disastrous affect for the relations between two states. The negotiations between two states had not been completed before March 1, 2003 and the demands of Turkey were not completely accepted by the US<sup>263</sup>. This voting for the official certificate was made in a wrong time<sup>264</sup>. There are some reasons of the Turkish refusal for official certificate

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<sup>260</sup> Bal, *Ibid*, p:164

<sup>261</sup> Tayyar Arı, "Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası(Turkey's Middle East Policy from Past to Present), 21. YY'da Türk Dış Politikası, Nobel Yayınları, Ocak 2004, p:685

<sup>262</sup> Gerry J. Gilmore, "U.S., Turkey Announce Operation Iraqi Freedom Support Agreement", American Forces Press Service, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29175>, 10.6.2007

<sup>263</sup> Faruk Birtek and Ted Widmer, "Old Friends, Why the US Should Support Turkey Now More Than Ever", The Boston Globe, 12/14/2003, [http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2003/12/14/old\\_friends/](http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2003/12/14/old_friends/), 10.5.2007

<sup>264</sup> Arı, *Ibid*, p:685

of opening a northern battlefield in Iraq. First of all, after 1993, with the death of Özal the relations have started to be worse than the period of Özal government. When Özal died the US was represented by vice minister of Foreign Affairs Clifford Wharton but the US foreign minister Madeleine Albright represented the US in the funeral of Hafiz Esad in Syria. Also in Jordan, when Hussein the King died, former US presidents Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter joined the funeral. The habit of always finding Turkey next to the US gave hope to the US so the US gave less importance to persuade the Turkish government, the Turkish Military forces, Turkish media and more importantly Turkish public about the wins and loss about opening the battlefield. The US ignored that situation. The US underestimated the Turkish public opinion. It prepared itself for the opening of the northern battlefield easily<sup>265</sup>.

Secondly, before war, the Turkish media supported that the US didn't help Turkey effectively after the 1991's war in the gulf. Turkey's economy and diplomatic prestige were damaged after 1991 especially in the Arabic world. The Turkish media argued that this would be the same again. Opening a battlefield would create Arabic criticisms over Turkey. Economic losses would increase with opening a battlefield for pleasure of the US. The Turkish media has supported that without a northern battlefield the US would not dare to attack Iraq because Iraq would be a second Vietnam for the US. These arguments had started to confuse the opinions of deputies, soldiers and Turkish people. Some European states had started to see Turkey as a hired military force.

Thirdly, caricatures and jokes were made by the states that disagree with opening a northern battlefield from Turkey. Turkish public opinion was reshaped under ethical and moral values<sup>266</sup>. Especially, Turkish media defended that Turkey had to increase its prestige in the world by refusing the official certificate against all odds.

Fourthly, the Justice and Development Party has been an inexperienced party to deal with such a situation<sup>267</sup>. Although the JDP had shared common ideas with the

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<sup>265</sup> Bal,*Ibid*, p:171

<sup>266</sup> <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?viewid=316265#top> , 6.5.2007

<sup>267</sup> Bal,*Ibid*, p:171

US but Erdoğan did not take a group decision about opening the battlefield so some deputies voted negatively for the official certificate.

Fifthly, the president of the Republic of Turkey showed his negative opinion about the official certificate<sup>268</sup>. However, Ahmet Necdet Sezer is a jurist, he defended that use of force in Iraq could only be possible with international legitimacy<sup>269</sup>. The declarations of the president affected the deputies and the public opinion.

Sixthly, the chairperson of the Turkish National Assembly stand against the idea of opening a battlefield from the Northern Iraq<sup>270</sup>. The Chairman's opinions also affected the base of JDP<sup>271</sup>.

Lastly, the Turkish Armed Forces did not declare negatively about opening battlefield clearly but they stand against the demands of the US. Some of the generals commented on official certificate and argued that Iraq war was not the war of Turkey<sup>272</sup>. The Turkish Armed Forces did not support the agreement on opening Battle Field. The Turkish Armed Forces did not take an advisory decision from the National Security Committee for the Assembly. Deputies needed such a decision but Turkish Armed Forces thought to stay neutral for affecting votes negatively<sup>273</sup>.

The relations between the US and Turkey during the Iraq War can be interpreted as a negotiation period that ended with failure for both states because this period increased the problems, which may be solved in a long time with enormous effort.

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<sup>268</sup> [www.radikal.com.tr/haberno=67539&tarih=28/02/2003](http://www.radikal.com.tr/haberno=67539&tarih=28/02/2003), 5.3.2007

<sup>269</sup> <http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/almanak2003/news.asp?sid=2>, 5.3.2007

<sup>270</sup> [http://www.belgenet.com/2003/tbmm\\_010303.html#s](http://www.belgenet.com/2003/tbmm_010303.html#s), 2.12.2006

<sup>271</sup> <http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/almanak2003/news.asp?sid=2>, 2.11.2006

<sup>272</sup> Özcan Gencer, "Dört Köşeli Üçgen Olmaz: Irak Savaşı, Kürt Sorunu ve Bir stratejik Perspektifin Kırılması(A triangle can not have four corners: Iraq War, Kurdish Issue and A collapse of the strategic perspective) ", **Foreign Policy Türkiye Baskısı**, Mart-Nisan-Mayıs-Haziran 2003, p:48

<sup>273</sup> Arı, *Ibid*, p:686

### 3.3 Turkey's Role in the Region After the Iraq War:

The most important event in the relations between the US and Turkey after the war has been the US raid on the Turkish Special Forces team in Sulaimaniyah<sup>274</sup>. This raid was established on 4 July, as it is known that Fourth of July has been celebrated as the independence day of the US. This is very meaningful. This event damaged the relations between the US and Turkey very much.

The US military and diplomatic resources explained before the government that the arrested Turkish soldiers had been plotting to assassinate the governor of Kirkuk, an oil rich ethnic tinderbox 200 kilometers west of Sulaimaniyah. It was claimed that a colonel who had already been arrested and deported twice by coalition forces while he was carrying out covert missions inside Iraq led the group<sup>275</sup>. *"A few days later, following outrage from Turkish politicians, public and media, the men were quietly released, but the bad blood between Turkey and the US - already stirred by Ankara's refusal to let US troops invade Iraq from its soil - will linger much longer"*<sup>276</sup>. According to Ed O'loughlin, there are two ways to explain this situation. The first one is that Turkish army was indeed planning covert operations to destabilize Northern Iraq because Turkey has strong interests in the region as well. Turkey wants to stop PKK. For the past 10 years, it has kept several thousand troops inside Northern Iraq, until now with US blessing. Turkey wants the union of Iraq and has tried to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq which would encourage the PKK to fresh violence. Secondly; with the refusal of the official certificate for opening a northern battlefield in Turkish National Assembly, Iraqi Kurds have actively increased the alliance with the US instead of Turkey. The increase in the influence of Kurds over the US has made Turkey unhappy<sup>277</sup>. The Iraqi Kurds advised the US to stop the Turkish presence in the Northern Iraq. By this advice, the US wanted to take revenge of the refusal of the official certificate and declare Turkey that it could not make any progress without permission of the US. Whoever sparked the July 4 raid, there is no doubt that many Kurds were delighted to see the Turkish soldiers - and several Turkoman Front members - arrested in Sulaimaniyah by the Kurds' US protectors<sup>278</sup>.

The Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan said that this event was an ugly incident and it should have not happened. He argued, *"For an Allied country to behave in such a way toward its ally cannot*

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<sup>274</sup> Ali Bayramoglu, "What is it Behind The Iraq Arrest Crisis?", <http://www.byeegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING2003/07/03x07x09.HTM>, 11.6.2007

<sup>275</sup> Nicholas Birch, "Detention Strains Already Tense US-Turkey Relations", July 15, 2003, [www.csmonitor.com/2003/0715/p11s01-woeu.html](http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0715/p11s01-woeu.html), 10.6.2007

<sup>276</sup> Ed O'loughlin, "Bad Blood Lingers after Strange Days in Kurdistan", July 19 2003, [www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/07/18/1058035204818.html](http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/07/18/1058035204818.html), 11.6.2007

<sup>277</sup> Bill Park, "Iraq's Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for US Policy", *Parametres*, Autumn 2004, p:23

<sup>278</sup> James E.Kapsis, "From Desert Storm to *Metal Storm*: How Iraq Has Spoiled US-Turkish Relations", *Current History*, November 2005, p:386

be explained”<sup>279</sup>. The US gave no immediate reaction against the comments of Erdoğan. As an immediate reaction, Turkey closed the Habur gate with Iraq. The Turkish deputy chief of staff released a statement, which slammed the incident as a mistake that would affect the U.S.-Turkish relations which date back to half a century. The statement denied that the Turkish troops were planning to assassinate the governor of Kirkuk, asserting that Turkish troops were officially deployed in northern Iraq in coordination with the U.S. to monitor the situation in northern Iraqi cities dominated by Turkmen. Washington and Ankara agreed April 10 on deploying Turkish military observers in northern Iraq. A 30-strong Turkish unit was then sent there.<sup>280</sup> US State Department representative Richard Boucher told the US arrestment of a group of Turkish soldiers in Northern Iraq was due to reports of disturbing activities. “*What I can tell you is that the US military was acting on reports of disturbing activities that they might have been involved in,*” Boucher said in reference to Friday’s arrests<sup>281</sup>. Özkök, the former Turkish Military Chief of Staff described the incident as “*the greatest confidence crisis between the armed forces of the two countries*”<sup>282</sup>. He argued that this incident was not the policy of the US military or Washington. This event dented the honor of the Turkish Armed Forces. Özkök criticized the style of the US troops. According to him, the justification and intelligence behind the incident had not been confirmed, and acting on that basis was unacceptable<sup>283</sup>. The US did not apologize for the raid and Turkey closed the case because of the politicians. Unfortunately; the relations were damaged and especially mistrust between militaries was established<sup>284</sup>.

