

DOKUZ EYLÜL UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM
DOCTORAL THESIS
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

**SECURITY DYNAMICS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS IN
LIGHT OF RSCT: THE UNSETTLED CONFLICT OVER
NAGORNO-KARABAKH**

Eshgin TANRIVERDI



Supervisor
Prof.Dr. Nilüfer KARACASULU

İZMİR- 2019

DOCTORAL THESIS
APPROVAL PAGE

University : Dokuz Eylul University
Graduate School : Graduate School of Social Sciences
Name and Surname : ESHGIN TANRIVERDİ
Title of the Thesis : Secuity Dynamics in the South Caucasus in light of RSCT: The Unsettled Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh
Defence Date : 20/12/2019
Supervisor : Prof.Dr.Zehra Nilüfer KARACASULU

EXAMINING COMMITTE MEMBERS

<u>Title,Name and Surname</u>	<u>University</u>	<u>Signature</u>
Prof.Dr.Zehra Nilüfer KARACASULU	- Dokuz Eylül University	
Assist.Prof.Dr. Üyesi İrem AŞKAR KARAKIR	- Dokuz Eylül University	
Prof.Dr.Mustafa TANYERİ	- Dokuz Eylül University	
Assoc.Prof.Dr.Ülviyye AYDIN	- Celal Bayar University	
Assoc.Prof.Dr.Sedef EYLEMER	- İzmir Katip Çelebi University	

Unanimity (X)
Majority of votes ()

The thesis titled as "**Secuity Dynamics in the South Caucasus in light of RSCT: The Unsettled Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh**" prepared and presented by ESHGIN TANRIVERDİ is accepted and approved.

Prof. Dr. Erkan GÖKSU
Müdür V.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this doctoral thesis titled as “**Security Dynamics in the South Caucasus in light of RSCT: The Unsettled Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh**” has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honor.

Date

....../....../2019

Eshgin TANRIVERDI

Signature

ABSTRACT

Doctoral Thesis

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

**Security Dynamics in the South Caucasus in light of RSCT: The Unsettled
Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh**

Eshgin TANRIVERDI

Dokuz Eylül University

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

International Relations Program

The South Caucasus is one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world. This thesis aims to analyze regional conflicts and security dynamics in the South Caucasus and possible peace settlement processes. Particularly, it focuses on the unsettled conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, in light of the Regional Security Complex Theory. The RSCT has been developed by Buzan and Waever, and had been applied to all the regions in the world. The South Caucasus has been identified as a regional sub-complex in the post-Soviet arena. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is considered one of the bloodiest conflicts that happened in the post-Soviet zone after the end of the Cold-War. The South Caucasus region has caught the attention of foreign scholars from various aspects: regional security, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, energy politics, diplomacy, and so on. Conducting an articulate analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the thesis intends to arrange a theoretical correlation with RSCT. Since the beginning of the conflict until today, the volatile character of the conflict had an overwhelming impact on shaping the regional security dynamics in the South Caucasus. The structure of the research has articulately displayed the entitled conflict in the three main columns, as warfare; no war and no peace situation; the involvement of the external actors in the resolution process. In addition, the research elaborates on how interstate conflict shapes the policies of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The effectiveness of the unresolved

conflict doesn't limit itself to making drastic changes in regional security, but it has also become an incentive for potential terror attacks in the region. As a result, the thesis makes a conclusion in two parameters: whether Nagorno-Karabakh as a regional conflict in the South Caucasus matchup with the characteristics of the Regional Security Complexes; in regards to security implication, the role of the external actors to fulfill the expectations of Azerbaijan and Armenia on the basis of peaceful resolution.

Keywords: South Caucasus, Regional Security Complex, Azerbaijan's foreign policy, Armenia's foreign policy, Nagorno-Karabakh.



ÖZET

Doktora Tezi

**Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi Teorisi ışığında Güney Kafkasyada Güvenlik
Dinamikleri: Çözümlememiş Dağlık-Karabağ Çatışması**

Eshgin TANRIVERDİ

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı

İngilizce Uluslararası İlişkiler

Doktora Programı

Güney Kafkasya dünyada en çok çatışmanın olduğu bölgelerden biridir. Bu tez, Güney Kafkasya'daki bölgesel çatışmaları, güvenlik dinamiklerini ve olası barış çözümleme süreçlerini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Özellikle Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi Teorisi ışığında çözümlememiş Dağlık-Karabağ çatışması incelenmiştir. BGKT, Buzan ve Waever tarafından geliştirilmiş ve dünyanın tüm bölgelerine uygulanmıştır. Güney Kafkasya, Sovyetler sonrası dönemde bölgesel bir alt kompleks olarak tanımlanmış bölgelerden biriydi. Dağlık Karabağ çatışması, Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesinden sonra Sovyet sonrası bölgede meydana gelen en kanlı çatışmalardan biri olarak kabul edilir. Güney Kafkasya bölgesi yabancı akademisyenlerin dikkatini çeşitli açılardan çekmiştir: bölgesel güvenlik, uyuşmazlıkların çözümü ve barış inşası, enerji politikaları ve diplomasi ve benzeri. Dağlık-Karabağ çatışması üzerine detaylı analiz yürüten bu tez, BGKT ile teorik bir ilişki kurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Çatışmanın başlangıcından bugüne kadar, çatışmanın geçici niteliği Güney Kafkasya'daki bölgesel güvenlik dinamiklerini şekillendirmekte büyük bir etkiye sahipti. Bu nedenle araştırmanın yapısı bu çatışmayı, savaş durumu, savaşın olmaması-barışın olmaması durumu ve dış güçlerin müdahalesi durumu olarak üç farklı şekilde açıkça ortaya koymuştur. Ayrıca, araştırma, devletlerarası çatışmanın Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan politikalarını nasıl şekillendirdiğini incelemektedir. Çözümlememiş çatışmanın etkinliği, bölge

güvenliğinde sert değişiklikler yapma konusunda kendisini sınırlamaz, ancak bölgeye yönelik terör saldırıları için de teşvik edici bir unsur haline gelmiştir. Sonuç olarak, tez iki parametrede bir sonuca varma eğilimindedir: Dağlık Karabağ'ın Güney Kafkasya'da bölgesel bir ihtilaf olarak Bölgesel Güvenlik Komplekslerinin özellikleriyle eşleşip eşleşmediğini; güvenlik bağlamında Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan'ın barışçıl beklentilerinde dış aktörlerin rolü.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güney Kafkasya, Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi, Azerbaycan dış politikası, Ermenistan dış politikası, Dağlık-Karabağ.



**SECURITY DYNAMICS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS IN LIGHT OF RSCT:
THE UNSETTLED CONFLICT OVER NAGORNO-KARABAKH**

CONTENT

DOCTORAL THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
DECLARATION	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	vi
CONTENT	viii
ABBREVIATIONS	xi
LIST OF TABLES	xiii
MAP	xiv
INTRODUCTION	1

CHAPTER I:

**CONCEPTUAL and THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: REGIONAL
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

1.1.	CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	
1.1.1.	National versus International Security	9
1.1.2.	Region, Regional Security and Level of Analysis	12
1.1.3.	The characteristics of Securitization	18
1.2.	THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	
1.2.1.	Significance of the Regional Security Complex Theory	19
1.2.2.	Classical Regional Security Complex Theory	22
1.2.3.	Moving beyond the Regional Security Complex Theory: Constructivist method	25
1.2.4.	Types of Security Complexes	27
1.2.5.	Structural significance of ‘amity and enmity’	30

1.3.	THE EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF THE RSCT	
1.3.1.	Empirical application of the Regional Security Complex Theory in the global system	32
1.3.2.	South Caucasus as Regional Security Sub-Complex after the Soviet Union	34
1.3.3.	Interconnectedness between the South Caucasus and the Regional Security Complex Theory	37
1.4.	LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH	
1.4.1.	Objectivity of the case study	41
1.4.2.	Sensitivity of the case study: Failure of Track Two Process	43

CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: CAUSES AND EVOLVEMENTS OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS CONFLICTS

2.1.	NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT	
2.1.1.	Evolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict	47
2.1.1.1.	Azerbaijani peoples' deportation from Armenia: 1988-1989	55
2.1.1.2.	Sumgayit Incident	57
2.1.1.3.	'Black January'-January 20, 1990	59
2.1.2.	Karabakh War: 1991-1994, Nagorno-Karabakh+7	61
2.2.	GEORGIAN ETHNIC CONFLICTS: ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA	
2.2.1.	Escalation of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict	73
2.2.2.	Origins of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict	81
2.2.3.	Russo-Georgian war: 2008 August	84

CHAPTER III: NAGORNO-KARABAKH ON THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW ERA: 1994-PRESENT

3.1.	REASONS FOR A PEACE AGREEMENT	
3.1.1.	Bishkek Protocol: Basic Principles	89
3.1.2.	OSCE-Minsk Group Involvement	98
3.1.3.	Contagious Peace Negotiations	104
3.2.	CONSTANT BORDER CLASHES AND NEW CHALLENGES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND PEACE PROCESS	
3.2.1.	Constant ceasefire violations: April War-2016	120
3.2.2.	Obstacles for Peace	130

CHAPTER IV: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND RESOLUTION OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

4.1.	SECURITY IMPLICATIONS	
4.1.1.	Azerbaijan and Armenia Relations as a Security Dilemma	133
4.1.2.	Challenges on Regional Security in the long-run	137
4.1.3.	Insecurity in the Region and Armenian Terror Attacks	139
4.2.	POLICIES OF AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA	
4.2.1.	Policy of Azerbaijan	143
4.2.2.	Policy of Armenia	145
4.2.3.	Decrease of trouble-makers and Increase of peace-makers	148
4.2.4.	Impact of Regional Economic Development	152
4.3.	ROLES OF THE EXTERNAL ACTORS	
4.3.1.	Russia's Involvement in the Conflict Resolution	155
4.3.2.	Turkey's Policy About the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict	160
4.3.3.	EU's Policy About the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict	165
4.3.4.	Role of the United Nations	173
4.3.5.	Role of NATO	177
	CONCLUSION	181
	REFERENCES	192

ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline
CIS	Commonwealth Independent States
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CSO	Chief Security Officer
CIO	Chairmanship Office
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSCE	Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CRRC	Caucasus Research Resource Centers
CAG	Conflict Affected Groups
GMO	Genetically Modified Organism
E&F	Evaluation and Feedback
EU	European Union
EaP	Eastern Partnership
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EIB	European Investment Bank
ENPI	European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
EPNK	European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh
IPAP	Individual Partnership Action Plan
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISS	International Security Studies
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IPE	International Political Economy

IR	International Relations
JCC	Joint Control Commission
HLPG	High-Level Planning Group
LINKS	London Information Network on Conflicts and State Building
LOC	Line of Contact
NSA-LA	Non-State Actors and Local Authorities
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organizations
NABUCCO	Nabucco Pipeline
NASSR	Nakhchivan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
NKAO	Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OCC	Operational Capability Concept
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PSM	Post-Soviet Security Macrocomplex
PfP	Partnership for Peace
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
RSC	Regional Security Complexes
SIPPI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
TANAP	Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline
TASAM	Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Chronologies of the committed terrorist actions by the Armenian terrorist groups between 1991 and 1992 p. 63

Table 2: Chronologies of the committed terrorist actions by the Armenian terrorist groups between 1993 and 1994 p.65

Table 3: Chronology occupied territories of Azerbaijan by Armenian military forces between 1991 and 1993 p.73

Table 4: Chronology of meetings between the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict p.115

Table 5: The EU's political contributions to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict p.167

MAP OF THE OCCUPIED NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND SURROUNDING SEVEN DISTRICTS BETWEEN 1991 and 1993:



Source: International Crises Group, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground", Europe Report № 166, September 14, 2005

INTRODUCTION

The South Caucasus region shares boundaries with Turkey, Russia, Iran, and is positioned in the crossway of Asia and Europe. The South Caucasus geopolitically has gained prominence by being the vying center of the Post-Cold War period. Geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the region was not only understood or gained attention since the 1990s but in every part of the history, the region was at the center of skirmishes.

The South Caucasus region is a fascinating study area with its regional, political, cultural and energy perspectives. The region predominantly caught the international media's attention and has a particular place in the international politics literature with its political and security issues per se. Furthermore, the South Caucasus has attracted international attention through regional dynamics, which specifically escalated after the end of the Soviet Union.

The failure of the Soviet Union brought advantages for the Caucasian states to realize their dreams of regaining independence. However, the road to independence paved with adversaries. The South Caucasus region got into the threshold of a new era. Some interethnic conflicts began in the region after the 1980s and coincided with the Soviet Union's fragmentation. Some other conflicts began during the 1990s and passed through very complex phases. Interethnic conflicts had been served in variegated forms. Some conflicts were extended to become an interstate war such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Some conflicts are in preserved condition. Moreover, in those states from time to time by depending on the current regime, conflicts were sometimes igniting, and sometimes inflaming, which has been observed in the cases of Georgia-Abkhazia, and Georgia-South Ossetia. Nowadays, various forms of solutions have been proposed. Regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the compromise is assumed to rely mostly on great powers' decision. In some conflicts, government agencies prefer to make consensus in the conflict zones. This sometimes appeared with hard and sometimes with soft forms of reaction as in the case of Georgia.

All entitled conflicts are a big threat to regional security from various perspectives. All the attempts to achieve the peaceful settlement proved futile,

because of the volatile interstate interactions and border clashes, which triggered the sides to go into a new bloody war such as in Nagorno-Karabakh.

a) Scope and objective of the thesis:

The thesis predominantly focuses on the South Caucasus region and security relations within, since the end of the Cold War. The detailed security relations are examined focusing on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

This conflict started as an interethnic conflict in the territory of the Soviet Union, whereas, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union the status of the conflict became an interstate one. Today the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is considered as the most problematic regional issue in the South Caucasus. Since the ceasefire agreement held in 1994, both sides have run into a consistent peace negotiation process. However, demands of two countries are quite diverse. The Republic of Azerbaijan prioritizes the territorial integrity and put this issue at the top of the foreign policy agenda. While negotiating with the Armenia, Azerbaijan demonstrates an irrevocable demand on the withdrawal of the Armenian armies from the occupied territories with no condition. However, the Republic of Armenia stands on justifying the occupation by stating the historic desire of the ethnic Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh to be part of Armenia. In the early 1987, the rise of the Armenian minorities in the Karabakh region had escalated the spreading of the ethnic skirmishes. Armenia still relies on the self-determination initiative and the Armenian political elites are constantly announcing this during the negotiations.

Presently, the status of the conflict is complying on the status quo and ceasefire agreement. However, the formation of the conflict signaled the future potential border clashes and ceasefire violations. The worst one happened between 2-5 April 2016, the 'Four Day April War'. Both sides lost hundreds of soldiers and big amount of the munitions were destroyed. The April War has also destroyed the hope for a peaceful resolution, and since then war is on the threshold of the border. The April War had alerted other states, but the Russian command let everyone put the weapons down. Similar to the other international conflicts, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict necessitated the support of the external actors in the implementation of the

resolution. The external actors have been Russia, Turkey, the EU (OSCE-Minsk Group) and the USA.

In this thesis, the security dynamics of the South Caucasus region is considered as a crucial aspect to be analyzed. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are the three states in the South Caucasus region. In this region, security dynamics became unpredictable with unstable regional conflicts, sometimes staying silent and other times triggering sides to go into a real war. There are three conflicts in the region: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Georgian-South Ossetian conflict and Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

The thesis examines the security dynamics in the South Caucasus in the light of the Regional Security Complex Theory. This thesis focuses on the regional security dynamics, specifically by concentrating on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The main objective is to find whether the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict might restructure the Regional Security Complex.

b) Research methodology:

The thesis tries to answer several questions as below:

1. What are the conditions that might lead to the regional destabilization in the South Caucasus?
2. How does the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict affect the regional security relations?
3. Does the South Caucasus obtain the characteristics of the RSCs?
4. How do the South Caucasus security dynamics respond to the RSCT?

The thesis offers two main hypotheses as below:

1. Interethnic and interstate conflicts in the South Caucasus introduce more competitive interaction among the regional actors, which also influences the regional security dynamics. The continuation of the border clashes triggers the potential for a 'new war', and threatens the peace process by making situation more complex.
2. The unsettled Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with its unpredictable nature leads the South Caucasus into a regional security complex.

The OSCE, EPNK, agreements (Bishkek Protocol and Basic Principles), official statements, interviews, and declarations are some of the primary sources used for analyses. Secondary sources have been collected from the annual and quarterly

journals, articles, books, newspapers (mostly online), relevant websites, and manuscripts. An empirical research is done to analyze Azerbaijan and Armenian foreign policy through looking over the mainstream media in Azerbaijan and Armenia. English and Russian sources are analyzed. Track II Diplomacy is held with the unofficial representatives of the conflicted sides. The main aim is articulately searching out the possible and better method to establish peace.

c) *Theoretical conception:*

In order to analyze the security relations in the region, the Regional Security Complex Theory is adopted. According to the RSCT, the regional actor cannot attempt to have a separate security concern apart from other actors. The regional actors have security interdependence and common concerns on securitization. The RSCT has been proposed and developed by Buzan and Waever in their book titled 'Regions Power: The Structure of International Security' in 2003. They emphasized the significant aspects of territoriality and security dynamics within. They examined the worldwide Regional Security Complexes, including the South Caucasus region under the roof of the post-Soviet arena. Certainly for being one Regional Security Complex, there are various factors, however, this thesis examines only from the ongoing conflict perspective.

d) *Structure of the thesis:*

This thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter I explains the theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis including definition of region as well as regional security. The thesis evaluates the case study on regional basis and in regional security dynamics. Chapter I also introduces characteristics of securitization. The thesis is based on the Regional Security Complex Theory. The first version of this theory as well as modified one has been presented. The geographical proximity is the important point for security complex, where inter-subjective issues among the states has to be handled together. Buzan also elaborates the distinction of various forms of security complexes, which are coherently devising the security complexes' structure. Chapter I provides an empirical application of the RSCT over the South Caucasus region. The South Caucasus has been examined under the umbrella of the Post-Soviet zone. In this sense, Buzan defined the South Caucasus as a sub-complex. In addition, within the chapter the plausible interconnectedness between the RSCT and

the South Caucasus has been rendered, by taking into account all the features of the RSCT. At the last section, it is explained whether analysis of the thesis over the case study was objectively approached or with subjective partiality. Usually, the different sides blame each other on giving fake information related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Impartiality has been sometimes observed in the research works of the foreign scholars. Not all the foreign scholars are able to access primary sources and even if they do, primary sources may not be objective. The sensitivity of the case study for Azerbaijan and Armenia has influenced the research process, but it did not make a negative effect on the credibility of the research. Both countries' citizens have been bounded to cross the border, and in this circumstance to conduct Track II diplomacy research has been impossible. However, to fill the gap, the related media sources have been analyzed thoroughly to measure the tensions and attitudes of the political elites, scholars, and public.

Chapter II consists of two sections. In general, it highlights the historical backgrounds of the South Caucasus conflicts. Even though the thesis evaluates the application of the RSCT over the unsettled Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, because of its geographical location in the South Caucasus, other regional conflicts (Georgian-Abkhazia, Georgian-South Ossetia) have to be briefly presented in order to understand regional security complexes. Therefore, the historical dynamics and development of the Georgian ethnic conflicts have been presented. First section encompasses the starting reasons of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Although the interethnic skirmishes began in the late 1980s, states have been in a bloody war since 1991. Armenia's territorial claim over the Nagorno-Karabakh had eroded interstate relations, and plenty of rallies had been observed in both states. Russia had tempted Armenia to continue redundant and subversive attitudes over Nagorno-Karabakh region. Evolution of the interstate war ended up with 20 percent territorial loss of Azerbaijan. The ceasefire agreement in 1994 became a solvent action, which made countries to give a little break. In the second section, because of the regional significance the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts are explained. The starting reasons, escalations, and outcomes of the conflicts are elaborated. The latest Russo-Georgian war was held in 2008, which was an important

moment for the region when Russia solely proclaimed the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Chapter III examines interstate relations of Azerbaijan and Armenia since the ceasefire agreement in 1994. In the first section, the reasons for the ceasefire agreement and consistent peace negotiations under the supervision of the Minsk Group are widely elaborated. In addition, the evaluation of the consecutive border clashes and ceasefire violations are summarized. The volatility in the border has been examined through several examples. The most hazardous skirmishes occurred in 2-6 April 2016, which was lately named as the 'Four Day April War', or the 'April War'. That war drastically changed the level of social and political tension in both sides. The societal mindset was structured believing on a renewed Karabakh war, because the operational spectrum was considerably large unlike previous border clashes. Both sides used heavy artilleries. Hundreds of soldiers died. After the international warnings, countries stopped fighting. Unfortunately, this war had negative effects over the peace negotiation process. Once again, the interstate and inter-societal distrustfulness emerged.

Chapter IV evaluates the security implication and conflict resolution process between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The interstate relational development led the current Azerbaijan and Armenian relations to seem as security dilemma. Consequently, the current relation between Azerbaijan and Armenia has been quite tense and distrustful particularly after the April 2016. This might be one of the reasons that motivate each side on increasing its military capabilities as much as possible, though they do not demonstrate a clear intention of attack. Even for the defensive matter, they do invest giant amounts of money for the betterment of the defense capacity. Interestingly, they run for peaceful negotiations but at the same time, they focus on the development of military powers. These distrustful state behaviors shape their foreign policy that is predicting an unresolvable Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in near soon. The chaotic atmosphere and insecurity in the region attracts the terror groups to realize their blasts around or inside the region, in order to destroy interstate relations, politically and economically. The South Caucasus is an energy hub, which needs high security to precede energy projects. The second section mainly explains the both countries' policies concerning conflict resolution

and establishing a peace. The result is quite diverse and uncompromised. Thus, the newly proposed initiative on preparing the people for peace has been analyzed through media interviews. Political-military dynamics may reformulate the flow of negotiation. The regional energy projects also cannot be underestimated with respect to the conflict resolution process.

Azerbaijan in the region is known as an oil rich country and its natural gas resources put the country on the prior list of the international economic powers. On the other hand, Armenia became an isolated country in the region and cannot get the benefit from the regional projects, yet Georgia does. The regional economic development became a challenge for Armenia, and presumably, this development may be an incentive for political elite to get compromise concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Thus, the external actors are assumed as a particular influencer in terms of conflict resolution process. In this regard, Turkey, Russia, the EU, NATO, and the United Nations role in conflict resolution have been analyzed. Predominantly, Russia has never left the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict alone, either being as one of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group or alone. From time to time Russia behaves paternalistically, since Russia does not want any other external power to be influenced in the region. Turkey continues its irrevocable support for Azerbaijan, and maintains closed border relations with Armenia. Turkey serves as an energy route. The EU tends to apply a peacebuilding policy through the Minsk Group in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, since the ceasefire agreement the Minsk Group did not demonstrate any positive result and indirectly EU's mission proved futile. Nevertheless, the EU is interested due to the rich energy resources. The Caspian oil and natural gas resources are targeted to pass through the EU to reach to the world market. Comparatively, the EU has more interest on the Georgian ethnic conflicts rather than the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The case for NATO and the United Nations are same. They neither pursue direct involvement nor prefer to become outer, want to be simply neutral about the conflicts. Yet, NATO is concerned on the regional security issues and builds up a constant cooperation with the South Caucasus states for military training in order to help them to restructure the security relations in the region. There are also the UN Security Council Resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nevertheless, all the resolutions ask for an unconditional

withdrawal of the Armenian deployed military forces from the occupied territories.
Yet, until now, Armenia did not comply.



CHAPTER I:

CONCEPTUAL and THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

1.1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.1.1. National versus International Security

A comprehensive security analysis is presented in the Buzan's book titled 'People, States, and Fear'.⁽¹⁾ Besides the political and military security, he mentioned societal, environmental, and economic security. According to Buzan's work, the compatibility between national and international security is an important consideration, thinking that whether international system on behalf of the state is willing to build cooperation between international and global security. Some others argue that globalized world integration process is more important which is associated with the societal security.⁽²⁾

In the classical approach, the state is the main referent. In this sense, the classical deals with national territorial security-territorial waters and air-space and national sovereignty. Whereas Buzan offers a broader framework of security, the traditional approaches have given narrowly defined definition.⁽³⁾

National security is the main issue considered by realists. Classical realism describes the world with mutual fear, constant suspicion, and possibility of conflict, which puts pressure over states to search for constant survival. Furthermore, system realism underlines the fact that states are living in an anarchical world order, in which there is no control above the states. Therefore, the problem for national security occurs by viewing this anarchical world order, where, states independently are capable of being armed and any time get ready to defeat or harm one another. Considerably, establishing and maintaining sustainable armed forces for deterrence and defense are particular aims of national security policies. National security policy

¹ Barry Buzan, **People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations**, A Member of the Harvester Press Group, 1983.

² John Baylis, "The Concept of Security in International Relations", **Globalization and Environmental Challenges, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace**, Vol. 3, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008, pp. 496,497.

³ Anton Grizold, "The Concept of National Security in the Contemporary World", **International Journal on World Peace**, Vol. 11, No. 3, September, 1994, p. 41.

takes calculated measures for international threats such as; terrorists, criminals, demonstration, rebels and etc.⁽⁴⁾

Although the 'national security' or 'national interest' as political formulas achieves prominence, they should be examined with certain care. The term should not be understood as the same concept. In general, 'national interest' does not recommend a political track, which others can differentiate and bring alternatives. It highlights that the policy is designed particularly to promote demands for nations, rather than individuals, groups and so forth, meaning the policy regards as of lesser importance to others interests to those of the nation.⁽⁵⁾

International security has historical background; however, it has obtained new forms in the 21st century. Today, the international security as a security concept among the states belongs to the 21st century. Because external threats are not only coming from states, but from ethnic groups with the hyper-nationalized mindset, mafias towards government, criminal gangs, poverty, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and other epidemics, terrorism, Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) foods, economic inflation and mismanagement, refugee flows, over-population, failed states, additionally and most importantly environmental threats such as pollution effects on destruction of nature, irrigation problems and diversification of nature. Individuals are the primary victims of a new threats to human security, societal security, and in general global security.⁽⁶⁾

Pluralists view the world as a mixture of conflict and cooperation. Pluralists highlight that in the international system states are not the only actors to provide security. However, the belief is that states obtain an extensive responsibility to provide a security in international level. Therefore, international security has different paradigmatic consideration compared to national security.⁽⁷⁾

International security today does not necessarily associate with military power. Indeed, during the Cold War in order to maintain security, power was equated with military capability. Today's environmental nature and our planet are threatened

⁴ Jennifer Jackson-Preece, **Security in International Relations**, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011, p. 19.

⁵ Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 67, No. 4, December, 1952, p. 48.

⁶ Bartel Heurlin and Kristensen, "International Security", **International Relations**, (Ed. Jarrod Weiner and Robert A. Shrire) Encyclopedia of Life Support System, Vol. 2, p. 3.

⁷ Jackson-Preece, pp.19, 20.

not by the only traditionally known military issues, but also with issues that are originated by humans. Most importantly, no matter if, a state is taking precautionary measures in the face of climate change with its fully prepared military power; they cannot run away from the influence of climate change. In short, security cannot be provided only by balance of power, but it is more than that.⁽⁸⁾

The emergence of International Security studies (ISS) occurred in the period of the Second World War, where the debates have increased in terms of focusing on how to protect the states from both external and internal threats. Unfortunately, the ISS is not able to give a straightforward explanation and exercise as it was wished to be. The reason is at the beginning the concept of international security did not get prominent adoption, but progressively it was accepted. It is also true that there is no universally accepted definition over what actually the ISS consists of. The description of the ISS is quite intricate and its progressive volatile perspectives predict what falls in and what does not.⁽⁹⁾

International Security Studies has faced with the major criticism for its reliance on the significance of use of military power and state security. This approach was observed during the Cold War, where international security described international system with the bipolar nature. At the first state, it was exemplified with an ideological fight between the United States and Soviet Union. Lately, between them the security dilemma has turned out to become a deterrent method with the improved nuclear capability.⁽¹⁰⁾

The idea of an interdependence emerged by changing the concept of the international security. The interdependence period has evolved and enlarged the international security studies framework. The situation has become complicated by the applied oil embargo over the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Thus, the oil producers, particularly the Middle Eastern countries, have decided to increase their power by limiting the energy resources, which was highly demanded and needed by other countries. Therefore, the researchers in the

⁸ Denise Gracia, "Warming to a Redefinition of International Security: The Consolidation of a Norm Concerning Climate Change", **David Davies Memorial Institute for International Studies**, 20 September 2010, Vol.24, Issue. 3, p.274.

⁹ Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, **The Evaluation of International Security Studies**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p.8.

¹⁰ Bamzi Banchiri and Julie Blase, "International Security in the Age of Globalization", **SCRIBD**, 2014, p. 12.

international security studies have emphasized that considering all these factors the recognition of the economic importance in the international security cannot be ignored.⁽¹¹⁾

1.1.2. Region, Regional Security and Level of Analysis

The regionalist perspectives have two historical waves, the first was between 1950 and 1970, and the second one started in the mid-1980s. Many IR and IPE scholars lately have labeled the following process as the ‘new regionalism’.⁽¹²⁾ This approaches have emerged with the evolvement of the new regionalism. Those views have lasted for almost two decades. Indeed, regionalism was called ‘an elusive concept’ in the most of the literature reviews. Moreover, the scholars extensively interested in working on regionalism in order to demonstrate the widely accepted conceptual definition. The conceptual understanding of the region seemed blurring in the framework of relative subjects. Considerably, the regional studies took place in geography, particularly in the framework of the empirical research. Thus, the new regionalism became crucially a central subject of the constant debates. However, geographers have described the region as a sub-state entity. The core contradiction is highlighted by exemplifying the term ‘renaissance of border studies’. On the threshold of the world politics, the term resembled the Westphalian system. In the borderless world the term was linked to the prominent research realms within the IR.⁽¹³⁾

The notion of region, particularly in the framework of the modern geopolitical discourse has been widely endorsed and accepted. Moreover, it has gained an important role during the post-Cold War period. Moreover, there is consistent interaction between different societal sectors such as local, national, metropolitan, international, and global.⁽¹⁴⁾

¹¹ Banchiri and Et.al, p.9.

¹² Rick Fawn, “Regions and Their study: wherefrom, what for and where to?”, **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 35, February, 2009, pp. 5,8.

¹³ Fawn, pp.11,12.

¹⁴ Jessica da Silva Correia de Oliveira, “The Place of the Region in IR”, **Contexto Internacional**, Vol. 39, No.1, January/April, 2017, p. 98.

John Agnew has stated that the researchers in International Relations have usually associated the term 'region', either with the 'group together with nations that are seemingly similar, which simplifies a greater complexity', or to locate the IR studies in a 'meso-regional/sub-national field of reference'⁽¹⁵⁾ that is considerably bigger than the national, and apparently smaller than international. The emergence of region has been observed as undeniable level, such as special location or an object, which can be easily differentiated from the domestic, international, and global levels. Although it has frequently been in danger of reproducing the same notion in regard to an objectionable interaction, it has rarely been across but mostly between and among these levels or scales.⁽¹⁶⁾

The notion of the region goes against the idea of the nation-state as a fundamentally geographical unit of delineation, which has obviously been at the center of the social sciences and humanities in an entire period of the late nineteenth century. Indeed, the region keeps its articulate and exact social and geographical parameters. However, it is also undeniable fact that the term is increasingly becoming an important issue in the other field of studies, though the definition sometimes don't even match.⁽¹⁷⁾

The term a region is regularly described as a number of states are situated in the same geographical location. However, a place where one region's ending causes another region's beginning which is complicated. Moreover, scholars commonly agree on the idea that a region is envisaged more than only physical proximity. Yet, despite of an alternative formula, which needs to be used, has also proved disputes.⁽¹⁸⁾

Regional schematic terms have never been neither political nor simply intellectual. It is very unpredictable to pin its location or working area. Taking into account of the certain facts about the world that they tend to play, additionally it is relevant to their originators also in order to reflect the biases.⁽¹⁹⁾

¹⁵ John A. Agnew, "Arguing with Regions", **Regional Studies**, Vol. 47, No.1, January, 2013, p. 8.

¹⁶ Jessica da Silva Correia de Oliveira, p. 111.

¹⁷ Agnew (Regional Studies), p.8.

¹⁸ Edward D. Mansfield and Et.al Solingen, "Regionalism", **Annual Review of Political Science**, Vol.13, February 16, 2010, p.146.

¹⁹ John Agnew, "Regions on the mind does not equal regions of the mind", **Progress in Human Geography**, Los Angeles, Vol. 23, No.1, 1999, p. 95.

Regional security may be examined in the framework of international security, which categorically creates two formulas: One is an expected concern of the external aspects for national security, relatedly is aiming to establish and maintain either in two or multilateral relationships with other interested parties. These are relatively the neighboring countries, military alliances, regional institutions, and organizations for economic and political interaction and so forth. Another one is considered an international system as a whole. As a last resort is to evaluate the state in the regional context specifically from an international security perspective.⁽²⁰⁾

Accordingly, an analytical approach to the concept is more relevant. "The concept of regional security has a long tradition in IR and was understood as an effective protection, which was implemented in the system, where the interstate relations are consistent in the regional scale. This happens basically against the threats of instability, crises, armed conflicts, and regional wars". Most regularly, the essence of security concept at the regional level is usually built up on the ground of the particular system or via regional alliance, which is going to conduct an action within the certain region. Therefore 'regional security institutions are often, but not always, established on the basis of geographical boundaries of the region, and at the interface of functional cooperation'.⁽²¹⁾

The levels of analysis emerges with its five most regularly used forms in the international relations studies. These are; 1. *International system*-is highest level of analysis. 2. *International Subsystem*: Within the international system, certain distinction among the units happens in two ways: certain patterns of relationship, and occurrence of mutual interdependence. Coherently subsystems are regional 3. *Units*: which means an untitled actors are determined by different organizations, communities, subgroups, plenty of individuals are initiated cohesively get their independence to have a distinction comparing to others. This initiative is aimed to upgrade the levels. 4. *Subunits*: means that within the units there are some organized groups of individuals, which may be able to influence the behavior of the unit such

²⁰ Aleksandra Kuształ, "Theoretical Foundations of Regional Security in International Relations: The overview", **Journal of Science of the Military Academy of Land Forces**, Vol. 49, No.1, 2017, p. 18.

²¹ Kuształ. Et al.

as - bureaucracies, and lobbies. 5. *Individuals*: are considered the basement of other level of analysis.⁽²²⁾

Besides all these, two levels of analysis have been introduced by David Singer, as national sub-system and international system. Singer considers international system as the most complete one. Reasonably, it circumscribes communication of the system next to the constituent parts of the system. He argues that international levels of analysis give an awareness of the structure and interaction. Moreover, it supports the idea of generalizations and predictions. Systematically the levels of analysis arrange an atmosphere for studying entire international relations. He adds that lack of details is the core weakness of the systematic level of analysis. However, the strengthening characteristic of the system is its ability of prediction, which means the actors' behaviors can be generally predicted in a systematic arena.⁽²³⁾

In the study of international politics, the comprehensive starting point is contributed for us by the levels of analysis. It is adaptable methodological tool kit that provides us to evaluate the different components, which influences the policy making process. It provides an awareness to question the development of one state's foreign policy. Moreover, the occurrence of the international conflicts may be explained by relative questions. Thus, an intensive interaction creates an available understanding of the development among the levels. The proponents of the level of analysis usually have preferences, which levels should be prioritized in the view of International Relations.⁽²⁴⁾

Regional security dynamics have usually been observed as a security dilemma. In international relations such as other theoretical ideas, security dilemma has its important place in the literature. In the international politics, security dilemma plays a conceptual role on labeling particular situations. However, theoretical approach towards the security dilemma has very much endorsed by the

²² Barry Buzan and Et.al, **Security: A New Framework For Analysis**, Lyne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998, pp. 5,6.

²³ Fakhreddin Soltani, and Et.al, "Level of Analysis in International Relations and Regional Security Complex Theory". **Macrothink Institute-Journal of Public Administration and Governance**, Vol. 4, No. 4, Malaysia 2014, p. 167.

²⁴ Tamaki.T, "Levels of analysis of the International System", **Encounters with World Affairs: An Introduction to International Relations**, (Ed. Kavalski, E), Loughborough University's Institutional Repository, 2015, p. 22.

understanding of causes, regulations, and implications of the security dilemma. Conceptually, security dilemma took a particular and extended place within the security policy and IR theory per se, to clarify relevant questions.⁽²⁵⁾ The conceptual approach to security dilemma in the framework of defensive realism is very crucial, because of defensive realists' belief on security dilemma within the context of cooperation between states possibly to confront with the common enemy.⁽²⁶⁾ Security dilemma prepares an interaction between war and peace. Security dilemma had explained particular events in the world politics, and outbreak of ethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet Union regions. Furthermore, security dilemma has been used to analyze military races,⁽²⁷⁾ ethnic conflicts,⁽²⁸⁾ and preventing potential conflicts in certain areas.

