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MASTER'S THESIS

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

AND LEADERSHIP STYLE:

AN ANALYSIS OF PRIME MINISTER ERDOĞAN'S

FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST

(2010-2013)

Brittany WOOD

Supervisor

Assist. Prof. Dr. Müge AKNUR

İZMİR-2014

University : Dokuz Eylül University

Graduate School : Graduate School of Social Sciences

Name and Surname : BRİTTANY WOOD

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
Defence Date : 20.06.2014

Supervisor : Assist Prof.Dr.Müge AKNUR

EXAMINING COMMITTE MEMBERS

Title, Name and Surname	University	Signature
Assist Prof.Dr.Müge AKNUR	DOKUZ EYLUL UNIVERSITY	
Assoc Prof.Dr.Gül Mehpare KURTOĞLU ESKİŞAR	DOKUZ EYLUL UNIVERSITY	
Prof.Dr.Nazif MANDACI	YASAR UNIVERSITY	

Unanimity (✓)

Majority of votes ( )

The thesis titled as "**Foreign Policy Analysis and Leadership Style: An Analysis of Prime Minister Erdoğan's Foreign Policy towards the Middle East (2010 - 2013)**" prepared and presented by BRİTTANY WOODis accepted and approved.

Prof.Dr. Utku UTKULU
Director

DECLARATION

   I hereby declare that this master's thesis / project titled as "Foreign Policy Analysis and Leadership Style: An Analysis of Prime Minister Erdoğan's Foreign Policy towards the Middle East, 2010-2013" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honor.

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Date

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Brittany L. WOOD

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ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

Foreign Policy Analysis and Leadership Style:

An Analysis of Prime Minister Erdoğan's Foreign Policy towards

the Middle East (2010-2013)

Brittany WOOD

Dokuz Eylül University

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

International Relations Program

Since his election in 2002, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* –AK Party) have transformed Turkish foreign policy particularly towards the Middle East. Upon consolidating his power as Prime Minister through three consecutive elections, Erdoğan has started to wield considerable political strength in both domestic and international politics. In this context, this thesis aims to complete an in-depth examination of the role of Prime Minister Erdoğan as the leading decision-maker in Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, it plans to quantitatively investigate the personality traits and leadership style of Erdoğan using Leadership Trait Analysis in order to determine how these factors influence his behavior in foreign policy decision-making. Three case studies are then presented to qualitatively assess how Erdoğan's personality traits and leadership style impact the Turkish government's policies regarding relations with Syria, Iran, and Israel. The temporal focus of this study is during the period of 2010-2013; a period in which the Middle East and Turkey experienced a sequence of events which have significantly altered the foreign relations of the region. By using both quantitative and qualitative approaches, the study aims to provide an in-depth analysis of how Erdoğan influences Turkish foreign policy, specifically towards Syria, Iran, and Israel.

ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

Dış Politika Analizi ve Liderlik Stili:

Başbakan Erdoğan'in Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya Yönelik Dış Politikasının

İncelenmesi (2010-2013)

Brittany WOOD

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı

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Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin (AK Parti) 2002 yılında iktidara gelmesi ile birlikte Orta Doğu'ya yönelik Türk dış politikası ciddi bir değişime uğramıştır. Birbirini izleyen üç genel seçimden Erdoğan'ın güçlenerek çıkması ve başbakanlığını sağlamlaştırması iç ve dış siyasetteki etkisinin artmasına yol açmıştır. Bu bağlamda, çalışma önemli bir karar verici olarak Başbakan Erdoğan'ın Türk dış politikası üzerindeki etkisini incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Ayrıca tez Başbakan Erdoğan'ın kişilik özelliklerini ve liderlik tarzını Liderlik Özellikleri Analizi (Leadership Trait Analysis) yöntemini kullanarak sayısal (nicel) olarak incelemeyi ve bu özelliklerin Erdoğan'ın Türkiye'nin Suriye, İran ve İsrail ile ilişkilerini içeren dış politika kararlarını nasıl etkilediğini belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma özellikle Türk Orta Doğu ilişkilerinin en yoğun etkileşim içinde olduğu 2010-2013 dönem üzerine odaklanacaktır. Sonuç olarak çalışma hem nicel hem de nitel yöntemler kullanarak Erdoğan'ın Türkiye'nin Suriye, İran ve İsrail'e yönelik dış politikası üzerindeki etkisini derinlemesine inceleyecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk dış politikası, dış politika analizi, Liderlik Özellikleri Analizi, liderlik tarzı, kişilik özelliği, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND LEADERSHIP STYLE:
AN ANALYSIS OF PRIME MINISTER ERDOĞAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS
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ABBREVIATIONS

LTA	Leadership Trait Analysis
CC	Conceptual Complexity
DIS	Distrust
BACE	Belief in Ability to Control Events
PWR	Power
TASK	Task Focus
SC	Self-Confidence
IGB	In-group Bias
DP	Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
CHP	Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
AK Party	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi)
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty)
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council (Millî Güvenlik Kurulu)

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INTRODUCTION

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* – AK Party) have transformed Turkey and Turkish politics since they came to power in the 2002 general elections.[1] Under AK Party, Turkey has adopted a new and proactive foreign policy that has caught global attention. Furthermore, the Turkish economy has improved for a moment as the unemployment rate has fallen, interest rates have decreased, and the overall economy has grown.[2] Turkey has instituted a couple of democratization packages and made constitutional amendments that have bestowed new rights for ethnic and religious minorities. In addition, Prime Minister Erdoğan and his government have significantly altered the Turkish civil-military relationship by reducing the power of the Turkish military to intervene in political affairs.[3] Domestically, in spite of the implemented democratization packages, Erdoğan has created a considerable backlash among some parts of the Turkish population due to what many consider direct and authoritarian tendencies.[4]

Scholars analyze foreign policies of countries through various conceptual tools. They utilize numerous theories and approaches to analyze an array of internal and external factors that influence state behavior and foreign policy decision-making. Realists concentrate on survival and power politics, while liberalists focus on the interdependence that exists in the 21st century society. Constructivists, on the other hand, look at socially constructed issues at play in the global arena. Among other issues, researchers can analyze foreign policies of countries by looking at their governmental system or societal groups. Moreover, researchers can analyze foreign policy through the examination of leaders, their leadership style, and their personality.

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[1] For a fuller discussion, see: Menderes Çınar, "Turkey's Transformation under the AKP Rule", **The Muslim World,** Vol: 96, No: 3, 2006, pp. 469-486; M. Hakan Yavuz, ed., **The emergence of a new Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti**, University of Utah Press, Utah, 2006.
[2] Daniel Dombey, "Six Markets to Watch: Turkey, How Erdoğan Did It -- and Could Blow It", **Foreign Affairs**, 06.12.2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140338/daniel-dombey/six-markets-to-watch-turkey, (06.03.2014).
[3] Ersel, Aydınlı, Nihat Ali Özcan, Doğan Akyaz, "The Turkish Military's March toward Europe", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol: 85, No: 1, 2006, pp. 77-90.
[4] "Turkey police clash with Istanbul Gezi Park protesters", **BBC News,** 31.05.2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22732139, (01.06.2014).

Although many modern Realist theorists discredit much of individual-level analyses by focusing on the systemic factors that shape international relations, it is nonetheless difficult to denounce the influence of powerful individuals. In foreign policy, analyzing leadership really matters. For example, Jonathan W. Keller found that a country responds differently to foreign policy crises depending on the leadership style of its leader.[5] Similarly, through the assessment of several US presidents and their advisory teams, Thomas Preston has concluded that to understand foreign policy making fully, researchers cannot ignore the role played by leaders.[6]

Along the same line, scholars cannot denounce the impact of Prime Minister Erdoğan on Turkish foreign policy. Both scholars and journalists from around the world have publicized similar views regarding the political might of Erdoğan.[7] As one journalist from the Financial Times put it, "Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is – and behaves as – lord of all he surveys."[8] As "lord," Erdoğan has gained significant control over both domestic and foreign policy-making. Slowly he and his government have weeded out many adversaries within the Turkish establishment and have reduced the power of the once-omnipotent Turkish military.[9]

There are existing studies that examine Prime Minister Erdoğan's influence on Turkish foreign policy.[10] Among these, Aylin Görener and Meltem Ucal have regarded Erdoğan as an authoritative individual with substantial influence on Turkish politics and have conducted a personality analysis to determine how his personality traits may affect his leadership style.[11] Barış Kesgin, as well, has used similar techniques to examine the personality traits of Erdoğan and his role as a leader of the Turkish Republic.[12] In addition, numerous biographies and literary accounts have attempted to decipher and

[5] Jonathan W. Keller, "Leadership Style, Regime Type, and Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior: A Contingent Monadic Peace", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol: 49, No: 2, 2005, pp. 205-231.

[6] Thomas Preston, **The president and his inner circle: Leadership style and the advisory process in foreign affairs**, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, p. 267.

[7] Jurgen Gottscschlich, "The New Sultan of Turkey", **The German Times**, 08.04.2010, http://www.german-times.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=29434&Itemid=162, (05.07.2014); Aylin Ş. Görener and Meltem Ş. Ucal, "The Personality and Leadership Style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy", **Turkish Studies**, Vol: 12, No: 3, 2011, pp. 357-381.

[8] David Gardner, "Global Insight: Hubris threatens to humble all-powerful Erdoğan", **Financial Times**, 02.06.2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/91caeca4-cb99-11e2-b1c8-00144feab7de.html, (03.06.2014).

[9] Aydınlı, Özcan, and Akyaz, pp. 77-90.

[10] Rana Foroohar, "Turkey's Man of the People," **Time**, Vol: 177, No: 26, June 27, 2011, pp. 36-40.

[11] Görener and Ucal, pp. 357-381.

[12] Barış Kesgin, "Leadership Traits of Turkey's Islamist and Secular Prime Ministers", **Turkish Studies**, Vol: 14: No: 1, 2013, (Leadership Traits), pp. 136-157.

explain Erdoğan's political life.[13] Despite numerous works that concentrate on Erdoğan, his political life, and his personality characteristics, there is currently no study with a temporal analysis of Erdoğan's leadership style in foreign policy particularly concerning Turkey's relations with Syria, Israel, and Iran.

Leading up to the present point in time, the AK Party government has made significant efforts to create a new and dynamic foreign policy in order to make Turkey a regional powerhouse.[14] The goal of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu's "Zero problems with the neighbors" policy plan is to utilize Turkey's strategic depth in order to maintain cooperative relations with its neighbors and increase Turkish influence on a regional and global scale.[15] Although the initiative has helped list Erdoğan and Davutoğlu on Foreign Policy Magazine's "Top 100 Global Thinkers" for "imagining a new role for Turkey in the world, and making it happen."[16] It has also placed Turkey in a precarious position at the turning point of the twenty-first century's second decade.

Through discerning the prevailing personality traits of political figures, researchers can gain a multidimensional understanding into the decision-making of the powerful individuals and ultimately greater understanding of the foreign policy-making of states.[17] "Thus, when foreign policy scholars study personality traits, they attempt to discern which foreign policy behaviors are associated with which traits."[18] By analyzing foreign policy behaviors with their corresponding personality traits, political researchers can create leadership profiles and could potentially foresee how certain leaders would react under a given situation.[19] Furthermore, it has been suggested by researchers that foreign policy behavior is significantly affected by decision-makers' personalities,

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[13] See, Ruşen Çakır and Fehmi Çalmuk, **Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Bir Dönüşüm Öyküsü,** Metis Yayınları, Istanbul, 2001; Sefa Kaplan, **Recep Tayyip Erdoğan**, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2007;

[14] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Zero Problems Foreign Policy", **Foreign Policy,** 20.05.2010, (Zero Problems), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy, (03.06.2014).

[15] For more information, see Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", **Insight Turkey**, Vol: 10, No:1, 2008, (Assessment of 2007).

[16] Kedar Pavgi, "The FP Top 100 Global Thinkers", **Foreign Policy**, 28.11.2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/28/the_fp_top_100_global_thinkers, (03.06.2014).

[17] Margaret G. Hermann, "Explaining foreign policy behavior using the personal characteristics of political leaders", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol: 24, No:1, 1980, (Explaining Foreign Policy), pp. 7-46.

[18] Laura Neack, **The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century**, Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland and Oxford, 2003, p. 62.

[19] Margaret G. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis", **The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: with profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton**, ed. Jerrold M. Post, University of Michigan Press, 2003, (Leadership Style), pp. 178-212; Hermann, Explaining Foreign Policy.

particularly when in a state of war or policy-making crisis (i.e. in the case of Erdoğan, during the Arab Spring).[20]

Thus, this study poses two research queries:

1.   Does the assessment of personality using Leadership Trait Analysis explain the relationship between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Turkish Foreign Policy during 2010-2013?

2.   How does Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership style and personality traits shape Turkey's relations with Syria, Iran, and Israel during 2010-2013 period?

This thesis will analyze Prime Minister Erdoğan's impact on foreign policy particularly towards Israel, Iran, and Syria during the 2010-2013 period using Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA). LTA is a quantitative method developed by Margaret Hermann to assess leadership style. LTA is designed to utilize the spoken material of a leader to ascertain his or her given personality traits. The personality traits that are detected using LTA have been determined to be specifically important to political behavior.[21] The traits are as follows: (1) the belief that one can influence or control what happens (BACE), (2) the need for power and influence (PWR), (3) the ability to differentiate things and people in one's environment, also known as conceptual complexity (CC), (4) self-confidence (SC), (5) the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others' ideas and sensitivities (TASK), (6) general distrust or suspiciousness of others (DIS), and (7) the intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias (IGB).[22]

In order to analyze a leader's traits, the analyst must collect spontaneous spoken material from the leader. Researchers can find spontaneous material in the form of speeches, interviews, etc., and mostly through online sources such as journals, newspapers, etc.[23] This thesis will examine the spontaneous spoken material of Prime

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[20] Fred I. Greenstein, "The impact of personality on politics: An attempt to clear away underbrush", **The American Political Science Review,** 1967, pp. 629-641; Margaret G. Hermann, "On 'Foreign policymakers, personality attributes, and interviews: A note on reliability problems'", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol: 24, No: 1, 1980, (Reliability Problems), p. 71.

[21] See, Hermann, Explaining Foreign Policy; Hermann, Reliability Problems; Hermann, Leadership Style.

[22] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 178-212.

[23] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 178-212.

Minister Erdoğan. An analyst can interpret the discourse by assessing the frequency of certain words articulated by the leader; the rate of occurrence of specific words exhibits the meaning of the content spoken and thus displays information about the speaker's personality. Following a quantitative examination of the spontaneous spoken material of Erdoğan, the thesis will qualitatively analyze Turkey's relationship with Syria, Iran, and Israel.

Hans Morgenthau, despite being at the forefront of realist thought in the 20th century, outlines an important point in **Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace** regarding the ability of a researcher to potentially gain great understanding of a politician's thoughts and actions through the study of his/her words:

> *We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman-past, present, or future-has taken or will take on the political scene. We look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his conversations with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts. Thinking in terms of interest defined as power, we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself.[24]*

As Morgenthau notes, through the study and analysis of a political figure's writings and speeches, it is possible to cognize the politician's beliefs and views, as well as his/her conduct and behaviors. Morgenthau even goes so far as to assume that it is possible to know political figures' thoughts and actions even better than he, himself. Both of these assumptions underline leadership studies and are ultimately the goal of leadership analysis.[25]

This study aims to analyze Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's personality using LTA for two reasons. Firstly, Erdoğan as Prime Minister of Turkey has significant impact on foreign policy, which has increased in the last twelve years due to winning three consecutive elections. Political leaders of Turkey wield considerable

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[24] Hans Morgenthau, **Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace**, Alfred Kopf, New York, 1948, p. 5.
[25] Morgenthau, p. 5.

amount of power[26] and prime ministers in particular exercise a substantial amount of control in the realm of foreign policy.[27] As Prime Minister, Erdoğan has a great deal of un-infringed executive power and executive decision-making. He is the most powerful political figure in Turkey at present.

Secondly, Turkey as a country and Turkish foreign policy deserve attention. Politically speaking, Turkey is important, as it is a member of the Council of Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Group of Twenty (G20). Since 1963, Turkey has been an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) and a member of the EU Customs Union since 1995. In 2005, Turkey began negotiations with the European Union for full membership. Turkey is also a member of the Turkic Council, Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), BLACKSEAFOR, and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and was a founding member of the United Nations (UN).[28] Overall, Turkey's diplomatic and economic relations with its neighbors and the world have made it a regional power.[29]

Turkey's political and geographical location in the world makes it a significant country by sharing its borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran in the south and southeast. Moreover, to its North lie Russia, Georgia, and other Black Sea nations. To its West Balkan countries such as Greece and Bulgaria and further to the west the European countries are located. Turkey is essentially the meeting point between a mass of important regions: the Middle East, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucuses, and Central Asia. In addition, its economic and political ties to the Middle East, Europe, the Black Sea Region, as well as the United States place the country in a strategic position.

This study begins in its first chapter with an overview of the theoretical background by examining realism, liberalism, and constructivism; as well as foreign policy analysis approaches such as public opinion, societal groups, and leadership

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[26] Metin Heper, and Sabri Sayari, eds., **Political leaders and democracy in Turkey**, Lexington Books, 2002; Barış Kesgin, "Tansu Çiller's Leadership Traits and Foreign Policy", **Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs**, Vol: 17, No: 3, 2012, (Tansu Çiller), p. 36.

[27] Kesgin, Leadership Traits, p. 36.

[28] "Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present", **United Nations**, "http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml\, (03.06.2014).

[29] "International Organizations", **Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs**, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?7cafe2ef-78bd-4d88-b326-3916451364f3, (03.06.2014).

studies. Among these theories and approaches, which researchers can use as conceptual tools to explain foreign policies of countries, this thesis will concentrate on leadership studies and the effect of leadership style on Turkish foreign policy. As a method to analyze the impact of leaders on foreign policy analysis, the study will make use of Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA). The first chapter will focus on the methodological analysis by examining the supporting evidence for the LTA method as well as an assessment of the academic literature concerning leadership studies and LTA. Moreover, it will examine the literature relating to individual-level analysis of Turkish leaders. The chapter will also briefly highlight each of the seven traits utilized in LTA and conclude with an in-depth discussion of LTA and its modes of analysis.

The second chapter will examine the historical background of Turkish foreign policy by focusing on the leadership styles of Turkish decision-makers. It will analyze Turkish foreign policy in six periods including the early years of the Republic in which determinative leaders, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, dominated the foreign policy decision-making. The chapter will continue with an analysis of Turkey under a multi-party system in which both Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shaped foreign policy decisions. For the third period under review, the chapter will concentrate on the chaotic period of 1960 and 1983 where a combination of various actors including the public opinion had an impact of foreign policy of the country. Then, the chapter will analyze the Prime Minister/President era Özal era (1983-1991) where in addition to Özal's strong leadership, the business groups also influenced foreign policy. Regarding the last period of 1991-2002, there is an examination of the impact of Turkish military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The next section of the historical background chapter will concentrate on the current Turkish foreign policy, particularly concerning Turkish foreign policy towards Israel, Syria, and Iran. Furthermore, the chapter analyzes current events under the AK Party with a brief overview of the principles and initiatives of the current foreign policy plans.

The third and main chapter of the thesis will present the results of the LTA assessment conducted using the interviews of Erdoğan from 2010-2013. Following a presentation of the norming groups used to compare Erdoğan's scores, Erdoğan's leadership style during the period under examination will be analyzed using the established LTA results. The chapter will also examine the significant personality traits exhibited by Erdoğan, his leadership style, and the stability and instability of his

personality traits. The chapter concludes with an examination of the impact of Erdoğan and his personality and leadership style on foreign policy decisions during the period of 2010-2013.

The concluding chapter will briefly summarize the main arguments of the thesis with a recapitulation of the chapters. Following a discussion of the limitations to this research, the conclusion makes suggestions for possible research concerning Turkish leadership studies as well as future studies concerning Erdoğan using LTA.

CHAPTER ONE
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

What factors shape the foreign policy decision-making is the main question of foreign policy analysis. Foreign policy analysts try to find an answer to why states behave the way they do and how they can account for the foreign policies of states in the international system. In an attempt to analyze nations' foreign policies, some scholars focus on levels of analysis such as the individual level, state level and systemic level. When researching at an individual level of analysis, scholars focus on leaders and decision-makers, in state level analysis, they concentrate on institutional framework of the state; and in systemic level analysis, the power capability of states is taken into consideration.[30] Other scholars focus on internal and external factors that have an impact on foreign policy-making. As already stated Juliet Kaarbo et. al. scholars utilizing theories such as realism, liberalism and constructivism focus on external factors, while scholars studying public opinion, governmental systems, societal groups and leadership style focus on the internal factors that have impact on foreign policy. Leadership style always plays a significant role in the majority of the foreign policy analysis.[31]

Characteristics of leaders who have the authority to make foreign policy are significant in shaping policy. These leaders' personality, beliefs, values, and expectancies may shape what the state does in coping with foreign issues. Some leaders are more nationalistic and do not trust the world. Others may trust the world and see themselves as part of the world community.[32] Along the same line in Turkey, the leader and his/her style in foreign policy-making is a significant issue. In the early years of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk shaped the foreign policy of the country by staying neutral in world politics; throughout the 1950s, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes played a significant role in shaping Turkey's pro-western foreign policy. Personalities, beliefs, and experiences of these leaders shaped their foreign policy.

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[30] Marijke Breuning, **Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction,** Palgrave, Macmillan, New York, 2007, pp. 1-21.
[31] Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Ryan K. Beasley, "The analysis of foreign policy in comparative perspective", **Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective,** (ed. Kaarbo, et. al.), 2002, pp.1-23.
[32] Kaarbo et. al., pp.1-23.

Currently, Prime Minister Erdoğan's beliefs, values, and experiences shape Turkish foreign policy particularly concerning its foreign policy towards the Middle East.

In the first section of the chapter after giving an overview of theoretical framework of approaches that are utilized in foreign policy analysis, the concentration will be on the impact of leadership style on foreign policy analysis. The second half of the chapter will explicate the methodology with a unit dedicated to each of the seven traits used in Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) and the methods used to uncover a leader's leadership style.

I.   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES

Foreign policy decision-making may be the result of various factors. In other words, when studying foreign policy, there are multitudes of theories and approaches that researchers use to explain the external and internal factors shaping the behavior of countries. External factors being the organization of the international system, the current features of international affairs, and the actions of other nations, international organizations, and people; internal factors being the specific features of the domestic political system, the citizenry, government organizations, and individual leaders. As noted by Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley, "The analysis of foreign policy begins with theories that identify different factors—various forces that influence a state's foreign policy."[33] Those theories include, but are not limited to, Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. This chapter will briefly expand on these theories in the framework of foreign policy analysis in the following section. Afterwards, the chapter will concentrate on the leadership styles and the main theoretical argument of this thesis based on the leadership studies approach.

Realist theory was derived from the works of Thomas Hobbes[34] and Niccolo Machiavelli,[35] then further elaborated on by 20th century scholars such as Hans Morganthau[36] and Kenneth Waltz.[37] Although there are many variants of Realism,

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[33] Kaarbo, et. al., p. 7.
[34] See Thomas Hobbes, **Leviathan: or, The matter, form, and power of a commonwealth ecclesiastical and civil,** Vol: 21, G. Routledge and sons, London, 1894.
[35] See Niccolo Machiavelli, **The Prince: And Other Works,** Hendricks House, New York, 1964.
[36] See Hans Morgenthau and Politics Among Nations, 1948.
[37] See Kenneth N. Waltz, **Theory of international politics**, Mcgraw Hill, New York, 1979; Kenneth N, Waltz, **Man, the state, and war: a theoretical analysis**, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001;

Realist theory contains four core assumptions: anarchy, distrust, power politics, and survival. Realism supposes that the international environment is in a state of anarchy, which alone shows that international politics is significantly different from the domestic politics of states. While in the domestic system there is an over-arching governmental structure that controls behavior through rules and regulations; not to mention has the capabilities to enforce the rules and regulations imposed, in the international system as stated by realist theory such control mechanism does not easily exist. Although, there may be rules set by international organizations and international law, there is yet to be a method of enforcement. Therefore, nations may follow the rules, or may choose not to which would cause anarchy. This inevitably places nations in a constant state of conflict and distrust. Due to this condition of insecurity, power accumulation by other nations is seen as a threat to others. This threat then drives nations to procure and preserve power. As such, foreign policy becomes a game in which balancing power is key to a nation's survival.[38]

As stated by Kaarbo et. al., the driving force behind foreign policies is the "constant need to acquire and safeguard one's security and power."[39] Every country aims at keeping its survival, preserving its territorial integrity, and protecting its citizens. Therefore, their economic power to purchase military strength and to sophisticate its military forces is very important. When they do not have enough military power, they find themselves allying with stronger states. Sometimes they find themselves allying their foreign policies with the foreign policies of the stronger state.

