

T.C.
DOKUZ EYLÜL ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
İŞLETME ANABİLİM DALI
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER PROGRAMI
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

**NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:
PARTNERS OR COMPETITORS IN PROMOTING
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY?**

Sevcan ATAKUL

Danışman
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2007

YEMİN METNİ

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Öğrencinin

Adı ve Soyadı : Sevcan ATAKUL
Anabilim Dalı : İşletme Fakültesi
Programı : Uluslararası İlişkiler
Tez Konusu : NATO and the EU: Partners or Competitors in Promoting International Security?
Sınav Tarihi ve Saati :

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ABSTRACT
Master Thesis
NATO and the European Union: Partners or Competitors in
Promoting International Security?
Sevcan ATA KUL

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Although there were some hesitations at the end of the Cold War, NATO has survived as a collective defense organization and adapted itself to the changing security dynamics of the post-Cold War era. For instance, by ‘out-of-area’ policies, NATO shifted its focus from collective defense to collective security and played an active role, especially in the Euro-Atlantic region, in stabilizing the turmoil that occurred after the Cold War. Even though the principle of collective defense has remained as the primary aim of NATO, the Allies produced new security strategies, which involve a comprehensive security understanding in the post-Cold War era.

Meanwhile after the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has taken steps to complete its political and military union besides economic. It is willing to play more active, firstly in the European region and later in the global context; it is not yet clear how effective the EU’s role will be as an international actor. Recently, the EU’s relations with the US have undergone a serious crisis with the Iraqi intervention. Especially, the EU’s search for multilateralism in contrast to the US unilateral policies in the new millennium, created problems for the political and military unity between the two sides of the Atlantic as well as for NATO. The different views which are emphasized for promoting international security in the US and EU security documents reflect the diverging policies of both sides.

Yet, the deep-rooted partnership between the United States and the EU members based on NATO is indispensable for the both sides. The United States needs European cooperation and the EU needs the US support and partnership. For the Transatlantic security in particular and the global security in general, the United States and Europe are still partners. But in the conduct of their security policies for promoting international security, they have given different views recently. Thus, the divergence of policies renders the both sides of the Atlantic as competitors.

Key Words: NATO, ESDP, transatlantic security relations, international security, the Iraqi War.

ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

NATO ve Avrupa Birliği: Uluslararası Güvenliği İlerletirken

Ortaklar mı Rakipler mi?

Sevcan ATAUL

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

İşletme Anabilim Dalı

Uluslararası İlişkiler Programı

Soğuk Savaş sonrasında bazı çekinceler ortaya çıkmış olmasına rağmen NATO hayatta kalabilmiş ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası değişen güvenlik dinamiklerine uyum sağlayabilmiştir. Örneğin, yürüttüğü ‘alan dışı’ politikalar yoluyla NATO odağını ortaklaşa savunmadan ortaklaşa güvenlik alanına kaydırmış ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası oluşan kargaşayı dengeleyerek Avrupa-Atlantik bölgesinde faal bir rol oynamıştır. Ortaklaşa savunma ilkesi NATO’nun birincil amacı olarak kalmış olmasına rağmen Müttefikler Soğuk Savaş sonrasındaki kapsayıcı güvenlik anlayışını içeren güvenlik politikaları üretmişlerdir.

Bu arada, AB ekonomik birliğinin yanı sıra askeri ve siyasi birliğini de tamamlamak için Maastricht Anlaşması’ndan sonra çeşitli adımlar atmıştır. AB ilk önce Avrupa bölgesinde daha sonra da küresel olarak daha aktif bir rol oynama isteğindedir; ama AB’nin uluslararası bir aktör olarak ne kadar etkin olacağı henüz belli değildir. Son dönemde özellikle Irak müdahalesinden sonra AB’nin Amerika ile olan ilişkileri ciddi bir krize girmiştir. AB’nin Amerika’nın yeni binyıldaki tek taraflı politikalarına karşın çok taraflılıktan yana tavır sergilemesi hem NATO açısından hem de Atlantik’in iki yakası arasındaki siyasi ve askeri birlik açısından sorunlar yaratmıştır. AB ve Amerika güvenlik belgelerinde uluslararası güvenliği ilerletmek için üzerinde durulan farklı yollar Atlantik’in her iki yakasında farklılaşan politikaları yansıtmaktadır.

NATO ittifakı üzerine kurulmuş olan AB üye ülkeleri ve Amerika arasındaki köklü ortaklık her iki taraf için de vazgeçilmezdir. Amerika Avrupa’nın işbirliğine ve AB de Amerikan desteğine ve ortaklığına ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Hem Transatlantik güvenlik hem de küresel güvenlik açısından, Amerika ve AB hâlâ ortaklardır. Fakat son dönemde uluslararası güvenliği ilerletirken ortaya konulan davranışlarda farklı görüşler ve yollar izlemişlerdir. Sonuç olarak, ayrılan politikalar Atlantik’in her iki yakasını rakip kılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: NATO, AGSP; Transatlantik güvenlik ilişkileri, uluslararası güvenlik, Irak Savaşı.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CCC	Capabilities Commitment Conference
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJPS	Combined Joint Planning Staff
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CSCE	Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DCI	Defense Capabilities Initiative
DSCAEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Commission
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defense Agency
EDC	European Defense Community
EEC	European Economic Community
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Force
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
HG	Headline Goal
HHG	Helsinki Headline Goal
HQ	Headquarter

ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSS	National Security Strategy
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P.	Page Number
Pls.	Please
PP.	Pages
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJC	NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council
PLS	Please
PSC	Political and Security Committee
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SFOR	Stabilization Force in Bosnia
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
9/11	September 11

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INTRODUCTION

International security environment has experienced significant changes since 1989. For almost two decades after the end of the Cold War, we have observed various new factors, events and challenges, which shaped the actions of states and collective decision-making of states in international organizations and alliances that are distinctive from the Cold War era. For instance, Germany has reunited. The Warsaw Pact was disbanded, along with the Soviet Union itself. The Baltic Republics gained their independence, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) replaced the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the symbol of the Cold War, which divided Europe as East and West, was abolished. Finally, the United States was left as the sole superpower. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War has been mostly felt by Europeans, since they were at the heart of the Cold War superpower clash of interest. The end of the US-Soviet nuclear rivalry based on the entities of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the Warsaw Pact had a tremendous impact over the European security architecture. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of communism left NATO as the sole security organization in Europe.

The Cold War was established on traditional security understanding, which has given importance to military power, especially nuclear power. This was a classical visit to traditional understanding of international relations based upon the realist theory. The main threat to the European states and the United States (US) was considered as the threat of the Communist bloc, in particular the Soviet Union.

Yet we perceived some changes on this traditional approach after the end of the Cold War as told by US President W. Bush, in his speech to the Congress on September 11, 1990, about the emergence of a 'new world order'. As a generalized view, the post-Cold War trends in international tendencies can be categorized into three. In the security front, firstly, the salience of strategic nuclear weapons had decreased to a great extent, leaving their place to conventional weapons. Secondly, depolarization on behalf of the United States occurred. On the economic front, three

regions were spelled out as the European Union (EU), the North America and the East Asia. The three economic blocs became an important element of the post-Cold War international order. On the ideological front, the ideas of market economy, democracy and civil society prevailed over the other ideologies and became almost universal.¹

Furthermore, in this new era, NATO felt the need to internally transform itself in order to survive and face new threats and challenges:

“Although there is a case to be made that military threats in the twenty-first century are as apparent as ever, and maybe even greater than during the Cold War, the simple fact remains that they are not the only threats that face states, people and the world as a whole.”²

In the post-Cold War era, global security is conceptualized rather than regional, in which the focus shifted from military threats to non-military. One of the most proponents of this view was in Europe, the Copenhagen School, which was established in 1985 by the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research. The first project of this center was titled as ‘Non-military aspects of European Security’.³

“Moreover, without wanting to introduce a radical split between European and other, especially American, security studies the Copenhagen project has emerged within a typically European security landscape which has given its work an explicitly European flavor.”⁴

¹ Sharif M. Shuja, “Post-Cold War International Relations: Trends and Portents”, **Contemporary Review**, Vol: 278, No: 1621, 2001, pp: 82–86, pp. 82-83.

² Peter Hough, “Chapter 1: Security and Securitization”, **Understanding Global Security**, Routledge, London, 2004, pp: 1–20, p. 7.

³ Pls see for further information: Jef Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe”, **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol: 4, No: 4, 1998, pp: 479–505.

⁴ Huysmans, p. 480.

Table 1. *Narrow, wide and deep conceptions of security*

Referent object of security	<i>Types of issues</i>		
	<i>Military</i>	<i>Non-military</i>	
	Using military means		Unsolvable by military
State	Narrow	Wide	
Non-state actor			Copenhagen School
Individual			Human Security

Source: Peter Hough, “Chapter 1: Security and Securitization”, **Understanding Global Security**, Routledge, London, 2004, pp: 1–20, P. 13.

Two predominant views to global security emerged after the Cold War. One side claimed the necessity of a narrow definition of security whilst the other side focused on a wider agenda for the definition of security. ‘Narrowers’ emphasized the importance of military terms and argued that the main component of security is the use of force. Furthermore, they advocate that the focus of the security concept should not shift to non-military elements, even though they accept the existence of those threats. Oppositely, ‘wideners’ questioned place of military elements in understanding international security. This side advocated that the focus on territorial integrity of the state and the core institutions of statehood should be widened, by encompassing to cover societal (and human), economic, and environmental security.⁵

Widened concept of security includes an extensive range of area. Hough’s categorization of new security threats can be used for defining non-military elements of security: economic threats to security (poverty, food security and depression); social identity as a threat to security (societal security and forms of violent discrimination); environmental threats to security; health threats to security (poverty and infectious diseases); natural threats to security (natural disasters); accidental

⁵ Anne Aldis and Graeme Herd, “Managing Soft Security Threats: Current Progress and Future Prospects”, **European Security**, Vol: 13, 2004, pp: 169–186, pp. 70–171.

threats to security; and criminal threats to security (global crime, transnational crime and organized crime).⁶

Besides widening, there was deepening of security after 1990s. National states started to give greater priority to issues such as environmental degradation, organized crime, ethnic conflict, poverty, public health. Deepening of security created the division of 'hard security' and 'soft security', or the dichotomy of 'high politics' and 'low politics'.

The changes on the conceptualization of international security had impacts over NATO, which had deep roots in military and defense area. Thus, NATO initiated new policies focusing on non-military activities.⁷

The question on how to achieve security led to a transatlantic rift between the United States and the European Union. For instance, firstly, after the US decisive attitude to use force against Iraq, there is a growing divergence within and between members of the Euro-Atlantic security community about the means to achieve their shared interests. The fundamental variance occurred over the use of force, when and how to use it. As claimed by Aldis and Herd, secondly, US hard military power will continue to be the constant reality of the coming years.⁸

Taking into consideration these two facts, the thesis of Julian Lindley-French that there is a revolution in security affairs in which the boundaries between hard and soft, civil and military are blurred is significant. As French argues there is a 'hard America/soft Europe'. While the EU adopts a security agenda of 'soft' character, the US prepares strategies that are 'hard' in character. "[T]he European security agenda and the American security agenda do reflect different security emphases. Europe's obsessions are not those of America."⁹

⁶ Pls see for a detailed explanation of categorization: Peter Hough, **Understanding Global Security**. Routledge, London, 2004.

⁷ Hough, p. 10.

⁸ Aldis and Herd, p. 180.

⁹ Julian Lindley-French, "The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security Dynamics in the 21st Century", **European Security**, Vol: 13, 2004, pp: 1-15, p. 12.

In this thesis after a comparative analysis of NATO and European policies, the US-EU departure on the Iraqi war is examined. Furthermore, we have analyzed whether diverging policies and strategies between the United States and the EU surfaced after the September 11 attacks is a crisis that can be solved or a sign of a troubled relationship that is creating a Transatlantic rift within NATO. It is argued that the different emphasis of European and American security agenda have developed the basis of Atlantic crisis exposed by the Iraqi debate.

The Objective of the Thesis:

The main objective of this thesis is to discuss the diverging and converging roles of NATO and the EU after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Our first aim is to understand the post-Cold War transformation of NATO. Secondly, we have analyzed development of the European Union from economic to political, and the diverging and converging points on security policies of NATO and the EU giving special emphasis to September 11 and the Iraqi War. Lastly, a comparative analysis on security and defense identities of NATO and the EU has been done.

This topic has been chosen, because NATO and the EU are vital actors in the European security, which is also important for Turkey. In fact, NATO is unique in 20th century as an alliance. Besides, as a half-century ally of NATO and a candidate country to the EU, the evaluation of security relations between NATO and the EU has great significance for the Turkish security. Furthermore, this thesis topic is chosen in order to contribute to the Turkish literature that lacks investigations about NATO-the EU and transatlantic security relations that have been under serious crisis after the Iraqi war.

Foreign literature contains lots of studies dealing specifically with the troubled partnership within the triangle of NATO/EU/US. It is noted that the Turkish literature is rich in the subject of NATO transformation after the Cold War, the development of European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the interaction of Turkey with NATO and the ESDP. Yet, these subjects have frequently been evaluated based on their effects to the Turkish security. For instance, the effects of the post-Cold War NATO and the ESDP to Turkey are well analyzed in the Turkish literature. The related theses on these issues can be given as follows; “The position of European Security and Defense Policy in The European Union's Security Policies and its Relations with NATO” by Ebru Gençalp (2004); “Security dimension of the Atlantic Cooperation among EU, USA and NATO after the Cold War” by Erhan Kalyon (2004); “The transatlantic security relations in the 21st century: New security challenges and the transformation of NATO” by Emel Elif Tuğdar (2006). In addition, Güney’s book (*Batı’nın Yeni Güvenlik Stratejileri AB-NATO-ABD*) has also contributed to the Turkish literature. Consequently, we hope that this thesis will further contribute to the Turkish literature about the problems and crises in the transatlantic partnership after the September 11 attacks.

The Methodology:

This thesis is based on secondary resources. Scholarly journals are the primary sources used during the evaluation of the subject. Books concerning with NATO and CFSP/ESDP are utilized, as well. However, it should be stated that the weight of scholarly articles is significant in the study. Additionally, fact sheets of NATO and the EU formed the bedrock of historical knowledge about NATO and the CFSP/ESDP.

The second part of the thesis includes a comprehensive focus on the transformation of NATO after the Cold War. After a brief introduction to the Cold War history of NATO, we focused on the post-Cold War security strategies and new security partnerships of NATO. Furthermore, the impact of September 11 attacks on the transformation of NATO is evaluated under the guidance of decisions taken in NATO summits such as the Prague Summit and the Istanbul Summit. Finally, the debate on NATO’s strategies is given with a special emphasis on questions about the

identity of NATO, and whether the Alliance is still a sole collective defense organization or not.

In the third part of the thesis, a thorough analysis on the establishment of the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy is given since the beginning of the Cold War to the present. After presenting the historical development of the CFSP, the institutional structure of European CFSP is examined. In addition, the European Security and Defense Policy, the proof of the strongest connection between NATO and the European Union, and the internal development of ESDP are analyzed.

In the final part of the study, the transatlantic security relations and the US-EU security relationship is analyzed. Levels of cooperation between NATO and the ESDP are examined. Also, emerging division of labor between NATO and the ESDP, which is related with NATO's hard power and the EU's soft power capabilities, is discussed. Nevertheless, it is argued that there is an embryonic division of labor between the EU, via the ESDP, and NATO. Secondly, the US and EU foreign security strategies and policies are evaluated. In order to understand differentiation of the US and EU policies, the capabilities gap between two sides of the Atlantic were examined. Capabilities gap is questioned by giving data about defense expenditures of the EU and the United States. As data about defense expenditures strongly prove, there is a widening capabilities gap that creates the occurrence of different policies that foster the Atlantic crisis. After the capabilities gap examination, the transatlantic gap is studied with regard to the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States (2002) and the European Security Strategy (ESS) (2003). In addition, the developments in the transatlantic partnership are analyzed in post-September 11 and the Iraqi War. The root cause of the transatlantic rift is given as unilateralist policies of the US, especially its assertive pre-emptive policy about the use of force, and the European Union's reluctant commitment to effective multilateralism. Besides, US hegemonic position in the world and the European efforts toward becoming a strong global player formed the basis for diverging policies.

In this study, it is intended to present a comparative study of the strategies of the EU members and the United States and the impact of the divergences in strategies over the transatlantic relationship. With regards to this framework, there are some limitations of the study. First of all, since we focused on the transformation of NATO in the post-Cold War and the European efforts on defense and security, deep separate examination of NATO and the ESDP has not been done. Secondly, the interaction of the EU and the United States within NATO during the 1990s, were not studied deeply. The Balkan crises during the late 1990s are not included in the study. Nonetheless, the diverging US and EU securities after the September 11 are examined.

PART I

TRANSFORMATION OF NATO

I. A Brief Historical Background

The end of the Cold War had a scheming effect on the future of international relations as well over the actors of international politics. Among these actors, NATO was the most prominent alliance that felt a requirement to transform its policies, strategies and structure.

For to understand the transformation of NATO after the Cold War, we have to review the reason for the establishment of NATO. Initially, NATO was founded as a collective defense organization against the Soviet Union aggression towards the Western alliance. The essential purpose of NATO is to protect the security of its members in Europe and North America. It works on the principle of collective defense. It aimed to take collective action against the armed attacks.

“NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the United Nations Charter.”¹⁰

The North Atlantic Treaty has several crucial articles for the preservation of security. For instance, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that the Allies ‘separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.’ Moreover, Article 5 of the Treaty pledges that an attack on one ally would be treated as an attack all.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the 1990s, NATO had lost its *raison d’être*. Thus, it felt the need to dissolve or transform itself. The

¹⁰ “NATO Handbook”, 2001,
<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf> (02.02.2007), p. 30.

Alliance members have preferred to transform NATO with new reasons for survival as a collective security organization.

*“Some analysts expressed the opinion that NATO was about to become a hybrid organization as two distinct security bodies coexisted under the same denomination: the one devoted to collective defense of its members in case of an armed attack and the other devoted to maintaining collective security on an undivided but not wholly pacific continent.”*¹¹

It is crucial to mention that since 1991, NATO's activities were a combination of collective defense and collective security which are different actions rather than only the collective defense. Firstly, in collective security system there is no clear foe, every member is the potential aggressor; whereas in collective defense there is a pre-determined, clear foe tried to be stopped by the cooperation of the allies. Collective defense is based on the traditional realist approach. On the other hand, collective security is based on idealist approach which presupposes a world government leading to common security. Combining two approaches, NATO had successfully changed the fragile balance of the Cold War to its interest through responding to crises and preserving its position against domestic pressures and solving the puzzle-ridden cases by the creation of formulaic phrases¹².

There is an assumption that “the North Atlantic Treaty is a Cold War relic”¹³. Thus, NATO had to introduce new policies and strategies to keep its existence as a cogent post-Cold War organization. Underneath this survival and persistence in the post-Cold War era lays the fact that NATO had never been solely a traditional military organization. During the Cold War, NATO had political role as well. However, the military side of the Alliance was larger than the latter. This is not to say that during the Cold War NATO had no political role to play either. The various forms of cooperation with its former adversaries have indeed become one of NATO's strongest hallmarks in the post-Cold War era. However, this is not to argue that NATO has developed as a purely political organization since 1990 either. Its once essential defense and nuclear deterrence mission might no longer be NATO's

¹¹ Jean Klein, “Interface Between NATO/WEU and UN/OSCE”, Michael Brenner (Ed.), **NATO and Collective Security**, St.Martin's Press, Inc., USA, 1998, p. 252.

¹² Anthony Foster and William Wallace, “What is NATO For?”, *Survival*, Vol: 43, No: 4, Winter 2001-2, pp: 107-122, p.107.

¹³ Foster and Wallace, p. 107.

foremost military planning issue. *“The decade from 1991 to September 11, 2001, certainly constituted a period of profound adjustment and change for the alliance”*.¹⁴ After the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has been developed and strengthened in the military and political fields by having new missions.

NATO is an intergovernmental organization. Every member state is equally represented in the Council by a permanent representative. The supreme political decision-making body of NATO is North Atlantic Council (NAC) which is represented by the Secretary General and is placed in Brussels. Every member state is represented in the NAC. The decisions are taken on the principle of consensus in the NAC. *“The Council thus provides a unique forum for wide-ranging consultation between member governments on all issues affecting their security and is the most important decision-making body in NATO.”*¹⁵ The importance of common consent in the decision-making of NATO depends on the assumption that *“each nation retains complete sovereignty and responsibility of its decisions”*¹⁶. The NAC can establish committees and groups in order to introduce new policies. In these committees and groups, member states consult with each other on a regular basis. The exchange of information and opinions facilitate the process for common consent.

II. NATO in the Post-Cold War

A. The Development of Strategic Concepts

NATO's policies have evolved with the changing international environment. Below this evolution will be reviewed.

¹⁴ Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G. Sens, “Introduction: NATO in Transition”, Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G. Sens (Ed.s), **NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism**, Praeger, Westport, 2003, p. XIX.

¹⁵ “NATO Handbook”, 2001, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf> (02.02.2007), p. 149.

¹⁶ “NATO Handbook”, 2001, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf> (02.02.2007), p. 150.

1. 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts:

The highest priority of NATO, which is collective defense, has been adapted to the changing environment of the post-Cold War. The Alliance gained a more flexible approach during the adjustment period about the conception of security strategies. The member states have preferred to use the identification of risks rather than threats. In other words, NATO started to define risks rather than determined threats. Thus, the disappearance of the original threat was not the end of the challenges, but rather was the starting point for the emergence of new challenges for NATO that would arise from the power vacuum in Eastern and Central Europe and in the Balkans.

In 1991, at the NATO Rome Summit, NATO accepted a new strategic concept. According to the New Strategic Concept, the Allies had agreed on the future conceptual strategy based upon comprehensive security approach.¹⁷ The new strategic concept laid the ground principles that would shape the post-Cold War structure of NATO's conventional forces. First, forces were to be reduced in size and increased in the level of readiness. The forces were replaced by emergency intervention forces which had the capability of rapid movement. Rapid Reaction Force was decided to be composed of multilateral participation for generating flexible defense. Second, considerable emphasis was placed on maintaining the Alliance's integrated military structure. Thirdly, the strategic concept called for the continued presence of significant numbers of U.S. conventional forces in Europe. Fourthly, "it declared the purpose of the alliance to be 'the establishment of a just and peaceful order in Europe'"¹⁸. The new strategic concept developed following the end of the Cold War redefined Alliance's strategy to include crisis management beyond the present territory of the Alliance.