There complexity also emerges between the security dilemma and conflict of interest. The structural differences between defensive and offensive realism remain a particular reason to come out. According to the defensive realist, approach within the conflict of interests the occurrence of objective and subjective sides are crucial outcomes, which may lead to the irreconcilable and reconcilable consequences. These actual and factual points create another complexity within the conflict of interests. However, the actual violent conflict does not happen by conflict of interests. There are some divergences between interests of two states in order to explain conflict of interests. Obviously, both states will not perceive the same things at the same time, maybe because they want different things. Accordingly, if two states get involved in full-scale war or demonstrate measurable threat that may lead to real war, defines an actual violent conflict. Presumably, complexity remains between conflict of interests and security dilemma because of these unpredictable dynamics.⁽²⁹⁾ However, for general observation several key points can be summarized. Indeed, there is certain competition between conflict of interest and

²⁵ Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis", **Security Studies**, Vol.18, No.3, October 08, 2009, pp. 587-588.

²⁶Shiping Tang, "Fear in International Politics: Two Positions," **International Studies Review**, Vol. 10, No. 3, September, 2008, pp. 451-470.

²⁷ Charles Glaser, "When Are Arms Races Dangerous?" **International Security**, Vol. 28, no 4, 2004, pp.44-48.

²⁸Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," **International Security**, Vol. 20, No.4,1996, pp.139-175.

²⁹ Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century", *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), **Blackwell Publishing**, Vol. 67, No. 3, July, 1991, pp. 440-444.

security dilemma. However, security dilemma does not necessarily give prominence to be placed between states, where conflict of interest has already been emerged. In addition, theoretical approach based on security dilemma explains that two states can possibly end up in actual conflict, though there is no objective conflict of interest in between, or there is only irresponsible subjective conflict of interest between them, on the other hand reconciling conflict of interest become genuinely objective. Another general observation is an emergence of possible danger in international politics may happen by the provocation of misperceptions and security dilemma led states to get into real conflict. Thus, predators might trigger the escalation of the conflict in the international politics as an offensive realist defines that, and defensive realists approve this claim.⁽³⁰⁾

A security dilemma is a particular situation that the certain actions driven by the state in order to increase its own military capability because of the unknown reactions might be understood from the other states, which possibly not stop but decrease the security of state. In the realm of IR, some scholars state that security dilemma can be an important source to analyze the international conflicts. They intensify their argument by stating that the legitimate monopoly of violence does not exist in the realm of international relations. Additionally, inexistence of central anarchy or world government led military and political chaos emerges in the world, as a result, there is no action to rescue. Therefore, states understand their urgent survival responsibility to manage their constructive security individually. It can be a reason for state to maximize its own security. Even though this course of action has aimed only for its own security reasons, but not to harm or threaten other state intentionally, but this movement will unintentionally decrease the security of other states, though one state increase military capabilities for its own security with no other intention. The dilemma does not happen when one state decreases the security of other state, but if one state is going to arm in because of the anarchic structure. Obviously, they cannot figure out the arming state has an intention to conduct any military action with its developed military arms for a future attack. Thus,

³⁰ Tang, (2009), pp.599.603.

reestablishing the balance of power, this option shows up that the military attack will be imminent.⁽³¹⁾

1.1.3. The characteristics of Securitization

Securitization has conceptually evolved by the Copenhagen School. Proponent researches including Buzan and Weaver have produced comprehensive works to develop this school.⁽³²⁾

The Copenhagen School analyzed the significance of the speech act, which was used by John L. Austin. That was slanted a reference to John R. Searle. The speech act in security is considered as the fundamental argument of the securitization theory. The idea is simply to complete the security action. Thing becomes a security concern only if the process has been labeled as such. It explains that object stands for a particular reason and gets threatened in its existence. Therefore, the object expects a particular support from the securitizing actor in order to guarantee its survival. The notion of security has literally been accepted as an intersubjective and social constructed.⁽³³⁾

The treatment towards security within the securitization theory is not on the basis of detached condition, but the result of paradigmatic social developments: the construction of security on social understanding elaborates the uncertainty on whom or where security should be applied and from what security should be guaranteed. The speech act examines this process by clarifying the potential threats. Thing first becomes securitized, and only then have been treated as a security issue.⁽³⁴⁾

The securitization theory has also brought intense critics, which may be because the understanding of the securitization concept is narrow. First, the

³¹ Anders Wivel, "Security Dilemma", **International Encyclopedia of Political Science**, January, 2011.

³² Holger Stritzel, "Securitization Theory and the Localization of Threat", **Securitization Theory and Copenhagen School**, Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2014, p.11.

³³ Rita Taureck, "Securitization theory and securitization studies", **Journal of International Relations and Development**, The University of Warwick, Vol. 9, Issue.1, March, 2006, pp. 53-61.

³⁴ Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 47, 2003, p. 513.

framework in identifying security is quite narrow, mainly focuses on the dominant actor's speech act. These are usually political actors, that influence the clarification process which the securitization might be observed by the institutionally legitimate political community, which is ideally state.⁽³⁵⁾

1.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.2.1. Significance of the Regional Security Complex Theory

Barry Buzan in proposed the term 'regional security complex' in the book named 'People, States, and Fear' published in 1983. By this he aimed to label the relevant structures based on level of analysis.⁽³⁶⁾

In international relations theory, traditionally the global system consisted of individual units that they achieve almost the same power in regards to the same influence on the systematic dynamics. Therefore, anarchy predicts an inevitability of the war, considering intense relations among the individual units. However, by the end of the Second World War, this scenario lost its popularity by the emergence of the multilateral institutions which rejects Clausewitzian⁽³⁷⁾ understanding of war practically is the political continuation. The regional level of security interdependence maintains its popularity in comparison to the global level. This assumption is credited by almost all world's sovereign states, where the power demonstration happens in regional scale. Therefore, the regional level of analysis, particularly after the Post-Cold War period, significantly has become an epicenter of the security studies. Buzan has developed the RSCT by thoroughly analyzing the subsystems in the regional level. He did this separately and independently from the global and international level.⁽³⁸⁾

³⁵ Vladimir Sulovic, "Meaning of Security and Theory of Securitization", **Belgrade Center for Security Policy**, October 05, 2010, p.5.

³⁶ Buzan, (1983), pp.105-115.

³⁷ Emile Simpson, "Clausewitz's Theory of War and Victory Contemporary Conflict", **Exploring War's Character and Nature**, The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters, Vol. 47, No. 4, 2017-2018, p. 9.

³⁸ Michaela Cruden, **Regional Security Complex Theory: Southeast Asia and the South Pacific**, Research Commons, University of Waikato, 2011, pp.10, 12.

The Regional Security Complex Theory builds up a bridge linking various historical dimensions with the current developments. The particular impact of the Cold War period in the international system might be an example. The RSCT supplies more refinement view than dynamically clarifying ideas, kind of center-periphery or unipolarity. It maintains harmonization in between, and constructs the theoretical attachment per se. The theory also includes the constructivist ideas, since, the RSCT attaches on the structure of amity and enmity. This makes the regional system hinge on an exposition of the actors' behavior and certain actions. The RSCT is applicable for the entire international system and putting lens on studying particular regions per se. ⁽³⁹⁾

The RSC provides a clear understanding of the trepidation and inclination of the separate units. In this context, the security concern either in separate units or global scale of intervention may be understood through the regional security dynamics. The security complex has been scrutinized in the framework of region and security. However, in other word, the security complexes have not necessarily been referred to the regions. Yet, they were originated from or depend on the other impression regional paradigm. Articulately, the RSCs characteristically focus only on the security terms and its open relationship for the clear examination. The first time the classical version of the of the security complex was defined by Buzan, which was called, "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another". Lately he had presented an updated version of the definition as, "a set of units whose major processes of the securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another". ⁽⁴⁰⁾

Significantly, the security complexes specifically tend to be applied in the medium level of analysis by being merged with the two others: micro and macro levels of analysis. The crucial combination between them may supply a full-reaching and applicable analytical understanding and investigation for the target regions. These regions consist of countries, which locate in the same geographical zone and

³⁹ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, **Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003, p. 40.

⁴⁰ Buzan and Waever, pp.43,44.

covered up with the certain historical experience. Thus, between the levels, there is a constant interaction, which means the local security dynamics may be possibly transformed into the international one or contrary. The RSCs authorize interest groups to concentrate on the collection of the states that their behaviors and actions influence the security concern of the other member states. Thus, RSCT can be articulately understood if it looks at the states from their heterogeneous perspective. This act may comprises the group of states and creates an interplay dynamics between them and other potential states, which is going to be emerged.⁽⁴¹⁾

Furthermore, the RSCT must be significantly useful due to three reasons. 1. The theory produces an awareness of the suitable level of analysis for the security studies. 2. Provides empirical studies arrangement. 3. Alternatives to the Regional Security Complexes may be set up based on the known and attainable forms of the theory. The RSCs have been identified based on the sustainable figures of an amity and enmity. This action links the process to the sub-system, which are geographically unified figures of the security interdependence. History shows that the specific nature of the local RSC, quite often have been influential with their past factors alike-Turkey and Greece, Persians and Arabs, Azerbaijan and Armenia, or an acceptance of the shared cultural civilization area-Europeans, South Americans, and Central Asians. The Security interaction in the context of geographical proximity does not happen in all the sectors, but mostly in political, military, environmental, and societal. The certain interaction in the same proximity for an economic sector doesn't go ahead successfully.⁽⁴²⁾

The RSC may not be perspective in order to be accordingly applicable to any constellation of states. It is discussable that the right exposition of the frontiers has been shaped by the figures of the corresponding security linkage and lack of interest about. However, the theoretical framework does not privilege the one determine a random group of states based on the RSC for any group of states. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Members, Warsaw Pact, and Norden can be relevant example in this regard. To be qualified as a Regional Security Complex, it requires originating the security interdependence as a precondition among the group of states

⁴¹ Fatmir Xheladini, "Regional Security Complex: The Macedonian Context", **European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies**, Vol. 1, Issue. 6, September/December, 2016, p. 36.

⁴² Buzan and Waever, pp. 45,46.

and other entities. The purpose to that is to set up a sufficient correlation and distinguish them from other security regions. The Regional Security Complexes determine themselves as a substructure of the international system within the RSCT. It has been operated by the aggregative initiatives by the constellation of units in order to serve for the multilateral security interdependence. Yet, an important queries need to be answered here. Firstly, the Regional Security Complex does not literally locate in ideas of the digressive construction of the regions. The reason is the RSC has conceptually been defined as an analytical and have become an applicable theoretical framework by Buzan and Waever. More importantly, the nature of the regions in terms of RSC are socially constructed, therefore, they are unable to give an advanced prediction in order to detect the actors' practices in terms of security. Presumably it is unclear that from whom and what the regional actors will be securitized. Buzan and Waever's constructed approach has been circling around the security. On behalf of the RSCT, a security has actually been understood as what actors operate.⁽⁴³⁾

1.2.2. Classical Regional Security Complex Theory

The application of the theory had been addressed to the different parts of the world in various periods. The basic logic of regional security symbolizes an understanding of the interactional affairs based on international security. The principle behind the classical security complex emphasized that actors in the unit level had mostly political-military security concerns. The classical security complex demonstrates the regional subsystems as security objects. The traditionalist scholars describe a state as a key unit in the military and political sectors. This conceptual approach aimed to design and underline the correlative autonomy of the regional security relations. Certainly, supplying relevant area specialists, which are fully prepared with language and theoretical concepts in order to implement comparative studies throughout the regions, is one of the purposes of theory. Besides these, the theory aims to balance the inclination of the theoretical approach in the realm of the international security; it has been prominently valued at the regional level.

⁴³ Buzan and Waever , p.48.

Inherently, the most of the military and political threats can be transmitted in a short range comparing to the long one, thus, insecurity is frequently equated with an adjacency. Accordingly, the neighbor states frighten each other rather than other states locate in far distance. Practically, the security interdependence has usually been observed as complex among the states, which are in the neighborhood rather than with states outside of the zone.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Classically a security complex is defined as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another”. Escalations of the structural dynamics within the security complexes have been derived by the units that are usually states with their mutual security attitudes and communications. The theory postulates that in geographical variations, the security complex and international anarchic system are normally accepted factors. If these do not exist, one wanders to know the reason. Therefore, identically those factors are characterized by the local states of aggregation. Thus, practically the classical security complexes do not exert its interrelated impacts only among their members; whereas they have anxious concern for the region is about the potential penetration may be realized by the stronger external powers. As a result, there are two crucial conditions to clarify the uncertain future of a security complex. 1. In some regions, not all the states out there are literally prepared fully with their power projects, which enables them to operate an action out of their own frontiers. These types of states generally focus on the domestic security concerns, which bound them to have a sufficient security interaction with others in order to originate a local security complex. 2. The condition happens when the stronger external powers have direct penetration into the region. The condition vanquishes an expected security performance among the local units, which is called overlay.⁽⁴⁵⁾

The necessary structure in classical security complex defines three the crucial constituents: positioning of the units and distinction among them; a motif of amity and enmity; power dissemination among the leading units. Besides these, there are four additional structural options which examine the influential change over the security complex. They are: 1. Preservation of the status quo, which explains a

⁴⁴ Buzan, and Et.al, (1998), pp. 10-11.

⁴⁵ Buzan, and Et.al, (1998), p.12.

structural importance of the local level security complexes which have been engaged with the power dissemination and motifs of animosity; 2. internal transformation- that explains the emergence of the local complexes which happen by the transformation of its necessary structure within the context of its available exterior boundary; 3. External transformation- usually happens when the current structure of the complex is adjusted. This action has been realized in two ways: enlargement and discrepancy of their available outer frontier; 4. Overlay that explains the direct penetration has been realized by the group of external powers targeted to the regional complex. As a result, they destroy the domestic security. Lastly, an analysis of the classical regional security looks for elements of the security interdependence. Those elements are considerably powerful to separate the group of units from the outsiders. Additionally, two other possible options explain the security complex theory by making it available to other sectors besides military-political and state related; 1. Homogeneous complex- preserves the classical belief that the security complexes have been intensified within the particular sectors. It produces particular types of communication for the better togetherness of an analogous structure of units; 2. Heterogeneous complexes-disregards the belief that security complexes are stuck into particular sectors. Presumably, the regional rationale can move forward on building up an active interaction with the other actors throughout the two or more sectors. For instance, socio-economic or socio-political sectors is convenient place for an achievable interaction to combine two or more interested groups such as; nations-states-alliance.⁽⁴⁶⁾

The security complexes in their own angle are sub-systems and miniature anarchies, and similarly with the complete systems they have a separate formation for themselves. The current durable status of the RSCs with its elements on anarchy makes us possibly accept sub-systems with their unique formations and motifs of communication. This supplies an advantageous standard opposite to the testable developments in the motifs of regional security.⁽⁴⁷⁾

⁴⁶ Buzan, and Et.al, (1998), pp.13-16.

⁴⁷ Fredrick Soderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (Ed.), **Theories of New Regionalism**, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 143.

1.2.3. Moving beyond the Regional Security Complex Theory: Constructivist method

Adler states that “constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.”⁽⁴⁸⁾

Onuf introduced constructivism in his manuscript is called ‘With World of Our Making-1989’⁽⁴⁹⁾ that influenced the IR scholars’ approach on constructivism and made them rethink about it. Onuf’s work had an incentive impact on Wendt for his article is called ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It-1992’⁽⁵⁰⁾ which gained prominence in worldwide and endorsed by many scholars in the relative realm. The importance of the Wendt’s book and its significant contribution to IR even today is saluted.⁽⁵¹⁾ The third important contributor Kratochwil is known as prominent constructivist, that he started with John Ruggie defining the importance of central constructivist concept and intersubjectivity.⁽⁵²⁾

The constructivist approach doesn’t only fulfill the gaps in international relations theories, but most importantly it helps constructing the international social system in the complex world.⁽⁵³⁾

Constructivists incline to focus on social structure of states/units’ behaviors at the scale of international system. While doing this, constructivist tend to investigate the general process of configuration of world politics by norms. Consequently much of the assignments finalized with the interstate conflict and state operates on the basis of normative concerns.⁽⁵⁴⁾

⁴⁸ Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics”, **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 3. No. 3, September 01, 1997, p. 322.

⁴⁹ Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, **World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations**, University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

⁵⁰ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, **International Organization**, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, pp. 391-425.

⁵¹ Zebfuss, p. 10.

⁵² Fredrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State”, **International Organization**, Vol. 40, No.4, 1986, pp. 753-775.

⁵³ Ganja Nugroho, “Constructivism and International Relations Theories”, **Global and Strategies**, January/June, 2008, pp. 89, 95.

⁵⁴ Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of Research Program”, **International Studies Review**, Vol. 4, Issue. 1, 2002, p. 52.

The constructive quality of security ideas depends on convey from a descriptive to a conductive scene of universally considered linguistic literature. Thus, universal definition of linguistic literature eyes at the ideas from their manufacturing angle. It replies the query of the sense of security not by seeking for an interpretation that contrives the 'principles' of the understanding of security. Actually the understanding of security has been determined as a collection of the regulations which interprets articulation as security utterance.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Constructivism faces with the realist questions on constructing anarchy in international system, meaning that realists discuss the idea of anarchy and its uncertainty exerts states to be in a trap feeling insecure and continue on increasing maximum power in order keep balancing with other states for the sake of survival.⁽⁵⁶⁾

As it was mentioned above security studies does not only represent military-political security. While security studies conceptually enlarge, its activity in other sectors 'state' still maintains the central position. If states overvalue security for its existence, it envisages that the idea of 'societal security' actually is the sort of state security which is opposing with society, where society per se may be insecure. Therefore, Buzan and Waever moved on new optional referent object describing as an assemblage in societal sectors with any identity may need to manage its absolute survival. The differentiation between two sides; referent objects and securitizing actors, creates possibility to develop a conditional environment within the generic theoretical framework, where actors manage to securitize some potential threats in support of a particular referent object.⁽⁵⁷⁾ According to Buzan and Waever, the securitizing actor delicately uses the condition of delayed defensible action on necessary survival for its own benefit claiming the right of using an outstanding means or abolishes normal rules by using security as a main reason. By this definition of security, the attitude has articulately portrayed constructivism in the meaning that, the necessity of wondering about the existence issue is considered as a threat by itself, whereas the essential curiosity should be on unknown conditions

⁵⁵ Jef Huysmans, "Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security", **Alternatives**, Vol. 27. Issue.1, February, 2002, p. 45.

⁵⁶ John Ackerman, Barak Carlson and Young Han, "Constructivism and Security", Air Command Staff College, **Maxwell AFB**, 2010, p. 5.

⁵⁷ Holger Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond", **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 13, Issue.3, September 01, 2007, p.377.

makes us think of what issue will be securitized and by whom.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Classical Regional Security Complexes were originated as chaotic processes, which the trepidation and perturbation installed in the framework of the region that constructs the Regional Security Complexes. By the new interpretation in international level the construction of the new form of RSCs may be possible, which astonishingly appreciated by the particular sectors. Regions might be constructed as motifs based on the operations specifically in the system level. Regionally, some groups of countries consider the responsive responsibility towards the local issue that they may be effected-can be environmental or something different. Regional Security Complexes still maintain its association with the regional actors, because emerged problems are interpreted and regional arrangement over the issues are settled by them. Consistent interactions among the regional units help to define the Regional Security Complexes. The main reasons behind their actions might be either internal to the region or external to global; however, these reasons have never been successful on clarifying the outcomes. Therefore, using visible outcomes might help such as-refugee flows, wars, military confrontations, mass expulsions and some other unexpected situations might be considered as securitization indicators. Successful securitization can be constructed if the outcomes of the actions become visible for international consideration.⁽⁵⁹⁾

1.2.4. Types of Security Complexes

Buzan and Waever stated that in the world the security dynamics with its developments create several types of security complexes: 1. *Standard*: means that regional powers are determining polarity such as: Middle East, Southeast Asia, Southern Africa, South America. 2. *Centered*: consists of various powers in which: superpower-gets central place in unipolar system as such: North America. Great power gets central place in other unipolar systems as such: CIS, South Asia.

⁵⁸ Ieva Karpaviciute, **Analysis of Regional Security Dynamics. Internal and External Factors and Their Interplay**, Vytautas Magnus University, Social Science, Political Science (02 S), Kaunas, 2010, p. 52.

⁵⁹ Buzan and Waever, pp.70-73.

Institutional: via institutions regions obtains actor quality like the EU. 3. *Great power*: great powers as the regional poles in bi-or multipolar system, such as-East Asia, Pre-1945 Europe. 4. *Supercomplexes*: Great power influences the neighboring regions that effect the development of persistent interregional level security dynamics as such: East and South Asia. Their first differentiation held between standard and centered Regional Security Complexes. A *Standard* Regional Security Complexes symbolize the traditionalist version simply the Westphalian where security concern had been taken account on military-political scale among two or more powers. The characteristic interpretation of all standard RSCs has been determined as anarchic. Thus, entirely the regional powers determine the polarity in the framework of the RSCs. It is different from the unipolar and multipolarity.⁽⁶⁰⁾ Essence of unipolarity in the standard RSCs is about the certain region may obtain only one regional power where Southern Africa may be an articulate example. The reason of it is being standard but not centered, because the regional security dynamics are not controlled by the unipolar power, additionally it is standard because security complexes in the region do not obtain any global level power. On the other hand *centered* Regional Security Complexes consist of almost mainly three or sometimes four dimensions.⁽⁶¹⁾

Usually great power and superpower lie on the system level, by contrary regional powers lie on the regional level. Centered *superpower*-capabilities and exercising spectrum should be in international system level. It is required to demonstrate the highly evaluated military-political capacities, which may match with the measurement of standard RSCs, and it must obtain the same level of economic power to maintain it. Their capability on exercising military-political means must be in global scale. Another centered dimension *great powers* by contrary is not obliged to achieve the same amount of capabilities and means to behave.⁽⁶²⁾ Great powers are not expected to cover up all sectors with its giant capabilities; therefore, the expectation is very low from it in the regard of maintaining securitization in entire sectors in international system. Great powers act like lonely wolf, which

⁶⁰ Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context", **European Journal of International Relations**, June 02, 2005, p. 174.

⁶¹ Buzan and Waever, pp.55, 66.

⁶² Robert E. Kelly, "Security Theory in the New Regionalism", **International Studies Review**, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2007, pp. 205, 209.

differentiates them from regional powers in the system level where they have been treated by other powers in the calculation of the potential-military, political and economic capabilities. Third centered form *regional powers* determine the polarity in the framework of RSC such as; Southern Africa as unipolar, South Asia as bipolar, Southeast Asia, Middle East, and South America as multi-polar. Their influential capabilities are webbed in the regional level, but do not commit much of any initiatives to take part in the global level.⁽⁶³⁾ They have been responded by the superior power (higher than their) if they tend to influence regional level securitization which is more or less relevant to the higher-level powers capabilities. They have been always in the concern of higher-level powers with the reason of their suspicious calculation whether regional powers desire to be on higher status. Regional powers always have been target of global powers.⁽⁶⁴⁾

The last centered form *institutional* RSC involves institutionally integrated regions rather than standing a single power. The European Union is a clear example with its structure maintaining regional level security for its communities, and acting as a great power on its own track obtaining prominent actors in global the level. According to the Institutional centered complex, the RSCT is challenged with a problems created by the members of the RSC. Repeating the interpretation of the RSC is based on security actions and security perturbations of actors, where securitization dynamics must be obtained by the RSC, which explains the securitization in regional level maintains by the regional actors. Thus, desecuritization escalated the development of the security community. Referring to the Kantian social structure on the view of Wendt, saying that; security problem and threatening disappeared with the actors' friendly behaviors each other. What combines all these four centered RSC dimensions are apparently the notation of centrally positioned dominant region and its security dynamics.⁽⁶⁵⁾ In the international system different from the centered forms, separately two other types of security complexes are created: *great power regional security complexes*, and *supercomplexes*. The number of powers based on the great powers in the RSC has determined the

⁶³ David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (Ed.), **Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World**, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, p. 25.

⁶⁴ Buzan and Waever, pp.34-37.

⁶⁵ Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization", **On Security**, (Ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz), Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, pp.3,9.

definition of regional polarity in the global level. They are not ordinary RSC; therefore, the treatment towards them should be different with two reasons. 1. Comparatively to standard RSC, great powers dynamics possess direct influence on global level stability estimation. 2. *Great powers* are actively involved in the interregional interactions by exerting their influence, which is higher than expected. Great power RSCs have been composed as a combination of the global and regional levels. Continuingly, the sustainability of the strong interregional levels are core characteristics of *supercomplex* RSC, however, the level or strength should be in control in order to refrain on trampling upon regional dynamics in the Regional Security Complex.⁽⁶⁶⁾

1.2.5. Structural significance of ‘amity and enmity’

Regional level of analysis is the best place for giving articulate understanding for the significant characteristics of ‘amity and enmity’. The concept is not only trapped in the regional level but also includes global and domestic actors in two opposite sides. The origin of the ‘who fears whom, and who likes whom’ have certainly not been made up by the system level. However, the system level has originated the idea domestically in the region by the collections of the political history and of course material conditions.⁽⁶⁷⁾ Thus, regional level is playing undeniable role in the security analysis. Regional level is acting as like flashlight for global power by lightening their spillover and their competitiveness into the entire system as a result. Considerably regional level signifies much for the regional states within, whereas global powers are not also out of this attention. Characteristic of the security in comparison to other levels, in long-term has been sustaining on the regional level.⁽⁶⁸⁾

The idea of an amity and enmity are the concepts Buzan introduced in his analysis on regional security. According to him, these concepts describe a consistent

⁶⁶ Buzan and Waever, pp.56-60.

⁶⁷ Charles A.Kupchan, “Enmity into Amity: How Peace Breaks Out, International Policy Analysis”, **Friedrich Ebert Stiftung**, April, 2011, pp.2-3.

⁶⁸ Buzan and Waever, p.47.

interaction among states that underlines a scene of friendship and enemies. Therefore, he emphasizes that conceptually ‘amity and enmity’ should not be associated only with the balance of power. The idea of ‘amity and enmity’ according to Buzan theoretically constructed the idea of ‘security complex’.⁽⁶⁹⁾ Therefore he argues that “security complexes are about the relative intensity of interstate security relations that lead to distinctive regional patterns shaped by both the distribution of power and historical relations of ‘amity and enmity’”.⁽⁷⁰⁾

The idea of the ‘Self and Other’ explains where enemies lie on, usually in the relationships of conducting use of violence. Enemies are associated by the delineation of ‘Other’ actor. Therefore, it doesn’t acknowledge the existence of Self, and continuingly behaves violently to limit Self’s sovereignty. Thus, in IR the interpretation of ‘enemy’ presented as unit willingly who creates adversary using violence.⁽⁷¹⁾ In order to target ‘other’ as an enemy, states adapt several implications in their foreign policy. Firstly, states will contradict with the enemies with the intention of destroying and vanquishing of others. However, this behavior and action will not symbolize their interest as revisionist-by contrary they tend to maintain interests on status quo, however, when states feel the threats of enemies then behave as revisionist in the framework of either to be killed or kill first. Furthermore, balancing military capabilities is core interest for states. Because enemy’s attacking intention is obvious, therefore, states take protective measurements and arrange their behaviors accordingly in order to win if war may happen. Relatively power matters a lot in the survival context, thus, this belief consistently encourages status quo states to increase its military capabilities to be ready for any bad scenario with the formula of ‘if you want peace, prepare for war’. Consequently, enmity simply creates a condition for increasing capabilities not because of the anarchic atmosphere only but the structure of relationships made them to act as such.⁽⁷²⁾

Amity (or Friendship), is developed in the Kantian culture links to the role structure of friendship. In the international politics, enmity is more problematic than

⁶⁹ Marianne Stone, “Security According to Buzan: A Compressive Security Analysis”, **Security Discussion Papers Series 1**, 2009, p. 6.

⁷⁰ Buzan and Et.al, (1998), p.198.

⁷¹ Alexander Wendt, **Social Theory of International Politics**, Cambridge Studies International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 260.

⁷² Wendt, (1999), p. 262.

amity, and historically only few examples maintain their friendship. However, this scene gets critique by realists saying that believing friendship in an anarchic system is dangerous firstly and utopian also, because states always will act according to their interests. Wolfers and Schmitt from theoretical perspective also argue that enmity and amity is necessary concept in international relations. With these approach states will be seen as an enemies in the eyes of scholars, which loses the further interests on searching systematically the existence of the friendship in the international politics.
(73)

1.3. THE EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF THE RSCT

1.3.1. Empirical application of the Regional Security Complex Theory in the global system

The Regional Security Complex Theory has enlarged its effective impact in the world. The RSCT and its application in the world regions individually the same results. Buzan and Weaver argued that the international security structures divided into three levels: neorealist, globalist, and regionalist. Globalization does not believe in power politics, rather contains variety of approaches such as transnational, intercultural, and International Political Economy (IPE). By this, presumably the fundamental guiding of it is pointing out the deterritorialisation of world politics.⁽⁷⁴⁾ Deterritorialization puts every state in the center arena of world politics and eliminates the state-centric system. Thus, structurally globalist perspective is removing the existence of the neorealist state centric approach. The motivation in this action is the escalation of the capitalism, necessity of global market and similar forms of world society endorse the values of system structure from globalist perspective.⁽⁷⁵⁾ To study Asia in the RSCT framework is justified with few necessary key aspects need to know. Asia is a region where internal and external

⁷³ Wendt, (1999), p.298.

⁷⁴ Edward A. Kolodziej, **Security and International Relations**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, p. 18.

⁷⁵ Magdalena Kozub-Karkut, "Between Realism and Social Constructivism: 'Region' in Regional Security Complexes Theory and Security Communities Theory", **International Relations in Asia, Africa and the Americas| Global Politics in the 21st Century: Between Regional Cooperation and Conflict** (Ed. Andrzej Mania and Marchin Grabowski), Peter Lang, Berlin, 2019, p. 41.

transformation process might be observed. Additionally, the region witnessed the transition period from bipolarity to unipolarity. The region is transmitted from conflict origination to security regime. Thus, Asia is known as a region where the functioning of supercomplex sustained for a long time.⁽⁷⁶⁾

Continuing with the *Africa* and *Middle East*, trade was a traditionally conjunction instrument between these regions, which coincides to the spread of Islam. Regional level of security dynamics has done much in the Middle East for few decades; however, it was lately affected by the high degree penetration of globalization. The determination of the precise time of the RSC in the Middle East was difficult. The situation always has been quite volatile in the region; kind of colonial status was replicated by the independence.⁽⁷⁷⁾ Therefore, the starting date of the RSC in the region may be taken after the transition period of decolonization between 1945 and 1948. It was originated the regional independent states as a result. After the Israeli independence, the region embraced new interstate conflict with the Palestinians. As a conclusion, more than twenty states included in the RSC in the region. In Africa, the development of the RSC reached on an essential level of security interdependence among group of states and other actors. This process in Africa has been observed either within regional states or with non-state actors outside of boundaries.⁽⁷⁸⁾ Security interaction levels in Africa has been observed at the local scale and particularly they were seen very low which did not help to maintain the consistency of strong interstate regional RSCs, on the contrary after the decolonization it was performed outside the region. The RSCT should put light to both the Middle East and Africa because of their interstate conflicts. Political break down privileged the theory to give further predictions accordingly.⁽⁷⁹⁾

Regarding *Americas*, it is not considered one RSC, though its hemispheric activities. Security dynamics in the North and South America are different and they do not have symmetric connection. The reason can be the escalation of security dynamics in the South America are mostly observed as regional rather than US-

⁷⁶ Buzan and Waever, pp.6, 97.

⁷⁷ Ramazan Erdağ, **Regional Security Complex Theory and the Middle East and North Africa. Libya in the Arap Spring**, Palgrave Macmillian, New York, March 28, 2017, pp. 7-19.

⁷⁸ Alice Hills, "Managing the Interface: Regional Security and Substate Politics in Africa", **African Security, Routledge**, Vol.1, No. 2, December 08, 2008, pp.94,97-98.

⁷⁹ Buzan and Waever, pp.185, 254.

oriented. However, it is obvious that the North America is one RSC per se, and it is important how to describe the north, east, and west, whereas, it is quite uncertain where the line should be drawn for south.⁽⁸⁰⁾ RSC in the North America popped out by the emergence of the decolonization and then was characterized as conflict. May be this was the reason during 20th the North America was known as unusual RSC. In the global level the North America, extended geopolitical activities were confronted with the Soviet Union, which challenged its security and intention of holding world leadership. As a result, the North America still is and will be as one RSC.⁽⁸¹⁾

Europe does not share the same story with other parts of the world where RSC popped out with decolonization. The reason is Europe has never been the source of colonization; by the contrary, it was the one to conduct that process⁸². The EU added some more security elements after 1989, such as terrorism, organized crimes, immigrants, environment, and ethnic conflict. Some elements most of the time were seen as security problems for the EU members and spread up to all Europe. As a model, predominantly the EU is recognized as a security community at the global scale and its maintenance always made the EU intriguing.⁽⁸³⁾

1.3.2. South Caucasus as Regional Security Sub-Complex after the Soviet Union

The South Caucasus is a former Soviet region, which has been examined within the content of Europe. It has mostly been focused in the security dynamics after the Soviet Union within establishment of the sup-complexes. The South Caucasus has been determined as one regional sub-complex. The South Caucasus in another words Transcaucasus region, has a historical background regarding the security dynamics. Regional interethnic and interstate conflicts have been the core concerns. In addition, the Russian forces had penetrated the region during the

⁸⁰ Richard J. Kilroy Jr, and Et.al, "Security Inequalities in North America: Reassessing Regional Security Complex Theory", **Journal of Strategic Security**, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2017, pp.3-5.

⁸¹ Buzan and Waever, pp.263,340,

⁸² Emil J. Kirchner, Theoretical Debates on Regional Security Governance, **Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies Global Governance Programme-97, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/40**, European University Institute, Italy, April, 2014, p. 5.

⁸³ Buzan and Waever, pp. 345,375.

Georgian conflicts. Moreover, receiving the Russian support Armenia has occupied some of the territories of Azerbaijan. All these regional dynamics had shaped the regional structure. Not only Russia got involved into the region, but Turkey, Iran, the EU, and the US also interfered in regional issues.⁽⁸⁴⁾ All these ties merge all the actors on multi-lateral benefits, specifically over the energy and pipeline projects. Georgia's consistent policy has reached on success level in 2001, that time Georgia managed the closure of main Russian bases within the country, which happened with low intention of Russia, but with an agreement. However, the agreement did not end the Russian peacekeeping involvement. At the following year in 2002, Georgia received the US assistance on fighting the Islamic troops that were associated with the Al-Qaeda and Chechen rebels in the Pankisi George. Besides all these, the formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was an interethnic conflict at the first stage. When both countries gained their independence, the status of the conflict became an interstate over the undisputed region. The entitled conflict started with interethnic skirmishes in 1987, and then ended up with the ceasefire in 1994. As a result, the twenty percent territory of Azerbaijan had been occupied by Armenia. Although the ceasefire agreement is still on power, the region witnesses an unaccountable border clashes. Since the ceasefire agreement, both countries were involved in a peaceful negotiation under the supervision of the Minsk Group. There are efforts for the peace settlement in the region. Obviously, the stability will create advantages for the regional cooperation including Nakhcivan enclave arrangement as a possible exchange corridor between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Conflict resolution initiatives are attempted by Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, he US, Russia and the EU consistently. Intrinsically, the entitled corridor exchanged would merge Azerbaijan with Turkey, whereas it would separate Armenia from Iran.⁽⁸⁵⁾

Within the conflict, the agreement between Armenia and Russia is also an important element of the negotiation process. They have traditional religious grounded kinship as Christians, which always motivates Russia to prefer Armenia against the Muslim neighbors. Regime changes or incumbent presidency always

⁸⁴ Jannatkhan Eyvazov, "The Regional Security System in the Post-Soviet Space: Formation and Present Political Structure", **Journal of Economics and Political Sciences**, No. 1(10), Baku, March, 2018, pp.133-135.