Liberalism, unlike realism, focuses on the distribution of economic wealth and the civil society in which states are embedded which constrains their actions. According to liberalists this distribution of wealth and the interdependence that has spawned from it, is the primary characteristic defining the international system. Interdependence denotes the reliance and dependence that forms between nations due to international trade and the global financial system. Due to this reliance on each other, i.e. interdependence, nations are more likely to cooperate as it is in their best economic

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Kenneth N. Waltz, "The emerging structure of international politics", **International Security,** Vol:18, No:2, 1993, pp. 44-79.
[38] John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", **International Security**, Vol: 19, No: 3, 1995, pp. 5-26.
[39] Kaarbo et. al., p.8.

and financial interests.[40] Even the smallest of states can benefit from such a system. Small nations can produce goods and services in which they specialize and then participate in regional and global trade networks; hence, establishing an efficient way to generate wealth. As nations are interdependent, conflicts within the international system are less likely to occur and cooperation is more prevalent. Examples of cooperation include, but are not limited to; arms control agreement, trade agreements, and cultural exchanges. The level of interdependence can determine the elasticity of control concerning one's own foreign policy. That is, interdependence may limit a nation's ability to implement a proactive and independent foreign policy as their decisions will then greatly affect their trading partners and therefore may generate repercussions for themselves. As Kaarbo et. al. explain, interdependence means "that states can be fairly constrained in their foreign policy" as "the fortunes of one state are connected to the fortunes of others, when one state harms another, it does so at its own peril."[41]

Globalization, however, is leading to an obfuscation of the effects of interdependence in the 21st century. Countries are not only becoming more and more linked, they are at the same time facing pressures to become more liberalized. The snare in the globalization scheme is that not all countries have equally benefitted from liberalization and globalization. Indeed, there is an expanding gap between poor and rich states that many have noted to be widening. In response, some areas of the world have embraced regional economic integration to create regional-level interdependence. Although interdependence at the regional-level is less complicated and more easily controlled, it nevertheless adds yet another level of external influence that may affect the foreign policy of states.

Constructivist theory extends from the perspective that states follow sets of norms and social interactions that constrain state behavior. As such, the international system in comprised of international laws, organizations, and standards which are all given meaning by the states' behaviors and the states themselves.[42] For clarification, "Norms represent shared expectations about appropriate behavior that derive from a combination of beliefs, standards of behavior, international conventions, and decision-

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[40] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Interdependence in World Politics", **The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy: A Reader**, (ed. G.T. Crane and A. Amawi), Oxford University Press, New York, 1997.
[41] Kaarbo et. al., p. 11.
[42] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics", **International Organization**, Vol: 46, No: 2, 1992, pp. 391-425.

making procedures."[43] In accordance to this, norms regarding appropriate international state behavior are socially constructed and socially regulated. If a state behaves in a fashion outside of the socially accepted norm, other countries will react in a way to discredit them or sanction them. States, therefore, tend to work within the recognized norms and although "states do not always comply with international laws, the system does carry some kind of moral, normative authority that states support."[44] Researchers consider such norms as some of the possible external factors that may carry an impact on the foreign policy of states.

In sum, Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism all explain some of the external factors that may have an effect on states' foreign policies. Realism focuses on the self-interests of states who are motivated by self-survival in an anarchic international system. Liberalism points to the interdependence that stems from the international trading schemes which allows for more cooperation and less conflict. Constructivism looks at the socially constructed norms such as identity and religion that shape the international system and state behavior. The one thing each of these theories has in common is that external factors, such as the interaction of states from around the globe and the overall design of the global community, are the source of states' foreign policies.

Besides the theories and approaches that point to the external factors that have an impact on foreign policy, there are also internal factors such as public opinion, governmental organizations, societal groups, and leadership styles that affect foreign policy-decision-making. Domestically sourced theories "argue that states sometimes make decisions that do not necessarily benefit them in international politics."[45] Namely, there are many voices from varying levels of government that must come together to formulate a foreign policy, all the while assuaging public domestic groups, organizations, leaders, and the citizenry. Each of these factors greatly affects and complicates the decision-making process.

When studying public opinion, scholars are assessing the identity, culture, and opinion of the domestic masses. Although there are discrepant views as to how much public opinion plays a role in foreign-policy making, researchers note in some specific

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[43] Kaarbo et. al., p. 12.
[44] Kaarbo et. al., p. 12.
[45] Kaarbo et. al, p. 13.

instances that leaders were especially sensitive to public views and responses. How a government is organized can influence the foreign policy of a state. Democratization and bureaucratization are especially important characteristics as they dictate how foreign policy is determined. Governmental organizations also points out the difference in foreign policy-making in democratic systems and authoritarian regimes. They mainly concentrate on bureaucratic politics where bureaucracies are essential in "gathering information, developing proposals, offering advice, implementing policy and at times, making foreign policy decisions."[46]

Societal groups, which can be consisted of opposition groups, political parties, interests groups, civil society groups, or military may also have significant impact on foreign policy-making in a country. Such groups may be motivated by economics, religion, security, or values. The increase in the number of economic groups as a result of liberalization may led to the dominant effect of economic groups on state's foreign policies. Sometimes, military groups the subordinate the democratically elected authorities may force the leaders to follow expansionists policies. Finally, as an internal factor leadership, including the personal characteristics and beliefs of a nation's leader, may have significant influence on the foreign policy of a state.

As a significant factor that has an impact on foreign policy making, this thesis will concentrate on leadership style. In particular, it will investigate the role played by Prime Minister Erdoğan in Turkish foreign policy towards Israel, Syria, and Iran. The following section will give an in-depth discussion of leadership studies.

A. Foreign Policy Analysis and Leadership

Leaders sit at the top of government and commonly have the decision-making power to shape foreign policy. Characteristics and personality traits of a leader are generally more significant when the leader has substantial autonomy in determining policy and when the circumstances are either ambiguous or complex. Such a setting is highly probably in foreign policy making. When the setting is ripe, a leader's personality and leadership may affect state behavior. As such, leaders matter considerably in foreign policy particularly when they wield much power in decision-making. As an

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[46] Kaarbo et. al., p. 18.

example, it would be difficult to imagine the 20th century's turn of events in Turkey without considering the actions of one man: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Few would doubt that Atatürk influenced the state behavior of domestic and foreign affairs of the Turkish Republic. To study the political transition from the Ottoman Empire to the modern-day Turkish state without considering the leadership style and behavior of Ataturk would render a study incomplete. Atatürk not only helped to create modern day Turkey, but also instituted reforms that can still be felt by Turkish citizens in the present day. Although much of the scholarly discourse involving international relations emphasizes structural forces in regards to state behavior, it is nonetheless evident by the Turkish example that strong leaders can persuade and manipulate the course of history.

In 2013, Joseph S. Nye Jr. published "Do Presidents Matter?" essentially asking whether the person in the highest position of political power really makes a difference in the overall political and historical scheme of events. Nye concluded that some transactional leaders in fact have a hand in making history by affecting the political outcomes and executing their policies.[47] According to Jean Blondel, political leaders can affect more than their own countries and in fact, leaders of powerful nations can affect other areas of the world as well. "Within each nation, political leadership can command and reach out widely and extensively; and the rulers of the most important nations have a resonance that carries an echo to all corners of the world."[48] Hence, political leaders do not only affect political outcomes within and to do with their own nation, but some leaders do in fact affect the political outcomes of other nations as well. It is under this assumption--that individuals can affect world politics--which the following study ensues.

The study of political leaders adds extensively to the academic scholarship of international relations and foreign policy analysis. Through the study of political leaders, researchers conduct individual-level analyses. Although, individual-level analyses are not the most common method to analyze and interpret international political behavior, they have proven beneficial to the overall understanding of state behavior. Actor-specific studies are fundamental to foreign policy analysis and essentially give meaning

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[47] Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Do Presidents Matter?", **Atlantic Monthly,**. Vol: 311, No: 5, June 2013, pp. 13-15.
[48] Jean Blondel, **Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis**, Sage Publications, London, 1987, p. 1.

to the study of international relations.[49] Individual-level analysis, e.g. analyzing leadership, has expanded within political science, particularly in international relations, and specifically within foreign policy analysis. The expansion of individual-level analysis is owed in part to the field of psychology and political psychology.[50] There is not, however, only one approach to analyzing a political leader.

Many methods can be used to analyze leadership styles. Young and Schafer identify "four bodies of research – studies focused on operational code analysis, cognitive mapping, image theory, and conceptual complexity – that offer promising ways to determine leaders' cognitions"[51] By use different methods, each of these bodies of research identified above are designed to understand and analyze factors such as personality traits, political attitudes and behavior, methods of decision-making, as well as interpersonal skills of leaders and individuals. Of these research programs, leadership trait analysis – the study of conceptual complexity – has stood out as a reliable and dependable research program in order to examine the personality traits of a leader and in turn determine a the leadership style of an individual. As Leadership Trait Analysis is the method chosen for this study, an in-depth description is presented in the following sections.

In the subsequent section, the literature concerning leadership studies and personality studies will be examined in order to validate the methodology of Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) in the minds of the readers. In addition, a section is also dedicated to a review of the literature concerning Turkish prime ministers, as well as the leadership analyses of Prime Minister Erdoğan. Finally, the methodology behind LTA will be discussed.

B. Literature Review on Leadership Studies

Psychopathology and Politics, published in 1930 and written by Harrold Lasswell, is one of the earliest attempts of a scholar to combine psychology and political science to create a comprehensive look into the personality types of powerful

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[49] Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations", **Foreign Policy Analysis**, Vol: 1, No: 1, 2005, pp. 1-30.
[50] Richard. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, **Foreign Policy Decision Making**, Free Press, New York, 1962.
[51] Michael D. Young and Mark Schafer, "Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International Relat Aydınlı ions", **Mershon International Studies Review**, Vol: 42, No: 1, May 1998, p. 64.

individuals. In 1950, this work was described by McConaughy as "a pioneer in its field."[52] Nine years later, Hennessy stated, "Not until Lasswell, under the influence of Freudian theory, turned to the study of political psychopaths was there any serious attempt to relate personality characteristics to political behavior."[53] Yet, Lasswell's work did not create a surge in personality studies of political leaders upon its release. In fact, not until 1950's did political scientists begin to dig deeper into the study of personality and its effects on political leadership.

Following the *Psychopathology and Politics,* there were a series of research programs that enabled leadership studies of the present day. Psychobiography is a field that aims to understand not only political leaders, but any significant individual, using historical evidence and psychological theories to create a comprehensive analysis. Thanks to such fields, systematic studies of leaders began to arise in the second half of the 20th century. Such studies hoped to determine what type of personality characteristics leaders tended to possess. Political scholars began to create quantitative and qualitative means to measure such personality characteristics and traits (e.g. operational code, leadership trait analysis). Although the beginning of leadership studies within the realm of political science focused primarily on Western leaders, by the 1990's and early 2000's a shift began to occur. Currently, substantial literature[54] can be found on leaders from various parts of the globe, yet "much of the published work in LTA remains within the Western context."[55]

1. Psychobiography

In 1956, Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George published one of the most successful and influential psychobiographies to date, titled *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study.*[56] This work draws on Lasswell's labor, as George noted, Lasswell's "writings on power and personality . . . provided some of the central

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[52] John B. McConaughy, "Certain Personality Factors of State Legislators in South Carolina", **American Political Science Review**, Vol: 44, No: 4, 1950, p. 903.
[53] Bernard Hennessy, "Politicals and apoliticals: Some measurements of personality traits", **Midwest Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 3, 1959, pp. 336-355.
[54] Kesgin, Tansu Çiller, p. 36; Kesgin, Leadership Traits, pp. 136-157.
[55] Kesgin, Tansu Çiller, p. 36.
[56] Alexander George and Juliette George, **Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House**, John Day, New York, 1956.

ideas" for their study.[57] The study utilizes history, political science, and psychology to create a comprehensive analysis of Woodrow Wilson, leading it to be known as "one of the most rigorous and convincing of the psychobiographies of political figures,"[58] as noted by Fred I. Greenstein and Michael Lerner. According to the book, traits that were established during Wilson's childhood affected not only his pursuit of power upon reaching adulthood, but also the way in which he wielded his achieved power as President. As George and George wrote in their earlier work on Wilson, "The traits of character which enabled him to [become President] were forged in his childhood, as such traits usually are."[59] George and George continue, "It is to Wilson's early years, then, that we must look for the origins of his superb strength and of his truly classical tragic weakness."[60] In this, it can be understood that traits which are solidified in childhood can and do make an impact in one's later life.

Political scientist, Arnold Rogow, published another psychobiography that has greatly added to the political psychology literature in 1963 titled James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy. Rogow's psychiatric approach to the profiling the first US Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, helped close the gap between politics, psychology, and personality. Rogow discloses in the preface of his book that his aim was "to produce a psychological portrait of James Forrestal that would focus on the complex interplay between his personality, the policy process of which he was a part, and the political arena in which he was a central figure."[61] To do this, Rogow examined Forrestal's personal diaries and interviewed those whom were close to him. Rogow does not illuminate on key personality traits of Forrestal, but instead focuses on personality characteristics (e.g. Forrestal "was too driven")[62] and how they influenced his later life, be it in the public or private sphere. Rogow also bases much of his interpretations on Forrestal's childhood and early adulthood.

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[57] As quoted in William Friedman, "Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House" and Political Psychobiography, **Political Psychology**, Vol: 15, No: 1, 1994, pp. 35-59.
[58] Fred I. Greenstein and Michael Lerner, ed., **A Source Book for the Study of Personality and Politics,** Markham Publishing Co., Chicago, 1971. As quoted in Edwin A. Weinstein, James William Anderson, and Arthur S. Link, "Woodrow Wilson's political personality: A reappraisal", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol: 93, No: 4, 1978, pp. 585-598.
[59] George and George, p. 192.
[60] George and George, p. 193.
[61] Arnold A. Rogow, **James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy**, Macmillan, New York, 1963, p. x.
[62] Rogow, p. 328.

Victor E. Wolfenstein made significant strides in the literature for political psychology in regards to assessing political leaders through the combination of psychological theories and political analysis. His work is one of the first systematic studies of leaders' personality using theoretical insights of psychoanalysis. Wolfenstein utilized the theories of Otto Fenichel, Erik Erickson, and Sigmund Freud in his examination of the lives of Mahatma Ghandi, Vladimir Lenin, and Leon Trotsky. In regards to his methods, Wolfenstein noted that he aimed to utilize psychoanalysis as the theoretical basis for his research and apply it to the field of international politics in order to better understand the personalities that lead individuals to act in revolutionary activities.[63] Through his analyses, Wolfenstein aimed to gain a deeper understanding of these men's motivations as political revolutionaries.

2. Systematic Studies of the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders

Definitively different from psychobiographies, new personality literature began to arise in the realm of political science in the middle of the 20th century. Unlike psychobiographies that used psychology to analyze important figures, the systematic political studies on personality of the same era focused on pinpointing the precise personality traits that affected politics in general. In other words, instead of focusing on the *great men of history* to determine their personal personality traits and characteristics that impacted their life and careers like psychobiographies, these systematic studies looked towards the masses to discover which personality traits were more conducive to politics and political life.

Using data from a series of personality and opinion tests collected from eighteen legislators, state senators and representatives of South Carolina, John B. McConaughy (1950) applied both the Bernreuter Personality Inventory and the Guilford-Martin Inventory of Factors. The Bernreuter Personality Inventory measures neurotic tendency, self-sufficiency, introversion-extroversion, and dominance-submission[64]. Guilford-Martin Inventory of Factors measures: general pressure for overt activity, ascendency in social situations as opposed to submissiveness, masculinity of attitudes and interests as

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[63] Wolfenstein, p. 12.
[64] Robert G. Bernreuter, **Manual for the Personality Inventory,** Stanford University, Stanford, 1935, p. 1; see in McConaughy.

opposed to femininity, self-confidence, lack of nervous tenseness and irritability.[65] According to the Bernreuter Personality scale, "Political leaders were decidedly less neurotic than the general male population; that they were more self-sufficient; that they were decidedly more extroverted; but that they were only slightly more dominant."[66] By means of the Guilford-Martin Inventory of Factors, McConaughy finds that political leaders are "decidedly more masculine than the general male population; that they are, to a large degree, more self-confident than the average person and have fewer feelings of inferiority; and that they are less irritable and tense than the average person."[67] In the end, McConaughy concluded that the 18-person sample size was too small for the results to be conclusive, yet the method used was one in a series of personality assessments of political leaders by means of quantifiable assessment tools.[68]

In 1959, Bernard Hennessy completed a study using interviews and questionnaires from 138 adults in order to ascertain the types of personality traits that are associated with being political and apolitical. The personality characteristics that Hennessy used to base his scales are as follows: Power Orientation, Willingness to Risk, Willingness to Compromise, Tough-mindedness, Authoritarianism, and Liberalism. It was found that politicals had a higher power drive than apoliticals and political men were more likely to take risks than apolitical men. Apoliticals, however, ranked higher in terms of Willing to Compromise. As for Tough-mindedness, Liberalism, and Authoritarianism, no difference exists between politicals and apoliticals.[69] Such a study is important to the literature of political science as it provides the base for answering questions as to what type of personality characteristics are evident in those engaged in politics.

In 1962, Milbrath and Klein in "Personality Correlates of Political Participation" interviewed 114 Washington lobbyists and received 88 completed personality tests from the interviewees. From the data collected, Milbrath and Klein cited personality factors such as dominance, esteem, and sociality as determinants of political participation. Milbrath and Klein conclude that Sociality, Dominance, and Esteem assist those to be

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[65] **Manual of Directions and Norms for the Guilford-Martin Inventory of Factors G-A-M-I-N**, p. 1; see in McConaughy.
[66] McConaughy, p. 903.
[67] McConaughy, p. 903.
[68] McConaughy, p. 903.
[69] Hennessy, pp. 336-355.

participators in politics, but are not sufficient indicators of who will participate.[70] That is, "A person with low sociality-dominance-esteem is not likely to participate, but those with high sociality-dominance-esteem will not necessarily participate."[71] As Hennessy did before, Milbrath and Klein were able to provide more explanation into the personality factors that may influence those who choose to be politically active, hence allowing future research to create more conclusive studies on which personality traits impact political leadership styles.

As can be seen in the previous literature, much of the work done on psychoanalytic assessments of political leaders had been conducted within a multitude of academic fields (e.g. psychology, history, political science). There had yet to be an establishment of a single area of study that allowed for the examination of political leadership. In 1972, Glenn Paige published *Political Leadership: Readings for an emerging field* in hopes of establishing "the study of political leadership as a special subject of inquiry in world colleges and universities," through his "book of readings plus an accompanying monograph and bibliography."[72] Paige collected any and all of the literature on leadership studies, such as studies on charisma,[73] political biography,[74] and political elite studies.[75] Paige's work was immensely influential on the field of leadership studies, especially within the field of political science.

3. Individual-level Analysis of Turkish Prime Ministers

There has been a steady increase in the amount of scholarly attention that has been paid to the leaders of Turkey since the turning of the new millennium. First, published in 2002, is a collection of essays concerning eleven of Turkey's prime ministers edited by Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, titled *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*. The book aimed at examining the lives of these influential

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[70] Lester W. Milbrath and Walter W. Klein, "Personality correlates of political participation", **Acta sociologica,** Vol: 6, No: ½, 1962, p. 60.
[71] Milbrath and Klein, p. 65.
[72] Glenn D. Paige, **Political Leadership: Readings for an emerging field**, Free Press, 1972, p. v.
[73] See essay on "Charismatic Authority" in Max Weber, **The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,** trans by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, The Free Press, New York, 1957, pp. 358-364.
[74] See Wolfenstein; George and George.
[75] See Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, **The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and Bibliography,** Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1952.

leaders, as well as their policies and beliefs.[76] A second book was published, although currently only in Turkish, titled *Türk Dış, Politikasında Liderler: Süreklilik ve Değişim, Söylem ve Eylem* (Leaders in Turkish Foreign Policy: Continuity, Change, Discourse and Action) was edited by Ali Demir Faik. The book analyzed the leadership style of Prime Ministers Adnan Menderes, Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan, Alparslan Türkeş, and Turgut Özal.[77]

Barış Kesgin has done many works regarding Turkey's leaders' personalities. In 2011, Kesgin presented his doctoral thesis of which analyzes multiple Turkish and Israeli leaders using Operational Code and Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA), titled *Political Leadership and Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Israel and Turkey*.[78] In 2012, Kesgin published a detailed analysis of Turkey's 22nd Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller. In this work, Kesgin uses LTA to study Çiller's personality, and then compares Çiller to other Turkish leaders of the same era.[79] "Leadership Traits of Turkey's Islamist and Secular Prime Ministers," was published by Kesgin in 2013. In this work, Kesgin examines whether or not labels such as "secularist" and "Islamist" give credence to the actual personalities of Turkish leaders. To do this, Kesgin compares and contrasts the personality traits using LTA of each of Turkey's prime ministers starting from the early 1990's.[80] Kesgin's work, mentioned above, has been especially helpful in widening the academic literature concerning individual analysis of Turkish political personalities. Specifically, Kesgin has created profiles and data sets of Turkish leader's personality traits which allow other researchers and scholars to successfully compare and analyze future Turkish leaders with Kesgin's data sets. In addition, Kesgin's data and profiles, when cited with the findings of Margaret Hermann, have widened the existed norming groups that can be used to assess future leaders not only from Turkey, but with other leaders around the globe.

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[76] Heper and Sayarı.

[77] Ali Faik Demir, ed, **Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler: Süreklilik ve Değişim. Söylem ve Eylem, Bağlam,** Vol: 201, 2007.

[78] Barış Kesgin, **Political Leadership and Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Israel and Turkey**", (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation), University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 2011, (Israel and Turkey).

[79] Kesgin, Tansu Çiller, p. 37.

[80] Kesgin, Leadership Traits, pp. 136-157.

4. Individual-Level Analysis of Erdoğan

Aylin Ş. Görener and Meltem Ş. Ucal in their article entitled "The Personality and Leadership Style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy," give systematic view of Turkey's Prime Minister Erdoğan's leadership by using Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA).[81] Through the use of LTA, the authors evaluate the impact of Erdoğan's leadership style on policy choices. At the same time, Görener and Ucal emphasize the worth of actor-centered approaches in foreign policy analysisby conceding that Erdoğan was very active in policy decision-making and had little tolerance for individuals that lack like-minded thinking. According to the authors, based on their LTA results Erdoğan perceives his environment as perilous and threatening, and yet is willing to take risks.[82]

Not only did Görener and Ucal create an overall analysis of Erdoğan, the authors also broke down their analysis longitudinally. They claim that Erdoğan exuded fewer traits that demonstrate his power and belief in his ability to control events throughout 2007, just shortly before the presidential elections and general elections. Following his victories in both elections, however, Erdoğan's self-confidence and power peaked at their highest. Additionally, they conclude that Erdoğan lacks a nationalistic view and instead constitutes his "in-group" as fellow Muslims. From LTA, the authors deduce that the results produced from Erdoğan's analysis indicate that he exhibits an "evangelist" political orientation, meaning that he pays much attention to persuading others to rally around his goals, mission, and political aspirations. Görener and Ucal only examined Erdoğan using material dating from 2003 until 2009.[83]

Kesgin[84] found dissimilar results as Görener and Ucal through his analysis of Erdoğan. Kesgin utilized spoken material of Erdoğan dating from 2003 until what appears to be the end of 2012.[85] According to Kesgin, Erdoğan's motivation for pursuing office is context specific; that is, contextual factors play a large role in determining whether or not Erdoğan is problem-focused or relationship-focused.

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[81] Görener and Ucal, pp. 357-381.
[82] Görener and Ucal, pp. 357-381.
[83] Görener and Ucal, pp. 357-381.
[84] Kesgin, Leadership Traits, pp. 136-157.
[85] The article was published on February 25, 2013.