There is another development in the relations between the US and Turkey after the end of the Iraq war. This was another military demand to Turkey from the US. The US needed support from Turkey for the guerilla warfare in Iraq because the capabilities of the US Special Forces were not enough to stand against the resistances. It was an emerging chance for Turkey to fix the relations after the refusal of the official certificate and the hood event. Turkey accepted the second official certificate about sending troops to Iraq as a support for the US on 7 October 2003. As General Myers explained<sup>285</sup>, the US demand for Turkish Troops could be explained as a test for the Turkey. Turkey showed that it respected the relations between Turkey and the US and wanted to fix the relations. For

<sup>279</sup> “Turkish Special Unit in US Custody in Iraq”

<http://www.turks.us/article~story~20030705083131368.htm>, 7.8.2006

<sup>280</sup> “Turkish Special Unit in US Custody in Iraq”

<http://www.turks.us/article~story~20030705083131368.htm>, 7.8.2006

<sup>281</sup> “Boucher: “Turkish troops were arrested on”,

<http://www.turks.us/article~story~20030708111321391.htm>, 8.11.2006

<sup>282</sup> “This is the Biggest Trust Crisis between US and Turkey”,

<http://www.turks.us/article~story~20030708081948333.htm>, 8.5.2006

<sup>283</sup> “This is the Biggest Trust Crisis between US and Turkey”,

<http://www.turks.us/article~story~20030708081948333.htm>, 8.5.2006

<sup>284</sup> Hilal Köylü, “ABD ısrarlı: Haklıydık(The US is insisted that it was right)”,

[www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=82072](http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=82072), 22.3.2007.

<sup>285</sup> Nuri Gürgür, “Türkiye ABD ilişkileri test sürecinde(The relations between Turkey and the US are being tested), **Türk Yurdu**, Ağustos 2003, Cilt:23, Sayı:192, p:2

Turkey; the US had still been an important ally. This approval explained the behaviors of Turkey for the US exactly. The US abandoned from the demand of the troops from Turkey after the approval of the Turkish National Assembly. Kurdish people in the Northern Iraq played great role in the US cancellation about demand for troops from Turkey because Kurdish people thought that a possible Turkish military presence in Iraq could decrease the political influence of Kurdish people and especially the US<sup>286</sup>.

After the war, the US promoted Turkey as a model for the region. The US supported that Turkey fit the model in the GMEI. During the 1990s, the various Turkish leaders and Western diplomats promoted Turkey as a model of a democratic, secular, free-market society to the newly independent states in the Central Asia and Central Europe. According to these scholars, advancing Turkish model would make a leading foreign policy tool and asset for Turkey in its regional rivalries with Greece, Iran and Russia<sup>287</sup>. Without being ready, this policy tool had never worked. Turkey had not prepared itself for such a responsibility so this tool was not able to be used by Turkey anymore. After Iraq war, G-8 summit was established and the US declared the GMEI. Turkey, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Algeria, Jordan and Yemen attended the G-8 summit as "*regional partners*." Turkey and Jordan supported the US plan but the leading Arab states Saudi Arabia and Egypt saw this plan as way of imposing Western values to the Middle East and they did not support the plan. During that summit, the US national security advisor Condoleezza Rice welcomed the support of Turkey and explained the Turkey's success story with a majority Muslim population and its development as a secular democracy<sup>288</sup>. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan argued that the reforms for the GMEI should not be imposed on countries by outside powers. According to him changing political systems of countries and ignoring their inner dynamics, culture and beliefs would not succeed. Ahmet Necdet Sezer the Turkish President answered Bush by saying "*Religious and state affairs are definitely separate from one another. Islamic countries can analyze Turkey but it is wrong to launch Turkey as a Pan Islamic state*" on a meeting with George Bush in Ankara. Bush had repeatedly cited Turkey as a model for Islamic states<sup>289</sup>. Bush agreed with Sezer and said that he understood Turkey's secular structure. He added; "*Your country, with 150 years of democratic and social reform, stands as a model to others, and as Europe's bridge to the wider world. Your success is vital to a future of progress and peace in Europe and in the broader Middle East*"<sup>290</sup>. Metin Camcıgil argues that in order to discuss any role that Turkey may or may not be able to play in the Middle East we have to consider the problems of

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<sup>286</sup> Bal, *Ibid*, p: 178

<sup>287</sup> Kut, *Ibid*, P:9

<sup>288</sup> Singh Gajendra, "America's democratic initiative in the Middle East", Al-Jazeera, July 14, 2004, <http://www.aljazeera.info/News%20photo%20negatives/2004%20phor%20originals/May/index.htm>, 11.8.2006

<sup>289</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>290</sup> *Ibid*



the Middle East and what Turkey has to offer. He argues, “*Middle East is ethnically Semitic but not necessarily homogenous because of religious differences*”<sup>291</sup>.

Onur Öymen argues that the US has not mentioned about secularism during the talks of democratization in the Middle East. He added the declaration of Colin Powell” *We would not stand against an establishment of a religious state in Iraq*”<sup>292</sup>. According to Öymen, a Muslim state cannot be a democratic state unless this state adopts its state system to secularism.

### **3.4 The Possible Problems For Turkey:**

It seems that Turkey may face two problematic issues in the future. The first one is the case of Iran. The Iran issue has started for Turkey with the US approach to Iran since September 11. There are many reasons for the US to see Iran as a target. First of all on January 29, 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush has grouped Iran, Iraq and North Korea as "axis of evil," which supports terrorism and threatens global peace<sup>293</sup>. Towards the end of 2002, Iran canceled an UN inspection of two of its nuclear sites, saying the Iranians need more time to prepare. The president Bush declared on July 21, 2003, that Iran and Syria have been supporting terrorism and this was unacceptable. Furthermore, the UN inspectors found enriched uranium in Iran and Iran tried to explain this situation with the need of nuclear energy on August 26, 2003. The UN started to persuade Iran to stop its nuclear program since 2003. Yet, the UN inspectors found nothing about nuclear weapon in Iran<sup>294</sup>. The Iranian President Mohammad Khatami denied that Iran want to obtain nuclear weapons, besides Iran declared that Shahap-3 with a 2000 km range was tested. After the negotiations between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) , Iran announced that it would continue building a heavy-water plant near Arak. The inspectors argued that this plant could be used to enrich uranium on February 14, 2005. President Ahmedinejad threatened Israel which shocked the world<sup>295</sup>.

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<sup>291</sup> Metin Camcıgil, “*Turkey’s role in the stability of the Middle East*”, President’s address at Manhattan Marymount College, ,November 4 2003, <http://www.ataturksociety.org/asa/news.html>, 10.9.2006

<sup>292</sup> Işık Kansu, “*Ortadoğu’daki Büyük Oyun: BOP(The Great Game in the Middle East:GMEI)*”, Cumhuriyet, [www.cumok.org/html/yazidizileri/ikansu/ortadakibuyukoyun.htm](http://www.cumok.org/html/yazidizileri/ikansu/ortadakibuyukoyun.htm), 8.5.2007

<sup>293</sup> <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iran/timeline.html>, 15.6.2007

<sup>294</sup> <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iran/timeline.html>, 15.6.2007

<sup>295</sup> <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iran/timeline.html>, 15.6.2007

Furthermore, president Ahmedinejad told that Iran would not stop enriching uranium because Iran needed nuclear energy. However, it is argued that Iran stand against the UN Security Council by enriching uranium.

*“The United Nations Security Council passes resolution 1737, imposing sanctions on Iran for its failure to comply with earlier motions calling for the suspension of uranium enrichment on 23 December 2006. The sanctions cover blocking the import or export of sensitive nuclear material and freezing the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation of sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.”<sup>296</sup>*

Iran's nuclear chief, Gholamreza Aghazadeh declared that they rejected the UN Security Council resolution 1737 on February 5, 2007. The developments on nuclear programme of Iran hesitated the US. Obtaining nuclear weapons, supporting terrorism and threatening Israel are considered unacceptable by the US. Economic concerns also directed the US actions against Iran, because Iran has choosen to change the oil trading currency Euro. Yet, Iran has been supported directly or indirectly by Russia, China and Latin American states. This has also challenged the US interests in the Middle East<sup>297</sup>.