In April 1999, NATO's current strategic concept was approved at the 50th anniversary of the Alliance. The 1999 Strategic Concept repeated that the core purpose of the Alliance will remain collective defense and the Alliance would go on

¹⁷ Beril Dedeoğlu, **Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Strateji**, Derin Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003, p. 238.

¹⁸ Foster and Wallace, p. 107.

performing ‘the fundamental security tasks it set out, namely security, consultation, deterrence and defense, crisis management, and partnership’.¹⁹ This strategic concept describes the security risks. The new risks are basically ethnic conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights violation, and organized crime.

The emergence of new threats outside the Euro-Atlantic area had been invading the NATO agenda since 1991. Accordingly, NATO’s gradual and often very reluctant involvement in various Peace Support Operations in the 1990s has raised questions about how NATO should decide where and whether to become involved. In addition to satisfying the demands of defenders of Article 5, the 1999 Strategic Concept “was decided to meet the demands of those who believe that Article 5 collective defense is increasingly marginal, if not irrelevant, in a post-Cold War strategic setting and that NATO must move beyond its traditional commitment to territorial defense”²⁰. This demand was the introduction of ‘out-of-area’ missions of the organization, or the so-called non-Article 5 missions. According to Carpenter, borders of ‘out-of-area’ have never been defined. Secondly, the concept of security defined in the Strategic Concept in general and for the ‘out-of-area’ in particular was so elastic applying to everything from economic brake to human rights abuses.²¹

*“The 1999 Strategic Concept reiterates NATO’s offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or responsibility of the OSCE.”*²²

In the short term, a likely massive attack was unforeseen by the Allies. The focus within the security understanding shifted towards non-conventional factors such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. “The Alliance’s security

¹⁹ “Comprehensive Political Guidance”, 29 November 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b061129e.htm> (30.02.2007).

²⁰ Ted Galen Carpenter, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Coherent Blueprint or Conceptual Muddle?”, Ted Galen Carpenter (Ed.), Special Issue on NATO Enters the 21st Century, **The Journal of Strategic Studies**, Vol: 23, No: 3, September 2000 (Strategic Concept), pp: 7-28, p. 7.

²¹ Carpenter, Strategic Concept, p. 14.

²² Mamuka Metreveli, **Legal Aspects of NATO’s Involvement in the Out-of-Area Peace Support Operations**, NATO–Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Research Fellowship Final Report, 2001–2003, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/metreveli.pdf> (20.02.2007), p. 7.

was seen as subject to uncertainty, instability and possible regional crises on its periphery.”²³ As a result of this fact, the Strategic Concept was drafted toward the emphasis on crisis-management and out-of-area intervention. The areas for crisis-management had been defined as ‘in and around the Euro-Atlantic area’. According to Carpenter, the borders of these likely theaters of war were not defined in the 1999 document. Secondly, the concept of security defined in general and for the ‘out-of-area’ in particular was so elastic applying to everything from economic brake to human rights abuses.²⁴

The post-Cold War era had forced NATO to face with the new realities of Europe and challenges. Not only have the borders of the Alliance but the periphery of these borders been included in the post-Cold War agenda. In other words, NATO gave great importance to area around Euro-Atlantic region excluding NATO borders. Thus, NATO established partnerships with the former Soviet Union countries and tried to stabilize the environment beyond Europe.

2. Open Door Policy

Today, NATO membership remains open to any European country. The aim is to strengthen NATO and Euro-Atlantic security. The Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty reflects the openness of the Alliance to new members. Following the end of the Cold War, the process was reaffirmed at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, at which NATO leaders stated that “*We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East.*”²⁵

Since the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO has always pursued an open door policy. When the Alliance was established, NATO had 12 members. Yet recently, NATO has 26 members. As the first wave of expansion, Turkey and

²³ Mannik, p. 24.

²⁴ Carpenter, Strategic Concept, p. 14.

²⁵ “NATO’s Open Door Policy”, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9904-wsh/pres-eng/04open.pdf> (21.04.2007).

Greece has joined the Alliance in 1952. During the Cold War, Germany (in 1955) and Spain (in 1982) were the other participatory states. The first wave of 'open door' policy after the Cold War included the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO structure. In 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the Alliance.

In 1995, the document named as "Study on NATO Enlargement" was publicly declared which stated the rationales behind the NATO enlargement and concluded that *"there was both a need for and a unique opportunity to build improved security in the whole of Euro-Atlantic area, without recreating the dividing lines"*²⁶. In fact, NATO Enlargement process cannot and should not be considered as the addition of new members to the transatlantic cooperation and extension of the borders of the security circle. As a contrast of such a process, NATO aimed at stabilizing the whole Europe under the guidance of democracy and human rights. The main rationales behind the enlargement process were composed of democratization and the hope of enlarging the Alliance as including the very state in the Euro-Atlantic region by means of NATO-led institutions.²⁷ NATO sought some criteria for the acceptance of new members. These criteria cover a range area from military capabilities to political situation of the country. By pushing the East and Central European countries to fulfilling these criteria, NATO endeavored making Europe as a whole more stable. *"Moreover, new members should not only enjoy the benefits of membership, they should also contribute to the overall security of all member countries. In other words, they need to be providers as well as consumers of security."*²⁸ In this manner, through a slow process, the skepticism over the admission of new members was less reflected to the policy-making. *"The new 'partners' would be 'allies', but not in the beginning. While they would not be offered membership immediately they would be able to participate in a host of confidence-building activities, such as military exercises, would have access to*

²⁶ "NATO Handbook", 2001, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf> (02.02.2007), pp. 61-62.

²⁷ David S. Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security", *Survival*, Vol: 40, No: 2, Summer 1998 (New NATO), pp: 135-160, p. 138.

²⁸ "NATO in the 21st Century", http://www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/21st_eng.pdf (10.02.2007).

certain NATO technical data, and would exchange information on defense planning.”²⁹

“NATO enlargement is an open, continuing process, not a single event.” ³⁰

B. Partnership for Peace (PfP)

In 1994 Brussels summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council, another major initiative dealing with the security in Europe was the Partnership for Peace (PfP). It was an invitation addressed to the members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the parties to the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 30 countries accepted the invitation. After the entrance of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Alliance, the PfP member states had been 27.

The PfP Invitation was a focus on defense-related cooperation. The primary aim of the initiative was to provide the military dialogue among the participant states. Among the objectives, those can be ranked as the prior:

“(1) to facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes; (2) to ensure democratic control of defense; (3) to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the United Nations and/or the responsibility of the OSCE; (4) to develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises, in order to strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; and (5) to develop, over the long term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.” ³¹

The PfP program functioned as a middle way for softening the admission of new members to the Alliance and which “...was intended to offer a halfway house

²⁹ Lawrence S. Kaplan, “NATO after the Cold War”, Jarrod Wiener (Ed.). **The Transatlantic Relationship**, St. Martin’s Press, Inc., New York, 1996, pp. 36-37.

³⁰ “NATO Handbook”, 2001,
<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf> (02.02.2007), p. 63.

³¹ “NATO Handbook”, 2001,
<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf> (02.02.2007), p. 68.

between exclusion and full membership to new democracies pressing to join NATO (as well as the EU)”³².

C. North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

In the immediate aftermath of the termination of the Soviet Union, NATO turned its face towards the former Soviet Republics. The instability within this power vacuum brought the call for providing a post-Cold War strategy. The new strategy was based upon ‘preventive intervention in the out-of-area’ significantly. For decreasing the likelihood of new perils and for the aim of complete Europe, NATO has adopted a loose alliance affiliation with the countries out of the Alliance. On 20th of November, 1991, NATO and 22 former Eastern Bloc countries gathered and established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

The striking among the objectives of this Council cannot be separated since the Council served as a platform in which political, military and environmental issues were negotiated. Furthermore, the foreseen mission of the Council was to serve as a tool for the preparation of the ground that would facilitate the transformation process of liberal democracy in the former Eastern Bloc countries.

In May 1997, the NACC was succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to bring together and serve as a new stage of cooperation among 46 countries. The EAPC basic document was the re-affirmation of the PfP policies which offered opportunities for “*result-oriented multilateral consultations, enhanced practical cooperation, increased consultation and cooperation on regional matters, and increased transparency and confidence in security matters*”³³. It serves as the political framework between NATO and PfP members as well as security related issues.

³² Foster and Wallace, p. 116.

³³ “NATO Handbook”, 2001,
<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf> (02.02.2007), p .20.

D. Relations with Russia

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO has been developing relations with Russia. Although the major objective of the Alliance was based on ‘keeping the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down’³⁴, Russia has evolved as the partner since the end of the Cold War. The role of Russia during the transformation of post-Cold War NATO was always indicative in shaping the policies of the Allies and remained included in the policy agenda. According to Dannreuther, Russia remains the fundamental external threat to the existence of NATO and still pursues policies opposing to the general adaptation and enlargement of the Alliance in general and to NATO’s activism in Europe in particular.³⁵ For most, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not put an end to the rivalry between Russia and US-led NATO. “...*The reality of Soviet power dividing Europe continued to be a centripetal force holding the Alliance together.*”³⁶

NATO’s proactive role in the post-Cold War was perceived by the Russian elites with deliberation. “*This was nearly the first time in the post-Soviet history of Russia when the society and the elite reached consensus concerning the aggressive character of the alliance, which was approaching Russia’s borders.*”³⁷ The majority opposed NATO expansion. “*The Russian Duma termed NATO expansion the ‘most serious military threat to our country since 1945’.*”³⁸

Russian membership has always been on table for negotiation after the Cold War. “*Russia, however, still waits outside the door.*”³⁹ Besides, before the demise of the Soviet Union, Kremlin announced their willingness of becoming a member of the

³⁴ Dmitry Polikanov, “NATO-Russia Relations: Present and Future”, **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol: 25, No: 3, December 2004, pp: 479-497, p. 480.

³⁵ Roland Dannreuther, “Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian Relations”, **Survival**, Vol: 41, No: 4, Winter 1999-2000, pp: 145-164, p. 145.

³⁶ Kaplan, p. 27.

³⁷ Polikanov, p. 480.

³⁸ Richard Rupp, “NATO 1949 and NATO 2000: From Collective Defense toward Collective Security”, Ted Galen Carpenter (Ed.), Special Issue on NATO Enters the 21st Century, **The Journal of Strategic Studies**, Vol: 23, No: 3, September 2000, pp: 154-176, p. 169.

³⁹ James A. Baker, “Russia in NATO?”, **The Washington Quarterly**, Vol: 25, No: 1, Winter 2002, pp: 95-103, p. 96.

Alliance.⁴⁰ As well as the Russian opposition to NATO expansion toward the East, the old Soviet geographic area of domain, most European nations contested to the establishment of so tight relations with Russia, may be opening the final way to membership. Their first priority was to balance the old nuclear power. According to Yost, there are three reasons to object the full Russian membership for the Organization. Firstly, Russian membership could turn the collective defense organization to an ineffective Kantian model of collective security one for the Euro-Atlantic region. Secondly, the Alliance would be probably be subordinated to a US-Russian tandem. Thirdly, if Russia is involved in NATO, the task of protecting Russia against China can become a top priority for the Allies.⁴¹

Due to the fact that both sides have deliberation to each other and the Cold War memories being still in the minds, becoming immediate allies for NATO and Russia was a dream. But entering into cooperation was inevitable for both sides. Since 1991, NATO and Russia worked together for improving defense and security-related issues. In 1994, Russia joined PfP. Later Russia joined 1997 peace negotiation talks for Bosnia and Herzegovina. *“For the first time, Allied and Russian contingents worked side by side in a multinational military operation.”*⁴²

In May 1997, NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. This Act was the symbol of an institutionalized partnership between NATO and Russia in the post-Cold War. In addition to PfP, the Act was born out of the requirement of establishing a special relationship between NATO and Russia.⁴³ The Act can be summarized as follows:

“The Act reassures Russia that the Alliance seeks to include and not isolate Russia in the Euro-Atlantic community, while serving as a test bed for Russia to demonstrate that it wants to be part of a democratic European security system with NATO as an equal partner. The parties agree to no longer regard themselves as adversaries and to join in a ‘strong,

⁴⁰ Polikanov, p. 483.

⁴¹ Yost, New NATO, pp. 139-140.

⁴² “NATO Handbook”, 2001,

<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf> (02.02.2007), p. 80.

⁴³ John Borawski, “The NATO-Russia Founding Act”, **ISIS Briefing Paper**, No: 12, July 1997, <http://isis-europe.org/bp-12.pdf> (01.10.2007), p. 2.

*stable, enduring, and equal partnership" in building "a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security'."*⁴⁴

They committed to improve the partnership and cooperation by signing this Act. Decidedness toward establishing common interests was proved by the foundation of NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The underlying motive behind the foundation of PJC was to create a venue for consultation, further cooperation and transparency.

In 1998, Russia established its Mission to NATO to keep the relations better and more integrated in the Euro-Atlantic dimension. By reciprocal gestures, NATO and Russia showed their willingness to cooperate effectively and secure their role in European history. As much as the benefits of this new period for relations, there were two constraints. Firstly, NATO should not lose its effective role within the European security by combining all the countries to its body and turning itself from a military organization to a political one. Secondly, Russia was reluctant to argue precedence of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) over NATO.⁴⁵ NATO and Russia continued to consult in the PJC meetings. In fact, these meetings *"tended to be more about protocol, exchanges of pleasantries and discussion of rudimentary issues than about serious bargaining over serious matters"*⁴⁶.

The Balkan crisis had a tightening effect on NATO-Russian relations. NATO launched the military operation without consulting its Russian partner.⁴⁷ Russia completely opposed direct NATO military action over Kosovo. There were several reasons behind this strict Russian opposition. Firstly, the possibility that NATO would be the centerpiece security organization in European affairs. And Russian unforgettable past of having lost the Cold War shaped Kremlin's policies toward Kosovo crisis.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Borawski, p. 1.

⁴⁵ Robert E. Hunter, "NATO-Russia Relations after 11 September", **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol: 5, 2, May 2005, pp: 28-54, p. 34.

⁴⁶ Hunter, p. 36.

⁴⁷ Polikanov, p. 480.

⁴⁸ Hunter, p. 37.

The slow trend in the relations had changed after the terrorist attacks of September 11. At the same day NATO invoked the Article 5, the PJC met in an extraordinary session and Russia with all the members condemned the terrorist attacks. The following days were an exchange of assistance between the United States and Russia against international terrorism.

This new atmosphere in partnership has been supported by a new wave of negotiations to move beyond the PJC. “...the 9/11 attacks vividly reminded Russian and Western officials that, on most security questions, their shared interests outweigh the issues that divide them.”⁴⁹ The Russian dissatisfaction about the PJC was permanent. Moscow perceived her position in the PJC as ‘19 plus one’ – 19 NATO countries and the one Russian Federation.⁵⁰ In 2002 Rome Summit, NATO-Russia Council (NRC) replaced the PJC. “Moscow was happy about the ‘at 20’ format since NATO had no such practice with any other non-member country.”⁵¹ Moreover, the Rome Declaration was almost the re-confirmation of the 1997 Founding Act.

Since the NRC replaced the PJC, the considerable development was realized in the fields of crisis management, struggle against terrorism, defense reform, theatre missile defense, civil emergency and non-proliferation.⁵² The forerunning role of the NRC has contributed much to the security relations. In December 2004, the NRC adopted a plan designed against terrorism. Under the umbrella of this plan, intelligence sharing and joint development of new weapons were foreseen.⁵³ In general, collaboration between NATO and Russia was widespread in the field of defense. For instance, by 2004, there were approximately 45 annual defense-related projects NATO and Russia actively participated.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Richard Weitz, “Chapter 3: Strengthening NATO-Russian Ties”. **Adelphi Papers 45(377): Revitalizing US-Russian Security Cooperation: Practical Measures**, 2005, pp: 59–73, p. 59.

⁵⁰ Hunter, p. 42.

⁵¹ Polikanov, p. 483.

⁵² Hunter, pp. 46–47.

⁵³ Weitz, p. 61.

⁵⁴ Weitz, p. 66.

After the demise of the Berlin Wall, lots of steps were taken by NATO and Russia in the direction of improving relationship that has negative and positive dimensions. According to Polikanov, Russia pursued the Trojan horse strategy to get inside NATO since the beginning of the Cold War. And Lenin's 'one step forward, two steps back' formula dominated the relationship. Secondly, the threat perception of each side originating from the Cold War renders the relationship complex and unstable at the current stage. Despite these negative features of NATO-Russian relationship, the considerable enhancement was achieved through the vision of "whole Europe". Russia also contributed to NATO peacekeeping forces in the Balkans.

III. NATO Summits after September 11

The terrorist attacks of September 11 changed the dimension of world history as much as the history of NATO. *"Both the transatlantic relationship in general and NATO in particular had to adapt to the realization that the immediate post-Cold War period has ended a new, still undefined era has begun."*⁵⁵ Only one day after the September 11 terrorist attacks to the United States, the members of the NATO invoked the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the organization's history. The light of the mechanism for the mutual defense guarantee of the Alliance was fired and the terrorist attacks to the United States were accepted as an attack against all of the members. It was dramatic, at first that the invocation of the Article 5 occurred in 2001 about a decade after the end of the Cold War, not during the Cold War, the beginning of which had been the basic reason of the establishment of NATO. Secondly, NATO, a US-led alliance, was especially existent for securing the defense needs of the Europeans against the Soviet Union and its counterparts. *"When Article 5 was drafted – pledging that an attack on one ally would be treated as an attack on all – not a single signatory could have imagined*

⁵⁵ Michael Rühle, "NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11", **Parameters**, Summer 2003, pp: 89–97, p. 91.

that its first invocation would involve Europeans coming to the aid of the United States rather than the way around."⁵⁶

Until September 11, 2001, after 52 years of the sign of the North Atlantic Treaty, the meaning and scope of the Article 5 and the reality of mutual defense guarantee had never been discussed in such a depth. During the Gulf War, the member states discussed whether the commitment would apply to an Iraqi attack on the ally Turkey as an Iraqi retaliation against air-strikes from Turkish territory or not. Since this attack never came to scene, the question waiting to be replied by NATO about the Article 5 was left without answer until the 11th of September. Moreover, the collective defense provision is not an automatic guarantee of military operation by NATO legally.⁵⁷

The response of NATO to the September 11 attacks assisted to decrease the ambiguity about NATO's role and mission in the 21st century. On the other hand, of being the attack from not a state but from a non-state actor and a terrorist act complicated the decision-making process in the post-September 11 as well. The offense was from a non-state actor which used passenger aircrafts as a means of mass destruction. This combination was really non-traditional in security and defense terms and thus led to the re-thinking of the future of NATO in Euro-Atlantic region.

After a very limited time, it was decided to start an operation against Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. This was the end of debate whether a terrorist attack would be included within the scope of Article 5 or not. Although the post-rhetoric of the Allies was the proof of full solidarity to the United States, "*Washington had no intention of asking NATO to lead or even be closely involved in the eventual military response*"⁵⁸. The Operation Enduring Freedom was handled by the United States and the United Kingdom. The US and UK officials accused the Taliban regime of harboring the Al Qaeda organization and permitting it to operate in its territory. "*The*

⁵⁶ Philip H. Gordon, "NATO after September 11", *Survival*, Vol: 43, No: 4, Winter 2001-02 (NATO), pp: 89-106, p. 89.

⁵⁷ Gordon, NATO, pp. 91-92.

⁵⁸ Gordon, NATO, p. 92.

*United States and the United Kingdom, not NATO, would bear the major responsibility for the attack on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan...*⁵⁹ The Operation was initially an air-campaign. *“However, after having been largely excluded at the beginning, NATO allies and others were drawn in as the campaign gathered momentum.”*⁶⁰ Many Allies contributed to the military campaign and to stabilization of the political situation in Afghanistan.

As a conclusion, the Afghanistan intervention was not an operation tackled under the command of the North Atlantic Council. Rather it was a military operation in which the Washington used NATO assets and allies’ support for becoming successful. Thus, the continuing efforts and military contribution, even being very small if compared to the US contribution, of the member states have been a good demonstration of the political commitment of NATO as a whole.

In 2003, NATO took over control of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The ISAF has been established under the mandate of Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter and the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions of 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1659 and 1707. The primary mission of ISAF is ‘to assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in creating a stable and secure environment for the people of Afghanistan’. This secure environment will ‘be conducive to establishing democratic structures, to facilitate the reconstruction of the country and to assist in expanding the influence of the central government’. The ISAF is deployed in Kabul and its surrounding areas in order to assist the reconstruction of a new Afghanistan. In addition to Kabul, the ISAF has responsibility throughout the whole of Afghanistan. The five general commands of ISAF assist local authorities in order to maintain peace in the area. By rank, the United Kingdom (UK), Turkey, Germany, Canada, France, Turkey and Italy took the command of ISAF. The current ISAF mission is being commanded by Headquarters

⁵⁹ Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G. Sens, “Introduction: NATO in Transition”, Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G. Sens (Ed.s), **NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism**, Praeger, Westport, 2003, p. xxii.

⁶⁰ Strobe Talbott, “From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk”, **Foreign Affairs**, November/December 2002 (NATO at Risk), pp: 46 – 57, p. 55.

Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. NATO aims not to depart from Afghanistan until the mission is accomplished for the Afghan people.⁶¹

A. Prague Summit

On 21 and 22 November of 2002, the Allies met for the Prague Summit. The Prague Summit and the decision taken for the future of the organization gave clear signs of a new Alliance that is ready to adapt to the new conditions of the 21st century. *“The Prague Summit addressed three broad agendas as the vehicle for NATO transformation: new members, new relationship with NATO partners, and new capabilities.”*⁶²

At the Prague Summit, NATO invited seven countries to begin accession talks: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. This was the second round of post-Cold War NATO enlargement that included ‘three former Soviet republics, three former Warsaw Pact members and one former Yugoslav republic’.

The change on defense field centered around three dimensions: *“implementing the Prague Capabilities Commitment, reforming the military command structure, and establishing a NATO Response Force”*⁶³. At first, NATO leaders declared their willingness and decisiveness toward protecting their territory and population against any kind of attack and announced the launch of NATO Response Force (NRF) in the Prague Summit. The extent of this NATO force should have extended NATO capability to carry its missions better than its past missions. Thus, ‘NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, upon decision by the NAC, to sustain operations over distance and time,

⁶¹ “International Security Assistance Force”, <http://www.nato.int/isaf/> (01.07.2007).