⁸⁵ Buzan and Waever, pp. 397,421.

influenced all these three states to rearrange their political orientation in the direction of surrounding powers. For example, the Armenian first president Levon Ter-Petrosyan's attempt to balance with Russia made him loose presidency. The Azerbaijani second president Abulfaz Elchibay disregarded Russia's role in the region; instead build up strong relationship with Turkey, which also led him to loose presidency, because Azerbaijan was the only Muslim republics rejecting the Russian military bases and frontier protection. Azerbaijan did not get a satisfactory support from the US, due the fact that Armenian diaspora settled so strongly in the US, which made the US not to support Azerbaijan and in worst case to be placed in the blacklist of America. Nevertheless, 09/11 terror attacks changed the US's view positively towards Azerbaijan with the resultant military assistance. It has redressed the rising tension in the Caspian Sea and challenge from Iran. Although, Iran is sharing the same Muslim brotherhood as Shia with Azerbaijan; in various stages of the history Azerbaijan and Iran had a very complicated relationship. Iran always keeps the fear that hosting Azerbaijani Turkic population within its territory may end up with confrontation in fact, from time to time small nationalist movements have been observed.⁽⁸⁶⁾

The case for Russia is different. Russia realized its role is not powerful after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The only way to keep hands over the region is to secure its seat by the development of interstate relations, particularly over the natural resources. The policy aims to disperse external actors from the region in order not to share the advantage of holding the strategic position. Different from Russia, yet similar to the United States, the EU has focused on economic benefits. Considerable natural resources productions have been operating by Azerbaijan. The EU is seen as a potential important player if it continues its enlargement policy targeting the South Caucasus states. The United States did not expect to as maximize strategic relations with Azerbaijan, after cutting off its relationship with Russia and Iran. In geopolitical term, the Caucasus is valuable because of its rich natural resources. From the international perspective it is seen different, as for China it is just energy source, as for Turkey and Iran coordinating the energy companies as a regional actors, as for Russia, gaining strategic position economically and politically in order to prevent

⁸⁶ Buzan and Waever, p. 422.

other interested actors. This could be the reason that Russia. Considered protecting the Caspian Sea natural resources from others is part of its national security. The current struggle is to deliver these resources to the world market through Europe. There is tough political and economic competition, on the issue whether the pipelines should go through Russia and the Black Sea or through the Caucasus and Turkey. Security concern in the South Caucasus is not the new phenomena; on the contrary, the region historically lived within a security game, and now the regional actors handle conflicts predominantly. For some reasons the South Caucasus is involved in mini-security complexes and that is unfortunate history repeats itself with insulator functions. Considering the influence of Russian policy over the region and the CIS, which is, primarily an important political arena for Russia, the region in long run will be recognized as a sub-complex within the post-Soviet Regional Security Complex. The fundamental reasons, which made the South Caucasus a sub-complex, can be explained with four components. First, there is separation of Georgia. Second, there is an evolvement of an interstate conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh. Third, there is effectiveness of small ethnic groups and their micro coalition motives between the North and South Caucasus. Fourth, one is about energy and pipelines. A possible scenario is to isolate regional sub-complexes from the post-Soviet RSC, which would encourage external bipolarized elements to step into the region, which attracts regional states and external powers. Azerbaijan and Georgia receives full support from Turkey and the US, but Armenia different from them gets support from Russia and Iran including separatists sub-states within Georgia.⁽⁸⁷⁾

1.3.3. Interconnectedness between the South Caucasus and the Regional Security Complex Theory

As it was mentioned in the previous section the South Caucasus became one sub-complex after the end of the Soviet Union. The region preserves rich natural resources, and diverse ethno-cultural groups. Unstable political developments

⁸⁷ Buzan and Waever, p, 423.

including interethnic and interstate conflicts made the region an important case study. The South Caucasus countries have pursued different political relations with the external actors in terms of regional security concerns. For instance, Azerbaijan keeps its balanced policy with the neighboring countries - Turkey, Russia, and Iran as well as with the EU and the US. Besides all these, Azerbaijan is still struggling for the territorial integrity and political discussion continues for the Caspian Sea's status. On the contrary, Armenia in a high degree depends on Russia support and demonstrated this intention once again by joining Russia's Customs Union. Georgia is somehow in the stage of chasing the western road such as NATO and the EU membership.⁽⁸⁸⁾

According to the RSCT the emergence of the structural changes within the regional security system does not affect the general structure of complex. From this understanding we may assume that the reconstruction of the RSC, with the fragmentation of the Soviet Union does not perfectly match with the RSCT's interpretation and evolvement of the regional security system.⁽⁸⁹⁾

By the end of the Soviet Union, regional structure was called 'Post-Soviet Security Macrocomplex' (PSM), which consisted of four regional sub-complexes including Russia: and Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, which defined the South Caucasus sub-complex. Although the South Caucasus was considered as a sub-complex in the territory of the PSM; it has been questioning an existence of the RSC separately in the South Caucasus.⁽⁹⁰⁾

Some scholars tried to apply the RSCT to the South Caucasus. For example, Bruno Coppieters raised up his particular interpretation about the RSC in Caucasus in general saying that "Both the Transcaucasus and North Caucasus may be thought of as parts of a larger security complex, comprising Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and part of Russia."⁽⁹¹⁾ Also Svante Cornell, who told that "...the Caucasus is a region; but more than being a region, it is a security complex: the national security of

⁸⁸ Özge Nur Ögütücü, "Regional Security Complex Theory and The South Caucasus Security Perceptions and Their Reflections on Regional Level", **AVIM Report No:7**, August, 2014, p. 7.

⁸⁹ Jannatkhon Eyvazov, "Some Aspects of the Theory of Regional Security Complexes as Applied to Studies of the Political System in the Post-Soviet Space", **Central Asia and the Caucasus**, Vol. 12, Issue. 2, 2011, p.19.

⁹⁰ Eyvazov, (2011), p.20.

⁹¹ Bruno Coppieters, "Conclusion: The Caucasus as a Security Complex", **Contested Borders in the Caucasus**, 1996, <http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/conclusi.htm>, (30.03.2019).

one of the Caucasian states cannot realistically be considered apart from that of the other two. As far as the three regional powers (Russia, Turkey, and Iran) are concerned, the security of the Caucasus does have a direct bearing upon the national security of these states that justifies their inclusion into the security complex.”⁽⁹²⁾

Obviously, regional actors such as mentioned above have endless interests, which from time to time put regional states in a complex interdependence. For an example looking at Azerbaijani and Iranian complicated historical relationship, enormous number of Azerbaijani Turkic population are living in Iran.⁽⁹³⁾ Moreover, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, serious number of Azerbaijanis migrated to Russia to be employed. Today over three million Azerbaijanis are living in Russia. Yet, Russia has threatened publicly that migrants would be departed.⁽⁹⁴⁾ Another regional actor Turkey is also in complex relationship with Armenia due to Armenian claim over the so-called genocide held in 1915 during the Ottoman Empire.⁽⁹⁵⁾

The fragmentation of the Soviet Union had accelerated interstate frictions in the Caucasus. The region did not witness independent security dynamics because of the regional overlay. Security concerns after the regional states' independence were not only internal but also regional and even beyond the border. The South Caucasus' geopolitical and geostrategic position always became an advantage when the regional security talk had gone at the global level. However, the Western allies did not demonstrate a concrete reaction when Russia's military involvement as realized in Georgia during 1993 and 1994. On the reciprocal manner, the US penetrated into Haiti with silent assent of Russian diplomacy in 1994. These actions gave a clue to think that Russia and the US are in the game of 'now is your turn'. Different from the US and Russia, the South Caucasus security issue has much concerned Europe, because of regions territorial linkage with Europe. There are also economic interests of EU in the region. Russia therefore, looks at the region from a global perspective

⁹² Eyvazov, (2011), p.21.

⁹³ “İran’da 35 Milyondan Çok Azerbaycan Türk’ü Yaşıyor”, [More than 35 million Azerbaijani Turks are living in Iran], **Gundem.be**, <http://www.gundem.be/tr/ayhan-demirci/iran-da-35-milyondan-cok-azerbaycan-turk-u-yasiyor>, (30.03.2019).

⁹⁴ “Rusiyada miqrantlara münasibət dəyişməyə başlayıb”, [Russia has changed its treatment towards migrants], **Azadliq.org**, 27.10.2017, <https://www.azadliq.org/a/moskva-miqrantlar/28819934.html>, (30.03.2019).

⁹⁵ Ahmet Fuat Mütevellî, “Ermeni Soykırımı İddiaları Karşısında Gerçekler”, [Ahmet Fuat Mutevellî, The Truth in front of the Armenian Claim on Genocide], **Ankara University Journal Database**, Vol. 12, 2001.

and would unwillingly not interfere to Azerbaijan in reserving Caspian Oil resources.⁽⁹⁶⁾

Regaining the independence for the South Caucasian states the years during the 1991-1994 might be defined as an era of internal weakness. In those years, regional security issue was evaluated in a highest degree of its negative potency. The existence of internal weaknesses together with the regional security problems became beneficial for Russia, who was supporting the escalation of the ethnic conflicts. This has made situation even worse and bounded the regional integration process, economic developments, intercultural dialogues and so forth.⁽⁹⁷⁾ All these actions resulted with the bloody wars. The interstate conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh is typical example, which happened during the years 1988-1994. Furthermore, Georgian interethnic conflicts happened during the years 1989-1993, while the central government confronted with the South Ossetian and Abkhazian minorities. In the later stages Georgian military frictions with these two in 2008 August, invited the Russian military intervention. Due to regional conflicts, regional states ambitiously and intentionally increased their military capabilities in the context of security dilemma. Interstate socio-political and socio-economic relations were its worse. It finalized with an inexistence of the regional security regime. Regional situation slowly got into a deep security complex.⁽⁹⁸⁾

In a broad context, the collapse of the Soviet Union had a benefit for Armenia comparing to Georgia and Azerbaijan. Although Armenia was part of the bloody war, but as a result achieved its historical goal by occupying Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other surrounding regions, in total 20% of Azerbaijani territory. Georgia in this regard, also lost its territorial integrity and political control over the ethnic minorities. Consequently, the reflection of social tensions against Russia became very aggressive particularly after the 2008 August incident.⁽⁹⁹⁾

Currently, the South Caucasus region is seen as a region with high security risks. Because whatever is going to happen in the region, which challenges security,

⁹⁶ Coppieters, Et.al.

⁹⁷ Jannatkhan Eyvazov, "Regional Security System in the Post-Soviet Space: Political Structure, Environment, and Transitivity", **The Caucasus and Globalization: Geopolitics**, Vol. 8, Issue 1-2, 2014, p. 20.

⁹⁸ Vali Kouzegar Kaleji and Shirin Akiner, "South Caucasus as a Regional Security Complex", **Research Institute of Strategic Studies**, Tehran, 2014.

⁹⁹ Eyvazov, (2014), p. 24.

will not stay only inside of the region but presumably and most neighboring actors will get involved that is Russia, Iran, and Turkey and the EU. This makes region more complex.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

The interrelations of the South Caucasus with the RSCT theoretically and geographically (including political, economic) proves the existence of the RSC in the region. As Buzan argues the reflection of security, interdependence is usually emerging between the states inside the RSC, rather than outside of it. Because the RSC is practically consistent; intense inter-state security relations differentiates the regional structure by two dynamics: first is an interaction between amity and enmity; second is the division of the capabilities. From this perspective the conflicted parties of the Nagorno-Karabakh have been composed as a single object because of the ongoing conflict, challenges both sides' internal security. Buzan later included a constructivist method, saying that "a set of units whose major processes of security, desecuritization, or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another".⁽¹⁰¹⁾

1.4. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

1.4.1. Objectivity of the case study

Usually the failure emerges when the readers find out partiality or subjectivity within the research. Particularly, it happens if the analysis is mostly about an ethnic conflict and the researcher or scholar holds a national origin of once of the states in ethnic conflict. This scenario happened many times in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It appears that the researchers are; from either Armenia or Azerbaijan, this brings doubt in regards to credibility of research. How can we resolve the credibility of research?

Should we trust the credibility of the written works of Azerbaijani scholars, and academic researchers? The majority of them had been an eye-witness to the

¹⁰⁰ Farhad Mammadov and Azad Garibov, "South Caucasus as a Regional Security Complex: Divergence of Identity and Interdependence of Security", **Cooperation in Eurasia: Linking Identity, Security, and Development**, 2018, p.112.

¹⁰¹ Soberbaum and M.Shaw, p. 141.

conflict in two ways: being from the occupied territory and outside of area but had been involved indirectly. People who were not living in the occupied territory before the end of the Soviet Union but they used to live in capital cities or other parts of the country. They were living with Armenian neighbors under the Soviet supremacy. Even when the Sumgayit incident emerged, analysts knew the reason of the escalation of the friction. Additionally, when they try to prove that separatist the Armenian government intervened into the sovereign state and broke the territorial integrity by occupying the 20 percent of the Azerbaijan, we must look at the result of the conflict once again, asking that if the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was for Armenians the people's right of self-determination, and why it ended up adding seven surrounded cities to occupation map. According to Azerbaijan government, the intention was to enlarge the land of Armenia and to realize the historical plan of Armenia as "From Sea to Sea, Great Armenia". Azerbaijani researchers refer to the consequences of the conflict indicating the UN resolution. They try to use historical materials to analyze the subject.

Both Azerbaijani and Armenian researchers cannot deny that their governments' policies have created a bias approach. Nevertheless, Armenian researches try to convince international audience that this war escalated to realize the right of the self-determination of the Armenian minorities. In addition, they consistently emphasize that Azerbaijan was the first aggressor. The findings may be relevant if the context of the work discuss the certain part of the conflict: for instance the updated negotiation process etc. However, things change tremendously when the opinion are presented on reason and consequences of the conflict as well as the view on final resolution.⁽¹⁰²⁾ They try to convince the readers that the area was a historical part of Armenia, before 1988 majority population of the Nagorno-Karabakh was Armenians. They asked to be part of Armenia, triggered Azerbaijan to confront politically.

¹⁰² In 2013 May 17-18 May, Georgia/Tbilisi. The Ministry of Sport and Youth Affairs of Georgia together with the Berghof Foundation organized a regional conflict in the framework of "Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in South Caucasus" conference was an opportunity Mr. Tanriverdi had delivered a speech in the regards to youth initiatives for peacebuilding in the South Caucasus. In the event, Armenian analyst Sos Avetisyan exactly stated: "My mother is a history teacher, and when I ask her why you don't teach true history. She said that, I am teaching what my government tells me".

The conflict from the foreign scholars' perspectives had been demonstrated quite diverse. Most of the scholars do not know the region-that did not hold field studies most of the scholars do not know the organic language-no matter some of them are aware of Russian language and refer to the secondary sources written by the Armenian and Azerbaijani researchers.

For the sake of objectivity in this research, the author has used sources from Armenian (only English and Russian), Azerbaijan, and foreign literature. Yet, impartiality was preliminary condition of the research.

1.4.2. Sensitivity of the case study: Failure of Track Two Process

Track Two research process was part of the thesis. In fact, that due the political reasons implementation of the field study could not be realized. Instead, it was planned to meet with the local people in Azerbaijan and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), academicians, and researchers to learn the conducted analysis they had done so far particularly, the intention was to learn certain development in the regards to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. For this reason, during the thesis research several international conferences were attended.

At the beginning the aim was preparing certain questions for every correspondent, however, it proved that that method took time and made correspondent quite boring, thus the method was changed from interview format to informal meeting. During the informal meeting, the researchers addressed some general questions, in terms of what they have already done as an analysis in regards to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and their relative security concerns in the region.

The Track II process has not been completed, because of several important reasons. First, holding the nationality and citizenship of a conflicted country, makes it very sensitive. None of the citizens from each side can cross the border to conduct a research. A meeting with the opposite side's civil society members even in a third country would have been understood differently because of the sensitivity of the case study. Considering all, no attempt has been done as Tomas de Waal emphasized, "there have been occasions when contacts have been authorized, as when, around a decade

ago, several delegations of Armenian experts and journalists visited Baku. More recently, however, the Azerbaijani government has been much more negative about civil-society dialogue initiatives, and Azerbaijani activists who have met with Armenians have been harassed or arrested.”⁽¹⁰³⁾ Second, no matter numerous initiatives had been taken to arrange some meetings with unofficial representatives, there were no responses, or short answers given.

Nevertheless, even if a meeting would have been taken with the opposite side of the country’s correspondents, it does not guarantee objectivity. It is not hard to foresee it, by focusing on the websites.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ Yet, it would have been better to hear the thoughts and approaches of the opposite sides in the regards to current situation of the conflict that challenges regional security, as well as the attitudes on peaceful settlement.

Below Track II diplomacy process within the research, is given though it did not reach to a point what it has desired.

The Caucasus Research Resource Center program (CRRC)⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ was established in 2003 with the support of Eurasia Foundation and Carnegie Cooperation of New York. It is a Program of Eurasia Foundation in regional countries, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia to build up a common understanding and the same goal on empowering the research spectrum relatively in the social sciences. The main scientific concentration was targeted to produce research works about the South Caucasus. The meeting held with Mr. Murad Nasibov,⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ he talked about the mission of the CRRC as a whole and what the main activities and roles are that Baku office is responsible in the context of conflict. Unfortunately, he mentioned that a new report for the years 2016-2017 is still on the process; where they will set out all the research activities they implemented. He mentioned in the center they do research per se about the region; security concern is one of the key issues they raise up within the research process. Additionally, on their quarterly or

¹⁰³ Thomas De Waal, “Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process”, **Survival: Global Politics and Strategy**, Vol. 52, No. 4, July 21, 2010, p. 169.

¹⁰⁴ See the relevant information in these websites: <http://www.mountainous-karabakh.org/>; <http://www.nkr.am/>; <https://www.encyclopedia.com/places/commonwealth-independent-states-and-baltic-nations/cis-and-baltic-political-geography/nagorno-karabakh>; <https://karabakhfacts.com/links/> , (02.11.2018)

¹⁰⁵ See more about the center, <http://www.crrccenters.org/2015/Brief-History>, (04.04.2019)

¹⁰⁶ Murad Nasibov is a former director in the Caucasus Research Resource Center in Azerbaijan.

annual meeting in Georgia with all other CRRC members such as Armenia and Georgia, they discuss current situation with partners and suggestions for the building up regional security in the South Caucasus.

Mr. Zaur Shiriyev⁽¹⁰⁷⁾. Since March 2017, Mr. Shiriyev is managing the program of the PEACE Project under the Caucasus Research and Resource Center of Georgia and its Azerbaijani counterpart the Eurasia Partnership Foundation, Caucasus Research Resource Center Georgia, and Eurasia Partnership Foundation. The project follows up the Track II peace process of the Azerbaijan and Armenia conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh. On the meeting, Mr. Zaur Shiriyev talked about the PeaCE project that he manages. In PeaCE project, they engage with the civil society institutions, experts, politicians, or officials from the governments. The project is conducted both, Azerbaijan and Armenia. By this, there is a possibility to analyze the attitudes and thoughts of partner states for the conflict resolution. Furthermore, he mentioned that this project is funded by Eurasia Partnership Foundation, meaning that the third party actor plays a mediator role in a way.

Sophia Pugsel is a Caucasus Regional Manager of International Alert organization is one of the members of EPNK. The Skype discussion started with the main roles of the International Alert. She stated that the International Alert deals with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue only and the organization is one the members of the EPNK project. Ms. Pugsel realized several business trips to Armenia, which was important to hear the attitude of the Armenian civil societies about the conflict. She said that the Armenian civil societies are taking part of the discussion process in order to break the communication barrier between both sides. They believe that will help to reach a peace settlement sooner. However, Armenian NGOs accept the security dilemma in the region, making hard the negotiation process. She added that International Alert as like other EPNK members takes the role of building the reconciliation and mediation bridge between parties.

Mr. Cavid Aliyev is Deputy Director of the “Azerbaijan and Turkey Brotherhood and Cooperation Association” in Izmir, Turkey. He stated, they merge all social, political, economic, cultural events within one purpose. The discussion aimed to rethink the South Caucasus security problem from the Turkey’s perspective.

¹⁰⁷ Zaur Shiriyev was Chatham House fellow and current program manager of the PeaCE project with Track II process on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

He informed how he and his association evaluate the role of Turkey-Russian relations under the framework of the South Caucasus regional security issue. He told that, the Turkish political elites had prioritized regional stability in the South Caucasus and Nagorno-Karabakh. Particularly, Khojali Genocide is very heart-breaking tragedy for the Turkish society and political elite as well, which is continually headlined on the certain news every year.

TASAM - Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies,⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ has been operating in the institutional body of a NGO as a “think tank” for fourteen years. One of the research areas for these institutions is the Black Sea - Caucasus that is- the security zone for Turkey. The meeting held Mr. Ihsan Toy, who is board member of the institution. He told that security issue is quite challenging now for not only the regional states, but also neighbors such as Iran, Turkey, and Russia. Because of this reason, Turkey takes very seriously regional conflict resolution and security establishment because insecurity limits the regional cooperation with the regional states.

Mrs. Cindy Wittke is a leader of research group “Between Conflict and Cooperation: Politics of International Law in the Post-Space” and “Frozen and Unfrozen Conflict” in the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Germany, Regensburg. The meeting realized in the Bucharest Security Conference in September 2018. After her speech, the personal discussion was held over the current situation of the Nagorno-Karabakh in a security context.

¹⁰⁸ See more about the TASAM, <http://www.tasam.org/en> , (05.03.2019)

CHAPTER II:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: CAUSUS AND EVOLVEMENT OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS CONFLICTS

2.1. NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

2.1.1. Evolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

The Republic of Azerbaijan right after the obtaining its independence, it started to use this opportunity to seek for its national and historical path. The truth always had been suppressed and publicly prohibited during the Soviet Union. The political and legal estimation of violence against Azerbaijani people was always left aside as unopened pages of the South Caucasus history.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

Azerbaijan was divided two times between Russia and Iran in 1813 and 1828 with the Gulistan and Turkmenchay treaties. These historical divisions were not only territorial, but its population as well. These treaties could be considered starting stages of the territorial occupation of Azerbaijan and national tragedy. Right after the Turkmanchay treaty in 1828, the Russo-Ottoman war occurred and during 1829-1830, around 90.000 Armenians transferred from Erzurum, Kars, and Eastern-Bayazit to South Caucasus. Thus, increasing the number of Armenian population in the region would spoil the demographic structure of the muslim-turks in the region. The territorial occupation and national oppression of Azerbaijani Turks in the region started slightly. Nevertheless, the Armenian minorities mostly settled in the disestablished Erevan Khanate's territories, as well as Karabakh and Nakhcivan khanates. Although, Azerbaijanis were minorities in those territories but the danger was on the door with the establishment of the 'Armenian province' was an administrative territorial division with high support behind the initiative. By this administrative division, the dislodging policy of Azerbaijani population from their historical territories stepped in. This policy was propagating 'The Great Armenia' plan with practical actions. Reinforcement of the Armenian population in the Azerbaijan's land had been justified with the falsified and systematically

¹⁰⁹ Murtuz Alasgarov, **Tragic pages of our history: Genocide**, Edition of the Milli Majlis of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Baku, 2000, p.77.

programmed history of Armenian people in the region. The history of South Caucasus, particularly the history of Azerbaijan was distorted by this programmed history.⁽¹¹⁰⁾

In 1905-1907, Azerbaijanis faced with the Armenian occupants where they committed bloody actions openly. Baku city was the first location occupants realized aggressive actions, and very soon, it spread out to villages of the Azerbaijan, where are in current Armenia's territory. Consequently, numerous settlements were destroyed and plenty of Azerbaijanis were massacred. However, the history turned its back to the justice, and humanitarian crime organizers added one more claim was falsified territoriality from Azerbaijanis' historical lands. In 1917, February Revolutions in Russia and October crush coincided to the same year when Armenians started to conduct their historic plan under the Bolshevik leading. Since March in 1918, the Baku Commune started to conduct its plan with the particular slogan was fighting against the anti-revolutionary essentials was particularly devoted to clean Baku province from the Azerbaijanis. Armenians crimes against Azerbaijanis remained as an irreplaceable tragic memory from the people of Azerbaijan. The Baku city turned into destruction with numerous elements; thousands of defenseless people were killed because of their devotion. In additions, houses left on fire, national architectures, symbols, as well as religion ornaments, hospitals and schools had been destroyed.⁽¹¹¹⁾

The humanitarian attacks against Azerbaijanis was not limited with Baku provinces, but also continued in Guba, Zangazur, Lankaran, Shamakhi, Nakhcivan, Karabakh and other regions. In these territories, the slaughtering of Azerbaijanis was in mass form. In addition, cultural monuments were destroyed, villages left on fire. After the establishment of the Peoples Republic, the 'March 1918' incidents prioritized as special history of Azerbaijan. In June 15, 1918, the Council of Ministers ratified a decision to establish a special commission to inspect the committed crime. First investigation was on Shaicakhi incident was a province of Erevan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a group to transmit the truth of the incidents to the world public. The People's Republic of Azerbaijan approved the first day of its national sadness of 31 March of 1919 and 1920. Actually, the

¹¹⁰ Alasgarov, p.78.

¹¹¹ Alasgarov, p. 79.

humanitarian crime against the Azerbaijanis brought a political estimation to understand the plan over the territorial occupation throughout the century. However, the plan was prevented by the breakaway of the People's Republic of Azerbaijan.⁽¹¹²⁾

The main idea was to turn the Transcaucasia into the Sovietized region, therefore, Zangazur and some other lands of Azerbaijan were declared as territories of Armenia. The reason for this action was to deport Azerbaijani minorities from their lands in future. Therefore, in order to realize this action, the Council of Ministers of the Union Soviet Socialist Republics adopted a special resolution in order Armenians to realize their plan in life. The context of the resolution was deported the Azerbaijani population as well as collective farmers to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan's Kur-Araz valley from the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia. The deportation conducted during 1948 and 1953. Since 1950 Azerbaijani people has been suppressed aggressively by the Armenian nationalists. Yet, during the Soviet times, Armenian nationalists started to work deeply on proclaiming the national features, monuments, architectures and overall classical heritages of Azerbaijan actually belonged to them. However, all these struggles showed off the real faces of the Armenian strategy with the committed violence against Azerbaijanis at the 1990s, and this time the world became an eye-witnessed to the violence, in addition, the historical 'Miserable Armenian people' concept was internationally destroyed by their own aggressive actions. At the beginning of the twentieth century the majority of Azerbaijanis were settled in Erevan particularly, and other parts of Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia, however, they were oppressed in mass forms. Armenians immensely violated the rights of Azerbaijani minorities, and more importantly, the Azerbaijani minorities had obstacles to obtain their education in their native languages, as well as their repression became a big issue. Next step was to change the historical names of Azerbaijani villages; particularly it was focused to ancient toponyms.⁽¹¹³⁾

The Armenian implemented a policy in two levels through education: first, Armenian young generation should be raised up with strong nationalist mentality, which led to chauvinism. The libels directed against the national prides, and moral ideologies of Azerbaijan, which turned into political and military aggression. The

¹¹² Alasgarov, pp.80-81.

¹¹³ Alasgarov, p.82.

estimation of military aggression towards the Azerbaijan's territories was an actual issue among Azerbaijani peoples. Because of the Soviet press used for the benefit of Armenia that created a confused public opinion by distorting a historical facts. Benefitting from Soviet regime, an anti-Azerbaijani propagation started to be in active process in 1980s via Armenian's growing political devotion. As a result, in 1988 before the starting of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, hundred thousands of Azerbaijanis were deported from their historical lands.⁽¹¹⁴⁾

Armenians according their anti-constitutional decision to include the Nagorno-Karabakh province of Azerbaijan into the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan that Azerbaijani people strongly stood against that decision and Azerbaijan forced the Special Administration Committee to take an important political actions. During the meetings in the republic, the straightforward plan to conduct a territorial occupation of Azerbaijani lands was strongly condemned, where the Azerbaijan acted very passive without any active response. Yet, in Azerbaijan, the national movement was increasingly growing and this movement disturbed the Soviet political elites, therefore, Soviet tanks carried its tanks through Caspian Sea to the Baku in 1990. As a result, thousands of civilians were killed, nullified, injured, and other physical damages subjected. Following, February 1992 Khojali massacre (in Azerbaijani literature it was called as 'genocide') was a culmination of the aggression against Azerbaijanis was unimaginable anti-human manner. This tragic night afterwards placed as a genocide and politically Azerbaijani government implemented local and international propaganda to have worldwide ratification.⁽¹¹⁵⁾

By this event the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continued by the separatist Armenians, consequently the escalated conflict left over one million internal displayed Azerbaijanis, and twenty percent territorial loss of Azerbaijan that occupied by Armenia.⁽¹¹⁶⁾

¹¹⁴ Cəlal Əliyev və Budaq Budaqov, **Türklər, Azərbaycanlılar, Ermənilər: Tarixi Həqiqətin Soyqırımı**, Azərbaycan Nəşriyyatı, Bakı, 2003, səh. 56, 60, [Jalal Aliyev and Budag Budagov, **Turks, Azerbaijanis, Armenians: Historical Truth of Genocide**, Azerbaijan Publication, Baku, 2003, pp.56,60].

¹¹⁵ Aliyev and Budagov, pp. 70,73

¹¹⁶ Conciliation Resources, **Qarabağ Müzakirə Olunur**, Conciliation Resources Nəşrləri, Bakı, 2006, səh. 22,23, [**Karabakh has been discussing**, Conciliation Resources Publishing, Baku, 2006, pp. 22,23].

The XIX-XX centuries' tragic events brought various political and military violence, and most importantly territorial occupation of Azerbaijan's lands by Armenians. In 'March 1918' massacre as one of the tragic events at some point brought a political initiative to approve the aggressive actions towards Azerbaijanis. Current political elites and thinkers accept the responsibility of raising the covered history in 1918 March, with endorsed political appreciation, to deliver the clarity of attempted logical and concrete decision to committee genocide that could not be completed till the end.⁽¹¹⁷⁾

Nagorno-Karabakh is located in the territory of Azerbaijan and had been occupied by Armenia. The territory of the region is 4,400km². In 1990, the population of the region reached up to the 192,000. It consisted of Armenians (70%), Azerbaijanis (25%), Kurds, Russians, and Jewes. The main city was Khankendi (Steppanakert), another big city was Shusha. In the past Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Albania (Caucasus Albania). B.C. 95 the place occupied by the Armenian sultan II Tigran. At the beginning of 4th century, Albanians got back the Artsag and in 387, it became part of the Albanian territory. Since the 8th century, Albania's territory was decreasing and in Artsag it existed as Khachin principality. At the beginning of 17th century, in Iran, and in 18th century, Karabakh khanate, the region Karabakh gained the status of autonomy. In 1813 with the Gulustan treaty Nagorno-Karabakh became part of Russia. In 1822, khanate rescinded in Karabakh and Russian government deported one million Armenians from Turkey and Iran. However, in 1923 the Nagorno-Karabakh province was established. Thus, in 1989 the Azerbaijani Parliament had rescinded the status of autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh unanimously. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, ethnic clashes and Armenia's demands on obtaining the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomy Republic pushed both countries into a bloody conflict. The war ended up with cease-fire signed in Bishkek by the so-called "Bishkek Protocol". The local government in Nagorno-Karabakh announced its independence in 1991. However, since that time till "independency" was not recognized by any country in the world.⁽¹¹⁸⁾

¹¹⁷ Conciliation Resources, pp. 34,37.

¹¹⁸ Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin İşlər İdarəsi, **Dağlıq Qarabağ: Tarixə baxış**, Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin İşlər İdarəsinin Prezident Kitabxanası, Bakı, 2005, səh.6,7, [Prezidential Affairs Department of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **Nagorno-Karabakh: To look at History**,

Going back to the starting point of, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 1988-Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province has merged to Armenia. The main source of the conflict was the Armenian political colonization and territorial occupation targeted to obtain part of Azerbaijan's territory. In fact, the previous USSR officials supported the attempt. With the supportive acts of the USSR, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province officials adopted anti-constitutional statements. Development of the national-liberty movement in Azerbaijan frightened Russia, and in January 19-20, 1990, Russian tanks exerted through the Caspian Sea in the framework of establishing "rule of law". Gorbachov's speech highlighted the security to fight with the Islamic fundamentalism in the region.⁽¹¹⁹⁾

Since the end of 1991, modernized and heavily armed forces of Armenia its military operations on the borderline and in Nagorno-Karabakh. The №-366 Russian regiment facilitates the main military support to Armenia. By the help of that regiment Armenia occupied several residential properties, then continued with conduction of Khojaly genocide in 1992 April 26. At the same year, they occupied Shusha. From May 1992, till October 1993 Armenian armed forces occupied seven more regions in Azerbaijan: Lachin, Kalbajar, Agdam, Fuzuli, Gubadli, Chabrayil, and Zangilan, 161 km of Azerbaijan-Iran border stayed as uncontrolled.⁽¹²⁰⁾

In 1920-1921 the South Caucasus countries; Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia were consolidated into the Soviet Union, however, their borders were not settled immediately. Presumably, it was because of the unlined border between Armenian and Azerbaijan over the entitled status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and Nakhcivan. This duration was determined with the political struggle for Karabakh region between the two countries within the Soviet Union. Unless the Soviet political leadership was not involved to settle the issue within three year, the process would have been so long. Under the Soviet pressure in 1920, Soviet Azerbaijan released a statement of transferring Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhcivan to be under the Armenian control. It was told by the Stalins public decision on

Prezidential Library of the Prezidential Affairs Department of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Baku, 2005, pp.6,7].

¹¹⁹ A. N. Abbasbayli, and Et.al, **Konfliktologiya Dərslik**, Bakı Dövlət Universiteti Nəşriyyatı, Bakı, 2006, Səh. 217,218, [**Conflictology Textbook**, Baku State University Publishing, Baku, 2006, pp. 217, 218].

¹²⁰ Abbasbayli and Et.al, p.219.

December 2, however, that the Azerbaijani political leadership, particularly Narimanov denied the relocation and by the insistent demand, after four month the steer turned back to Azerbaijan again.⁽¹²¹⁾

More articulately, on March 16, 1921 mutual treaty between Turkey and the Soviet Union: Nakhcivan and Karabakh region were left to the control of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic-but Zangazur stayed within Armenia. In 1924, autonomous republic status was given to Nakhcivan (NASSR), on the contrary Nagorno-Karabakh obtained the status of autonomous oblast only.⁽¹²²⁾

Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally known bloodiest conflict happened in the South Caucasus, and default to resolve in the near future. Obviously, during the war both sides suffered. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan lost 20% of its territory and over millions people became IDP. The, Karabakh Armenians also had faced material and moral damages. Although the conflict ended up with ceasefire, there is no hope for peaceful resolution. The final stage of Azerbaijani peoples' deportation started in 1987, accelerated the demands of the Karabakh Armenians to be part of the Armenia, which increased the tension between Armenian-Azerbaijan. In 1988, the consistent threatening of the Azerbaijani people in the Mountainous-Karabakh region challenged peace. Thus, the collapse of Soviet Union, 1991 Azerbaijan and Armenian's independence, and the announcement of the 'Nagorno-Karabakh Republic have converted the conflict into an interstate war.'⁽¹²³⁾

The starting the date of conflict is considered as 1987, when Azerbaijanis were attacked in Khankandi (in the Soviet Union it was called Stepanakert) and the Azerbaijanis dispersed by the Armenians and became refugees and IDPs. At the Soviet of People's Deputies session of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous (NKAO), the Armenian community representatives came up with a decision on February 20, 1988 to arrange a petition to send both Supreme Soviets of Azerbaijan

¹²¹ Svante E. Cornell, "Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered", **Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1997, p. 2.

¹²² 'Область', Oblast is Russian origin word, which means 'region'. On the other hand 'нагорно', nagorno is also Russian origin word, means 'upland/mountainous', and in Azerbaijani it is 'Dağlıq' therefore in the literature it may be called 'Mountainous Karabakh by some authors. The Karabakh Autonomous region was composed mostly by mountainous, therefore, after it was called Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

¹²³ Reha Yilmaz and Elnur Ismayilov, "Etnik Çatışma Teorileri Işığında Dağlık Karabağ Sorunu", [Nagorno-Karabakh Problem in the light of Ethnic Conflict Theories], **Bilgesam**, Report No. 37, Istanbul, 2011, p. 4.

SSR. The aim was give the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to Armenia, while Azerbaijanis were protesting against the decision of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, Armenians opened a gun-fire and two Azerbaijani youths died.⁽¹²⁴⁾

On 26-28 February 1988 around the 26 Armenians and Azerbaijanis were killed in the Sumgayit upheaval. There was an active participation and coordination of a leading Armenian figure Edward Grigorian.⁽¹²⁵⁾

One year later on December 1989, a resolution was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR for joining of the Nagorno-Karabakh to the Armenian SSR. However, a year later on January 10, an important resolution act was adopted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR stating that unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with the Armenian SSR is not legally binding and cannot happen without the agreement of the Azerbaijani SSR according to the USSR Constitution.⁽¹²⁶⁾

The Armenians' demonstration held in 1988 at the Erevan and Stepanakert cities was resulted with the Moscow's approval on shifting Nagorno-Karabakh enclave to Armenia. However, the tension in the Azerbaijani side was rising which was later calmed down by Gorbachov fearing from the Azerbaijan demonstrators..⁽¹²⁷⁾

In May 1990, the Armenian National Movement won the parliamentary election in Armenia. In essence, extreme nationalist and chauvinist forces have gained power, who propagandizes war in Armenia. This also accelerated the starting process of their aggressive war. Erevan was aiming to create unofficial military unions. Azerbaijan started to establish arm forces directly after the end of the Soviet Union. By the contrary Armenia had already obtained trained armed forces. At the beginning of conflict, militarized Armenia has an advantage, and intended to solve

¹²⁴ "Beginning of the Conflict", **Mfa.gov.az**, <http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/813>, (18.03.2018).

¹²⁵ "Dağlıq Qarabağ: Tarixə baxış", [Nagorno-Karabakh: To look at History], p. 60.

¹²⁶ "Dağlıq Qarabağ: Tarixə baxış", [Nagorno-Karabakh: To look at History], p. 61.