Furthermore, Kesgin states that Erdoğan does not perceive the world as a hostile, unlike Görener and Ucal's view of Erdoğan. Kesgin asserts that Erdoğan is likely to challenge constraints; yet, Erdoğan is likely to be open to new and diverse information (contrary to Görener and Ucal's view of Erdoğan).[86]

According to Kesgin, Erdoğan is an actively independent leader.[87] As Hermann has indicated, an actively independent leader's main focus "is on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both."[88] As a conclusion Kesgin states that in the Turkish example, it was evident that norming groups mattered by comparing Erdoğan to five different norming groups and receiving four different leadership profiles. As such, Kesgin points to an obvious flaw that could have hazardous potential for LTA analysts; that is, given leadership style based on LTA results are only as credible as the norming groups used. Currently, most norming groups are based on geographic regions. However, as Kesgin points out, for some leaders, religious groupings or national groupings may be more beneficial in determining the most credible leadership style of a leader.[89]

II.   METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF LEADERSHIP TRAIT ANALYSIS

In order to effectively analyze the personality traits of a political leader, it is first necessary to determine who qualifies as a *leader* and what exactly *personality traits* are. Hermann gives a definition for political leader as "an individual who has authority to commit the resources and select the goals of political unit and, in turn, to affect its policies"[90] Political leaders can be at the local, state, regional, or national level of government. Furthermore, leaders can have an office through free elections, appointment, revolution, or assassination.

As for *personality traits*, it is necessary to disassociate *personality traits* and *personal characteristics*. According to Hermann (as derived from   Glenn Paige[91]),

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[86] Kesgin, Leadership Traits, pp. 136-157.
[87] Kesgin, Leadership Traits, p. 53.
[88] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 178-212.
[89] Kesgin, Leadership Traits, pp. 136-157.
[90] Margaret G. Hermann and Thomas W. Milburn, **A psychological examination of political leaders**, Free Press, 1977, (Psychological Examination), p. 2.
[91] Paige, p. 86.

personal characteristics are "all aspects of an individual qua individual – his biographical statistics (e.g., age, place of birth), his capabilities and skills, his training, his work experiences, his motives, his cognitions, his affect, his attitudes, and beliefs, his role perceptions, and his values."[92] Conversely, *personality traits* are "personal characteristics which are consistent across different kinds of situations."[93] To expound, Wolfenstein defines personality as, "a relatively stable organization of the ways in which the individual deals with his internal psychological conflicts, and his involvement in and conflicts with external reality."[94] Although personality and personality traits are both considered to be stable structures, according to Hermann, it is still nonetheless possible to determine which traits remain most prevalent given the context; namely, the analyst can determine the susceptibility of the leader to be influence by the circumstances of his environment.[95]

The topic as to whether or not the personality traits used in LTA are stable or contextual has been a long-lasting debate.[96] As defined earlier in this manuscript, personality traits and personality itself is considered within the majority of the literature as a stable organization. Nonetheless, recent research has brought illumination to the issue. As already noted, the most current of Hermann's work has addressed the matter by stating that it is indeed possible to determine the sensitivity of a leader to his context by organizing the spontaneous material according to spontaneity, time, and/or audience.[97] Additionally, it has been found that one of Hermann's personality traits that was previously thought to be one of the most stable of the bunch, has been found to be "stable for some people, but not for others."[98] In fact, personality traits may not always be temporally stable for each person and may depend on the individual him/herself.

It is important to note that LTA is not the only method used to study a political leader. There are several techniques that can be employed, such as questionnaires, interviews, observation (e.g. self-observation, informants, participant observation, and

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[92] Hermann, Psychological Examination, p. 2.
[93] Hermann, Psychological Examination, p. 3.
[94] Wolfenstein, p. 12.
[95] Hermann, Leadership Style, p.180.
[96] See the discussion between Karen A. Rasler, William R. Thompson, and Kathleen M. Chester, "Foreign policy makers, personality attributes, and interviews: A note on reliability problems", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1980, pp. 47-66 and Hermann, Reliability Problems, pp. 67–73.
[97] Hermann, Leadership Style, p.180; Hermann, Reliability Problems.
[98] Dille, Brian, and Michael D. Young. "The conceptual complexity of Presidents Carter and Clinton: An automated content analysis of temporal stability and source bias." **Political Psychology**, Vol: 21, No: 3 2000, pp. 587-596.

field observation), biographical statistics, simulation (e.g. computer simulation, all-person or person-machine simulation) and content analysis.[99] LTA is a convenient option if the political leader who is to be analyzed is unwilling to participate in some of the above techniques, or is distant from the analyst.

In "Assessing Leadership Style: A trait analysis." Margaret G. Hermann states that it is difficult to run series of psychological examinations on well-known politicians with their approval and cooperation due to a lack of skepticism on the part of those to be analyzed.[100] For example, the politician may fear bad results, or they may assume that the results could damage their public image. Therefore it is important to administer personality and psychological analyses at-a-distance. Such analyses use spontaneous spoken material from the politician being examined. Considering that, in the age of television, radio, print, and the Internet, most of what politicians do and say is being recorded; such a task is not overwhelmingly difficult. Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is just one of the ways that academics and researchers can analyze the personalities of leaders and politicians.

Hermann also explains what exactly constitutes as spontaneous spoken material. There are two ways that a leader or politician speaks to the public: speeches and interviews. Speeches are often planned in advance and written by or with the help of a speechwriter. Therefore, "scores gleaned from prepared remarks may contain systematic differences large enough to affect the workings of models using at-a-distance measurement."[101] As such, speeches would not be considered spontaneous material as they do not reflect accurately the character and true nature of the politician or leader. Interviews, on the other hand, are done without the assistance of props, aids, or pre-written responses. Although a leader may receive questions in advance, or may have pre-planned suitable answers if a certain question arises, the politician is nonetheless forced to deliver replies quickly and in their own words. The question and answer style of an interview allows those being questioned and cross-examined to fully display their personality. The words that leaders choose while responding, or the sentence structure of the answers, all give a glimpse into a politician's character. As

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[99] Hermann, Psychological Examination, pp. 4-12.
[100] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 178-212.
[101] Brian Dille, "The Prepared and Spontaneous Remarks of Presidents Reagan and Bush: A Validity Comparison for At-a-Distance Measurement", **Political Psychology**, Vol: 21, No: 3, 2000, p. 583.

interviews create an environment where leaders are less able to control what they say, interviews are the speech act of most value when analyzing a leader at-a-distance.[102]

When obtaining interviews of specific leaders, it is important to have regard for the sources of said interviews. Interviews are often recorded in newspapers, magazines, or can be viewed online through the Internet. The key to acquiring adequate and suitable material from interviews to use in a personality analysis is to make sure that the interview is in fact the exact words verbatim from the interviewee. Often magazines or even newspapers will adjust the responses or remove and or edit pieces of the interview in order to make the interview more appealing to the masses. Such material is not suitable for LTA.[103]

According to Hermann, it is essential to the analysis that the analyst acquires a minimum of 50 responses of at least 100 words each in order to achieve viable results. As such, a minimum of 5,000 words is required to accurately analyze a leader's personality. However, the analyst must procure a wide array of responses. By only utilizing responses from a single year or concerning a single topic, the analyst can create context-specific and/or temporal-specific analyses. In addition, the interviews should derive from a variety of settings and circumstances, as well as cover a variety of topics. In consequence, it is important for the analyst to record the interviews and responses with labels assessing the setting, time, and topic of the interview. Organizing the data in such a way helps the researchers to analyze the sensitivity of the leader to the context and the environment. Hermann does not limit the ability to organize the data by context and setting alone, but also states that it is possible to categorize interviews which are also based on spontaneity. Hermann asserts that in addition to categorizing based on context and setting, "it is also possible to classify interviews on their degree of spontaneity, facilitating the analyst gaining some insight into the differences between a leader's public and private selves."[104] Hence, setting, time, topic, and level of spontaneity are all forms in which an analyst can organize interviews and spoken material.[105]

According to Hermann, while trying to affect policy, political leaders face several challenges. First, political leaders must discover ways to uphold control over policy

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[102] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 178-212.
[103] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 178-212.
[104] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 180.
[105] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 178-212.

while, at the time, maintaining authority and delegating responsibilities to other actors within the government. Second, political leaders must determine how to effectively shape the policy agenda under circumstances where he/she has not defined the terms and where the context is being regulated by other actors from within the political system. The way in which a leader manages these challenges can be seen in his/her leadership style. By leadership style what Hermann meant was "the ways in which leaders relate to those around them, whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders – how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions."[106] The leadership style of a political leader not only determines how the leader will maintain control over the policy agenda while delegating authority and simultaneously shape the agenda under conditions controlled by other actors, but also determines the nature of the decision-making process.

Over 122 leadership style analyses have been conducted over the last three decades.[107] Based on the results from these 122 analyses, Hermann has found three factors that determine a leadership style of a leader. According to Hermann, these three factors can be assessed based on the answers the following three questions: (a) How do leaders respond to constraints within their political context? (b) How receptive are leaders to new information and ideas within the decision-making process? (c) How are leaders driven to attain their political position – is it a personal drive or one that is motivated by the relationship formed with his/her constituents.[108]

Hermann continues by explaining the significance of each answer to the previous questions and the relevance to the congruence and variation between the answers. These queries are particularly important because the answers they generate are indicative of the leadership style of the leader under analysis. In regards to the query regarding political constraints, the answers received will inform the analyst as to how essential is it for a leader to exercise control over his/her environment. It is also possible to determine just how adaptable a leader to his/her surroundings and whether a leader is open to the demands of his/her constituencies. In addition, one can learn

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[106] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 181.
[107] See Hermann, Explaining Foreign Policy; Hermann, Reliability Problems; Juliet Kaarbo and Margaret G. Hermann, "Leadership styles of prime ministers: How individual differences affect the foreign policymaking process", **The Leadership Quarterly,** Vol: 9, No: 3, 1998, (Prime Ministers), pp. 243-263.
[108] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 181.

whether a leader is willing to work within a system with constraints and limitations, or if s/he is inclined to combat with those constraints.[109]

Within the decision-making process, whether a leader is open or closed to incoming information and ideas is indicative of whether or not the leader has a planned vision for a particular outcome or whether he/she is willing to study the situation before making a decision. The motivation for why a politician chooses to run for office also provides important information as to the drives and incentives that energize an individual.[110]

In sum, how leaders respond to constraints, perceive information, and are motivated within their political context, provide researchers with information that can be used to derive a functional leadership style.

A. Using Trait Analysis to Assess Leadership Style

According to Hermann, there are seven traits that are predominant in assessing leadership style: (1) the belief that one can influence or control what happens (BACE), (2) the need for power and influence (PWR), (3) the ability to differentiate things and people in one's environment, also known as conceptual complexity (CC), (4) self-confidence (SC), (5) the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others' ideas and sensitivities (TASK), (6) general distrust or suspiciousness of others (DIS), and (7) the intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias (IGB).[111] What about need for power I can't find it here but it is on your list on page 33

The relevancy of these seven traits to political leadership is based on research that has previously linked policy behavior to the personal characteristics of individuals.[112] Not only are individual traits significant for understanding components of an individual's leadership style, but so are combinations of the traits. Specifically, how the trait scores relate can express information. For example, depending how BACE and

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[109] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 182.

[110] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 183.

[111] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 178-212. Note: Acronyms of the seven traits were not used in original literature.

[112] Hermann, Explaining Foreign Policy; Hermann, Reliability Problems; Peter Suedfeld and Stanley Coren, "Cognitive correlates of conceptual complexity", **Personality and Individual Differences**, Vol: 13, No: 11, 1992, pp. 1193-1199; Kaarbo and Hermann, Prime Ministers.

PWR correlate can disclose as to whether or not the individual confronts the circumstantial constraints of his environment or not. IGB, DIS, and TASK, when looked at together, can reveal what motivates him/her. Lastly, by examining the correlation between CC and SC, the analyst can determine how open or how closed the individual is to new information.[113]

In LTA, it is assumed that the frequency of particular words used by leaders in interviews demonstrates the substantiality of the spoken content. That is to say, the more recurrent certain words are within a speech, the more salient the matter is to the speaker. When assessing the traits of a leader, specific words correlate to specific traits and with that, the frequency of such words determine the trait score for the leader. This trait score can then be compared to some norming groups which can be found in the related literature or through Social Science Automation website.[114] It is through this comparison that the analyst can determine whether a leader ranks low or high for a trait. Thankfully, there is a computer program provided by Social Science Automation that automatically codes based on the speech material given and provides the analyst with numerical data that can be used to assess each of the seven traits.[115] The following section will give a brief introduction into the seven personality traits examined under LTA.

1. Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events

The Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) is in regards to the perception of an individual as to his or her own ability to control the circumstances in which he or she is placed. In other words, BACE coordinates to the view in which individuals deem themselves to have some amount of control over the happenings of their environment.[116] Individuals with high BACE tend to have confidence in the idea that they can affect the outcomes of situations. Such individuals believe that they are able shape the happenings of the world and as such tend to be more active in the process of policy-making. Within policy-making, individuals high in BACE are inclined to maintain

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[113] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 186.
[114] The norming groups can be found through the "Syracuse supported package for academics" through the Social Science Automation website, http://socialscience.net/. The current version is from October, 2012.
[115] "Social Science Automation", http://socialscience.net/, (03.04.2014).
[116] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 188-189

their control over decision-making and implementation of policies; hence, such individuals are less likely to delegate their responsibilities to others. According the Hermann, "such leaders are likely to call subordinates to check on what they are doing, to make surprise visits to places where policy is being implemented, and to be interested in meeting face-to-face with other leaders to see how far they are willing to go."[117] Additionally, political leaders with high BACE scores will be less likely to work with others and make compromises as they already "know what should be done."[118] Hermann also acknowledges that BACE has many features of a self-fulfilling prophecy due to the fact that an individual high in this trait will believe that he has control and therefore will attempt to take control. This is true in the opposing manner as well; an individual low in BACE will believe he/she does not have control and consequently will forego the control he/she may have had.[119] Low BACE individuals will be reactive rather than proactive. According to Kesgin, such individuals will follow a 'wait-and-see' policy before they make a decision to act. Unlike leaders high in BACE, low BACE leaders are more inclined to delegate responsibilities. This, however, means low BACE leaders are also more likely to hold others accountable for administrative failures and mistakes.[120]

2. Conceptual Complexity

Stephen Benedict Dyson and Thomas Preston define Conceptual Complexity (CC) as "how attentive or sensitive individuals are to information from (or nuances within) their surrounding political or policy environments and to the extent to which they require information when making decisions."[121] This is in line with Hermann's identification of CC as "the degree of differentiation that an individual shows in describing or discussing other people, places, policies, ideas, or things."[122] Hence, CC is associated to the level of sensitivity an individual relates to his or her environment; as well as, the level of interpretation of the individual to the information given in the particular context. Hermann elaborates by stating that individuals who are high in CC

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[117] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 178-212.
[118] Hermann, Leadership Style. pp. 178-212.
[119] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 178-212.
[120] Kesgin, Israel and Turkey, pp. 13-14.
[121] Stephen Benedict Dyson and Thomas Preston, "Individual characteristics of political leaders and the use of analogy in foreign policy decision making", **Political Psychology**, Vol: 27, No: 2, 2006, p. 267.
[122] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 184.

"can see varying reasons for a particular position, is willing to entertain the possibility that there is ambiguity in the environment, and is flexible in reacting to objects or ideas."[123] As for those who are low in CC, such individuals are disposed to "classify objects and ideas into good-bad, black-white, either-or dimensions; has difficulty in perceiving ambiguity in the environment; and reacts rather inflexibly to stimuli."[124] Therefore high complexity individuals tend to be more flexible in reasoning and tolerant to new ideas, whereas low CC individuals are less flexible in reasoning and not as tolerant to new ideas. Interestingly enough, Hermann initially asserted that CC was a stable trait and that it did not vary over time or context, unless under extreme circumstances.[125] Nonetheless, since then, Hermann has suggested that environment and context may have an effect on some leaders, and hence their CC scores may in fact fluctuate over time or under certain circumstances.[126] In other research, fluctuations in CC scores have been found in the analyses of Bill Clinton[127] and Ronald Reagan.[128]

CC is a particularly important trait as it has been associated with aggressive behavior in foreign policy.[129] High CC scores correlate with less aggressive foreign policy behavior. Conversely, low CC scores are linked to more aggressive foreign policy behavior.[130] In addition to foreign policy behavior, CC has also been linked to decision-making style; that is, how a political leader will use advisors and how he/she will process the information within decision groups. According to Dyson and Preston, "the more sensitive leaders are to information from the decision environment, the more receptive they are to the views of colleagues or constituents, the views of outside actors, and the value of alternative viewpoints and information discrepant with their existing ideas."[131] Therefore, higher CC correlates to a leader being more able and

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[123] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 195.
[124] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 195-196.
[125] Margaret G. Hermann, Reliability Problems, p. 68.
[126] M. G. Hermann, and C. F. Hermann, "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry." **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol: 33, No: 4, 1986, (Empirical Inquiry), pp. 361-387.
[127] P. Suedfeld, and M. D. Wallace, **President Clinton as a cognitive manager.** In S. A. Renshon (Ed.), The Clinton presidency: Campaigning, governing and the psychology of leadership, Westview, Boulder, CO, 1995, pp. 215-233.
[128] B. Dille, **Cognitive management during foreign policy restructuring: The Bush administration's review policy.** (Unpublished master's thesis), Arizona State University, 1996.
[129] Hermann, Explaining Foreign Policy, p. 10.
[130] Hermann, Explaining Foreign Policy, p. 11.
[131] Dyson and Preston, p. 267.

willing to listen to others (including those with opposing ideas), and more able to value the information (discrepant or not) gathered.

3. Self-Confidence

Self-confidence (SC) refers to "one's sense of self-importance, an individual's image of his or her ability to cope adequately with objects and persons in the environment."[132] It is important to note that since people typically form self-confidence by comparing oneself with others, the SC is then frequently used as an expression of the way in which one positions him or herself in a particular context.

Leaders with high SC are less likely to absorb contextual information as compared to those with lower SC scores. Additionally, leaders high in SC tend to be quite satisfied with themselves. Due to this, a leader with high SC does not pursue additional information or material to use in assessing one's behavior or one's overall self.[133] Additionally, it is less probable that a leader high in SC will be affected by changes in his or her environment; meaning, he or she will maintain behavioral consistency. Conversely, leaders low in SC will be inconsistent in performance and behavior as they are more likely to be affected contextual vicissitudes. Fluctuating circumstances lead low SC leaders to seek new information as they often tend not to know how to conform and adapt to the changing environment. As noted by Kesgin, low SC individuals "are likely to behave inconsistently since the environment around them conditions their behavior and not their needs and desires."[134]

4. Task Focus

Task Focus (TASK) refers how an individual orients him or herself; that is, most individuals have either problem-focused or relationship-focused orientations. This trait can be thought of as a continuum, with one end being problem-focused and the opposite end being relationship-focused. By relationship-focused, it is meant that a leader is more motivated to act in order to build relationships and maintain group spirit.

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[132] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 194
[133] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp.194-195.
[134] Kesgin, Israel and Turkey, p. 18.

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Such leaders are likely to focus on the needs of their constituents. By problem-focused, it is meant that a leader is oriented more towards completing an existing task or problem. Leaders as this focus on progressing toward a specific goal. "For leaders who emphasize the problem, moving the group (nation, government, ethnic group, religious group, union, etc.) toward a goal is their principal purpose for assuming leadership. For those who emphasize group maintenance and establishing relationships, keeping the loyalty of constituents and morale are the central functions of leadership"[135] Hermann explicates on this topic by explaining that leaders are either motivated by an internal focus (i.e. a problem, cause, ideology, or a specific set of interests) or an external focus (i.e. relationships, power, support, acclaim). As such, leaders who are relationship-focused will work to protect the groups with which they fill affiliated from potential threats. Leaders who are problem-focused will not look out for threats, but rather for opportunities from which they can benefit.[136]

5. Distrust of Others (DIS)

Distrust of Others (DIS) deals with feelings of suspicion, uneasiness, and an overall apprehension of other people and their actions. Leaders high in DIS often suspect the motives of others as being ill in nature. Often, those with opposing views will be considered as competitors and therefore all of their actions will be questioned. DIS in extreme form can lead to paranoia, often causing the individual to mistrust not only other individuals, but also other groups and countries as well. As distrust and suspiciousness is excessive for those high in DIS, such individuals are likely to shift their advisors frequently to relinquish any fear of doubt. Leaders who are low in the trait of DIS will often use previous experiences to judge who to trust and not to trust.[137]

6. Need for Power

The trait, Need for Power (PWR), concerns an individual's desire to establish and preserve his or her power and maintain control or influence over others. A leader

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[135] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 198.
[136] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 197-199.
[137] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 202-203.

high in PWR will want to appear as the winner in all occasion, thus will try to manipulate his or her environment. Hermann states that the ones high in PWR "are highly Machiavellian, often working behind the scenes to ensure that their positions prevail."[138] In this regard, such individuals give little care to the people around them. On the other hand, leaders low in PWR often have a sense of teamwork and have less of a need be in command and at the helm. Moreover, such leaders work in the best interests of the group, as what benefits the group is also considered to benefit the leader.[139]

7. In-group Bias

In-group bias (IGB) or as known in previous literature, nationalism[140], is a trait that evaluates how an individual views the importance of his or her identifiable group compared to the rest of the world.[141] A group can be a social, political, or ethnic based affiliation. Hermann explains that one's in-group is based on emotional attachments and often one perceives his or her in-group as the best.[142] Likewise, it is essential to preserve the in-groups culture, values, and status. When an individual ranks high in this trait, he or she will work hard to maintain the identity of his or her own group. Moreover, he or she may become alarmed if other groups (i.e. organizations, governments, countries) intrude in his or her group's affairs. Hermann explicates, "Leaders with high scores for in-group bias tend to see the world in we and them (friends and enemies) terms and to be quick to view others as challenging the status of their group."[143] Additionally, individual's ranking high in IGB are likely to consider only the good qualities of their group, and ignore any existing flaws. If an individual is low in IGB, however, that does not mean he or she is not a patriot of his or her group. Conversely, such individuals would still be interested in group maintenance and can be labeled as loyal. However, the difference between a low and high ranking in IGB is that low IGB

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[138] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 191.
[139] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 190-192.
[140] See Hermann, Explaining Foreign Policy, pp. 7-46.
[141] Kesgin, Israel and Turkey, p. 16.
[142] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 201.
[143] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 201-202.

individuals are more capable of seeing the world in shades of gray and judging enemies based on the situation and context, not simply on a "us vs. them" standard.[144]

B. LTA Methodology Used to Assess Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Leadership Style

Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) uses coding schemes based on spontaneous spoken material from individuals to determine personality traits. These coding schemes utilize anchors within the spoken material to interpret the speaker's true meaning and intentions. The use of anchors within LTA is based on the assumption that the substance of a speaker's words when spoken spontaneously can reveal the speakers authentic personality traits. There are seven personality traits that are coded using LTA. The seven traits are as follows: Conceptual Complexity (CC), Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE),[145] Task Focus (TASK), Need for Power (PWR), Self-Confidence (SC), Distrust of Others (DIS), and In-Group Bias (IGB). The abbreviated written-form of each of the seven traits has not always been used in the literature; however for the purposes of this work abbreviations are used.

For the purposes of this study, each of the seven traits were calculated individually using Profiler Plus (Version 7.1.5), which is available online free of use with permission. Profiler Plus is provided through Social Science Automation and based upon the works of Margaret Hermann.[146] In order to take full use of the program, it is important to input only spontaneous spoken material as clarified by Hermann.[147] Spontaneous material includes words spoken "off the cuff" such as during interviews or when speaking in unplanned situations. Such material is widely available through newspapers such as the New York Times and online databases such as Highbeam Research.

Once the spontaneous material has been collected, it is inputted in the Profiler Plus. Profiler Plus analyzes the text based on the specified codes (see Table 1) then the results are given with each sentence listed from the spontaneous material's input with its appropriate code and anchor. The anchor is the word from the sentence that

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[144] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 201-202.
[145] Sometimes referred to as Belief Ability Can Control Events
[146] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 178-212.
[147] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 178-212.

signifies either a low or high score for the trait. For example, if the analyst has input spontaneous material into the Profiler Plus for the trait CC, then the Profiler Plus will then search the text for anchors such as "only", "exactly", "all".

A code is then applied to the anchor based on whether the anchor exhibits a low or high score. To use the previous example for the trait CC, each anchor would be applied a code of either "HC" or "LC". Once the text has been completely analyzed, a list of anchors and codes is presented to the analyst. From this point, it is important to calculate the codes based on the appropriate trait equation. Again, elaborating on the existing example, if the analyst is presented with 170 codes for all of the anchors within the text, let's say 100 are coded as "HC" and 70 are coded as "LC". The analyst would then apply the given CC trait equation; that is, the total amount of "HC" (100) divided by the total amount of codes given (170). The result would then be 0.59. This number now can be used in addition to the other CC trait equation quotients based on other spontaneous spoken material, to find the mean and therefore overall trait score. Each trait possesses its own codes and anchors. Table 1 lists the personality traits with a description of each trait's coding scheme, anchor examples, code value, and equation to calculate trait score.