⁶² Raymond A. Millen, “Reconfiguring NATO for Future Security Challenges”, **Comparative Strategy**, Vol: 23, 2004, pp: 125–141, p. 126.

⁶³ Millen, p. 126.

including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives.’

It was foreseen to activate the initial combined capabilities in 2004 and air, naval and land full capabilities in 2006. As the name given to this Force, the target in creating of such a force was to have a military army that can be deployable within a few days.⁶⁴ The Allies declared their will by the following words in the summit declaration: ‘...*decided to create a NATO Response Force consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed...*’⁶⁵

In close relation with the launch of NRF, NATO leaders approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment as a part of developing new military capabilities to challenge new threats of the 21st century. The capabilities underlined include nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological defense; surveillance, intelligence, target-audience as well as the air, land and sea capabilities. Furthermore, the main subject dominated the Summit was for sure ‘terrorism’ and the measures that should be applied for minimizing the civilian loss against any terrorist attack and maximizing social awareness about terrorism.

B. Istanbul Summit

The NATO Istanbul Summit held during 28 and 29 June, 2004 was of milestone characteristic for the Alliance history. 24 members after the final round of enlargement gathered in Istanbul to take decisions on enhancing the new security challenges of the 21st century. The subjects of Istanbul concern were the continuation and complimentary of those decided in 2002 Prague Summit. Secondly, the Istanbul

⁶⁴ “NATO after Prague Summit”, **Strategic Comments**, Vol: 8, No: 10, December 2002, pp: 1-2, p. 2.

⁶⁵ “Prague Summit Declaration”, 21 November 2001, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> (08.03.2007).

Summit was the proclamation of the vital link between North America and Europe and the re-commitment to enhancing democratic Europe as whole and at peace.

NATO Heads of State decided to expand NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan that had been established in 2003. They promised to increase the force from 6,500 to 10,000 numbers of soldiers and to endeavor for the contribution of ISAF to the future of Afghanistan.⁶⁶

Secondly, it was decided to transfer NATO military existence in Bosnia to the European Union. The Stabilization Force in Bosnia (SFOR) was shifted to European Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia. Another point of subject during the Summit was about the situation in Iraq. At the time of the Summit, Iraqi authority had been submitted to Interim government and the Allies agreed to help the military training of the security forces of the Iraqi Interim Government.⁶⁷

The open door policy was also underlined during the Summit and expressed in the declaration as follows: *“We pledge again that our Alliance remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe.”*⁶⁸ For the first time in its history, NATO has more members (26) than partners (20).⁶⁹ Albania, Croatia and the Republic Macedonia were welcomed as a result of their progress in Membership Action Plan (MAP). In close association with MAP, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia were called to join the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD).

After the stretch of security threats out of the physical reach of Europe, NATO started to be interested in the Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus. In

⁶⁶ “NATO’s Istanbul Summit: Alliance under a Cloud”, **Strategic Comments**, Vol: 10, No: 5, June 2004, pp: 1-2, p. 2.

⁶⁷ “The Istanbul Declaration: Our Security in a New Era”, 28 June 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-097e.htm> (02.04.2007).

⁶⁸ “The Istanbul Declaration: Our Security in a New Era”, 28 June 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-097e.htm> (02.04.2007).

⁶⁹ “NATO after Istanbul”, 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/07-july/e0705b.htm> (02.04.2007).

regard to this curiosity, alliance leaders launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in order to promote cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries. The engagement of the Alliance over the region was offering an advancement of military and defense reform and combating terrorism basically.

C. Riga Summit

NATO leaders, for the last time, met for the Riga Summit on 28-29 November of 2006. Nations of the Alliance repeated their commitment toward democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

Post-September 11 security threats and challenges were put down on the summit agenda to underline NATO's resolve to withstand against them. In relation with this resolve, NATO accepted Comprehensive Political Guidance that 'provides a framework and political direction for NATO's continuing transformation, setting out, for the next 10-15 years, the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence'⁷⁰.

The military existence of NATO in Afghanistan and the improvement of this force for fortifying the political situation NATO Afghanistan were of one of the top priority issue of the summit. NATO repeated its continued effort to the assistance to Afghanistan. The important role of NATO partners in enhancing the security beyond the physical borders of NATO countries was again one of the hot topics of the Summit where NATO nations especially mentioned the vitality of PfP, MD, EAPC and NRC as in the Istanbul Summit.

⁷⁰ "Riga Summit Declaration", 29 November 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm> (03.04.2007).

IV. Evaluations on NATO's Transformation

When we review the literature, it is clear that the transformation of NATO has received high attention. From the early 1990s and after the end of the Cold War, it has been discussed whether NATO should wither away. Many argued that a military alliance without a clear defined enemy would no longer survive in the international security arena. For instance, Meyer argued that *"NATO's time has come and gone, and today there is no legitimate reason for it to exist"*⁷¹. Yet, NATO converted itself to changing circumstances and survived. The discussions over its policies and strategies to transform have been and still has important place in the literature. *"Yet there is still a relevant and pertinent debate to be had on whether mere survival is sufficient."*⁷²

Enlargement process and its outcome on the cohesiveness of the Alliance were conversed so much and found lots of opponents. As explained in the open door policy section, NATO expansion has lots of supporters. However there are ideas against the enlargement of NATO, which argue that an enlarged NATO with Russia linked to it, would no longer be used in crises and it would be the end of NATO. Especially after the second round of enlargement *"expanding the Alliance was [perceived as] unnecessary and counterproductive"*⁷³. The proponents of strong military NATO had continuously opposed the expansion. Their basic point of objection was that NATO is a collective defense organization, not a collective security one and should maintain its role as a military alliance. The addition of new members would not only transform NATO to a political organization such as the UN and OSCE but also will loosen the strong military body and cohesiveness within the decision-making process. For example, according to Rebecca Michael, the political cohesiveness within the Alliance is very important keeping NATO together. Thus, today, the different national interests of both sides challenge NATO over the

⁷¹ Steven E Meyer, "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO", **Parameters**, Winter 2003-4, pp: 83-97, p. 83.

⁷² "Conclusions: Where is NATO Going?", **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol: 25, No: 3, December 2004, pp: 545-555, p. 545.

⁷³ Zoltan Barany, "NATO Expansion, Round Two: Making Matters Worse", **Security Studies**, Vol: 11, No: 3, Spring 2002, pp: 123-157, p. 124.

Atlantic. *“Although the reality of European dependence on American military technology shows no signs of changing in either the near or distant future, the fact of diverging political wills threatens to undermine the Alliance.”*⁷⁴ The second point of criticism over enlargement focuses on the possibility that the eastward expansion may endanger the relations with Russia which can draw back from cooperation on arms control and security affairs.⁷⁵

A second debate over NATO's transformation and enlargement emphasizes the changing characteristic of the Alliance. Is NATO a collective defense – as initially founded – or a collective security organization? NATO has always a dual role and is both a military and political actor in transatlantic security. During the Cold War, the military role of NATO was dominant over its political role since the prior aim was to deter Soviet military and nuclear power. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the first-purpose had disappeared and the NATO leaders inclined to pursue more political strategies to recover the Alliance survival. NATO, during and after the Cold War, deepened its structural formation and adjusted to the new organizations in Europe, the European Economic Community (EEC), CSCE. The principle of indivisible Europe is the main political aim of NATO. In order to reach an indivisible European security, NATO adopted open door policy and enlarged. Moreover, NACC – later EAPC - , PfP, NATO-Russian Council, NATO-Ukraine Council, and the Mediterranean Dialogue were founded for widening the security zone for the Allies. So, NATO was trying to be put at the top of the list of European security organizations. Many authors claimed that NATO leaders tried to transform the organization toward a collective security mechanism. The NATO as a political actor flirting with collective security is supported by Europeans and Americans. Their supportive argument to this view was chiefly based upon the following points.

“Collective self-defense, embodied in NATO, logically should be complemented by some form of collective security. Why? (1) the effectiveness of any type of collective security system in Europe requires that the NATO retain its integrity and remain competent to act

⁷⁴ Rebecca Michael, “The Dynamics of Change: NATO Adaptation and the Future of Transatlantic Security Cooperation”, **The Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs**, Spring 2002, <http://www.jhubc.it/bcjournal/archive/print/2002/nato.pdf> (03.02.2007), p. 2.

⁷⁵ Dan Reiter, “Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy”, **International Security**, Vol: 25, No: 4, Spring 2001, pp: 41–67, p. 42.

*either in concert with the UN (and OSCE), or under their aegis; and (2) ensuring the Alliance's capacity for action depends on maintaining a unity of agreed purpose while developing methods of decision and operation suited to a more egalitarian partnership.”*⁷⁶

According to Strobe Talbott, North Atlantic region for a collective security expansion is not adequate so China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia should be involved. Eurasia is very important for NATO and there is no cooperative military engagement. *“To fill that partial vacuum, NATO may, over time, extend its gravitational field even further.”*⁷⁷

According to Richard Pupp, though the structural and institutional changes including NACC, Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), PfP and enlargement, NATO has been transformed from a collective defense organization into an organization resembles a collective security organization.⁷⁸ Similarly, David S. Yost claimed that the elements of PfP, the relations with Russia based on the NATO-Russian Founding Act and the stabilization efforts in post-war Bosnia indicate that NATO still serves as a collective defense organization. However, developments suggest that the Alliance is being transformed into an organization that actively pursues collective security actions in the Euro-Atlantic region on an ad hoc or selective basis.⁷⁹

NATO is the most capable organization which can play a valuable role coping with multi-dimensional threats. There are several reasons for this suggestion: Firstly, *“it is deficient, though, in two attributes essential to their success: a competent military organization, and the ability to generate popular approval for the activation of nationally controlled armed forces.”*⁸⁰ Secondly, NATO has cohesive decision-making body unlike the UN which has been paralyzed by the self-seeking interests and behaviors of states. Thirdly, *“the Western allies are in a position to exercise direct influence on parties to a regional conflict situation that can bolster*

⁷⁶ Michael Brenner, “Introduction”, Michael Brenner (Ed.), **NATO and Collective Security**, St.Martin's Press, Inc., USA, 1998, p. 2.

⁷⁷ Strobe Talbott, NATO at Risk, p.53.

⁷⁸ Richard Pupp, “NATO 1949 and NATO 2000: From Collective Defense toward Collective Security”, Ted Galen Carpenter (Ed.), Special Issue on NATO Enters the 21st Century, **The Journal of Strategic Studies**, Vol: 23, No: 3, September 2000, p. 172.

⁷⁹ Yost, New NATO, p. 135.

⁸⁰ Brenner, p. 3.

and focus the UN efforts to resolve disputes in accordance with its own methods for conflict prevention and peacekeeping.”⁸¹ As much as NATO is prescribed as a collective security organization, it does not reflect the classical model of it. In a Kantian or Wilsonian system of collective security, the system functions on an obligatory basis. In stark contrast with the classical security system, NATO decision-making guidelines include terms such as ‘case-by-case’, ‘selective’ and the ‘coalitions of the willing’.⁸²

*“The United States and its Allies have little choice but to pursue a two-track policy: pursuing collective security aspirations to the extent that they are feasible and prudent while maintaining a collective defense posture as a hedge in case those aspirations can not be fulfilled. The challenges to find a middle course that maintains collective defense capabilities in good order, given the risk of future threats to Alliance security, while seeking to deepen cooperation and transparency in security matters and to contain the risks inherent in emerging or ongoing rivalries.”*⁸³

The third debate on NATO’s survival in the post-Cold War era was over its policies in the political field. This debate was about the identity of NATO. It was argued that NATO had never been a military organization for which the glue was the sense of common external threat. Rather NATO members composed a community of liberal democratic values and norms.⁸⁴ In other words, the principles of democracy and the rule of law for the cohesiveness of the Alliance became crucial more than a military threat and embodied the common identity of the organization. Furthermore, the proponents of this view strongly believe that the post-Cold War NATO placed the promotion of democracy at the top of its activities.⁸⁵

It is argued that the strong motive which lied beneath the enlargement was based upon the well-known democratic peace theory that ‘liberal democracies do not fight with each other’. Say explained the survival of NATO with supporting this argument. He claims that in such an environment where the clear foe no longer exists “[t]he alliance was thus such a reflection of a deeply embedded community identity

⁸¹ Brenner, p. 3.

⁸² Yost, New NATO, p. 150.

⁸³ Yost, New NATO, p. 150.

⁸⁴ Helene Sjursen, “On the Identity of NATO”, **International Affairs**, Vol: 80, No: 4, 2004, pp: 687–703, p. 683.

⁸⁵ Sjursen, p. 689.

reinforcing democracy and free market economies”⁸⁶ so that can survive. Reiter mentions that there are three mechanisms by which NATO enlargement can contribute to the spread of democracy. First, the vision of NATO membership can be used as a tool (carrot policy) to encourage the potential allies to apply democratic reforms and eventually become democratic.⁸⁷ Second, “*NATO membership can be used as a stick to spur democratization*”⁸⁸. This is to say that any deviation from democratic rule can result the end of membership.

Accepting new democratic states to membership was part of the policy to build an Atlantic community based on liberal democracy. In fact, it is right that most of NATO formal documents attribute to democratic principles and being democratic is accepted as criterion for membership. Yet, claiming the core identity of NATO as democracy is not totally convincing. First of all, NATO is not based on the rule of law.⁸⁹ It is an intergovernmental military organization and uses consensus as the basic principle of decision-making. Secondly, histories of some NATO members have some non-democratic periods. This creates question marks in our minds about the democratic identity of NATO.⁹⁰ In short, it is strong to argue that the *raison d’être* of NATO is democracy. Instead of asserting being democratic, it has to be stated that NATO is equipped with military tools and is a military alliance in the international arena.

Nevertheless, transatlantic debate is going on since the 1990s. In the 1990s, it has centered around three policies of NATO: ‘open door’ policy, growing political role and the spread of democracy. After 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 2003 Iraqi War, a more intensifying and challenging debate is observed which includes: the diverging attitudes and strategies of the European Union and US-led NATO over international security and how to respond to security disputes.

⁸⁶ Sean Kay, “What Went Wrong with NATO?”, **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, Vol: 18, 1, April 2005, pp: 69–83, p. 70.

⁸⁷ Reiter, p. 52.

⁸⁸ Reiter, p. 52.

⁸⁹ Sjursen, p. 694.

⁹⁰ Sjursen, p. 695.

PART II
THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

I. The Historical Development of the CFSP

A. From the Western European Union (WEU) to Petersberg Tasks

The compromise between the Western countries and the Soviet Union started to shatter after the end of the Second World War and the idea to defend Europe by Europeans had emerged. A safe security environment could be sustained through an institutional mechanism. Foremost, France and Great Britain signed the Agreement of Dunkerq in 1947 to realize the aim of ‘the defense of Europe by Europeans’. The threat of the ‘division of Europe’ had occurred by the events of Prague Coup and Berlin Blockade. In this context, Benelux countries, France and Great Britain signed Brussels Treaty which established the Western European Defense Community in 1948.⁹¹ This Community, at the beginning of its establishment, had targeted to stop the rearmament of Germany, to pull the United States to the European defense, and finally to prevent the Soviet expansion in Europe. The foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 under the leadership of the United States, one of the super powers, had made the WEU dysfunctional. NATO superseded the Western European Defense Community.

France was very reluctant to pursue the objective of establishing a European cooperation framework. In 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman announced a radical plan of which the aim was uniting the French and German coal industry under a supranational authority. The clear message behind this radical plan indicated that economic integration was only means while peace being the end.⁹²

⁹¹ Dedeoğlu, p. 258.

⁹² Karen E. Smith, “Chapter 2: The Evolution of the EU as an International Actor”, **European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World**, 2003, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003 (The Evolution of the EU), p. 28.

The Schuman Plan was embodied in the Paris Treaty that established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. The founding members were France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The other West European states, especially the United Kingdom, preferred to be staying out of this economic frame. The Paris Treaty was a move signaling a cooperative behavior in Europe. At the same year, the signatory countries aimed the integration of all defense forces of Europe in one singular hand. This carried a great importance for France which had been invaded by Germany three times in the previous centuries. The six signatory states of ECSC signed the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty. The idea of building a European defense front was halted because France objected to ratify the EDC Treaty in August 1954.⁹³

Western Germany and Italy were included in the defense community with the signing of Paris Treaty by which the community became the Western European Union. The WEU, in its structure, was not a supranational organization but an international one that advocated the thesis of the defense of Europe by Europeans. The military cooperation between member states, the principle which stipulates that an attack against one will be perceived as an attack against all, and political and economic cooperation had been foreseen at the initial establishment of the organization.⁹⁴

The aims underlining defense initiatives were put in a secondary position when NATO became the primary security organization for European defense. But to claim that the WEU did never function will be a mistake because the WEU contributed to European defense, especially between 1954 and 1973. For instance, it obtained the Western Germany to become a NATO member. Secondly, it established the Agency for Armament Inspection in 1954.

At the Hague Summit in 1969, the six member states met for instructing their willingness toward creating chances for a political union and the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was founded. It was designed to serve as a forum for cooperation

⁹³ Smith, *The Evolution of the EU*, p. 28.

⁹⁴ Dedeoğlu, p. 259.

between sovereign states. This forum included mutual information sharing and policy consultation as well as concerted diplomacy, rather than a real common foreign policy.⁹⁵

In 1970s, the Europeans put more emphasis on economic matters and worked on coordinating their economic, trade relations and justice and internal affairs more than defense issues. In 1975, they formed the Trevi Group against terrorist activities such as IRA. This Group would then form the basis of the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. In fact, “[f]or almost 40 years of European construction the very expression ‘common foreign policy’ found no place in the treaties”⁹⁶.

The phases of the Cold War had shifting effects on Europe. After 1980s the Second Cold War gave rise to thoughts among European countries that the United States wished to rearm Europe by the project of renewing and modernizing European military. French objected these US initiatives. As a result of these doubts, in 1984, the WEU was declared as the responsible organization for the European security and that it would continue its activities with NATO by the Rome Declaration. This declaration was to revive the WEU which had been an autonomous organization from the European Community.⁹⁷

*“Further steps towards linking security and foreign policy were made with the signing of the Single European Act in 1986, revising the Treaty of Rome and drawing the European Parliament closer to the European Political Cooperation (EPC).”*⁹⁸ In 1987, the decision to include EPC in the EC was taken. As a result of the changing international paradigms after the Cold War, the trend to create a separate European identity increased. Europeans decided to endeavor for taking the responsibility of their own defense. This is the reason lies behind the milestone decision of creating common security and defense policy in Maastricht Treaty which

⁹⁵ Robert M. Cutler and Alexander Von Lingén, “The European Parliament and European Union Security and Defense Policy”, **European Security**, Vol: 12, No: 2, Summer 2003, pp: 1-20, p. 2.

⁹⁶ Cutler and Lingén, p. 2.

⁹⁷ Dedeoğlu, p. 260.

⁹⁸ Kjell A. Eliassen, “Introduction: The New European Foreign and Security Policy Agenda”, Eliassen, A. Kjell (Ed.), **Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union**, Sage Publications, London, 1998, p. 4.

is one of the key treaties institutionalizing European security and foreign policy integration.

At last, in 1992, the Petersberg Tasks were put down agenda in order to define completely the missions of the WEU. These tasks are an integral part of the European Security and Defense Policy and include: ‘(1) humanitarian and rescue tasks; (2) peace-keeping tasks; (3) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’. These missions consist military measures, “*from the most modest to the most robust*”⁹⁹. The addition of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the EU which covers the Petersberg Tasks bring the necessity of explaining a unique dimension for European defense policy.

The WEU was incorporated into the EU structure at the Cologne European Council in 1999 by transfer of its assets to the EU. Thus, bifurcated security structure of the EU was finished. In the Cologne Declaration, two types of way were foreseen to implement EU-led operations: by using NATO assets and capabilities or without using NATO assets and capabilities. In this Declaration, the EU leaders pointed out the requirement of avoiding ‘unnecessary duplication’ and three operational capabilities were defined for EU-led operations: “*European military capabilities (envisaged on the basis of existing national, bi-national and multinational forces) for conflict prevention and crisis management; the development of suitable intelligence, strategic transport and command and control capabilities; and the restructuring of European defense industries and more efficient defense collaboration*”¹⁰⁰.

B. From Maastricht to Amsterdam

“Over the last decade, there has been much debate about a “European – as distinct from transatlantic/NATO – contribution to defense. For much of the 1990s, however, major Western European countries were divided over whether, how far, and how to proceed down this road. As a consequence, they agreed on a compromise formula whereby the WEU -

⁹⁹ Martin Ortega, “Petersberg Tasks, and Missions for the EU Military Forces”, **Institute for European Securities European Union**, February 2005, p. 1.

¹⁰⁰ Richard G. Whitman, “NATO, the EU and ESDP: An Emerging Division of Labor?”, **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol: 25, No: 3, December 2004, pp: 430-451, p. 437.

*rather than the EU – would act as the institutional framework for European defense cooperation but its use would be limited to crisis management operations (the so-called Petersberg Tasks) rather than to defend national territory.”*¹⁰¹

The motive behind creating common foreign and security policy was stronger in the post-Cold War environment than that of the Cold War. In the Maastricht Summit of 1991, the 12 member states established the CFSP. The establishment of Petersberg Tasks was the reflection of this security quest for Europe. These tasks could be categorized under the issues of ‘soft security’ while NATO was still holding the primary seat as an organization for defense. The Single European Act had foreseen security political cooperation. *“In the Maastricht Treaty, by contrast, the member states pronounced their intention to include all questions of security, ‘including the eventual framing of a common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense’ (Article J.4.1)”*¹⁰² According to Cameron, there was a lack of consensus about the future role of the Union in global politics. It was ambiguous in minds whether the EU would be a global military player, a regional power with some military capabilities, or simply provider of soft security.¹⁰³

The objectives of the common and foreign security policy were defined as follows (Title V - Art. J.1 (2)):

- *to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;*
- *to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;*
- *to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;*
- *to promote international cooperation;*
- *to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.*

¹⁰¹ Andrew Cottey, “The European Dimension of Defense Reform: From the WEU to the EU’s New Defense Role”, Ambassador Gyarmati, Istvan and Ambassador Theodor Winkler (Ed.s), **Post-Cold War Defense Reform**, Brassey’s, Inc., Washington D.C., 2002, p. 19.