¹²⁷ Melita Kuburas, "Ethnic Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh", **Review of European and Russian Affairs**, Vol. 6, Issue.1, 2011, pp. 50, 51.

the issue by using arm forces. Therefore, Armenia had never took peace negotiations seriously.⁽¹²⁸⁾

2.1.1.1. Azerbaijani peoples' deportation from Armenia: 1988-1989

Since January 1988, Armenian with the support of USSR supreme leadership, started deportation of the Azerbaijani peoples from their historical homeland. The first wave of deportation held in 1988 January 25 and Azerbaijanis reached to Azerbaijan. Since February 9, 1988, Erevan was the center of mass protestors. Protestors gathered up with slogans such as "Cleaning Turks from Armenia", 'Armenia is only for Armenians'. In the third day of the demonstrations the only mosque (in the early 20th century there were 8 mosques in the city) and materials of the Azerbaijani primary school, and the Azerbaijani Dram Theatre named of J.Jabbarli were burned.⁽¹²⁹⁾

A year before the inter-ethnic tensions escalated in Armenia. Close to the end of 1987 Azerbaijani people in Armenia challenged with the moral and psychological pressures. In January 1988, the hundreds of people from Kafan and Megri districts of Armenia being refugee settlement in the closest regions of Azerbaijan. By the February, the number tremendously increased. The Azerbaijani people forcefully triggered to leave the homes, when unofficial report popped out about the territorial claims and Armenians with anti-Azerbaijanis slogans announced within several events, which made civilians to leave home to escape from violent the attacks. Baku became the first place of refugees and later on they spread out to the western part of Azerbaijan, because of similar climate and geographical conditions.⁽¹³⁰⁾

The emotional tension was rising up in Baku when reports were released from Stepanakert deputies in the context of joining to Armenia. However, the reaction of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union came out on 24 February 1988,

¹²⁸ "Ermenistan-Azərbaycan Dağlıq Qarabağ Münaqişəsi", [Armenian-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict], **Prezident.az**, <https://static2.president.az/media/W1siZiIsIjIwMTgvMDMvMDkvOGowdDVxODhvc19EYV9sX3FfUWFyYWJhX19BWkUucGRmIld?sha=c1feac0d3415a521>, (17.03.2018)

¹²⁹ "Dağlıq Qarabağ: Tarixə baxış", [Nagorno-Karabakh: To look at History], p. 53.

¹³⁰ İlgar Niftaliyev, "1988: The Final Stage of the Deportation of Azerbaijanis from Armenia", **IRS Karabakh**, Vol.4, No. 19, 2014, p. 31.

about the unwanted events happened in Armenia, stating that the separatists' territorial claim was unlawful, and unreasonable, therefore, central government did not support them. Unfortunately, the statement didn't mention anything about the refugees deported from Armenia, as well as the political intervention of Armenia into the Nagorno-Karabakh events.⁽¹³¹⁾

People fled from Goycha district tells that, 'at the beginning they did not take this warning seriously, and insisted not to leave homes, however, they were warned second time to leave homes within three days and, there was no reaction from the central government. At the beginning, they thought return will happen after political settlement and left homes with hopes of return. They have been settled in the lowland parts of Azerbaijan, where hot regions mostly assembled. However, people rejected this offer and asked for going to the western parts of Azerbaijan where upland is; the existence of the similar climate and geography might help them to adapt easily. Majority of the people settled in the school buildings. And some of them got place in the relatives' houses.'⁽¹³²⁾

This attempt was the starting point of cleaning all the Azerbaijani Turks from Armenia, including Nagorno-Karabakh and 7 surrounding regions. By the starting of the reconstruction novation in the USSR triggered Armenia's territorial claim over the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, and realized the first wave of refugee flow.⁽¹³³⁾

However, deportation plan was not so easy, 33 Azerbaijani villages in the Basarkecher (current Vardenis in Armenian) did not move until the last stage of the deportation process in 1988. In order to accelerate the deportation the USSR leadership was pressuring on the regional authority. At the first stage, the targeted villages were less Azerbaijani minorities and have good climate and productive lands.⁽¹³⁴⁾

¹³¹ Niftaliyev, p. 34.

¹³² Kalvalı Həsənov, **And Yerimiz**, Steyk KM nəşriyyat, Gəncə, Sentyabr, 2001, Səh. 19-22, [Kalvali Hasanov, **Place of Oath**, Steyk KM Publishing, Ganja, September, 2001, pp.19-22].

¹³³ "Azərbaycanlıların etnik təmizlənməsi. Xronologiya", [Ethnic Cleansing of Azerbaijanis. Chronology], **Sumqayıt 1988**, <http://sumqayit1988.org/az/ethnic/c>, (19.03.2018)

¹³⁴ Həbib Rəhimovlu, "Azərbaycanlılar Ermənistan SSR Ərazisində", Qərbi Azərbaycan, [Habib Rahimoglu, Azerbaijanis in the territory of Armenia SSR, , Western Azerbaijan, **West-land.az**, <http://www.west-land.az/index.php?mod=static&page=ssr16>, (18.03.2018).

In 1988 February 26, Georgi Shahnazarov hosted M. Gorbochov, S. Kputikyani and Z.Balayan. G. Shahnazarov was an assistant of M. Gorbochov. They presented a map of Turkish world and insistently tried to convince him on impossibility of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) as part of Azerbaijan. However, M. Gorbocov did not promise them that Nagorno-Karabakh would be given to Armenia, instead for the socio-economic development, Gorbachov promised to give 400 million rublei, which was a huge amount. Goybocov knew the existence of the 19 potential national conflict zones within the USSR. During the meeting Gorbochov told them to proclaim in Erevan, soon there will be a union conference and the decision would be made until that conference. After this, in Erevan and Khankendi (Stepanakert) rallies started.⁽¹³⁵⁾

Consequently, 250,000 Azerbaijani peoples moved out from Armenia forcefully in 1988. Currently, Armenia with its capital Erevan completely cleaned up from Azerbaijanis and no Azerbaijanis live there with particular Russia's involvement.⁽¹³⁶⁾

2.1.1.2. Sumgayit Incident

The Sumgayit incident was the continuation of the Armenian great plan, which happened on February 27-28, 1988. Sumgayit as an industrial city is located in 30km distance from Baku in which around fifteen various nationalities were living. The protestors in the city were threatening Armenian residents. The tension continued three days in the city with no intervention by the Soviet authorities. The city wrapped up approximately 258, 200 residents, and about 18,000 were ethnic Armenians.^{(137),(138)}

¹³⁵ Nazim Mustafa, "Azərbaycanlıların əzəli torpaqlarından sonuncu 1988-1989-cu illər deportasiyası", **Sağlam Gələcəyə Doğru Gənclər İctimai Birliyi**, [The last stage deportation of Azerbaijani's ancient lands in 1988-1989, **Towards to the Healthy Future Public Union**] <http://deportasiya.az/en/Home/ReadNews/311>, (20.03.2018).

¹³⁶ Vidadi İsayev, **Hardan gəlir bu Köç**, Azərinəşr, Bakı, 1995, Səh.119, [Vidadi Isayev, **Where does this immigration come from?**, Azerpublishing, Baku, 1995, p.119].

¹³⁷ "Sumqayıt hadisələrindən 30 il ötür", [30 years passes since Sumgait incidents], **Oxu.az**, 28.02.2018, <https://oxu.az/society/244826ç>, (20.03.2018)

¹³⁸ Aslan İsmayılov, **Sumqayıt: SSR'nin Süqutunun Başlanğıcı**, [Aslan Ismayilov, **Sumgayit: The Begening of the USSR's end**], Çayıoğlu, 2010, p. 142.

This incident was clearly committed under the control of the USSR leadership. An artificial condition was created in the city. For these collected alcoholic drinks, cigarettes were filled in with narcotics, and other psychotropic substances were distributed to the youth, particularly students of the technical vocational schools. They delicately tried to deploy saboteurs particularly chosen among ethnic minorities (Armenians mostly) who spoke in Azerbaijani fluently. Those saboteurs tried to convince people that, in the Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijanis had been beaten up, tortured, killed, and rapes of underage girls etc. Supposedly, in Baku the railway station was full of dead bodies brought from Armenia. Additionally, a crashed bus filled out with dead bodies was demonstrated in the center of Sumgayit. Law-enforcements authorities banned to take action in the city. No one told anything to the extremist provocateurs. On February 28-29, military forces under the coordination of the general Krayev, entered into the city to surround party building. During that time the extremists groups killed 26 Armenians. On 29 February afternoon military forces immediately intervened into the city and as a result 6 Azerbaijanis were killed, around 400 hundreds people were wounded, 200 hundreds apartments plundered, more than 40 cars were damaged and some of them fired.⁽¹³⁹⁾

On March 1, the investigation team of the former USSR prosecutor's Office began to investigate the incidents. The investigation group was coordinated by the head of the USSR Prosecutor's Office and investigator Galkin who was an important figure in the office.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾

In the immediate aftermath, the Sumgayit events were grossly exaggerated by the Armenian diaspora all over the world and at the same time underestimated and dismissed as a simple act of hooliganism by the Soviet leadership. A more detailed look into the unrest reveals many loopholes that exist in both Armenian and Soviet accounts of the riots. The premeditated nature of the riots, active involvement of non-resident agent provocateurs before and during the riots and the unfolding of carefully planned scenario are indications that its masterminds willfully misrepresented the Sumgayit unrest. The principle figure of the Sumgayit unrest was a man of Armenian

¹³⁹ "Sumqayıt hadisələri-27-29 Fevral 1988", [Sumgayit incidents 27-29 February 1988], **Anl.az**, http://anl.az/download/meqale/adalet/adalet_fevral2009/70529.htm, (21.03.2019)

¹⁴⁰ Ismayilov, p.144.

origin, namely Eduard Robertovich Grigoryan, who was born in Sumgayit and had been recruited to incite the Azerbaijani protesters and to assemble the group of criminals.⁽¹⁴¹⁾ Eduard Grigoryan was an important figure of the incident; he was Armenian origin but lived in Azerbaijan, Sumgayit. During the incident, he killed six Armenians, and arranged provocation against Azerbaijanis that they commit murder against Armenians. After the end of the Sumgayit incident, he was captured by chance by the recognition of Armenian family – two sisters Marina and Karina Mezhlumanyan and mother, Rosa Mezhlumanyan. His intention was not coincidence, but was planned criminal intention. He had a list of Armenian families where he started to kill their members.⁽¹⁴²⁾

On March 31, 2016 in Moscow, Vladimir Kalinichenko a former member of the preliminary investigative group of the USSR Prosecutor's Office, presented a book delivered by Saadat Gadirova called “From the first sources of Sumgayit Incidents”. He stated that the Sumgayit incidents were serving to the Armenian lobby and the USSR State Security Committee’s interests. Evaluation and analysis of materials collected by the current investigation team confirm that the disorder in Sumgayit was a provocation against Armenia by the Armenian special services and the USSR State Security Committee.⁽¹⁴³⁾

2.1.1.3. ‘Black January’-January 20, 1990

The Azerbaijani people have been facing severe tragedies from time to time. One of the tragedies that happened was the bloody January 20 tragedy. On the night of January 19-20 in 1990, Russian tanks were deployed to Baku and several other regions of Azerbaijan without declaring a state of emergency. Hundreds of civilian people were killed, wounded, and disappeared. Occupation of Baku by the large

¹⁴¹ Ismayilov, pp.17,19, 37.

¹⁴² Elchin Eyyuboglu, “Sumgayit Slaughterer Grigoryan has been found”, 16.02.2016, vestnikkavkaza.net, <http://vestnikkavkaza.net/articles/Sumgayit-slaughterer-Grigoryan-has-been-found.html>, (22.03.2018).

¹⁴³ “Sumqayıt hadisələri: Qanlı erməni təxribatından 31 il ötür”, [Sumgayit incidents: 31 years pass through bloody Armenian provocation], Yeniavaz.com, 28.02.2019, <https://www.yeniavaz.com/az/newscontent/znewscontent/100318/sumqayit-hadiseleri-qanli-ermeni-texribatindan-31-il-otur>, (23.03.2019).

number of Soviet troops, and Special Forces was accompanied by special cruelty and unprecedented atrocities. Until the announcement of the state of emergency, already 82 people were killed. After the announcement of the state of emergency, 21 people were killed in Baku. In the regions where the state of emergency was not declared- on January 25 in Neftchala and on January 26 in Lankaran 8 more people were killed.⁽¹⁴⁴⁾

However, the political and legal assessment for the ‘January 20, 1990’ incident was given after the former president Haydar Aliyev returned to political power. The decision on giving a political assessment of the ‘January 20, 1990 Baku’ event was made at the first session of the Nakhchivan Supreme Assembly. The Nakhchivan’s Supreme Assembly adopted a decision on November 21, 1990 stating that the political evaluation of the January 1990 was pointing out the tragedy networks were the Republican Party of the Soviet Union and its military personnel, which have not been found and brought to justice that caused consistent protest and resentment among people. The action was considered a policy and military aggression by the Supreme Assembly of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan with a declaration of human rights violations:

1. The January 20, 1990 event in Baku should be considered as an attempt on the sovereign rights and the democratic process of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan.

2. Using modern weapons against the unarmed, defenseless, and innocent masses was an open attack towards the Azerbaijani people.

3. Although it has been passed a year over that night, the Azerbaijan SSR was failed to bring the action into the political and legal evaluation with an unclear reasons, in order to prosecute the perpetrators of military aggression against Azerbaijani civilians.

4. The prior requirement should be bringing this issue to the parliament in advance by the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR.

5. The ‘January 20’ shall be annually celebrated as the National Day of Mourning in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic since the decision was adopted.

¹⁴⁴ Reza Deghaty and Betty Blair, “Black January: Baku 1990, Behind the Scenes: A Photojournalist’s Perspective”, **Azerbaijan International**, 1998, p. 3.

6. The Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan to mark the 'January 20' as the National Day of Mourning in the country.

Although, in the January 20 events, the innocent civilians were attacked when they were out with the sovereign rights of Azerbaijan, whereas, they were killed with no resistance, whereas it did not activate the political assessment instruments of the Azerbaijani leadership on that time. Nevertheless, the Supreme Soviet Commission of the Azerbaijan SSR, had to investigate the January events, strangely, they did not involve in the work.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾

2.1.2. Karabakh War: 1991-1994, Nagorno-Karabakh+7

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was not the starting point to observe the Armenian separatist actions against Azerbaijanis, whereas, appeared Armenian terror attacks were a signal for further actions that in future it ended up with the full-scale interstate war. The dissolution of the Soviet Union became an opportunity for union countries to announce their independence, as well as South Caucasus countries. With this opportunity, the terrorism became part of underground independent state policy. After the official independence, the political elites decided to reactivate the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), Dashnakustyan, the Armenian Liberation Front, Armenian Unity and some other terrorist organizations. Those organizations have been endorsed by the Armenian government and received financial and institutional support for their activities. The next step was releasing of Varojoyan Garabedian, who was guilty on organizing a terrorist action in July 1983, at the Orly Airport of Paris. In order to release him, Armenia started to have official signature collection. During the terrorist action in the airport, sixty people were wounded and eight people were killed. After the incident, he captured and sentenced to life imprisonment. However, 18 years later in 2001, the court in France decided to release him, and right after Armenia officially arranged a shelter for him.⁽¹⁴⁶⁾

¹⁴⁵ Elnur Hajaliyev, "Milli azadlıq hərəkatının zirvəsi", [The peak of the national liberation movement], № 13, S. 4, Azerbaijan, **Elibrary.az**, 20.01.2016, http://www.elibrary.az/docs/qazet/qzt2016_198.htm, (22.11.2018)

¹⁴⁶ Eldar Mahmudov, **Armenian terror**, The State Commission of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Prisoners of War, Hostages and Missing Persons, Baku, 2005, p. 145.

Moreover, another popular terrorist Monte Melkonyan, who was leading the well-known ASALA terrorist organization in the Western Europe. Because of his revolutionary movement, in November 28, 1985, French court arrested him for six years imprisonment; however, five years later he was released by the same court. The first thing he did, visited Armenia and in order to continue his terrorist mission was sent to the Nagorno-Karabakh. During the Khojavand district's occupation, Monte Melkonyan was commanding the special terrorist division. However, in 1993, Azerbaijani military forces in Nagorno-Karabakh killed him and his dead body was buried in Yerevan. His funeral was not ordinary one, but involved many political officials as well as president of Armenia to take part in that day. Right after his funeral, Armenian government declared him as a national hero, and Ministry of Defense's one of the incendiary centers started to carry his name. Another terrorist leader Grant Markaryan was a member of 'Dro' terrorist group, which was within the Dashnakstuyan party The Nagorno-Karabakh, was also his destination to create his terrorist groups and conduct an active actions accordingly. His terrorist group was provided with military arms by the Armenia.⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ In 1981, the Turkish embassy in Paris was victimized of terror attack, which was organized by the Vazgen Sislyan, lately he was given an award of Karabakh war hero that was presented by the Robert Kocharyan, the president of Armenia, highlighting his appreciative participation and involvement in the Karabakh war where he committed violence. The Armenian Intelligence Agencies were protecting all the potential Armenian terrorists from all around the world; particularly they endorsed and highly protected the Armenian terrorists; Abu Ali and Hilbert Minasyan from Middle East by origin. Obviously, there are plenty of chronologies about the conducted terror attacks realized by Armenian terrorist groups to threat the regional stability. Several of them would be essential to list them down, because those actions realized during the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh war, and they were indirectly part of the Karabakh war.⁽¹⁴⁸⁾

In order to have articulate list of action, it is better to write them down according to their year of action.

¹⁴⁷ Mahmudov, pp.133, 135.

¹⁴⁸ Mahmudov, pp.138, 140.

Table 1: Chronologies of the committed terrorist actions by the Armenian terrorist groups between 1991 and 1992.^{(149),(150)}

DATE OF ACTION	PLACE OF ACTION	RESULT OF ACTION
30.05.1991	Explosion of the Moscow-Baku passengers train in the territory of Dagistan, near the Khasavurd station	-11 people died, 22 people wounded.
19.06.1991	Explosion of the car UAZ-469, at the Yevlakh-Lachin road's 106 th km distance.	-2 people died, 2 heavily wounded
31.07.1991	Explosion of the Moscow-Baku passenger train in the territory of Dagestan (Russian Federation), near the Temirtau station.	-16 people died, 20 wounded.
02.08.1991	Explosion of the car Gaz-53, in the Dolanlar village located in the Hadrut district.	-4 men died, 8 heavily wounded.
21.08.1991	Explosion of the passenger bus no: 70-30 AQO, near the Shadakht village was located in the Hadrut district.	-2 men died, 10 injured.
08.09.1991	-The bus was machine-gunned on the road to Agdam-Khojavend. The attack was committed by the Valodi Khachaturyan, Armo Arustamyan, Saro Yermenyan, Sasha Chalyan were ethnic Armenians. -The bus was machine-gunned on the road to Agdam-Garadagli by Armenian terrorist group.	-6 people were killed, 34 were injured in various degrees. -8 people were killed, 42 received various degrees of injuries.
26.09.1991	Explosion of the car VAZ-2106, on the	-2 men died, 14

¹⁴⁹ Mahmudov, pp.141-143.

¹⁵⁰ Mahmudov, pp.144,147.

	Yevlakh-Lachin road with the state number plate: D 72-07 AQ	wounded.
19.10.1991	Explosion of the car UAZ-469, near the Shiravend village of Agdere province.	-3 men died, 2 heavily wounded.
20.11.1991	MI-8 Helicopter was downed close to Garakent village of Khojavend province.	-All passengers, including crew members were killed. Note: The passengers inside of the helicopter were observers from Kazakhstan and Russia, and rest of them were government officials of Azerbaijan.
26.12.1991	Explosion of cars 'Moskvich' and ZIL-130, on the 4 th km distance of Shusha and Lachin districts.	-5 men died, 4 wounded.
08.01.1992	Terrorist attack to ferry was sailing to Baku from Krasnovodsk	-28 people were killed, 88 wounded
28.01.1992	MI-8 Civil Helicopter was downed by terrorists, on the route to Agdam-Shusha.	-44 people were killed (mostly women and children)
Jan,1992	Terrorist attack to Kargigahan village	-80 people were killed
Feb,1992	Terrorist attack to Garadagli village was located within the Khojavend district	-77 people were killed
26.02.1992	Armenian soldiers' attack to Khojaly	-613 defenseless civilians were killed, 650 wounded
22.03.1992	Explosion of the car UAZ-469 with state №-plate: 60-25 AZU, in the Gazakh territory.	-3 men died, 2 wounded
20.05.1992	Armed attacks to the car UAZ-469, with state №-plate: 80-33 AZU, near	-2 men were killed, 2 wounded.

	the Zangilan district in the Qaranchi village.	
--	--	--

Table 2: Chronologies of the committed terrorist actions by the Armenian terrorist groups between 1993 and 1994.^{(151),(152)}

DATE OF ACTION	PLACE OF ACTION	RESULT OF ACTION
02.06.1993	Explosion of in the railway station in Baku. The explosion was conducted by the Russian citizen Igor Khatkovsky, during the investigation he released the command behind the action was coordinated by Ministry of National Security of Armenia under the control of colonel Djaan Ohanesyan. Igor Khatkovsky was sent to Azerbaijan to delivery spying information to D. Ohanesyan and waits his command for any action. One of his tasks was to commit explosion to Russia-Baku passengers train.	-Huge material damages and loses.
22.07.1993	-Explosion in Tartar district. -Explosion in Gazakh districts	-5 men died, 18 wounded. -6 men died, 10 wounded.
30.08.1993	Explosion of car ZIL, in the Hardrut district's territory.	-2 men died.
August,1993	Explosion of bus GAZ-66 near the territory of Hardrut.	-4 people died, 8 heavily wounded.
01.02.1993	Terrorist attack to Kislovodsk-Baku	-3 people were killed, 20

¹⁵¹ Mahmudov, p.151.

¹⁵² Aliyev and Budagov, pp.79,81, 83.

	passenger train, in the Baku railway station.	wounded.
18.03.1994	‘Herkules’ plane was downed near the Khankendi city, which belonged to Iran Air Force.	-34 diplomats and their family members were died.
19.03.1994	<p>Explosion in the subway, at the ‘January 20’ station. The court investigation brought the truth on the table proving that, Armenian special services coordinate the action, and committed by the ‘Sadval’ Lezgi terrorist organization.</p> <p>Note: Lately it was proved that members of Sadval, visited to Yerevan quite frequently since 1992. And they have been financed and informed by the National Security Department of Armenia. At the same year during April-May seventeen Azerbaijani citizens with Lezgi origins, joined a special training, organized by the Armenia in Lusakert settlement of Nairi district. They confessed that their main task was to commit an explosion in two places: Nizami Cinema House in Baku, and Republican Palace. During the investigation 30 members of Sadval terrorist organization were charged because of the explosion happened in subway ‘January 20’ station.</p>	-14 people were killed, 49 wounded.
13.04.1994	Explosion of the passenger train routed Moscow to Baku, in the territory of	-6 people died, 3 wounded.

	Republic of Dagestan, near the 'Dagestanskije Ogni' station.	
13.07.1994	<p>Explosion in the subway between two stations in Baku: 'May 28' and 'Ganjlik'.</p> <p>Note: Azer Aslanov committed the terrorist action, who was Azerbaijani citizen. Armenians captivated him during the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1994. During the investigation, he confessed that in January 14, 1994, he met with Armenian ideologist and writer Zori Balayan. All the military captives were recruited, particularly Lezgis (minorities in northern Azerbaijan), to unit with Azer Aslanov to commit terrorist actions against Azerbaijan.</p>	-13 people died, 42 injured.

Armenians captivated many Azerbaijani soldiers during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, and Azer Aslanov was one of them. On June 9, 1994, his parent's house was rang several times by Armenian special agents named mostly Arthur to inform his parents that Azer is alive and needs help for negotiations in Yerevan to be released. Therefore, his mother Tajibat Aslanova went to Yerevan for release his son on June 16, 1994. According to his words, everything started after that, meaning he was threatened with the life of his mother, therefore, he agreed on being recruited as an Armenian agent permanently with the 'Omar-75' alias. In order to guarantee his entrance to Azerbaijan, he was provided with the fake documents, and they fixed the explosives into the chocolate, perfumery, and biscuit boxes. On July 3, 1994, Yerevan-Mineralnievodi-Baku route carried him to Baku, realized his terrorist action in the Baku subway between the 'May 28' and 'Genjlik' metro stations, and immediately returned to Yerevan. During the investigation, court revealed his

counterparts were captain Seryan Sarkisyan and colonel Bagdasaryan during the terrorist action. His Armenian counterparts were members of special service agency of Armenia. The Supreme Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan proved during the investigation that the entitled terrorist actions particularly and directly financed, organized, and coordinated by the Armenians separatists from unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh regime, and Armenia's special services and other state institutions.⁽¹⁵³⁾

In 1992, late winter, the conflict emerged within low-intensity, which was accelerated to demonstrate a full scale of fighting the between two sides. All the international attempts, including an involvement of the OSCE proved futile and did not change the destiny of conflict to a positive direction. The Armenian forces continued their attacks in 1993 spring, which resulted by capturing new regions outside its territory. Consequently, Armenians managed to take in total 20% of the territorial control of current Azerbaijan by the 1994.⁽¹⁵⁴⁾

The Armenian forces had gone ahead for capturing of the Azerbaijani settlements within the Nagorno-Karabakh territory. The occupation was consecutive, first in January 15, 1992, Karkidjahan village, and then Gushchular and Malybeyli while the local people were killed and injured. The situation around the Khojaly and Shusha became more complex. The collected Azerbaijani volunteer troops were unsuccessful at the Dashalty operation. In the mid-April, Garadaghly village was captured by the Soviet and the Armenian troops. Khojaly massacre was most the tragic incident that happened in February 26, 1992. Looking at the political situation in Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani political elites were fighting for their chairs and supporting the Kremlin policy. On that time, Ayaz Mutallibov's (the first president of the Republic of Azerbaijan during 1992-1992; 1991-1992) government relinquished which additionally made the Republic of Azerbaijan powerless. This incident coincided with the development of Azerbaijan national liberation movement

¹⁵³ Aliyev and Budagov, pp. 87-89,92.

¹⁵⁴ QAT (Qarabağ Azadlıq Təşkilatı), "Qarabağ Dünən, Bu gün və Sabah", **7-ci elmi-əməli konfransının materialları toplusu**, Bakı, Qanun, 2008, [GFT (Garabag Freedom Organization), "Garabag Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow", **The collection of the 7th scientific-practical conference's materials**, Bakı, Qanun, 2008].

and that gave another incentive for them to become powerful.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ Instability in the Azerbaijani government was great opportunity for the Armenian troops to continue their attacks. As a result, on May 8, 1992 Shusha was occupied; the Armenian troops almost managed to occupy the whole Nagorno-Karabakh. The Lachin region was also on the target, which held strategic position, between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Political instability in the Azerbaijani government became inevitable opportunity for the Armenian troops to realize their attack which resulted with occupation. Chair-fight was still ongoing in Baku under the Popular Front regime during May 1992 to June 1993 that made Azerbaijani's defensive capacity very sluggish. The chaotic political situation made occupation very consistent, which announced another bad new with the occupation of Khelbedjer in 1993. The political crises continued until June that lately brought high demand of population to recall Haydar Aliyev to take control of this situation. However, the continuation of territorial occupation did not stop. Between July and October Aghdam, Fuzuli, Jabrayil and Zangilan were occupied.⁽¹⁵⁶⁾

On June 12, 1993, the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibey was removed suddenly from his position. Armenian troops used this opportunity continuing offensive action towards east of Karabakh. Furthermore, Mardakert was captured on June 27. Aghdam was taken only after long surrounding, which was followed with an attack to Fuzuli region. The Aghdam attack was condemned by the US, stating that this attack cannot be justified even in the regard of legitimate self-defence. Armenian forces took the Fuzuli region on August 23, and then they moved towards the Jabrayil region where it is close to the south Iranian border. The region was surrounded until Azerbaijani habitants left houses faced with attacks. The next destination was Gubadly, which was easily captured because the region was abandoned. The same situation was observed in Zangelan and Goradiz. The Security Council also condemned Armenian's attack to Fuzuli region on August 18, stating to stop the hostilities, the occupying forces must be withdrawn from the Fuzuli, Aghdam and Kalbajar regions. That action was aimed to apply 'unique

¹⁵⁵ Bülent Aras, ve diğerleri, "Qarabağ: Bildiklərimiz və Bilmədiklərimiz", **Qafqaz Universiteti Beynəlxalq Münaqişələri Araşdırma Mərkəzi Nəşrləri, No: 002**, Bakı, 2010, [Karabakh: What we know, What we do not know", **Caucasus University International Strategic Research Center Publishing, No: 002**, Bakı, 2010].

¹⁵⁶ Bulent Aras, and Et.al, p. 307.

influence' over Armenia to assure that those regions will not be attacked. Armenia was accused by Iran for its aggressive military action in the borderline of Iran, and proclaimed strong demand of abandonment of the forces from all the Azerbaijani territories, by declaring that nothing will happen alike. When Russian Foreign Ministry understood that Armenian troops would not face with any Azerbaijanis in the region, they asked for cease of military action. Around 100.000 Azerbaijani refugees were ready to settle in the arranged camp by Iran in Azerbaijan, in addition Iran strengthened the border security together with Revolutionary Guards. On October 24, Armenian forces attacked Zangelan and Goradiz. These attacks were a big threat for Azerbaijan. In the Iranian frontier, the alert came out with the news that Armenian troops reached the Aras River and took 40km land of Azerbaijan. It was a serious signal for Azerbaijan and Iran because of Armenian ultimatum for deporting around 30.000 Azerbaijanis to flee to Iran. However, most of them came back to settle in the Azerbaijani camps. At the end Zangelan was occupied by Armenia on October 29.⁽¹⁵⁷⁾

When Azerbaijan welcomed its new president Haydar Aliyev in November, he started a military criticism while calling support from foreign countries for the Afghan veterans. With that, help Azerbaijani forces used maximum capacity to withdraw Armenian forces from the Fuzuli region. Unfortunately, their action proved futile, and they reached to the mountains close to Aghdam in December. Some other territories were regained in the Mardakert region. Azerbaijan forces did not stop fighting back and during the heavy fight in the early 1994, the Goradiz region was regained by Azerbaijani forces, including the northern part of Kalbajar, and area along the border of Iran. However, the pay back was huge. Next battle emerged near Kalbajar, Aghdam, Martuni, and Mardakert. During the battle mercenaries were used actively which raised up another issue for both sides claiming who started first. H.Aliyev managed to identify that Armenian troops were fighting against Azerbaijan together with Russian, Syrian, Lebanese, Baltics, and French mercenaries. However, on the other side Armenia claimed that the mercenaries of CIS nations such as Afghan and Turks had supported Azerbaijan. With accusation, both sides got into heavy fight again near Aghdam, Mardakert, and Fuzuli. On March 19, explosion in

¹⁵⁷Rəşad Cəfərli, "Qarabağ Savaşı Belə Başladı", [Rashad Jafarli, Thus Karabakh War Started], *Azerbaijan News*, 22.02.2015, <http://1905.az/qarabag-savasi-bel%C9%99-basladi/>, (14.01.2018)

the Baku subway made officials to blame Armenia. One month later on April, Armenians reported that over Stepanakert and along the border, Azerbaijan had air attacks. Nevertheless, the cease-fire initiative has been finalized on May 1994, but that action did not stop border clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia.⁽¹⁵⁸⁾

Armenia finalized the ethnic cleansing policy (1988-1992) when 250, 000 Azerbaijanis forcefully expelled from their historical hometowns and settled in the current Azerbaijan. In 1990, around 50.000 Akhiska Turks came from the Central Asia, and Azerbaijan became shelter for them. Since 1988, 126 Azerbaijani settlements of Nagorno-Karabakh were forcefully deported by Armenia. During the Khojaly incident, within one night 6000 Azerbaijani civilians were killed by Armenian forces with the support of 366th regiment of the former Soviet army. As a result, 106 women, 70 elderly people, 63 children, and 613 civilians were killed; in addition, 1000 people became disabled, and around 1275 people were captivated, 56 people burned alive in different methods, 8 families were destroyed. The Nagorno-Karabakh war left 20% of territorial loses for Azerbaijan: Nagorno-Karabakh plus seven surrounding provinces: May 18 1992- Lachin; April 2 1992-Kelbajar; 23 July 1993-Aghdam; 23 August 1993-Jabrayil; 23 August 1993- Fizuli; 31 August 1993- Gubadly; 29 October 1993-Zangilan, were occupied. In addition, 700 thousand people from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions were deported becoming IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) settled in 62 districts and cities temporarily, thus, 1600 settlements were managed in high compactness.⁽¹⁵⁹⁾

On May 12, 1994, between Azerbaijan and Armenia cease-fire was signed. Despite of passing 14 years over cease-fire, Armenia is still keeping 20% of Azerbaijan territory under its occupation. About one billion civilians have been exiled and scattered throughout Azerbaijan and continue to live in temporary refugee camps. Azerbaijan government implemented some socio-economic development programs, but nearly one billion displaced people are still living deprived of many rights. The Nagorno-Karabakh war and the post-war occupation had made many

¹⁵⁸ QAT/GFT, pp. 38, 44.

¹⁵⁹ QAT/GFT, pp.79-81.

negative effects on the region with political, legal, humanitarian and economic dimensions.⁽¹⁶⁰⁾

The Nagorno-Karabakh region was a small isolated Caucasus mountainous 'oblast' within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic until 1991. It had an autonomous status given by Stalin in 1921. Nevertheless, Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians requested in 1988 to be part of the Armenian Soviet Socialist, but the response was denial by the Soviet authorities. This political confrontation fueled the military friction between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Soviet Union preserved the situation under control until 1991. When the Union collapsed and both countries gained their independence by the end of 1992, the violence in the region occurred again. Armenia used an opportunity to occupy Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding provinces, when Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrated an initiative for declaring its independence in 1992.⁽¹⁶¹⁾

The regional disaster became not only an internal threat but also challenged external actors; thus, both Azerbaijan and Armenia were called for an immediate peace agreement. As a result, the city of Bishkek the capital of Kyrgyzstan hosted all the parties to rely on Bishkek Protocol and to sign cease-fire agreement. From Azerbaijan-first deputy parliament speaker Afiyaddin Jalilov; from Armenia, parliament speaker Babken Ararkstian; from the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Karen Baburian-chairman of parliament; from Russia the representative to the OSCE Minsk Group Vladimir Kazimirov attended. After the bloody war over the Nagorno-Karabakh, led Azerbaijan and Armenia sit for an agreement to settle cease-fire in order to resolve the conflict peacefully. As a provisional ceasefire agreement, the Bishkek Protocol was signed by the first deputy parliament speaker Afiyaddin Jalilov (Azerbaijan), the parliament speaker Babken Ararktsian (Armenia), the OSCE Minsk Group Vladimir Kazimirov (Russia), and the chairman of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic parliament Karen Baburian (the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic).⁽¹⁶²⁾

¹⁶⁰ Kosolapov.N, "Конфликты постсоветского пространства и современная конфликтология". **Мировая экономика и международные отношения**, [Conflicts in Post-Soviet Space and modern conflictology], **World Economy and International Relations**. No:10, 1995, p.8.

¹⁶¹ Consolidation Resources, p. 42.

¹⁶² "Bishkek Protocol", <https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Bishkek+Protocol>, (27.03.2018)

Table 3: Cronology occupied territories of Azerbaijan by Armenian military forces between 1991 and 1993.⁽¹⁶³⁾

DATE AND TIME	OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Regions within the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh	
26 December 1991	Khankandi
02 October 1992	Khojavend
26 February 1992	Khojaly
08 May 1992	Shusha
17 June 1993	Agdere
Seven surrounding regions outside of Nagorno-Karabakh	
18 May 1992	Lachin
2 April 1992	Kalbajar
23 July 1993	Agdam
23 August 1993	Fuzuli
23 August 1993	Jabrayil
31 August 1993	Gubadli
29 October 1993	Zangilan

2.2. GEORGIAN ETHNIC CONFLICTS: ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA

2.2.1. Escalation of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict

After the official declaration of Georgia in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Abkhazia region became very complex. Abkhaz people were worrying that with the Georgia's independence a big threat is on the door by the central government for their culture, language, and national identity. Abkhaz people started to demonstrate high demands for gaining political power and regional

¹⁶³ The Occupied Territory, "State Committee For Affairs Of Refugees And Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan", [Qmkdk.gov.az](http://www.qmkdk.gov.az/en/pages/16.html), <http://www.qmkdk.gov.az/en/pages/16.html>, (29.03.2018)

autonomy. At the same time, nationalism was spreading, and regional tension was fired up, which made the situation worse? 1992, a war broke out. Eventually, cease-fire agreement was signed, but the result of war was very tragic. Around 12.000 people were killed. Around quarter of million ethnic Georgians forcefully left their homes. In 1999 Abkhazia declared its independence, nevertheless, it is still unrecognized region. This political act was very much offensive for the Georgian government, because Georgia stated that its territorial integrity had been violated, and no matter Abkhazia declared its de facto independence, but still that region is part of the Georgian state. Later on, very limited border exchange was managed where the conflict set a division.⁽¹⁶⁴⁾

Without the Soviet Union control regional tension increased, which turned out to become interethnic conflict. People out of the that imperialistic ideology found an opportunity to gain their territorial sovereignty. Georgia and Abkhazia conflict was one of the brutal confrontation, considering that Abkhazia is a resort area with potential agricultural industry has been serving as a border to Russia and Black Sea. Two sides got into conflict in August 1992 which lasted almost 14 months with many loses from both sides. No matter cease-fire agreement obtained, still the issue is not resolved up to this day.⁽¹⁶⁵⁾

Abkhaz communities became more demanding by receiveing huge support from other ethnic minorities in the region to continue having independence or at least autonomy. However, on the other side Georgian people in all over the country including ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia were highly motivated to stand for their territorial integrity and not to let this separation happen in their newly independent Republic. All in all, the war left 10.000 to 15.000 dead bodies⁽¹⁶⁶⁾, and at around 8,000 wounded people.⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ More than 200.000 Abkhazian people were displaced, displaced ethnic Georgians were equal to the half the region's population.⁽¹⁶⁸⁾

¹⁶⁴ Stephen D. Shenfield, "Origin and Evolutions of the Georgian and Abkhaz Conflict", **Abkhazworld.com**, 15.10.2008, <https://abkhazworld.com/aw/conflict/31-origins-and-evolutions-of-the-georgian-abkhaz-conflict>, (28.03.2018)

¹⁶⁵ Greenberg Research.Inc, "Country Report Georgia-Abkhazia", **People on War project by the International Committee of the Red Cross-ICRC**, Geneva, November, 1999.