In short, the tension between the US and Iran has increased mainly due to Iran's nuclear program. The US evaluates the nuclear program of Iran as a footstep for having nuclear weapon. According to the US, this nuclear weapon may be also handed out to Al-Queda. Iran has also been accused of supporting terrorism, the Shiats in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Actually, Iran has started to increase its influence in the Middle East in the post-Saddam's Iraq. Iran aimed to be the leader of the Arab world. To achieve this goal, Iran has started to change the balances in the Middle East as the leader of Shiats. In this connection, the relations between Turkey and the US have been perceived as a security threat for Iran. Turkey's strategical role in the GMEI has also been received as a critical position. Former President Mohammad Khatami declared that there was no need such a reform in the region directed from the West and no need for a model state in the region<sup>298</sup>. There has been another tension between Turkey and Iran since the 1979 Iranian revolution. The relations between Iran and Turkey have started to enter into new phase with the Iranian nuclear development. Historically, Iran and Turkey have lived in peace since 1639 Kasr-ı Şirin agreement. They have not entered in an open war against each other, because both states have had similar military forces and

<sup>296</sup> <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iran/timeline.html>, 15.6.2007

<sup>297</sup> İbrahim Karagül, “Dünyayı Yol Ayrımına Sürükleyecek Savaş(The war which will lead the world into crossroad)”, [www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/icbasin-turkdispolitikasi/2005/12/28x12x2005.htm](http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/icbasin-turkdispolitikasi/2005/12/28x12x2005.htm), 15.6.2007.

<sup>298</sup> İbrahim Al-Marashi, “Middle Eastern Perceptions of US-Turkey Relations After 2003 Iraq War”, [http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi\\_turkey\\_tpq\\_id\\_25.pdf](http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_25.pdf), 16.5.2007

they both have thought that no one would have advantage after a possible war. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the similarity between these two states will be broken in the advantage of Iran. This advantage may be used to expand Islamic ideology to the Central Asia and to increase the influence in Caucasia and Central Asia<sup>299</sup>. The other problem, which can emerge due to the nuclear development in Iran, may be the distrust to international legality in Turkey, because Turkey has supported international norms and legals since the establishment of Turkish Republic. If the international norms and legals don't prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, the Turkish public may think that not obeying the international norms and legals cost nothing. If Iran manages to get nuclear weapons, Turkey will have a neighbor, which does not obey the international precautions for nuclear weapons. The social groups in Turkey may defend Iran's power, support a Turkish nuclear development, and disobey the international laws. This may break the traditional politics of Turkey. Especially the debates about the NATO nonprotectionist behaviors in Iraq, the problematic relations between the US and Turkey after March 2003 have increased the importance of power in international relations for Turkey<sup>300</sup>. These debates can provide a desire to have nuclear energy and weapons in Turkey<sup>301</sup>. Turkey does not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons because this situation can provide instabilities in the region. Turkey may be the one which can be damaged mostly in a probable war between Iran and the US. As David Rothkopf argued, *"If Iran becomes a nuclear power, then the test for U.S. policy will not be about prevention at all, but rather about how to manage new threats in a world in which the nuclear nonproliferation regime is rapidly failing and in which terrorist-sponsoring states will have real nuclear capabilities"*<sup>302</sup>. Turkey wants to prevent instability in the region, because Turkey may be involved in war against Iran, Iran demands for not opening the Turkish bases to the US<sup>303</sup>. But the US may choose not to attack a state which has nuclear weapons. Thus, the deterrence of Iran's nuclear weapons might prevent geopolitical changes in the region after Iraq. In contrary to the above, the US and Israel politics over the Kurdish people have also been threatening Iran, thus Iran can be seen closer to the Turkish interests<sup>304</sup>.

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<sup>299</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Iran'ın Nükleer Programı ve Türkiye'nin Konumu(Iran's Nuclear programme and Turkey's situation)", Foreign Policy Institute, [www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/turkish/dosyalar/mkibaroglu\\_250106.htm](http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/turkish/dosyalar/mkibaroglu_250106.htm), 11.6.2007

<sup>300</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey Says No", **The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists**, Temmuz-Ağustos 2003, Cilt:59 ,Sayı:4, S:22-25.

<sup>301</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Iran's Nuclear Program May Trigger the Young Turks to Think Nuclear", **Carnegie Endowment**, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16284>, 10.5.2007

<sup>302</sup> David Rothkopf, "Look Who's Running The World Now", **Washington Post**, March 12,2006, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/10/AR2006031002060.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/10/AR2006031002060.html), 11.5.2007

<sup>303</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Missing Bill Clinton", **The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists** (Mart/Nisan 2004), Cilt. 60, Sayı. 2, ss. 30-32.

<sup>304</sup> Arif Keskin, "Iran'ın Nükleer Çabaları: Hedefler,Tartışmalar ve Sonuçlar(Iran's Nuclear struggle:Aims, Debates and Results)", [www.turksam.org.tr/yazilar.asp?kat1=2&yazi=77](http://www.turksam.org.tr/yazilar.asp?kat1=2&yazi=77), 11.5.2007

Nüzhet Kandemir as an ex-ambassador argues that Iran is not similar to Afghanistan and Iraq. The nuclear plants and developments in Iran cannot be destroyed by a few bombs, because it established nuclear factories and plants in different places. Bombing these factories and plants need a complete superiority over the Iran Armed Forces. Israel's and the American military forces are strong but such a bombardment may cost a lot<sup>305</sup>. Under these circumstances, Turkey has chosen to persuade Iran to continue negotiations with the UN and the EU.

The second problematic issue for Turkey is the Kurdish terrorism and the Northern Iraq. The Kurdish terrorism is one of Turkey's most important security problems, between 12 million and 14 million Kurds live in Turkey today<sup>306</sup>. Thus the Kurds are not considered as minority. Tarık Oğuzlu argues that the post Iraq war era has made it once again clear that Turkey's external and domestic politics are becoming increasingly intertwined because the political status of Kurdish groups in the Northern Iraq can impact on Turkey's policies towards its own Kurds. The way Turkey deals with the Kurdish terrorism will also affect Turkey's attitude towards the Kurds of Northern Iraq<sup>307</sup>. *"Given that the political status of Turkey's Kurdish origin citizens is an issue of high concern, if a solution cannot be found that would satisfy all the parties, Turkey would likely continue to securitize the political developments outside its borders in which the Kurds are involved"*<sup>308</sup>.

Gareth Stansfield argues that Turkey's national interests in the Northern Iraq will be best preserved by the suppression of the Kurds there and the strengthening of Turkoman community to counterbalance the Kurds. According to him Turkey has tried to prevent main Kurdish political groups in the region, the (KDP)<sup>309</sup> Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan(PUK)<sup>310</sup> from becoming powerful enough to challenge the territorial integrity of Iraq. He continues that *"The Kurds have always been seen as as potential sources of instability in the region as well as in Turkey itself. They have been thought as master minding grandiose plans first to break up Iraq and establish*

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<sup>305</sup> "Türk Dış Politikası: 2006 için öngörüler(Turkish foreign Policy: Prediction for 2006)", Cumartesi Konferansları, ABAKADEMİ- Konrad Adanuer Stiftung, Konferans Metni, March 2006, No:1, <http://www.abakademi.com/DOKUMAN/ABAKADEMI-KAV-Konf1.pdf> , 11.6.2007

<sup>306</sup> Patricia Carley, "Turkey's Role in the Middle East", Conference Report, **United States Institute of Peace**, p:8, [www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks1.pdf](http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks1.pdf), 17.6.2007

<sup>307</sup> Tarkı Oğuzlu, "Changing Dynamics of Turkey's US and EU Relations", **Middle East Policy**, Vol.XI, No. 1, Spring 2004, p: 103.

<sup>308</sup> Doğu Ergil, "Identity Crisis and political Instability in Turkey", **Journal of international Affairs**, Vol.54, No 1, 2000, pp:20-43 ; Michael Gunter, "The Continuing Kurdish Problem In Turkey after Ocalan's Capture", **Third World Quarterly**, Vol.21, No.5, 2000, pp:849-869.

<sup>309</sup> KDP aims to adopt new policies and strategies which correspond to the changes in Kurdish and international politics. It works hard to strengthen the basis of the Federal state and the Kurdistan National Assembly , and it works hard to mobilize international support for it. KDP wants support of World governments to establish Kurdistan. <http://www.kdp.se/>, 17.6.2007

<sup>310</sup> PUK seeks to establish a democratically elected Kurdistan National Assembly, which would be the highest power in Kurdistan and to facilitate the return of Kurdish deportees to their original areas. <http://www.puk.org/>, 17.6.2007

*their own independent state and then carve out Turkey's Kurd dominated regions*"<sup>311</sup> Tark Oğuzlu argues that it has been in line with this spirit that Turkey did not want to let the US open a second front in the Northern Iraq in the latest war. The fear was that the Kurds would take this as an opportunity to establish their own state<sup>312</sup>. Kurds have been only nation, which has not established state for centuries. Kurds have had approximately 25 million of population and have lived within Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran<sup>313</sup>.

Relations between the US and Turkey have been complicated by differences over Iraq, especially the increasing "Kurdization" of Kirkuk, and the refusal of the United States to play a more active military role in combating the Kurdistan Workers Party, which continues to make cross-border attacks on the Turkish territory from sanctuaries in the Northern Iraq<sup>314</sup>. Former Vice Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz stated that they knew the importance of Iraq's territorial integrity for Turkey and the US would protect this integrity after the intervention over Iraq in a meeting which was established in a Turkish Think Tank organization on 14<sup>th</sup> July 2002<sup>315</sup>. This has contradicted the recent US behaviors on supporting a federal state system in Iraq.