¹⁰² Arnhild and David Spence, “The Common Foreign and Security Policy from Maastricht to Amsterdam”, Eliassen, A. Kjell (Ed.), **Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union**, Sage Publications, London, 1998, p. 50.

¹⁰³ Fraser Cameron, “The Role of the EU and WEU in European Security”, Wilfried von Bredow and Gerhard Kümmel (Ed.s), **European Security**, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1997, p. 131.

By the Treaty on European Union, the EPC was transformed into the CFSP of the EU in 1993. The WEU put triple membership for realizing these tasks. Since there were some both NATO and EU countries, only NATO countries, and non-NATO EU member countries in the WEU, the difficulties of compromising all states' interests made the integration of the WEU with the EU inescapable. Nevertheless, the permanently neutral state status of Austria, Finland, and Sweden was problematic for the WEU that is a defense organization in which these states could not participate. Thus, in 1997, by the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Petersberg Tasks were incorporated to the CFSP. Moreover, this Treaty was the sign of the further attempts to integrate the WEU to the EU fully. The Amsterdam Treaty entered into force in 1999 and became one of the basic policies of the Union.

At an informal EU Summit, the British Prime Minister surprisingly gave the signs of real intention to develop a strong EU military capability.¹⁰⁴ This demand was of great significance for the development of a robust CFSP for the reason that there had been always disagreement between France and Great Britain which advocated the defense of Europe with strong partnership with the United States within NATO structure. Two months later after this intent, Great Britain and France met in the St. Malo Summit in 1998. This Joint Declaration was a call to the EU member states to fully implement the Amsterdam Treaty on CFSP, including deciding on 'the progressive framing of a common defense policy'.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, they issued for the establishment of an 'autonomous' capacities which would be backed by military force. This compromise lifted one of the biggest halts for an integrated European defense capability.

¹⁰⁴ Alistair J. K. Shepherd, "The European Union's Security and Defense Policy: A Policy without Substance?", **European Security**, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp: 39-63, p. 40.

¹⁰⁵ Shepherd, p. 40.

C. From 1999 to Present

The European discourse and action on foreign and security policy showed a significant process since 1999 and the well understanding of this accelerating progress can only be examined by the analysis of the external factors creating stimulus for the evolution of CFSP. Jean Yves Haine divides these external factors into four basic groupings. For Haine, “*after more than fifty years of status quo, several factors may explain the progressive emergence of a genuine security and defense policy for the Union.*”¹⁰⁶ The basic factor was the systemic change, the end of the Cold War. Europe lost its strategic importance for the United States if compared to its strategic significance during the Cold War. Besides that, the post-Cold War security environment was different from the previous period in the sense that there were various security threats which can be overcome only by effective and cohesive cooperation. Secondly, the integration process of the EU in the economic field had been completed. After the economic union has been adopted, the further step for integration should have been in the political one. Thirdly, the widening gap between the economic power and military/political power of the EU should have been removed, especially after the Cold War. Finally, the ethnic conflict at the door of Europe made an accelerating effect in the development of a real political integration. The war in the Balkans brought the vitality to improve the EU’s security policies since the ethnic conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo threatened the rationale and credibility of the Union’s integration process.¹⁰⁷

The resolute coming of this progress within the second pillar was strengthened with the German proposal for a Common Policy on Security and Defense. This proposal carried the aim of shift from identity to policy. At Cologne European Council in 1999, the member states decided to transfer the WEU assets to the EU. By this transfer, the WEU was considered to finish its mission as an organization. At this meeting, to reach the capability of responding international

¹⁰⁶ Jean-Yves Haine, “An Historical Perspective”, Nicole Gnesotto (Ed.), **EU Security and Defense Policy: The First Five Years (1999–2004)**, Institute for European Security Studies, Paris, 2004 (Historical Perspective), p. 35.

¹⁰⁷ Haine, Historical Perspective, p. 36.

crises was decided. In order to achieve this goal, the institutionalization process should have been started. Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) were founded. The Cologne Declaration anticipated two kinds of EU-led military operations: military operation with NATO assets and capabilities and military operation without NATO assets and capabilities.¹⁰⁸

In December 1999, the member states embarked the Headline Goal (HG) objectives in the Helsinki Summit. The aim of the HG was to put forces capable of carrying out Petersberg missions under the authority of the EU. These forces included several levels; from the operations to army corps level, i.e. 50.000 to 60.000 troops.¹⁰⁹ States should be able to deploy the requested forces within 60 days and to sustain these troops for at least one year by the year of 2003. The mission forces assigned for the Petersberg tasks are called as Rapid Reaction Force. In addition to these tasks, the Union included conflict prevention and crisis management tasks into defense policy.

The developments both within the decision-making process and institutionalization continued at the Nice European Council in December 2000. “*By incorporating some functions of the WEU, the EU assumed the crisis management functions of the WEU and its objective of making ESDP quickly operational was incorporated as a declaration annexed to the Treaty of Nice.*”¹¹⁰ In this summit, enhanced cooperation is permitted in the foreign policy area, but not in military one. Besides that at the June 2000 Santa Maria da Feira European Council, the EU defined four priority areas in which the EU should acquire concrete capabilities: the police, strengthening the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection.¹¹¹ This was an attempt to add a civilian crisis-management constituent to the ESDP agenda. The second HG was declared and named as Headline Lite. The Headline Lite would function as a police capacity mission drawing on the WEU’s Civilian Crisis

¹⁰⁸ Whitman, p. 437.

¹⁰⁹ Haine, Historical Perspective, p. 44.

¹¹⁰ Shepherd, p. 45.

¹¹¹ Haine, Historical Perspective, p. 45.

Management procedures. The aim was to create a gendarme style police capacity of 5.000 officers which would involve in cases of peace, civil and economic construction.¹¹²

The progress in the improvement of European military capabilities got faster after the September 11 attacks which had made a threatening fear for all countries, especially for the United States and Europeans. After these terrorist attacks, the EU declared its solidarity with the United States and initiated an Action Plan for the fight against terrorism.

The Laeken European Council is one of the key meetings in which a real European security and defense identity started to be implemented. ESDP – the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) - was declared operational. That was to say, the EU could conduct itself crisis management operations. These declared operations would be low-end Petersberg Tasks such as humanitarian assistance and national evacuation operations. These endeavors were to meet the capabilities in the civilian aspect of European forces, the so-called police missions.

With all respecting the steps taken to strengthen the European role as a security actor, there were shortfalls in national commitments which differ in importance, nature and operational implications. In order to determine these shortfalls and eradicate them as much as possible, the EU defense ministers met at first Capability Improvement Conference in 2001 and the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was launched in order to deal with these deficits.¹¹³

The four principles were defined to guide the ECAP process:

“(1) the improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of European defense efforts, enhancing cooperation between member states or group of member states;

¹¹² Alexander Moens, “Chapter 2: ESDP, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance”, Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (Ed.s), **Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, pp: 25-37. pp. 29-30.

¹¹³ Burkard Schmitt, “Chapter 4: European Capabilities: How Many Divisions?”, Nicole Gnesotto (Ed.), **EU Security and Defense Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004)**. Institute for European Security Studies, Paris, 2004, p. 93.

- (2) a 'bottom-up' approach to European defense cooperation, relying on voluntary national commitments;*
- (3) coordination between EU member states as well as coordination with NATO;*
- (4) public support through ECAP's transparency and visibility”¹¹⁴*

In 2002, the European Council decided to take command of the International Police Task Force's mission in Bosnia from the UN. It would be the first police mission for the EU to command. During the tragic events of Bosnia and Kosovo, the EU could not face the challenges of ethnic conflict at the door of its borders. This suffering past of the EU caused them to take further steps to bridge the gap between their economic and military capabilities. After a few years of Balkan wars, the EU decided to take the command of police missions in Bosnia. After this decision, the EU declared its willingness to take over the NATO Operation in the Republic of Macedonia¹¹⁵ when the mandate of NATO ended.

In December 2003, at the European Council, the defense ministers declared the end of the Helsinki process. At the same time, the Council adopted the European Security Strategy of 2003. By this security document, the EU member states opened the way for Headline Goal 2010.

At the Seville European Council, the EU enlarged the scope of ESDP. They decided to fight against terrorism. The peripheral concerns of the EU leaders extended toward international and transnational dimensions due to the terrorist attacks of September 11. Another important development about ESDP was the agreement conducted between ESDP and NATO. This agreement – Berlin-plus arrangements - gave the EU access to NATO assets for crisis management. In turn, the EU leaders agreed to give permission to the involvement of non-EU NATO members within ESDP.

In addition to developments about NATO and ESDP, the Union worked much on generating a global strategy for minimizing the vulnerability of their own borders to any possible terrorist attacks. The EU cooperated with the United States against

¹¹⁴ Schmitt, p. 93.

¹¹⁵ NATO members except Turkey do not recognize the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name rather call it as Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They launched a common Action Plan against proliferation. Another breakthrough came after US Iraqi intervention, they adopted Solana document in December 2002. This document was the reflection of the necessity of adapting a genuine strategic thinking about international security issues. The premise of the Solana document is concluded as “a secure Europe in a better world”¹¹⁶.

*“A strategy document is always a tentative exercise by nature. It is more about a vision than about strategic interests, more about attitude than policies. This is even truer in the context of an organization of 25 independent states. The document is thus historic.”*¹¹⁷

The European Security Strategy is declared, according to Jean-Yves Haine, is a threat-driven document. Five threats such as international terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, failed states, and organized crime are defined as major threats. *“Second, the strategy builds on the Union’s acquis and identity in security policy. It is based on three pillars – extending the zone of security around Europe, strengthening the international order and countering the above-mentioned threats – and two key concepts, ‘preventive engagement’ and ‘effective multilateralism’.”*¹¹⁸ The divergence of US and EU’s approach to dealing with international security threats after September 11, particularly after Iraqi intervention, will be discussed in detail in one of the continuing sections.

II. The Institutional Structure of the CFSP

The European Union is an international actor and has a great presence in the international political, economic and military era and is based on the EU’s internal institutional development.¹¹⁹ As an international actor, the EU has some policy objectives. For reaching these objectives, the EU members should use their resources according to defined rules of internal policy engagement through institutions.

¹¹⁶ Haine, Historical Perspective, p. 50.

¹¹⁷ Haine, Historical Perspective, p. 50.

¹¹⁸ Haine, Historical Perspective, p. 51.

¹¹⁹ Smith, The Evolution of the EU, p. 24.

As the world's most and largest unified economic market and trading bloc¹²⁰, the EU has a considerable presence in world affairs and proved its willingness to have a common and foreign security policy since 1990s. In order to be a global player their policy objectives should be articulated by means of institutionalization.

The most important step towards institutionalization, the Maastricht Treaty, known also as the Treaty on European Union, established three pillars of the Union: the European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs. Since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, there have been several developments concerning CFSP.

The EU as an actor establishes relations with the third parties and acts collectively towards international issues. During the conduct of these relations and collective actions, the EU uses some foreign policy instruments: “(1) *propaganda*; (2) *diplomacy*; (3) *economy*; and (4) *military*.”¹²¹ Generally, the EU resorts to economic and diplomatic instruments. Three pillars wield these instruments to complete the common foreign and security policy. In a detailed fashion, the Amsterdam Treaty defines the means for pursuing the CFSP objectives [Article J. 1 (3)]:

- *defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy;*
- *deciding on common strategies;*
- *adopting joint actions;*
- *adopting common positions;*
- *strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of foreign policy.*

¹²⁰ Smith, *The Evolution of the EU* p. 24.

¹²¹ Karen E. Smith, “Chapter 3: The EU's Foreign Policy Instruments”, **European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World**, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003 (Foreign Policy), p. 52.

A. The European Community Pillar

The Council of the European Union, or formally known as the Council of Ministers, with the European Parliament (EP) is the responsible institution for passing the laws and taking policy decisions and competent in the field of common foreign and security policy. Two main foreign policy instruments of the Union fall under the authority of the Council: entering into international agreements and deciding on financial assistance to third countries.¹²²

The European Council identifies the general guidelines and principles of the CFSP. Under the guidance of these principles, the Council of the European Union decides on adopting joint actions or common positions.

“Joint actions address specific situations where operation action by the EU is considered necessary and lay down the objectives, scope and means to be made available to the EU. They commit the member states.

Common positions on the other hand, define the approach that the EU takes on a certain matter of geographical or thematic nature, and define in the abstract the general guidelines that the national policies of Member states must conform to.”¹²³

The High Representative for the CFSP assist to the Council about all the issues related to the CFSP *“through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third countries”¹²⁴*. Secondly, the CFSP working groups are existent and make expertise workings along geographical (Latin America, Middle East and etc.) and functional (drug trafficking, organized crime, terrorism etc.) lines. Thirdly, four committees assist the Council to enhance the implementation of the CFSP. The European Military Committee is responsible for advising the EU about the military matters. The EU Military Staff provides military expertise to the ESDP, especially in the conduct of crisis-management operations. The Politico-Military Group examines

¹²² Smith, Foreign Policy, p. 53.

¹²³ “Common Foreign and Security Policy”,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Foreign_and_Security_Policy (24.03.2007).

¹²⁴ “Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP),
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm (03.07.2007).

all the proposals of politico-military aspect within the framework of the CFSP. And the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management advises on the political aspects of non-military crisis management and conflict prevention.¹²⁵

There are three kinds of agreements the EU sign with third countries: trade; cooperation or development cooperation; and association.¹²⁶ Through these agreements, the EU has probably one of the largest webs of trade relationship with the countries all around the world and is linked to every country through a formal agreement. The US and some other countries are exceptional within the EU domain of formal agreements since they have only sectoral agreements with the Union.¹²⁷

Secondly, the EU is one of the biggest donor regional groupings in the world. In 2000, the EU shared 6.0 percent of the European Commission's (EC) budget for assistance to third countries.¹²⁸ Since the assistance to third countries is increasing year to year and it has a special role in pursuing the policy objectives, the EC established EuropeAid in 2001. EuropeAid is responsible from the contribution of all the assistance outside the EU. It was established to deliver 'high-quality aid programmes that will have a practical impact on the quality of people's lives, and that achieve a level of efficiency to meet the highest international standards'. EuropeAid manages the transfer of aid to about 160 countries all around the world. The EC distributed 10.4 billion Euros, out of 7.5 billion Euros through EuropeAid.¹²⁹

Near the positive economic instruments of the Union, the EU, if decides necessary, applies negative economic measures such as "*embargo (ban on exports), boycott (ban on imports), delaying conclusion of agreements, suspending or denouncing agreements, tariff increase, quota decrease, withdrawing GSP, reducing or suspending aid, delaying granting of successive loan tranches*"¹³⁰.

¹²⁵ "Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP), http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm (03.07.2007).

¹²⁶ Smith, Foreign Policy, p. 53.

¹²⁷ Smith, Foreign Policy, p. 55.

¹²⁸ Smith, Foreign Policy, p. 57.

¹²⁹ "EuropeAid",

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/promotion/know/knowlist_en.htm (24.03.2006).

¹³⁰ Smith, Foreign Policy, p. 60.

B. The Common and Foreign Security Pillar

The Amsterdam Treaty defined the five fundamental objectives of CFSP;

*“(1) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principle of the United Nations Charter;
(2) to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
(3) to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principle of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
(4) to promote international co-operation;
(5) to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”*¹³¹

The Council of the European Union is responsible of defining the general framework and principles of CFSP and determines the common strategies. Within this context, the Council of Ministers is the decision-making body. Member states should harmonize their national policies with common positions the Council of the EU defines. Secondly, the common actions are also binding and the member states should determine their external attitudes according to these common actions.¹³²

The Council of the European Union takes decisions with unanimity. The principle of unanimity prevents of taking decisions that are contradictory with one of the member states' national interests. However, abstention does not have an impact over the voting. In taking 'common positions' and 'joint actions', the principle of qualified majority voting is valid. The principle of majority is used only in decisions of secondary importance to national interests. On the other hand, in case of any of the Member state's rejection, the Council does not realize the voting process.¹³³

Within the framework of the CFSP, the EU does apply foreign policy instruments as well as especially diplomatic instruments. The diplomatic instruments used as a means of foreign policy making can be ranked as follows:

¹³¹ “Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP),
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm (03.07.2007).

¹³² B. Esra Çayhan, “Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası ve Türkiye”, **Akdeniz İ.İ.B.F. Dergisi**, Vol: 3, 2002, pp: 42–55, p. 46.

¹³³ Çayhan, p. 46.

*“(1) démarches; (2) declarations/statements; (3) high-level visits; (4) supporting action by other international organizations; (5) diplomatic sanctions; (6) diplomatic recognition; (7) political dialogue; (8) making peace proposals; (9) sending special envoys; (10) sponsoring peace conferences; (11) sending cease-fire monitors; (12) administering a foreign city; (13) sending election observers; (14) sending civilian experts; (15) imposing arms embargo; [and] (16) offering EU membership.”*¹³⁴

The diplomatic instruments are mostly used by the CFSP pillar. The decisions to use these measures are taken by unanimity. The Amsterdam Treaty also identifies the ways how the CFSP objectives will be pursued;

“(1) defining the principles and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, which is done by the European Council;

(2) deciding on common strategies. These instruments were introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty and set out overall policy guidelines for activities with individual countries. Each strategy specifies its objectives, its duration and the resources that will have to be provided by the EU and the Member States. So far there are Common strategies on Russia, Ukraine, Mediterranean and the Middle East Peace Process. They too are decided by the European Council.

*(3) adopting joint actions and common positions. These commit the Member States to adopting a certain position and a certain course of action. They are decided by the General Affairs Council.”*¹³⁵

III. The ESDP: From Security to Defense

The unprecedented events of 1989 had made multitude policy shifts in US national security understanding. After the disappearance of the Soviet Union which had been the *raison d'être* of NATO for four decades, the debate to put an end to NATO has arisen in the United States. But the Alliance making accent on the importance of Transatlantic relationship continued to be the most living Alliance of the history. NATO survived in the post-Cold War's challenging environment by creating new strategic concepts of 1991 and 1999.

The most debated issue after the Cold War was the problem of burden sharing. Europeans did not pay much to defense spending during the Cold War and relied on the United States and NATO for defending their own home soil. In the

¹³⁴ Smith, Foreign Policy, p. 61.

¹³⁵ “Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP), http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm (03.07.2007).

years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States stressed the importance of burden sharing for the future of Transatlantic partnership.

France and Germany put forward the idea of 'European Defense Identity' in 1990. This initiative faced objections from the Bush Administration, and from some NATO members which rejected the idea that the WEU should have become the military wing of the EC.

European Security and Defense Policy is the complementary pillar of CFSP and is a further move of European Union states toward minimizing the 'capabilities-expectations gap'. However, CFSP is the decision-making pillar and the place where basic European foreign and security policy is produced. The institutional place where the tools for pursuing the common foreign policy is ESDP, the successor of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). For some commentators, during the Cold War, the Western allies were bound in a 'community of fate' and were under the umbrella of NATO against their Eastern enemies.¹³⁶ On the contrary this Cold War history, the Western democratic alliance endeavored for having a common foreign policy. And eventually, the ESDP formed the backbone of a European Defense Community for the first time 50 years after the attempts to create a European unity.¹³⁷

After the Petersberg Tasks were launched in 1992, the United States accepted the launch of a 'European Defense Identity' at the NATO Summit in 1994 within the framework of Atlantic security system and "*envisaged the prospect of putting military assets at the disposal of their European allies for the accomplishment of peace missions to which they did not wish to take part: the Combined Joint Task Forces*"¹³⁸. Secondly, at the Berlin Summit of NATO in 1996, NATO leaders

¹³⁶ David G. Haglund, "Chapter 1: 'Community of Fate' or Marriage of Convenience? ESDP and the Future of Transatlantic Identity", Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Alten G. Sens (Ed.s), **NATO and European Security Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism**, Praeger, Westport, 2003, pp. 1–13, p. 1.

¹³⁷ Anthony King, "The Future of the European Security and Defense Policy", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol: 26, No: 1, April 2005, pp: 44–61, p. 44.

¹³⁸ Jean Klein, "Interface Between NATO/WEU and UN/OSCE", Brenner, Michael (Ed.), **NATO and Collective Security**, St.Martin's Pres, Inc, USA, 1998, p. 251.

declared ‘that it would begin to build a European Security and Defense Identity that would develop a more balanced partnership between North America and Europe’. Furthermore the ESDI was launched to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and prevent the emergence of larger growing military capabilities gap between the United States and the EU members.¹³⁹ In other words, the ESDI was an attempt to create a European pillar within NATO and was the sign of European willingness for sharing the security burden with the US. The security burden of European continent had been on the shoulders of the US as the superpower during the Cold War. By the creation of ESDI, and lastly ESDP, was a step toward the embryonic division of labor between the EU and NATO.¹⁴⁰

Creation of the ESDI would provide a military force “*that is separable, but not separate, from the NATO force structure that could be available for use under the political direction and strategic control of the WEU*”¹⁴¹. The introduction of CTJF would provide the WEU the capability of realizing a European-led operation. ‘Separable forces’ mean that European forces would be able to borrow NATO and US assets while conducting any operation. In general, the concept of combined joint task force is a multinational force that can be deployable with multi-service formation for specific contingency plans. This concept can be used to any military operation for a specific mission. NATO’s concept of CJTF was defined by the Head of NATO’s Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) as ‘flexible, deployable, multinational, multiservice Headquarter (HQ)’ using a building block approach.¹⁴² Specifically, the concept had been developed under NATO.

¹³⁹ Asle Toje, “The First Casualty in the War against Terror: The Fall of NATO and Europe’s Reluctant Coming of Age”, **European Security**, Vol. 12, No. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 63-76, p.64.

¹⁴⁰ Richard G. Whitman, “NATO, the EU and ESDP: An Emerging Division of Labor?”, **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol: 25, No: 3, December 2004, pp: 430–451, p. 430.

¹⁴¹ Ahmet Çevikbaş, **The European Union’s Evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy**, (Unpublished Master Thesis), Bilkent University, The Department of International Relations, Ankara, 2002, pp. 60-61.

¹⁴² Terry Terriff, “Chapter 3: The CJTF Concept and the Limits of European Autonomy”, Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (Ed.s), **Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, pp. 39-58, p. 40.