¹⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch, "Georgia-Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia's Role in the Conflict", **Human Rights Watch Arms Project**, Helsinki, Vol. 7, No.7, March, 1995.

¹⁶⁷ Georgia-Abkhazia, HRW, p.10.

¹⁶⁸ Georgia-Abkhazia, HRW, p. 6.

The causes of the conflict could be defined in three points. First of all, political confrontation between Tbilisi and Sukhumi about getting sovereignty was alive even decades ago, or even in the period of Russia's annexation of the region in 1864. Abkhazia gained its independence within the USSR, right after the Russian Revolution in March 1921. However, in 1931 Abkhazia became under the control of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia. The tension continued for decades, and Abkhazia tried to be separated from Georgia in 1978 but the attempt was unsuccessful. The second is 1991 December civil war in Georgia, which later resulted with Georgian's independence. The first president of the country was Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who held an authoritarian regime, and thus faced with public demonstration. The demonstration was highly supported by the national guard unit and parliamentary forces. Gamsakhurdia was overthrown by a coup in January, 1992. After him Eduard Shevardnadze came to power after three months for taking the political control in Georgia, who was former the Soviet Foreign Minister. The maximum and prior initiative was to take full territorial control of Georgia during 1992. The political disruption in Tbilisi, was an advantage for other regions to declare their independence. Thus, the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia in July, 1992 restored its status of state, which was obtained with 1925 constitution. It followed with the eruption of an armed conflict in Abkhazia. The Georgian government tried to take the political control in Abkhazia at the beginning of the war, which was also an unexpected that loyal forces committed periodic attacks to Gamsakhurdia. The third reason was related to Russia. Despite of the neutral involvement of Russia at the first stage of conflict, later became the guarantor of peace and stability. Meanwhile, it was still unclear whether Russia acted as a regional security stabilizer or for the betterment of its regional primacy. In fact the full military contribution of Russian forces had been seen during the fight.⁽¹⁶⁹⁾

The conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia entitled as an ethnic conflict between two ethnic groups in Abkhazia, which was partially recognized as de-facto independent republic. Thus, Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is placed in the literature as a geopolitical conflict in the South Caucasus region, which was accelerated at the end of 20th century together with cessation of the Soviet Union. The unresolved

¹⁶⁹ Greenberg Research.Inc, ICRC, p.19.

ethnic conflict is considered as one of the bloodiest interethnic conflict in the post-Soviet Space. Nevertheless, Abkhazia had been offered to be an autonomous within Georgia by the Georgian government, however, the suggestions always were refused by the separatist government of Abkhazia together with the opposition powers in order not be unified with Georgia. Georgians still believe and support the historical fact that Abkhazia has always been part of Georgia, but on the other hand Abkhazia stands for their independence. In the pre-war period of Abkhazia, the largest ethnic group was formed by the Georgians which was considered as plurality in 1989 with 45.7%. At the end of war, one might have been accused for the result, and Eduard Shevardnadze's government was main target for that for its meaningless hostilities, and lack of political movement in order to control the war, and his post-war diplomacy.⁽¹⁷⁰⁾

1992-1993 war in Abkhazia could be addressed at the query of the political reason behind the decision of Shevardnadze's surroundings in the State Council of Georgia to deploy armed forces in Abkhazia on August 14, 1992. The first reason might have been just a military operation, but the armed forces started to stay longer. Many believed that, diplomatic means might have been helpful to prevent the conflict. When we look at the two versions of the Georgia's war probably aimed to spread out mostly by the Georgian side. Actually, the main intention to continue the invasion was very limited at the beginning, but it lost control during the fight. Thus, Shevardnadze said his own version in the report to the Georgian Parliament, stating that ensuring and maintaining security along the railroad that connected Georgia to Russia and Armenia that strategically passes via Abkhazia. Nevertheless, this statement was not plausible in all matter: firstly, in comparison to Abkhazian territory, armed train robberies emerged mainly in the western Georgia; secondly, there was a lack of initiative in regard attaining security in the line of collaboration and communication with the authorities in Shukhumi. The second version popped out unofficially that was intended to sacrifice other State Council's member in order

¹⁷⁰ Sergey Markedenov, "The ethno-political conflict in Abkhazia: origins, dynamics and implications for regional security", **Abkhazia: Between the Past and the Future**, (Ed. Islam Tekushev, Sergey Markedenov, and Kiril Shevchenko), Medium-Orient, Prague, 2013.

to liberate Shevardnadze. There was a circulated claim that the restricted and limited operations to rescue of the Georgian officials had been abducted by pro-Gamsakhurdian Zviadists. Yet, this was the intention of Shevardnadze particularly. Insurgents kept Georgian officials in the Gali district somewhere in the southern Abkhazia. Shevardnadze had supposedly called to Ardzinba to inform him in advance about the operation and to make him assure that his intention was limited. However, Ardzinba had not proved his alleged statement, on the contrary, he said that he did not receive any telephone call as such; in addition, it was not clear either that the Georgian officials were in the place inside of Abkhazia. In addition, Tengiz Kitovani who was Minister of Defense of Georgia had put Shevardnadze in an awkward situation, that he rejected to all the articulate instructions given by Shevardnadze, instead, he went through to Sukhumi to defeat the insurgent regime with his patriotic ambitions. Thus, Shevardnadze was lacking to centralize his role in Tbilisi due to the limited time, which made him to be unable to control over his disorderly generals.⁽¹⁷¹⁾

During the Soviet Union, Abkhazia was part of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic as an autonomous republic. The scenario had changed by the collapse of Soviet Union, when South Caucasus countries including Georgia gained its independence, which seemed an opportunity for the ethnic Abkhazians who were living in Abkhazia to proclaim their independence with two options; either to be independent apart from Georgia, or stay as part of the Soviet Union, but no way to be part of the Georgia. However, Georgian nationalist including the President Zviad Gamsakhurdia warmly welcomes these options; instead, he pursued unified policies by considering that, Abkhazia is historical and integral part Georgia. In Abkhazia, the majority of inhabitants were ethnic Georgians around 45, 7%, but ethnic Abkhaz were 17.8% that intensified the situation even worse.⁽¹⁷²⁾ Thus, Abkhazia faced with the deployment of Georgian military troops on August 14, 1992. In a short of period time, with an intensive attack Georgian troops occupied the capital of Abkhazia, Sukhumi including large amount of territory in the region. To confront the Georgian

¹⁷¹ Shenfield, Abkhazworld.com.

¹⁷² Julian Dember and Johanna Speyer, "Georgia (Abkhazia) 1992-1993", **Peace Research Institute Frankfurt Member of the Leibniz Association (PRIF | HSFK)**, October 15, 2015.

attacks, Abkhazians received significant support from Russia and North Caucasus. Ethnic Armenians and Russians in Abkhazia have supported, which brought a victory in Garga battle on September 26, 1992. After that, there had been several cease-fire violations in various occasions. In September 1993, Abkhaz managed to expel all the Georgian forces from Abkhazia right after the unexpected attack from the two fronts. That victory became a big incentive for Abkhaz to manage their de facto independence. Since that time, Georgia-Abkhazia conflict has been known as 'frozen conflict'. More importantly, the status of Abkhazia did not change, but remains as a disputed region. However, the stability still is under danger, and spontaneous and periodic incidents are quite frequent which challenges both sides to get into warfare.⁽¹⁷³⁾

In 1992-1993 War in Abkhazia, one side was the Abkhaz separatists who were demanding independence, on the other side the Georgian government forces were fighting for territorial integrity. Georgian government received internal support in Abkhazia from the ethnic Georgians. However, ethnic Russians and Armenians showed up their support for Abkhazians and even many of them fought. In addition, Abkhaz separatist received military support from the North Caucasus and Russian Federation's Cossack militants who were positioned near Abkhazia. Civil confrontation in Georgia between supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Eduard Shevardnadze who headed the post-coup government, made the ethnic conflict more complex. Beside this, Georgian-Ossetian conflict aggravated the situation even worse.⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ Having somehow equal military capability didn't let neither side to go beyond the limit, the Georgian-Abkhaz disagreement had enormously been entrusted to the legislatures by July 1990. Abkhazia turned out to become an arena of war of laws until the armed animosity began in August 1992. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union was on the edge of collapse but still it offered a few preventive options to end up that interethnic conflict. The Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia held an election in 1991, which was a big frustration, because national quotas were less than it was

¹⁷³ Alexandros Peterson, "The 1992-1993 Georgia-Abkhazia War: A Forgotten Conflict", **Caucasian Review of International Affairs-CRIA**, Vol.2, No. 4, 2008.

¹⁷⁴ Dember and Speyer, HSFK.

expected in comparison to the ethnic distribution of the region's population.⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ In Abkhazia the active warfare continued until the end of September 1993. Angry battles were for Tkvarcheli, Gagra, and Sukhumi and the neighborhood of Ochamchira. The both sides had violated international humanitarian norms in several times periodically and repeatedly. Specifically, the parties deposed population from the strategically important regions. The battle in Abkhazia spread out against the history of the civil war in Georgia, which began between Zviad Gamsakhurdia that his supporters realized the depose in January 1992, and Eduard Shevardnadze whose forces aimed to subordinate to the State of Georgia.⁽¹⁷⁶⁾

After the war, Georgia and Abkhazia got into a tense relation. Abkhazia has increasingly been isolated that sea blockade was culmination of the Georgian enforcement. In November 2009, when the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili officially opened the Georgian embassy in Kiev, Ukraine, and he delivered a statement announcing that the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were also welcomed to use all the facilities were provided, because there was also their homes. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, ethnic minorities in Georgia demonstrated their disagreement in several times, as well as their separatism, facing with the unexpected result of central government's loss of the control over the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. More importantly, Russia's enormous role during the conflict and satisfactory control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia in many years, put both sides to get into conflict, argued by some observers. Before the Russo-Georgia war in August 2008, Russia had granted the most of the residents from South Ossetia and Abkhazia with the Russian citizenship. However, most of the residents still stood for being part of Russia or independent region.⁽¹⁷⁷⁾ Georgian-Abkhazian crisis did not end up with the peaceful resolution at the end of the 1992-1993 war. Georgia struggled to sustain its territorial integrity that was national project of Georgia, and Abkhazian political elite stood for their independence. Both sides committed action

¹⁷⁵ George Tarkhan-Mouravi, "The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict in a Regional Context", Political Analysis and Commentaries, **Policy Documentation Center–PDC and Institute for Policy Studies**, Georgia, 1996.

¹⁷⁶ "War in Abkhazia, Main Facts 1992-1993", **Caucasian Knot**, 17.08.2017, <http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/40479/>, (18.04.2018)

¹⁷⁷ Andre W.M. Gerrits and Max Bader, "Russian patronage over Abkhazia and south Ossetia: Implications for Conflict Resolution", **East European Politics**, Vol. 32, No:3, July 20, 2016, pp. 297-313.

accordingly in framework of mutual mistrust, that parties pictured each other as an enemy, which triggered an unsuccessful and complicated negotiations in later stages. Regarding to Russia only got involved into conflict because of its territorial interest and post-imperial political vision. After the Soviet Union, Russia did not want to let those countries to perform independent political statement. Thus, Russia did not go there to end up conflict but promote the tension by being on the side of Abkhazia. Even though international political players including UN demonstrated their peacebuilding initiatives all the attempts were insufficient and proved futile at the end.⁽¹⁷⁸⁾ Gali district in Abkhazia was the core area of the conflict at the first time of war in 1998, right after the Abkhazian anarchist government faced with the confrontation of ethnic Georgian's rebellion. Occasionally, both sides got into the six-day war in Abkhazia only related to the offensive Abkhazians in May 20-26, 1998 while aggressive invasion had already emerged before that date. Georgians inflamed the conflict by killing 20 police officers, on May 18, 1998. In spite of the oppositions were called by the Georgian government to deploy troops to help Gali to support Georgian insurgents, it was refused by Eduard Shevardnadze. All of a sudden, the Georgian insurgents were crowded finally by May 26.⁽¹⁷⁹⁾

In Eurasia and more precisely in South Caucasus, Abkhazia is placed as a de facto republic. Conflict lasted 14 months between two sides, and after all Abkhazia celebrates its independence day since September 30, 1993. At the same day, militias and Georgian troops defeated the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic by the collective forces of volunteers from the Confederation of Mountain People of the Caucasus and Abkhazian troops. This historical moment was evaluated in Tbilisi as loss of jurisdiction over part of its territory, which belong to Georgia formally according to the de jure recognition. On the contrary, the capital of Abkhazia, Sukhumi put maximum effort complaining and securing its international recognition. The Abkhazian leaders pursued the precise objective in entire intervening period, which was very contradictive synergy with the external influences and mother state. The first recognition of the independence was attained in Abkhazia in August 2008.

¹⁷⁸ Natella Akaba and Iraklii Khintba, "Transformation of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict: Rethinking the Paradigm", **Conciliation Resource**, London, February 14, 2011.

¹⁷⁹ "An Overview of the Recent Conflicts and Abkhazia Today: The Abkhazian-Georgian Conflict 1998", **Discover Abkhazia**, 20.07.2015, <https://www.discoverabkhazia.org/single-post/2015/07/20/An-Overview-of-the-Recent-Conflicts-Abkhazia-Today> (22.04.2018)

Nevertheless, Russia's role was evaluated very importantly concerning transformation of the conflict; however, the recognition was not an essential issue for Kremlin. Abkhazian political elites had a concrete desire to separate the former Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic from the independent state of Georgia.⁽¹⁸⁰⁾

2.2.2. Origins of the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict

In 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet space stepped into a complex history, including the South Caucasian state Georgia. Alike other South Caucasian states, Georgia were also busy for its statebuilding process until August 2008. The ethnic relations in Georgia became very contradictory; the tension between Georgian-Ossetian ethnic groups periodically became relentless and calmed down. In very rare moments, both sides attempted for friendly cooperation. In 1990 after the first active confrontation between Georgia and Ossetia, the international experts determined and termed the conflict as 'frozen'. However, the term 'frozen' did not become a barrier for Georgia and Ossetia not to get into a new rivalry for restarting confrontation. Nevertheless, the tragic battle in 1991-1992 and including the 2004 short-term conflict, signaled the possibility of a new political disaster is on the edge between Georgia-Ossetia and Georgia-Russia, which proved right with the August 2008 war. This war intensified the animosity of the mutual political relations and gave no guarantee that the crisis is over.⁽¹⁸¹⁾

In 1920, there was the first battle between Georgian government and ethnic Ossetians. The ethnic Ossetian insurgents committed a number of initiatives for their independence. Not long ago, the Soviet Union took the control over Georgia and Ossetia, as an 'autonomous oblast' had gone under the control of Georgia Soviet Socialist Republic. Later on, South Ossetians demanded to obtain the status of 'autonomous republic' when they saw political disadvantage of being 'oblast' under

¹⁸⁰ Islam Tekushev, Sergey Markedonov and Kiril Shevchenko (Ed), "Abkhazia: Between the Past and the Future", **Medium-Orient**, Prague, 2013.

¹⁸¹ George Tarkhan-Mouravi, "Conflict in South Ossetia: Current Problems and Respectives of IDP Return", *Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict: Researching Peace/Collection of Georgian Papers*, GFSIS-George Mason University, 2011, p.6.

the Georgian government. In 1989, Georgian Supreme Soviet received an official request sent by the South Ossetian leaders, to change the status of autonomy from 'oblast' to 'republic'. However, this request of South Ossetia was denied in Tbilisi, in addition, the Georgian government increased anger towards them. The Georgian government adopted a law before the parliamentary election in 1990, aimed to ban the political parties in the regions. As a response, Ossetians committed a protest accordingly and held their own elections by boycotting Georgian government. Although, these actions distracted Georgian government, but newly elected the Georgian government in December 1990, abolished the results of the election held in Ossetia. In addition the Georgian government confined the status of the South Ossetia as an autonomous oblast. Georgian government's anger did not pass away by this, but decisively deployed Georgian troops to the Tskhinvali, a capital of South Ossetia in January 1991. A war continued until June 1992, which ended as the Georgian authorities and Russia signed a ceasefire agreement.⁽¹⁸²⁾ More precisely, the confrontation between Georgians and Ossetians coincides to 1918. Because of the Russian Revolution, Bolsheviks took the control of Russia, however, Georgia stayed under the Menshevik control. Georgian Army and People's Guard faced with the military confrontation by the Ossetian forces sponsored by Russia in June 1920. Georgia did not delay the active response and rebel groups had been defeated. Georgian forces burnt several Ossetian villages, and as a result, 20,000 ethnic Ossetians were expelled in the Soviet Union. In 1922, eight months later, the Red Army realized a successful invasion of Georgia. The invasion ended up by creation of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. The pre-Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact-1939 is recognized by the United States. Accordingly, the regained independence of the Baltic Soviet Socialist Republics received political support by the Georgia. H.W Bush administration. However, South Caucasus countries Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia and their internal conflicts together with restored independences did not affect the invariability of the international border of the USSR since 1920s.⁽¹⁸³⁾

The ethnic conflict between Georgian and Ossetian was part of the South

¹⁸² International Crisis Group-ICG, "**Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia**", Europe, Report No.159, Tbilisi/Brussels, November 26, 2004.

¹⁸³ Dennis Sammut and Nikola Cvetkovski, "Confidence-Building Matters The Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict", **Verification Technology Information Centre-VERTIC**, London, March, 1996.

Ossetia War happened in 1991-1992. From one side ethnic Georgian forces and Georgian government forces, on the other side ethnic Ossetian forces together with South Ossetian forces, including the Russian troops demonstrated huge support for the Ossetian militia to declare their independence. In June 24, ceasefire has signed left South Ossetia to be separated between conflicted authorities, with a joint peacekeeping force. Right after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia restored its independence under the power of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. His government highly prioritized the Soviet policies, and was ready to conduct an action in the expense of ethnic groups within Georgia. Contradictive response was immediate from the Supreme Soviet of South Ossetia to demonstrate Ossetians national aspiration concerning the change of status for Ossetia from autonomous oblast to republic, which was resisted as an illegal action by the Supreme Soviet of Georgia.⁽¹⁸⁴⁾

Georgia became one of the South Caucasus countries to call for independence. The nationalist movement and euphoria and political anxiety was one of the main characteristics at the end of 1980s, which led Georgia to attain its independence in April 1991. Zviad Gamsakhurdia became the first president of Georgia. His policy was directed to build up Greater Georgian nationalism at the expense of minorities, having strong contradictive policy against the Soviet-Russian communist rule. Thus, South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast elites decided to declare their independence in September 20, 1990 as the South Ossetian Democratic Soviet Republic, which accordingly sent an appeal to Moscow to get full recognition for its independence. Accordingly, South Ossetians rejected the conducted election took place in the Georgian Supreme Council in October 1990. Consequently, nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia won a victory on the election by heading the coalition set out a Round Table Free Georgia.⁽¹⁸⁵⁾ At the first part of the 1992, there was an aggressive environment for an ambitious armed forces that were working outside of the identified leadership control. Nonetheless, ceasefire was active and created temporary stability; but later on, it was violated several times in different occasions such as captivations, killing civilians etc. In May 20, 1992 one of the serious and

¹⁸⁴ International Crisis Group, “Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly”, Europe Report № 183, June 7, 2007.

¹⁸⁵ Sammut and Cvetkovski, VERTIC, p.10.

tragic incident was committed, where 36 Ossetians were killed in the vehicles near the northwest road of Tskhinvali. This incident triggered Russia to pursue a direct involvement into the conflict, which was a main incentive for Ossetians. The Georgian government was accused for this incident in regard of committing genocide over the civilians intentionally. Retaliation was operated very immediately by Russia, in which Russian helicopters bombarded villages under the control of Georgia. Ceasefire once again was discussed in Sochi in between the Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze to rise up the South Ossetia happened on June 24, 1992. One month later on July 14, 1992, the decision was made to involve the CIS (Commonwealth Independent States) peacekeeping operation into the region, that was combination of the Joint CIS Georgian-South Ossetian military patrols and Joint Control Commission.⁽¹⁸⁶⁾

2.2.3. Russo-Georgian War: August 2008

In late 2003, 'Rose Revolution' brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power, and he was elected as the President of Georgia in 2004. He brought democratic and economic reforms to the state institutions and defeated separatist from the government authority. South Ossetia was on the threshold of new era a with M.Saakashvili that started to strengthen the border controls to ban the ongoing organized crime and border corruption that involved Russia, and Georgian officials. With his command, South Ossetia was fulfilled with several hundred military and police including intelligence forces. Georgia proclaimed its intention to support its peacekeeping detachment rising up to the 500 troops, by relying on the cease-fire agreement. Purportedly, several hundred paramilitaries from Russia, Transnistria, and Abkhazia similarly were prepared to and got ready to enter. The incomplete confrontation made both sides backed off the military forces by late 2004. A new peace plan was proclaimed by President Saakashvili in July, 2005 to give a consequential autonomy to South Ossetia, with the three stages of conditionality; economic improvement, demilitarization, and political establishment. However, the

¹⁸⁶ Sammut and Cvetkovski, VERTIC, p. 14.

Eduard Kokoiti -‘president’ of South Ossetia, refused Saakashvili’s plan, instead declared once again in October 2005, that South Ossetians are citizens of Russia. In early December 2005, OSCE Ministerial Council received the Saakashvili’s peace plan. Thus, Eduard Kokoiti, together with huge international support, suggested a peace plan proposal for South Ossetia, which considered as benchmarks, whereas most importantly South Ossetia’s independence would be emphasized.⁽¹⁸⁷⁾

South Ossetia held a referendum that restated its independence from Georgia in November 2006. Accordingly, at the first stage, the result of the referendum was 95%, but then 55,000 registered voters yielded and at the end, referendum was approved with 99% result. However, Eduard Kokoiti was reelected with a separate vote with 96% approval. Surprisingly, these votes were refused and did not hold recognition of the U.S. State Department and OSCE. South Ossetia’s ethnic Georgians who were displaced from the region and other South Ossetians made up an alternative voting, which resulted with the election of the pro-Georgian Dmitriy Sanakoyev as the governor of South Ossetia. More importantly, Georgia’s territorial integrity gained considerable support with an approved referendum. Another peace plan was proposed in March 2007, by President Mikhail Saakashvili, which added another point to create transnational administrative districts a full length of the region. These administrative districts would be under the Sanakoyev’s authority and he was supposed to be represented by an envoy at Joint Control Commission or any alternative peace communications. Thus, President Saakashvili announced in July 2007, the creation of the commission deal with the status of South Ossetia as an integral part of independent Georgia. In October 2007, capital of Georgia, Tbilisi hosted an expected meeting was arranged by the Joint Control Commission, together with the envoys of Georgia as attendees. However, a surprising claim heard by the Russian Foreign Ministry stating that the result of meeting will be deliberately disrupted by the Georgian envoys in regards to their inadmissible demands. After that, no other meetings were arranged.⁽¹⁸⁸⁾

A few weeks later in latter half of July 2008, Georgia became a military practicing arena for Russia’s military exercise. Russia conducted its military

¹⁸⁷ Jim Nichol, “Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008: Context and Implication for US interests”, **CRS Report for Congress - Congressional Research Service**, March 3, 2009, p.4.

¹⁸⁸ Nichol, CRS, pp.7,9.

exercises near its border with Georgia by involving more than 8,000 troops in 2008. Thus, in the separated regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia the attacks were operated by unknown forces but a hypothetical scenario was pointing out they were Georgians. Russian forces from different angles did not delay counterattacks; to support the Russia's peacekeepers in the region, and to protect the Russian citizens, and to provide humanitarian aid. However, this scenario was condemned by the Georgian Foreign Ministry stating that the counterattack was a big threat of invasion. Russian military exercise was not the only one in the region, but 600 Georgian and 1000 US troops, including additional collected forces from the Azerbaijan Armenia and Ukraine were there. It was coordinated as an Immediate Responses in 2008, and increased military coalition was to be cooperated with the NATO's Iraq operation. By the end of the conflict in Georgia, most of these forces left the country.⁽¹⁸⁹⁾

However, tensions have escalated in July 3, 2008. Both sides got into heavy artillery battles that brought enormous destruction to both sides' villages. Right after international alter was announced from the European Union, Council of Europe and OSCE preceded an urgent warning to put guns down and continue peace negotiations. On July 8, Russia got involved with its airplanes flying over the South Ossetian territory. Accordingly, Russian Foreign Ministry stated that the attack bolstered alarming Georgia from conducting an inevitable incursion on South Ossetia. On the contrary, the Georgian government claimed that the attack was violating sovereign state's territorial integrity. Thus, the Georgian government committed an immediate diplomatic action by recalling the Georgian ambassador from Russia for a discussion, happened on July 11. Russia's overflights action was discussed in the UN Security Council's closed meeting on July 21, 2008. The Georgian diplomats welcomed the discussion as a successful attempt on behalf of Security Council, because it had an influence over the Russian emissary Vitaliy Churkin that was accused by some of the Security Council members on demonstrating pro-Georgian partiality.⁽¹⁹⁰⁾⁽¹⁹¹⁾

On July 30, a new battle emerged when both sides used heavy artillery fires

¹⁸⁹ Nichol, CRS, pp. 23, 27, 29.

¹⁹⁰ Nichol, CRS, pp. 11, 15, 32.

¹⁹¹ Charles King, "The Five Day War-Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 87, No.6, November/December, 2008, pp. 6, 7.

repeatedly. In turn, both sides blasting each other's strategically considerable areas, such as South Ossetians targeted road outside of capital that was on hill, on the contrary Georgians bombed two Ossetian villages. After the blast of the hill-road, two days later, the new blast committed at the same place where five Georgian police were injured. These repeated and exchangeable fights accelerated and triggered the confrontation between two sides to get into serious fight between 2nd and 4th of August, which was finalized with a dozen of death and wounded bodies. Georgian cities became a target for Kokoity that was threatened by the attacks.⁽¹⁹²⁾

Georgia was accused on August 7, 2008 evening by the South Ossetia, on Georgia's starting to line up an artillery barrage towards Tskhinvali, Georgia refused this claim and stated that on the conflict zone some Georgian villages were being bombed. An emergent action was taken by Saakashvili on the same evening, that a unilateral ceasefire was taken seriously. He announced, also that he called for South Ossetia to rely on that. Furthermore, on behalf of Georgia, he announced the urgent need for resuming the peace talks and repeated that Georgia is ready to grant a maximum autonomy of the region as part of a peace settlement within Georgia. However, South Ossetia was accused by Georgia that Georgian villages intensively and continuingly bombed. Georgia's claim was elaborating that the action was purposefully and forcefully served for a mission of Georgia violates its unilateral ceasefire and continues on sending ground forces as a response. Not long ago, much of South Ossetia including capital Tskhinvali got back into the control of the Georgian troops.⁽¹⁹³⁾ Alexander Lomaia as representing the Georgian National Security Council, reported three days after on August 10, that a political request sent by the Georgian government to Secretary Rice to manage mediation in cooperation with Russia in the case of South Ossetia crisis. In addition, Georgia had passed on a diplomatic remark stating that the Georgian military forces were withdrawn from almost all parts of the South Ossetia by declaring unilateral ceasefire. Nevertheless, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov received a call from the Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili to be reportedly informed that all Georgian forces had

¹⁹² C.W. Blandy, "Provocation, Deception, Entrapment: The Russo-Georgian Five Day War", Defense Academy of United Kingdom, **Advanced Research and Assessment Group**, Caucasus series 09/01, March, 2009, pp.6-8.

¹⁹³ Davir J. Kremer, "Renewed Confrontation in Georgia, Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 28", **Council on Foreign Relations**, March 17, 2016.

been withdrawn from South Ossetia, and ceasefire request had been highlighted again. However, Sergei Lavrov stated that in Tskhinvali city still was surrounded with the Georgian forces. One day later on August 11, Russia occupied several Georgian cities in the undisputed territory, by bombing the apartment buildings in the Gori city, Russia captured Zugdidi, Senaki, and Poti.⁽¹⁹⁴⁾

On August 23, international alarm had been heard from the governments of US and German, with a concrete statement of an immediate withdrawal of the Russian troops from Georgia. Outside South Ossetia, OSCE observes will be there replace the Russian forces. On August 25-26, Russian President Medvedev received an appeal sent by the Russian upper house of Parliament, to ratify full recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Accordingly, in the following day, South Ossetia and Abkhazia gained recognition as independent states by President Medvedev.⁽¹⁹⁵⁾

¹⁹⁴ Svante E. Cornell and Et.al, "Russia's War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World", **Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI) and Silk Road Studies Program-A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center**, August, 2008, pp.16-17.

¹⁹⁵ Cornell, and Et.al, CACI, pp.21-22.

CHAPTER III:
NAGORNO-KARABAKH ON THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW ERA:
1994-PRESENT

3.1. REASONS FOR A PEACE AGREEMENT

3.1. Bishkek Protocol: Basic Principles

The political confrontation over Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenian started in 1988 when the Armenian ethnic minorities' asked for a referendum to be part of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Karabakh Armenians' organized referendum in December, 1991, which triggered the confrontation intensively.⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ The Azerbaijani civilians were forcefully displaced from the Nagorno-Karabakh region plus seven surrounding districts. Khojaly lived a tragic massacre against defenseless civilians. Azerbaijan parliamentary investigation reportedly said after the Khojaly massacre that 485 civilians were killed. The Azerbaijani government demanded the Khojaly massacre to be recognized as internationally.⁽¹⁹⁷⁾ Stepanakert had extensively been bombed which left serious trauma amongst Armenians, and Armenia also faced a serious number of losses.⁽¹⁹⁸⁾ After all, both sides revealed the official number of deaths during 1991-1994. The Azerbaijani government officially delivered a death toll announcement stating that during those years, at least 11,557 Azerbaijani soldiers died, however, on the Armenia side the reported 6,500 of Armenian soldiers' death toll.⁽¹⁹⁹⁾

Many people died during the fights together and thousands of people were forced to leave their homelands. After the war, Azerbaijan hosted its Internally Displaced People (IDPs), a million of ethnic Azerbaijanis from the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven surrounding districts. Nagorno-Karabakh was a heart of the ethnic tension, which its historical version belonging to whom was a competing

¹⁹⁶ Svante E. Cornell, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", **Department of East European Studies, (EES)**, Report no. 46, Uppsala University, 1999, p. 12.

¹⁹⁷ "Information About Khojaly Genocide", **The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Republic of Azerbaijan-OMBUDSMAN**, <http://www.ombudsman.gov.az/en/view/pages/163/>, (14.03.2018)

¹⁹⁸ International Crisis Group-ICG, "**Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing The Conflict From The Ground**", Europe Report No. 166, Tbilisi/Brussels, September 14, 2005, pp. 2-3.

¹⁹⁹ Sabine Freizer, "Twenty years after the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire: an opportunity to move towards more inclusive conflict resolution", **Caucasus Survey**, Vol.1, No.2, April, 2014.

issue between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The regions historical connection to the regional national identity made the process even worse and complicated to attain a resolution.⁽²⁰⁰⁾

Since the 1994 ceasefire agreement, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is under the ‘peace talk’ process. Ceasefire agreement intensively involved both parties to sit for peaceful negotiation and accordingly the ‘Line of Contact’ was established which has a security function on maintaining territorial borderline control between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Besides these, the Armenian forces are controlling the Nagorno-Karabakh region including seven surrounding districts. Although, Armenia established a de-facto republic in Nagorno-Karabakh with its only recognition, no other single country in the world recognize it.⁽²⁰¹⁾

The Bishkek Protocol is a conditional ceasefire agreement, signed on May 5, 1994. The representatives of the ceasefire agreement were: Afiyaddin Jalilov, the First Deputy Parliament Speaker of the Republic of Azerbaijan; Babken Asarkstian, Parliament Speaker of the Republic of Armenia; Karen Baburian, the Chairman of Parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh de-facto Republic, from the unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh; Vladimir Kazimirov, representative of Russia to the OSCE Minsk Group. The Bishkek Protocol discontinued the Nagorno-Karabakh war and put the situation as a frozen conflict.⁽²⁰²⁾

Since that time, Azerbaijan and Armenia went through periodic peace negotiations under the supervision of the OSCE Minsk Group that consists of the representatives of the cochairmen from Russia, the United States, and France. Although, both parties went through a long process of negotiation together with the OSCE Minsk Group nothing had been achieved fundamentally. Current situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is determined in various forms from time to time such as, ‘frozen conflict’, ‘no war, no peace’, but constant border clashes may create another status

²⁰⁰ Emma Klever, “The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan: An overview of the current situation”, **European Movement International**, Brussels, September 24, 2013, p. 4.

²⁰¹ Klever, p.5.

²⁰²“Bishkek Protocol”, Peace Agreement Database-University of Edinburgh, **Peaceagreements.org**, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/310/Bishkek%20Protocol>, (2019.17.01)

for the situation. The peace process did not fulfill the expectations per se. The peace process is identified as a deadlock until June 2013.⁽²⁰³⁾

This year marked as 25-year anniversary of the Bishkek protocol. This protocol demanded to removal of military troops. In addition, internally displaced peoples and refugees must be returned to their homelands. The Institute of Peace Initiatives' director Denis Denisov, and Conflict Studies in Moscow, says the legacy of the Bishkek protocol is that it marked and official end to the armed standoff between the two South Caucasus neighbors.⁽²⁰⁴⁾

Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hikmat Hajiyeu says the first step to be taken under the ceasefire regime was creating a fertile ground for the establishment of regional peace by terminating the conflict. The Bishkek Protocol was intended to be implemented immediately, where the regional peace would be established only after the withdrawal of the military troops from the occupied territories. Kyrgyzstan hosted a ceasefire agreement between parties that was realized under the auspices of Commonwealth of Independent States and Russia. The Commonwealth of Independent States was a regional organization, which was created during the collapse of the Soviet Union but international community did not recognize it. The Bishkek protocol covered up four UN Security Council's adopted resolutions held in 1993. All four resolutions were an immediate call for Armenia to withdraw military forces from the occupied territories by discontinuing of hostilities. Elkhan Shahinoglu, the director of the Atlas Research Center in Baku, said that the Azerbaijani government expressed its readiness and willingness to agree on giving a complete status of autonomy to the Nagorno-Karabakh region being part of Azerbaijan. This statement was an important issue on the peace settlement process, whereby the region can have its own government and parliament, with military and foreign policy issues controlled by Baku.⁽²⁰⁵⁾

²⁰³ Caucasus Edition, "From Resolution to Transformation: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and the Need for More Civil Society Engagement", **Journal of Conflict Transformation**, 15.07.2013, <https://caucasusedition.net/from-resolution-to-transformation-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-and-the-need-for-more-civil-society-engagement/>, (22.10.2018)

²⁰⁴ Mushvig Mehdiyev, "23 Later, Bishkek Protocol has Remained Unfulfilled", **Caspiannews.com**, 05.05.2017, <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/23-year-later-bishkek-protocol-remains-unfulfilled-1493989931285/>, (28.12.2018)

²⁰⁵ Mehdiyev, Caspiannews.com.