The Turkish administration suggested that there would not be a radical change in the state system of Iraq, but now Turkey has started to worry about the territorial integrity of Iraq. Turkey, Syria and Iran will not welcome the Kurdish state, because they contain Kurdish people in their territories. A probable establishment of a Kurdish state may politicize Kurdish people who have lived in Syria, Iran and Turkey<sup>316</sup>. The worst scenario for the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry has started to be division of Iraq into three, Shi'a Arabs in South, Sunni Arabs in the Middle and the Kurds in the North. Shi'a Arab State can increase the influence of Iran in the Middle East and the Kurdish state may politicize the Kurdish minority in Turkey. The reason of strong opposition in Turkey is based on Kemalism. In a Kemalist tradition, there are danger and safe zones. Kurds have stayed in danger zone since the establishment of the Turkish Republic because Kurds have tried to be separated from Turkey. The Turkish National Security Elites opposes an establishment of a Kurdish state in the Northern Iraq strongly because of Kemalist tradition<sup>317</sup>.

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<sup>311</sup> Gareth R.V.Stansfield, "the Kurdish dilemma: The golden era threatened", *Iraq at the Crossroads: State in the shadow of Regime Change*, eds. Toby Dodge and Steven Simon, Adelphi Papers, 2003, p:354

<sup>312</sup> Oğuzlu, *Ibid*, p:103

<sup>313</sup> Vassilis Fouskas, "Avrasya'da ABD'nin Macht-Politik'i ve Büyük Ortadoğu'nun Yeniden Şekillenmesi(The Machtpolitik of the US in Eurasia and the Reshaping of the Middle east)", Bülent Aras, *Irak Savaşı Sonrası Ortadoğu*, TASAM Yayınları, 2004, p:21.

<sup>314</sup> Stephen Larrabee, "The Middle East The Changing Strategic Environment", **Rand Corporation**, 2006, p:4

<sup>315</sup> Paul Wolfowitz, "ABD-Türkiye İlişkileri Üzerine Konuşma", **TESEV**, July 14, 2002, İstanbul Conrad Hotel. [www.tesev.org.tr/temmuz2002/bltn.html](http://www.tesev.org.tr/temmuz2002/bltn.html), 17.5.2007

<sup>316</sup> Bülent Aras, "Türkiye ve Irak Krizi(Turkey and Iraq Crisis)", *Irak Savaşı Sonrası Ortadoğu*, Ed. Bülent ARAS, İstanbul, Tasam Yayınları, 2004, p:165.

<sup>317</sup> *Ibid*

Israel has supported the Kurdish people in the Northern Iraq since mid-2004 because Israel wants the establishment of the Kurdish state which can provide instabilities in Syria and Iran. Israel has wanted an ally in the Middle East, because being lonely against the Arab states has increased the security concerns of Israel. To provide friendship and public opinion, Israel has started to declare that Kurds came from Jews. Israel has started to train Kurdish people as commandos and spies since mid-2004<sup>318</sup>. These commandos have been trained professionally as Musterevim( Secret Israil Special Forces). These commandos have established secret operations in the Kurdish regions of Syria and Iran to provide instability. As Hersh argues, establishment of a Kurdish state will trigger a war between Turkey and that Kurdish state so this situation will damage the relations between Israel, the US and Turkey<sup>319</sup>.

Establishment of a Kurdish state in the Northern Iraq has also been important for the PKK as well as for Turkey, because it is known that the militants of PKK have benefited from the hospitals, social and economic facilities in the Northern Iraq. A sovereign state in the Northern Iraq will make things easier for the PKK. The US has also been aware of this situation. The leaders of PKK have established foreign press conferences without the fear of being caught in Northern Iraq. These situations increased the tension in Turkey. Opposing parties have used this event to criticize the government. The US promises about preventing the PKK has become unreal because of ignoring responsibilities for bringing stability to the Iraq. The relations between the US and Turkey have showed irrelevant results especially in the issue of PKK. The US false promises began with the meeting between Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Bush in Washington on 29 January 2004. Bush declared, *"We both talked in the same language, the territorial integrity of Iraq will be protected, Powell will be the negotiator and Kongragel (PKK) will be taken into the list of terrorist organizations"*. Bush added, *"We both know that our people were killed in terrorist attacks. We must be aggressive against terror and bring the terrorists in front of justice"*<sup>320</sup>.

In June 2004, The Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) abandoned its five-year unilateral cease-fire. The governor of the city of Van in the predominantly Kurdish southeast of the country narrowly escaped death when a car bomb exploded as his official convoy was passing by. Three bystanders were killed and another 21 injured. Even though Kongra-Gel(PKK's new name) has denied responsibility, the Turkish security forces remain convinced that it was involved, perhaps in collaboration with the other militant group known in Turkey as Hezbollah<sup>321</sup>.

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<sup>318</sup> Seymour Hersh, Emir Komuta Zinciri, 11 Eylül'den Ebu Gureyb'e Uzanan Yol(The chain of order, the road from September 11 to Abu Guraib), Agora Kitaplığı,2004,p:297.

<sup>319</sup> Hersh,*Ibid*, p: 303.

<sup>320</sup> Şerife Üstüner, "Bush'tan Üç Büyük Jest(Three gestures from Bush)", [www.aksam.com.tr/arsiv/aksam/2004/01/29/politika/politika1.html](http://www.aksam.com.tr/arsiv/aksam/2004/01/29/politika/politika1.html), 14.5.2007

<sup>321</sup> Gareth Jenkins, "Cross-Roads", [weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/846/re82.htm](http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/846/re82.htm), 14.5.2007,

On June 27, 2003, the Turkish National Security Council discussed the approach between the US and KADEK(Ex-PKK). The intelligent reports about the negotiations between the leaders of KADEK and the US were taken into the agenda of Council<sup>322</sup>. The draft law about the penitence for the terrorists was discussed under the new developments in the Northern Iraq. According to report, three meetings were established between the US and the leaders of the PKK in the Northern Iraq. The US talked with Cemil Bayik, Osman Öcalan and Ali Haydar Kaytan in Camp Dolakoga, Opravil Hotel in Mosul and Halis. The vice president of the National Council of Iraq was also in these meetings. The Çomma and Akademi camps of KADEK were evacuated after these meetings. The negotiations between the US and the leaders of KADEK provided debates in KADEK because Murat Karayilan argued that negotiations with the US created negative influences over the militants of KADEK. Karayilan had started to plan new attacks against the Turkish presence in the Northern Iraq<sup>323</sup>. On July 23, 2003, the Turkish Minister of foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül went to the US. This visit was important for both the US and Turkey because this was the chance to fix the relations between the US and Turkey after March 1 refusal. The most important thing in that meeting has determined the red lines of Turkey to the US such as demographic condition of Kirkuk and Mosul, establishment of a Kurdish state and the PKK.

Mehmet Ali Birand<sup>324</sup> argues that the US would guarantee the preventions against the KADEK. When Abdullah Gül returned Turkey, he explained about the meeting's results in Washington. He said, *"We told the US that they have been responsible from the Iraq. The US has had the authority and the US should not let the presence of a terrorist group where the US has had the authority"*<sup>325</sup>.

The European Committee established a session about *"The Future direction of Turkey and the US-Turkey relations"*, which is the lower branch of the House of Representatives on 2 October 2003<sup>326</sup>. The Ex-Ambassador of the US to Ankara; Mark Parris, the director of the Turkish project in the CSIS(Center for Strategic and International Studies) Bülent Aliriza, the Washington Institute Turkish Expert Soner Çağaptay and the Representative of Hürriyet to Ankara, Sedat Ergin joined that session as speakers. Mark Parris argued that the territorial integrity of Iraq would be protected by the US as they promised and they knew their responsibilities about the PKK.

Celal Talabani visited Turkey as the president of Iraq's governmental council on November 20, 2003. He was ordered to finish the PKK by Erdoğan. Talabani promised to prevent any hostile

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<sup>322</sup> Kemal Yurteri, "MGK ABD-KADEK yaklaşmasını görüştü(NSC discussed negotiations between the US and KADEK)", [webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/06/28/hurriyet.asp](http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/06/28/hurriyet.asp), 11.5.2007

<sup>323</sup> Yurteri, Ibid

<sup>324</sup> Mehmet Ali Birand, "Gül ABD ile Son Randevuya Gidiyor(Gül is going to last rendezvous with the US) ," July 23, 2003, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2003/07/23/yazar/zbirand.html>, 17.6.2007

<sup>325</sup> "Amerika Bizi İstiyor(The US wants us)", [www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=83236](http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=83236)

<sup>326</sup> "Türkiye ABD ilişkileri yeniden tanımlanmalı(The US-Turkey relations should be redefined)", <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/10/02/351659.asp>, 14.5.2007

attack Turkey from Iraq. He said that he would not let PKK attack Turkey<sup>327</sup>. The leader of Union of Iraq Kurdistan Patriots; Talabani argued that they will not try to establish a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Talabani added that the new government in Iraq would be for all the ethnic and religious identities. Talabani answered the question of Deniz Baykal who has been the leader of main opposition party in Turkey, about why the PKK has existed in Iraq, by saying that “*the Authority in the Northern Iraq and Camp Mahmur of PKK has been the US. If the US will not solve the problem about PKK, we will handle with this situation*”<sup>328</sup>. Kinzer who is the reporter of Washington Post argued that Turkey lost the strategical importance for the US because Turkey would not be a strategical ally for the US anymore<sup>329</sup>.