*“Three types of CTJF were foreseen: (1) NATO-only CTJF, involving Alliance members and without any outside participation, (2) NATO-plus CTJF, involving as many members of NATO and PfP as desire to take part, (3) WEU-led CTJF, where the WEU uses NATO assets, including a CTJF headquarters, in its own operation.”*¹⁴³

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was the initial stride in parallel with the decisiveness toward a strong European Union. The Treaty touched on the concept of a common defense policy by reference to the fact that the EU should have a strong military capability through the WEU.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, the Amsterdam Treaty established the post of High Representative for the CFSP. The creation of this position for the CFSP was almost the acceptance of the necessity of vigorous pioneering institution.

Further steps occurred at the Washington NATO Summit of 1999: NATO leaders accepted to give permission to the EU to conduct operations in which NATO would not be engaged. This permission was not a blank cheque to the EU; rather NATO repeated that the permission would be given on a case-by-case basis.¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was launched by NATO. The objective of this initiative was declared as *“to improve defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces, and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces.”*¹⁴⁶ The significance of the DCI for ESDP lied beneath the expression that NATO would give permission to the EU to use its assets and capabilities for the operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged militarily.¹⁴⁷ The DCI aimed at reaching the capacity to meet the challenges such as Kosovo.

¹⁴³ Çevikbaş, p. 61.

¹⁴⁴ Brian Crowe, “A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq?”, **International Affairs**, Vol: 79, No: 3, 2003, pp: 533–546, p. 534.

¹⁴⁵ Çevikbaş, p. 62.

¹⁴⁶ “Defense Capabilities Initiative”, 25 April 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm> (15.04.2007).

¹⁴⁷ Salman and Shepherd, p. 68.

The European military paralysis without NATO during the 1998-9 Kosovo crisis contributed a new dimension to the development of common defense policy. Two biggest military powers of the Union, Britain and France met in St. Malo in 1998 and issued a declaration. France and Britain first time called for a bigger role for the Union in international stage.¹⁴⁸ St. Malo Declaration – formally known as the Joint Declaration on European Defense – called for a progressive common defense policy. They declared that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’. The quest for an ‘autonomous action’ by the militarily strong EU was mirroring the European global ambitions.

It is mostly accepted that the ESDP is a European project, for many, it is the production of the trilateral relationship between France, Britain and Germany. Notwithstanding the fact that France, Britain and Germany are not the only states having efficient military capability so much to influence the European politics and the world politics in a wider sense and there are big states in military terms such as Spain, Italy and Holland, “*any feasible ESDP has finally to be built around Britain, France and Germany; this is the decisive European security triangle*”¹⁴⁹. In the years 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2004, these three European giants held meetings to increase their shared commitment to security related matters.

Albeit the consensus among France, Britain, and Germany are of great importance for the development of an efficient ESDP, their diverging interests to European security can have an awkward impact on ESDP as well. Firstly, Britain has an Atlanticist stand among them. In the 1990s, Britain had generally championed the uniqueness of NATO for European security and pursued parallel policies with the United States, even in the risk of excluding her European allies. Secondly, France had always been a defender of a distinct European entity from NATO and the United

¹⁴⁸ Antonio Missiroli and Gerrard Quille, “Chapter 7: European Security in Flux”, Fraser Cameron (Ed.), **The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement**, Routledge, London, 2004, pp. 114–134, p. 115.

¹⁴⁹ King, p. 46.

States and had an Europeanist point of view toward the development of common foreign and security policy. *“For fifty years, France had aspired to create a European security order that would enjoy relative autonomy from the United States within a rebalanced alliance.”*¹⁵⁰ And finally, Germany had been deeply committed to the alliance relationship with the United States under NATO. In the 1990s, these policies began to shift from their original strict stands. France finally turned to the military front of NATO after 30 years, somewhat a sign of recognizing the necessity of NATO in the post-Cold War period of turmoil. Britain moved closer to her European partners. Germany pursued policies accepting the vitality of an independent European defense capability.¹⁵¹

In 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force. The German presidency prepared a report on reinforcing the CFSP which was approved at the Cologne European Council of 1999. The adoption of this report had an evolutionary change over CFSP and ESDP. In this report, the member states accepted the inevitability of the backup of CFSP by credible operational capabilities. Secondly, this report proposed the formation of the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, and the EU Military Staff. In addition to these formal contributions of the report, the most significant characteristic of the report was the adoption of all fifteen members covering the neutral states of Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Austria. These states’ traditional avoidance of being part to organizations related to defense and now their participation to this report was a real step toward speeding the ESDP process.¹⁵² Furthermore, Javier Solana was chosen as the Higher Representative of CFSP.

Again in 1999, of being one of the most important military powers of the EU, Italy showed willingness to strengthen the EU military power by issuing the ‘Anglo-Italian Joint Declaration Launching the European Defense Capabilities Initiative’.

¹⁵⁰ Jolyon Howorth, “Chapter 3: Ideas and Discourse in the Construction of a European Security and Defense Policy for the Twenty-first Century”, Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G. Sens (Ed.s), **NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism**, Praeger, Westport, 2003 (Ideas and Discourse), pp. 37-53, p. 40.

¹⁵¹ King, p. 47.

¹⁵² Salman and Shepherd, pp. 69-70.

The approach of this declaration focused on improving tangible military forces, that are capable of handling cases of crisis management and that would open the way for an autonomous EU action in the defense and security fields.¹⁵³

After the St. Malo Declaration, the EU continued to develop ESDP as a specific programme within the CFSP and finally ratified ESDP at the Treaty of Nice in 2000. It was given formal status to the EU's new Military Committee¹⁵⁴ and the senior/ambassadorial level Brussels-based Political and Security Committee that was rendered responsible for the day-to-day management of CFSP. By this reform, the CSFP remained an intergovernmental body with six-month rotating presidencies.¹⁵⁵

Initially the Bosnian crises and later the Kosovo crisis channeled Europeans to re-consider their military presence in case of a security threat. And from 1990s, it was undeniably understood that no single European Union member state has the enough military power though which unilaterally can be effective at the global level.¹⁵⁶ *"The lesson learnt by the Europeans in Kosovo was indicated by the speed with which the EU military dimension, till then largely theoretical, was taking shape in the months following the campaign."*¹⁵⁷

At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the EU agreed to establish ERRF – the so-called Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) – by mid-2003. ERRF was declared as operational at the Laeken European Council in 2001. The ERRF is not a single standing army, but is based on the concept that national forces will be brought together in cases of necessity and military crises. Moreover, the ERRF was formed on the principles and activities of CJTF concept.¹⁵⁸ The HG, we can say that, is the first real sign for Europe which, for the first time, showed its willingness for being a global military actor, besides being an economic giant. The Helsinki Summit of 1999 is of great significance for the EU that ESDI became ESDP. St. Malo Agreement

¹⁵³ Salman and Shepherd, p. 70.

¹⁵⁴ EUMC is composed of 15 chiefs of staff.

¹⁵⁵ Crowe, p. 534.

¹⁵⁶ King, p. 48.

¹⁵⁷ Toje, p. 65.

¹⁵⁸ Terriff, p. 46.

between France and Great Britain “*caught by US officials by surprise and Washington became increasingly worry by a potential weakening of the Alliance, especially because Britain had dropped its decade-long opposition to the merger of the WEU into the Union*”¹⁵⁹. The HHG established a military force composed of 50-60.000 men with the backup of air and naval forces that can be deployable in two months and sustainable for a year at least¹⁶⁰ in support of the Petersberg Tasks. In the Helsinki Summit, the member states also declared the establishment of three interim committees that would be authorized to run the EU’s crisis management capabilities.¹⁶¹

On one hand, European leaders stepped in the defense field in order to bring to an end to their defense weakness as a Union, on the other hand, “[*m*]ember states made it clear that this process would not imply the creation of a European army. The objective was – and still is – ‘only’ to set up a pool of national units o which the EU can, in principle, draw if the Council decided unanimously to use military force in response to an international crisis.”¹⁶²

The objective outlined under the HHG was reflected to the detailed report named as ‘Presidency Progress Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense’. Another point which the Helsinki Summit clarified was the role of the Secretary – General/High Representative. The High Representative was rendered responsible as coordinating the various EU institutions in order to sustain the creation of a coherent security and defense policy.¹⁶³

In 2000, the Capabilities Commitment Conference (CCC) was held in Brussels. They committed to make national contributions on voluntary basis to the capabilities covering the needs of headline goal. These commitments are listed under the Helsinki Force Catalogue. This conference, in general, constituted the initial

¹⁵⁹ Jean-Yves Haine, “ESDP and NATO”, Nicole Gnesotto (Ed.) **EU Security and Defense Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004)**, Institute for European Security Studies, Paris, 2004 (ESDP and NATO), p. 134.

¹⁶⁰ Missiroli and Quille, p. 116.

¹⁶¹ Shepherd, p. 42.

¹⁶² Schmitt, p. 91.

¹⁶³ Salman and Shepherd, p. 72.

stage of further progress toward the quantitative focus over military capabilities.¹⁶⁴ Force catalogue was composed of the specified list of land, air and maritime forces with details of unit, number, size and duration of forces which can be demanded from member states in case of necessity.¹⁶⁵

As a complementary element of visible European defense project, qualitative side of military capabilities should also be evaluated and concerned. At the European Council in Nice held on 7-9 December 2000, member states decided to set up a mechanism that would serve to the improvement of availability, mobility, sustainability and interoperability of military forces.¹⁶⁶

The establishment of several institutions such as PSC, EUMC, and EUMS in order to realize the HG proposed in Helsinki “gave the United States the impression that ESDP would become a rival that would eventually have its own military structure”¹⁶⁷. Thus, the Clinton Administration reacted against this EU departure in Helsinki “by arguing that it could **decouple** Europe’s security from that of the US, **duplicate** what NATO already does in a costly and ineffective way, and **discriminate** especially against European NATO allies that were not EU members”¹⁶⁸. By this declaration, three ‘Ds’ occurred and produced the general US policy attitude toward the efforts of the EU which has been trying to establish an independent security mechanism from NATO. The US doubts about the ongoing ESDP were unnecessary in the sense that the EU always emphasized the role of NATO as pre-eminent, both in Helsinki and successive meetings. This continuing process removed the operational function of the WEU which is integrated to the second pillar of the Union, CFSP. At that point, the problems about the positions of the non-EU NATO countries in the decision-making process of CFSP surfaced. After nine months of ‘three Ds’ declaration, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott confirmed Washington’s doubts by stating that: “We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO, but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away

¹⁶⁴ Schmitt, p. 92.

¹⁶⁵ Whitman, p. 438.

¹⁶⁶ Schmitt, p. 92.

¹⁶⁷ Haine, ESDP and NATO, p. 137.

¹⁶⁸ Çevikbaş, p. 71.

from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO.” ¹⁶⁹

Turkey's position in this new dimension of the EU is very knotty. As a candidate to the EU full membership and fifty-year NATO ally, Turkey is determined to participate in ESDP decision-making process. At first, Turkey has been denied to participate. The Turkish response to her exclusion from this process was to use her veto right in the case of EU's access to NATO planning facilities for crisis management. Turkey requested to participate actively and regularly in planning and advice, the military operations, and decision-making process. But Turkey's this demand was not supplied by the EU in Helsinki, Feira, and Nice Summits. At the Feira Summit, the EU member countries decided to engage in military operations in three different ways: (1) as a NATO-led operation, (2) using NATO assets and (3) as an EU-only operation if 'NATO as a whole is not engaged'. In the second way, non-EU NATO members would participate automatically in preliminary discussions if they wish whereas, in the third way, non-EU countries would simply be invited to be involved.¹⁷⁰ Turkey demanded to participate in both decision processes otherwise; Turkey would veto the access of the EU to NATO assets. The card being played by Turkey seemed successful that the United States, Great Britain and Turkey met in 2001 to deal with Turkey's demand. On 21 November, 2001, Ankara Memorandum of Understanding was signed among Great Britain (representing the EU), the United States, and Turkey. According to this memorandum of understanding, the EU would not take approval from NATO for the operations being not strategic. Secondly, the EU would consult with Turkey about the operations affecting Turkey's national interests. Thirdly, the EU army would not be used against non-EU members. In other words, this army would not be able to intervene in a conflict within NATO allies. By this arrangement for Turkey, the Atlantic dimension of ESDP was completed.

¹⁶⁹ Strobe Talbott, **Washington's Views on U.S. – Europe Relations**, May 1999, <http://www.mkogv.hu/nato/angol99/99an30.htm> (19.06.2007)

¹⁷⁰ Nathalie Tocci and Marc Houben, "Accommodating Turkey in ESDP", **Center for European Policy Studies**, Policy Brief (5), Brussels, May 2001, p. 2.

At the Prague Summit of NATO, the NRF was created in order to deal with the security challenges after September 11 attacks.

*“The NRF emerged out of several parallel developments. The first was the perceived need to give the military capacity of the alliance new impetus and a new focus in the world of terrorism. The second was the desire to do something to help US forces to remain interoperable with their US counterparts and to avoid further strategic and force structure divergence between NATO and the emerging European RRF.”*¹⁷¹

The creation of the NRF generated questions about the future relationship between the NRF and the ERRF. For many, the United States wished to kill the ERRF by the creation of the NRF.¹⁷² These questions remain unanswered for today. But, we can say that, there is a division of labor between the roles of the forces. ERRF is, for now, capable of conducting Petersberg Tasks – soft security, while NRF is able to conduct hard security operations.

*“While the EU is still deficient in certain military capabilities (e.g. strategic transport by air and sea; strategic intelligence; and command, control and communications), noteworthy progress has been made since ESDP was declared operational at the 2001 European Council Meeting in Laeken.”*¹⁷³

In 2003, Javier Solana issued the European Security Strategy paper titled as “A Secure Europe in a Better World”¹⁷⁴. The paper not only proved European willingness of becoming a global actor in European world politics but also was a call to European states to take the shared responsibility for tackling the 9/11 international threats. Europe’s enthusiasm in having a larger share in the security cake was evident in the following sentence: “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world”. The focus on global challenges was an indication of Europe’s problem-solving approach transcending traditional

¹⁷¹ Jolyon Howorth, “ESDP and NATO: Wedlock or Deadlock?”, **Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association**, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2003 (ESDP and NATO), pp: 235-254, p. 238.

¹⁷² Howorth, ESDP and NATO, p. 240.

¹⁷³ Susan E. Penksa and Warren L. Mason, “EU Security Cooperation and the Transatlantic Relationship”, **Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association**, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2003, pp: 255-280, p. 262.

¹⁷⁴ “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy”, December 2003, <http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf> (25.04.2007).

geographical and conceptual limitations of its strategic original thinking.¹⁷⁵ Among the security threats challenging European nations were ranked as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.

Furthermore, this security strategy paper underlined the strategic objectives in order for the Union to tackle security challenges. Firstly, Solana called the member states to act in cooperative behavior in tackling the threats. Secondly, he addressed the vital necessity of settling good neighborhood and security around the Union borders. Finally, and may be most strikingly, the EU re-emphasized their attitude toward ‘an international order based on effective multilateralism’. Moreover, from Becher’s point of view, “[t]he *European Security Strategy* contains in effect a timely proposal by Europe to the US for a renewed, trusted, and lasting partnership with shared responsibilities and burdens”¹⁷⁶.

In April 2004, France, Germany and the United Kingdom represented the concept of ‘battle group’ and started an initiative in order to eradicate one of the shortfalls of the Helsinki process. The idea has been subsequently agreed by all members in September 2004. The concept of battle groups or tactical groups would include 1.500 troops, deployable within 15 days for higher-intensity operations. Additionally, these groups can only be used upon a UN request.¹⁷⁷

Depending on the Security Strategy Paper of 2003, the European Council endorsed Headline Goal 2010 on 17 May 2004. The HG 2010 was another declaration of European willingness to secure its place in international arena as the first sentence of the HG proves: “*The European Union is a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security*”¹⁷⁸. The document accentuated the fact that the EU is both a military and civilian power as well. Near addressing the existence of certain shortfalls, the member states committed themselves ‘to be able

¹⁷⁵ Klaus Becher, “Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World After the 2003 European Security Strategy”, **European Security**, Vol: 13, No: 4, 2004, pp: 345–359, p. 350.

¹⁷⁶ Becher, p. 356.

¹⁷⁷ Schmitt, p. 98.

¹⁷⁸ “Headline Goal 2010”, 17-18 June 2004, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf> (06.05.2007).

by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a full coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union'. Moreover, the members shared the view that interoperability, deployability and sustainability and having more flexible, mobile and interoperable forces would be at the core of the HG 2010.

The creation of a separate body specific to the defense development had been on the EU agenda for almost a decade. At the end, by the Joint Action of the Council of Ministers on 12 June, 2004, the European Defense Agency (EDA) was established in order *“to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defense capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defense Policy as it stands now and develops in the future”*¹⁷⁹. Four actions assigned to the Agency:

(1) developing defense capabilities; (2) promoting defense research and technology; (3) promoting armaments cooperation; and (4) creating a competitive European Defense Equipment Market and strengthening the European Defense, Technological and Industrial Base.

As of 2003, the EU engaged in three missions. Firstly, ESDP started its first civilian mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 2003 with an initial three years period. This engagement is named as the European Union Police Mission Operation (EUPM) and is the first civilian crisis management operation under ESDP.¹⁸⁰ Secondly, the EU launched the ‘Concordia’ mission in the Republic of Macedonia on 31 March 2003. This military deployment was conducted in cooperation with NATO and is the first-ever military operation of the EU. It should be pointed out that even though the military mission was conducted under the EU mandate, the Union used NATO assets and capabilities with legal reference to the Berlin Plus agreements.¹⁸¹ Thirdly, ESDP Artemis Operation was launched in the Democratic Republic of Congo in June 2003 as a positive response to the UN appeal for humanitarian assistance. This operation, again, was conducted with close cooperation with the

¹⁷⁹ “European Defense Agency: Background”, <http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Background&id=122> (06.05.2007).

¹⁸⁰ Missiroli and Quille, p. 126.

¹⁸¹ Missiroli and Quille, p. 127.

United States and the first ESDP operation initiated independent of NATO and outside the European region.¹⁸² In other words, the EU proceeded this military operation only by its own assets and capabilities.

Even if these three missions are small in scope and two of them were conducted from within NATO command structures, they undeniably contributed much to the development of ESDP. According to Anthony King, Artemis and Concordia missions demonstrated the fact that collective interests, in other words, the will to act together, began to come into existence.¹⁸³

One of the foreign policy objectives of the EU was “*to bolster peace and security in the South Caucasus and to assist in the transition of three states of the region: Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan*”¹⁸⁴. In 2004, these three states were included in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). And upon the Georgian invitation of the EU to launch an EU Rule of Law Mission to coordinate and assist the reform efforts of criminal justice system and legislative procedures, the EUJUST Themis (the EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia) was commenced on 16 July 2004. In addition to the said objectives, this mission would help the Georgian government to align their human rights standards in line with the European ones. EUJUST Themis is important in the sense that it is the first rule of law mission and proved EU commitment of being a strong civilian power.¹⁸⁵

In 2004, NATO decided to finalize the SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Istanbul Summit. Following this decision, the EU decided to deploy an equivalent force to SFOR under the UN Security Council Resolution 1575. This mission is named as Althea and the force that would accomplish this mission is called as EUFOR. Operation Althea was the largest military mission in size composed of about 7.000 troops launched by the EU. Secondly, this operation was conducted under the Berlin plus agreements. Thus it was not only the member states

¹⁸² Penksa and Mason, pp. 262-263.

¹⁸³ King, p. 52.

¹⁸⁴ Giovanni Grevi, Dov Lynch and Antonio Missiroli, **ESDP Operations**, Institute for Security Studies, <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf> (29.04.2007).

¹⁸⁵ Grevi, Lynch and Missiroli.

that joined the operation. 22 member (including neutrals as well) and 11 non-member states constituted the military force.¹⁸⁶

In September 2003, the operation Artemis ended but it was in the Union's interest of bringing security and stability to the Great Lakes region. After the Congolese and the UN official invitation, the EU decided to launch a Police Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo. This the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL 'KINSHASA') aimed at creating and training an integrated police unit in the country. In 2005, again upon the Congolese official request, the EU decided to initiate an EU advisory and assistance mission for DRC (Kinshasa) security reform for one-year period, the so-called EUSEC DR CONGO mission. And this mission aimed at mobilizing and coordinating the Congolese army.¹⁸⁷

Furthermore, the EU tried to contribute to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by forming the EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Peace Support (EU COPPS) which was the idea of Javier Solana. This mission was launched in order to give support to the Palestinian civil police organization.

Of not being a certain actor in the operation, the EU contributed to the AMIS II financially, politically and logistically. AMIS was the African Union's Mission in Darfur against a rebel movement that caused lots of civilian loss.

The other law of mission the EU conducted was realized in Iraq. The Brussels European Council discussed and reached the conclusion from the Union's point of view that the Iraq required a strengthened criminal justice system which would be in compliance with the principles of human rights. The EU deployed the law of mission in Iraq named as EUJUST LEX (the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq) in December 2004. The mission was basically deployed to stabilize Iraq through contributing the establishment of an integrated police rule and civilian administration.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ Grevi, Lynch and Missiroli.

¹⁸⁷ Grevi, Lynch and Missiroli.

¹⁸⁸ Grevi, Lynch and Missiroli.

Similar to those in Iraq, the EU conducted a police mission in Palestine. The Council took the decision that pointed out the creation of a police mission no later than January 2006 in November 2005. This mission has been named as EUPOL-COPPS and aimed at both assisting Palestinian police authorities and coordinating international assistance to Palestinian authorities.¹⁸⁹

If estimated in scope and nature individually, the EU military missions do not count big military deployments. The EU 25 member states have an overall 1.8 million armed forces. *“If UN operations around the globe, previous EU operations Concordia and Artemis, and occasional national operations (e.g. British and French operations in Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast) are taken into account, EU Member States are permanently sustaining 50 000–60 000 troops in operations abroad.”*¹⁹⁰

As a delayed military power compared to NATO, the EU inevitably suffered and is suffering some ‘crosscutting challenges’¹⁹¹ that can be categorized as operational, financial and planning challenge while conducting military operations. Regarding the operational dimension, the place of operations being out-of-area and distant to the European mainland underscores the success of the operations. Secondly, the lack of multi way of means of communication along the chain of command restraints the movement place of operations. Finally, there are still questions over the sustainability of a European force in a war theatre distant from Europe. About the financing issue, the EU member states suffer to a great extent since the operations cost high expenditures to CFSP budget. Basically, the funding of the operations is decided on ad hoc mechanisms and this ad hoc mechanism causes the lack of sustainable management of operations. On the other hand, the initial cost calculations exceed the total actual cost of the operation to the Union.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ Grevi, Lynch and Missiroli.