In May 4-5, 1994, representative of the parties gathered in Bishkek to witness a historical moment under the initiative of the Parliament of Kyrgyz Republic, Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth Independent States, and Russian Federation's Federal Congress and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main aim was to contribute a maximum assistance on discontinuing the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts, which not only Azerbaijan and Armenian people will be faced with irreplaceable losses, but certainly, other external actors' regional interests will be benefited from these side effects significantly. In short, the security complexes in the South Caucasus may seriously complicate international situation. In April 15, 1994, the head of states of the Commonwealth Independent States Council's announced the full support expressively, highlighting the immediate action had to be taken on stopping the armed conflicts, and managing a peace agreement as soon as possible. The Commonwealth and Inter-Parliamentary Assembly took responsibility and an active advocacy to in discontinuity of the armed conflict, in regard to consider the adopted goals, decisions and principles of the OSCE and UN, particularly the Security Council's resolutions were articles: 822, 853, 874, 884.⁽²⁰⁶⁾ All the conflicting sides were called to get gathered for a common agreement to stand for the ceasefire at the midnight of 8th to 9th of May. The main aim was to get around the table to sign an agreement, which legally envisages a reliable mechanism, to have full power on ensuring the discontinuity of the armed conflict and aggression as soon as possible. In addition, all the Armenian military forces had to be withdrawn from the Azerbaijan's occupied territories where the displaced refugees had to return, and possibly recovering the bilateral communication. V.Sumeyko, Chairman of Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, and M. Sherimkulov-Assembly's Peacekeeping Group on Nagorno-Karabakh proposed an initiative to agree on creating a peacemaking force of the Common Independent State. Consecutive meeting for peaceful negotiations to resolve the warfare is an appropriate consideration. At the end Kyrgyzstan must be appreciated for an excellent leadership, and working conditions.⁽²⁰⁷⁾

²⁰⁶ "The Bishkek Protocol", **United Nations**

Peacemaker, <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Bishkek%20Protocol.pdf>, (10.01.2019)

²⁰⁷ "The Bishkek Protocol", **ICC Legal Tools Database**, <https://www.legaltools.org/doc/83d2bc/pdf/>, (13.01.2019)

Although the twenty-five years ceasefire managed certain stability in the region, no reasonable and positive steps had been achieved during the negotiations in order to resolve the conflict. The ceasefire agreement was aimed to attain a legally binding, agreement that will achieve a reliable resolution mechanism in order to have enforcement on discontinuity of the armed conflicts, and any other similar types of aggressions, including occupied territories must be free of military forces in order displaced refugees to return their homelands.⁽²⁰⁸⁾

In May 11-12, 1994, ceasefire agreement was signed by the by defense ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Accordingly, the ceasefire agreement terminated the armed conflict; however, the Armenian forces and peacekeepers remained in the occupied territories, and return of the refugees to their homelands never happened. Thus, Kremlin was hopping to have a full domination over the Commonwealth of Independent State forces.⁽²⁰⁹⁾

Since that time, the twenty percent territories of Azerbaijan are still under the Armenian occupation, which caused one million Azerbaijani Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs), from the Nagorno-Karabakh region including seven surrounding provinces.⁽²¹⁰⁾ The result of the Nagorno-Karabakh war caused a violation of the UN Security Council's four resolutions, since 1993 were calling Armenia to pull off its military troops from the occupied territories.⁽²¹¹⁾

Since the ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia created an arena for conflicting parties including representatives of the observers to transform the ceasefire status into more comprehensive peace settlement, but nothing had been achieved positively on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Both sides have particular arguments. For instance, Armenia claims that the Nagorno-Karabakh region was separated from Azerbaijan with the organized referendum and de-facto independence held in December 1991, consequently, Azerbaijanis were forced to be out of the region since the 1992-1994 war. On the other side, the result of referendum was rejected by Azerbaijan, reasoning as an unconstitutional, considering the validity of the Soviet constitution on that time. Furthermore,

²⁰⁸ The Bishkek Protocol, ICC Legal Tools Database.

²⁰⁹ Freizer, p. 3.

²¹⁰ Freizer, p. 4.

²¹¹ "1993 UN Security Council Resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh", **U.S. Department of State Achieve.**

Azerbaijani population in Nagorno-Karabakh did not recognize the referendum, which makes it incomplete legal action. Azerbaijan stands on its unchangeable decision on stating that the Nagorno-Karabakh region was violently occupied as an integral part of Azerbaijan. Therefore, the Nagorno-Karabakh region may be attained a high level of autonomy only as being part of Azerbaijan's territory after peace settlement happened.⁽²¹²⁾

During the twenty-five years, very rare possibility occurred to attain a peace settlement. The most possible opportunity could have been emerged in the Key West (US) talks during the 1997 and 2001.⁽²¹³⁾ Nonetheless, several attempts were taken by the conflicting sides, but they never get on the decision stage to have concrete plan on peace settlement that all the sides agreed on. In 2005, co-Chairs of the Minsk Group decided to shift from ordinary peace talks to an agreement that was significantly and comprehensively detailed discussion package of Basic Principles. It was aimed to terminate the deadlock and get out of the complication of Nagorno-Karabakh's future status. In 2007, OSCE Madrid summit, the Basic Principles discussion package was officially submitted, and thus, 'Madrid Principles, became their common sobriquet.⁽²¹⁴⁾

The main importance of the Basic Principles relied on three fundamental elements; right to self-determination, no military aggression, and territorial integrity. However, few issues were quite comprehensive for the foundation of agreement, as it follows: establishment of the Lachin corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh; a meantime status for Nagorno-Karabakh as an assurance of self-governance and security; and returning Azerbaijan the occupied districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; consequent affirmation of the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh by lawfully conclusive expression of will; refugees and

²¹² Rexane Dehdashti-Rasmussen, "The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh: Causes, the Status of Negotiations, and Prospects", **Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik-IFSH**, OSCE Yearbook 2006, Baden, 2007, pp. 196, 207.

²¹³ Robert M. Cutler, "The Key West Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh: Preparing Peace in the South Caucasus?", **Institute for Policy Studies**, 01.04.2001, https://ipsdc.org/the_key_west_conference_on_nagornokarabakh_preparing_peace_in_the_south_caucasus/, (22.01.2019)

²¹⁴ International Crisis Group-ICG, "Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Plan for Peace", Europe Report No: 167, October 11, 2005.

internally displace peoples (IDPs) right to get back their homelands; all these got included in peacekeeping operations which gets guarantee internationally.⁽²¹⁵⁾

A real derive to let the Basic Principles mutually agreed and operated in autumn 2008. Right after the August, war with Georgia, an opportunity for Russia to look for its historical power and image in the region. The negotiations were under the President Dimitri Medvedev's leadership. Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Ilham Aliyev and Serj Sarkisian got into a meeting during the 18 months under the mediation of the President Medvedev. Since 1994 ceasefire agreement, the positive outcome emerged with this initiative and became an incentive for the next meeting to be held in Moscow's Meiendorf Castle on 2 November 2008. The pursued effort is known as the Moscow Declaration that aimed to extend the conflicting sides' initiatives and consistent intentions for the establishment of regional peaceful.⁽²¹⁶⁾ Later on, in 2009-2013 G8 Summits, co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group delivered a statement inspiring the conflicting sides to attain a few resolution on their final differences.⁽²¹⁷⁾ In 2009 they managed intensive talks. Thus, considerably co-Chairs demonstrated their assurance that conflicting sides may agree on the Basic Principles in Kazan meeting in June 2011, where the possibility is very high on achieving the initial drafting steps of peace process.⁽²¹⁸⁾

However, this attempt also proved futile. The reason was that the Azerbaijani authorities' allegations about the last additional updates were delivered to them on the way to Kazan summit, which included the possibility of Russian peacekeepers' deployment, and they could not accept these conditions. However, there were problems. For instance, despite the agreement was reliable for parties on accepting the Lachin town as a corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh; they disagreed on the total inclusion of the Lachin town and width of the corridor, as well as capability of travelers through this corridor.⁽²¹⁹⁾ The six series principles' implementation was another divergent concept that parties concerned. The Armenian

²¹⁵ Dehdashti-Rasmussen, p. 192.

²¹⁶ Tim Potier, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Ever Closer to a Settlement, Step-by-Step", **Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik-IFSH**, OSCE Yearbook 2009, Baden, 2010, pp. 210-211.

²¹⁷ Gulshan Pashayeva and Stephen Blank, "The U.S. Foreign Policy Towards The Resolution Of The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", **Center for Strategic Studies-SAM Review**, Vol.16, Baku, December, 2016, pp.31, 33.

²¹⁸ Potier, p. 207.

²¹⁹ ICG, Report No: 167, p. 10.

side claimed that Nagorno-Karabakh should be considered as an independent country and in regard to determine the status of the conflict that issue need to be assured. However, this claim was contradicted by the Azerbaijani side stating that before the determination of that status, the return of the refugees and displaced people need to be resolved including other problems. Since that time, all the initiatives proved futile and further expectations, which were linked, to Basic Principles disappeared, but instead distrust and doubt took its place. Thus, during 2012 and 2013, Azerbaijan and Armenia held elections have frozen the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process on behalf of the OSCE Minsk Group.⁽²²⁰⁾

Since 2008, ceasefire was sprained. Both sides welcomed a frequent border clashes, and more importantly, it witnessed usage of heavy weapons. However, the border was, filled with minefields and strategic underground tunnels, which caused both sides from time to time, appeared in closer confrontation during the years. The Line of Contact (LOC), witnessed many fights that happened 110-miles along the line around the occupied territory of Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh. Besides these battles, consistent brawls continued far from the disputed territory of the Azerbaijan and Armenian border.⁽²²¹⁾

Thus, one of the recommended peace settlements of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was specified in the Madrid Principles. In November 2007, Madrid hosted a Europe – OSCE ministerial conference. In the early summer of 2006, the co-chairing countries of the OSCE Minsk Group- the United States, Russia, and France disclosed the revised version of the peace settlement proposal. In 2009, the Madrid Principles were given according to the advice of the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group. Some of the proposed principles were endorsed and agreed by the senior officials of Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, no progress was reportedly observed, which asked for the Armenian troops' withdrawal from the Azerbaijani's occupied territories. The future status of the Nagorno-Karabakh stayed unchangeable.⁽²²²⁾

²²⁰ ICG, Report No: 167, pp.22, 24.

²²¹ Freizer, p.2.

²²² "Armenian, Azerbaijani Presidents Agree on Preamble to 'Madrid Principles'", **Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty-Caucasus Report**, 26.01.2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/Armenian_Azerbaijani_Presidents_Agree_On_Preamble_To_Madrid_Principles/1940349.html, (18.12.2018)

The Basic Principles were: Self-determination of peoples, and equal rights; non-use of force; and territorial integrity. Among other things, the Basic Principles called for particularly: the deactivation and removal of the military forces from the surrounding territories of Nagorno-Karabakh; an assurance of the security and self-governance of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh need to be prioritized; Lachin corridor links Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia; an irrevocable utterance of will in regard to the future determination of the legitimate status of the Nagorno-Karabakh; all the refugees and internally displaced people attained a right of returning to their homelands; the peacekeeping operations should remain in the region with an intention of assuring the international security. Thus, the Basic Principles got endorsement by Azerbaijan and Armenia, which gave positive signals on obtaining the regional stability, welfare, and more comprehensively regional peace.⁽²²³⁾

Both conflicting sides, Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed on the common views that in order to achieve regional security, welfare, and stability, the peaceful resolution is inevitable option to take action. It was indicated in the arrangement of 1975-Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between OSCE Participating States of Final Act of the Helsinki Conference. Particularly, Article II is highlighted which refer to the abstaining of use of force and any related threat. Continuingly, territorial integrity of states was mentioned in the Article IV. The people's self-determination and equal rights was mentioned in the Article VIII.⁽²²⁴⁾

As part of comprehensive and wider security package, the Madrid Principles being a valid and current peace proposal refers to the subject of the insecurity via the anticipated distribution of an international peacekeeping operation. This action should be conducted parallel to other prior issues indicated in the Madrid Principles. These were the removal of the military forces from the occupied territories; it follows by the returning of the refugees and internally displaced people to their homelands; establishment of the Lachin corridor between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia; assurance of the regional security and self-governance of the de-facto independent Nagorno-Karabakh authorities', including the future status of Nagorno-

²²³ "OSCE Minsk Group, Madrid Document", ICC Legal Tools Database, 2007, <https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0b80bb/pdf/>, (23.12.2018)

²²⁴ "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States", Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act, Helsinki, 1975, pp.3-7.

Karabakh. However, besides these principles, the expectation Azerbaijan and Armenian people to live together needs long-lasting and challenging political arrangement concerning the transformation of regional security.⁽²²⁵⁾

Although certain measures were envisaged in the Madrid Principles, the main concern for parties was insecurity in the region, which delays the peace settlement in the region. Therefore, even the peace assistance was securitized. Considerably, this factor is determined as a post-agreement security challenge. This challenge requires finding out a right mechanism and structure to cope with, which seems very hypothetical. In short, currently regional peace is more precarious than militarily activated and insecure status quo in the region. Furthermore, the underlying structure of the Madrid Principles permits a convinced number of likelihoods to be formed about alternative elements in the total package.⁽²²⁶⁾

3.1.2. OSCE-Minsk Group Involvement

The evolvement of the bloody war between Azerbaijan and Armenia gave a serious alert to the OSCE and the United Nations, to make a quick response in order to handle the conflict. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the OSCE started to get involved into the process and work over the peace settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, right after the addition of Azerbaijan and Armenia to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Later on, in 1992 Helsinki meeting of the OSCE Council of Ministries became an incentive to design an international conference about the conflict resolution and peace settlement as a main instrument, which was aimed to happen in Minsk. The conference happened with the eleven member states of the OSCE.⁽²²⁷⁾ It was authorized to distribute a continuous platform for the talks which serves for a peaceful settlement in the conflict zone on the basis of principles, relying on responsibilities and the charter of

²²⁵ Conciliation Resources, "Securing an Armenian – Azerbaijan Agreement: the roles of international and local security providers (SAAA), **Conciliation Resources Discussion Paper**, June, 2015, p.3.

²²⁶ Conciliation Resources, SAAA, p.6.

²²⁷ Besides Armenia and Azerbaijan, nine original members Belarus, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, United States of America, Turkey, France, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, and Sweden, made up Minsk Group.

CSCE.⁽²²⁸⁾ The initiatives have been endorsed by the four United Nations Security Council's resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh, underling the highest support of peace settlement which was going to be implemented in the framework of the CSCE Minsk Group Conference.⁽²²⁹⁾

In 1992, the creation of the OSCE Minsk Group enabled the CSCE Minsk conference, to mediate the peace negotiations process between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Although the conference was the first and last one, it left the OSCE Minsk Group as a main instrument of conducting peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Minsk Group pursues its mission with three objectives. First was contributing a suitable groundwork for conflict resolution. Second was an intention of setting up a ceasefire agreement, as well as run for the Minsk conference. Third and last one was an intention of advocating the peace process by redistributing peacekeeping forces in the region.⁽²³⁰⁾

The OSCE Minsk Group since 1992 coordinated the conflict resolutions process and arranges peace negotiations as being main political body. It was endorsed by the Personal Representative and co-Chairmen of the OSCE Chair. The OSCE alongside the European Union got involved into the conflict with the Special Representative on the South Caucasus, in addition CSO (Chief Security Officer) financial assistance.⁽²³¹⁾

In 1992, Helsinki meeting an important request was proposed by the CSCE Council called for Chairman to assemble an immediate conference to involve Azerbaijan and Armenia for the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The important meeting held in Minsk to contribute a peaceful negotiations platform for resolution. The Minsk Group was set up in 1994, OSCE Budapest Summit, in order to go ahead on formation of the conditions that conference may be organized. The co-Chairs of the Minsk Group consist of the Ambassadors of the United States of America-Mr. Andrew Schofer; Russian Federation-Igor Popov; and France-Stephane Visconti.

²²⁸ "CSCE First Additional Meeting of the Council Helsinki 1992", Summary of Conclusion, II, point 8, March 24, 1992.

²²⁹ United Nations Security Council, "**Resolution 884**", Adopted at the Security Council's 3313th meeting, S/RES/884(1993), November 12, 1993.

²³⁰ Klever, p. 7.

²³¹ P. Terrence Hopmann, "Minsk Group Mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Confronting an Intractable Conflict", **Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik-IFSH**, OSCE Yearbook 2014, Baden, 2015, p. 167.

Besides co-Chairs of the Minsk Group, there are permanent members are Turkey, Italy, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Belarus, and including Azerbaijan and Armenia. OSCE Troika becomes a permanent member based on rotation.⁽²³²⁾

Nonetheless, to organize the further conference was not possible; however, the Minsk Group initiated the OSCE assistance to deal with the political solution over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The decision on creating the co-chairmanship to handle the process was accepted during the Budapest Summit in December 1994, by the heads of state or government. During the summit, the deployment of the multinational peacekeeping forces was highly endorsed by the participants as a crucial part of the total settlement of the conflict. In March 23, 1995, the Hungarian Chairman Marton Krasznai issued an authorization for the co-Chairmen of the Minsk Process in order to implement the Budapest decision.⁽²³³⁾

The Minsk Process consists of key objectives: contribution of the suitable structure for conflict resolution in order to persuade the peace talk that was highly supported by the Minsk Group; Parties attained an agreed conclusion in regard to terminate an armed conflict in order to allow the assembling of the Minsk Conference; deployment of the multinational OSCE peacekeeping forces need to be advanced.⁽²³⁴⁾

The success of the Minsk Process might be considered if the listed objectives are fully concluded. The Minsk Group is directed by a co-chairmanship that involved the US, Russia, and France. Moreover, Turkey, Germany, Sweden, Portugal, Italy, Netherlands, and Belarus, together with Azerbaijan Armenia are participating states. These participant states appear at the Nagorno-Karabakh's Minsk Conference. The co-Chairmen of the Minsk Conference will direct the conference. The only change happened in the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group, with the James Warlick's involvement since the August 6, 2013.⁽²³⁵⁾

²³² "Who we are", **OSCE-Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**, <https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/108306>, (29.12.2018)

²³³ "Executive Summary", **OSCE-Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**, 24.03. 2011, <https://www.osce.org/mg/76209>, (25.12.2018)

²³⁴ Shamkhal Abilov, "OSCE Minsk Group: Proposals and Failure, the View from Azerbaijan", **Insight Turkey, Persistent Rise of China Global Challenges and Regional Dynamics**, Vol. 20, No.1, 2018, pp. 145, 146.

²³⁵ "Press Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group", **OSCE-Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**, Bern, 19.12.2015, <https://www.osce.org/mg/211456>, (27.12.2018)

In 1994 with an open-ended authorization, the OSCE High-Level Planning Group was created and declared in March 23, 1995 with the high support of the directives of the OSCE Chairperson-in-office (CiO). It was authorized to make an endorsement to the multinational peacekeeping force of the OSCE, which was handled by the OSCE Minsk Conference in order to put an effect on conflict. However, Nagorno-Karabakh received a limited endorsement in comparison to other OSCE areas within the OSCE. In total 31 officers were originally organized in regard to its capacity, which consists of five military officers those regularly stay three to four years. The representative of the CiO (current one is a Swiss national) controls the structure based in Vienna, however, the premise is different from the OSCE headquarters. The HLPG stays in cooperation with the co-Chairs of the Minsk Group and participate in monitoring exercises together with the Personal Representative of the chairman-in-office, and CiO receives direct reports from HLPG. The HLPG, according to its authorization has advanced four planning choices that were renewed annually and the details forms were delivered to Parties. The involved parties demonstrate their consultation to the implementation of the planning. These parties also rely on a veto rights. Even though the OSCE has obtained a satisfactory experience in the realm of unarmed monitoring missions, its first mission was involving the soldiers according to the post-agreement deployment. In order to do this, the unanimous agreement of the OSCE's 57 participating states, as well as the authorization of the UN was required. Before to realize the deployment of the peacekeeping forces, it was expected the readiness and common agreement of the OSCE states, meaning how and when they will contribute the troops particularly. The HPLG is a technical organ within the OSCE, therefore, it always updates itself following the Minsk Process and its developments.⁽²³⁶⁾

The Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk being as a Personal Representative locates in Tbilisi, Georgia in regards to the field presence of OSCE. The establishment of the Line of Contact was realized under the monitoring mission of the Ambassador Kasprzyk and his five assistants, which was mentioned in 2010's article. He, together with his assistants visited the borderline to collect the relevant information for report. However, it was unclear the duration of the other actors'

²³⁶ Hopmann, pp.168, 171.

presence within the OSCE Minsk Group in the Nagorno-Karabakh mission as well as in Azerbaijan and Armenia. The OSCE offices in Baku and Yerevan do not deal with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.⁽²³⁷⁾

The co-Chairmen and the co-Chair states issued frequent declarations that related to the OSCE Minsk Group activities, which commonly happened during the G8 or other similar summits. Very rare visits had been observed. The further Minsk Group's field evaluation mission was realized in 2010.⁽²³⁸⁾

A meeting between the OSCE CiO, its Personal Representative, the co-Chairmen, and Azerbaijan and Armenia's foreign ministers happens unevenly. Recent development in the regulation of the OSCE Minsk Group can be seen in several statements from involved parties, a sudden high frequency of informal meetings and preparations for a meeting at the highest level this year, as well as the visit of OSCE Chair-in-Person Leonid Kozhara to both Azerbaijan and Armenia.⁽²³⁹⁾ The Minsk Group had an intention to organize a conference together with the eleven Participating States, which authorized to contribute an assistance on negotiations of the peace settlement on the basis of obligations and principles of the CSCE's charter. Nevertheless, it has not been organized yet, whereas the Minsk Group mission still valid. In order to support the Minsk Process, the UN Security Council has adopted four resolutions calling an immediate withdrawal of the military forces in 1993, which was a support for the Peace Process.⁽²⁴⁰⁾

In December 1994, the OSCE Budapest Summit created a co-chairmanship consisted of Sweden and Russia in order to stop the competing mediation attempts and reinforces the negotiation process, by giving two necessary missions to the Minsk Group. To support the maintenance of the ceasefire status and implement peace negotiations for the conclusion of an obtained political agreement on

²³⁷ Thomas De Waal, "Remarking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process", **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**, 01.08 2010, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/08/01/remaking-nagorno-karabakh-peace-process/3ldh>, (27.12.2018)

²³⁸ Hungarian OSCE Chairmanship, **Mandate of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE**, Minsk Conference, Doc.525/25, Vienna, March 23, 1995.

²³⁹ Amanda Paul and Dennis Sammut, "Nagorno-Karabakh: It is time to bring peacekeeping and confidence building back on the agenda?", **European Policy Center**, Discussion Paper, September 29, 2016, p. 5.

²⁴⁰ Vladimir Kazimirov, "Karabakh and UN Security Council Resolutions", Highlights, XII, 2004, **Vn.Kazimirov.ru**, <http://vn.kazimirov.ru/k100eng.htm>, (21.12.2018)

termination of the military conflict. This option was nothing to do with the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which was expectedly remaining on the attention of the Minsk Conference. During the Budapest meeting, the deployment of the multinational OSCE peacekeeping forces also was declared expressively, whenever the agreement was ready to run for. For this reason, the High Level Planning Group (HLPG) was established to prepare for this mission.⁽²⁴¹⁾

Besides these, in order to regulate its work, the OSCE set up principles. In 1996, the Lisbon Summit was an opportunity for the Minsk Group to advise three main principles in regards to peace settlement: both countries-Azerbaijan and Armenian may have territorial integrity, the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh need to be determined in the framework of mutual agreement which allows self-determination, that should be realized within the high autonomy in Azerbaijan; and lastly, the security of the whole inhabitants in Nagorno-Karabakh must be guaranteed. Although these principles were endorsed by the OSCE's 53 Participating States, whereas Armenia raised hands for the resolution.⁽²⁴²⁾ In December 30, 1996, the French representative was assigned to prosper the Finnish co-chair by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, however, the decision was confronted with the request from Azerbaijan to replace the representative with the United States. In order to resolve the confrontation, it was decided to assign US representative as an additional third co-chair. Since then these three representatives called as 'Troika' has not changed. The involvement of the US and Russia into the negotiations created a balance on the basis of their interest towards the region, in addition, their participation gives more credibility to the peace talks. On the other side, France ensures the parties with the full information of the EU about the issue accordingly, and the EU has considerable interest over the region as well to establish peace.⁽²⁴³⁾

Azerbaijan and Armenia over the past decades have been represented at different levels. The French President Jacques Chirac facilitated the meeting of the

²⁴¹ CSCE Budapest Document 1994, "Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era", "II Regional Issues, Intensification of CSCE action in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict", **Budapest Summit Declaration**, Budapest, December 6, 1994, pp.5,6.

²⁴² Lisbon Document 1996, "Lisbon Summit 1996", **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**, DOC.S/1/96, Annex 1,2, Lisbon, 1996.

²⁴³ ICG, Report No: 167, p. 9.

Azerbaijan and Armenian presidents in 2001. Both presidents relied on the decision of the deputy foreign ministers' level of Personal Representatives that was signed in March 2002. Thus, since 2004 under the 'Prague Process' the meetings held by gathering the foreign ministers, which were added to the presidential meetings that happened sporadically. The meetings involved the OSCE co-chairs from the presidential to the ambassadorial level.⁽²⁴⁴⁾

The 'two-phase' or 'step-by-step' approaches were adopted by the OSCE in order to facilitate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. The Minsk Group mediated the first phase with an intention of terminating the military conflict in the region, and arranging the required conditions for the gathering of the Minsk Conference. Accordingly, the Minsk Conference handled the second phase, with an intention of achieving the significant settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue; in addition, the final and legal status of the Nagorno-Karabakh should be determined. The deployment of the multinational Peacekeeping forces was supplemented as a conditional Agreement in the Budapest Summit, would be implemented only after the possible consequences of the Agreement. During the Budapest Summit, the peace settlement over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was elaborated with comprehensive methodologies, which consist of several successive steps: deployment of the Peacekeeping forces, finishing the Agreement, implementation of the Agreement, and gathering the Minsk Conference in order to conclude the determination of the Nagorno-Karabakh's final and legal status.⁽²⁴⁵⁾

3.1.3. Contagious Peace Negotiations

After the ceasefire, the agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia remains on some critical points. Regarding Azerbaijan, the territorial integrity is the main priority that cannot be compromised. Moreover, Azerbaijan does not agree that the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh can be determined with the region's population

²⁴⁴ Abilov, pp.152, 153.

²⁴⁵ Levon Zourabian, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement Revisited: Is Peace Achievable?", **Demokratizatsiya**, 2006, http://demokratizatsiya.pub/archievs/14_2_p62330187w3k6794.pdf, (10.01.2019), pp. 254,255.

only. On the other side, Armenia does not rely on the UN Security Council's resolution; more specifically Armenia does not intent to remove military forces from the seven occupied districts around Nagorno-Karabakh, and it is to let the Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs get back to their homelands. It can be realized only if the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh is realized. Neither Azerbaijan not Armenia agreed on the details to clarify the voting procedure of who, when, and how it would happen. In addition, they did not agree about other conditions beside settlements to establish the context of such voting.⁽²⁴⁶⁾

Since 1992, the co-chairs from Russia, France, and the US had directed the mediation efforts by the OSCE Minsk Group. In 1996, the Lisbon Summit was an opportunity for the OSCE to call for a resolution on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict based on the certain principles as ensuring the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan; Nagorno-Karabakh might gain a high degree of self-government within the authority of Azerbaijan; and inhabitants, including the region itself should be fully secured. Beside Armenia, all the other OSCE members have accepted those principles.⁽²⁴⁷⁾

To reinforce the settlement process, the Minsk Group introduced two other proposals in May and September 1997. They consist of 'Package Deal' and 'Step-by-Step' proposals. The package deal proposed a significant recommendation to achieve an agreement of the all disputed issues as well as Nagorno-Karabakh's final status that would stay as part of Azerbaijan, even though its internal sovereignty maintained. However, the Armenian authorities in Karabakh rejected the recommended proposal, and agreed on keeping the process, as a serious issue that needs to be negotiated between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In contrast, mediators presented the 'step-by-step' proposal after receiving various approaches, which was recalling the withdrawal of the Armenian military forces from the seven occupied territories. The Lachin province was not included in the list because of its role of linking Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Azerbaijani, displaced people would be returned to their homes. If all the principles, which were mentioned above, have been successfully implemented, then economic embargoes will be lifted, and the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh will be progressed. Azerbaijan at the beginning hesitated to accept the principles, but at the end did, on other side Armenia accepted

²⁴⁶ Zourabian, p. 258.

²⁴⁷ Lisbon Document 1996, Annex 1, p.15.

the plan on basis of conditions. The Armenian authorities in Karabakh demanded their independence by rejecting the plan and stated that before any talks started their independence must be guaranteed. Moreover, Armenians in Yerevan were also against the plan and forcefully asked a resignation from the president Levon Ter-Petrosyan, and instead recalled the previous Robert Kocharian as the de-facto president of Nagorno-Karabakh.⁽²⁴⁸⁾

In 1998, the Minsk Group, which underlined that the relations between the Karabakh's Armenian authorities and Azerbaijan must be non-hierarchical and de-facto introduced the new common state proposal. The proposal did not include Nagorno-Karabakh's de-jure independence, which will not provide a right of separation. The Armenian authorities in Karabakh as well as Armenia per se, conditionally accepted the plan. However, Azerbaijan rejected the plan considering it as a big loss. The former president of Azerbaijan, Haydar Aliyev, stated the unacceptability of the common state from the Azerbaijan side, because Nagorno-Karabakh should a territorial entity in the territory of Azerbaijan.⁽²⁴⁹⁾

Further peace talks realized between Haydar Aliyev the president of Azerbaijan and his counterpart, Robert Kocharian the president of Armenia. There was a discussion on 1998's version of proposal, which was slightly modified, and agreement. Unfortunately, the talk stopped with the assassination incident in the Armenian parliament that happened in October 1999.⁽²⁵⁰⁾

After that incident, the presidents' next meeting was held in March, April 2001 in Key West, Florida and Paris. Both sides introduced a controversial version of the talks. However, both sides were informed to start the discussion over based on the land swap that explains the Lachin and Meghri corridors. The Lachin corridor supposed to be a link between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, while Meghri supposed to be a corridor between Nakhcevan enclave and Azerbaijan. During the process, both Azerbaijan and Armenian presidents refused the claim that they had agreed on corridors exchanged which caused the strong domestic criticism. After the

²⁴⁸ Tabib Huseynov, "Mountainous Karabakh: New Paradigms for Peace and Development in 21st Century", **Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, International Negotiations**, Vol.15, Issue.1, January 01, 2010, p.14-15.

²⁴⁹ Huseynov, pp.15, 16.

²⁵⁰ Ruzanna Stepanian, "Armenian officials deny Russian role in 1999 parliament carnage," **ArmeniaLiberty.org**, 04.05. 2005, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1576814.html>, (17.11.2018)

Key West talks, the further negotiation process was paused because of its failure, and the process was prolonged until the power change happened in Azerbaijan in 2003. During that negotiation, the corridor exchanged initiative was defined as an unreal and inadmissible for Azerbaijan and Armenia.⁽²⁵¹⁾

In April 2004, Prague was the place where the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, which was called as the Prague Process, held another meeting. In August 2005, the OSCE Minsk Group in the Commonwealth Independent States' sideline meeting in the Kazan summit presented a proposal to the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Until 2006, the proposals remained as a secret file. When an extraordinary move was revealed by the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group, the aim revealed as the basic principles were reinforcing pressure over the parties to get on mutual agreement on principles and to organize a relevant public debate about the issue.⁽²⁵²⁾

In summary these principles stated: abandoning the use of force; periodic military removal from the occupied seven districts outside of Nagorno-Karabakh; after the withdrawal of the Armenian forces, peacekeeping forces should be deployed to the region; the communication between Azerbaijan and Armenia should be restored, and the Azerbaijani internally displaced people must be returned to their homelands; the status of Nagorno-Karabakh should be finalized on the basis of the mutual voting, but after the return of internally displaced people; the status of Nagorno-Karabakh requires considerable international support and supreme guarantees before the voting process began.⁽²⁵³⁾

In order to intensify the peace settlement, in November 2007 in Madrid, Azerbaijan and Armenia received a document, which was called the Basic Principles, which reinforced a peace settlement over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which was introduced during the ministerial council of the OSCE. That document aimed to develop the process as an official proposal reserved by the Chairman-in-office for the future OSCE Minsk Group negotiations.⁽²⁵⁴⁾

²⁵¹ David Adkinson, "The Conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference", **Political Affairs Committee**, Doc.10364, November 29, 2004.

²⁵² Adkinson, p.16

²⁵³ International Crisis Group-ICG, "**Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War**", Europe Report No:187, November 14, 2007.

²⁵⁴ ICG, Europe Report No: 187, p. 2.

The Basic Principles also known as Madrid Principles is considerable advantage for both sides, as long as Azerbaijan prefers ‘step-by-step’ principles, however, Armenia chooses ‘package’ methodology. The advantageous of the Madrid principles for both Azerbaijan and Armenia was making them agree on one issue that needs to be discussed, which was the determination of the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this principle would happen only if all other necessary measures satisfied according to the systematic approach, which serves to the interests of Azerbaijan. In addition, these measures per se would be implemented only after the agreement over the final status of the region has been finalized, which serves to the interests of Armenia based on ‘package’ methodology. According to the former foreign minister of Armenia, Vardan Oskanian, the parties would start to work on the settlement of the conflict only all the basic principles receive full agreement by both sides.⁽²⁵⁵⁾

Nonetheless, both sides have various approaches towards these principles. The particular differences stay valid about the voting process, meaning certain questions arose about who, when, and how would vote. There is a common belief that the result of these questions might help to reach at conclusion on the peace talks. The demand was announced from the Armenian party on conducting election particularly in Nagorno-Karabakh and the majority vote should determine the decision. In addition, the determination of the final and legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh must happen before the Azerbaijani internally displaced people return their homelands, obviously their return remains as particular part of the negotiations. On the other hand, Azerbaijan demands the election must happen in entire Azerbaijan, relying on the state’s constitution which does not allow the election in only one part of Azerbaijani’s territory. It also declares that Karabakh Azerbaijanis should have an equal role on determining Nagorno-Karabakh’s future status, but before that they should return to their homelands.⁽²⁵⁶⁾

There is an attempt to criticize the problem of the implementation of OSCE’s principles in a certain way, however, in reality the initiative produced a failure that influences all the negotiation process in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Considering

²⁵⁵ Fuller Liz “Nagorno-Karabakh: mediators take the process public,” **Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty**, 30.06. 2006, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1069596.html>, (19.11.2018)

²⁵⁶ ICG, Europe Report No: 187, p. 4

the OSCE principles as an application, the political settlement presented confused signals, which triggered the confrontation and obstinacy within the parties and they legitimately justified their action, which would continue until their interests were secured. Between 1992 and 1996, the OSCE was not able to clarify its regime, principles and orders that aimed to have a legitimate impact over the parties' demands and interests. The institutional curb afterward came to the force with the decision-making process of the OSCE, which was conducted with three OSCE meetings: Emergency Senior Officials' Committee Meeting held in 1993, in 1993 the fourth meeting of the Foreign Affairs' Council and in 1996 the Lisbon Summit.⁽²⁵⁷⁾

In December 1993, the meeting of the Rome Council was an opportunity for OSCE to present two issues: First is to accept the the application of the UN Security Council Resolution 822 considering the immediate measures of the modified timetable. Second, before sending the monitoring mission it should be verified and prepared. However, the implementation of the OSCE's measures were quite confusive for the parties, which they understood as an effort for guaranteeing their interests and demands. When the OSCE started detailing its first significant peace plan, which was contradicted for the first time with an impossible barrier to accomodate the security status, adverses in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Because the situation was handled by the organization since it emerged. At this crossroad in October 1993, there was a huge hope of the delegation two months before the Rome Council Meeting to make a substantive progress for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Thus, the propose Timetable was convenient proposal for Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, which made them to come up, and mutual agreement that followed certain steps: renewal of the bilateral communication, maintaining ceasefire, and withdrawal of the military troops. However, acceptance of these measures would be submission and total loss for Azerbaijan, therefore, Azerbaijan insisted on the withdrawal of the Armenian military troops from their occupied territories and only then the broken communication might be restored.⁽²⁵⁸⁾

²⁵⁷ Nadia Milanova, "The territory-identity nexus in the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh: implications for OSCE peace efforts". **JEMIE - Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority issues in Europe**, Issue.2, Belgium, 2003.

²⁵⁸ Milanova, p.9.