Table 1: Personality Trait Coding Schemes

Personality Trait	Description of Coding Scheme	Anchor Examples	Code Value	Calculation
Conceptual Complexity	Coding for conceptual complexity focuses on particular words that suggest the author can see different dimensions in the environment and words that indicate the author sees only a few categories along which to classify objects and ideas. Examples of words that are suggestive of high conceptual complexity include: approximately, possibility, trend, and for example. Examples of words that are suggestive of of low conceptual complexity include: absolutely, without a doubt, certainly, and irreversible.	only, exactly, all	HC, LC	HC/ (HC + LC)
Belief in Ability to Control Events	Coding for belief in control over events focuses on verbs. It is assumed that when people take responsibility for planning or initiating an action, they believe that they have some control over what happens. Action proposed or taken by the author or a group with whom he or she identifies indicates belief in control over events.	I, we, my	IC, EC	IC / (IC + EC)
Self-Confidence	Coding for self-confidence focuses on the pronouns "my," "myself," "I," "me,"and "mine." When the use of the pronoun reflects that the speaker: is instigating an activity (for example, "I am going to . . .," "That is my plan of action"), should be viewed as an authority figure on this issue (for example, "If it were up to me . . .," "Let me explain what we mean"), or is the recipient of a positive response from another person or group (for example, "You flatter me with your praise," "My position was accepted") self-confidence is indicated.	I, my	SC+, SC-	SC+ / (SC + SC-)

Task Orientation	Coding for task orientation, attention focuses on words that indicate work on a task or instrumental activity as well as words that center around concern for another's feelings, desires, and satisfaction. For example, accomplishment, achieve(ment), plan, position, proposal, recommendation, and tactic are task-oriented, whilst appreciation, amnesty, collaboration, disappoint(ment), forgive(ness), harm, liberation, suffering are group maintenance words.	neighbor, father, volunteer	HC, LC	T+ / (T+ + T-)
Distrust	Coding for distrust focuses on references persons other than the leader and to groups other than those with whom the leader identifies that convey distrust, doubt, misgivings or concern about what these persons or groups are doing.	coup, struggling, opposition	D+	D+ / (word count)
In-Group Bias	Coding for in-group bias focuses on words or phrases referring to the author's own group that: are favorable (for example, "great," "peace-loving," progressive," "successful," "prosperous"); suggest strength (for example, "powerful," "capable," "made great advances," "has boundless resources"); or indicate the need to maintain group honor and identity (for example, "need to defend firmly our borders," "must maintain our own interpretation," "decide our own policies").	our region, our people, us	IGB, IGREF	IGB/IGREF
Need for Power	Coding for need for power focuses on verbs where the author (1) proposes or engages in a strong, forceful action such as an assault or attack, a verbal threat, an accusation, or a reprimand; (2) gives advice or assistance when it is not solicited; (3) attempts to regulate the behavior of another person or group; (4) tries to persuade, bribe, or argue with someone else so long as the concern is not to reach agreement or avoid disagreement; (5) endeavors to impress or gain fame with an action; or (6) is concerned with his or her reputation or position.	we, our, us	P+, P-	P+ / (P+ + P-)

Source: Magarett G. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis", **The Pychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton,** (Ed. Jerrold M. Post), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2003.

Once a score is calculated for each of the seven personality traits based on each source of spontaneous spoken material, the results must then be compared to a norming group in order to achieve significance. As mentioned previously by Kesgin, the norming group chosen by the analyst matters.[148] For the purpose of this study, three norming groups were utilized:

1) World Leaders, N=284[149]
2) Middle East, N=83[150]
3) Turkish Prime Ministers since 1991, N=7[151]

Each of the norming groups were chosen with a specific intention. *World Leaders* (N=284) was selected as it is the largest current pool of leader data available. By comparing Erdoğan's results with 284 world leaders it is possible to view how Erdoğan's personality compares and contrasts to other leaders from around the globe. *Middle East* (N=83) as a norming group was selected in part due to the fact that Görener and Ucal[152] also used *Middle East* (N=83) as a reference group for their analysis of Erdoğan, therefore leaving room to search for similarities and differences based on the results from the two time periods of their study and this study. In addition, the *Middle East* (N=83) norming group could be seen not only as a geographical pairing, but also a religious pairing allowing for possible diversity in the results. Finally, *Turkish Prime Ministers since 1991* (N=7) was chosen as the third and final norming group based on the research of Kesgin[153] in which it was stated that national norming groups for Turkish examples have produced the best results when determining leadership style. As this norming group is used in this study and in Kesgin, it also allows for comparison between the results given for Erdoğan between the two time periods. By comparing the results from this study and those of Görener and Ucal, as well as Kesgin, it is possible to determine just how sensitive Erdoğan is to his environment and context. Once the norming groups are established, it is possible for the analyst to determine whether the individual being analyzed ranks high, low, or within the mean in regards to

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[148] Kesgin, Leadership Traits, pp. 136-157.
[149] Social Science Automation, October, 2012.
[150] Kesgin, Leadership Traits, pp. 136-157.
[151] Kesgin, Leadership Traits, pp. 136-157.
[152] Kesgin, Israel and Turkey, p. 17.
[153] Kesgin, Leadership Traits, p. 136-157.

each of the seven traits. This information can then be used to create a leadership profile.

1. How to create a leadership profile?

A leadership profile consists of factors which can help the leadership style of an individual based on his/her personality traits. A leadership profile answers questions such as:

1. Does the leader respect or challenge constraints?
2. Is the leader open to new information?
3. What are the leader's motivations for seeking office?
4. How does the leader view the world?

Based on the results from the above questions, a leadership style can be determined. By leadership style, it is meant "the ways in which leaders relate to those around them, whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders – how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions."[154] In other words, leadership style is important in assessing a leaders decision-making style on foreign policy as it allows the researcher to greater understand the leader's beliefs, how he or she makes decisions, his or her views of the world, and typical ways he or she deals with others.

a. Constraints: Respects or Challenges

Through assessing an individual's BACE and PWR scores the analyst is able to determine whether or not a leader respects or challenges the constraints in which he/she faces. For example, if a leader has a high BACE score and a high PWR score, then he/she would be likely to challenge any limitations in which he/she comes across. According to research, leaders such as these are more likely to directly confront issues at hand, apply immediate resolutions to existing challenges, be decisive, and work

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[154] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 181.

aggressively to achieve solutions and answers.[155] They can manipulate their surroundings both directly and indirectly. In this way, such leaders can successfully seek desired policies and effectively achieve them. These leaders are in command of their surroundings and often push the limits of their role and political position. Such leaders are skilled at achieving their goals despite restraints. According to Hermann, "their personal characteristics are highly predictive of their responses to events because constraints are viewed as obstacles but not insurmountable ones."[156] Due to their need to maintain control over events, such leaders work to command the policy-making and decision-making.

On the other hand, leaders high in BACE and low in PWR challenge constraints, but are less successful in their attempts to command decision-making due to being too straightforward in their exercise of power. This also means such leaders are less capable of manipulating their environment and those within their environment to achieve their desired outcomes.[157] Alternatively, leaders with a low BACE and high PWR take a clandestine approach; that is, they operate indirectly. Due to such a leader's "behind the scene" style, they are therefore less accountable for the outcomes of their actions and decision-making.[158]

Hermann elaborates on this topic by stating that leaders who are quick to respond to their environment and constraints (e.g. leaders with low PWR and BACE scores) have been found to be more empathetic. That is, they are more interested in how their constituents view events and work to gain their support. This also means that leaders who are responsive to their context will be more open to compromising and bargaining, as well as be more likely to approach events case-by-case.[159] Such leaders function within the constraints given rather than combating to break away from them. As a result, leaders low in BACE and PWR often work towards building consensus and cooperating with others.

Leaders who are neither high nor low, but moderate for the traits BACE and PWR are situational in their approach to whether they will respect or challenge

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[155] M. J. Driver, **Individual differences as determination of aggression in the inter-nation simulation**, 1977; In M. G. Hermann (Ed.), **A psychological examination of political leaders,** New York: Free Press, 1977, pp. 337–353.
[156] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 182
[157] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 183.
[158] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp 181-183.
[159] See Driver; Kaarbo and Hermann, Prime Ministers.

constraints. Other dominant traits may drive their reaction or they may act according to the context of the circumstances.

Due to the fact that "constraints set the parameters for action for [political] leaders, their personal characteristics suggest the degree of support and closure they will need from the environment before making a decision and where that support will be sought.[160,161] In other words, researchers can look at the personal characteristics of leaders to determine how much support (i.e. from fellow politicians, the military, advisors, constituents) is needed before reaching a final decision, and also from where the leader will seek such support.[162] See Table 2 for more information on how leaders react to constraints.

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[160] See Driver; D. G. Winter, M. G. Hermann, W. Weintraub, and S. G. Walker, "The Personalities of Bush and Gorbachev Measured at a Distance: Procedures, Portraits, and Policy." **Political Psychology**, Vol: 12 No:2,1991, pp. 215-245.
[161] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 182.
[162] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 182.

Table 2: Leaders' Reactions to Constraints

| Need for Power | Belief Can Control Events | |
	Low	**High**
Low	**Respect** constraints; work within such parameters toward goals; compromis and consesus building important	**Challenge** constraints but less successful in doing so because too direct and open in use of power; less able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence.
High	**Challenge** constraints but more comfortable doing so in an indirect fashion-- behind the scenes; good at being "power behind the throne" where they can pull strings but are less accountable for result.	**Challenge** constraints; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens.

Source: Magarett G. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis", **The Pychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton,** (Ed. Jerrold M. Post), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2003.

b. Contextual Information: Open or Closed

By assessing an individual's CC and SC scores, the analyst can determine whether or not the individual under analysis is open to contextual information or closed. Hermann gives an example as to how being open or closed to contextual information may affect policy-making behavior through the use of US presidents. She explains that presidents, who have an established agenda (and therefore closed to new information), were more likely to pursue reinforcing ideas and information which supported their particular viewpoint. This also means that presidents as these were apt to surround themselves with individuals who were likeminded and supportive of such predispositions. In addition, leaders (such as the presidents in the previous example) who are less open to information "have been found to act as advocates, intent on finding information that supports their definition of the situation and overlooking

evidence that is disconfirmatory; their attention is focused on persuading others of their position."[163]

However, presidents who did not have an established agenda (and therefore open to new information) were more engaged to determine what was transpiring within the existing context and what was achievable given the circumstances. Such presidents also sought out experts to give advice and/or opinions on the matters before constructing their own final decision. Hermann elaborates by stating, "Such leaders are interested in information that is both discrepant and supportive of the options on the table at the moment, seeking political insights into who is supporting what and with what degree of intensity."[164] To determine whether an individual is closed or open to contextual information, it is necessary to look at their SC and CC scores. If an individual's CC score is greater than their SC score, the individual is likely to be open to new ideas and information. On the other hand, if the opposite is true, that is if an individual's SC score is greater than their CC score, the individual is likely to be closed to new information. If both scores are high, the individual is expected to be open to different ideas and new information. If both scores are low, the individual is not expected to be open to different ideas and new information. See *Table 3: Rules for Determining Openness to Information* for more details regarding how to determine whether a leader is open or closed to contextual information.

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[163] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 183. (See Hermann and Hermann, Empirical Inquiry; Kaarbo and Hermann, Prime Ministers).
[164] Hermann, Leadership Style, p. 183. (See Hermann and Hermann, Empirical Inquiry; Kaarbo and Hermann, Prime Ministers).

Table 3: Rules for Determining Openness to Information

Scores on Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence	Openness to Contextual Information
Conceptual Complexity > Self-Confidence	Open
Self-Confidence > Conceptual Complexity	Closed
Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence Both High	Open
Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence Both Low	Closed

Source: Magarett G. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis", **The Pychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton,** (Ed. Jerrold M. Post), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2003.

c. Motivation: Relationship-focused or Problem-focused

The score for TASK determines an individual's motivation for seeking office; i.e. whether his/her motivation is problem-focused or relationship-focused**.** Understanding the determining factors as to what motivates individuals can provide information as to the underlying forces that drive their behaviors. As for political leaders, it is especially important to determine what propels them to enter politics and maintain a position as a political official. Hermann, elaborates stating that political leaders "are driven, in general, either by an internal focus—a particular problem or cause, an ideology, a specific set of interests—or by the desire for a certain kind of feedback from those in their environment—acceptance, approval, power, support, status, acclaim."[165] In other words, those who are problem-focused are motivated by internal ideas and preconceptions that they give credence to and have chosen to advocate. Conversely, those who are relationship-focused are driven by outside forces; i.e. relationships with others whom they deem important and worthy. Such relationships pull relationship-focused leaders to act. Hence, "for those for whom solving problems and achieving causes is highly salient, mobilization and effectiveness feature prominently in movement toward their goal; for those motivated by their relationships with others,

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[165] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 183-184.

persuasion and marketing are central to achieving their goal."[166] To assess what form of motivation drives an individual to enter and continue in government, it is important to look at their TASK score. A high TASK score signifies a problem-focused motivation. A low TASK score implies a motivation that is relationship-focused. If the score on TASK is moderate, then the individual's motivation would be determined as contextual; that is, the individual may be either driven by an ideology or by relationships depending on the situation. See *Table 4: Rules for Assessing Motivation for Seeking Office* for more information as to how to determine a leader's motivation.

Table 4: Rules for Assessing Motivation for Seeking Office

Score on Task Focus	Motivation for Seeking Office
High	Problem
Moderate	Both problem and relationship depending on the context
Low	Relationship

Source: Magarett G. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis", **The Pychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton,** (Ed. Jerrold M. Post), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2003.

d. Motivation toward the World: Trusting or Threatening

DIS and IGB scores can be used together to reveal an individual's motivation toward the world; i.e. whether he/she perceives the world as hostile or not. If both IGB and DIS scores are low, it is expected that the leader views the world as a trusting space and not threatening in nature. When conflicts arise, individuals with low in IGB and DIS are likely to perceive them as situational; therefore, their approach will be case-by-case. If IGB and DIS scores are both high, i.e. if the individual is highly

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[166] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 183-184.

distrustful of his/her environment and has a large bias towards his/her in-group, he/she is likely to view the world in which he/she operates as hostile. In this hostile world exists malevolent adversaries whose aim is to spread their ideology and/or power to the dismay and detriment of others. For this reason, leaders with high IGB and DIS scores are motivated to impede such adversaries in order to preserve the status quo. Say an individual's DIS score is high, but their IGB score is low; in this situation, it would be assumed that the leader does not view the world as peaceful. In fact, such leader would expect conflicts between countries. And yet a leader high in DIS, but low in IGB, would also assume that cooperation among nations is both doable and feasible; therefore, he/she would work to enhance his/her country's interests by taking advantage of constructive relationships, all the while remaining vigilant in international affairs. If an individual is high in IGB, but low in DIS, he/she would perceive the world as a zero-sum game regulated by international laws and norms. Therefore, he/she would expect conflicts within the international system, but would also expect possible solutions to be available to resolve existing dilemmas. See *Table 5: Rules for Assessing Motivation toward World* to see the layout for assessing how a leader views the world based on IGB and DIS trait scores.

Table 5: Rules for Assessing Motivation toward World

In-group Bias	Distrust of Others	
	Low	**High**
Low	World is not a threatening place; conflicts are perceived as context-specific and reacted to on a case-by-case basis; leaders recognize that their country, like many others, has to deal with certain constraints that limit what one can do and call for flexibility of response; moreover, there are certain international arenas where cooperation with others is both possible and feasible. *(Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and relationships)*	World is perceived as conflict-prone, but because other countries are viewed as having constraints on what they can do, some flexibility in response is possible; leaders, however, must vigilantly monitor developments in the international arena and prudently prepare to contain an adversary's actions while still pursuing their countries' interests. *(Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relations while remaining vigilant)*
High	While the international system is essentially a zero-sum game, leaders view that it is bounded by a specified set of international norms; even so, adversaries are perceived as inherently threatening and confrontation is viewed to be ongoing as leaders work to limit the threat and enhance their countries; capabilities and relative status. (*Focus is on dealing with threats and solving problems even though some situations may appear to offer opportunities)*	International politics is centered around a set of adversaries that are viewed as "evil" and intent on spreading their ideology or extending their power at the expense of others; leaders perceive that they have a moral imperative to confront these adversaries; as a result, they are likely to take risks and to engage in highly aggressive and assertive behavior. *(Focus is on eliminating potential threats and problems)*

Source: Magarett G. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis", **The Pychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton,** (Ed. Jerrold M. Post), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2003.

C. Determining Leadership Style

Glenn Paige defines "style" as "a collection of habitual patterns in meeting role demand. Viewed from the outside, a man's style is the observed quality and character of his performance. Viewed from the inside, it is his bundle of strategies for adapting, for protecting and enhancing self-esteem."[167] Thus, when referring to leadership style, it is the manner in which an individual deals with the responsibilities of his/her role as leader and is ascertained by assessing the willingness of an individual to listen and be swayed by new ideas, the way in which he/she handles the limitations of his/her environment, and the motives that drive him/her to maintain an active role in office.

The ultimate goal of Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is to utilize the personality traits that have been determined through the analysis of spontaneous spoken material of an individual to then construct a reliable leadership style profile. Hermann has revealed eight different leadership style possibilities.[168] There are three different elements that collaborate to create a leadership style: openness to contextual information, responsiveness to constraints, and motivation for seeking office. Each of the leadership styles are constructed through assessing a leader's CC and SC score (how opened or closed he/she is to information) and his/her BACE and PWR scores (how he/she responds to constraints). In addition, his/her TASK score plays an in important role in determining what type of leadership style is most accurate as motivation for pursuing office is a key determinant.

The table below (Table 6) displays the eight different leadership styles that can be determined by using the three elements listed above.[169]

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[167] Paige, p. 86.
[168] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 178-212.
[169] For more detail regarding the ways in which the three factors that determine leadership style interrelate, see Margaret G. Hermann, et al., "Who leads matters: The effects of powerful individuals", **International Studies Review,** Vol: 3, No: 2, 2001, pp. 83-131.

Table 6: Leadership Style As A Function Of Responsiveness To Constraints, Openness To Information, And Motivation

Responsiveness to Constraints	Openness to Information	Motivation	
		Problem Focus	**Relationship Focus**
Challenges Constraints	**Closed to Information**	*Expansionistic* (Focus of attention is on expanding leader's, government's, and state's span of control)	*Evangelistic* (Focus of attention is on persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing other's around one's message)
Challenges Constraints	**Open to Information**	*Actively Independent* (Focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both)	*Directive* (Focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's status and acceptance by others by engaging in actions on the world stage that enhance the state's reputation)
Respects Constraints	**Closed to Information**	*Incremental* (Focus of attention is on improving state's economy and/or security in incremental steps while avoiding the abstacles that will inevitably arise along the way)	*Influential* (Focus of attention is on building cooperative relationships with other governments and states in order to play a leadership role; by working with others, one can gain more than is possible on one's own)
Respects Constraints	**Open to Information**	*Oppurtunistic* (Focus of attention is on assessing what is possible in the current situation and context given what one wants to achieve and considering what important consituencies will allow)	*Collegial* (Focus of attention is on reconciling differences and building consensus--on gaining prestige and status through empowering others and sharing accountability)

Source: Magarett G. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis", **The Pychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton,** (Ed. Jerrold M. Post), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2003.

All in all, the seven traits of LTA (BACE, CC, SC, TASK, DIS, PWR, IGB) can individually give information as to how a leader perceives his/her environment, to what

extent a leader believes he/she can control the situations in which he/she is present, whether he/she distrusts those around him/her, and more. Yet, the seven traits can also work in combination, allowing the researcher to gain further information regarding the personality and leadership style of a leader. Answers to questions such as does the leader challenge or respect constraints, is the leader open or closed to contextual information, does the leader view the world as threatening in nature, and what motivates the leader to seek office can be gathered from viewing specific traits in collaboration with one another. The answers to the above questions when applied to *Table 5: Leadership Style as A Function of Responsiveness to Constraints, Openness to Information, And Motivation* allows researchers to ascertain the specific leadership style of a leader. Hence, researchers can use the traits individually and in combination to learn the most regarding a leader, his personality, and his leadership style.

CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE IMPACT OF LEADERSHIP
ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Leaders, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the military, public opinion and business all have made an impact on Turkish foreign policy throughout various decades of Republic of Turkey. While leaders such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü shaped foreign policy in the early years of the Republic and throughout the Second World War respectively, Prime Minister/President Turgut Özal had a significant impact on the foreign policy decision-making towards the end of 1980s and early 1990s. This chapter aims to elucidate the historical background of the Turkish Republic. The goal of the following sections is to not only retell the history so that the reader may better understand the current conditions of affairs in Turkey, but also to highlight how past leaders affected Turkish foreign policy. The first section will highlight 20th century Turkish history as it relates to foreign policy and leadership. The next section discusses AK Party's approach to foreign policy, including a concise summary of the "Zero Problems with the Neighbors" approach designed by AK Party's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu. In addition, this section presents a brief analysis of leadership and who makes foreign policy decisions under AK Party. The third section gives an outline of 21st current events and an explanation as to how AK Party has changed Turkish foreign policy utilizing Charles Hermann's definition and model of foreign policy change. The final section presents a brief overview of the historical ties and relations between Turkey and Syria, Iraq, and Israel in order for the reader to gain better understanding of the contextual setting presented in the case studies.

I. FROM THE EARLY YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC TO THE 2000s

Various actors, groups, and dynamics shaped Turkish foreign policy from the early years of the Republic until today. As already stated while Atatürk and İnönü were the main decision-makers in the early years of the Republic and during the Second World War period, Prime Minister Menderes and the various Ministers of Foreign Affairs shaped the foreign policy-making between 1950s and 1960s. During the tumultuous period of 1960 – 1983, public opinion and the press shaped the foreign policy at

different times. Turkey and Turkish foreign policy was in chaos due to short-living vulnerable coalition governments that created instability during this period. During the 1983-1991 Prime Minister/President Özal period, Özal as a determinative leader shaped the foreign policy with influence from business groups who also had an impact on foreign policy decision-making. During the 1991-2002 coalition governments period, the Minister of Foreign Affair was in charge of foreign policy. Nonetheless, during the coalition between the center rightist and leftist parties, the military began to dominate foreign policy decision-making when a religiously conservative party established a coalition government. This section will give a brief historical background of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish leaders that have impact on foreign policy-making beginning with the establishment of the Turkish Republic until the current state of Turkish affairs in order for the reader to develop a broader understanding of the social, cultural, and historical state of Turkey.

A. Early Years of the Republic and the Second World War Period, 1923-1950

The formation of the Republic of Turkey spawned from the Turkish War of Independence; a war fought to regain Anatolia and Eastern Thrace from the Allied Powers after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was the first President of Turkey. He ruled over a single party system (Republican People's Party, CHP) from 1923 until his death in 1938. As Turkey's supreme leader, Atatürk was the main factor in Turkish decision-making in regards to internal, economic, and foreign policy. According to İlhan Uzgel, Atatürk was a "determinative leader" as he made the final calls concerning nearly all of the state's issues.[170] During much of this period, Turkey had a foreign policy dictating neutrality; that is, Turkey refrained from joining alliances with other nations. Instead of forming alliances, Turkey focused on maintaining good relations with its neighbors and Europe in an attempt to mollify previous problematic relations stemming from World War I and the Turkish War of Independence. According to Erik J. Zürcher, "The Turkish Republic's foreign policy throughout the period from 1923 to 1945 can be characterized as

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[170] İlhan Uzgel, "TDP'nin Oluşturulması", in Baskın Oran, **Türk Dış Politikası,** İletişim Yayıncılık, Istanbul, 2001, pp. 74-75.

cautious, realistic, and generally aimed at the preservation of the status quo and the hard-won victory of 1923."[171] In other words, Turkey aimed to keep the newly formed republic from entangling itself in new disputes so as not to endanger the safety of the young nation.

İsmet İnönü (1938-1950) who served as the president and the prime minister of the country acted as a determinative leader particularly during the Second World War when he proceeded as the ultimate decision-making power.[172] Both Atatürk and İnönü in an attempt to maintain a separation between the military sphere and political sphere restricted the military's role in foreign policy decision-making to strictly technical arenas only. During the Second World War, İnönü attempted to maintain good relations with both the Axis and Allied powers. During this period, Turkey signed agreements with both the British and the French, as well as with the Germans, in order to keep a "scrupulously neutral position."[173] In fact, Turkey refrained from entering the World War II until nearly the end and never engaged in combat. The determinative leadership style in Turkish foreign policy continued during the 1950's multi-party system in which Prime Minister Adnan Menderes dominated foreign-policy decision-making with increasing influence from the MFA.