¹⁹⁰ Sven Biscop, “Able and Willing? Assessing the EU’s Capacity for Military Action”, **European Foreign Affairs Review**, Vol: 9, 2004, pp: 509–527, p. 514.

¹⁹¹ A term used by Gustav Lindstrom. Pls see Gustav Lindstrom, “Chapter 5: On the Ground: ESDP Operations”, Nicole Gnesotto (Ed.), **EU Security and Defense Policy: The First Five Years (1999–2004)**, Institute for European Security Studies, Paris, 2004.

¹⁹² Lindstrom, pp. 122–126.

PART III

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS

I. Division of Labor between NATO and the EU Based on the ESDP

During the Cold War, the preponderance of the United States over the European security architecture via the sole collective defense guarantee of the continent, NATO, had simplified the security formula for reaching the peaceful environment in the European continent. For the Western European countries and the other side of the Atlantic, there had been fewer issues to be questioned under the conditions of nuclear attack likelihood. The disappearance of the nuclear threat as well as the economic and political transformation of the European countries under the European Union increased the number of factors within the European security paradigm and thus complicated this security formula and the process in which the EU endeavored for the development of an autonomous military structure.

The emergence of a European-based military and defense capability in the 1990s in parallel with NATO enlargement has been one of the most significant developments of European and Atlantic security affair.¹⁹³ In this decade, the European security architecture was not based on unique bedrock, NATO but also new embodiments were to be established by the European Union such as the ESDI, the ESDP, the CFSP and the WEU. The WEU is not a new security formation but strengthened after the Cold War and started to play more influential role.

The existence of multiple forums for cooperation and enlargement of NATO and the EU had some blurring effect on decision-making process. NATO and the EU dual enlargement after the Cold War and states that are not member to the two organizations have challenging impacts on the transatlantic partnership. These blank points between NATO and the EU defined the post-Cold War transatlantic agenda to a great extent. Secondly, the neutral EU member states (Austria, Sweden, Finland

¹⁹³ Mark Webber, "Chapter 8: NATO Enlargement and European Defense Autonomy", Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (Ed.s), **Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, pp. 157–179, p. 157.

and Ireland) complicate the partnership process around the ESDP with regards to NATO and the United States.

Table 1. *Members of NATO and the European Union*

<i>NATO Members</i>	<i>EU Members</i>
Belgium	Belgium
<i>Bulgaria</i>	-----
<i>Canada</i>	-----
Czech Republic	Czech Republic
Denmark	Denmark
Estonia	Estonia
France	France
Germany	Germany
Greece	Greece
Hungary	Hungary
<i>Iceland</i>	-----
Italy	Italy
Latvia	Latvia
Lithuania	Lithuania
Luxembourg	Luxemburg
Netherlands	Netherlands
<i>Norway</i>	-----
Poland	Poland
Portugal	Portugal
<i>Romania</i>	-----
Slovakia	Slovakia
Slovenia	Slovenia
Spain	Spain
<i>Turkey</i>	-----
United Kingdom	United Kingdom

United States	<i>Finland</i> <i>Ireland</i> <i>Malta</i> <i>Cyprus</i> <i>Sweden</i> <i>Austria</i>
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At present, the EU does not have a permanent and integrated military command structure which member states devote a number of forces to. As a remedy to this deficit in defense policy, the Union seeks to build and use temporary solutions for military crisis situations. When seeking these solutions, the EU is destitute to the existence of NATO assets. The previous ESDP operations except Operation *Artemis* included operations which were conducted with NATO assistance and by using NATO assets and capabilities.

Nevertheless, from its very inception, the ESDP is a problematic issue within NATO and for the United States. Since the ESDP is very favorable to those states that are party both to the EU and NATO and discriminatory to those belonging only to NATO, the United States always pursued precautionary policies in order to minimize the discriminatory effects of the development of the ESDP over the non-EU European NATO member states. The ESDI was established in order to allow the EU forces to be separated out from NATO forces in cases which the United States or the Alliance as a whole did not participate and had no intention of being involved.¹⁹⁴ In 1998, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright summarized US policy toward the ESDP in “three Ds”: non-*decoupling* of the US in European security, non-*duplication* of NATO and non-*discrimination* of non-EU NATO members. The third ‘D’ stayed on agenda as a contentious issue until the Berlin plus agreements. According to Moens, the Clinton administration produced more policies about the multiple effects of the ESDP over NATO than the Bush administration which has

¹⁹⁴ Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, “Chapter 1: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy”, Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (Ed.s), **Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, pp. 3-23, p. 8.

pursued a type of *laissez-faire* policy and demanded for an increased military capacity instead of dealing with rhetoric or organizational diagrams.¹⁹⁵

At first, at late 1990s, the WEU tried to bring a solution to the discrimination question. 21 states that have relationship with the WEU were categorized as full members, observers and associate members. This categorization had a blurring effect on legalistic distinctions between different categories of membership. The non-WEU EU states including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden were categorized under the observer status. Secondly, the non-EU NATO members, Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, were accepted as associate members that would participate in the WEU actions in the same status of full members and be involved in the institutions of the WEU.¹⁹⁶

In 1999, all the formal procedures setting the relationship between NATO and WEU were definite. Access request to NATO assets by the WEU would be evaluated case-by-case by the NAC. Due to the limited military capacity of high intensity warfare if compared with NATO, the EU/WEU is admittedly, not publicly and formally declared, dependent to NATO capabilities. Terriff argues that militarily the conduct of any EU-led operation is linked to, if not in fact implanted in, NATO and mentions the fact that NATO does not guarantee an assured access to common Alliance-held assets as it did in CJTF concept. For any specific case, the EU will request to access Alliance-held assets and this access will be guaranteed upon the consensual agreement of NAC. Hence, the request does not trigger an automatic right but will be evaluated by the Alliance on a case-by-case.¹⁹⁷

In 2000 Feira European Council, the EU leaders addressed the issue of discrimination and committed to create a 'single institutional framework' for the non-EU European NATO members and candidates for the EU integration. This commitment did not really address the original Albright's view of discrimination and

¹⁹⁵ Alexander Moens, "Chapter 2: ESDP, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance", Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (Ed.s), **Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy**. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, pp. 25-37, p. 25.

¹⁹⁶ Whitman, p. 434.

¹⁹⁷ Terriff, p. 46.

eradicate Turkey's doubts about the ESDP/NATO/EU interface so that Turkey continued to block direct EU access to NATO's assets and capabilities.¹⁹⁸

The EU's decisive endeavors through implementing an autonomous defense capacity inside NATO have intensified at the end of the 1990s and gave concrete results in the first five years of 2000. After the launch of the ESDI and the CJTF within NATO, in 2002 Prague Summit, NATO leaders agreed to give the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for those operations in which NATO is not engaged militarily. On 16 December 2002, the leaders of NATO and the EU issued NATO-EU Declaration on the ESDP and confirmed the assured EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for its own military operations. Political principles re-defining the cooperation and partnership are declared as well;

- *“effective mutual consultation;*
- *equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and NATO;*
- *respect for the interests of the EU and NATO members states;*
- *respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;*
- *coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organizations.”*¹⁹⁹

The Turkish resentment about the EU-led operations in relation with NATO was exterminated with the sign of Berlin Plus agreement in 2003. Turkey agreed to terms on the condition that Southern part of Cyprus will not be covered under the Berlin Plus agreements.²⁰⁰ The Berlin plus agreement is a comprehensive name for a package of agreements between NATO and the EU and includes following parts:

- a. *“NATO - EU Security Agreement*
- b. *Assured Access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO)*
- c. *Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led CMO*
- d. *Procedures for Release, Monitoring, Return and Recall of NATO Assets and Capabilities*
- e. *Terms Of Reference for DSACEUR and European Command Options for NATO*
- f. *EU - NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and capabilities*

¹⁹⁸ Whitman, p. 444.

¹⁹⁹ “NATO-EU Strategic Partnership: How did this Policy Evolve?”, <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/evolution.html> (21.06.2007).

²⁰⁰ Howorth, ESDP and NATO, p. 248.

g. *Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing Capability Requirements*”²⁰¹

The Berlin Plus provides ‘the basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management by allowing the EU access to NATO's collective assets and capabilities for EU-led operations’²⁰². The EU access can be available if NATO is not wholly engaged. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSCAEUR) will be the commander and adviser of any EU-led operation under the Berlin plus agreements. The elements of the Agreement are as follows;


- *“a NATO-EU Security Agreement (covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules);*
- *assured EU access to NATO's planning capabilities for actual use in the military planning of EU-led crisis management operations;*
- *presumed availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as communication units and headquarters for EU-led crisis management operations;*
- *procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities;*
- *terms of reference for NATO's Deputy SACEUR - who in principle will be the operation commander of an EU-led operation under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements (and who is always a European) - and European command options for NATO;*
- *NATO-EU consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led crisis management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities;*
- *incorporation within NATO's long-established defense planning system, of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations, thereby ensuring the availability of well-equipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led operations.”*²⁰³

²⁰¹ “Berlin Plus Agreement”,
http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm (19.06.2007).

²⁰² “NATO-EU Strategic Partnership: How did this Policy Evolve?”,
<http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/evolution.html> (21.06.2007).

²⁰³ “NATO-EU Strategic Partnership: How did this Policy Evolve?”,
<http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/evolution.html> (21.06.2007).

Table 2.



Source: Antonio Missiroli, “ESDP – How it Works?”, Nicole Gnesotto (Ed.), **EU Security and Defense Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004)**, Paris, Institute for European Security Studies, 2004, p. 60.

Another contentious issue between NATO’s transformation and the ESDP development is the existence of NRF on one side and of ERRF on the other side. According to Howorth, there is a problematic relationship between the NRF and embryonic the ERRF and this is the major conundrum that stays at the heart of NATO’s future.²⁰⁴ Even though there are legally two distinct structures, we can say that there is an embryonic division of labor between the EU, via the ESDP, and NATO.²⁰⁵ Thus, there is a division of labor between the NRF and the ERRF. In respect with the capabilities gap that will be mentioned below between the United States and the EU nations, rhetorical division of labor between the NRF and the ERRF does almost exist. With the strong backup of the United States and deep-rooted military structure, the NRF will play significant role in crises of high intensity warfare in global context whereas the ERRF will involve in crises that can be

²⁰⁴ Howorth, ESDP and NATO, p. 240.

²⁰⁵ Whitman, p. 430.

categorized under the Petersberg spirit in the European continent.²⁰⁶ Ojanen describes this division of labor as “*role specialization between the two organizations*”²⁰⁷.

II. Comparison of Strategies and Policies of both Sides

A. Capabilities Gap between Two Sides of the Atlantic

*“In a simplified way, the US wants the EU spend more on defense, but ‘certainly not an autonomous European strategic reflexion in the post September 11 world’.”*²⁰⁸

In parallel to the emergence of a division of labor between NATO and the EU within the security field, the division on the military capabilities between the United States and the EU has intensified. Actually, the military capabilities gap had always been existent in the Atlantic partnership. The United States had been one of the pioneering superpower having considerable hard power capabilities in an era of nuclear deterrence. Within the Cold War paradigm, the United States had always supported and stood behind Europe which had been more capable in the economic field and less capable in defense. Notwithstanding the fact that the United States has been loaded with the cost of saving Europe during the Cold War, it has started to pursue rhetoric of a stronger Europe in military terms, and furthermore has asking its European partners to share the defense burden.

*“The defense-capabilities gap that divides the United States from its European allies is real, and it matters.”*²⁰⁹ Since the end of the Cold War, the so-called capabilities gap between the United States and its European allies have been

²⁰⁶ Howorth, ESDP and NATO, p. 240.

²⁰⁷ Hanna Ojanen, “The EU and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defense Policy”, JCMS, Vol: 44, No: 1, 2003, pp. 57–76, p. 58.

²⁰⁸ Etienne Desbordes, “The Impact of the Iraqi Crisis on the Transatlantic Link. A Summary of Views on the US-EU and US-NATO Relationship”, **European Security**, Vol: 12, No: 2, Summer 2003, pp. 103–110, p. 109.

²⁰⁹ David S. Yost, “Chapter 5: The U.S.-European Capabilities Gap and the Prospects for ESDP”, Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (Ed.s), **Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy**. Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2003 (European Capabilities), pp. 81 – 106, p. 81.

clear and is widening especially after the September 11 attacks. The gap in concern can be defined as the aggregate of multiple gaps about the organization and conduct of large-scale military operations.²¹⁰

Yet, less influential position of the EU vis-à-vis the United States undoubtedly limits the European participation in certain types of military operations. Nonetheless, the role of the EU in decision-making process, related to the issues on NATO and global concern has weakened if compared with the United States. Admittedly, the EU as a global actor has an undeniable weight in international affairs.²¹¹

For many, the power gap between Europe and the United States “*is the genesis for the alleged divergence within the alliance*”²¹². Of being multiple in nature, there are lots of categories of capabilities gap. According to James Sperling, the categories are as follows;

*“A clear consensus exists that Europe’s capabilities shortfalls are likely to undermine NATO if they remain unbridged. Three general categories of capabilities shortfalls present themselves: those pertaining to enabling capabilities (deployability, interoperability, sustainability and logistics); those pertaining to primary forces (e.g., command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I)), effective engagement (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR)), and strategic mobility; and those that pertain to discrete weapons systems (e.g., air-to-air refueling, cruise missiles, friend-or-foe identification (FFI) systems, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)).”*²¹³

The numerical data also supports the widening military capabilities gap between the two sides of the Atlantic. The United States spends much more than of its European allies, and thus, its defense budget should not be compared in real terms with any other state. The United States’ defense budget is about five times that of Russia which is the second country in the world with its defense budget. Top ten countries in defense expenditure are as follows respectively: the United States,

²¹⁰ Yost, *European Capabilities*, p. 81.

²¹¹ Stephen J. Coonen, “The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?”, *Parameters*, Autumn 2006, pp. 67–84, p. 67.

²¹² Coonen, p. 69.

²¹³ James Sperling, “Capabilities Traps and Gaps: Symptom or Cause of a Troubled Transatlantic Relationship?”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol: 25, No: 3, December 2004, pp. 452–478, p. 453.

Russia, Japan, China, France, the UK, Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil. Actually, the US defense expenditure is larger than the combination of the next nine states in the top ten of the list.²¹⁴

The United States spends 5 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that equals to about 500 billion USD for defense expenditures. This amount is higher than the total of the EU member states' defense expenditures. Contrary to the United States, the European states spend 2 percent of their GDP on military and defense expenditures.²¹⁵

As a striking example, the United States added the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to National Security Strategy of 2002 after the September 11 attacks and foresaw a significant increase in defense expenditures. The planned increase in defense budget is higher than the total defense budget of the highest-spending EU member state.²¹⁶ Increasing trend in the US military expenditures vis-à-vis decreasing share of defense expenditures in the EU total budget widens the rift between the United States and Europe year-by-year. *“The EU’s military inadequacy, compounded by the likely unavailability of U.S. assets, thus remains the Achilles heel of the ESDP project.”*²¹⁷

As well as the difference in defense budgets, there is a certain capabilities gap. *“From a quantitative perspective, the United States today commits resources to defense that dwarf the resources committed by any other nation, and its deployable forces far outnumber Europe’s.”*²¹⁸ On the other hand, it should not be disregarded that European armies have almost same level of high-technology equipment capacity with the United States.

²¹⁴ Howorth and Keeler, pp. 3-4.

²¹⁵ Richard Sinkin, “The EU and US: From Cooperation to Rivalry”, **European Integration**, Vol: 26, No: 1, March 2004, pp. 93–100, p. 95.

²¹⁶ Howorth and Keeler, p. 4.

²¹⁷ Howorth and Keeler, p. 16.

²¹⁸ Coonen, p. 76.

With all due respect to the below capabilities gap, the EU is not a single state with a single administration notwithstanding its 'supranational' identity. "*The nascent 'European' foreign or defense policies that exist today do not represent a solid, well-developed plan to support a 'European' supranational strategy, but rather correspond to the lowest common denominator of 25 separate national policies.*"²¹⁹ The difficulty in harmonizing national foreign policies halts the process for the EU to take immediate and preventive actions in case of emergency and crisis situations. This is leadership gap as defined by Sperling. This gap is also existent in transatlantic relationship. The United States can no longer dictate alliance policy over its European allies. The policy directions differ accordingly.²²⁰ For a healthy analysis of capabilities gap, the United States should not be selected as the single indicator. If the EU is compared only with the United States, the conclusion will be deceptive since the United States is one of the biggest countries in military terms throughout the history. Thus, the EU is second after the United States in quantitative and qualitative terms.²²¹

As these figures show, the United States and the EU sometimes use different tools for pursuing foreign policy and preserving their interests. Yet the literature review proves that there is a general consensus over the identities of the United States and the EU. The United States is defined as a 'hard power' with its unchecked military and economic power while the EU is expressed as 'soft power' with its civil police capabilities and economic power.

The traditionalist international relations theory defines some basic criteria for an entity to be perceived as an international actor. Basically, the entity should have some certain capabilities such as "a strong economy, military capacity and a strong/political capacity and presence"²²². In fact, the EU covers most of these qualifications. Of not having the characteristic of statehood and a military structure

²¹⁹ Coonen, p. 72.

²²⁰ Sperling, p. 460.

²²¹ Coonen, p. 75.

²²² Henrik Larsen, "The EU: A Global Military Actor", **Cooperation and the Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association**, Vol: 37, No: 3, 2002. pp: 283-302, p. 202.

like a nation state can be considered as the most paramount hindrances for the EU to be categorized as an international actor in the same category with the United States.

Even if the EU is not measured as a military power, it is generally described as a civilian power.²²³ The concept of civilian power has various understandings. But, originally, the concept was used to portray the EC. Firstly, a civilian power does not have access to and resort to military means. Secondly, a civilian power does prefer using persuasion instead of coercion. In other words, carrots policies replace stick policies. Taking into consideration these features, the EC/EU was a civilian power until the 1990s. Since after the 1990s, the dominant discourse of the EU political agenda gave signs of shifting policies toward the military area. Labors for the development of common security and defense policy had a deviating effect on civilian identity of the EU. Persuasion remained at the top of policy tools. However developments about common defense and security policy drew on the arguments that the EU should have improved capabilities to use military means if necessary. Hence, the Union members struggled to combine their civilian components with military ones which were not given a crucial role. Larsen argues that the new articulation of military means since 1998 does not represent a total break with the dominant civilian power perceptive but should be considered as a total break because resort to military means in case of tangible crises was represented as an integral part of EU foreign policy path.²²⁴

Generally accepted military capabilities gap within the Atlantic domain of relations and differing identities of the United States and the European Union in terms of hard/soft power division created policy differences and blurred the Cold War scene where the foreign policy coordination among the Atlantic allies under the umbrella of NATO had been less unchallenged. The EU challenge against the post-September 11 US security strategy should be analyzed with a comparison of US and EU security strategies under the guideline of US National Security Strategy (2003)

²²³ Firstly, in 1972, François Duchêne defined Europe as a 'civilian power'. For further information pls see: Jennifer Mitzen, "Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol: 13, No: 2, March 2006, pp: 270–285, p. 271.

²²⁴ Larsen, pp. 289-292.

and European Security Strategy (2003) with taking into consideration the unilateralist/multilateralist foreign policy behavior.

B. Analysis of Transatlantic Rift with regard to the NSS and the ESS

The United States entered the post-Cold War era in a very determined multilateralist stand. 'A New World Order' declared by the President Bush was shaped in parallel with the multilateral frameworks. The Iraqi war under the UN mandate, and the finalization of Uruguay Round negotiations were clear marks of multilateralist US foreign policy.²²⁵ Thus, the US foreign policy during the two terms of the Clinton administration reflected a high degree of multilateralism in terms of relations not only with the EU but also with the other countries. However, September 11, 2001 and aftermath of this date made a shifting effect on the US security strategies and its relations with the other states, especially with its European allies.

The international support, actually from NATO allies, to the United States for the repair of the attacks and sustain a coalition against war on terrorism was indispensably important for a multilateral policy pursuance. Yet in contrast to the initial expectations, the United States intervened unilaterally. On October 7, 2001, the US administration notified the UN Security Council about the intervention and declared that the intervention would be exercised under the US right of self-defense. The main goal of the military intervention against Afghanistan was to throw the Taliban regime providing bases and support to the Al Qaeda organization which had been deemed responsible of the attacks.²²⁶ The report to the Security Council by the US contended the information about the evidence that Al Qaeda had a direct and central role in the attacks. The United Kingdom made a similar explanation to the Council and stated that the forces in the intervention were employed in exercise of the right of self-defense. The United States launched military strikes against the sites

²²⁵ John Van Oudenaren, "Unipolar versus Unilateral", **Policy Review**, Vol: 124, April & May 2004, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3413186.html> (30.05.2007).

²²⁶ Malcolm N. Shaw, **International Law**. Cambridge University Press, UK, 2003, p. 1028.

believed to house Al Qaeda personnel and equipment in Afghanistan with the United Kingdom. Military support and contribution to the intervention was not sought by the US administration.

The following policy decisions of the Bush administration such as opting out of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, rejection of the Germ Weapons Convention and the Programme of Action on Illicit Trade in Small and Light Arms, not supporting the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and rejection of the ratification of statutes of the International Criminal Court of Justice was unilateral. Additionally, the Bush administration unilaterally withdrew for the 1970s Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.²²⁷ Beyond these unilateral policies, the US Iraqi intervention of 2003 without the authorization of the UN raised the fears about the US unilateralism.

Before going into detail about the US and EU policy divergence, explanation of multilateralism and unilateralism will be necessary. Multilateralism is mostly exemplified in the international organizations such as the UN, the WTO and the OSCE. The universally accepted UN Charter obligations, the provisions of international treaties, and the customary international law are the main backbones of multilateralism regarding to the political dimension.²²⁸ In other words, multilateralism is a picture of an international system where the rule of law and international obligations function through intergovernmental organizations. Moreover, multilateralism can be defined as “...*the coordination of relations among three or more states according to set of rules or principles*”²²⁹.

There are various multilateral frameworks of cooperation. Firstly, these frameworks differ in relation to their level of institutionalization. Level of

²²⁷ Pls see: David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong, “Chapter I: Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives”, David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong (Ed.s), **Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives**, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Colorado, 2003, pp: 1-17 and G. John Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?”, **Perspectives on Politics**, Vol: 1, 2003, pp: 533-550.