The delegation received the first draft of the Rome Council document on November 16, 1993. The document was about two-pages decision to handle the negotiation over Nagorno-Karabakh, which was underling the preparation process of OSCE's deployment of the monitoring missions and creation of the primary presence of the OSCE in the area. In the following drafts, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan as well as all other regional states were cited directly by the delegations which was immediately rejected by Armenia. Therefore, the OSCE faced with the strong demand of Azerbaijani delegation in order to consider the opposing veto of Armenia. However, it was unexpected reaction for delegations that made them to get stuck in a dilemma, therefore, the new attempt was to propose the new draft in order to cool-down the reaction. On the new draft, OSCE's main concern was highlighted on the maintenance of the conflict and it put a compulsion over parties to search for a reliable threshold for consensus. However, the Minsk Group's Chairman was unable to gather conflicting parties for this benign consensus over Nagorno-Karabakh, which was aimed to include in the final communiqué. Surprisingly, Azerbaijan announced its determined position after several hours of delay and confusion, which included a direct allusion to Azerbaijan's sovereignty and territorial integrity either in separate statement or in the final communiqué. The entire attempt in the Chairman meeting proved futile, because Azerbaijan refused the forwarded statement, and vetoed the entire decision on Nagorno-Karabakh, instead explicating its position in an explanatory statement in the meeting's journal.⁽²⁵⁹⁾

Over the three years, the OSCE superioring the Lisbon Summit Meeting on Nagorno-Karabakh's negotiations process repeatedly rotated on the issue of how the measures on the right to self-determination and territorial integrity should necessarily be applied and understood. Therefore, the issue became unanticipated careening block in the following negotiations process on Nagorno-Karabakh. Accordingly, their main interests were neglected with certain frustration, and this put the parties under the regular burden to make compromise, which was considerably an unimportant effort in the framework of the ongoing peace efforts. Between the conflicting parties, the ongoing distrust put the OSCE mediation efforts on trouble. The problem was not only parties' mutual distrust, but also their lack of confidence

²⁵⁹ Milanova, p.10.

about the OSCE, which is the only political organ, that is searching for a peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, in 1994, the OSCE increased its effort to cope with these difficulties and unexpected results of the Rome Council Meeting and actually take an action on realizing the deployment of the peacekeeping forces in the region in order to maintain the OSCE's presence in the region. Thus, the next step for the Minsk Group was to increase the regional confidence building measures by strengthening its humanitarian assistance in the influenced states and establishing the threshold for deploying its peacekeeping forces to maintain the regional security. Positive outcome was about the conflicting parties' welcoming the entitled activities but continuously it required parallel and consistent talks to achieve a common ground for a general agreement on the political settlement, and even though the deployment of the peacekeeping forces was a prior issue on the agenda, it could be real deal only after such agreement.⁽²⁶⁰⁾

Different from Rome Council Meeting, the OSCE Chairman was ahead with its other participating states, other than Armenia, and presented a particular declaration as a last minute concession consisting of three certain principles aimed to be part of the Nagorno-Karabakh's peace settlement.⁽²⁶¹⁾ Those principles are giving Nagorno-Karabakh's highest degree of self-government, ensuring the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh and its population per se should be under security gurantee.⁽²⁶²⁾

Four years later in 1998, the conflicting parties received the Minsk Group's new pleace plan on the basis of establishing the 'common state' concept, which would presumably allow Azerbaijan and Armenia to build up a non-hierarchical relations and of course a de-facto independent Nagorno-Karabakh will be unable to puruse a right of one-sided separation.⁽²⁶³⁾ In the published peace proposal, Article 1, guarantee the common state shall be formed by the mutual cooperation of guarantees that Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, where the central government should be a joint commission, consisting of representatives from each entities. The purpose of this plan was triggering Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh to establish a

²⁶⁰ Milanova, pp.11,12.

²⁶¹ Lisbon Document 1996, Annex 1.

²⁶² Lisbon Document 1996, Annex 2.

²⁶³ Michael Emerson, "On the Forming and Reforming of Stability Pacts: From The Balkans To The Caucasus", **Center for European Policy Studies**, CEPS Policy Brief No.4, May, 2001, p.6.

horizontal relations in between rather than vertical one, which was welcomed by Armenia and Stepanakert, but rejected by Baku.⁽²⁶⁴⁾

Increasing diplomatic activities and resurgence of the Minsk process were observed since the 2001. The next meeting between the conflicting parties' presidents realized in July 2001, in Paris, for the discussion of the 'Paris principles' over the conflict settlement by restating the 'common state' concept as the most significant aspect of settlement which included the creation of the horizontal relations between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh that would eliminate the intention of the subordination. According to the proposed plan, there was not a possibility of making single change on the arrangements of the common state that was related to both sides. Thus, Nagorno-Karabakh would be able to organize its own legislative, executive, and juridical bodies, including police and guard system in the national level.⁽²⁶⁵⁾

Normally, the peace negotiations entirely depended on the borderline barometer that is the particular measurement for the further healthy peace talks. The main purpose was to intensify the negotiation process and maintain the security on the borderline, which was very successful in 2009; the time witnessed intensive and repeated talks. At the same year borderline was not as secure as expected and not so worse to disturb the negotiation process, where only 19 casualties were recorded. However, the casualties became intensive after the first half of 2010, which influenced the peace talks tremendously and made the negotiations as deadlocked. The most anxious issue was about the restoration of the full-scale war on the borderline, and both sides will upset the status quo using the heavier weapons to keep the balance of power, which consequently caused countable losses. Unfortunately, the OSCE is unable to control this kind of unexpected casualties on the Line of Contact that is very small, and if sides decide to violate the status quo within one night, it happens. Therefore, reinforcing the cease-fire statement is the highest priority to cope with these kinds of problems. Possibly, that movement

²⁶⁴ Emil Danielyan and Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Caucasus: Azerbaijan and Armenia Detail Karabakh Peace Plan", **Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty**, 22.02.2001, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1095808.html>, (24.11.2018)

²⁶⁵ Ali Abbasov, and Haroutiun Khachatryan, "**The Karabakh Conflict, Variants of Settlement: Concepts and Reality**", 3rd edition, sponsored by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung South-Caucasus Co-ordination office, Areat/Noyan Tapan publishing, Baku, Yerevan, 2005, p. 50.

would get resistance from both parties because the monitors would set up their mandate in Azerbaijan and in occupied territories outside of Nagorno-Karabakh.⁽²⁶⁶⁾

The presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia realized their next meeting in Kazan under the Russian President Medvedev's mediation in June 2011. During that meeting, the international communities' expectation was quite high on the conflicting sides' face-up for better deal will happen, but unfortunately, once again frustration was the result. The negotiation process was pretty challenging for Azerbaijan and unhappily, Armenia's movement on restoring the issues which were already settled in the 'Basic Principles', meaning the removal methodology of the Armenian armies from the occupied territories. Therefore, the Minsk Group mediators also welcomed to Kazan meeting in order to change the text within the 'Basic Principles'. Obviously, these changes would not have made Azerbaijan happy and Azerbaijan showed its opposite position, rejecting the new changes and did not accept the document. Because Azerbaijan preannounced its demands stating that first five occupied districts should be liberated from the Armenian military forces, and next two districts would be following. However, Armenia refused the withdrawal of its troops from the Lachin and Kelbadjar districts.⁽²⁶⁷⁾

The new hope emerged after Nikol Pashinyan came to the power, and President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan met in December 2018, to discuss the reinforcement of the particular mechanism in order to maintain the ceasefire status, and prevent border violations. The positive side of this initiative was the consequence of the discussion ended up with common agreement, which was encouraged with Pashinyan's previous statement concerning the resolution method of Nagorno-Karabakh should be peacefully and he is willing to do it. Paris hosted both countries' foreign ministers in January 2019, to revive the suspended Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Since that time the most recent and unplanned meeting between Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan happened during the World Economic Forum in Davos.⁽²⁶⁸⁾

²⁶⁶ Amanda Paul, "Nagorno-Karabakh – A ticking time bomb", **European Policy Center**, September 17, 2010, p. 2.

²⁶⁷ Fariz Ismailzade, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Current Trends and Future Scenarios", **Istituto Affari Internazionali**, IAI Working Papers 11| 29, November, 2011, pp.4,5.

²⁶⁸ Elmar A.Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliye, "Azerbaijan and Armenian Eager to Revive Nagorno-Karabakh", **Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst-CACI**, 23.01.2019.

Although these superior meetings were behind the closed doors with no press involvement, there was no positive development towards the peace settlement process, reported by both sides. The main purpose of the meeting was not to form a discussion based on concrete decision, but rather sharing certain opinions on related issues. However, the series meetings were considered as positive outcome and sharing common ideas on certain issues were understood as promising development from Azerbaijan's perspective. Thus, Elmar Mamedyarov a Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan on December 18, 2018 delivered a speech stating that Baku is willingly ready on obtaining Nagorno-Karabakh's special status within the Republic of Azerbaijan and the possibility of the economic development certainly would happen after Azerbaijan's occupied territories were returned. Right after that statement, several other superior government officials in Azerbaijan delivered a statement with a similar context, which was a big challenge for Armenian political elites causing an internal chaos. The consequence was pointing out Pashinyan as a guilty figure who might have had an agreement with Azerbaijan behind the closed doors.⁽²⁶⁹⁾

Between both parties the recent and last meeting realized in March 29, 2019 in Vienna, where the renewal of the territorial integrity was underlined and proposed as an essential issue. The meeting attained on receiving collective attention and interest from media and experts. During the meeting neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia could not enter the discussion on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. It presumably happened because of the recent political change in Armenia and attitude was quite unknown. Currently, the negotiation process is restored, and good news was the participation of the OSCE Minsk Group's co-Chairs in the meeting. At the end of the meeting all the parties including co-chairs demonstrated their positive opinions expressively. Accordingly, the outcome of the meeting influenced the co-chairs adding a positive statement in their mandatory work. In addition, the Armenian Prime Minister endorsed the usefulness of the meeting and negotiations. Even, Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev expressed his positive approach in the same context. However, Azerbaijan unsurprisingly stand on their unchangeable

<http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13557-azerbaijan-and-armenia-eager-to-revive-nagorno-karabakh-peace-talks.html> , (15.01.2019)

²⁶⁹ Elkhan Alasgarov, "Davos meeting was deciding future of not only Karabakh, but also Armenia", *Azernews.az*, 24.01.2019, <https://www.azernews.az/nation/144512.html>, (28.01.2019)

position, in regard to the withdrawal of the Armenian military troops from the Azerbaijan's occupied territories, and this action should be implemented immediately without any condition according to the UN Security Council's four resolutions 822, 853, 874, and 884.⁽²⁷⁰⁾

Table. Chronology of meetings between the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict:^{(271),(272)}

DATE AND TIME	CITY	VENUE CONFLICTING PARTIES AND MEDIATORS
1993		
-September 25	-Moscow	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
-October 8	-Moscow	-State leaders of the Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia
-December 23	-Ashgabat	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
1994		
-September 8	-Moscow	- Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
-September 27	-New York	-UN General Assembly's 49 th session
-December 5	-Moscow	- Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
1995		
-February 9	-Almaty	- Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
-March 12	-Copenhagen	-United Nations Summit

²⁷⁰ "Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group", **OSCE-Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**, Vienna, 29.03.2019, <https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/415643>, (29.01.2019)

²⁷¹ "Ermənistan-Azərbaycan Dağlıq-Qarabağ Münaqişəsi", [Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict], **President.az**, <https://static2.president.az/media/W1siZiIsIjIwMTgvMDMvMDkvOGowdDVxODhvc19EYV9sX3FfUWFyYWJhX19BWkUucGRml1d?sha=c1feac0d3415a521>, (22.02.2019)

²⁷² "Azərbaycan və Ermənistan Prezidentlərinin Martın 29-da Vyanada görüşü gözlənilir", [Azerbaijani and Armenian Leaders are expected to meet in Vienna on March 29], **Amerikaninsesi.az**, 25.03.2019, <https://www.amerikaninsesi.org/a/az%C9%99rbaycan-v%C9%99-erm%C9%99nistanr%C9%99hb%C9%99rl%C9%99rinin-mart%C4%B1n-29-da-vyanada-g%C3%B6r%C3%BC%C5%9F%C3%BC-g%C3%B6zl%C9%99nilir-/4846824.html>, (28.01.2019)

-May 8	-Paris	-50 th Anniversary of victory over Fascism
-October 24	-New York	-50 th Anniversary of United Nations
1996		
-January	-Paris	-The funeral ceremony of the France's former president Fransua Mittera
-January 18	-Moscow	- Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
-April 21	-Luxembourg	-The ceremony of signing the treaty of cooperation and partnership between Azerbaijan and EU
-May 12	-Mashad	-Opening ceremony of the Mashad-Saraxs-Tacan railway
-June 3	-Kislovodsk	-State leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia , Georgia and Russia in the concern of regional conflicts and problems
-October 25	-Moscow	-State leaders of the members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization
-December 2	-Lisbon	-OSCE Lisbon Summit
1997		
-Mart 28	-Moscow	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
-April 28	-Istanbul	-Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization/Business Conference
-October 10	-Strasbourg	-Council of Europe's Summit
-October 22	-Chisinau	-Commonwealth Independent States' Leaders
1998		
-April 28	-Moscow	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
1999		
-April 1	-Moscow	-Commonwealth Independent States' Leaders Summit
-April 28	-Moscow	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders'

-July 16	-Geneva	Summit
-August 22	-Geneva	-Practical Meeting Between Parties
-September 10	-Yalta	-Practical Meeting Between Parties
		-International Conference: “Black Sea Economic Cooperation-21 st century towards the European Integration”
-November 18	-Istanbul	-OSCE Summit
2000		
-January 24	-Moscow	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders’ Summit
-January 28	-Davos/Yalta	-World Economic Forum/Commonwealth Independent States’ Leaders
-June 20	-Moscow	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders’ Summit
-August 18	-Yalta	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders’ Summit
-September	-New York	-United Nations’ Millennium Summit
-November 30	-Moscow	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders’ Summit
2001		
-January 25	-Strasbourg	-Ceremony of the Azerbaijan and Armenia’s admission to the Council of Europe
-January 26	-Paris	-Mediation of the President of France
-March 4	-Paris	-Mediation of the President of France
-April 3	-Key-West	-Mediation of the United States
-May 31	-Minsk	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders’ Summit
-August 1	-Sochi	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders’ Summit
-November 30	-Moscow	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders’ Summit
2002		

-October 6	-Chisinau	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
-November 21	-Prague	-NATO Partnership Council's Summit
2003		
-January 28	-Kiev	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
-December 11	-Geneva	-World Summit on Information Society
2004		
-April 28	-Warsaw	-European Economic Summit
-September 15	-Astana	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
2005		
-May 15	-Warsaw	-European Economic Summit
-August 27	-Kazan	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
2006		
-February 10/11	-Rambuy	-Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group
-June 4	-Brussels	-Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership
-November 28	-Minsk	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
2007		
-June 9	-Sank-Petersburg	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
2008		
-June 6	-Sank-Petersburg	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
-November 2	-Moscow	-Mediation of the President of Russia in Mayn Dorf Residence
2009		
-January 28	-Zurich	-Practical Meeting Between Parties
-May 7	-Prague	-Southern Gas Corridor and Great Silk Way

-June 4	-Sank-Petersburg	Summit -Mediation of the President of Russia
-July 17-18	-Moscow	-Mediation of the President of Russia
-October 8	-Chisinau	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
-November 22	-Munich	-Practical Meeting Between Parties
2010		
-January 25	-Sochi	-Mediation of the President of Russia
-June 17	-Sank-Petersburg	-Mediation of the President of Russia
-October 27	-Astrakhan	-Mediation of the President of Russia
2011		
-March 5	-Sochi	-Mediation of the President of Russia
-June 24	-Kazan	-Mediation of the President of Russia
2012		
-January 23	-Sochi	-Mediation of the President of Russia
2013		
-November 19	-Vienna	-Practical Meeting Between Parties
2014		
-August 10	-Sochi	-Mediation of the President of Russia
-September 4	-Newport	-Mediation of the US State Secretary
-October 27	-Paris	-Mediation of the President of France
2015		
-December 19	-Bern	-Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group
2016		
-May 16	-Vienna	-Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group
-June 20	-Sank-Petersburg	-Mediation of the President of Russia
2017		
-October 16	-Geneva	-Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group
2018		

-September 28	-Dushanbe	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
-December 5	-Milan	-Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group
-December 6	-Sank-Petersburg	-Commonwealth Independent States Leaders' Summit
2019		
-January 16	-Paris	-Foreign Ministers of Conflicting Parties under the supervision of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group
-January 22	-Davos	-World Economic Forum
-March 29	-Vienna	-Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group

3.2. CONSTANT BORDER CLASHES AND NEW CHALLENGE FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND PEACE PROCESS

3.2.1. Constant ceasefire violations: April War-2016

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh since 1994 remains unresolved to this day, and outbreaks of fighting erupt periodically along the 160-mile so-called 'Line of Contact'. Since 1994, there have been over 7,000 ceasefire violations. In April 2016, the most serious outbreak of violence in over two decades erupted-the so-called 'Four Day War, which caused the death of at least 200 people. The conflict saw Azerbaijan take control of two strategic heights in addition to other modest gains, since 1994 ceasefire agreement representing the status quo's first change. These gains were seen in Baku as a major psychological and military victory. Yerevan, for its part, downplayed the loss of territory it described as limited and as having no tactical or strategic importance. The flare-up in fighting ended with another Russian-mediated ceasefire agreement, which has largely held. Broader implications of the war seem, in some ways, self-perpetuating. For example, because of the displacements related to the conflict, in today's Azerbaijan there are no Armenians and no Azerbaijanis living in Armenia. The border between two countries remains sealed and painful memories from the war continue to fuel

mutual mistrust. The unresolved conflict also translates into lost economic opportunities for the region, including hampering regional economic flows. For instance, it serves as a wedge between Armenia and Turkey (which is allied with Azerbaijan). Obviously, both sides condemn each other on violating the ceasefire, and attacking first on borderline. However, to find out the truth is better to look for neutral sources in to order to measure the objectivity.⁽²⁷³⁾

After the 1994 ceasefire agreement, the borderline casualties were quite rare, however, the serious ceasefire violation happened in 2008, and continuously evolved in the following years' skirmishes and 2010, 2014, and 2016 are the most known years.⁽²⁷⁴⁾

In March 4, 2008 right after the election protests in Armenia, the skirmishes erupted in Mardakert. In skirmishes, ethnic Azerbaijanis⁽²⁷⁵⁾ and Armenians⁽²⁷⁶⁾ got into a heaviest fighting, which was a serious confrontation after the bloodiest Nagorno-Karabakh war that ended up with a ceasefire in 1994.⁽²⁷⁷⁾ Azerbaijan was strongly accused on the Armenian media sources as Azerbaijan struggle was on using the ongoing crisis in Armenia as an advantage. On the other side, Azerbaijan sources brought counter arguments stating that the Armenian government was trying to turn the attention from internal dynamic in different direction. Subsequently after the incident, the United Nations General Assembly reported a data that Assembly's adopted the Resolution 62/243 voted 39 in favor, and 7 against, which was strongly demanding the Azerbaijan's occupied territories should be immediately cleaned from the Armenian forces, that was recorded in March 14, 2008.⁽²⁷⁸⁾

²⁷³ CSCE-Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "In Brief: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", **Helsinki Commission Report**, 15.06.2017, https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/Report%20-%20Nagorno-Karabakh%20-%20Design%20FINAL_0.pdf, (26.11.2018)

²⁷⁴ Shawn Wayne, "Continuous Violations of Ceasefire", **Georgiatoday.ge**, 23.07.2018, <http://georgiatoday.ge/news/11464/Continuous-Violation-Of-Ceasefire>, (19.12.2018)

²⁷⁵ "Fatal Armenian-Azeri border clash". **BBC News/new.bbc.co.uk**, 05.03.2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7278483.stm>, (22.12.2018)

²⁷⁶ "Karabakh Causality toll disputed". **BBC News/new.bbc.co.uk**, 09.03.2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7278871.stm>, (22.12.2018)

²⁷⁷ "Armenia/Azerbaijan: Deadly Fighting Erupts in Nagorno-Karabakh", **Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty**, 04.03.2008, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1079580.html>, (22.12.2018)

²⁷⁸ "General Assembly adopts resolution reaffirming territorial Integrity of Azerbaijan, demanding withdrawal of all Armenian forces", Plenary 86th Meeting (AM), GA/10693, **Un.org**, 10.03. 2008, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/ga10693.doc.htm>, (23.12.2018)

The Nagorno-Karabakh skirmishes evolved in February 2010. The Line of Contact was observed with an exchange of gunfire on February 18, between the Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijan soldiers. Right after the incident Azerbaijan claimed its accusation on the Armenian military forces of targeting several positions in Azerbaijan, and the Armenian forces' fires particularly the Qiziloba, Yusifcanli, Tap Qaraqoyunlu, Cavahirli, and Qapanli villages, in addition, snipers and small arms fires happened in Agdam's uplands and left three killed and one injured soldiers from Azerbaijan side.^{(279),(280)}

This incident accelerated the border clashes and intensive casualties increasingly. Even, increasing percentage of the border clashes and frequent casualties approved by the Armenian authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh as 53% higher in 2010. At the same year during August and September, the Line of Contact welcomed from three to eight daily exchanges of gunfire, which lasted around ten minutes on its different parts. The exchange of gunfire occurred on the limited territory specifically not over the line of contact; however, later on the incidents emerged beyond the line of contact and even much broader landscape.⁽²⁸¹⁾

Although the information on the ceasefire violations is controversial, the fact proves that the recent confrontation is organized.⁽²⁸²⁾

During the Mardakert skirmishes in 2010, the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire was violated several times quite frequently. The skirmishes mostly took place in the line of contact where the Armenian military forces from the de-facto independent

²⁷⁹ "Azerbaijan: Baku Claims Three Dead in Karabakh Crossfire", **Eurasianet.org/Azerbaijan**, 19.02.2010, <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-baku-claims-three-dead-in-karabakh-crossfire>, (23.12.2018)

²⁸⁰ "Three Azerbaijani Soldiers Killed Near Nagorno-Karabakh", **Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty**, 18.02.2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/Three_Azerbaijani_Soldiers_Killed_Near_NagornoKarabakh/1962175.html, (23.12.2018)

²⁸¹ International Crisis Group-ICG, "Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War", **Europe Policy Briefing No: 60**, Tbilisi, Baku, Istanbul, Brussels, February 8, 2011, p. 3.

In entire year of 2010, the number of death soldiers counted at least 25, which were nineteen in 2009. However, the number of killed soldiers was less than 30 in 2008, which preannounced their belief on the casualty figures in reality were much higher. In February 18, 2010, one sniper shot killed three and wounded one Azerbaijani soldier. In 2010, the most violently serious fighting erupted between June 18-19 in North-Eastern Nagorno-Karabakh area near the left Chayli village. The confrontation caused five dead soldiers, one Azerbaijani and four Armenian. Thus, experts from Azerbaijan claimed that number of killed Armenian soldiers were several dozen which happened overnight raid, where the attack was carried out by alone Mubariz Ibrahimov.

²⁸² "Armenian, Azerbaijan Clashes Continue In Karabakh", **Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty**, 22.06.2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/Armenian_Azerbaijani_Clashes_Continue_In_Karabakh/2078581.html, (12.02.2019)

but unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh region and the Azerbaijani military forces confronted. Reportedly, the accusation was always jumping from one site to another. However, since 1994 ceasefire, and since 2008 Mardakert skirmishes this one was considered the worst violation within two years and caused the Armenian forces to face up with heaviest calamities.⁽²⁸³⁾

Between the conflicting parties, the eruption of the new border clashes coincided between 2011 and 2013.⁽²⁸⁴⁾ In next year at late April through early June, new border clashes erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenian military forces. At the beginning Azerbaijan disprove the accusation of arms fire on the line of contact or death of any Azerbaijani soldier, instead announced the result of the incident with three Armenian soldiers were killed between the internal confrontation within the Armenian army.^{(285),(286)}

The border violence between Azerbaijan and Armenia made Russia to have prompt warning statement to both sides to stop the confrontation.^{(287),(288)}

²⁸³ “OSCE, EU Condemn Karabakh Armed Incident”, **Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty**, Caucasus Report, 24.06.2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/OSCE_EU_Condemn_Karabakh_Armed_Incident/2079009.html, (23.12.2018)

On both sides reportedly 74 soldiers were killed between 2008 and 2010.

²⁸⁴ Naira Bulghadarian, “Armenia, Azerbaijan Report More Deadly Skirmishes”, **Azatutyun.am**, 2011, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/24350911.html>, (24.12.2018)

Three Nagorno-Karabakh soldiers were killed in late April 2011 border clashes, interim fight left one Armenian and two Azerbaijani killed soldiers on October 5. Over all during the whole year, ten soldiers were killed from Armenia.

²⁸⁵ “Ermənistan 3 əsgərinin öldürüldüyünü bildirir”, [Armenia reported 3 soldiers were killed], **Azadliq.org**, 04.06.2012, <https://www.azadliq.org/a/24603074.html>, (24.12.2018)

²⁸⁶ “5 Azərbaycan əsgəri həlak olub”, [5 Azerbaijani soldiers died], **Azadliq.org**, 04.06.2012, <https://www.azadliq.org/a/24603945.html>, (24.12.2018)

The official confirmation released by the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, stating the death of five Azerbaijani soldiers during the skirmishes happened on June 5. During the confrontation, four of them died while fighting, and last one got a distance shot and died later. Azerbaijan reported the reason of the fighting happened because of the territorial violations by the Armenian subversive group through the Ashagi Askipara village. In 2014 by June 20, both sides occurred again for new border clashes and consequently the confrontation left 16 dead bodies to both sides. At the same year on August 2, eight soldiers were killed within the three days of confrontation, reported authorities in Azerbaijan. The Ministry Defense of Azerbaijan released with its statement on its official website showing the exact number of killed soldiers is eight. Moreover, the Defense Ministry explained the main reason of the escalation of the clashes was because of the several subversive Armenian insurgencies attempt on crossing the Azerbaijan's border. However, local reported delivered further statistic of the four wounded soldiers. Accordingly, the Armenian military troops had big losses after the shooting that pushed them back, also placed on the official website of Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, on Friday. In the Gazakh province in Azerbaijan, another gunfire exchange erupted and left two dead soldiers to Azerbaijani troops. On July 31, on the border clashes two Armenian soldiers killed. Reportedly, The Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan announced that the ceasefire had been violated 96 times within the 24 hours on July 31.

²⁸⁷ Naila Bagirova and Hasmik Mkrtchyan, “Five more killed in clashes between Azerbaijanis, ethnic Armenians”, **Baku/Yerevan Reuters**, 02.08.2014, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-armenia->

In spite of series international warning, new bloody war erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia on April 2-5, 2016. No matter the interstate conflict was on the status of ceasefire and literally it was called as frozen conflict, international eyes turned out to the region and warned the parties of being in a new war.⁽²⁸⁹⁾

Since ceasefire agreement, the stability in the region was quite satisfactory but security was not guaranteed, because the frequent border clashes triggered both sides to violate the ceasefire. Border clashes continued parallel with other regional development and dynamics: Azerbaijan became regional economic power by intensifying its gas and oil production and gained political and economic confidence as an exporter; on the other side Armenia build up strong security relations with Russia and became good ally of Russia; reinforcement on fortifying of the jurisdiction in Nagorno-Karabakh continued; and the Minsk Group mediation process continued slowly, considering that the OSCE Minsk Group is the only political organ handling the peace negotiation process between Azerbaijan and Armenia since 1992. The interstate violence has concentrated mainly on 160-mile long de-facto borderline along between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Azerbaijan and Armenia obtained a different Line of Contact (LoC) in comparison to other de-facto boundaries between South Ossetia and Abkhazia (until 2008), Transnistria and their located states. The Line of Contacts is separated with the strong fortifications between two sides, bridled with 20,000 strong armies, and only within the rare diplomatic event, crossing the line very rarely happened. The Line of Contact is

azerbaijan-conflict/five-more-killed-in-clashes-between-azeris-ethnic-armenians-idUKKBN0G20EP20140802, (25.12.2018)

The fighting erupted again in 27 July and continued on August 5, 2014, which resulted with the five Armenian and fourteen Azerbaijani dead soldiers.

²⁸⁸ Thomas De Waal, "The Karabakh Truce Under Threat", **Carnegieendowment.org**, Commentary, 12.02.2015, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/02/12/karabakh-truce-under-threat/i242>, (25.12.2018)

In November 12, 2014 the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army's 'Mil Mi-24' helicopter was shot down by the Azerbaijani forces over the Agdam is Karabakh's region. In the incident three Armenian servicemen died. However, the Ministry of Defense of Armenia reportedly stated that downing an unarmed aircraft was a direct provocation. On the contrary, authorities in Azerbaijan announced their claim on stating the aircraft was targeted with completed intention on attacking Azerbaijani army position. The British analyst Thomas De Waal, stated that the attacking to Azerbaijani army positions was not the helicopter's intention, however, mutually agree five-kilometers agreed no-fly zone was broken by the helicopter apparently, as a result it was downed in the no-man's land between two armies.

²⁸⁹ Laurence Broers, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Defaulting War", Chatham House, Russia and Eurasia Program, **The Royal Institute of International Affairs**, July, 2016. p.3.

entirely controlled by the parties' forces, however, the deployment of the international peacekeeping forces are not realized yet.⁽²⁹⁰⁾

The fighting reportedly erupted in the early hour of April 2, in Nagorno-Karabakh and the unexpected violence popped out in the news. Until April 2016, the post-Soviet region South Caucasus purportedly had been forgotten by the world, nevertheless, in borderline frequent ceasefire violations occurred. By this incident the region regained its place in the international agenda, because of its eruption became a regional security threat where the nationalistic and more powerful players as neighbors winked to each other. The Line of Contact hosted a volatile fighting between sides, where the constant ceasefire violations erupted and all of a sudden fighting escalated when Azerbaijan realized carefully prepared major into effect offensively which surprised Armenia. Therefore, Armenian Ministry of Defense was in hardship, did not know to figure out the situation and deliver on its first report. Yet, authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh at the beginning disregarded the seriousness of this borderline friction.⁽²⁹¹⁾

The fighting between 2-5 April in 2016, labeled as 'Four Day War'. According to the consequences of the short war in terms of military equipment and soldier loses, it is considered bloodiest fighting between two sides since 1994 ceasefire. The particular disruption of the conflict established a condition that Azerbaijan and Armenia get closest confrontation. Once again, the border clashes and ceasefire violations quite frequently and intensively erupted and increased in the line of contact over the past two decades. On March 2016, Azerbaijan and Armenian presidents were coming back from the Nuclear Summit organized in Washington. Washington meeting handled several key issues, specifically their bilateral relations and certain area developments, however, the US also delivered its position as critical as expected over the democratic credentials. The Azerbaijan's territorial integrity was affirmed by US leadership.⁽²⁹²⁾ The discussion circled around about the start of the April War right after the summit linked to the criticism and disappointment that

²⁹⁰ Broers, p.3.

²⁹¹ International Crisis Group-ICG, "Nagorno-Karabakh New Opening, or More Peril?", **Europe Report No: 239**, Baku/Yerevan/Vienna/Brussels, July 4, 2016, p.2.

²⁹² "State Department about meeting Kerry with Ilahm Aliyev", **Flnka.ru**, 31.03.2016, <https://flnka.ru/english/news/12889-state-department-about-meeting-kerry-with-aliyev.html>, (05.01.2019)

Azerbaijan faces in the summit. However, if this probability were a true story, then the Armenian President would have materialized it, because he was in the same summit. Obviously, Baku did not overestimated the role of the US more specifically Barak Obama administration's role over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement, and Baku's expectations were low considering the attitude of the US towards the situation was quite outgoing.⁽²⁹³⁾ In the summit it was expected that many unclear issues would be clarified, and US Assistant Secretary of State for European, Victoria Nuland demonstrated his role by blocking the resolution, that in January, 2016 the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe rejected the resolution in Karabakh. However, the territorial integrity issue was highlighted by the resolution.⁽²⁹⁴⁾

The "Four Day War" was particularly correlated with the domestic factors, mainly economic failure. This story would have been issue that is more sensible if the fighting coincided in January 2016, because regional protests occurred in 2015 against the price hikes after the Azerbaijan's national currency devaluated in front of dollar. In that moment, an official initiative to impose the internal perplexity to distract people's concentration from economic issue to the national integrity would have been a strong argument. On the contrary, devaluation over the national currency reinforced Baku leadership to empower the political stability, considering its international investments on mega gas projects required high and urgent security. Current insecurity in the region is deterring the potential investors to turn their heads toward the region, because as long as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was and is signaling the possibility of war no matter the stability is validated under the ceasefire, the April war once again proved that their fears are credible. One the Baku's priorities were to share and invest for the TANAP (Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project) project's financial burden, which was signified. While other requests of Baku were pending from the European Investment Bank (EIB), they

²⁹³ Zaur Shiriyeu, "The 'Four-Day War': Changing Paradigms in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 2017, p.54.

²⁹⁴ "Azerbaijan clarifying Nuland's role in non-adoption of Karabakh resolution," *Azvision.az*, 10.02.2016, <https://en.azvision.az/news/29979/azerbaijan-clarifying-nulands-role-in-non-adoption-of-karabakh-resolution.html>, (05.01.2019)

attained on securing one billion Euros loan to invest for the TANAP's construction, which Baku managed it by the early February 2016.⁽²⁹⁵⁾

Actually, the fundamental background of the April War had been already signaled in 2014 skirmishes in the Line of Contact, where the intensity of the border clashes were messaging the upcoming skirmishes would be worse. Both sides used heavy military equipment, which empowered and allowed commanders on both sides to deploy these heavy equipment on the Line of Contact.⁽²⁹⁶⁾ Since the early 2016, Armenia moved to active deterrence strategy from a immobile defense mode. In the April War, this was his very aggressive and offensive response to the restarted conflict. However, there was internal claim in Armenia the by local experts, stating that manifesto actually comes from the 2014 August skirmishes and Armenia actually changed its strategy at that time.⁽²⁹⁷⁾ This deterrence strategy intended to focus on one issue was pushing Azerbaijan's forces back till out of front line, which certainly would suspend the skirmishes as a result. However, Azerbaijan reported that its military forces on the borderline gave active response towards the increase fire from Armenia, which caused heavy losses for Armenia in March 2016.⁽²⁹⁸⁾ Armenia's strategic change after the August 2014 skirmishes and its implications became most likely an incentive for Azerbaijan to give unequal excessive response to Armenia in the April War. Once again Azerbaijan proved with the April War, that its territorial loss is not reconcilable, and will never reconcile and even compromise for it.⁽²⁹⁹⁾

According to Azerbaijan, the reason for the April War 2016 was the intensive military provocation from Armenia in the entire year. For this reason, Azerbaijan as a response developed a small-scale operations strategy in Karabakh, which means

²⁹⁵ David O'Byrne, "European Investment Bank Approves \$1 Billion Funding for TANAP Gas Pipeline", **Eurasianet.org**, 16.03.2018, <https://eurasianet.org/european-investment-bank-approves-1-billion-funding-for-tanap-gas-pipeline>, (05.01.2019)

²⁹⁶ Agence France-Presse in Baku, "Armenian military helicopter shot down by Azerbaijani forces, killing three", **TheGuardian.com**, 12.11.2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/12/azerbaijani-forces-shoot-down-armenian-military-helicopter>, (05.01.2019)

²⁹⁷ "Armenia to Switch to Karabakh 'Deterrence' Strategy", **Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty**, Armenia, 19.02.2016, <https://www.rferl.org/a/armenian-karabakh-strategy-change-azerbaijan/27562092.html>, (04.02.2019)

²⁹⁸ "Heavy shelling rocks fragile ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh," **Reuters**, 11.03.2016, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN0WD18E>, (05.01.2019)

²⁹⁹ Seymour Mammadov, "Why did Armenia lose the April War", **The Jerusalem Post**, 02.04.2018, <https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Why-did-Armenia-lose-the-April-War-547746>, (08.01.2019)

Controlled Conflicted Strategy. The situation was convenient for Azerbaijan to go even beyond the small-scale operations, to conduct full-scale war in Karabakh. By this active operations several important and strategic locations around Karabakh, where recaptured by Azerbaijan military forces, which were Leletepe, Seysulan, and Talish. Thus, Azerbaijan was acting impatiently towards the status quo regime, because of its tremendous oil and gas richness pushed country to invest huge amount of money on a military build-up. Azerbaijan in 2015, spent 3 billion dollars on its military, which was higher than entire national budget of Armenia.^{(300),(301),(302)}

The Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan on April 5, announced that bilateral ceasefire was handled already, which was attained in Moscow. The reason for this sharp decision was that the Armenian forces used mortars with 60, 82, and 120mm which covered Tapgaraqoyunlu settlement belongs to Goychay region in Azerbaijan.⁽³⁰³⁾ Azerbaijan authorities alleged accordingly the high caliber artillery was targeted by Armenian forces towards the mosque in Azerbaijan, particularly Ahmadagali settlement where it killed one civilian.⁽³⁰⁴⁾ Russian press reportedly state the Azerbaijan's damage houses as a result of these artillery attack.⁽³⁰⁵⁾

³⁰⁰ "Over 20 Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers killed in Jan-Feb" **Intellinew.com**, 29.03.2016, <https://www.intellinews.com/over-20-armenian-and-azerbaijani-soldiers-killed-in-jan-feb-93829/>, (27.12.2018)

In the entire period of January and February 2016, at the Nagorno-Karabakh border skirmishes Azerbaijan and Armenia lost four soldiers.

³⁰¹ "Armenian soldier fatally wounded and killed in Azerbaijani grenade explosion", **Times.com**, 12.03.2016, <https://times.am/?p=162110&l=en>, (20.11.2018)

During the April War in 2016, more precisely from the first to fifth of April, the total number of killed soldiers at the line of contact were as such: 31 to 93 dead soldiers from Azerbaijan and 92 dead soldiers from Armenia according to the Ministry of Defense's publishing. Besides these, three soldiers from Azerbaijan and one from Armenia were missing. Furthermore, the fight caused at least 10 civilians lives, which were six from Azerbaijan and four from Armenia.