B. Transition to Multi-Party System, 1950-1960

Due to the Soviet Union's threatening attempts to invade Turkey to gain control the Straits and occupy Kars and Ardahan, Turkey joined the Western-block as a NATO member in the aftermath of the Second World War, defaulting on its previous neutral position held during the war. During this period while Prime Minister Menderes played a significant role in foreign policy decision-making (i.e. Turkey's decision to join the war in Korea and Turkey's membership to NATO) particularly in early 1950s, the MFA and Ministers of Foreign Affairs started to dominate the foreign policy-making starting around mid-1950s.[174] In fact, Menderes placed his trust in the MFA to make decisions regarding international affairs, as he understood that he had less experience and understanding of foreign relations to make effective decisions. With that ushered in a

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[171], Erik J. Zürcher, **Turkey: A modern history**, IB Tauris, London and New York, 2004, pp. 200-201.
[172] Uzgel, p. 76.
[173] William Hale, **Turkish Foreign Policy, (1774-2000),** Frank Cass, London, 2000, (TFP), pp. 48-49.
[174] Uzgel, pp. 76-77.

new period with an increasing impact on foreign policy decision-making from the MFA. Moreover, during this period, the military and the Turkish press lacked significant influence on decision-making. The Turkish military only gave technical advice under Turkey's membership to NATO and Bagdad Pact. As such, Menderes paid little attention to the views of the military, and in that, greatly underestimated its importance to creating a viable foreign policy. [175]

Although Fuat Köprülü, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs under Menderes, was not a very experienced Minister and did not dominate foreign policy, the following foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu took charge and gained control of foreign policy decision-making. Particularly, as the unrest between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots began on the island of Cyprus, Zorlu came to be the central decision-maker. Menderes government's authoritarian rule led to a military intervention in May 1960 where the Turkish government under military control banned Menderes' Democrat Party and executed Menderes.[176]

C. Tumultuous Period with Relative Autonomy, 1960-1983

This period began with the 1960s military coup and continued with the restoration of a multi-party period and a deterioration of Turkish-American relations as a result of the dispute in Cyprus. This deterioration led Turkey to follow a more multi-dimensional foreign policy as the direct threat from the Soviet Union diminished. Domestically, the state confronted much turmoil as a result of the rise of extreme leftist and rightist movements. These extremist movements rose to fruition in part due to global developments as well as a new liberal Turkish constitution that granted a new level of freedom of speech. During this period, weak and vulnerable coalition governments, which came to power for only short periods of time, created an instable political environment. The foreign policy-making was further complicated with the often changing MFA ministers. In other words, Turkey experienced a "weak and unstable government and a rising tide of political terrorism from violent extremists of both right and left, combined with soaring inflation and huge deficits in the balance of

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[175] Zürcher, p. 231.
[176] Zürcher, p 231.

payments."[177] All of this led to the chaotic period that challenged the Turkish political landscape for over two decades.

In the first parliamentary elections, held in October 1961 following military rule, no party was able to gain the majority; therefore, a vulnerable coalition government between the Republican Peoples' Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* –CHP) and the newly established Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi* –AP) was formed. A short time later, this government collapsed and a marginally less vulnerable government was established in the mid-1960s under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, chairman of AP. Several events during this period led to mass riots and protests from the Turkish populous. For one, disappointment from a letter from U.S. President, Lyndon B. Johnson, invoked hostile feelings from the Turkish public towards the U.S., a Turkish ally. The letter was in essence a warning to Turkey of possible ramifications in the case of Turkey's possible intervention in Cyprus. The pressure created by the Turkish public opinion surrounding the letter led to multi-dimensional foreign policy as Turkey became disappointed with the American stance on Cyprus; hence, Turkey moved away from a pro-U.S. foreign policy and regained ties with other countries.[178]

In addition, the Turkish press regained some freedom following the Menderes period. In fact, the press was the byway in which the government delivered the foreign policy agenda to the public. This was a huge step forward for Turkish journalistic freedoms as the public and media began to discuss issues that were not in line the Turkish government and at times in which the government did not agree with. As an example, until this point in time foreign policy was a national issue of which it was a taboo for the public to question. However, after the 1961 constitution, foreign policy was open to debate by the press, public, and the political parties. Once foreign policy was open to debate, the MFA faced with more accountability. In other words, now the MFA and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were accountable to the public and had to explain their actions.[179]

Süleyman Demirel became the first publicly elected Prime Minister following the 1960 coup. Demirel was not interested in foreign policy due to a lack of experience in international affairs. Instead, he allowed the MFA to handle the foreign affairs of the

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[177] Hale, TFP, p. 148.
[178] Hale, TFP, p. 150.
[179] Uzgel, pp. 78-81

Turkish republic. Conversely, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, who was next to come to power, was more involved in foreign policy decision-making. Under Ecevit, attention to foreign affairs again regained importance.[180] The foreign policy directing the Cyprus Peace Operation was a large point in Ecevit's reign of power.

In the years of 1980-1983, known as the Period of September 12, another military coup took over power. During the military coup of 1980, U.S. influence became preponderant. The military and the National Security Council (NSC) controlled nearly all foreign policy decisions. In addition, to calm the chaos of the previous decade, the military administration did not permit the press or public opinion to interfere into foreign policy. Interestingly enough, during this time, the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey improved.[181]

D. Özal Years, 1983-1991

After the 1980 military coup, Turkey re-engaged itself with the Western alliance and returned to its warmer relations with the US. Soviet threat during this period decreased dramatically, beginning of the fall of Communism. The determinative leader, Prime Minister (later President) Turgut Özal leading the center-right Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi* –ANAP) controlled foreign policy decision-making. During Özal's rule, the Turkish business world greatly influenced the foreign policy decision-making process.[182]

As Özal had close connections with the United States and several international financial organizations, economic liberalization became a distinctive feature of his administration. Many of his economic programs mimicked those of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.[183] As economic and financial issues became priority, Özal allowed for the entry of big businesses into the political life in Turkey. Many businesspersons, henceforth, became greatly involved in the decision-making process, even at times taking on the role as diplomats. However, traditional institutions such as the MFA, military, and the assembly were not included into the decision-making process. Instead

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[180] Uzgel, p. 80.
[181] Uzgel, pp. 80-81.
[182] Uzgel, pp. 81-82.
[183] Hale, TFP, p. 164.

of using the existing, experienced diplomats, Özal placed business-people who were educated in Europe and the U.S. in the MFA and other government institutions.[184]

E. Coalition Governments, 1991-2002

Once Özal's ANAP lost the elections, a coalition government between the center right True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi* –DYP) and center-left Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti* –SHP) formed. Under the DYP-SHP coalition, the MFA became the primary decision-maker in Turkish foreign policy. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hikmet Çetin, in his three-year term distinguished himself among his predecessors with his active foreign policy. After Çetin left office, however, power changed hands too many time leaving the MFA debilitated. As an example, in an eighteen-month period in 1997-1998, four different ministers served for an average of only four and a half months each. Such a high turnover rate for ministers in a sensitive ministry left the MFA incapable of coping with the great changes in the international environment, i.e. the end of the Cold War.[185]

Towards the end of the period, the religiously conservatively Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi* –RP) came to power by establishing a coalition government with DYP. However, the military fighting with both PKK terror and rise of Islamist fundamentalism took over the foreign policy decision-making, incapacitating the civil government in the process. Particularly, when the leader of the conservative RP, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, paid his first official visits abroad to Iran and Libya, the military became more worried than ever. The military's fright is especially evident when Erbakan attempted to freeze relations with Israel from which the military was receiving intelligence concerning PKK terrorists; the military immediately intervened into the foreign policy-making of the RP-DYP government. However, in the aftermath of 28 February coup, this military domination of foreign policy was again transferred to the MFA and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem, during the coalition government of the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti* –DSP), the National Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* –MHP) and ANAP between 1999-2002

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[184] Uzgel, pp. 80-82
[185] Hale, TFP, pp. 195-199.

In sum, the foreign policy decision-making power changed from hand to hand throughout the 20th century in Turkey. At various points throughout this period, power to make decisions in foreign policy fluctuated between the Prime Minister, President, Military, and the MFA. In addition, throughout this period, various factors and actors such as public opinion, the press, and the business groups also gained and lost impact on the decision-making process, depending on the period and the people in charge. Nonetheless, it is evident that leader dominance is a significant underlying feature of Turkish political culture and the Turkish party system. This aspect of the Turkish system continues under the AK Party rule as Erdoğan becomes, in essence, a determinative leader.

II. AK PARTY'S FOREIGN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP STYLE (2002-2014)

Turkish foreign policy during the AK Party era witnessed a continuation of activism, which had already started during Özal's presidency in the early 1990s and under the Minister of the coalition government of 1999-2002, Ismail Cem. The relations with the Middle East that had already started improving in 1999 continued harmoniously during the AK Party period. Similarly, the significant initiatives that the previous government built in early 1990s to improve economic and diplomatic links with Russia also continued during AK Party foreign ministry. Most significant contribution of AK Party to the foreign policy was its constant emphasis on the use of soft power, by improving relations with the neighbors and avoiding problems with them.[186] Consequently, Turkey under AK Party government pursued a more proactive policy in both global and regional arena trying to implement more influence in the Middle East as well as Balkans, Central Asia, Caucasus and Africa.

As will be analyzed in depth in the upcoming section, during the first two terms of AK Party (2002-2011), the AK Party government established harmonious relations using soft diplomacy with countries of the Middle East, particularly its neighbors Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The soft diplomacy chiefly consisted of initiatives to improve economic relations. One exception among these Middle Eastern countries is Israel. Indeed, Turkey's deteriorating relations with Israel helped Turkey to consolidate its relations

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[186] For details see Ziya Öniş, "Multiple Faces of the "new" Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a New Critique", **Glodem Working Paper Series**, April 2010, pp. 3-5, http://glodem.ku.edu.tr/sites/glodem.ku.edu.tr/files/Onis_GLODEM-WP_04_2010.pdf (20.5.2013)

with Arab states. Nevertheless, with the emergence of the Arab Spring in Syria and changing dynamics in Iran and Iraq, these pleasant relations once again turned into conflicts. Concerning Caucasus and Central Asia, Russia shaped Turkish foreign policy in these regions. The energy deals made were predominantly under Russia's supervision, as well as the construction of numerous pipelines that bypassed Russia. While the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and so-called Armenian genocide shaped Turkish-Armenian relations, cultural and Turkic ties, as well as energy deals, dominated Turkish- Azerbaijani relations. Turkish-Georgian relations were under the same framework and limits of Turkish-Russian relations.

Turkish foreign policy towards the Balkans was mostly in the shape of aid; throughout this period, the Turkish government sent aid to the recently established Balkan countries. The Turkish government also utilized the Turkish connection with the Muslim minorities of the Balkans to establish relations. During the AK Party government, in order to consolidate Turkey's political and economic position and capacity in the Balkans, the activities of Turkish companies and civil society accelerated.[187] Concerning Africa, the AK Party designed a new discourse with African countries concerning humanitarianism, complementary state, apolitical approach, etc., in order to improve Turkey's relations with the countries of Africa. Through aid, Turkey started to establish new economic ties with African countries. In the long term, such economic ties will serve the newly emerging conservative so-called Anatolian tigers, a central Anatolian merchant class.[188] To understand Turkish foreign policy during the AK Party era, it is necessary to analyze Davutoğlu's policies and the impact of leadership particularly Prime Minister Erdoğan as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu on foreign policy decision-making.

A. Impact of Leadership on Foreign Policy-Making

AK Party's more vibrant activism in foreign policy emerges during AK Party's second period in government following the 2007 elections when the party consolidated

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[187] For a detailed analysis of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans see Mehmet Uğur Ekinci, "Turkey's "Zero Problem" Era in the Balkans", **SETA**, No: 1, October 2013
[188] For a more detailed analysis of Turkish African relations see Gökhan Bacık and İsa Afacan, " Turkey Discovers Sub-Saharan Africa: The Critical Role of Agents in the Construction of Turkish Foreign-Policy Discourse", **Turkish Studies,** Vol: 14, No: 3, 2013.

its power in Turkish politics. More concisely, this activism reaches its peak with Ahmet Davutoğlu coming to the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 2009. In fact, Davutoğlu was influential in foreign policy prior to taking the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs as chief advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan. Scholars have given credit to Davutoğlu for developing AK Party's foreign policy, labeled by Davutoğlu as *Zero Problems with the Neighbors.*[189] The new foreign policy aims to increase relations with Turkey's neighbors and take advantage of Turkey's "strategic depth." Although Davutoğlu was the brainchild of the foreign policy plan, it is still inconceivable that the policies would have any affect if it were not for "Prime Minister Erdoğan's willingness to appropriate [Davutoğlu's] vision in the implementation of foreign policy."[190] As such, Davutoğlu as foreign minister is still nonetheless an advisor to Erdoğan and Erdoğan makes the final decision in Turkey's foreign policy.

In his book, *Strategic Depth,* Davutoğlu argues that Turkey possesses a great opportunity to engage actively in regional politics thanks to its geographical position.[191] The strategic depth concept affirms that Turkey is in close relation to important areas of the world, i.e. the Middle East, Asia, the Balkans, Transcaucasia, Europe, and Africa; therefore has an advantage if it can create positive relations with each of these regions, unlike administrations of the past.[192] Bülent Aras explains, "Davutoğlu developed his foreign policy on the basis of a novel geographic imagination which put an end to what he calls the 'alienation' of Turkey's neighboring countries."[193] That is, Turkey's foreign policy should take advantage of its strategic depth and become involved with regional systems. This concept is key to the Turkey's foreign policy strategy, *Zero Problems with the Neighbors.*

Zero Problems with the Neighbors consists of five main principles. The first concerns the need of a country to balance security and democracy. That is, a country should not sacrifice democratic freedoms for the sake of its own security. Davutoğlu elaborates, "The legitimacy of any political regime comes from its ability to provide security to its citizens; this security should not be at the expense of freedoms and human rights in

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[189] Bülent Aras, "The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy", **Insight Turkey**, Vol: 11, No: 3, 2009, p.127.
[190] Aras, p. 128
[191] Ahmet Davutoğlu, **Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu**, Küre Yayınları, Istanbul, 2001, (Stratejik Derinlik).
[192] Hale, New Era, p. 144.
[193] Aras, p. 128.

the country."[194] Davutoğlu likens those administrations that restrict liberties during securitized periods as authoritarian or soon to be authoritarian.[195] This principle of balance is significant to Turkey's foreign policy as democracy is Turkey's most important form of soft power.

The second principle is to maintain non-contentious relations with Turkey's neighbors. From this is where Turkey's new vision of foreign policy attains its name, *Zero Problems with the Neighbors.* As already noted, Turkey can gain advantage of its strategic depth by involving itself in a positive manner with regional states. This principle is important as states with collaborative and approachable relations "can cooperate against a common threat."[196] It is important, however, not to treat one region or state in a more favorable tone than other regions or states; this may cause antagonisms. Aras notes that, "Turkey's all-inclusive policy and equidistance policy satisfy the concerns of regional actors and assure them of the constructive nature of Turkish policies."[197] By treating all states in a fair and courteous manner, Turkey can gain the respect of other nations and thus fully participate in regional and global affairs.

Third, Turkey's new foreign policy aims to foster relations with regions both near and far. That is, Turkey wishes to extend its regional impact past its own borders. This is a point of contention for the policy as many have likened it to neo-Ottomanism. In other words, some assume Turkey is trying to increase its influence within regions formerly under Ottoman rule, in an attempt to regain its Ottoman legacy and reclaim regional influence.[198]

The fourth principle outlined by Davutoğlu outlines the need for Turkey to adhere to a multi-dimensional foreign policy. During the Cold War, Turkey allied on the side with the US and had a very one-dimensional foreign policy approach. Now that the Cold War has ended, Davutoğlu argues that it is necessary for Turkey to cooperate with all regions and nations, not compete. That is, Turkey's aim under *Zero Problem with the Neighbors* is to be open to forming relationships with any and all nations, even if the country was considered an enemy previously. In addition, an adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy also means that Turkey may be on friendly terms with countries that Turkey's allies are not. The fifth and final principle concerns the development of rhythmic diplomacy. This term relates

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[194] Davutoğlu, Zero Problems, p. 79.
[195] Davutoğlu, Zero Problems, p. 79.
[196] Davutoğlu, Zero Problems, p. 81.
[197] Aras, p. 134
[198] Nora Fisher Onar, "Neo Ottomanism, historical legacies and Turkish foreign policy", **Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies, Discussion Paper Series**, 2009, http://www.gmfus.org/doc/Discussion%20Paper%20Series_Fisher.pdf (06.05.2014)

to the way in which Turkey establishes and sustains their diplomatic relationships with other nations and other international actors. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey should develop strong diplomatic ties by sending and retrieving envoys to and from international meetings and organizations.[199]

Though Davutoğlu designed the AK Party foreign policy approach, Erdoğan nevertheless controls the foreign policy decision-making authority in the Turkish political system. In the Turkish political culture and party system, leader dominance is an important underlying feature.[200] In addition, Turkish political parties have often tolerated authoritarian-style leadership and little to no intra-party democracy. This is also true under the AK Party, with Erdoğan as head of the party whose popularity and strong sense of identity with the Turkish common people was an important asset in the winning of three consecutive elections.[201] As noted in previous sections, determinative leaders have controlled the Turkish political arena. Hence, Turkish political culture has adapted to admire strong leaders and "has generated a political system that revolves around a few key individuals rather than ideologies."[202] In the case of Erdoğan, "Few prime ministers have had greater impact on Turkish political life . . . [Erdoğan] has been dominant in both the domestic and the foreign policy of Turkey. In many ways, it seems that there is no AKP or related movement but rather the hegemony and dominance of Erdoğan."[203]

Although AK Party, under Erdoğan, designed Turkish foreign policy according to Davutoğlu's design, changing dynamics in politics transformed the relations between Turkey and its neighbors. These changing dynamics include the emergence of the Arab Spring that ignited the civil war in Syria, the changing of leadership in Iraq, and Iran's support of the Assad government in Syria. The next section will concentrate on Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East as this study's focus is on the impact of the AK Party on Turkey's relations with the Middle East, specifically aimed at Syria, Iran and Israel.

B. AK Party's Foreign Policy towards the Middle East

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[199] Davutoğlu, Zero Problems, pp. 82-83.
[200] Sabri Sayarı, "Political Parties, Party Systems, and Economic Reforms: the Turkish Case", Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol: 34, No: 4, 1996, pp. 29–45.
[201] Sabri Sayari, "Towards a New Turkish Party System?", **Turkish Studies,** Vol: 9, No: 2, June 2007, p. 202.
[202] Görener and Ucal, p. 358.
[203] M. Hakan Yavuz, **Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey,** Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 120

Once AK Party rose to power through elections in 2002, Turkey adhered to a more pro-active foreign policy towards the Middle East. However, this was not a foreign policy unique to the AK Party. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem, of the previous government had already started to smooth out the relations with the Middle Eastern countries by first signing the Adana Accords with Syria to cooperate against PKK terror. In addition to the previous governments' policies, AK Party applied new policies in the region and created an active position in the Middle East. According to Altunışık and Martin who utilized Charles Hermann's definition and model of foreign policy change, Turkey has seen an adjustment and program change in regards to the Middle East. The increased effort the AK Party placed in foreign relations with Middle Eastern countries and as they have used new methods in order to achieve their foreign policy goals display these changes. However, it is still unclear as to whether Turkish foreign policy has had a complete orientation change. Although Turkey's relations with Israel have deteriorated since the AK party came to power, Turkey's relations with the U.S. have stayed the same. Therefore, it is still too early to determine if Turkey will completely break away from the Western block in order to align itself with the Middle East or not. It is also uncertain if Turkey has undergone a problem/goal change. Although under AK Party, Turkey has made some new foreign policy initiatives, some of the old initiatives from previous administrations are still on the table. As such, Turkey has not completely overhauled its foreign policy goals under AK Party, but instead, simply added new ones to the list.

Turkey has completed an adjustment change regarding the Middle East under the direction of the AK Party. An adjustment change is a change in the level of effort, in that the new government has increased the priority level of the Middle East in their foreign policy.[204] As mentioned in previous sections before the 2000's, Turkey aligned itself with Western goal initiatives for most of the 20th century and only concerned itself with its closest neighbors; however, currently the AK Party has reengaged its foreign policy regarding the broader region surrounding Turkey.[205] As an example, in 2003, the Turkish parliament voted against giving permission to US armed forces to enter Iraq via

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[204] Meliha B. Altunışık and Lenore G. Martin, "Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AK Party", **Turkish Studies**, Vol: 12, No:4, 2011, p. 570.
[205] Öniş, p. 57.

Turkey.[206] This event shows a stark break in alignment of Turkey with its American ally. Turkey has also amplified its areas of interest in the Middle East. This is evident in Turkey's initiatives to become a regional mediator between Israel and Syria, as well as between Iran and the West, as it is using Turkey must deepen its relations with said nations in order to act. In addition, Turkey has amplified in economic ties with Iraq, Syria, and Iran, among others.[207] Overall, under the AK Party, Turkey is no longer primarily involved with security issues, but rather, Turkey has taken steps towards new economic and political initiatives.

It is also important to note that Turkey has undergone a program change. A program change involves an alteration of the means used in order to achieve a set of foreign policy goals.[208] AK Party has utilized methods that are more diplomatic in order to achieve desired ends, whereas previous Turkish leaders preferred military and or other hard power assets.[209] William Hale notes Turkey's new preference to use soft power rather than hard power in its approach to the Middle East through its attempts to play mediator.[210] Turkey's new role as a regional intermediary is as a prime example of Turkey's program change. This is because Turkey is using diplomacy to engage its neighbors, rather than military might or threats. As in the case with Syria, Turkey relied heavily on diplomacy in the 21st century, rather than military force as used in the 1990s.

As for problem/goal change and international orientation change, there is less certainty that the AK Party has provided a wholesome and clean break with the foreign policy set forth by former Turkish governments. Instead of straightforward changes, Altunışık and Martin assert that there is in fact both change and continuity in regards to these categories of transformation. For example, in relation to problem/goal change, AK Party has made being a regional leader a top priority and has placed less emphasis on maintaining peaceful and prosperous relations with Israel, unlike administrations of the past. Conversely, some goals remain the same and have continued to stay on the table under the AK Party administration.

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[206] Doug Penhallegon, "The Story Behind Turkey's 'No' Vote on Iraq in 2003", **The Washington Review of Turkish and Eurasian Affairs,** June 2012, http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/the-story-behind-turkeys-no-vote-on-iraq-in-2003.html, (06.01.2014).

[207] Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, "Middle East Regional Information", **Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy**, July 2013,
http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&region=4, (02.03.2014).

[208] Charles F. Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol: 34, No: 1, March 1990.

[209] Altunışık and Martin, p. 571.

[210] Hale, New Era, pp. 152-153.

In regards to international orientation change, it is less certain as to whether Turkey has indeed shifted in orientation. Turkey still heavily cooperates with the United States and other Western allies, but at the same time has changed in orientations with relation to Israel, Iran, and Syria. For example, although the AK Party maintained the usual course of Turkish-Israeli relations during the early years of their administration, following the 2008 Gaza War, Turkish orientation changed. The orientation change is due to the apparent break between former allies. The break is in part owing to the harsh rhetoric of Erdoğan in response to events.[211] In regards to Iran, Turkish orientation again changed. Prior to AK Party rule, Iranian-Turkish relations were relatively steady, but often leaned closer to distrust than faithful companion. However, as Turkey distanced itself from Israel, relations between Iran and Turkey increased. In addition, two main points of convergence between Turkey and Iran allowed the two countries to enhance their relations. Two issues that allowed for a confluence between parties were first, common economic interests, and second, an unanticipated intersection between policies aimed at Iraqi Kurds.[212] As for Syria, again an orientation change took place. Relations were hostile throughout much of the 21st century due to three main issues: Hatay province, water disputes, and the PKK. After the Adana Accords and further reconciliation between the AK Party government and Syria, the first decade of the 21st century saw a rapprochement of relations between Syria and Turkey.