General BAŞBUĞ argues that an ethnical federative system in Iraq shed blood. He says that the most important security concern of Turkey has been about PKK(KONGRA-GEL/KADEK). PKK has tried to enlarge its activities in Iraq under a political identity. General BAŞBUĞ argues that Turkey has wanted the US to finish the PKK and deliver the militants to Turkey. Turkey has shared the ideas with the US about the PKK. The only debate between the US and Turkey on PKK has been about time<sup>330</sup>.

Sedat Ergin argues that the recent problem between the US and Turkey has been the externalizing behavior of Paul BREMER in Iraq<sup>331</sup>. Bremer’s activities in Iraq has not depended on the decisions between the US and Turkey. On 30 January 2004, Prime Minister Erdoğan argued that an idea about a cooperative attack to PKK was not decided by the US and Turkey<sup>332</sup>. According to Erdoğan, the most important step for the US against PKK was

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<sup>327</sup> “PKK’ya son ver(Finish PKK)”, 20 November 2003, Politika, <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/11/20/374393.asp>, 13.5.2007.

<sup>328</sup> Ibid,

<sup>329</sup> Gila Benmayor “Türkiye, artık ABD için normal ülke(Turkey is a normal stat efor the US form now on)”, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=195470&yazarid=20> , 14.6.2007

<sup>330</sup> “Emik Federasyon Kurulursa Kan Dökülür(If an ethnical federation is established, many blood sheds)”, [webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/01/17/399842.asp](http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/01/17/399842.asp), 15.6.2007.

<sup>331</sup> Sedat Ergin, “Kulağını Çekin(Warn him)”, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=198368> , 11.5.2007

<sup>332</sup> “PKK’ya karşı ortak operasyon kararı alınmalı(A common operation against PKK should be decided)”, <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/01/30/406129.asp>, 10.5.2007



taking the name of PKK into the list of terrorist groups. Prime Minister Erdoğan also mentioned that the US would analyse the situation of PKK in itself.

Gen.Başbuğ argued that he had not seen a reaction from the US against PKK. PKK has continued its presence and activities in the Northern Iraq against all odds. This would provide the Turkish military existence in the region<sup>333</sup>.

Furthermore, on 16 September 2004, Turkish National Security Council has declared that Kurds have tried to change the demographic structure of Kirkuk and this may provide a Kurdish administration in Kirkuk. The NSC wanted the US and temporary government of Iraq to purify PKK/KONGRA-GEL<sup>334</sup>.

Cüneyt Ülsever argues that media started to force the government to establish a military operation to the Northern Iraq. He added,

*"In 1991; Turgut Özal declared that Turkey would face with the problem of Northern Iraq and a Kurdish state would be established surely. Turkey had to enter the Northern Iraq and establish the Kurdish Federation because Turkey could control the federation by itself. The Turkish Military Forces and Yıldırım AKBULUT were angry about this idea. Turgut Özal also argued that the US would return Iraq one day"*<sup>335</sup>.

Ülsever explained that although the JDP government wanted to enter Iraq before 1<sup>st</sup> March disapproval, it has changed this idea about the approval for the US troop demand before the Iraq war.

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<sup>333</sup> "Org.BAŞBUĞ: Laiklik Demokrasinin İtici Gücü(Gen Başbuğ, Secularism is the force of democracy)", [webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/05/27/hurriyetim.asp](http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/05/27/hurriyetim.asp), 11.5.2007

<sup>334</sup> "Milli Güvenlik Bülteninde Kerkük Uyarısı", Dünya, 16 September 2004, [www.radikal.com.tr/sayfa.php?sayfa=6&tarih=17/09/2004](http://www.radikal.com.tr/sayfa.php?sayfa=6&tarih=17/09/2004), 11.6.2007

<sup>335</sup> Cüneyt Ülsever, "Kuzey Irak ve İran(Northern Iraq and Iran)", 5 February 2005, <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/02/05/595183.asp>, 10.5.2007

On February 26, 2003, Memorandum of understanding was signed between the US and Turkey. This MOU expresses the articles as mentioned below:

- *"Political system of Iraq will contain Arabs, Kurds, Turcoman and the others.*
- *The cities of Iraq belong to Iraqi nation not to only ethnical or religious group.*
- *Terrorism and terrorist organizations will be purified in Iraq. (Turkish Military Forces will not attack anyone in the Northern Iraq except PKK).*
- *Mosul and Kirkuk will be taken inside of green security line. The Kurdish Groups in the Northern Iraq will not be able to pass that line. Turkish Military Forces will follow the developments in this line<sup>336</sup>.*

This MOU was hidden from the Turkish National Assembly and was not explained to the media before 1<sup>st</sup> March refusal<sup>337</sup>. On February 12, 2005, Marc Grossman has argued that the US guarantees the territorial integrity of Iraq. Marc Grossman told, *"There can be differences between the ideas of the friends but the most important thing is remembering the friends. We all share the idea of peaceful, democratic Iraq inspite of some debates."*<sup>338</sup> Grossman promised to work with Turkey against the terrorist groups including the PKK in the Northern Iraq and worried about anti-Americanism in the Turkish Media.

The Ambassador of the US to Ankara has argued that the US would help the Turkish activities to destroy the PKK<sup>339</sup>. Prof.Dr.Yusuf Ziya Özcan<sup>340</sup> argues that 42.976 people were killed in 97000 terrorist attacks from 1979 to 2004. According to him, Turkey spent 120 billions of dollars against the PKK terrorism. Prime Minister Erdoğan argues that no one could expect Turkey to be patient about PKK because of martyries in the struggle against the PKK terrorism. He told, *"Our*

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<sup>336</sup> Fikret Bila: Milliyet, 18.11.2004, <http://www.milliyet.com/2004/11/18/yazar/bila.html>, 22.9.2006

<sup>337</sup> *"Milli Güvenlik Bülteninde Kerkük Uyarısı(Kirkuk warnings on NSC report)"*, 16 September 2004, [webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/09/16/hurriyetim.asp](http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/09/16/hurriyetim.asp), 22.9.2006

<sup>338</sup> *"Grossman: Irak'ın Toprak Bütünlüğünü Taahhüt Ediyoruz(Grossman: We guarantee the territorial integrity of Iraq)"*, 12 February 2005, [www.hurriyetusa.com/haber/haber\\_detay.asp?id=4776](http://www.hurriyetusa.com/haber/haber_detay.asp?id=4776), 22.8.2006

<sup>339</sup> *"ABD'nin PKK Çelişkisi(The US contradiction over PKK)"*, 1 March 2005, Dünya, <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/03/01/606828.asp> 22.8.2006

<sup>340</sup> [http://www.byege.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/anadoluyahaberler-yeni/2005/haziran/ah\\_10\\_06-05.htm](http://www.byege.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/anadoluyahaberler-yeni/2005/haziran/ah_10_06-05.htm)

*nation expects you to take the necessary precautions against PKK in the region. If you become late in taking precautions, we will!”<sup>341</sup>.*

As argued by Oktay Ekşi, this declaration became late because the Turkish nation has listened to these declarations many times. Oktay Ekşi argues that although the US promised to fight against the PKK terrorism for many times, it has not done any relevant activities, so Turkey should behave alone against the PKK terrorism immediately.

Cüneyt Ülsever has asked that why the PKK terrorism activated after its long sleep which began in 1999. The US has caught Öcalan and has given him to Turkey. Yet, we can see that the PKK terrorism became active in the Northern Iraq with new conditions and strategy in 2004. The Northern Iraq is also under control of the US <sup>342</sup> but the US could not prevent the PKK terrorism. Ülsever argues that this action is not a punishment for the 1<sup>st</sup> March refusal. The US wants to use the PKK in order to include Turkey to the Middle East crisis<sup>343</sup>.

Ross Wilson, the ambassador of the US to Ankara talked about the relations between Turkey and the US after the refusal of the official approval for the battlefield at a press conference in Ankara. Wilson argues that Turkey and the US have tried to recover the damage in the relations after the refusal. The Hood event was forgotten in the relations between the US and Turkey. Wilson told that Turkey has been still important for the US, because Turkey has been an important strategic and political ally for the US in the region. He added, *“We have worked with Turkey against PKK, we share our intelligence about PKK and have tried to make the Europeans to take PKK as serious. We need time to handle with PKK”*<sup>344</sup>.