²²⁸ John Van Oudenaren, “What is “Multilateral”?”, **Policy Review**, Vol: 117, February & March 2003 (Multilateral), <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3449941.html> (30.05.2007).

²²⁹ Ikenberry.

multilateral cooperation can range from ad hoc coalitions to international regimes and formal organizations. Secondly, the nature of commitment differs. Multilateral platforms can be voluntary, legal (such as to be bound by the treaties), ethical or political. And finally, organizational structure can be egalitarian or hierarchal. For instance, the multilateral organization can operate on the basis of equality (like the UN General Assembly) or some members of the organization can have some privileges (like the UN Security Council and World Bank).²³⁰

Unilateralism is antonym of multilateralism and presents a contrast policy inclination with multilateralism. Unilateralism “*refers to a tendency to opt out of a multilateral framework (whether existing or proposed) or to act alone in addressing a particular global or regional challenge rather than choosing to participate in collective action*”²³¹.

As mentioned below, the United States had made a unilateral turn in 2000s with the Bush administration guided by neoconservative thinkers. This unilateral turn in foreign policy is perceived by many scholars as the result of transformation of the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity. For instance, Ikenberry states that; “*America’s ‘new multilateralism’ has unsettled world politics.*”²³² Ikenberry relates this new unilateralist trend in the US foreign policy with the fact that the United States emerged out of the Cold War as the unmatched and unprecedented global superpower. He argues “[*p*ower breeds unilateralism”²³³. Oudenaren confirms this view by arguing that “*...small countries are more inclined than large ones to look to international solutions to policy problems*”²³⁴. Depending on these arguments, it is possible to claim that the unipolar world order, thus, triggers the occurrence of US ‘go-it-alone’ foreign policy approach. Besides, there is no direct relationship between the rise of unipolarity and recent American unilateralism. The

²³⁰ Malone and Khong, pp. 2–3.

²³¹ Malone and Khong, p. 3.

²³² Ikenberry.

²³³ Ikenberry.

²³⁴ Oudenaren, Multilateral.

paramount/superpower position of the United States paves the way for the pursuance of unilateral policies.²³⁵

The United States is aware of its unipolar strength, especially in the military field. This awareness can be realized in every detail of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) of 2002 or the so-called Bush Doctrine. The Bush administration promulgated this fact in the NSS as follows;

*“Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage.”*²³⁶

*“The United States possesses unprecedented – and unequalled – strength and influence in the world.”*²³⁷

Of being a post-September 11 document, the NSS was a manifest against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. For many authors, the NSS is an imperial document pointing out the unipolar place of the United States in the world.²³⁸ Against threats of the proliferation of WMD, terrorism and ‘rogue states’, the United States drew the scheme in which the United States would take the necessary precautions. Amongst these precautions, the pre-emptive action has attracted the attention of the international public opinion furthest. In the third part of the NSS, the Bush Administration declared that the United States would not hesitate to take pre-emptive actions in order to use its right of self-defense.²³⁹

The US declared preemption policy had made a considerable impact on the EU-US and transatlantic relations. European perspectives, even under the NATO structure, did not coincide with that of the United States about finding a solution to the Iraqi problem. In general, the US view of the use of force deepened the diverging

²³⁵ Ikenberry.

²³⁶ “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (25.05.2007), p. 3.

²³⁷ “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (25.05.2007), p. 7.

²³⁸ Ted Galen Carpenter, “The Bush Administration’s Security Strategy: Implications for Transatlantic Relations”. **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, Vol: 16, No: 3, October 2003 (Security Strategy), pp: 512–524, p. 513.

²³⁹ “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (25.05.2007), p. 6.

interests and perspectives that exist since the end of the Cold War. For instance, Carpenter argues that “[n]either side wants to admit the obvious: that American and European interests and perspectives are diverging on an array of issues. With the demise of the Soviet Union, there is no longer a focal point of unity in the Western Alliance.”²⁴⁰ Besides the fact that there are many issues two sides of the Atlantic cannot coincide about, Atlantic partners have general interests and overlapping policies on many issues.

Robert Kagan is one of the leading defenders of the vantage point that the United States and Europe have no longer congruent foreign policy approaches. In his famous essay “Power and Weakness” (2002), he advocates that;

*“It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power – the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power – American and European perspectives are diverging.”*²⁴¹

Kagan claims that there is no longer a common strategic culture²⁴² between Europeans and Americans. While Americans tend to use coercion and the use of force in the Hobbesian world, Europeans pursue policies which prioritize the rule of law by means of negotiation and cooperation for a world of Kant’s Perpetual Peace. *“That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less.”*²⁴³ Coker agrees with Kagan and claims that;

*“The problem is that two imperial systems now dominate much of the world, one American, the other European. Both are inspired by the same values but in instrumentalizing them they find themselves increasingly in conflict with each other.”*²⁴⁴

²⁴⁰ Carpenter, Security Strategy, p. 511.

²⁴¹ Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness”, **Policy Review**, Vol: 113, June & July 2002, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3460246.html> (30.05.2007).

²⁴² “Strategic culture is based on the understanding that states are predisposed by their historical experiences, political systems and cultures to deal with security issues in a particular way.” For further information pls see: Wyn Rees and Richard J. Aldrich, “Contending Cultures of Terrorism: Transatlantic Divergence or Convergence”, **International Affairs**, Vol: 81, No: 5, 2005, pp: 905–923, p. 906.

²⁴³ Kagan.

²⁴⁴ Christopher Coker, **Empires in Conflict: The Growing Rift between Europe and the United States**. Stephen Austin & Sons Ltd., London, 2003, p. 13.

In order to analyze the bifurcation of policies within NATO and between the United States and the EU, the post-September 11 period and the Iraqi crisis should be evaluated.

1. Post-September 11: Nominal Unity of Allies around NATO

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, European support to the United States was in full acceptance of the word indeterminate. Depending on the nature of the attack and European awareness of their vulnerability to such a terrorist attack produced an environment of solidarity.

This solidarity was at first manifested in rhetoric. Two days after the attacks, French newspaper *Le Monde* declared that ‘We all are Americans’. Secondly, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair showed their willingness of participation to the war against terrorism in the following words: ‘We stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States’.²⁴⁵

NATO allies backed the United States to a great extent. The Allies declared that the armed attack from abroad to the United States was regarded as an action covered by the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that ‘an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe and North America shall be considered an attack against them all’. NATO, the first time in its mid-century history, invoked the Article 5, the basis of the collective-defense character of the Alliance.

The UNSC with the French initiative²⁴⁶ adopted several resolutions condemning the attacks. The day after the attacks the Security Council adopted the resolution of 1368 (2001) in which it expressed the determination of the UNSC ‘to

²⁴⁵ Jiri Sedivy and Marcin Zaborowski, “Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Relations”, *European Security*, Vol: 13, No: 3, 2004, pp: 187–213, p. 190.

²⁴⁶ David M. Malone, “Chapter II: A Decade of U.S. Unilateralism?”, David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong (Ed.s), *Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Colorado, 2003, pp. 19–37, p. 33.

combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts' and condemned 'the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001' as being like any act of international terrorism...a threat to international peace and security.'²⁴⁷

The EU leaders conveyed extraordinarily on 21 September, 2001 in order to discuss measures for a post-September 11 world under the European Council body. In addition to the recognition of the UNSC Resolution 1368, a relatively distinct political agenda has been formulated. In general, the action plan was a broader view to this global crisis.²⁴⁸ Firstly, the EU called for "*the broadest possible global coalition against terrorism, under the United Nations aegis*"²⁴⁹. Secondly, the necessity of reactivating peace process in the Middle East was emphasized. Thirdly, European leaders called for the quickest solution to the root reasons of global terrorism and they argue that it can only be achieved through "*the integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development*"²⁵⁰.

In the US discourse, it is of great importance to be supported by the public opinion and defining the borders of the US enemies. In the NSS, the United States the axis of evil from which the United States perceives direct threat. The division of the world according to US threat perceptions was manifest in the President Bush's famous speech after the September 11 attacks. The President Bush kept a very decisive approach in the way of war against terrorism by addressing to the world: "*Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.*"²⁵¹

²⁴⁷ Christopher Greenwood, "International Law and the 'War against Terrorism'", **International Affairs**, Vol: 78, No: 2, 2002, 301–317, p. 306.

²⁴⁸ Categorization of the important conclusions has been taken from: Howorth and Keeler, p. 15.

²⁴⁹ "Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting", 21 September 2001, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/terrorism/documents/concl_council_21sep_en.pdf (11.06.2007).

²⁵⁰ "Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting", 21 September 2001, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/terrorism/documents/concl_council_21sep_en.pdf (11.06.2007).

²⁵¹ "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People", 20 September 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> (02.06.2007).

As mentioned below, the United States preferred to intervene unilaterally in Afghanistan although it initially appealed to global support. Regarding the US unilateral Afghanistan intervention, there are many factors to explain this unilateral behavior. Firstly, it was discussed that the United States does not wish to be restrained with multilateral institutions and alliances while conducting the war on terrorism. In the case of Afghanistan, the Bush administration thought that the engagement of partners would limit its dominance in the conduct of operations. These partners involved NATO allies as well.²⁵² On the other hand, it should be denoted that the United States benefited from NATO assets and accepted to take logistics support from some NATO allies.²⁵³ Secondly, Washington favors the priority of its military objectives over everything else for the sake of protection of homeland and national interests.²⁵⁴ Thirdly, it is claimed that the United States acted unilaterally in order not to suffer from lost of control over the operation as in the military campaign of Kosovo.²⁵⁵ Finally, Kagan and followers of his argument tried to simply explain the US intervention in Afghanistan. Multilateralism is a policy for weak states. Since the United States is the most powerful state in the world, it does not need to pursue multilateral policies, rather can behave in a ‘go-it-alone’ approach.

2. Iraqi War: Growing Transatlantic Rift

The developments which centered on the Iraqi crisis between the EU members and the United States had weakening effect on transatlantic cooperation.

“There were other serious traumas – Suez, Vietnam and Bosnia, to name just three –

²⁵² Sophia Clément, “Chapter XVIII: The United States and NATO: A Selective Approach to Multilateralism”, David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong (Ed.s), **Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives**. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Colorado, 2003, pp. 339–417, p. 403.

²⁵³ Pls see for further information: “International Contributions to the War against Terrorism”, 22 May 2002, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/d20020523cu.pdf> (02.06.2007).

²⁵⁴ Malone, p. 33.

²⁵⁵ Malone, p. 33.

but in none of these earlier crises was there such a precipitous deterioration as in 2002-2004.”²⁵⁶

In 2002, the US commenced on calling for further inspections on Iraq which has been deemed to be responsible of proliferating chemical and biological weapons as well as nuclear ones. The UNSC endorsed these arguments and passed the Resolution 1441 unanimously on November 8, 2002. This Resolution gave a final chance to Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations and weapons inspections regimes. If not so, the result would be ‘serious consequences’ for Iraq. In 2002, the Iraqi government accepted to open its military arsenal to inspectors, again. Even though the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Chairman Hans Blix reported that he could not find the evidence marking the existence of WMD in Iraq, the Bush administration went on to argue that there have been strong evidences showing the existence of WMD.²⁵⁷ The negative side of this report was the statement of Blix that Iraq did not cooperate with inspectors. The United States and the United Kingdom failed to derive a second Resolution from the Security Council for the military intervention in Iraq. The call of President Bush for a war on Iraq was only approved by one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, Great Britain. *“France, Russia, and China argued for more time and greater reliance on UNMOVIC and its inspections.”*²⁵⁸

The inability of the United States in persuading the members of the Security Council to pass a resolution which would explicitly authorize the use of force against Iraq as in the case of the Gulf War did not matter so much in the sense that the United States and the United Kingdom found enough statements in Resolution 1441 for a possible war in Iraq. The United States generated a ‘coalition of the willing’

²⁵⁶ Dana H. Allin, “The Atlantic Crisis of Confidence”, **International Affairs**, Vol: 80, No: 4, 2004, pp: 649–663, p. 649.

²⁵⁷ Mark A. Drumbl, 2003, “Self-Defense and the Use of Force: Breaking the Rules, Making the Rules, or Both?”, **International Studies Perspectives**, Vol: 4, 2003, pp: 395-408, pp. 415-416.

²⁵⁸ James M. Wilkinson and Christopher D. O’Sullivan, “The UN Security Council and Iraq: Why It Succeeded In 1990, Why It Didn’t In 2003, and Why the United States Should Redeem It”, **American Diplomacy**, Vol: 9, No: 1, 2004, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2004_01-03/wilkinosull_unsec/wilkinosull_unsec.html (30.03.2007).

composed of 46 states out of which only Britain and Australia contributed to the intervention with substantial number of troops.²⁵⁹

Three important European nations had had different policy paths with respect to Iraq in January 2003. *“Britain was prepared to go to war. Germany had ruled out going to war. France was keeping open all options.”*²⁶⁰ In this context, the EU sought for a unique policy option over Iraq and existing international situation and convened. At the Extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels in January 2003, the EU leaders focused upon some principles that should have been emphasized in dealing with the problem of Iraq. Some of them were:

*“(1) commitment to the UN remaining at the centre of the international order, (2) commitment to full and effective disarmament of Iraq in accordance with Resolution 1441, and (3) force should be used as a last resort.”*²⁶¹

During this period which was going to the Iraqi war, the EU was polarized into two sections regarding the US policies toward Iraq: Old Europeans versus New Europeans. Old Europe is built around Franco-German relationship while New Europeans are composed of the former communist states in the Central and Eastern Europe and the U.K., Spain, and the other Washington supporters.²⁶²

Although the United States showed unilateral tendencies, it tried to popularize its policies through multilateral forums of cooperation, one of which is NATO. NATO allies are the paramount US partners possessing enough political will, shared values and military strength that the United States can cooperate. Thus Clément argues that NATO is a selective multilateralism approach of the United States because the Alliance presents a defense platform in which some sorts of cooperation and understanding such as the fight against terrorism can be functionalized with lots of countries in the Euro-Atlantic region.²⁶³

²⁵⁹ Peter Dombrowski and Rodger A. Payne, “Global Debate and the Limits of the Bush Doctrine”, **International Studies Perspectives** Vol: 4, 2003, pp: 395-408, p. 398.

²⁶⁰ Howorth, ESDP and NATO, p. 245.

²⁶¹ Howorth, ESDP and NATO, p. 248.

²⁶² Sedivy and Zaborowski, p. 188.

²⁶³ Clément. pp. 407-409.

In the Prague Summit, NATO member states pledged their full support to the UNSC Resolutions about Iraqi proliferation of WMD and the compliance with these resolutions. There were no discussions of a possible NATO involvement. In December 2002, the United States proposed NATO a list of six measures through which NATO could assist in the event of a possible military operation to Iraq. The content of these measures ranged from the protection of US military assets in Europe to defense of Turkey. But the North Atlantic Council could not reach any decision because the Allies were fractured over the Iraqi issue. Following these developments, the United States brought a new proposal to the NAC. This was a proposal toward starting to deploy deterrent and defensive military measures in relation to a possible attack to Turkey. There was no consensus again.²⁶⁴

At the same time of these discussions, the United States and Turkey were negotiating for the opening up Turkish bases to the United States in case of a war. But Turkey was frightened of a possible Iraqi retaliation that could occur after the United States uses Turkish bases for attacking Iraq. Due to this fear, Turkish government demanded from NATO allies to invoke Articles IV and V of the North Atlantic Treaty and defend Turkey if a possible Iraqi retaliation happens. France, Germany and Belgium blocked this request on the ground that *“any early moves by NATO to deploy defensive measures to Turkey could influence the ongoing debate at the United Nations Security Council in regard to Iraq and the effort to find a peaceful solution to the crisis”*²⁶⁵. This blockage has been criticized by the Bush administration. Finally, Turkish government had failed to pass the bill that would give permission the United States to open a northern front in Turkish soil. Upon this Turkish decision and NATO allies’ attitude, the Alliance anyway took some precautionary defense measures in order to ensure Turkey’s security in case of an attack from Iraq. The Operation Display Deterrence was deployed in Turkey from 20 February to 16 April 2003.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁴ “NATO and the 2003 Campaign against Iraq: How did this Policy Evolve?”, <http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq/evolution.html> (04.06.2007).

²⁶⁵ “NATO and the 2003 Campaign against Iraq: How did this Policy Evolve?”, <http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq/evolution.html> (04.06.2007).

²⁶⁶ “NATO and the 2003 Campaign against Iraq”, <http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq/index.html> (04.06.2007).

In respect to the US assertive and determined policies toward Iraq, the key EU member states, except the United Kingdom, put across some reservations about these policies. It is crucial to denote that not only the EU governments but also the European publics criticized the US Iraqi policy with a heavy hand.²⁶⁷ At the initial stage, “[b]y fighting as if [Iraq saga] were a unique American interest on which the opinion of other key states (except the UK) did not matter, the United States lost ground internationally”²⁶⁸.

Intra-NATO tensions grew when France and Germany generated a common front with Russia and advocated to give the UN inspections more time to reach some evidences that would be enough to resort to force. This Joint Declaration meant that France and Germany would not give permission to a military operation to Iraq through UNSC resolution.

*“...we will not let a proposed resolution pass that would authorize the use of force. Russia and France, as permanent members of the security council, will assume all their responsibilities on this point.”*²⁶⁹

At the same time of these discussions, the United States and Turkey were negotiating for the opening up Turkish bases to the United States in case of a war. But Turkey was frightened of a possible Iraqi retaliation that could occur after the United States uses Turkish bases for attacking Iraq. Due to this fear, Turkish government demanded from NATO allies to invoke Articles IV and V of the North Atlantic Treaty and defend Turkey if a possible Iraqi retaliation happens. France, Germany and Belgium blocked Turkey’s request. This blockage was criticized on the US side so much.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁷ Carpenter, Security Strategy, p. 518.

²⁶⁸ Lawrence Freedman, “The Transatlantic Agenda: Vision and Counter-Vision”, **Survival**, Vol: 47, No: 4, Winter 2005–06, pp: 19–38, p. 27.

²⁶⁹ “Joint Declaration of France, Russia and Germany”, 5 March 2003, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,908441,00.html> (03.06.2007).

²⁷⁰ Carpenter, Security Strategy, p. 518.

There were certain cleavages within NATO on one side and the EU on the other side. Notwithstanding the EU's supranational identity, CFSP pillar has not yet overcome the differences of national policies of 25 member states. As a result, *"it is rather pointless to speak about a single European strategic position. The result is an intra-European cleavage between Europeanists and Atlanticists, Old and New Europe."*²⁷¹

The current division within Europe about the possible American intervention against Iraq surfaced when eight European leaders publicized their support to US Iraqi policies by means of an open letter, the so-called 'the letter of the eight'²⁷². The letter of the eight was signed on 30 January, 2003 by five of then fifteen members of the Union and three Central European countries that would enter the Union in 2004. The letter signed by United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic was an accusation of Saddam Hussein and his regime and called for an end to the proliferation of WMD and compliance to the UN inspections. This letter's being a diverging attitude from the other ten members of the Union and especially that of France and Germany was a proof of deep division within the Union in comprising a common foreign and security policy toward the United States about Iraq.

The declaration from the Vilnius Group followed the letter of the eight on 6 February, 2003. Vilnius Group which is composed of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Republic of Macedonia, Romania, and Bulgaria announced their support to the United States.²⁷³ The Vilnius Group has added a new dimension to the difficulty and disunity the European states experiencing about the Iraqi war.²⁷⁴

In addition to these developments, the United States tried to push NATO leaders to take an active military role in Iraqi intervention. After no conclusion could

²⁷¹ Sedivy and Zaborowski, p. 203.

²⁷² "The Letter of the Eight", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_letter_of_the_eight (03.06.2007).

²⁷³ "The Letter of the Eight", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_letter_of_the_eight (03.06.2007).

²⁷⁴ Carpenter, Security Strategy, p. 521.

be reached, the Bush administration gave full support to the states that were prone to contribute to the military intervention. The most significant out of these states was Poland. After the Iraqi intervention, NATO accepted to support Poland in the context of its planned leadership of a sector in the multinational stabilization force.²⁷⁵

NATO's role in Iraq and the Greater Middle East was one of the hot topics of the Istanbul Summit. Contrary to the US big expectations of NATO's engagement in Iraq and the Middle East, a symbolic decision about Iraq was taken in the Summit. According to this decision, NATO would provide training upon the request of Iraqi interim government.²⁷⁶ Generally under this mission, 'NATO is involved in training, equipping, and technical assistance - not combat. The aim is to help Iraq build the capability of its government to address the security needs of the Iraqi people.'²⁷⁷

The European fracture between the Europeanists and Atlanticists produced the first security strategy paper of the EU, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'. The High Representative Javier Solana has prepared the document that would sustain the EU to have a 'word' in global issues. The ESS of 2003 was an indication of European global ambitions. Firstly, the ESS was a clue of a future assertive European foreign and security policy. Secondly, the Union members at the first time of the Union's history determined the framework and principles of European foreign policy.²⁷⁸

The NSS, especially the part including the strategy of pre-emption had been found very troubling for many Europeans. *"The European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council at Thessalonica in December 2003 constitutes an important first step, but much remains to be done on developing clear strategic concepts governing how, when, and where the EU will use force."*²⁷⁹

²⁷⁵ "NATO and the 2003 Campaign against Iraq: How did this Policy Evolve?", <http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq/evolution.html> (04.06.07).

²⁷⁶ Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney, **Batı'nın Yeni Güvenlik Stratejileri AB-NATO-ABD**, Bağlam Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2006, p. 56.

²⁷⁷ "NATO's Assistance to Iraq", <http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq-assistance/index.html> (04.06.2007).

²⁷⁸ Güney, pp. 14-15.

²⁷⁹ Adrian Hyde-Price, "European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force", **European Security**, Vol: 13, No: 4, 2004, pp: 323-343, p. 328.

The contentious Iraqi problem between old Europe and America can be well understood with an analysis of the ESS, or the so-called Solana Paper. Firstly, key threats have been defined not only within the European context but also with a global eye. Key threats are determined as (1) terrorism, (2) the proliferation of WMD, (3) regional conflicts, (4) state failure, and (5) organized crime.²⁸⁰ The ESS has been built on three pillars.²⁸¹ First of all, the document has so much emphasized the changing character of threats and increasing vulnerability of the EU to these threats. As a result of the ambiguousness of threats, the necessity of creating a peaceful environment (under the heading of 'Building Security in Our Neighborhood' in the document) both around the close abroad and distant abroad of the European continent was stressed. Secondly, the EU declared their desire of 'an international order based on effective multilateralism'.