Despite a change orientation towards Iran, Israel, and Syria, remaining relations between Turkey and its allies remained steady. Specifically, the orientation of Turkey concerning other nations remained constant. Due to the continuation and change of the foreign policy orientation of Turkey, it is difficult to validate an international reorientation. In other words, despite a reconciliation of Turkish Syrian relations and Turkish Iranian relations, and a divergence between Turkey and Israel, Turkish relations with other nations remained constant from previous Turkish administrations to the AK Party government. Despite the lack of a significant orientation change, based Turkey's adjustment change and program/goal change, it is evident that Turkey's foreign policy approach towards the Middle East under the AK Party employs pro-active diplomatic means.

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[211] Hasan Kösebalaban, "Turkey and the New Middle East: Between liberalism and Realism", **Perceptions,** Vol: 16, No: 3, 2011, p. 95.
[212] Hale, New Era, p.153.

Overall, leadership is an important factor in the formulation of foreign policy in Turkey. Although the MFA, various MFA ministers, public opinion, the Turkish military, as well as the business world have all at different times affected foreign policy decision-making, it is without a doubt that determinative leaders in Turkish history were the most effective decision-makers. As noted above, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü were the sole shapers of Turkish foreign policy throughout the early years of the Republic and into the Second World War. Prime Minister/President Turgut Özal also had a significant impact on foreign policy decision-making until the early 1990s. Erdoğan is similar in this regard, as he also has the power to influence Turkish foreign policy as a determinative leader. AK Party's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, designed the AK Party approach to foreign policy as outlined by the *Zero Problems with the Neighbors;* however, as made clear in the text above, Erdoğan nonetheless remains the most powerful decision-maker in Turkish foreign affairs. Thanks to the new foreign policy approach, Turkey has undergone many changes in foreign policy particularly towards the Middle East. The next chapter will further elucidate just how much of an impact Erdoğan's leadership style played a role in the 2010-2013 Turkish foreign policy events between Turkey and Israel, Syria, and Iran.

CHAPTER THREE
ANALYSIS OF PRIME MINISTER ERDOĞAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS MIDDLE EAST THROUGH HIS PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT

Leadership really matters in foreign policy-making. As already stated, characteristics of leaders are significant when they have significant latitude in shaping policy. A leader's personality, which may have been shaped by his/her own personal history, which in turn may have an impact on foreign policy-making. Throughout the history of Turkey, determinative leaders significantly shaped foreign policies of the country in different eras. Among these President Atatürk in the early years of the Republic, President İnönü during the Second World War, Prime Minister Menderes in the early years of his rule in 1950s, and President Özal in 1990s, all directly impacted the foreign policy decision making in Turkey. From time to time dominant Ministers of Foreign Affairs, such as Fatin Rüştü Zorlu towards the end of the 1950s and Hikmet Çetin and İsmail Cem in 1990s, also significantly influenced foreign policies of the Turkish government. Along the same line, during the AK Party era, particularly starting from mid 2000s on, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, despite a strong Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, turned out to be one of the most significant decision-makers. Through his speeches and interviews, his influence in foreign policy is most evident.

The following sections will present the results from the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) by particularly concentrating on how Erdoğan's personality has affected Turkish foreign policies towards Syria, Iran and Israel during 2010-2013. In addition, the chapter explains how the traits and leadership style established by LTA of Erdoğan has affected Turkish foreign policy generally. Finally, three case studies are presented which will give a side-by-side analysis of the foreign policy events between Turkey and Syria, Iran, Iraq, during the years of 2010-2013. The analysis of these three cases will start with an examination of the background of Turkey's relations with these countries.

I. LTA ASSESSMENT RESULTS

In order to analyze Erdoğan's leadership style and personality traits, the author collected 27,346 words from thirteen different interviews conducted with Erdoğan

between the years of 2010-2013. Each interview averaged 2,104 words. As Hermann as stated, it is important for each transcript to be a minimum word length. Sources of interviews range from NPR, Time Magazine, and The Wall Street Journal. The interview sources and word count of each source is listed in Table 7.

Table 7: Word Count

	Sources	Word Count
1	**Brookings Institute (2013)**	2,014
2	**NPR (2011)**	482
3	**The Wall Street Journal (2010)**	1,204
4	**TIME (2011)**	1,177
5	**Washington Post (2012)**	1,457
6	**CNN (2012)**	1,721
7	**Politiken (2013)**	1,276
8	**Charlie Rose (2010)**	5,475
9	**CNN (2011)**	1,668
10	**NBC (2013)**	297
11	**Charlie Rose (Sep, 2011)**	4,382
12	**Charlie Rose (May, 2011)**	4,856
13	**CNN (2010)**	1,337
	Total Word Count	**27,346**

After Erdoğan's spontaneous spoken material was collected, the transcripts were inputted into Profiler Plus (Version 7.1.5). From this point, the codes and anchors from Erdoğan's spontaneous spoken material were given. With these codes, it was possible to calculate each score for each of the seven traits for each of the thirteen sources. At this point, a mean for each of the seven traits from the thirteen sources was found. Erdoğan's personality trait scores from each of the transcript sources and the trait means are listed in *Table 8: Erdoğan's LTA Results*.

Table 8: Erdoğan's LTA Results

	Sources	BACE	CC	DIS	IGB	PWR	SC	TASK
1	Brookings Institute (2013)	0.42	0.73	0.00	0.09	0.18	0.63	0.83
2	NPR (2011)	0.40	0.68	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.18	0.83
3	The Wall Street Journal (2010)	0.39	0.62	0.01	0.11	0.32	0.17	0.57
4	TIME (2011)	0.40	0.68	0.01	0.04	0.00	1.00	0.72
5	Washington Post (2012)	0.37	0.73	0.01	0.09	0.23	0.30	0.64
6	CNN (2012)	0.44	0.52	0.00	0.10	0.21	0.22	0.67
7	Politiken (2013)	0.27	0.68	0.01	0.26	0.13	0.22	0.67
8	Charlie Rose (2010)	0.43	0.65	0.00	0.14	0.16	0.83	0.88
9	CNN (2011)	0.34	0.60	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.71
10	NBC (2013)	0.75	0.56	0.01	0.00	0.10	0.17	0.86
11	Charlie Rose (Sep. 2011)	0.45	0.68	0.01	0.08	0.21	0.34	0.72
12	Charlie Rose (May. 2011)	0.33	0.61	0.01	0.11	0.14	0.44	0.72
13	CNN (2010)	0.11	0.60	0.01	0.13	0.09	0.54	0.68
	LTA Results	**0.39**	**0.64**	**0.01**	**0.09**	**0.15**	**0.39**	**0.73**

In comparison to the norming groups previously mentioned *World Leaders* (n=284), *Middle East* (n=83), and *Turkish Prime Ministers since 1991* (n=7), it is

possible to determine whether Erdoğan lies within the standard deviation of each of the seven personality traits. This information allows the analyst to determine whether the individual under analysis has received a high, low, or moderate score in regards to the seven personality traits of LTA. Erdoğan's scores are listed with the norming groups in *Table 9: Erdoğan's Personality Trait Scores Compared to Norming Groups*. Bold Scores indicate Erdoğan's placement as compared to the norming group.

Table 9: Erdoğan's Personality Trait Scores Compared to Norming Groups

Personality Traits	Erdogan 2010-2013	World Leaders N=284 (SSA)		Middle East N=83 (Kesgin, 2013)		Turkish Prime Ministers since 1991 N=7 (Kesgin, 2013)	
Belief can Control Events	**.39**	Mean =	.35	Mean =	.33	Mean =	.351
		Low <	.30	Low <	.29	Low <	.319
		High >	.40	**High >**	**.37**	**High >**	**.383**
Need for Power	**.15**	Mean =	.26	Mean =	.25	Mean =	.287
		Low <	**.21**	**Low <**	**.22**	**Low <**	**.243**
		High >	.31	High >	.28	High >	.331
Conceptual Complexity	**.64**	Mean =	.59	Mean =	.64	Mean =	.564
		Low <	.53	Low <	.60	Low <	.527
		High >	.65	High >	.68	**High >**	**.601**
Task Focus	**.73**	Mean =	.63	Mean =	.71	Mean =	.637
		Low <	.56	Low <	.65	Low <	.572
		High >	**.70**	High >	.77	**High >**	**.702**
In-group Bias	**.09**	Mean =	.15	Mean =	.50	Mean =	.142
		Low <	**.10**	**Low <**	**.43**	**Low <**	**.114**
		High >	.20	High >	.57	High >	.170
Distrust of Others	**.01**	Mean =	.13	Mean =	.01	Mean =	.0138
		Low <	**.07**	**Low <**	**.01**	**Low <**	**.097**
		High >	.19	High >	.01	High >	.0179
Self-Confidence	**.39**	Mean =	0.36	Mean =	.37	Mean =	.400
		Low <	0.26	Low <	.26	Low <	.320
		High >	0.46	High >	.48	High >	.480

Sources: Social Science Automation, I. **Profiler Plus**. Columbus, OH., 2008; Barış Kesgin, "Leadership Traits of Turkey's Islamist and Secular Prime Ministers", **Turkish Studies,** Vol: 14, No: 1, 2013, (Leadership Traits), pp. 136-157.

II. TEMPORAL LTA ANALYSIS

In the following section, a temporal analysis of Erdoğan (employing the personality traits established) based on the years of 2010 to 2013 will be given. In order to assess how sensitive Erdoğan is to his contextual environment, a segment is dedicated to a breakdown of the temporal analysis by year to observe possible fluctuations of trait scores. Following, an analysis of how Erdoğan's leadership style of 2010-2013 period may affect his foreign policy behavior of the same period is given. This is important, as many large events during this period, both domestic and abroad, have had an affect Turkish foreign policy. Through assessing Erdoğan personality, it is possible to draw conclusions as to how much of his decision-making behaviors can be derived from his leadership style.

From these results, many conclusions can be drawn regarding the way in which Erdoğan perceives his own abilities and his circumstances. For example, through examining a political leaders BACE and PWR scores, it is possible to determine how successful the leader is in rallying others to his/her causes and putting his/her initiatives into action.[213] For the BACE trait, Erdoğan has a score of 0.39. For two of the norming groups (*Middle East*, n=83 and *Turkish Prime Ministers*, n=7), such a trait score is considered high. However, compared to the norming group *World Leaders* (n=284), Erdoğan is within the mean. As for Erdoğan's PWR score, 0.39 is considerate moderate as compared to each of the three norming groups. With this information, it can be inferred that Erdoğan believes he is able to control and manipulate events and circumstances in which he is placed. This is vital information as it has been found that non-U.S. leaders who have high BACE scores exhibited expansionist foreign policy orientations.[214] In addition, Preston found that in terms of the decision making process, leaders high in BACE tended to favor policy solutions that were proactive, rather than less deliberative decision process.[215] Furthermore, individuals ranking high in BACE tend to want to maintain control and follow through with implantation to ensure that decisions are followed through. In addition, Hermann notes that high BACE individuals

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[213] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 187-188.
[214] Kaarbo and Hermann, pp. 252–253.
[215] Stephen, et. al.. p. 295.

prefer to meet face-to-face with other leaders in order to better judge their capabilities.[216]

Yet, his need for power is not significantly different from other leaders within the world. As such, Erdoğan is likely to challenge most contextual restraints that limit his exercise of power and will attempt to maintain control over decision-making and policy-making. At the same time, when working within decision-groups, Erdoğan will struggle with influencing and controlling the individuals who surround him. As noted by Hermann, "Leaders who are high in the belief that they can control events but low in the need for power will take charge of what happens and challenge constraints, but they will not do as well in reading how to manipulate the people and in working behind the scenes to have the desired influence."[217] Therefore, leaders as Erdoğan will not be effective within decision-making groups as he is likely to be too candid in his employment of power. Such exploitation of authority brings about the possibility of alienating powerful individuals inside and outside of government; leading such people (who are conceivably valuable to Erdoğan) to react negatively.

Furthermore, from Erdoğan's TASK score, it is possible to determine what his motivation for seeking office is. Erdoğan's TASK score is 0.73. This score is low compared to the *World Leaders* (n=284) and *Middle East* (n=83) norming groups. As for the *Turkish Prime Ministers* (n=7) norming group, Erdoğan's score is moderate. From this data, it can be inferred that Erdoğan's motivation for seeking office is relationship focused; meaning Erdoğan is not driven by a precise set of interests or specific cause. Rather, he is motivated to act in order to build relationships and maintain group spirit. He is also likely to focus on the needs of his constituents and will work to protect the groups with which they fill affiliated from potential threats.

Erdoğan received an IGB trait score of 0.01 and a DIS score of 0.09. Compared to each of the three norming groups, Erdoğan ranks low in both traits. This would lead us to believe that Erdoğan does not see his environment or the world in which he lives as threatening in nature. In fact, if and when conflicts do arise, Erdoğan is likely to perceive such events as context-specific or situational. Since conflicts are not generalized as being threatening to Erdoğan, he would respond to each conflict individually or on a case-by-case basis. In regards to his view of his own country's

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[216] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 188-189.
[217] Hermann, Leadership Style, pp. 187-188.

limitations, it can be assumed based on his IGB and DIS trait scores that Erdoğan recognizes the limitations of his nation. That is, Erdoğan understands that it would not be possible for Turkey to always act alone in international affairs and in many cases cooperation is not only possible, but necessary. Therefore, the emphasis in policy-making and foreign affairs would be on gaining the most from relationships with other nations and taking advantage when opportunities arise.

In regards to CC, Erdoğan has an established score of 0.64. Compared to *World Leaders* (n=284) and *Middle East* (n=83), Erdoğan's score would be considered within the mean, but leaning toward high CC as his score very close to the cutoff. As compared to the *Turkish Prime Ministers* (n=7) before him, Erdoğan's CC score is high. As for his SC score, Erdoğan has a moderate score compared to each of the three norming groups. As a result, it can be assumed that Erdoğan's openness to contextual information is situational, but most probably he would more often be open than closed as his CC score leans toward high CC. In other words, depending on the context and given circumstances, Erdoğan may be more or less willing to listen (and be swayed by) new and/or opposing information.

Due to the results listed above, Erdoğan's leadership style is Directive. Although he may at times be closed to new information, more often than not he will be open, leading him to have a Directive leadership style. Individuals with a Directive leadership style will emphasize the need to maintain their own reputation as well as the government's reputation. In addition, such individuals are likely to engage in world stage politics in order to enhance his or her state's status. This has in fact been noted in regards to Erdoğan by other scholars and has come to realization; as F. Stephen Larrabee stated in 2010, "under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his energetic foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey has launched a number of new foreign-policy initiatives that have increased the country's international stature and regional influence."[218]

Individuals as Erdoğan who are open to contextual information and challenges constraints are usually quite strategic in their approach to politics.[219] It can be inferred

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[218]Stephen F. Larrabee, "Turkey's new geopolitics", **Survival,** Vol: 52, No: 2, 2010, p. 157.
[219] Margaret G. Hermann, et. al., "Who leads matters: The effects of powerful individuals", **International Studies Review,** Vol: 3, No: 2, 2001, pp. 83-131.

that Erdoğan will search for ways to enhance his image in the eyes of other people.[220] In addition, as other leaders with a Directive style, Erdoğan is likely to view power and authority stemming from how his constituencies view him. As this is the case, Erdoğan would be likely to try and maintain his status in the eyes of important constituencies and institutions and work hard in order to make sure they support what he is doing in foreign policy. In order to maintain such support even with disapproving foreign policy actions, Erdoğan may use diversionary tactics in order to maintain approval ratings. In other words, strategic and deliberative behavior is common for those with a Directive leadership style. In addition, Erdoğan is able to adapt his behavior according to the context in order to better reach his goals. As noted by Hermann, et all leaders as Erdoğan "know what they want to do; at issue is whether or not the current context indicates such behavior is feasible and likely to be successful."[221]

Figure 1: A Temporal Look at Erdoğan's Personality Traits

BACE was significantly higher in 2013 as compared to 2010-2012. CC and DIS remained relatively stable throughout all four years. IGB, PWR, and TASK experienced some fluctuation, but not significant. SC, on the other hand, was at its lowest in 2012 and 2013 and at its peak in 2010 and 2011.

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[220] Hermann, et. al., pp. 98-99.
[221] Directive leadership style was known as Charismatic leadership style in previous literature. See, Hermann, et. al., pp. 98-99.

III. RECEP TAYYIP ERDOĞAN'S LEADERSHIP TRAITS AND FOREIGN POLICY

The following sections will analyze how Erdoğan's established personality traits and leadership style has affected the foreign policy of Turkey during the period of 2010-2013. Three case studies will be used to show the reader that under three different contexts within the same time period, Erdoğan's leadership style is still nonetheless prevalent. The three case studies will examine Turkish foreign relations with Syria, Iran, and Israel. Several events have occurred during the period of 2010-2013 that display how Erdoğan's personality has influenced his decisions. In 2010, Turkey attempted to defuse the Iran nuclear issue through diplomacy, to the irritation of the United States and its allies.[222] This event displayed Erdoğan's belief in his own ability to control the outcomes of events, as well as the necessity of Turkey to work through collaboration to achieve its goals. The same year, Turkey became entangled in a dispute with Israel over the Mavi Marmara flotilla raid. Erdoğan's personality as one who was proactive and cooperative with other international institutions was shown clearly. The same can be said with how Erdoğan reacted to a Turkish jet being shot down in international waters by Syrian forces;[223] he attempted to work through NATO, again displaying the need for international cooperation.

A. Case Study: Syria

Prime Minister's impact on Turkish foreign policy towards Syria particularly between 2010 and 2013 cannot be overlooked. This section before analyzing Erdoğan's influence on Turkey's relations with Syria will give a brief background of Turkish Syrian relations.

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[222] Sabrina Tavernise and Michael Slackman, " Turkey goes from pliable ally to thorn for U.S.", **New York Times**, 08.06.2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/world/middleeast/09turkey.html?_r=0, (14.05.2014).
[223] "Turkish F-4 warplane 'shot down' near Syrian border", **BBC News**, 22.06.2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18554246, (22.05.2014).

1. Background of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Syria

During the early years of Republic of Turkey, when Syria was under French mandate, the only significant problem between the two countries concerned the Hatay province. Before the Syrian independence, Hatay (also known as Sanjak and Antakya) was a largely non-disputed territory outside the Turkish borders under French rule. Turkey agreed to attach the province of Hatay to Syria by signing the Franklin-Bouillon Pact. In 1938, the independent Republic of Hatay was established. Due to a plebiscite made in the province, people of Hatay showed their preference to live under Turkish Republic. However, Syria has vehemently disputed the annexation.[224]

During the Cold War era, Syria followed a pro-Soviet foreign policy while Turkey was a close ally of the United States and a member of NATO. Moreover, Syria established a socialist government and for a short time unified with Egypt establishing United Arab Republic. Although this republic did not last long, it showed the rise of Arab nationalism. During Cold War period, tense relations between the two countries rose as each country belonged to the opposite camps of the Cold War struggle. A more significant conflict between the two countries took place in 1979 when Turkey started the construction of a large dam project, known as the Southeastern Anatolian Project. The dam project was located on the area of the ancient rivers of Euphrates and Tigris. This dam project encompassed many dams, hydraulic power plants, and irrigation facilities. Syria disapproved of the project since it decreased the amount of water flowing to its territories coming from these rivers.[225]

Interestingly enough, the terror attacks of Kurdistan Worker's Party (*Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan* –PKK) from Syrian territory began roughly at the same point in time. The PKK was by far the largest issue of conflict between these two nations since 1980s. Turks considers the PKK a terrorist organization fighting for the creation of an independent Kurdistan in Southeastern Turkey. By the 1990s, Turkey had been combating PKK terrorists for over a decade. To Turkey's dismay, Syria had been harboring PKK combatants and the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan. Due to Syria's

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[224] Hale, TFP, pp. 66-67.
[225] Hale, TFP, pp. 173-174.

encouragement of the PKK, Turkey maintained a relation full of disdain and contempt with Syria for much of the 1990's.[226]

Throughout the 1990s, Turkish Syrian relations revolved around water disputes and PKK conflict. During this time, Syria provided aid to the PKK in an attempt to gain advantage over Turkey in response to the water disputes and regional affairs. The Turkish government responded by starting a military campaign against Syria to apprehend the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. Syrian President, Hafez Assad, reacted by deporting Öcalan and signing the Adana Accords in 1998.[227] Subsequently, Syrian Turkish relations greatly improved as old conflicts fell to the wayside. Overall, political, economic, and social-cultural ties progressed between the two countries. As an example, Turkey chose not to oppose Syria by way of isolation as the US did under President George W. Bush. Alternatively, Turkey made an effort to engage Syria with the world. In fact, Turkey even attempted to resolve long-standing qualms between Israel and Syria by acting as mediator. To further cement Turkey and Syria's good relations, the two countries signed a free-trade agreement in 2007. In April 2009, a joint military exercise ensued between the two countries to help protect the Turkish borders from PKK infiltration. Following the joint military exercise, Turkey and Syria signed the High Level Strategic Cooperation. As a result, the Turkish military removed Syria from its list of "problematic security areas."

2. Impact of Prime Minister Erdoğan on Turkish Foreign Policy towards Syria under AK Party

The leadership style of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Turkish foreign policy are unequivocally linked.[228] A prime example of the relation between Erdoğan's leadership style and its impact on foreign policy can be seen in the events between 2010-2013 concerning Turkey and Syria. As already analyzed in the precious

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[226] Hale, TFP, p. 173.

[227] Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, "Desecuritization of Turkey's Relations with Syria and Iran", **Security Dialogue**, Vol: 39, No: 5, 2008, p. 509.

[228] As journalists have made note, Erdoğan has significant impact on foreign policy making. New York Times columnist, Sabrina Tavernise declared, "One wild card is Mr. Erdoğan, a strong-willed former Islamist who is the driving force behind Turkey's criticism of Israel and its policy toward the Palestinians. He has pushed a foreign policy that has taken a more active role in the region. See: Sabrina Tavernise, "Raid Jeopardizes Turkey Relations", **New York Times,** 31.05.2010, (Raid), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/world/middleeast/01turkey.html, (01.06.2014).

section, Turkish-Syrian relations before the AK Party came to power in 2002 were strained due to three main events including Hatay province, water disputes and Syria's support for PKK. Once Erdoğan came to power, however, he and his administration worked to further mend the relations with Turkey's southern neighbor, increasing the priority of Turkey's relationship with Syria to a higher level that administrations previous. To a large extent, Erdoğan was successful at restoring the frayed ties between these two nations. Nonetheless, by 2011, the Turkish-Syrian relationship took a down turn. The purpose of this case study is to demonstrate how Erdoğan's reaction to particular events and the subsequent outcomes all correspond to the determined personality traits and leadership style of Erdoğan. The following case will be presented with examples of how Erdoğan's leadership style affected relations and foreign policy decisions between Turkey and Syria from 2010-2013. Furthermore, examples of how Erdoğan's reactions to events are as expected based on his determined leadership style will be shown.

Before 2011, Syrian President, Basar Al-Assad and Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were on good terms. Together, the Syrian and Turkish administrations had made great strides at reconciling previous bitter relations.[229] Due to Erdoğan's relationship-focused orientation (TASK), such a friendship is an expression of Erdoğan's foreign policy approach which focuses on gaining the most from relationships with other nations. In fact, in an interview with Charlie Rose in May, 2011, Erdoğan went so far as to call Assad "a good friend of mine."[230] As such, Erdoğan worked hard in order to convince Assad to reform after protests began in early 2011 in Syria. Erdoğan explained that he "had a long discussion with him, even one year ahead, one year before now, lifting state of emergency, release political prisoners. We discussed these issues, and elections, I mean, changing the election system, allowing political parties, and we discussed all of these issues with him."[231] In fact, Erdoğan made several phone calls to Assad asking him and his administration to take a "positive, reformist approach."[232] This is in clear line with Erdoğan's personality and leadership style. Erdoğan believes that he is capable of controlling events (BACE), and as such intervenes in areas in which he thinks he can control. As he believed Assad

[229] Aras and Polat, p. 509.
[230] Charlie Rose, "Interview with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan", **High Beam Research**, 12.05.2011, (RTP), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-2346132011.html#, (01.06.2014).
[231] Charlie Rose, RTP.
[232] Delphine Strauss, "Erdoğan urges Assad to hasten reform", **Financial Times**, 28.03.2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8a87bfd6-5921-11e0-b9f6-00144feab49a.html#axzz33NnkEpK2, (01.06.2014).

was a "good friend" of his, Erdoğan assumed that Assad would heed his advice. Converse to Erdoğan's expectations, Assad disregarded Erdoğan's recommendations.[233]

According to Erdoğan's personality, it is to be expected that Erdoğan would be ineffective in his approach to reconcile the struggle in Syria due to the tactic he is likely to employ. Although Erdoğan and Assad's conversations are essentially private, it can be assumed based on Erdoğan's trait scores that Erdoğan exhibited an excessive use of power when trying to convince Assad to reform. As Erdoğan is likely to believe he can control events, it is possible for him to exploit his power and hence, alienate those he comes in contact with. As noted by Erdoğan, he and his administration pushed for reform, and yet Assad refused to listen; "We told President Assad from January 2011 onwards that we would provide support to him if he wanted to engage in reforms. I had a three-hour meeting with him myself at that time, and then I sent my envoys. And we also had telephone conversations. Syria asked for our help, and we sent that help, but nothing changed. Unfortunately, he kept killing his own people by using his tanks, artillery, helicopters and aircraft."[234] This episode between Assad and Erdoğan is consistent with what is to be expected based on Erdoğan's high BACE score and low PWR score; that is, it is reasonable that Erdoğan will struggle with trying to influence those around him; therefore, Erdoğan's exploitation of authority will not be in his favor.