Yiğit Alpogan, the secretary of Turkish National Security Council, argues that the US has only watched PKK activities since the end of the Iraq War. Yiğit Alpogan told that if the US continued to watch PKK, the Turkish people would not trust the US<sup>345</sup>. General Hilmi Akın Zorlu declared that Turkey has wanted the US to make positive developments against the PKK terrorism in the Northern Iraq. According to him, struggle against the PKK terrorism has also been a part of the global war against terrorism<sup>346</sup>. General Sullivan from the US Army answered General Zorlu by

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<sup>341</sup> Oktay Ekşi, “Gerdeğe Girmenin Kuralı”, [www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/icbasin-turkdispolitikasi/2005/10/20x10x2005.htm](http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/icbasin-turkdispolitikasi/2005/10/20x10x2005.htm), 22.8.2006

<sup>342</sup> Cüneyt Ülsever, “Şemdinli Üzerinden Irak II(Iraq over Şemdinli II)”, 30 November 2005, [www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/4035503.asp](http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/4035503.asp), 22.8.2006

<sup>343</sup> Cüneyt Ülsever, “Türkiye’ye Ortadoğu’da gel gel yapılıyor(Turkey is being invited to the Middle East)”, [www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/icbasin-turkdispolitikasi/2006/01/04x01x2006.htm](http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/icbasin-turkdispolitikasi/2006/01/04x01x2006.htm), 22.8.2006

<sup>344</sup> Nur Batur, “Çuval Tarih Oldu(the Hood became history)”, [hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=3745730&p=2](http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=3745730&p=2), 11.6.2007

<sup>345</sup> Salih Zeki, “ABD, PKK’yı sadece seyrediyor(the US is watching PKK only)”, [www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/icbasin-turkdispolitikasi/2006/01/29x01x2006.htm](http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/icbasin-turkdispolitikasi/2006/01/29x01x2006.htm)

<sup>346</sup> “Türkiye Bölgede Nükleer Silah İstemiyor(Turkey does not want nuclear weapon in the region)”, [hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=43213630&p=1](http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=43213630&p=1), 11.6.2007

saying, “We understood your doubts about the US activities against PKK in the Northern Iraq but we need time and stabilize the Iraq completely before handling with PKK in the region”<sup>347</sup>.

On 11 April 2006, Deniz Baykal argued that Turkey has started to enter the swamp because of the false and passive politics of the JDP about the PKK<sup>348</sup>. He also argued that the hood event and the PKK terrorism, occurred because of the complete trust of the JDP on the US. The US declared that the PKK must say farewell to the arms because terrorism is not the solution<sup>349</sup>. The US also declared that 500 people were killed in the PKK terrorist attacks in Turkey and this brought nothing to the Kurdish people in Turkey. This declaration made the PKK happy because the PKK thought that the US saw the PKK as the side of conflict. The leader of KONGRA-GEL Zübeyir Aydar argues that the declaration showed that the PKK was thought as a drawee by the US<sup>350</sup>.

As argued by Oktay Ekşi, the declaration for cease-fire by the US gave moral support to the PKK. According to him, the US declaration for the PKK’s 22th anniversary on the terrorist attacks made the PKK’s start in terrorist activities as a historical event. Oktay Ekşi argues that the US has detained Turkey about the PKK. The first declaration about the PKK from the US came on June 4, 2004. President Bush told that they would work with Turkey against PKK on June 26, 2004. Condoleezza Rice argues that the US does not want the group that was called terrorist to attack Turkey and the US would continue working with Turkey. Furthermore, Colin Powel told that he would talk with the commanders about the ways to destroy the PKK. The negotiations between the US and the PKK on Mount Kandil was written on the newspapers, January 4, 2005. The Commander of the US military forces in Iraq, John Abizaid promised to prevent the logistics of PKK on Mount Kandil, 12 January 2005. The US secretary of state Rice told that they would not ignore the activities of PKK in the region. Rice argues that she agreed with Abdullah Gül to work against PKK on June 8, 2005<sup>351</sup>.

Nevertheless as argued by Oktay Ekşi promises of the US have increased but the results have been nothing. The US asked Turkey to promote a general coordinator in the struggle against the PKK terrorism. On the Daily Telegraph, it was written that the only solution for purifying the PKK has been invading the Mount Kandil<sup>352</sup>.

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<sup>347</sup> “Türkiye Bölgede Nükleer Silah İstemiyor(Turkey does not want nuclear weapon in the region)”, [hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=43213630&p=1](http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=43213630&p=1), 11.6.2007

<sup>348</sup> “İktidarın terör konusunda Kafası Karışık(The administration is confused about terror)”, [www.meclishaber.gov.tr/develop/owa/haber\\_portal.aciklama?p1=42403](http://www.meclishaber.gov.tr/develop/owa/haber_portal.aciklama?p1=42403), 11.6.2007

<sup>349</sup> “ABD’den PKK’ya mesaj: Silahı ve Terörü Bırak(Message from the US to PKK: Leave the guns and terror)”, <http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=1647109>, 11.1.2007

<sup>350</sup> Uğur Ergan, “PKK: ABD bizi muhatap aldı(PKK: The US saw us as a drawee)”, 18 August 2006, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4939347&tarih=2006-08-18>, 10.6.2007

<sup>351</sup> Oktay Ekşi, “Bizimle alay ediyorlar(They are kidding with us)”, 18 August 2006,

<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4939161&yazarid=1>, 11.6.2007

<sup>352</sup> İhsan Dörtkardeş, “Çözüm Kandil’i İşgal(the solution is to invade Mount Kandil)”, 30 August 2006, [www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/08/30/son/sondun14.asp](http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/08/30/son/sondun14.asp), 11.6.2007

Mehmet Ali Birand argues that PKK declared cease-fire because of the US declaration. According to him, Ralston<sup>353</sup> persuaded PKK to increase the prestige of the US in Turkey<sup>354</sup>. After the cease-fire of PKK, Barzani and Talabani have been anxious about the PKK's existence in the Northern Iraq. If Turkey gives a general exemption to the PKK, Barzani and Talabani will force the PKK to leave the Northern Iraq, especially Mount Kandil<sup>355</sup>. Oktay Ekşi argues that Turkey had to believe that the US help in the struggle against the PKK has been unreal and to expect help from the US would only make things worse.

Prime Minister Erdoğan complained the US to the Turkish journalists during the trip on Lebanon<sup>356</sup>. Erdoğan told that the US had not been loyal to its promises about the PKK and it did not destroy money resources of the PKK terrorism and did nothing in the Northern Iraq. Prime Minister Erdoğan also said that the Turkish Military Forces has caught militants of the PKK armed with weapons that are made by the US. Furthermore, Cemil Bayık and Murat Karayılan went to hospitals in the Northern Iraq. Turkey asked the US to let Turkey catch these leaders of PKK but the US did not answer. The US navy besieged Somalia, because the Union of Islam Courts (A fundamentalist terrorist organization) captured the government and life in Somalia. The same group threatened Ethiopia and Ethiopia invaded Somalia. The terrorist group had started to run. The US intervened Somalia once again. The reason of intervention was terrorism. If the Union of Islam Courts was a terrorist group Yalçın Doğan has asked, what the PKK was for the US<sup>357</sup>. On January 12, 2007, Erdoğan declared that Turkey had a strategy and plan against the PKK terrorism and has been waiting for the right time<sup>358</sup>. Erdoğan answered the question about the Zalmay Halilzad's declaration about Kırkuk saying Kırkuk has been the internal issue of Iraq. *"If this declaration was made by Zalmay Halilzad, He must be asked that if the intervention and existence of the US in Iraq has been internal issue of Iraq or not? Turkey has had historical relations with Kırkuk so Turkey can interfere in Iraq"*. Çengiz Çandar argues that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan must ask the US came to Iraq from 10.000 km. away, why did you come to Iraq from 40 km away. According to Çandar, Turkey cannot enter the Northern Iraq, because the Middle Eastern states especially Iraq approved the new road map

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<sup>353</sup> General Coordinator of US in the struggle against PKK.

<sup>354</sup> Mehmet Ali Birand, "Büyükanıt, AKP'yi topa tuttu(Büyükanıt targeted the JDP)", 3 October 2006, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=5190359&yazarid=69> , 11.6.2007

<sup>355</sup> Mehmet Ali Birand, "Türkiye Bir dostunu kaybediyor(Turkey is losing a friend)", 7 October 2006, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=5215904&yazarid=69>, 12.6.2007

<sup>356</sup> Oktay Ekşi, "Ağlama Yap!(Don't Cry, Do)", 5 January 2007, [www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/icbasin-turkdispolitikasi/2007/01/05x01x2007.htm](http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/icbasin-turkdispolitikasi/2007/01/05x01x2007.htm), 12.6.2007

<sup>357</sup> Yalçın Doğan, "Leş Kokulu Yazarlar(Stinky writers)", 12 January 2007, [gazeteler.hossobbet.com/son-dakika/93681-les-kokulu-yazarlar.html](http://gazeteler.hossobbet.com/son-dakika/93681-les-kokulu-yazarlar.html) , 12.5.2007

<sup>358</sup> "Başbakan Erdoğan: Bana Tuzak Hazırlıyorlar(Erdoğan:They're preparing a trap form )", 12 January 2007, [stvhaber.com/index.php?khide=1&hid=34371&sec=11](http://stvhaber.com/index.php?khide=1&hid=34371&sec=11), 11.6.2007

of President Bush. President Bush will not let Turkey enter Iraq, because a Kurdish brigade was sent to Baghdad and this movement increased the importance of Kurds in Iraq<sup>359</sup>.