*"We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority."*²⁸²

And thirdly, it was aimed to produce alternative policies and strategies in order to tackle 21st century threats such as terrorism, failed states and the proliferation of WMD.

Basically, two reasons lie behind the founding of the ESS document. At first, the EU could not pursue a unified and clear foreign policy toward the US military intervention in Iraq. Thus the EU created such a document in order to take measures for future events like Iraqi crisis. Secondly, the EU did not approve the US policies of the proliferation of WMD related with Iraqi case and terrorism of which was founded with the NSS. Against the realization of the Bush Doctrine in Iraq, the EU should have created its own alternative foreign policy line.²⁸³

²⁸⁰ "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy", December 2003, <http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf> (25.04.2007), pp. 3-4.

²⁸¹ Güney, p. 18.

²⁸² "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy", December 2003, <http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf> (25.04.07), p. 9.

²⁸³ Güney, pp. 13-14.

In close relationship with the birth reasons of the two security documents, there are basic differences between the NSS and the ESS due to the perception disparity between two sides of the Atlantic, that is acknowledged by Javier Solana as well;

*“The shock of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has shed light upon the developments in the relationship between Europe and the United States over the past decade. While Washington has been quick in reacting to new challenges, both in practice and in its definition of strategy of differences in perceptions and capabilities contain the seeds of a potential transatlantic rift. Nothing could be more dangerous for both sides. Europe and the United States have a common duty to nurture their relationship, which requires a serious debate about perceptions, values, methods, and capabilities.”*²⁸⁴

As a whole the NSS draws a world where the United States has the dominant superpower role and conditions of global world order where the US national interests, especially ‘homeland security’, prevail over everything. In light of this reality, Washington favors the use of force if necessary for its national interest. Moreover, the rule of law can be subordinated to the use of force if vital for ‘homeland security’.

On the contrary, the ESS points out the importance of European security and the indispensable elimination of global threats. In comparison to the NSS, the ESS foresees the build-up a secure global world order by means of full commitment to multilateralism as a basic principle. In other words, Europe is seeking to be a global player by means of multilateral institutions and the rule of law, not the use of force. At that point, Jones prescription should be mentioned. Depending on Kagan’s argument, Erik Jones argues that the United States act as a ‘cowboy’ while Europeans acting as ‘lawyers’.²⁸⁵

Even though the United States emphasize the importance of organizations and alliances, it gave the signals of unilateral use of force. This is defined as ‘*à la carte* multilateralism’. That is to say that Washington tends to adopt multilateralism only

²⁸⁴ Javier Solana, “The Transatlantic Rift: US Leadership after September 11”, Harvard **International Review**, Winter 2003, pp: 62–66, p. 62.

²⁸⁵ Sedivy and Zaborowski, p. 197.

when it is required or if unilateral action has a collision with certain constraints.²⁸⁶ “Where the USA applies multilateralism *à la carte*, the European document does not leave room for an alternative: ‘international cooperation is a necessity’.”²⁸⁷ Kagan explains this US preference as deriving from the fact that Washington has enough power to apply such a choice of ‘a la carte multilateralism’. The relative power imbalance between Europe and the United States also had an impact on preferences about the foreign policy instruments and perceptions. Firstly, Americans tend to classify threats like terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and ‘rogue states’ whereas Europeans describe challenges such as ethnic conflict, environmental degradation, organized crime and poverty.²⁸⁸ “The result is a paradoxical division of labor: whereas Americans are in the habit of worrying about Iraq, North Korean missiles, or a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Europeans are generally more worried about food safety and global warming.”²⁸⁹ Secondly, Europeans prioritize the rule of law so much then the United States does. Thirdly, the NSS declares the precedence of the use of force in order to respond to new threats. Counter to the US pre-emption policy in tackling threats, the EU believes that the use of force is not enough alone to deal with threats but should be combined with negotiation, cooperation, comprise and reward. Solana criticizes the US pre-emption policy as follows;

“As a European, I wonder whether it is in the common interest of the international community to develop principles that grant a single country such an unfettered right. The threat of terrorism linked to weapons of mass destruction may very well justify a revision of the traditional categories of containment and deterrence that have guaranteed peace in Europe since World War II. But the preventive use of force needs a wider legitimation, either throughout the UN Security Council or at least through some form of multilateral backing. If the United States claims that power for itself, it will only foster resentment and hostility abroad and ultimately undermine its own national interests.”²⁹⁰

In regards to these more diverging and less converging points of the NSS and ESS, the transatlantic relations have come under serious tension during the Iraqi crisis.

²⁸⁶ Clément, p. 413.

²⁸⁷ Felix Sebastian Berenskoetter, “Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies”, **Security Dialogue**, Vol: 36, No: 1, 2005, pp: 71–92, p. 86.

²⁸⁸ Kagan.

²⁸⁹ Philip H. Gordon, “Bridging the Atlantic Divide”, **Foreign Affairs**, Vol: 82, No: 1, January/February 2003 (Atlantic Divide).

²⁹⁰ Solana, p. 64.

Table 3. *Comparison of US and EU Security Strategies*

	National Security Strategy	European Security Strategy
<i>Responsibility</i>	Global/universal <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberal order • ‘Human dignity’ Maintaining US hegemony	Mainly regional <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multilateral order • Stability in Europe Maintaining EU credibility
<i>Threats</i>	Deviant beliefs/behavior <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Terrorism (WMDs) • Rogue states (WMDs) • Tension in ‘Muslim world’ 	Conflict <i>as such</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WMD proliferation <i>as such</i> • Failed states • Terrorism, organized crime
<i>Means</i>	Military, liberal ideas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preventive ‘war’ • Coalition of the free/willing • US mandate 	Mainly civilian <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict prevention • International regimes • UN mandate

Source: Felix Sebastian Berenskoetter, “Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies”, **Security Dialogue**, Vol: 36, No: 1, 2005, pp: 71–92, p. 88.

CONCLUSION

The end of the Cold War was forerunner of the beginning of a new era both for the global order and the European security order. The end of the capitalist/communist rivalry on the ground of competition between the Warsaw Pact and NATO created compelling factors for the European security architecture towards transformation. NATO that had been established against a common enemy, the Soviet Union, was the first organization pushed to change itself on behalf of transformation. The shift of threat perception from state-centric view to comprehensive view generated the basic stimuli of NATO transformation in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The disappearance of the original threat was not the end of the challenges NATO had been facing during the Cold War, but rather was the starting point for the emergence of new challenges that would arise from the power vacuum in the Eastern and Central Europe and the Balkans. Since threats were not emanating only from states but also from non-state actors and transnational actors, NATO's activities were shaped more of a combination of collective defense and collective security rather than only the collective defense as of 1991. NATO started to operate out of its legal territorial reach in order to meet the post-Cold War security challenges such as ethnic conflict and terrorism. 'Out-of-area' operations of NATO and increasing number of member countries raised the weight of collective security policies in the evolution of NATO. Yet, NATO is prescribed as a 'hybrid' organization which combines tasks of collective defense and collective security. However, it should be mentioned that NATO's sole role is still collective defense that depends on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Much more than the impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO has been affected from the September 11 terrorist attacks to the World Trade Organization and the Pentagon. The Allies invoked the Article 5 and declared their full support to the United States in the fight against terrorism. It was dramatic, at first that the invocation of the Article 5 occurred in 2001 about a decade after the end of the Cold

War, not during the Cold War, the beginning of which had been the basic reason of the establishment of NATO. NATO Allies united against terrorism threat and they, all, have showed their willingness for endeavoring for the sake of the eradication of terrorism. The Prague Summit and all the rhetoric were of full support to the United States. However, even though the Article V was revoked and Washington sought full support from its NATO partners, the United States did not appeal to NATO for the intervention in Afghanistan. Only the United Kingdom participated in the Afghanistan intervention tangibly. The Afghanistan intervention was not an operation tackled under the command of the North Atlantic Council. Rather it was a military operation in which the Washington used NATO assets and allies' support for becoming successful. During the Afghanistan intervention, some facts about the NATO's new political role in the 21st were laid down. The Allies have not physically participated in the intervention, but politically supported the United States. This was the proof of NATO's increasing political role as an alliance. Secondly, the invasion of issues of global concern in NATO's agenda and its reluctant policies for involving in 'out-of-area' proved that NATO has already been transformed to overcome the 21st century non-traditional security threats.

Since the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO has always pursued an open door policy. When the Alliance was established, NATO had 12 members. And now, NATO has 26 members. Essentially, NATO enlargement not only enlarged the NATO's sphere of influence but also contributed significantly to the stabilization of Europe by including former communist states into the European security architecture. NATO and the EU tried to illuminate the way Eastern and Central European states would watch after the Cold War by defining criteria for membership. And by integration (the EU) and enlargement (NATO), the post-Cold War ambiguity in the European area has been eradicated to a great extent. By analyzing this era, we should not ignore the fact that NATO's military strength backed by the US leadership was the paramount stabilizing factor. This fact was evident in the Bosnian crisis and Kosovo war. The stabilizing role of NATO in the Balkans also proved the Alliance's success of becoming a crisis-management organization.

Enlarging the security circle around the Euro-Atlantic region became another policy target for the Allies. In addition to enlargement, NATO established various forums for cooperation like the PfP, the NACC, the EAPC, and the PJC. The PfP Invitation was a focus on defense-related cooperation. The primary aim of the initiative was to provide the military dialogue among the participant states. The NACC was a forum for consultation between NATO and 22 former Eastern Bloc countries. The NACC was replaced with the EAPC to consolidate a new stage of cooperation among 44 countries. Lastly, as the old foe, the Russian Federation became one of the most important partners of NATO. The underlying motive behind the foundation of the PJC was to create a venue for consultation, further cooperation and transparency. As a conclusion, we can argue that NATO attempted to generate a peaceful environment around the Euro-Atlantic region by means of cooperation and consultation.

The response of NATO to the September 11 attacks assisted to decrease the ambiguity about NATO's role and mission in the 21st century. By deciding to establish the NRF, NATO leaders went on supporting NATO's important role in crisis management. This political will is always expressed in the later summits of NATO.

Even though the European security and defense identity has not a long history, its very existence caused the emergence of question marks in the world. The devastating outcomes of the Second World War over Europe had pushed Europe for recovery of the economy and social life. The necessity for the revitalization of their nations and the US superpower role had left behind the defense area in the secondary place. NATO emerged as the provider of defense guarantee. Even the fact that there was the WEU, it could not be effective as much as Europe because of its limited number of members and limited budget. Nevertheless, the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 under the leadership of the United States, one of the super powers, had made the WEU dysfunctional. NATO superseded the Western European Defense Community.

In 1970s, the same pattern of European attention toward development continued. The Europeans put more emphasis on economic matters and worked on coordinating their economic, trade relations and justice and internal affairs more than defense issues. Strengthened economy accelerated the progress in European economic union around the EEC. This trend changed with the conversion of the ECC to the EU. In 1992, by the sign of Maastricht Treaty, Europeans showed their willingness of creating common security and defense policy. The incorporation of the WEU into the EU overcame the bifurcation of security mechanisms in European originated organizations. In 1997, the Common Foreign and Security Policy was established. Europeans were aware of the fact that the economic union should be backed by the political union at both internal and external level. Generally, it was of vital importance to create the general determination to unite more at the political level. The motivating and accelerating factor was the consensus of big states of Europe. Thus, the St. Malo declaration of the United Kingdom and France became the milestone of autonomous European defense capacity. The Europeanist France and the Atlanticist United Kingdom called for the establishment of an 'autonomous' capacity which would be backed by military force. This compromise lifted one of the biggest halts for an integrated European defense capability. The paralysis of Europe during the Balkan crises almost made a dreadful effect so that the dependence to NATO should have been decreased by the formation of a distinct European military existence. The first step through this goal was taken in 1999 by the foundation of Security and Defense Policy.

It was imperative initially to dream further than the one that can be actualized in the short-term. Laying the foundation of the ERRF and crisis-management forces was such an example at the beginning of 1999. The member states decided to transfer the WEU assets to the EU. By this transfer, the WEU was considered to finish its mission as an organization. The institutionalization process for a healthy security and defense policy was initiated as well. The HG declared the launch of forces called as the ERRF that can be deployable within 60 days for the Petersberg missions. The ERRF carried importance in terms of the formation of an operational ESDP.

After September 11, the progress in the improvement of European military capabilities got faster. Europeans were aware of their vulnerability to terrorism. The ERRF was declared operational and later on the EU could conduct crisis management operations. Besides these European efforts as a whole, national contributions and commitments to this process differed so much to take preventive actions. The ECAP was launched in order to eradicate these deficits among the member states. In 2002, the European Council decided to take command of the International Police Task Force's mission in Bosnia from the UN and later declared its willingness to take over the NATO Operation in the Republic of Macedonia when the mandate of NATO ended. The EU conducted and completed eight operations in the areas of Balkans, South Caucasus, South East Asia, and Africa. And there are ongoing operations in the Western Balkans (EUFOR-Althea, EUPM and EU Planning Team in Kosovo), Middle East (EUPOL COPPS, EU BAM Rafah and EUJUST LEX), Asia (EUPOL Afghanistan), and Africa (EUPOL RD Congo, EUSEC DR Congo and EU Support to AMIS II – Darfur).

The international environment affected from the September 11 attacks intensified the European efforts in the field of ESDP. Javier Solana wrote the European Security Strategy in 2003, reflecting the European ambitions of becoming a global player which needs adapting a genuine strategic thinking about international security issues.

Even though there were parallel developments in NATO and the EU in the field of security and defense, problematic positions emerged out of their relationship. The first development of an autonomous European military capability was the launch of ESDI which was a totally NATO product. The ESDI was formed to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and prevent the emergence of larger growing military capabilities gap between the United States and the EU members. The security burden of European continent had been on the shoulders of the United States during the Cold War. By the creation of ESDI, and lastly ESDP, NATO and the EU stepped toward the embryonic division of labor between the EU and NATO. In 1999, NATO decided

to give permission to the EU for using NATO assets and capabilities where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. By this condition, the United States pursued its policy of keeping NATO as the paramount security actor in the Euro-Atlantic region. The United States was not the only Member state claiming the priority of NATO over the EU defense initiatives. The United Kingdom was the pioneer of the Atlanticist camp within the EU and France was at the opposite side which demands the vital necessity of an autonomous EU military capability. The Atlanticist and the Europeanist divide within the Union blurred in St. Malo with the meeting of France and the UK for calling a bigger role for the EU in international stage and autonomous action capacity. This meeting could commonly be perceived as the result of the European military paralysis without NATO during the 1998-9 Kosovo crisis. The quest for an 'autonomous action' by the militarily strong EU was mirroring the European global ambitions.

It is mostly accepted that the ESDP is a European project, but mostly is the production of the trilateral relationship between France, Britain and Germany. Albeit the consensus among France, Britain, and Germany are of great importance for the development of an efficient ESDP, their diverging interests to European security can have an awkward impact on the ESDP as well. The UK strict Atlanticism, Germany's deep commitment to US partnership under NATO and the French deep-rooted Europeanism began to shift from their original strict stands in the 1990s. France finally turned to the military front of NATO after 30 years, somewhat a sign of recognizing the necessity of NATO in the post-Cold War period of turmoil. Britain moved closer to her European partners. Germany pursued policies accepting the vitality of an independent European defense capability. The harmonization of policies of the troika about ESDP generated a robust basis for a global EU security and defense policy.

Initially the Bosnian crises and later the Kosovo crisis channeled Europeans to re-consider their military presence in case of a security threat. And from 1990s, it was undeniably understood that no single European Union member state has the enough military power though which unilaterally can be effective at the

global level. This fact inclined the Union to establish the ERRF for military action. The ERRF is not a single standing army, but is based on the concept that national forces will be brought together in cases of necessity and military crises. Thus, we can say that the existence of it is bound to the national wills of the member states. Rendering the ERRF operational is the first real sign for Europe which, for the first time, showed its willingness for being a global military actor, besides being an economic giant.

The EU's reluctant efforts of being a military actor inclined the United States to think that the EU can become a military rival. In regards to this impression, the Clinton Administration argued that the ESDP should not decouple European security from that of the United States; duplicate NATO activities; and discriminate non-EU European NATO members. This US attitude called as 'Three Ds' in the direction of the security developments within the EU reflected the US doubts about the EU's probable challenging position in NATO. The issue of discrimination was finalized with the sign of the Berlin Plus agreements in 2003.

The ESS is the most determinant document of the ESDP development process. The paper not only proved European willingness of becoming a global actor in European world politics but also was a call to European states to take the shared responsibility for tackling the 9/11 international threats. The focus on global challenges in the document was an indication of Europe's problem-solving approach transcending traditional geographical and conceptual limitations of its strategic original thinking. Among the security threats challenging European nations were ranked as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.

Since 2003, the EU has conducted several military operations. If estimated in scope and nature individually, the EU military missions do not count big military deployments. As a delayed military power compared to NATO, the EU inevitably suffered and is suffering some 'crosscutting challenges' that can be categorized as operational, financial and planning challenge while conducting military operations.

But, we can say that, there is a division of labor between the roles of the forces. ERRF is, for now, capable of conducting Petersberg Tasks – soft security, while NRF is able to conduct hard security operations.

The emergence of a European-based military and defense capability in the 1990s in parallel with NATO enlargement has been one of the most significant developments of European and Atlantic security affair. The existence of multiple forums for cooperation and enlargement of NATO and the EU had some blurring effect on decision-making process. NATO and the EU dual enlargement after the Cold War and states that are not member to the two organizations have challenging impacts on the transatlantic partnership.

At present, the EU does not have a permanent and integrated military command structure which member states devote a number of forces to and is destitute to the existence of NATO assets. The EU uses NATO assets and capabilities since it does not have enough. Yet, there is a certain capabilities gap between the United States and the EU members. Actually, the military capabilities gap had always been existent in the Atlantic partnership. But, since the end of the Cold War, the so-called capabilities gap between the United States and its European allies have been clear and is widening especially after the September 11 attacks. The United States spends much more than of its European allies, more than all the other states in the world. Increasing trend in the US military expenditures vis-à-vis decreasing share of defense expenditures in the EU total budget widens the rift between the United States and Europe year-by-year.

In addition to the capabilities gap, we should not ignore the fact that the EU is not a single state but a supranational organization and is bound to the national wills of its member states. The difficulty in harmonizing national foreign policies halts the process for the EU to take immediate and preventive actions in case of emergency and crisis situations.

The United States is defined as a 'hard power' due to its unchallengeable military capacity and economic power while the EU is expressed as 'soft power' with its civil police capabilities and economic power. The EC/EU was a civilian power until the 1990s. Since after the 1990s, the dominant discourse of the EU political agenda gave signs of shifting policies toward the military area. We can say that the EU is still a civilian power which struggles to combine their civilian components with military ones.

The September 11 attacks had shifting effects over the US foreign and security policy. The Bush administration started to pursue unilateralist policies. The United States intervened Afghanistan unilaterally. The following policy decisions of the Bush administration such as opting out of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, rejection of the Germ Weapons Convention and the Programme of Action on Illicit Trade in Small and Light Arms, not supporting the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and rejection of the ratification of statutes of the International Criminal Court of Justice was unilateral as well. And finally, the Bush administration intervened in Iraq without the authorization of the UNSC.

The US unilateralist policy stand was manifested in the NSS in 2002. By this document, the United States declared that they would apply to pre-emptive use of force against threats of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. In general, this view of the use of force deepened the diverging interests and perspectives that exist since the end of the Cold War between the EU and the United States.

Contrary to the US NSS document, the EU repeated their deep commitment to effective multilateralism in the ESS document. The basic difference between these documents manifested the fact that Europe and the United States have no longer a common strategic culture. Kagan argued that while Americans tend to use coercion and the use of force in the Hobbesian world, Europeans pursue policies which prioritize the rule of law by means of negotiation and cooperation for a world of Kant's Perpetual Peace.

In fact, the European reaction to the September 11 was a full support to the United States. But the United States preferred to intervene in Afghanistan without appeal to the EU consent and the assistance. NATO assets and capabilities were used in the operation. However, the United States was in full control of the operation. Rather than seeking full support of NATO as a whole, the United States favored the establishment of 'coalition of the willing' with minor states. As a result of this period, we can say that there was a nominal unity between the United States and the EU.

In 2002, the Bush administration started its campaign against Iraq. Initially, the campaign was tried to be continued on the UN ground. Nevertheless the United States and the United Kingdom failed to derive a Resolution from the Security Council for the military intervention in Iraq. The call of President Bush for a war on Iraq was only approved by one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the UK. During this period which was going to the Iraqi war, the EU was polarized into two sections regarding the US policies toward Iraq: Old Europeans versus New Europeans. Old Europe is built around Franco-German relationship while New Europeans are composed of the former communist states in the Central and Eastern Europe and the U.K., Spain, and the other Washington supporters.

The United States attempted to popularize NATO support for an Iraqi intervention as well. Since the Allies were fractured about the Iraqi issue, the United States could not take what it wanted from NATO. NATO even blocked Turkish demand of defense in case of an attack from Iraq. Intra- NATO tension rose after Germany and France took a common position with Russia against an Iraqi intervention. As much as an intra-NATO fracture, the EU was divided when 'the letter of the eight' was publicized to declare their support to the United States.

The divisions within the EU that surfaced during the Iraqi crisis produced the ESS. Against the realization of the Bush Doctrine in Iraq, the EU should have created its own alternative foreign policy line. The ESS was a challenge to the NSS in terms of confronting the US hegemonic power and the US unilateral policies,

especially the pre-emption policy. As Jones' differentiation, we can argue that the EU tends to become the 'lawyer' of the international order against the US efforts of being 'cowboy' of it.

The deep-rooted partnership between the United States and the EU members based on NATO is indispensable for the both sides. The United States needs European cooperation although it is the most powerful state of the world. Similarly, the EU needs the US support and partnership notwithstanding the fact that it is the biggest trading bloc and the most powerful civilian power of the world. For the Transatlantic security in particular and the global security in general, the United States and Europe are still partners and will go on being. But in the conduct of their security policies for promoting international security, they differ so much recently. The divergence of policies renders the both sides of the Atlantic as competitors.

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