Erdoğan acknowledged the previous friendship between Turkey and Syria, however, he also conceded to its end in an interview with National Public Radio (NPR) in 2011. When asked about what to expect with Syria, Erdoğan explained, "Of course, the current developments between Syria and Turkey are not very promising right now. We needed certain reforms to be carried out, but unfortunately under these circumstances instead of carrying out the necessary steps forward to improve the situation, Assad wanted to keep his position and he became increasingly aggressive and violent."[235] Erdoğan concluded his statement by declaring, "That's where friendship

[233] "Assad: Erdoğan lost his credibility", **Aljazeera**, 04.07.2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/07/20127465430838203.html, (01.06.2014).
[234] Lally Weymouth, "Lally Weymouth Interviews Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.", **Washington Post**, 20.09.2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lally-weymouth-interviews-turkish-prime-minister-recep-tayyip-Erdoğan/2012/09/20/a837da66-01c7-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story.html, (01.06.2014).
[235] David Greene and Steve Inskeep, "Turkey's Erdoğan Blasts Syria, Israel", **NPR,** 26.09.2011, (Blasts Syria, Israel), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=140790657, (31.05.2014).

ends."[236] According to Erdoğan's personality traits, he is likely to take advantage of relationships with other countries as could be seen with the blooming liaison between Assad and Erdoğan during the first decade of the 21st century; however, after Assad dismissed Erdoğan's calls for reform, Erdoğan's position toward Assad and his regime hardened. This is an expression of Erdoğan's BACE score in which compels Erdoğan to be less compromising. In other words, Erdoğan made a decision in how he wished for Syria to follow reformation policies and as he believes he can impact the world, it would not be expected for him to compromise with Syria on reforms. Rather, it would be expected for him to assume confidence in his decision, and press for it to come to fruition.

Syria, however, did not follow through with reformation policies. Due to this, in November, 2011, Erdoğan formally pressed for Assad to step down.[237] As explained in the New York Times by Henri Barkey, "The escalation of political pressure is motivated by the apparent conviction among the Turkish leadership that Assad is unlikely to recover from the cycle of protest and violence in Syria and that his days as leader are numbered."[238] That is, the leaders of Turkey expect Assad to fall from power regardless of their assistance. Therefore, it is to be expected that Erdoğan would take advantage of the new situation by commanding Assad to step down (TASK). This places Erdoğan in a position where he could more easily begin a new relationship with the next Syrian leader. Such an assessment is partially based on Erdoğan's relationship-focused orientation which describes Erdoğan as a person who takes advantages of relationships with other nations, as well as opportunities when they arise. Therefore, Assad was likely to fall from power, therefore by dismissing Assad and asking for him to step down; Erdoğan would be able to renew a bond with the new Syrian leadership more easily.

The following year, tensions began to rise significantly between the two countries. On June 22, 2012 a Turkish Jet was shot down by Syria.[239] Although the exact location i.e. whether in international waters or not, is highly disputed – what is not disputed is the fact that this incident led to higher securitization of relations. Erdoğan,

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[236] Greene and Inskeep, Blasts Syria, Israel.
[237] Alice Fordham, "Turkey urges Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down", **Washington Post**, 11.22.2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/turkey-urges-assad-to-step-down/2011/11/22/gIQAlnTmlN_story.html, (01.06.2014).
[238] Fordham.
[239] "Turkish F-4 warplane shotdown near Syrian border", **BBC**, 22.06.2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18554246, (31.05.2014).

however, remained cautious in response to the event. As reported by the New York Times, Erdoğan consulted the military, his advisors, and the opposition party in Turkey, before giving a response.[240] This is in direct relation to his CC score in which Erdoğan is able to view events in non-black and white terms. Furthermore, as issues are seen on a gray-scale, Erdoğan is likely to ask for the opinions of others before making his own final decision. In this event, Erdoğan did just that; he discussed the event with many parties before making a concluding evaluation of the incident.

Following the meetings between Erdoğan and other parties, Turkey made its response. First, a letter was sent to the United Nations by the Turkish government. In the letter, the Turkish government named the event a "hostile act by the Syrian authorities against Turkey's national security."[241] Second, Erdoğan began to make statements affirming that a military approach was not inappropriate. In addition, he expressed his intentions that Syria "will be dealt with accordingly."[242] Erdoğan also explained, "The rules of engagement of the Turkish Armed Forces have changed. Any military element that approaches the Turkish border from Syria by posing a security risk and danger will be regarded as a threat and treated as a military target."[243] As observed by CNN, such a pronouncement by Erdoğan a week after the jet was shot down is an extreme escalation in rhetoric.[244] That is, after Erdoğan was serenely circumspect considering the events he finally comes to a decisive response which is to react in a strong and firm manner. This response by Erdoğan is as expected as his BACE score determines that once Erdoğan makes a decision, he will exude confidence and maintain assurance. This is because once a decision is made; he knows what should be done and how to go about it. Following the pronouncement by Erdoğan to maintain a military response, Erdoğan stayed firm in Turkey's reaction to the events.

Following the letter to the UN, the Turkish government invoked Article IV of NATO. Article IV is invoked, and consultations with other NATO parties are held, when

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[240] Sebnem Arsu and Rod Nordland, "Turkey to consult NATO over downing of Jet by Syria", **New York Times**, 24.06.2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/turkey-to-consult-nato-over-downing-of-jet-by-syria.html, (31.05.2014).
[241] "Letter From Turkey to U.N. on Plane Shot Down by Syria", **New York Times**, 25.06.2014, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/06/26/world/middleeast/26Syria-Turkey-letter.html, (31.05.2014).
[242] CNN Wire Staff, "Turkey hardens military position after Syria downs jet", **CNN**, 27.06.2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/26/world/meast/turkey-syria-plane/, (01.06.2014).
[243] "NATO Says Fighter Jet Downing 'Unacceptable': Erdoğan Takes Tough Stance against Syrian Regime", **Spiegel**, 26.06.2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/Erdoğan-takes-tough-stance-against-syrian-regime-over-downed-jet-a-841053.html, (01.06.2014).
[244] CNN Wire Staff.

a NATO member state feels that their security is threatened.[245] By resorting to NATO, Erdoğan's government chose cooperation rather than direct retaliation. Again, such a response by Erdoğan and his government is expected as his due to his IGB and DIS scores. With both IGB and DIS being low in Erdoğan's case, he is more likely to cooperate with international organizations and acknowledge the limitations of his nation when acting alone.

Interestingly enough, in September, 2012 when asked in an interview with the Washington Post if Turkey should not take a unilateral role in the response to Syria, Erdoğan replied, "if there is an attack on our country, then we would do what is required. But this situation has an international dimension and a dimension that concerns the Islamic world. So the UN and also the Arab League should be involved with respect to Syria."[246] As already mentioned in the case of Turkey invoking Article IV of NATO, this expression by Erdoğan shows his acknowledgment that Turkey cannot act alone in the international arena (IGB and DIS). Even though some may consider the downing of the Turkish jet as an attack on Turkey, Erdoğan further pushed for cooperation and assistance from NATO in reaction to the event. Furthermore, although Turkey is being most affected by the civil war in Syria (i.e. influx of refugees, downed Turkish jet), Turkey nonetheless maintains its position that an international response is needed, not a unilateral one.

In October, 2012, between Turkey and Syria became more stifled. First, Syrian cross-border shelling killed 5 Turkish citizens, in which Turkey retaliated by shelling targets within Syria. [247] Then, Turkey intercepted a Syrian commercial airliner under the pretense that Russian-made artillery was on board degrading already tarnished relations between the two countries even further. At the end of the month, another cross-border shelling from Syria struck a health center in the Hatay province of Turkey.[248] In response to these events, Turkey did not act unilaterally[249] but yet again invoked Article IV of NATO, again displaying Erdoğan's acknowledgement that Turkey

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[245] The North Atlantic Treaty (NATO), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, (01.06.2014).
[246] Weymouth.
[247] Tim Arango, "Turkey Strikes Back After Syrian Shelling Kill 5 Civilians", New York Times, 03.10.2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/world/middleeast/syria.html?pagewanted=all, (01.06.2014).
[248] "Shell from Syria hits Turkish health centre-CNN Turk", **Reuters**, 23.10.2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/23/syria-crisis-turkey-idUSL5E8LN8AZ20121023, (01.06.2014).
[249] Ivan Watson, "Turkey strikes targets in Syria in retaliation for shelling deaths", CNN, 04.10.2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/03/world/europe/turkey-syria-tension/, (01.06.2014).

should and must cooperate with international organizations to impart the most affect (IGB and DIS). In response, NATO instituted Patriot Battery missiles in Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, and Adana.[250]

To summarize, Turkish and Syrian relations were tense throughout much of the 20th century due to conflicts over the Hatay Province, Southeastern Anatolian Dam Project, and the PKK. The tense relations lasted until the signed of the Adana Accords at the end of the century. When Erdoğan and the AK Party rose to power in 2002-2003, relations between Syria and Turkey had already bettered; however, Erdoğan and his administration were able to elevate Turkish Syrian relations to a new level of cooperation. Nevertheless, cooperation between countries subsided during the 2010-2013 period, in part due to Erdoğan's leadership style and approach to foreign policy. Although Erdoğan prefers cooperation with international organizations and other nations due to his acknowledgement of the limitations to acting unilaterally, in the case with Syria, the international community is at a stalemate. In other words, as the international community has been inactive in response to the civil war in Syria, Erdoğan too is limited in his actions. Acting unilaterally is out of the question for Erdoğan and his leadership style. Thus, it is evident that Erdoğan's personality traits and leadership style greatly affected Turkish foreign policy during 2010-2013. Through careful examination of Erdoğan's speech and reactions to events, the extent of his effect on foreign policy can be determined. Furthermore, the quantitative results based on the 2010-2013 collection of interviews and the resulting analysis, are parallel.

B. Case Study: Iran

Following an examination of the background of Turkish foreign policy towards Iran, the subsequent section will examine Prime Minister Erdoğan's personality in Turkey's current relations with Iran.

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[250] "NATO support to Turkey : Background and timeline", **NATO**, 19.02.2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-E6526D70-39BD4AD0/natolive/topics_92555.htm?, (01.06.2014).

1. Background of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran

Relations between Iran and Turkey for the majority of the 20th century were good and generally peaceful. In fact, the two nations signed many non-aggression and security agreements during this period. In addition, Turkey and Iran established various business and trade agreements, linking the two states economically. The Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran, however, placed a strain on the relations.

Not long after the formation of the Turkish republic Turkey signed the first "Treaty of Friendship" with Iran, which instituted a relationship based on friendship, neutrality, and non-aggression. The Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran even visited Turkey and expressed interest in introducing similar Kemalist reforms in Iran. In 1937, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan signed the Treaty of Saadabad. The rationale behind the agreement was to safeguard peace and ensure security in the Middle East. Security agreements continued and in 1955, Iran and Turkey helped establish first Bagdad Pact and then Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), a mutual security-pact between Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Britain.

As for economic projects, in 1964 Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran instituted the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). The RCD aimed at joint economic projects between the three countries. Although it dissolved for a period, in 1985 the RCD would become known as the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and expand to more members, such as Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Unlike Syria, both Turkey and Iran engaged in Pro-western foreign policies until the Iranian revolution in 1979. The revolution changed Iran's political orientation and created major changes in the Middle Eastern status quo. As Atatürk designed Turkey to be a strictly secular country, the Islamic revolution struck fear in secular Turkish officials and the public. As put by Zürcher, the 1979 revolution did in fact encourage Islamist groups to act and prompted protests in Turkey in which Islamists called for things such as the return of Sharia law, particularly during the rule of Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*— RP). Such groups may also have been obtaining backing and support from Iran.[251] Hence, the military acted in order to maintain Ataturk's vision of a secular Turkey and overthrew RP from power in 1997.

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[251] Zürcher, p. 268

Despite being on opposite side of the ideological spectrum, relations between Turkey and Iran were relatively stable after the initial chilling during the post-1979 era. As stated by Hale, "Turkish-Iranian relations since the Iranian revolution of 1979 have been far more cooperative than might be expected, given that the two countries are at opposite ideological poles, pitching radical Islamism against secularist democracy."[252] In spite of the rather calm dealings between the two nations, the 1990s brought in an era of conflict as the PKK became a point of tension. During this time, Turkey engaged in cross-border attacks in 1999 under the presumption that PKK gangs were using Iranian territory to make attacks on Turkey. As can be expected, these events strained the relationship; yet, following this period a cautious entente ensued between the two countries.[253]

Although Turkish-Iranian relations remained tense throughout the 1980s and 1990s due to the Turkish fears that Iran would export its Islamist revolution to Turkey and Turkish anger that Iran was providing support to PKK, in the 2000s Turkey's relationship with Iran greatly changed. With its new neighborhood policy (*Zero Problems with the Neighbors),* Turkey and Iran put aside their existing ideological differences and worked towards creating a sustainable economic and political relationship. The two countries increased trade volume and launched a military cooperation campaign to fight against terrorism.[254] As will be discussed in further details in the ensuing sections, the AK Party government also declared its support for Iran's right to possess nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in opposition to the US and the EU. By increasing economic and political relations, Turkey was able to alter its relationship with Iran from one based on securitization, to a relationship based on cooperation. Formerly, Turkey listed Iran on the National Security Policy Document's (*Milli Güvenlik Siyaset Belgesi* –MGSB) threat list due to its Islamic rule and nuclear capacity, yet Iran is no longer on the threat list as of the release of the 2010 MGSB.[255]

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[252] William, Hale, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 'New Era'", **Insight Turkey,** Vol:11, No:3, 2009, (New Era), p. 153.

[253] Hale, New Era, p. 153.

[254] Iranian Ambassador to Turkey Bahman Hosseinpour speaking to journalists at the embassy in May 2011 said that the trade volume between the two countries increased to 11 billion USD in 2010. He noted that the trade volume would reach 15-16 billion USD by the end of the year. http://www.thefreelibrary.com/TURKEY-IRAN+-Iranian+ambassador %3A+Turkish - Iranian+relations+in+unique...-a0255623329

[255] "Israeli-caused instability makes its way to Turkey's security document," **Today's Zaman**, 29.10.2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-225712-israeli-caused-instability-makes-its-way-to-turkeys-security-document.html, (05.05.2014).

2. Impact of Prime Minister Erdoğan on Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Iran during AK Party

There is an explicit relationship between the foreign policy of Turkey and the leadership style and personality traits of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.[256] This is evident in the events between Turkey and Iran during the period of 2010-2013.

Turkish-Iranian relations before the AK Party came to power in 2002 were generally positive. Although Iran and Turkey experienced slight deterioration in relations after the 1979 Iranian revolution, affairs between countries regained pre-revolution levels due to energy and economic ties. During the Erdoğan's term as Prime Minister, relations between the two countries were preserved. The 2010-2013 period, however, shows a decline in relations due to the Syrian conflict which will put the two countries on opposing sides, as well as the Western labeled "nuclear threat". The goal of the ensuing case study is to show how Erdoğan's reaction to certain incidents and the ensuing outcomes match the established leadership style of Erdoğan. Examples of how Erdoğan's leadership style and personality traits influence the foreign policy relations between Turkey and Iran during the period 2010-2013 will be provided.

After nearly a decade of increasing relations between Turkey and Iran, Turkey was posited in a difficult situation in regards to its bordering neighbor in 2010 due to the heightened accusations that Iran was producing nuclear capacities. As such, Turkey was faced with considerable pressure to co-impose economic sanctions on Iran in order to insist that the country to end its nuclear program. This event demonstrates Erdoğan's existing world view that his environment is not threatening. That is, despite accusations that a nation on its border is enriching uranium for possible use as a nuclear weapon, Turkey decided to diplomatically resolve the situation rather than immediately resort to imposing sanctions in alignment with the US, China, Russia, and other nations. Erdoğan and Brazil's President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, initiated talks with Tehran to compromise on a deal to ship much of Iran's uranium stock piles abroad for

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[256] As journalists have made note, Erdoğan has significant impact on foreign policy making. New York Times columnist, Sabrina Tavernise declared, "One wild card is Mr. Erdoğan, a strong-willed former Islamist who is the driving force behind Turkey's criticism of Israel and its policy toward the Palestinians. He has pushed a foreign policy that has taken a more active role in the region." See: Tavernise, Raid.

processing.[257] As can be understood from the economic sanctions introduced by the UN, most other nations viewed Iran's position as hostile and hence, Erdoğan and Silva were alone in their more relaxed approach on the situation.

Imposing sanctions on its own neighbor, however, places Turkey's "Zero Problems with Neighbors" foreign policy plan at risk. Despite Erdoğan's trust in Iran that they are not to be feared, Iran with nuclear capabilities is perceived by the UN and the US as a threat. Ban Ki-Moon, secretary general of the United Nations, stated at international conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that, "The nuclear threat remains real," Ban Ki-Moon said. "It has evolved in new and varied forms."[258] This was at the same conference where Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, defiantly sought to reject any allegations that Iran was creating a nuclear arsenal.[259] Despite the UN and US displaying deep concern regarding Iran's nuclear intentions,[260] Erdoğan refused to impose sanctions by signing Security Council Resolution 1929 alongside its ally, the US.[261] This again shows his trust in not only the nation of Iran, but also in the world.

Furthermore, Erdoğan's displays his belief in his own ability to control events in an interview with Christianne Amanpour in 2010 at the Nuclear Security Summit. When asked if he has a diplomatic offer that would resolve the situation with Iran, Erdoğan replied, "I am here. I am here for a diplomatic solution. And countries that are members of the [International Atomic Energy Agency] and the countries that sign up to the NPT we must all work together on this. And as Turkey, we could act as a very important intermediary, and I believe that we can find a way out."[262] Such a statement clearly exhibits the belief that Erdoğan thinks his presence can influence the turn of events, as well as his belief that Turkey can play an important role. At the same time, such a statement by Erdoğan shows that he believes this role by Turkey can only be

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[257] Alexei Barrionuevo, "Brazil and Turkey Near Nuclear Deal With Iran", **New York Times,** 16.05.2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/world/middleeast/17iran.html, (02.06.2014).
[258] Neil MacFarquhar, "Iran angrily defendes nuclear program.", **New York Times**, 03.05.2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/world/04nuke.html?fta=y, (14.05.2014).
[259] MacFarquhar.
[260] Security Council, "Resolution 1929 (Iran)", **Press Release**, 09.06.2010, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/iran/49368.html, (19.05.2014).
[261] Barrionuevo.
[262] Christiane Amanpour, "Interviews with Goodluck Jonathan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Kofi Annan", **CNN,** 2010, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1004/16/ampr.01.html, (31.05.2014).

successful with cooperation from other nations; again, showing his acknowledgment that Turkey, as a nation, has limitations to its power.

In September 2011, Turkey accepted US-designed radar as a part a NATO defense shield. Although no name was given as to which nation the shield was protecting Turkey and its European partners from, the growing suspicion was Iran. Erdoğan responded to the accusations that the defensive radar was installed due to increase threat from Iran in an interview with CNN, "The radar base in Turkey is a NATO concept. No specific country has ever been referred to."[263] Moreover, Erdoğan again expressed his view that until concrete evidence is given that proves Iran is aiming to produce nuclear weapons, sanctions should not be imposed.[264] Both incidents, that Erdoğan approves of the NATO-led radar system and that he still believes sanctions should not be imposed display his belief in international cooperation and in addition, his lack of desire to change opinions once he has given his final say (BACE). To elaborate based on Erdoğan's BACE score, he is not likely to change his mind once he has made a final decision. He decided not to accuse Iran of hostility in partnership with his NATO allies. Erdoğan continued to maintain this stance despite being in disagreement with Iran over Syrian policies. Based on Erdoğan's leadership style and personality traits, it is expected of him to assume confidence in his decision, and press for it to become a realization.

In regards to Syria, Iran and Turkey were on opposite sides of the dispute. Iran has historically been an ally to Syria and the Assad regime. When the conflict began, Iran maintained its position in support of Assad. Turkey, however, had asked Assad to step down merely months after the conflict began and has supported the Syrian opposition by way of weaponry and harboring.[265] As such, ideological the two countries have been in opposition. Nonetheless, by the end 2013, Iran and Turkey experienced a softening of opinions in regard to Syria. The Iranian foreign Minister visited Turkey in 2013 to meet with Erdoğan in order to discuss the current state of Syrian affairs. According to New York Times, Erdoğan maintained his position that Assad should step down from office, but agreed to allow portions of the existing Syrian government to

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[263] Fareed Zakaria,"Interview With Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan; Interview With Sergey Lavrov; Interview With Jose Manuel Barroso", **CNN**, 25.09.2011, (RTP interview),
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1109/25/fzgps.01.html, (31.05.2014).
[264] Zakaria, (RTP interview).
[265] Bayram Balci, "Turkey 's relations with the Syrian opposition", **Carnegie,** 13.04.2013,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/13/turkey-s-relations-with-syrian-opposition/a88u, (02.06.2014).

maintain in its current state.[266] No conclusion on the matter was presented; however, the opening to discussion represented a softening of the dispute. Although according to Erdoğan's BACE score, he is not likely to make compromises; his CC score denotes that he can be open to contextual information. That is, if Iran wants to present new information that may be vital to Erdoğan's decision-making, Erdoğan is likely to listen. Furthermore, this event also demonstrates Erdoğan's need for cooperation (IGB and DIS) and at the same time, increase in the status (Directive leadership style) of Turkey through collaboration as again Turkey becomes the link between the West and Iran in regards to Syrian policies.[267]

In sum, Turkish Iranian relations prior to the rise of AK Party were idle and tense. Turkey feared Iran would export its Islamic revolution to Turkey. In addition, Iran ostracized Turkey by providing support to PKK terrorists. Nonetheless, the relations changed significantly, as AK Party came to power. Bilateral trade agreements and military cooperation against terrorism marked the 21st century relationship between Turkey and Iran. During the 2010-2013 period, the influence of Erdoğan's personality and leadership style on Turkish-Iranian policies is most evident. The events during this period display Erdoğan's view that the world is not threatening and the acknowledgement that Turkey cannot act unilaterally. Furthermore, Erdoğan's directive leadership clearly guides Erdoğan as he attempts to increase his and Turkey's reputation in the world through acting as an intermediary along with Brazil during the Iranian nuclear crisis. Based on these events, it is evident that Erdoğan's personality traits and leadership style affected Turkish foreign policy during 2010-2013. By examining Erdoğan's speech and reactions to events, the extent of his effect on foreign policy can be determined. Furthermore, the quantitative results based on the 2010-2013 collection of interviews and the qualitative results based on the case study, are parallel.

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[266] Tim Arango, "Turkey and Iran Signal a Softening of Differences Over Syria", **New York Times**, 01.11.2013, (Turkey and Iran), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/02/world/middleeast/turkey-and-iran-suggest-a-thaw-in-stands-on-syrian-conflict.html, (02.06.2014).
[267] Turkey was also considered a link between the West and Iran in regards to the Iranian nuclear dispute. See, Arango, Turkey and Iran.

C. Case Study: Israel

This section will first examine the background of Turkish Israeli relations and then analyze Turkish foreign policy towards Israel during AK Party period and the impact of personality traits of Prime Minister Erdoğan on this foreign policy.

1. Background of Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Israel

Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949 following its establishment in 1948. The relations between the two countries were turbulent during the Arab-Israeli wars. While Turkey was neutral during the 1948 and 1956 Arab-Israeli war, it supported the Arabs in the 1967, 1973, and 1982 Arab-Israeli wars. Turkish American relations mainly shaped Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel.

Following the establishment of Israel, Turkey and Israel established commercial ties, regular air and sea travel, and initiated a variety of sports and cultural events.[268] However, Turkey's positive relationship with Israel damaged its relations with Arab nations. Although Turkey and other Arab countries feared an invasion from the Soviet Union, Arab countries refused to join defense agreements with Turkey due to Turkey being an ally with Israel.[269] The Turkish-Israeli friendship placed Turkey in a negative light according to Arab neighbors. The careful balancing between ties with Israel and ties with Arab countries will continue to be a highlight of the affairs of Turkey with the Middle East.