On February 1, 2007, Matt Bryza has argued that Turkey would see the US progress against the PKK terrorism as soon as possible. He emphasized that the US knows what it can handle with the PKK. Enis Berberoğlu argues that the US would start struggle against the PKK because new 20.000 troops in Baghdad would establish stability and security. World has evaluated the US according to stability in Kabul of Afghanistan and sees the US successful. The US wants to stabilize Baghdad and after that, it will handle with PKK<sup>360</sup>. The American AP agency entered the camp of PEJAK (Branch of PKK in Iran) on Mount Kandil. According to news, the US and Kurdish people in the region let PEJAK to attack Iran as a part of US politics against Iran. The US has identified PKK as a terrorist organization but the US has supported PEJAK against Iran<sup>361</sup>. Turhan Çömez, the JDP Balıkesir Deputy has argued that the PKK was sending heavy weapons to Kirkuk on 05 February 2007<sup>362</sup>. On February 28, 2007, Secretary of state Condoleezza Rice argued that the PKK has been responsible from the attacks in the border between Turkey and “Kurdistan”. Rice has shown that the Northern Iraq refers to “Kurdistan” for the US<sup>363</sup>. Sinan Doğan argues,

*“Turkey’s security has depended on the territorial integrity of Iran because if Iran and Syria lose their territorial integrities with a possible coalition attack, Kurdish groups in Syria, Iran and Iraq may establish a Kurdish state which may attract the Kurdish people in Turkey”*<sup>364</sup>

As argued by Sean McCormack, Secretary of state Rice has called Kurdistan for a region, but in the political view, the US has been supporting the territorial integrity of the Iraq<sup>365</sup>. Yet, Mehmet Ali Birand argues that Ankara does not predict the PKK’s actions in the future because it is involved in internal political debates. Turkey should redefine its policy over the Northern Iraq and the PKK. According to him, the PKK suggested a strategic partnership to Barzani against the Turkey. This suggestion occurred with a declaration of Aydoğan who is deputy from Democratic Society Party.

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<sup>359</sup> Cengiz Çandar, “Kerkük Gerçekleri; Kerkük Yalanları(2)(Realities and lies of Kirkuk II), 19 January 2007, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=5803447&yazarid=215>, 11.5.2007

<sup>360</sup> Enis Berberoğlu, “PKK için düğmeye Mart’ta basılıyor(it will start for PKK on March 2007)”, 03 February 2007, [www.byege.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/icbasin-turkdispolitikasi/2007/02/03x02x2007.htm](http://www.byege.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/icbasin-turkdispolitikasi/2007/02/03x02x2007.htm), 12.5.2007

<sup>361</sup> “ABD, İran’a Karşı PEJAK’ı Kullanıyor(the US uses PEJAK against Iran)”, 5 February 2007, [www.usakgundem.com/haber.php?id=10137](http://www.usakgundem.com/haber.php?id=10137), 3.4.2007

<sup>362</sup> “PKK’lilar Ağır Silahlarla Kerkük’e kaydırılıyor(PKK with heavy guns have been moved to Kirkuk)”, 5 February 2007, [www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/5896387.asp?sd=2](http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/5896387.asp?sd=2), 12.5.2007

<sup>363</sup> “Rice said Kurdistan for Northern Iraq”, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6032172>, 17.5.2007

<sup>364</sup> Şenol Kantarcı, “ ABD’nin imparatorluk projesini gerçekleştirme düşüncesi çerçevesindeki İran krizi ve Türkiye(Turkey and the US Imperialism’s Iran Crisis)”, [www.turksam.org.tr/yazilar.asp?yazi=736&kat=19](http://www.turksam.org.tr/yazilar.asp?yazi=736&kat=19), 15.6.2007

<sup>365</sup> <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6038476>, 17.5.2007

Aydoğdu argues that “If Turkey enters Kirkük, He will take this as it is done to Diyarbakır”<sup>366</sup>. 57 soldiers were killed in the first six months of 2007 by the PKK<sup>367</sup>. 168 PKK militants were neutralized in the last three months<sup>368</sup>. From the beginning May 2007, with the increase in the losts in the struggle against the PKK, the Turkish Military Forces has supported entering the Northern Iraq but Erdoğan government has seen this movement as a mistake or a secondary objective in Turkey’s agenda<sup>369</sup>. Foreign minister Gül stated that Turkey opened its border for the Kurds in the Northern Iraq during the Gulf War but they thank us in a different way”<sup>370</sup>. Foreign minister of Iraq, Hoşyar Zebari argued that they oppose a Turkish Military operation in the Northern Iraq<sup>371</sup>. On the other hand, Gül argued that the PKK attacks have increased in the recent months and these attacks were supported by the Northern Iraq<sup>372</sup>.

Sean Mc Cormack argues that the US would not support a buffer region which is planned to be established by Turkey in the Northern Iraq<sup>373</sup>. Cengiz Çandar argues that it is sure that the Northern Iraq has been a logistic base for the terror and violence in Turkey, but this does not mean a military operation in the Northern Iraq is inevitable for Turkey. A possible operation in the Northern Iraq may bring economical problems, international isolationism and closure of the EU<sup>374</sup>. Soner Cagaptay argues that if the US policymakers want to rebuild their special relationship with Turkey, it is necessary that Washington be transparent about its policy toward the Kurds because distrust with regard to U.S. Kurdish policy has peaked across the Turkish spectrum with the resumption of near daily PKK terrorist attacks in eastern Turkey. The US has given many commitments to eradicate the terror infrastructure in Iraq, many Turkish officials has asked why the US ignores the PKK presence and activities in the Northern Iraq. “*Filibustering by U.S. joint chiefs of staff on plans to counter the PKK have led skeptical Turks to question whether Washington is a true ally*”<sup>375</sup>. According to him, the Turkish officials want even a symbolic US action against the PKK. While the State Department has listed the PKK as a terrorist organization since it started designating such groups, it seems at present that Tehran understands the Turkish sensitivities better than Washington, because Iran has put anti-terrorist operations against the PKK terrorism into progress.

<sup>366</sup> Mehmet ali Birand, “ Kürt sorununda Dönüm Noktasındayız (We are crossroads in the Kurdish Issue)”, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6038476>, 11.6.2007

<sup>367</sup> [http://www.tsk.mil.tr/HABERLER\\_ve\\_OLAYLAR/5\\_Terorle\\_Mucadele/terorle\\_mucadele\\_2007.htm](http://www.tsk.mil.tr/HABERLER_ve_OLAYLAR/5_Terorle_Mucadele/terorle_mucadele_2007.htm), 17.6.2007

<sup>368</sup> [http://www.tsk.mil.tr/HABERLER\\_ve\\_OLAYLAR/6\\_Terorle\\_Mucadelede\\_Haftalik\\_Durum/Haziran\\_2007.htm](http://www.tsk.mil.tr/HABERLER_ve_OLAYLAR/6_Terorle_Mucadelede_Haftalik_Durum/Haziran_2007.htm), 17.6.2007

<sup>369</sup> <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6712427>, 17.6.2007

<sup>370</sup> <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6708032>, 17.6.2007

<sup>371</sup> <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6706957>, 17.6.2007

<sup>372</sup> <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6713463>, 17.6.2007

<sup>373</sup> <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6714803>, 17.6.2007

<sup>374</sup> Cengiz Çandar, “Terörün dış desteği Kuzey Irak mı? Batı Avrupa mı? (Is the Northern Iraq external supporter of terror?Or Western Europe)”

<http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6712597>, 17.6.2007

<sup>375</sup> Soner Cagaptay, “Where Goes the US –Turkish Relationship”, **Middle East Quarterly**, Fall 2004, p:50

Turkey has started to increase its relations with Iran under the Erdoğan administration. Altuğ Ünal argues that under GMEI, the US will try to use Turkey to decrease economic and military costs of an intervention in Iran and Syria<sup>376</sup>. Under such a condition, Turkey will face a dilemma because it will choose the side, the West or Iran and Syria. Sedat Laçiner argues that Kurdish people wants Kirkük because of its economic value which includes oil reserves more than Kuwait's so they want to establish a state without a common nation and a union. Barzani has needed a common enemy for Kurdish people to create a union and establish an independent state. For him, this common enemy for Kurdish people has been Turkey since 2003. If Barzani chooses Iran, Iran will bomb the Northern Iraq. If he chooses Syria, it will not be suitable for Kurdish nationalism. Turkey has been the ideal for common imperialist enemy as heritaged from the Ottoman Empire. Barzani uses the PKK to attack Turkey<sup>377</sup>. The reason for US unwillingness to respond against the PKK in the Northern Iraq can be US military bases that if US protect and use its high capable military bases and airports in the Northern Iraq, it will not have to negotiate with Turkey over the use of İncirlik. In June 17<sup>th</sup> Hürriyet, it was written that the US established a grand military base and airport in the Northern Iraq<sup>378</sup>.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CONCLUSION

The GMEI (or the MEPI) has increasingly been discussed after 9/11. For instance, Huntington and Fukuyama, have presented their ideas under the titles "The Clash of Civilizations" and "The End of the History". Within their discussion it is claimed that the US have initiated her old strategy with a new title in the Middle East. Economic concerns have directed the empires, hegemonic and super powers in the history and recently the US. Thus, it is considered that the GMEI has given the opportunity to the US to control natural resources in the Middle East.