During the Suez Crisis, Turkey attempted to maintain a neutral position, preferring to alienate neither the Israeli nor the Arab side. The Suez Crisis began as a conflict between Egypt and Israel, along with its allies France and Britain, over the nationalization of the Suez Canal. In defense of Egypt, Iraq also joined the war. As Iraq and Turkey were both members of CENTO, an agreement of cooperation and security, Iraq applied pressure on Turkey to relinquish its ties to Israel. In order to assuage Iraq's and the rest of the Arab world's wishes, Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Israel in

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[268] George E. Gruen, "Turkey's Relations with Israel and its Arab Neighbors", **Middle East Review**, Vol: 17, No: 3, 1985, p. 34.
[269] Mahmut B. Aykan, "The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s", **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, Vol: 25, No: 1, 1993, p. 93.

November 1956. In addition, Turkey denounced Israeli policies towards Egypt during a CENTO meeting.[270]

Despite the decline in diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel because of the Suez Crisis, economic and military bilateral relations developed significantly in the second half of the 1950s. Due to the pan-Arab and communist threat invading the Middle East, Israel attempted to deepen its relations with its non-Arab and non-Communistic neighbors. As such, Israel prompted greater relations with Turkey and Iran in the form of intelligence sharing, as well as military and economic agreements.[271]

Nonetheless, the rapprochement between Turkey and the Arab world and the emerging conflict between Turkey and the U.S. led to a decline in Turkish-Israeli relations. Turkey and the U.S. experienced a period of aggravated relations over Turkey's actions towards Cyprus. Turkey became concerned over the impending actions of self-determination on the island and voiced its concerns to its American ally. The U.S. responded negatively to Turkish anxieties in a letter by President Lyndon B. Johnson. Disappointment from the letter led Turkey to turn away from the Western block. By rebuffing its Western allies, Turkey began to engage in a more multi-dimensional foreign policy and began to rekindle previous relations with its Arab neighbors.[272]

The increase in Turkish relations with Arab nations led Turkey to condemn Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. The 1967 Arab- Israeli war began when several Arab states invaded Israel to aid the Palestinian cause in regaining Palestine back from Israel. Turkey not only condemned Israeli policies, but also voted in favor of United Nations Resolution 242, which ordered Israel to withdraw from newly occupied Palestinian territory. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Turkey maintained it support for the Resolution 242 and continued to condemn Israeli policies. Nonetheless, towards the end of the 1970s as Egypt softened its ties with Israel, as did Turkey.

Turkish condemnation of Israel returned however in 1980. Israel's attempt at positioning Jerusalem as its new capital largely instigated the Turkish hostilities. Turkey argued that Israel's actions were inappropriate as they had yet to resolve their

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[270] Aykan, p. 93
[271] Dalia Dassa Kaye, Alireza Nader and Parisa Roshan, **Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry**, National Defence Research Industry, Pittsburgh, 2011, pp. 10-11.
[272] Süha Bölükbaşı, "Behind the Turkish Alliance: A Turkish View", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol: 29, No: 1, Autumn 1999, p. 25.

Palestinian conflict. In addition, Turkey condemned the annexation by Israel of Golan Heights and remained critical of Israel's invasion in Lebanon. To Israel's dismay, Turkey also recognized the new Palestinian State in 1988 becoming the only NATO member to do so. Despite Turkey condemnations against Israel, communication between the two countries remained open during this time.[273]

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 led Turkey to take a pro-American and pro-Israeli stance. Particularly, Turkey and Israel regained positive relations during this time beginning with the peace process in 1993 and the Madrid Meetings and Oslo Accords. Bilateral relations boomed in the mid-1990s with a tremendous increase in cooperation in economy and security. The Tourism Cooperation Agreement signed in June 1992 led to a flow of Israeli tourists to Turkey. Many high level diplomatic visits took place between the two countries. In addition, military agreements and joint protocols signed between Turkey and Israel allowed the countries to engage in bilateral military relations and joint battles against terrorism.[274]

2. Impact of Prime Minister Erdoğan on Turkish Foreign Policy towards Israel during AK Party

Prime Minister Erdoğan's significant impact on Turkish foreign policy can clearly be seen in Turkish Israeli relations between 2010-2013 particularly by observing the Davos episode and Mavi Marmara Crisis. Turkish-Israeli relations before the AK Party came to power in 2002 were generally positive. In fact in the early years of the AK Party, despite the conservative tone of AK Party, the harmonious relations between the two countries continued. However, once Erdoğan consolidated his power in politics through two consecutive elections by gaining 47.6 and 49.9 percent of the votes in 2007 and 2011 general elections respectively, he felt confident enough to follow the foreign policies he wished to. The most important issue that played a substantial role in the deterioration of Turkish Israeli relations was the intervention of Israel to Gazza. In addition, the decrease in the role of the Turkish military in politics has also led to increased ability of Erdoğan's government to have more voice in Israeli-Turkish affairs.

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[273] Aykan, p. 104
[274] Dov Waxman, "Turkey and Israel: A New Balance of Power in the Middle East", **the Washington Quarterly**, Vol: 22, No: 1, 1999, pp. 29.

This is noteworthy as throughout the 1990s when military's role in foreign policy reached a peak, the commanders did not permit the former religiously conservative Prime Minister Erbakan to falter Turkey's relations with Israel. During that period, Turkish military was very sensitive at Turkish-Israeli relations due to the intelligence and military aid it received from Israel against its fight with the PKK.

The subsequent case study aims to display how Erdoğan's reaction to specific events, the words that he spoke in response, and the outcomes all coincide with the already determined leadership style that was presented in previous sections. As such, an extensive overview of Turkish-Israeli relations covering all aspects will not be given. Rather, specific examples of how Erdoğan's leadership style impacts foreign policy relations between Turkey and Israel from the time period assessed (2010-2013) will be presented.

Although relations between Israel and Turkey were already in decline after the 2009 Davos World Economic Forum where Erdoğan publicly accused Israeli President Shimon Peres of knowing "well how to kill,"[275] in regards to the Gaza war, relations proceeded to deteriorate even further after Israel attacked a flotilla headed towards Gaza leaving eight Turkish citizens dead in May, 2010. As will be shown, Erdoğan's personality and leadership style can be clearly seen in his response to the event. Erdoğan did not want Turkey to look weak, corresponding to the Directive leadership style in which maintaining his status and his country's status are important. Simultaneously, Erdoğan worked to collaborate with other countries in reaction to the incident which can be anticipated based on his relationship-focused personality.

In June, 2010, just a few short weeks after the Mavi Marmara incident, Erdoğan gave an interview with Christiane Amanpour to discuss the event. When asked about a statement made declaring Israel as the biggest threat to peace in the Middle East, Erdoğan clarified, "What I'm looking for is contribution to peace. And I want Israel to contribute to peace. If we speak of this as threat, it's one thing. If we speak of it as contribution, it's another."[276] After the flotilla incident, Erdoğan exclaimed, "This attack has clearly shown that the Israeli government has no desire for peace in the region."[277]

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[275] Katrin Bennhold, "Leaders of Turkey and Israel Clash at Davos Panel", **New York Times**, 29.01.2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/world/europe/30clash.html, (19.06.2014).
[276] Christiane Amanpour, "Interviews with Goodluck Jonathan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Kofi Annan", **CNN,** 2010, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1004/16/ampr.01.html, (31.05.2014).
[277] Tavernise, Raid.

Erdoğan also called the raid on the Turkish ship a "bloody massacre" and stated that Israel should immediately end "the inhumane embargo on Gaza."[278] In addition, the prime minister said in an interview with Charlie Rose in 2010 that what Israel's action in regards to the flotilla "is state terror" and called Israel "the West's spoiled child."[279] Each of these statements by Erdoğan can be harsh and unsympathetic. Erdoğan chooses not to use diplomatic language, but rather pushes the limits of his speech.

As shown in his personality assessment, Erdoğan is likely to battle the constraints of his position. One of those constraints in relation to Israel in which Erdoğan challenges is the limit set on his ability to freely speak due to the sensitivities of the international environment and diplomatic norms. Erdoğan unceasingly challenges this constraint and has become famous for his harsh statements and rash criticisms of the Israeli government. In 2011, David Greene of NPR asked Erdoğan if he regrets any of the previous comments made. Erdoğan responded, "My objective is not to put on a show or to look nice to this or that person. I am making an observation. And all of these things have happened. You have bombed children playing on the beach, and what will we say, "Well done?"[280] When asked by Charlie Rose if he was using harsh language to gain credibility among Arab nations, Erdoğan retorted, "Why do you look at it like this? Why do you evaluate the situation this way? I make no distinction between Arab and non-Arab. I`m human. And I`m reflecting my human approach. And when I use my words, I choose my words. And I choose them knowingly and I never speak to the Israeli people. My remarks are directed at the Israeli government."[281] As can be seen, Erdoğan is unapologetic in regards to his tough language. Such use of language despite the reactions from journalists and the international community displays one way in which Erdoğan is challenging the constraints of his position.

At the same time, using harsh language also shows how Erdoğan flaunts his use of power. The excessive use of power is in direct correlation to his personality traits (i.e. BACE and PWR). Erdoğan explained why he speaks as he does in regards to

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[278] Isabel Kershner, "Pressure Mounts on Israel as Activists Vow to Test Blockade Again", **New York Times**, 01.06.2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/world/middleeast/02flotilla.html?fta=y, (31.04.2014).

[279] David D. Kirkpatrick, "Premier of Turkey Takes Role in Region", **New York Times,** 12.09.2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/world/middleeast/13egypt.html?_r=0, (31.05.2014)

[280] Charlie Rose, "Interview with Prime Minister of Turkey; Opening Day of Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan`s Confirmation Hearings; Senator Robert Byrd Dies" **High Beam Research**, 29.06.2010, (Opening Day), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-2068938121.html, (31.05.2014).

[281] Charlie Rose, Opening Day.

politics by stating, "Never forget that as a prime minister, as a leader of my country, I am carrying a responsibility. I am not only speaking about the 74 million inhabitants living in Turkey who are my citizens, to whom I'm responsible for, but also the entire population of the Arab world. They expect our reactions and our responses towards these issues."[282] Therefore, Erdoğan believes that he has a duty to speak for not only his constituents, but also those outside of Turkey; Erdoğan is overusing his power by attempting to speak for all Arabs. As noted by Ziya Öniş, "the strong and assertive positions taken by Prime Minister Erdoğan, in terms of his vocal criticisms of Israel starting in Davos and his championing of Palestinian cause have helped to bolster the popularity of Turkey quite dramatically in most Arab countries."[283] This is as to be expected in that Erdoğan's leadership style shows that he will work to maintain and build his and Turkey's reputation on the international stage. At the same time, Erdoğan is challenging constraints by using speaking in a fashion that is unsuitable to his position. Again, this matches his personality traits as his BACE and PWR scores show that he is likely to misuse his power and confront constraints.

After the Mavi Marmara incident, Turkey called for an international firm to investigate the incident.[284] Turkey also banned Israeli military jets from entering Turkish air space,[285] and recalled Turkey's ambassador from Jerusalem. Each of which were minor retaliatory actions. All in all, however, economic relations between the two countries remained stable.[286] As Erdoğan's personality allows him to view events on a case by case basis, it is evident that Erdoğan did not view Israel's attack of Mavi Marmara as an explicit attack against Turkey. In other words, the Mavi Marmara incident did not warrant direct military retaliation or increased military defense. Conversely, as would be expected based on Erdoğan's leadership style in which maintaining Turkey's reputation is vital and cooperation is key, Erdoğan demanded three requests from Israel as explained in an interview in 2011 with Time Magazine. Erdoğan stated, "Right now, as long as they refuse to apologize for the nine people of Turkish descent who lost their lives on the flotilla, so long as they refuse to pay

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[282] Greene and Inskeep, Blasts Syria, Israel.

[283] Öniş, p. 56.

[284] Sebnem Arsu and Jack Healy, "Turkey Barring Israeli Military Flights From Its Appearance", **New York Times,** 28.06.2010, (Appearance), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/world/middleeast/29turkey.html?_r=1&, (31.05.2014).

[285] Arsu and Healy, Appearance.

[286] Dina Kraft, "Despite Raid, Mostly Business as Usual for Israel and Turkey" **New York Times**, 02.07.2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/world/middleeast/03israel.html, (31.05.2014).

compensation to the families, and of course as long as the embargo on Gaza has not been lifted, the relations between the two countries will never become normalized."[287] This expression by Erdoğan emphasizes his need to not surrender to the circumstances, but simultaneously retain a strong appearance in order to not wound his reputation.

Although Erdoğan was evidently displeased with the flotilla raid and expressed his ideas with harsh rhetoric, he did not retaliate irrationally. Other leaders may have struck back or severed relations; Turkey did no such thing. Erdoğan explained the situation in an interview with CNN in 2011, "Whoever, whoever is in question if rights, if liberty is in question, it should be defended. We gave our warnings to Israel. This is the reason for war. This is something you cannot do in international waters, but as a great state, we have been very forgiving. That's why we have been very patient."[288] In fact, on the face troubled relations subsisted, yet economic relations and business relations went on as usual throughout the 2010-2013 period.[289] For this reason, it can be said that Erdoğan is very aware of contextual events and understands that other nations and countries are not out to get or take advantage of Erdoğan and his administration. Although the relationship between Turkey and Israel did not regain its previous status, nonetheless, it did not significantly degrade either. This demonstrates the view of Erdoğan that the flotilla incident was a one-time episode and there is no need for Erdoğan to increase defense as will most probably not happen again.

As mentioned before, Erdoğan's need for an apology from Israel stems from his leadership style in which he aims to preserve Turkey and his reputation in the international arena. In March, 2013, the apology from Israel was realized.[290] Despite the Mavi Marmara incident, by the end of the 2010-2013 period relations between Israel and Turkey stabilized. In fact, Erdoğan achieved nearly all his requests; Israel

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[287] Ishaan Tharoor, "Exclusive: TIME Meets Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan", **Time World,** 26.09.2011, http://world.time.com/2011/09/26/exclusive-time-meets-turkish-prime-minister-recep-tayyip-Erdoğan/, (31.05.2014).
[288] Zakaria, (RTP interview).
[289]Note: In December 2011, Israel canceled a $141 million contract that would supply Turkey with an advanced aerial intelligence system; private sector bilateral trade remained as usual. Isabel Kershner, "Report That Turkey Exposed Spies Strains Its Relations With Israel", **New York Times,** 17.11.2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/world/middleeast/israel-turkey-ties-strained-by-report-of-spy-exposure.html, (03.05.2014).
[290] Doug Mills, "With Obama as Broker, Israelis and Turkey End Dispute", **New York Times**, 22.03.2013, ttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/23/world/middleeast/president-obama-israel.html?pagewanted=2, (31.05.2014).

apologized for the Mavi Marmara event and met with Turkish officials to discuss compensation plans for those affected by the incident, as well as talks concerning easing of the restricting on Gaza.[291] In addition, economic relations increased as the Syrian civil war forced Turkey's private sector to use Israel as a corridor to bypass Syria in order to ship goods to the Middle East.

To conclude, Turkish Israeli relations prior to 2003 were instable and seemingly linked to the rise and fall of Turkish American relations. By the 1990's, however, relations between Turkey and Israel stabilized. The two countries, in an attempt to fight terrorism, signed many military agreements and joint protocols. In addition, bilateral trade relations increased significantly during this period. After the election in 2002, relations between Israel and Turkey remained stable, however, quickly took a downturn in 2007 as Erdoğan openly condemned Israel's actions in Gaza. Relations continued to deteriorate after the 2009 Davos incident. During the 2010-2013 period, Erdoğan sustained his harsh rhetoric and persisted to challenge constraints of his position. Erdoğan's concern over his and his country's reputation, which stems from his Directive leadership style, dictated the Turkish Israeli relations as Erdoğan refused to reinstate previous level cooperation without an apology from Israel for the Mavi Marmara incident. Based on these events, it is evident that Erdoğan's personality traits and leadership style affected Turkish foreign policy during 2010-2013. By examining Erdoğan's speech and reactions to events, the extent of his influence in foreign policy decision-making can be determined. Furthermore, the quantitative results based on the 2010-2013 collection of interviews and the qualitative results based on the case study, are greatly correspond to one another.

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[291] Isabel Kershner, "Israel and Turkey in Talks Oveer Deadly Flotilla Raid", **New York Times**, 06.05.2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/world/middleeast/israel-and-turkey-talk-compensation-in-flotilla-raid.html, (31.05.2014).

CONCLUSION

As Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip has considerable power in foreign policy decision-making. Historically speaking, Turkish foreign policy making has included other actors along with the prime minister: the civilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy, the Turkish military, the president, as well as the parliament. There were times when the leaders, i.e. prime ministers or presidents, shaped foreign policy too. For example, in the early years of the Republic while Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was the sole decision-maker of foreign policy, during the period of Second World War Ismet Inonu decided whether to include Turkey in the war or not. However, since then other actors have been increasingly involved in foreign policy-making. In the last twelve years, similar to the early years of Turkey and the Second World War, again a determinative leader has dominated foreign policy. Prime Minister Erdoğan, with the help of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Davutoğlu, and his advisors, is the sole decision-maker in foreign affairs.

This study used Margaret Hermann's LTA methodology to assess Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's personality and leadership style. The study then compared Erdoğan's LTA results to other world leaders, middle-eastern leaders, and previous Turkish Prime Ministers in order to compare how Erdoğan's traits measure in contrast. From these results, it was determined that Erdoğan has a Directive leadership style, meaning that Erdoğan works within a political framework that allows him to maintain and increase his and Turkey's reputation on the international stage. Once Erdoğan's personality traits and leadership style were established, three case studies qualitatively assessed the validity of the LTA results. That is, the three case studies assessed whether the LTA determined personality traits and leadership style are visible in the 2010-2013 period between Turkish Iranian, Turkish Syrian, and Turkish Israeli relations.

The three case studies presented in this thesis were in regards to Turkey's relations with Syria, Iran, and Israel. The assessment found that in relation to Israel, Erdoğan's approach to foreign policy dampened relations between the two countries. Based on his LTA results, Erdoğan is likely to challenge constraints and abuse his power based on his BACE and PWR scores, which is visible in the way Erdoğan uses harsh rhetoric and non-diplomatic approaches when communicating about or with Israel

officials. Furthermore, Erdoğan's concern for his and Turkey's international status based on his Directive leadership style confirms that Erdoğan will work to maintain and build his and Turkey's reputation on the international stage. Meaning, during the Mavi Marmara incident, Erdoğan's leadership style will lead Erdoğan to be strong and unrelenting against Israel so that the world does not view Erdoğan or Turkey as weak.

In the case study concerning Syria, Erdoğan's need for international cooperation controlled much of his approach in the dealings with Turkey's southern neighbor. Despite increased violence spilling over into Turkey's borders, Turkey via Erdoğan maintained a stance of cooperation and relied heavily on its relationship with NATO and the UN to deal with Syrian-Turkish relations. The standoff between countries concerning how to act in regards to the Syrian Civil War has left Turkey incapable of action. In other words, as the international community has remained motionless, Erdoğan too is immobile as proceeding unilaterally in response is out of the question for Erdoğan and his leadership style.

Finally, in the case of Iran, Erdoğan's directive leadership style is most clearly visible. Not only is his need for cooperation on display, but so is his hunger to increase his and Turkey's regional and international reputation which is driven by his Directive leadership style. Turkey worked side-by-side with Brazil in an attempt to assuage the Iranian nuclear conflict diplomatically. Although the attempt was in vain, nonetheless, Turkey earned itself a reputation of being rational and collaborative.

For four consecutive years under the analyzed period, 2010-2013, Turkey was witness to a tumultuous phase of incidents among itself and its neighbors. First, Turkey made headlines as it continued its economic relations with Iran despite the West's decision to impart sanctions. In the same year, Turkey's relations with Israel took a downturn after the Mavi Marmara flotilla raid. The Syrian Civil War, although started with the Arab Spring in the same year, became an entity of its own and created a mass of new foreign policy issues for Turkey and Prime Minister Erdoğan. In 2012, the ramifications of a civil war along Turkey's borders began to be felt domestically as Syrian refugees flooded in and cross-border fire damaged Turkish towns and villages. The following year, 2013, began on a positive note as Israel and Turkey attempted to end their long-running dispute; nonetheless, domestic turmoil stemming from the Gezi Park protests and deterioration of relations with the unyielding Syrian government has kept Turkey in a state of seamless conflict. These events make the period under

analysis, 2010-2013, highly unlike years previous under the AK Party administration. In addition, such events mark great changes in the relations between Turkey and the countries under review, Israel, Iran, and Syria.

Not only has Erdoğan and the AK Party made an historical impact on Turkey, so have the events mentioned above. It is due to these compounding factors that it is important to assess Erdoğan's personality during these years. Such an analysis allows the researcher and the reader to see how Erdoğan has changed and/or adapted to his significantly altered environment. This analysis of Erdoğan, in comparison to previous analyses of Kesgin, and Görener and Ucal, will help to complete a broader picture of Erdoğan's personality traits, what type of leadership style he has, as well as how his personality and style may have impacted Turkish foreign and domestic policies and affairs. It is apparent, through examining the LTA results of these studies with previous ones, that Erdoğan is instable in his personality traits and his leadership style. Erdoğan received different trait scores for many of the seven LTA traits and different leadership styles in the Kesgin study, as well as the Görener and Ucal study. This is significant as it displays Erdoğan's sensitivities to his contextual environment.

As already noted in earlier chapters of this thesis, other scholars have also found that some leaders may be instable in regards to particular traits depending on the context. Some individuals may be temporally instable, meaning that overtime their traits and leadership style may change. Other leaders may be affected by conflicts; therefore, during crises, the leader may exude different personality traits and leadership styles until the crises in concluded. Moreover, specific events may cause a leader to change his or her leadership style. In other words, a leader may maintain his or her leadership style throughout all circumstances, except when involved or discussing a particular event to which he or she is sensitive. In addition, some leaders may be respond and behave differently in domestic and international arenas; therefore, they may be instable in their personality traits and leadership style depending on the sources used to gather spontaneous spoken material. As Erdoğan is clearly instable in both his personality traits and leadership style, it is imperative to learn under which context he is likely to change. That is, is Erdoğan most affected by his setting (i.e. domestic vs. global environment), the period of time, under crises, or only by certain events. Through understanding which contextual factors shape his personality, researchers and scholars

can better understand grasp how Erdoğan is likely to behave in different contextual settings.

In sum, this study sought to answer if LTA is an appropriate method to analyze Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This study has determined that LTA is a sufficient tool to utilize in assessing Erdoğan's personality and leadership style; however, further research is needed in order to determine Erdoğan's contextual sensitivities. Through the LTA approach, it was possible to establish Erdoğan's personality and leadership traits and qualitatively assess their impact on Turkish foreign policy. This thesis concludes that Erdoğan's leadership style is a significant factor that researchers of Turkish studies and International Relations must examine when analyzing Turkish foreign policy. As shown in the case studies, Erdoğan's personality greatly affects how he manages his relations and actions in terms of foreign affairs. Hence, Erdoğan's personality greatly influences his decision-making style and therefore influences Turkey's foreign policy.

There are limitations to this study, however. As already noted, this is a temporal analysis of Erdoğan using LTA for the four-year period of 2010-2013. Therefore, this study does not present a complete assessment of Erdoğan. As previous researchers have attempted to complete full LTA assessments of Erdoğan, this study has picked up where previous studies have ended. Therefore, readers and researchers can use this study to contrast and compare the similarities and differences between years and events of the three LTA assessments of this study, Kesgin, and Görener and Ucal. Furthermore, an important note, the interviews in this study were from international sources. Consequently, it is possible that the changes in Erdoğan's personality and leadership style during the 2010-2013 period may in fact be related to Erdoğan's contextual sensitivities during the interview process. Further research is needed to determine what Erdoğan is most sensitive to when conducting at-a-distance analyses.

What is clear from this analysis of Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan is that his personality and leadership style has had a defining effect on the foreign policy choices of the Turkish government during the 2010-2013 period. He exhibits behavior consistent with the directive leadership style determined in the LTA assessment of his spontaneous spoken material and consistent with journalistic and scholarly representations of Erdoğan throughout this period. Furthermore, this study shows that leadership studies and the LTA assessment tool are an effective to analyze foreign

policy of states, particularly when the state places significant decision-making power in the hands of one or few leaders, as in the case of Turkey.

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