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<sup>376</sup> Altuğ Ünal, "Büyük Ortadoğu projesi ve Türkiye (The Broader Middle East Initiative and Turkey)", p:162, [www.eab.ege.edu.tr/pdf/4/C4-S1-2-%20M15.pdf](http://www.eab.ege.edu.tr/pdf/4/C4-S1-2-%20M15.pdf), 11.6.2007

<sup>377</sup> Sedat Laçiner, "Barzani Neden Böyle Konuşuyor(Why does Barzani Speak like that)", <http://www.usakgundem.com/yazarlar.php?id=666&type=3>, 17.6.2007

<sup>378</sup> <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6715628.asp?top=1>, 17.6.2007



On the one hand it is considered that there was stability but not security during the Cold War; on the other hand, during the 1990s there is security but not stability. Furthermore, there has been no security and stability after 9/11<sup>379</sup>. According to the Bush doctrine we live in a dangerous period due to threat of terrorism and rogue states, especially with weapons of mass destruction. Especially, it is dangerous because terrorists can obtain nuclear weapons from the rogue states. If the US does not help to make the world better, it will be more dangerous.<sup>380</sup> The Bush doctrine has explained that global terrorism emerged under the clash of civilizations; thus, it is considered that Turkey could not and cannot be the target of religious terrorism within that standpoint, because of its Muslim identity. Yet, this thesis has not been true according to the following statistics:

- “11 April 2002 –Tunisia. (The most secular state in North Africa): The target was a synagogue. 20 people died.
- 12 October 2002 –Indonesia (ally of USA in East): 202 people died.
- 28 November 2002 –Kenya: 15 people died.
- 12 May 2002 –Saudi Arabia, Riyadh: The target foreigners. 35 people died.
- 16 May 2003 –Morocco (Ally of West): The target was the Center of Jews. 41 people died.
- 5 August 2003- Jakarta Island: 10 people died.
- 25 August 2003 –India, Bombay: The target was the touristic places. 52 people died.
- 15 November 2003 –Turkey, Istanbul: The target was a synagogue. 22 people died.
- 20 November 2003 –Turkey, Istanbul: The target the British Consulate and HSBC Bank. 32 people died. 450 people were injured”<sup>381</sup>.

Thus, it is claimed that Turkey is one of the targets, because Turkey is an ally of the West, Israel and the US and has cooperated with the US. Besides, Al-Qaeda has told that, “*if you are with the West, You are our enemy*”.

As there was international reaction after 9/11 to terrorism, Turkey has also hoped for international support against the PKK terrorism on its soil<sup>382</sup>. Unfortunately, the PKK terrorism still exists today. In this connection it is claimed that one of the aims of the GMEI has not been established. In addition, in the Middle East, democratization efforts were unsuccessful; besides, civil rights, human rights violations still exist. Thus, there are many questions about the prospect of the GMEI and especially about the Middle East. What will be the situation in the Middle East after the declaration of the GMEI? In the history, the Ottoman Empire was only one, which established stability with weapons in the region, having also strong cultural, religious and historical connections

<sup>379</sup> Gürler, *Ibid*, p:398

<sup>380</sup> Sinem Sonuvar, “Global terrorism and clash of civilizations”, 15 April 2005, [www.eastweststudies.org/makale\\_detail.php?tur=100&makale=102](http://www.eastweststudies.org/makale_detail.php?tur=100&makale=102), 17.6.2007

<sup>381</sup> Sonuvar, *Ibid*

<sup>382</sup> Serdar Kırallı, “Hangi Komşu Tehlikede?(Which Neighbor is in danger?)”, 12 August 2005, [www.eastweststudies.org/tr/makale\\_detail.php?tur=100&makale=141](http://www.eastweststudies.org/tr/makale_detail.php?tur=100&makale=141), 17.6.2007

with the countries. Yet, the US is not able to control the developments in the region even though it is a super power. Thus, the GMEI initiated by the US was not a successful policy. Furthermore, the public support in the region for the US has been decreasing since it has not a successful policy.

When the Bush administration announced the Middle East Partnership initiative, based on democracy and human rights, the European Union found itself obliged to respond to US initiatives and policies. Yet, the Barcelona process has started before the Greater Middle East and Northern Africa Project, which has focused on economic aspects of relations between the European Union and the Middle East. Even though the European Union supported the GMEI at the Sea Island Summit in the beginning of the process, differences emerged between the US and the European Union in their approaches towards Iraq, Iran, Syria and Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>383</sup>. It is considered that European security approach in the Middle East has been different from the US approach, because the European Union has not supported use of force without international legitimacy and justification. Nevertheless, it is claimed that the European Union has not created a common policy about the Middle East because member states respond differently to the Greater Middle East and Northern Africa Project.

Meanwhile, the Turkish government has supported the GMEI. Yet, Turkey has different policies towards Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and Syria than the US. For instance, the US has tried to isolate Syria, but Turkey has improved its relations with Syria since 2002. In addition, Turkey has shown negative reactions against the US foreign policy over Iran and has established four high level diplomatic visits in Iran. Furthermore, although the JDP government has told that the relations between the US and Turkey would be fixed, the JDP government declared genocide about the events in Fallujah in 2004. Besides, the JDP government has promised the US to open the northern battlefield towards Iraq, but did not take necessary actions to give approval for the proposal in the Turkish National Assembly. It is considered that the hood event was the reaction of the US, which stimulated the crisis situation between the US and Turkey.

The second proposal in the Turkish National Assembly to give approval for the US military bases was considered as a test for the relations between the US and Turkey, but the damage of the hood event in the relations were not recovered. It is claimed that unwillingness of the US to take action against the PKK terrorism in the

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<sup>383</sup> Richard Youngs, Trans-Atlantic Cooperation on Middle East Reform: A European Mis-judgment?, **The Foreign Policy Centre, London**, November 2004, p:1

Northern Iraq has also increased the frustrations in the relations. Furthermore, Israel's policies in Palestine and Lebanon have been criticized by the JDP government many times. Sometimes the declarations of Turkey were seen as the propaganda of anti-Semitism because no Arab states had dared to criticize Israel as hard as the Turkish criticisms<sup>384</sup>. It is considered that the US invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the PKK terrorism and Israel's policies in Palestine and Lebanon have increased nationalism, anti-Americanism and anti-semitism in Turkey.

Recently, the control of Mosul and Kirkuk has started to be one of the main problems in the Northern Iraq. After the end of Iraq war, Turkey has started to negotiate with Turcoman who lived in Mosul and Kirkuk in the Northern Iraq. However, the PKK has started to increase its terrorist attacks after a long cease-fire period, the Turkish foreign policy has shifted into a new policy "*Mayday for struggle against PKK*".

In this thesis, the main aim is to explain the content, rationale and causes of the GMEI. In the beginning of the thesis, the guiding principles of US foreign policy are identified. Following the debates on the GMEI, the EU approach is elaborated. In the following chapter, the main impact of the GMEI on the Turkish security policies is analyzed. In general it can be stated that the GMEI did not bring security and stability to the Middle East. In addition, the invasion of Iraq has not been justified since the nuclear weapons were not found in Iraq, on the contrary to the aims of invasion. Moreover, moral values are damaged and terrorism has increased its violence since September 11. Democracy and stability have not been established in Iraq. The US has not managed to establish security in Iraq, plus new insecurities and instabilities emerged in the region such as Israel-Lebanon war, Afghanistan and Algeria. Thus, it is claimed that the US promises about establishing security and stability in the region have failed.

It is considered that security and stability in Iraq has been vital for Turkey since Turkey has been the northern neighbor of Iraq. Insecurity and instability in Iraq have been great danger for Iraq's territorial integrity and Turkey, because the Kurdish separatist movements have started to use this situation as an opportunity to establish a Kurdish state which includes the Northern Iraq and Turkey's South Eastern Region. It is claimed that Turkey should react to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq in order to avoid the establishment of a Kurdish state and to protect the structure of Mosul and Kirkuk.

Besides, Turkey plays a critical role in Iran crisis. It is considered that Turkey has been the most powerful rival of Iran in the Middle East so developments in the nuclear program of Iran may force Turkey to take a side in the issue. If Turkey helps the US on Iran, Turkey can face with Iran,

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<sup>384</sup> Ibid

Russia and China, which have been the biggest investors in Iran. On the other hand, supporting Iran may decrease the relations between Turkey and the US. The traditional Turkish “*Wait and See policies*” may affect Turkey’s position in the Middle East negatively not only in Iraq, but also in the other arenas such as Iran and Arab-Israel conflict.

In short, the GMEI increased the security problems of Turkey and it has forced Turkey to face with security dilemmas. Thus, advantages and disadvantages of this project must be considered by the Turkish government. We have emphasized that Turkey with its secular, democratic state structure does not fit under a role in the GMEI As a final world, I hereby underline that Turkey should develop its policies in the region trying to be a regional power based on Kemalism.

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