³⁰² "Karabakh War Causality Update: Armenia puts April death toll at 92", **Armenianow.com**, 14.04.2016, <https://www.armenianow.com/en/karabakh/2016/04/14/armenia-casualties-update-karabakh-april/951/>, (22.11.2018)

³⁰³ "The ceasefire regime is still being violated by the units of the Armenian Armed Forces". **Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan**, 06.04.2016, <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/the-ceasefire-regime-is-still-being-violated-by-the-units-of-the-armenian-armed-forces-12794.html>, (27.11.2018)

³⁰⁴ "Армяне разбомбили мечеть, погиб сельский житель", [Armies are ravaged by the mysterious nature of village], **Musavat.com**, 16.04.2016, http://musavat.com/news/novosti-casa/armyane-razbombili-mecet-pogib-selskiy-zhitel_337378.html, (23.11.2018)

³⁰⁵ Vladimir Dargachev, "Сражался и погиб как мужчина", [He Fought and Died like a Man], **Газета.ru**, 12.04.2016, https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/04/07_a_8165687.shtml?updated, (05.12.2018)

Samvel Babayan as the former Minister of Defense of de-facto Nagorno-Karabakh stated that Azerbaijan military forces recaptured territories, which were strategically important, and they recaptured within one hour.⁽³⁰⁶⁾

The international reactions were quite diverse. Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs urged the conflicting parties, to terminate the fighting immediately and resume the ceasefire.⁽³⁰⁷⁾ Ban Ki-Moon the former Secretary General of United Nations demanded all the parties got involved into the conflict pursue an immediate stop of exchanging fires and rely on ceasefire agreement.⁽³⁰⁸⁾ Pedro Agramun as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe-PACE sent an immediate call to the conflicting parties to stand for ceasefire and proceed the peace negotiations. In addition, he called Armenia to conduct an immediate withdrawal from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan in consent to the United Nations Security Resolutions.⁽³⁰⁹⁾ The co-Chairs of the Minsk Group on its side delivered its expression, stating the along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh, the full-scale violence resulted bloodiest war, therefore, co-Chairs strongly criticized the both sides that got into this full-scale of fighting, which regrettably caused many pointless loss of soldiers, including civilians.⁽³¹⁰⁾ Therefore, in April 5 was scheduled as OSCE Minsk Group's meeting in Vienna to discuss the entitled incidents.⁽³¹¹⁾

The 'April War' or 'Four-Day War' in April 2016 did not influence the conflict resolution process positively, instead the border clashes were escalated in following years. According to the Thomas De Waal, is an author of the 'Black

³⁰⁶ “Самвел Бабалян: Легко говорить, что вы в Баку будете пить чай. Скорее, наоборот”, [Samvel Babayan: It is easy to say that you will drink tea in Baku. Rather, the opposite is true], **Armenianreport.com**, 03.06.2016. <http://armenianreport.com/pubs/131568/>, (05.12.2018)

³⁰⁷ “Top EU Diplomat Mogherini Calls for End to Fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh”, **Sputnik News.com**, 02.04.2016, <https://sputniknews.com/politics/201604021037381544-mogherini-nagorno-karabakh/>, (27.11.2018)

³⁰⁸ “Генсек ООН призвал немедленно прекратить столкновения в Карабахе”, [UN Secretary-General urged immediately stop the clashes in Karabakh], **Ria.ru**, 02.04.2016, <https://ria.ru/20160402/1401551089.html>, (28.11.2018)

³⁰⁹ “PACE President calls for respect of ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh”, **Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe**, 03.04.2016, <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-EN.asp?newsid=6094&lang=2&cat=15>, (29.11.2018)

³¹⁰ “OSCE Minsk Group Calls for ending Hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh (Video)”, **SputnikNews.com**, 02.04.2016, <https://sputniknews.com/europe/201604021037378602-nagorno-karabakhconflict-osce/>, (05.12.2018)

³¹¹ “OSCE Minsk Group to Discuss Nagorno-Karabakh Escalated Tensions on April 5”, **SputnikNews.com**, 02.04.2016, <https://sputniknews.com/politics/201604021037386131-osce-conflict-minsk/>, (05.12.2018)

Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War', right after the April fighting, both parties went back to their corners and became a bit quite unlikely, because of any possible upcoming violence would be hard to accommodate in comparison to previous ones.⁽³¹²⁾

3.2.2. Obstacles for Peace

Certainly, a common question asked since 1994, is what are the fundamental and updated obstacles for peace? The answers could be various. Perhaps, Azerbaijan does not want to compromise its territorial integrity and asks Armenia to withdraw its militants with no conditions. On the contrary, Armenia has no intention to rely on that demand, but is on the table for peace talks. Furthermore, the Minsk Group still handles the negotiation process with no positive hope. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still depends on third party's mediation; however, the lack of neutrality among the mediators postpones or slows down the negotiation process. For instance, the mediators in the OSCE Minsk Group did not demonstrate impartiality while mediating the peace talks, therefore, the peace settlement process remains ineffective.⁽³¹³⁾ The mediators' partial effort was expectedly ineffective and would not bring positive change over the peace talks, considering the conflicting parties obtained a belief that that mediators pursue a lack of impartiality. Considering that mediators are the only power to reconcile the conflict, the expectation is very high about their influence on the meditation. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since the 1994 involved three main international organizations to pursue the mediation and peace settlement process. These are, CSCE-Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which later turned out to become the OSCE, UNSC-United Nations Security Council, and CIS-Commonwealth of Independent States. Individually each organization pursues its own vision, role, strategy and position in the mediation

³¹² Thomas De Waal, "Prisoners of the Caucasus: Resolving the Karabakh Security Dilemma", **Carnegie Europe**, 16.06.2016, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/06/16/prisoners-of-caucasus-resolving-karabakh-security-dilemma/jlyq>, (13.12.2018)

³¹³ Michael J. Baranick and Samuel Schwabe, "In Pursuit of Peace in Peace Nagorno-Karabakh", **The International Symposium on Military Operational Research (ISMOR)**, December 18, 2006, p. 321.

process, by offering various solutions, however, until now none of them have achieved a positive result over the conflict. Whenever they acted actively the initiative was confronted with the influence of international and regional actors' interests. All the organizational mediators were lacking on bring an effective measure to end the peace settlement. Presumably, it happens because of their power demonstration and competition, which has better instruments to conduct. The problem emerges when the mediators act not according to the organizational principles but out of these principles, quite often they contradict each other. In order to expand one's influence over the mediation process, they tried to suppress other's role in that arena to increase their own role actively in order to achieve a better result. Although the competition on mediation is ongoing among the organizations there is no positive impact on conflict settlement, and this competition has preserved the conflict until now.⁽³¹⁴⁾ Thus, the biggest obstacle in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace settlement has been observed as less impartial and dishonest mediation. Considering the imperfect role of the OSCE Minsk Group, as well as the impossibility of the conflicting parties to get along for a separate negotiation, attraction of the regional energy richness for international and regional actors over the trade routes, leads to rethink the role of the mediators over the peace process. Nevertheless, the OSCE Minsk Group is the only political organ involved in active mediation process yet in time it became inactive. The co-chairs lost their credibility and trustworthiness by pursuing lack of impartiality on peace settlement process, and they presumably lost their certain interest to bring peace settlement over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, considering the geopolitical situation has been evolved in the South Caucasus and security dynamics became complex. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement requires a new progressive, politically credible, promising mediator to handle the peace process for achieving a result as earlier as possible.⁽³¹⁵⁾

As long as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains unsettled, the regional security and stability will be under the threat and peace will be a utopic notion. It will threaten the potential regional cooperation in the South Caucasus and regional development will remain under question. The April War in 2016, once again proved that the status of the conflict is not frozen, but always ready to be changed

³¹⁴ Baranick and Schwabe, p.322.

³¹⁵ Baranick and Schwabe, pp.322, 323.

dangerously. Antonio Guterres as the United Nations Secretary General once again approved that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict does not fit into the ‘frozen conflict’ term, because it was frequently related to the conflicts in Europe. He additionally rose a fact stating that as long as the peace agreement did not signed bilaterally and has gone into force, then the danger in the South Caucasus over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will remain, which the ‘April War’ is a real example.⁽³¹⁶⁾

The governments also have to pay attention to the public support. Without public approval, the implementation of the peace process will prove futile. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict negotiations presumably considered one of the high ranked peace talks in the world with its most reticent and least inclusive peace talks.⁽³¹⁷⁾

³¹⁶ “Never Take Peace in Europe for Granted, Say Speakers as Security Council Holds Open Debate on Region’s Protracted Conflicts,” **United Nations Security Council, 7886th Meeting (AM), SC12724**, 21.02. 2017, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12724.doc.htm>, (17.12.2018)

³¹⁷ De Waal, p.168.

CHAPTER IV: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND RESOLUTION OF THE NAGORNO- KARABAKH CONFLICT

4.1. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

4.1.1. Azerbaijan and Armenia Relations as a Security Dilemma

The analysis of the security framework about the interstate conflict in the South Caucasus based on Security Dilemma is very crucial. The South Caucasus countries did not have a separate army during the Soviet Union period, and their men citizens have to complete a military service under the auspices of the Union. Moscow was applying a policy not allowing to have military of their own them.⁽³¹⁸⁾ This lack of military training negatively influenced Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. First of all, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991⁽³¹⁹⁾, the South Caucasus states got independence. After having and with this independence Armenia and Azerbaijan involved in a regional ethnic conflict which turned out to be an interstate conflict during 1988-1994.⁽³²⁰⁾ Non-of the states had enough munitions to fight. While the Azerbaijani people were using hunting guns for fighting, Russia's 366⁽³²¹⁾ numbered military battalion stood on the side of Armenia, particularly on conducting Khojaly genocide on 26 February 1992.⁽³²²⁾

After the 1994 cease-fire agreement ⁽³²³⁾ Azerbaijan signed "treaty of century" in 1994 September 20,⁽³²⁴⁾ and its oil industry boosted up tremendously. Besides other sectors, increasing its military capabilities with high level of

³¹⁸ Doctoral student has made interview with the former soldiers that served during the Soviet Union.
³¹⁹ "Fall of the Soviet Union", **The Cold War Museum**, http://www.coldwar.org/articles/90s/fall_of_the_soviet_union.asp, (03.01.2019)

³²⁰ Administrative Department of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan/ Presidential Library, **Armenian-Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict**, Baku, 2005, p. 10.

³²¹ Aysel Bədəlova, "Ermənistan-Azərbaycan Münaqişəsində Rusya Faktoru", **Qafqazşünasların 1-ci Beynəlxalq Formu 2-ci kitabı**, [Aysel Badalova, Russian Factor in the Armenian-Azerbaijan Conflict, **Qafqazşünasların 1-ci Beynəlxalq Formu 2-ci kitab, First International Forum of the Caucasus Studies Scholars II Book**], Institute of the Caucasus Studies of ANAS, Scientific Papers, Baku, April 17-18, 2017, p. 243.

³²² "Xocalı soyqırımı hakkında məlumat", [Information About the Khojaly Genocide], **Ombudsman.gov.az**, <http://www.ombudsman.gov.az/az/view/pages/163>, (03.01.2019)

³²³ "Ümumi xülasə", "General Summary", **Mfa.gov.az**, <http://mfa.gov.az/content/835>, (04.01.2019)

³²⁴ "Əsrin Müqaviləsi", [Treaty of Century], **Minenergy.gov.az**, <http://www.minenergy.gov.az/index.php/az/19-energetika/neft/315-esrin-muqavilesi>, (02.01.2019)

technologies and munitions became one of the state priorities as far as being on war condition position. In 2018 Azerbaijani's military budget was 2,738⁽³²⁵⁾ billion Azerbaijani manat, and it in 2019 it became around 2 billion was 4.6% higher than the previous year comparatively.⁽³²⁶⁾ On the other hand, Armenian military budget was 600 million dollar in 2018, and they intended to increase military expenditure in 2019 in order not to be behind Azerbaijan considering they are in conflict.⁽³²⁷⁾

Through the lens of Security Dilemma, some important factors should be underlined in Armenian–Azerbaijan relations despite that both countries are in the condition of cease-fire and protecting status quo.⁽³²⁸⁾ Both parties have been struggling on peaceful settlement after the bloody war, both sides have been publicizing military development by demonstrating their defensive readiness for any offensive action. Azerbaijan for the defensive purposes produced its several material rifles-snipers; famous one is Istiglal IST-14-5 Anti Material Rifle, which was recorded in 2008 and unveiled in 2009. The Jordanian, Pakistan, uses these Turkish armies beside Azerbaijan. These weapons have been particularly leading to a security dilemma.⁽³²⁹⁾

After the Nagorno-Karabakh war the UN Security Council has adopted several resolutions articles such as 822, 853, 874 and 884⁽³³⁰⁾ stating that Armenia must withdraw its military forces the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Yet, the UN could not resolve the conflict. Thus, Azerbaijan felt that it has to maximize its offensive and defensive capabilities. For examples, Azerbaijan held an agreement

³²⁵ “Aərbaycan hərbi xərclərini 1,123 milyard manat artırdı”, [Azerbaijan increased its military expenditure as 1,123 billion manat], **Azeri Defense**, 20.10.2017, <http://az.azeridefence.com/azerbaycan-herbi-xerclerini-1-123-milyard-manat-artirdi/>, (03.01.2019)

³²⁶ “2019-cu ildə Azərbaycan hərbi büdcəsi açıqlandı”, [In 2019 Azerbaijan released its military budget], **Banco.az**, 18.01.2019, <http://banco.az/az/news/2019-cu-ilde-azerbaycanin-herbi-budcesi-aciqlandi>, (29.01.2019)

³²⁷ “Ermenistan savunma bütçesi büyüyor ve Ermeni bütçesi modernleşiyor”, [Armenian defense budget is increasing and Armenian army is modernizing], **Ermenihaber.am**, 08.10.2018, <https://www.ermenihaber.am/tr/news/2018/10/08/Ermenistan-ordusu-savunma-b%C3%BCt%C3%A7esi/138678>, (05.01.2019)

³²⁸ Barry R. Rosen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”, **Survival: Global Politics and Strategy**, 1993, pp.27-47.

³²⁹ “Azərbaycan Silahlı Qüvvələrinin 100 illiyi münasibətilə Bakıda təntənəli hərbi parad keçirilib Azərbaycan Prezidenti Ali Baş Komandan İlham Əliyev hərbi paradda olub”, [Supreme Commander President İlham Aliyev attended on 100 years of Azerbaijani armed forces anniversary], **Mod.gov.az**, 26.06.2018, <https://mod.gov.az/az/news/azerbaycan-silahli-quvvelerinin-100-illiyi-munasibetile-bakida-tenteneli-herbi-parad-kecirilib-azerbaycan-prezidenti-ali-23207.html>, (04.01.2019)

³³⁰ “1993 UN Security Council Resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh” **US Department of State Archive**, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/13508.htm>, (04.01.2019)

with Pakistan to buy 24 JF-17 war jets for 500 million dollars.⁽³³¹⁾ Furthermore, Azerbaijan bought Hermes 900 type suicide drones from Israel in 2017 for 17 million dollars. Nevertheless, these weapons are also leading to a security dilemma.⁽³³²⁾

Armenia's main munitions supplier has been Russia at the first place. In 2018, Armenia brought additional weapons and military equipment, from Russia for 100 million dollars loan such as Kornet-E type laser-guided anti-tank missiles.⁽³³³⁾

Apparently, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan has conflict of interest, and occasional border clashes or ceasefire violations were not actual-violent conflicts, because of the signed ceasefire agreement and compliance with the status quo. However, misperception and security dilemma in regards to defensive weapons sometimes has accelerated violence, which happened in the "Four Day War" in April 2016.⁽³³⁴⁾

Azerbaijan with its boosted economic richness and giant investment on military sector, gives an offensive concern to Armenia by signaling that a new war is inevitable. This misperception and uncertainty of the real objective of Azerbaijan is hastening Armenia to increase its military capability.⁽³³⁵⁾ By this reality Azerbaijan stands on a defensive but mostly an offensive position, because of its intention to retain the lost territories. Azerbaijan holds peace negotiations or stays ready to defend any attack. This situation explains that security dilemma proves futile, meaning that maximizing its own military capability Azerbaijan has no intention to

³³¹ "Azərbaycan, Pakistan'dan JF-17 savaş uçağı alıyor", [Azerbaijan is buying JF-17 war jets from Pakistan], **Kokpit.aero**, 10.12.2018, <http://www.kokpit.aero/azerbaycan-pakistan-jf-17-satisi>, (04.01.2019)

³³² "Azərbaycan İsrailden milyonlarca dolarlık kamikaze drone alıyor", [Azerbaijan is buying million dollars kamikaze drones from Israel], **Tr.euronews.com**, Last update: 18.02.2019, <https://tr.euronews.com/2019/02/18/azerbaycan-israil-den-milyonlarca-dolarlik-kamikaze-drone-aliyor>, (04.01.2019)

³³³ "Rusya Ermenistan'a silah satışına devam ediyor: Hedefte Azerbaycan var ", [Russia continues on selling arms to Armenia: Azerbaijan is on the target], **OldQha.com.ua**, 04.2018, <http://old.qha.com.ua/tr/askeri-guvenlik/rusya-ermenistan-a-silah-satisina-devam-ediyor-hedefte-azerbaycan-var/168532/>, (06.01.2019)

³³⁴ "Aprel döyüşləri"- böyük zəfərin başlanğıcı", [April War-the beginning of great victory], **Mod.gov.az**, 17.02. 2018, <https://mod.gov.az/az/pre/21662.html>, (06.01.2019)

³³⁵ **Armine Zakaryan** was a representative of the Peace Dialogue NGO of Armenian stated on her speech in the regional conflict held in Georgia, in 2013 was titled "Conflicts and Peacebuilding in South Caucasus", that Azerbaijan is increasing its military munitions and that is quite normal that Armenia concerns this.

start a new war by violating the ceasefire agreement and status quo, however, unintentionally causes fear in Armenia for an offensive attack.⁽³³⁶⁾

Nonetheless, Azerbaijan and Armenian relations are quite tense now. The situation can go from calm into actual violent conflict. Yet, both sides believe that this conflict is reconcilable which was also stated by the newly elected prime-minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan on his interview to the Deutsche Welle service.⁽³³⁷⁾

Once again, it proves that security dilemma is evident. Lack of malign intention to operate is core requirement in security dilemma, meaning that between the two states, on the moment both sides are threatening each other unintentionally. Additionally, security dilemma is not either psychological or perceptual but very structural by origin, because security dilemma can be productive by only where the self-help is very competitive.⁽³³⁸⁾ In short, Azerbaijan and Armenian conflict was driven by the misperception and security dilemma.⁽³³⁹⁾

The Security Dilemma emerges in Azerbaijan and Armenia relations as deterrence model rather than spiral model. Clear difference between these two models is the intention of the parties. Broadly, deterrence model emphasizes the malign intention of state-meaning one state may keep itself secure only by deterring other state. However, the state of intention in the spiral model is benign. None of the parties' desire to harm opposite and this fearful situation makes both sides aggressive because of the misperceived atmosphere. Considering that, Azerbaijan is trying to make the situation better for itself by increasing its military procurement and weaponry technology to deter a real aggressor. But it has no intention to go attack.⁽³⁴⁰⁾

³³⁶ "Azərbaycan ordusu işğal olunmuş torpaqlarını azad etməyə hazırdır", [Azerbaijani army is ready to release its occupied territories], **Mod.gov.az**, 20.03.2017, <https://mod.gov.az/az/news/azerbaycan-ordusu-isgal-olunmus-torpaqlarimizi-azad-etmeye-hazirdir-18015.html>, (05.01.2019)

³³⁷ "Paşinyan Qarabağ münaqişəsinin sülh yolu ilə həllində alternativ görmür", [Pashinyan doesn't see alternative to the peaceful solution over Nagorno-Karabakh], **Old.armradio.am**, 30.05.2018, <http://old.armradio.am/az/2018/05/30/pasinyan-qarabag-munaqis%C9%99sinin-sulh-yolu-il%C9%99-h%C9%99llind%C9%99-alternativ-gormur/>, (04.01.2019)

³³⁸ Shiping Tang, "Security Dilemma and ethnic conflict: toward a dynamic of integrative theory of ethnic conflict", **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 37, No.2, April, 2011, p.517.

³³⁹ L. Freedman, "Perception and Misperception in International Politics" by Robert Jervis, **Royal Institute of International Affairs**, Vol. 54, No. 1, 1978, pp. 94-95.

³⁴⁰ Paul Roe, "The Interstate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflicts as a 'Tragedy'?", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.36, No.2, March, 1999, pp.186-187.

4.1.2. Challenges on Regional Security in the long-run

In fact, more than 25 years has passed since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Yet still no positive result has been obtained.⁽³⁴¹⁾ Considerably, conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh is a main threat for the regional security and peace in the South Caucasus. This does not only violate political integration, but being a potential transit zone to the region that links the Caucasus to Europe for trade.⁽³⁴²⁾ After the cease-fire agreement both countries moved on ‘no war- no peace’ situation. Nevertheless, situation-triggered sides go into an actual war sometimes. The Nagorno-Karabakh region including seven surrounding regions also got affected. Beside the negative impact on the Azerbaijan and Armenian humanitarian, geopolitical, and economic situation, the region got isolated completely. Yet this region is very rich with its natural resources and potentials of tourism. Because of the war, Azerbaijan citizens cannot go to the other side. Agricultural, economic and social infrastructure should be developed.⁽³⁴³⁾

Nagorno-Karabakh was known with its natural resources such as mineral water⁽³⁴⁴⁾ and gold⁽³⁴⁵⁾ and platinum. The region used to be agriculturally strategic zone for the Azerbaijani farmers in regards to easy irrigation. After the territorial occupation, Azerbaijani’s 43% of agricultural production was cut which caused food crises during the first stage of war. The irrigation system collapsed after the conflict, that made drastic damage in the Azerbaijani’s economy, and for the government it took almost a decade to build up a new one. Negative impact of the conflict did not limit itself with Azerbaijan only; Armenia could not extract the region’s natural

³⁴¹ “Füzuli və Cəbrayıl rayonlarının işğalından 25 il ötür”, [25 years passed out of occupation of the Jabrayıl and Fuzuli regions], **Dailykarabakh.com**, 23.08.2018, <https://www.dailykarabakh.com/news.php?id=8958&lang=az>, (04.01.2019)

³⁴² Gunel Shukurova and Khayala Gadimova, “The Impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the regional prosperity of the South Caucasus”, **Newseasterneurope.eu**, 23.04.2018, <http://newseasterneurope.eu/2018/04/23/impact-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-regional-prosperity-south-caucasus/>, (04.01.2019)

³⁴³ Shukurova and Gadimova, “The Impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the regional prosperity of the South Caucasus”, **Newseasterneurope.eu**.

³⁴⁴ “Kəlbəcər rayonu İsti su (1948)”, [Kelbejer rayon hot water (1948)], VIDEO, **Youtube.com**, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BafJJIJs3xA>, (04.01.2019)

³⁴⁵ “Göyçə mahalı, Zod kəndi”, [Goycha district, Zod village], **Vetensesi.qmkdk.gov.az**, http://vetensesi.qmkdk.gov.az/news_content.php?id=1237, (05.01.2019)

resources because of the destroyed infrastructure and poor economy, but instead focused on deploying its armies in the region.⁽³⁴⁶⁾

Another negative impact of the conflict resulted with the huge number of migration flow- around 1 million Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) fled out of conflicted area and lived in tents more than decades and later on the Azerbaijani government reestablished new settlement for them.⁽³⁴⁷⁾

April Four Day War in 2016 showed up once again the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh is a threat for the regional security in many terms. Four days perhaps do not seem long for an actual violence, however, its consequences have made actors to rethink, which influenced civilians, private border infrastructure, regional economy, and damaged interstate peace negotiations. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense reported that, during the short war, around 232 private houses, necessary parts of gas and water pipes, 3 electric substations, and 99 electric poles had been destroyed.⁽³⁴⁸⁾ The Four Day War proved that in the region as long as the situation is struggling among no peace and no war, then anxiety for future still remains.⁽³⁴⁹⁾

The conflict affects not only the regional actors but also international actors. Strategically, Azerbaijan carries its two oil and gas pipelines via western part of Azerbaijan that passes near the conflicting areas. Any possible conflict could put the regional trade in danger, and the hopes of Europe of being independent from the Russian energy could fail.⁽³⁵⁰⁾

It is undeniable fact that neither conflicted parties Armenia and Azerbaijan nor none of the external actors wants any upcoming violent conflict in the region. However, no one guarantees that in the future single border clashes will not escalate

³⁴⁶ Shukurova and Gadimova, Newseasterneurope.eu.

³⁴⁷ "The state has always focused on the solution of the problems of refugees and internally displaced persons", **Qmkdk.gov.az**, <http://www.qmkdk.gov.az/en/pages/3.html>, (03.01.2019)

³⁴⁸ "Nagorno-Karabakh: Affected civilians of both sides of conflict wait for peace and justice to come", **International Federation for Human Rights-FIDH situation note**, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/20160713_nagorno_karabakh_situation_note_en_final.pdf, (05.01.2019)

³⁴⁹ "The danger of no peace, no war in Nagorno-Karabakh", **Turkishpolicy.com**, 21.03.2018, <http://turkishpolicy.com/article/900/the-danger-of-no-peace-no-war-in-nagorno-karabakh>, (04.01.2019)

³⁵⁰ "Explainer: Why the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis matters", **Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty**, 05.04.2016, <https://www.rferl.org/a/nagorno-karabakh-explainer-conflict-azerbaijan-armenia/27656158.html>, (05.01.2019)

into a bloody war. The uncertainty in the borderline is very dangerous and it may happen within a night. Therefore, the situation in the region is kind of ready bomb to blast and to spill over internationally.⁽³⁵¹⁾

The expectation from the international involvement is too high, that is also very paradoxical that, considering one of the co-Chairs of the Minsk Group is Russia. From time to time, it handles the mediation role separately, but at the same time supplying Armenia and Azerbaijan with military munitions, which influences the perception of each country. Broadly, Armenia is prioritizing its security; in order to prevent the possible violence that could emerge towards its community. By contrast, Azerbaijan's security perception is currently dominated by an unfavorable status quo, because of the territories of Azerbaijan are seen as under the foreign occupation. Azerbaijan rejects the policy on tightening security measures along the Line of Contact and wait the security arrangements and involvement of international powers which is seen stagnating the return of its territorial integrity.⁽³⁵²⁾

4.1.3. Insecurity in the Region and Armenian 'Terror Attacks'

The region is very unsecure politically because of the unresolved conflict and inexistence of the regional peace settlement. The internal security for Azerbaijan became main priority. However, after the end of the bloody war, the Azerbaijani government was not fully capable to have a systematic security plan. Yet the government didn't expect any security threat beside the border clashes with Armenia.⁽³⁵³⁾

The Azerbaijani government underestimated the first terroristic attack that can come from Armenia. In 1994 March 19, Baku metro station a bomb was blasted by the Armenian Intelligence Service. According to the ANS PRESS, during the blast 14 people died, and 49 people wounded. Among the dead bodies national artist

³⁵¹ Tracey German, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia: Security Issues in the Caucasus", **Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs**, Vol.32, No.2, 2012, pp. 216-229

³⁵² Conciliation Resources, SAAA.

³⁵³ Isabella Langerak, "Regime Stability in Azerbaijan", **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, 2014.

of Azerbaijan, Rafiq Babayev⁽³⁵⁴⁾ was found. The court proved that the terror attack organized by the Armenian Intelligence service and operated by the separatist “Sadval”⁽³⁵⁵⁾ lesgi⁽³⁵⁶⁾ organizational members. The truth released the separatist members “Sadval” that had been several times in Armenia since 1992, and very closely participated on the formation, financing and arming of the Armenian National Security Department. In 1992, April and May, around 30 people with Lezgin nationality but citizens of Azerbaijan, took part in particular terror attacks preparation in the Lusakert district located in Nairi region of Armenia. During the investigation it was released that they also intended to bomb Nizami metro station, Republican Palace, and Baku Flash Light Factory.⁽³⁵⁷⁾

Another internal security threat was signaled by the “Meşə Qardaşları”- “Forest Brothers” who were known for the first time with the blast happened in Abu Bakir Mosque, Baku in 2008 August 17. According to the findings, the intention of the blast was part of the terror operation, and therefore, further investigation process was pursued by the Azerbaijan’s Ministry of National Security. In the same year, the Ministry of National Security of Azerbaijan conducted an operation capturing 26 members of “Forest Brothers” and plenty of weapons, hand bombs, schemes and tools for preparing bombs, special communication tools, various maps and so forth had taken off. During the investigation they claimed many other facts happened and stayed mysterious within the country.⁽³⁵⁸⁾⁽³⁵⁹⁾

‘Forest Brothers’ were radical Islamic groups with an intention of creating ‘Sharia state’ in the Caucasus. They labeled themselves as new ‘Robin Hood’ by using their guerrilla tactics. The radical group was active in Dagistan, Chechniya particularly. It is important to differentiate the Forest Brothers who resisted the

³⁵⁴ Rafiq Fariz oglu Babayev, an Azerbaijani jazz musician, composer, conductor, arranger, author of scores for films and was nominated as People’s Artist of Azerbaijan.

³⁵⁵ Sadval was Lesgin National Movement was established in 1990 in Darben Dagestan (USSR), to fight against Azerbaijani government in order to create their own country which supposed to call Legistan.

³⁵⁶ Lezgins are one of the minority groups are living in northern part of Azerbaijani regions are Quba, Gabala, Khachmaz, Qusar. They speak lesgin language.

³⁵⁷ “19 Mart metro partlayışı: unutmariq, bağışlamariq”, [March 19 metro bombing: unforgotten, unforgiveable], **Day.az**, 19.03.2014, <https://news.day.az/society/475645.html>, (05.01.2019)

³⁵⁸ “Meşə Qardaşları haqda şok açıqlamakar!”, [Shocking facts about the Forest Brothers], **Mediainfo.az**, 14.05.2011, <http://mediainfo.az/kriminal/1616>, (05.01.2019)

³⁵⁹ Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Dagestani Jamaat Expands Operations into Azerbaijan”, **The Jamestown Foundation, North Caucasus Weekly**, Vol.9, Issue: 44, 24.11.2008, <https://jamestown.org/program/dagestani-jamaat-expands-operations-into-azerbaijan/>, (05.01.2019)

Soviet Union occupation after the World War II. According to the Azerbaijani and Russian media in 2008, Ilgar Mollachiyev established the Forest Brothers as a Dagestani branch in Azerbaijan, Sumgayit rayon, which was called jamaat connecting with the Quba, and Qusar jamaat the branch was comprised.⁽³⁶⁰⁾

The next terror attack happened in April 30, 2009, at the State Oil Academy of Azerbaijan. Qadirov Farda was a citizen of Georgia who was born in 1980, entered the building with the 'Makarov' type gun where Oil Mechanics and Gas and Oil Mine faculties were located, and shot everybody. Consequently, 13 people were wounded and 13 people were killed. At the end, he had committed suicide when he realized police surround the building. On his dead body, three cartridges and two pistols were found, with the capacity of 71 bullets. After the incident, the investigation asserted that the organizer of the terror attacks was Mardun Gumashyan from Georgia. The fact proved that Gumashyan⁽³⁶¹⁾ promised to pay 50.000 dollars to the killer.⁽³⁶²⁾

Obviously, the Azerbaijani government took the intensive security control, calculating all the risks. The government started to promote multiculturalism⁽³⁶³⁾ and tolerance, as a state policy with various reasons. Firstly, Azerbaijan is multiethnic and multi-religious country, which embraces all minorities. 9,4% of the population of the Azerbaijan holds different cultures, religions, and traditions, including Armenians after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.⁽³⁶⁴⁾ Second, according to the constitution religion is apart from state. Thirdly, legally all the citizens no matter from which ethnic and religious background have protection guaranteed under the national law.⁽³⁶⁵⁾ The French political scientist, Olivier Roy quoted that "Today

³⁶⁰"Forest Brothers", **Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium**, <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/forest-brothers>, (05.01.2019)

³⁶¹ The real name of his, is Mardun Gumashyan was Armenian origin but lived in Tbilisi, Georgia, who financed the terrorist.

³⁶²"ADNA-da terrordan 8 il keçir", [8 years have passed since ADNA terror], 30.04.2017, **Amerikaninsesi.com**, <https://www.amerikaninsesi.org/a/terror/3831678.html>, (06.01.2019)

³⁶³ Azerbaijani Multiculturalism, "General Information", **Multiculturalism.preslib.az**, http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a1.html, (05.01.2019)

³⁶⁴ "Milli azlıqlar", Azərbaycan Respublikasında mədəni müxtəliflik, [Ethnic minorities, Cultural Diversity in the Republic of Azerbaijan], **Mfa.gov.az**, <http://mfa.gov.az/az/content/114>, (05.01.2019)

³⁶⁵ "Constitution: The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan", Articles: 18 and 25, **Mfa.gov.az**, <http://www.mfa.gov.az/?options=content&id=164>, (05.01.2019)

Azerbaijan is probably the only country where there are still mixed mosques and Shia and Sunnis pray together”.⁽³⁶⁶⁾

In general, population of Azerbaijan is Shia Muslim, and country is known as a Muslim country. This put Azerbaijan on the attention of Iran, considering that Iran is a Shia Muslim country, and has high influence on the religious enlightenment.⁽³⁶⁷⁾ This manipulative influence showed up with the ‘Nardaran Incident’ in 2015 November 25. Nardaran is the engaged district to Baku with the 10 thousands habitation. The settlement is known with its strong Shia believers. During the incident, police faced with the civil militants used weapon and hand bomb. On the counter attack, four radical militants were killed and some were wounded. The belligerents killed two servicemen. After the disarmament operation by the government, Taleh Bagirzade-the leader of the ‘Muslim Unification’ movement and 15 others were arrested. The investigation proved that the incident was targeted to damage the state’s stability, and Iran had finger on that.⁽³⁶⁸⁾

All these incidents give brief understanding that attacking to the internal security proved futile, but what if radical groups intend to bring chaos on multi-state regional energy project? Turkey is sharing borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the last couple of years, Turkey has been targeted by the terror attacks in various cities. Syrian refugee flows used Turkey as a bridge and ISIS⁽³⁶⁹⁾ terrorist groups used this chaotic moment to operate several blasts within the country. In 2015 June 5, after the attack of ISIS, five people killed. At the same year July 20, ISIS’s explosion killed 33 people. October 10, Ankara was attacked by ISIS suicide bomb that killed 101 people. In 2016 October 12, ISIS suicide bomb killed 11 people in Istanbul Sultan Ahmet square that tourist group. In 2016 June 28 Istanbul Atatürk

³⁶⁶ “Azerbaijani model of multiculturalism and tolerance as a tool to prevent conflicts highlighted at landmark conference in Geneva”, **Multiculturalism.preslib.az**, http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_events-BUbhjzSyRX.html, (05.01.2019)

³⁶⁷ Zaur Shiryev, “Azerbaijan Wrestles with Rising Iranian Influence”, **Eurasianet.org**, <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-wrestles-with-rising-iranian-influence>, (17.05.2019)

³⁶⁸ Seymur Kazimov, “Nardaran hadisələrinin siyasi tərəfləri və gələcək fəsadları”, [The political sides and future complication of the Nardaran incident], 02.12.2015, **BBC.az**, https://www.bbc.com/azeri/azerbaijan/2015/12/151202_nardaran_aftermath, (07.01.2019)

³⁶⁹ The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant founded in 199, also known international media as Islamic State of Syria, but by Arabic language it is called Daesh, is fundamental Salafi jihadist militant group is holding the Salafi doctrine of Sunni Islam.

International Airport was on the target of ISIS and suicide bomb killed 41 people.⁽³⁷⁰⁾

We do not know if all these signal that ISIS may attack the regional pipelines-TANAP ⁽³⁷¹⁾, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan ⁽³⁷²⁾, NABUCO Gas pipeline ⁽³⁷³⁾ and newly opened Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway ⁽³⁷⁴⁾ and whether lines are secured. Certainly all shareholders states, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, have been taking very tense control in the project. However, what if ISIS targets the pipelines to damage the global projects, which is not going to destroy the pilot energy project but at the same time may fade the interstate relations and regional chaos would increase further ethnic conflicts that are not solved yet. Out of these unwanted attacks, not only regional states will get negative impact but also Europe's gas supplier project would collapse. The EU values these energy projects because the Caspian energy resources go to Europe out of Caucasus, and the EU hopes to see more similar pipeline projects in the future as regional states. However, all these hopes may prove futile unless the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains unsettled.⁽³⁷⁵⁾

4.2. POLICIES OF AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA

4.2.1. Policy of Azerbaijan

Nagorno-Karabakh is a state sovereignty issue for Azerbaijan and stays on the first and prior place in the foreign policy of Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, over more than two decades the Azerbaijani government did not achieve any positive resolute, still territorial integrity is the main and core political challenge. Currently Azerbaijan

³⁷⁰ "Son dönemlerde Türkiyede düzenlenen terör saldırıları", [Terror attacks in Turkey in last years], **Sozcu.com**, 01.01.2017, <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/son-donemde-turkiyede-duzenlenen-teror-saldirilari-1526510/c>, (06.01.2019)

³⁷¹ "Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline", **TANAP**, <https://www.tanap.com/corporate/about-us/>, (06.01.2019)

³⁷² "BakuTbilisiCeyhanPipeline", **BP**, https://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operations/projects/pipelines/BTC.html, (05.01.2019)

³⁷³ "NABUCCO-West Gas Pipeline", **Hydrocarbons Technology**, <https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/nabuccopipeline/>, (05.01.2019)

³⁷⁴ "Baku-Tbilisi-Kars rail line, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey", **Railway Technology**, <https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/baku-tbilisi-kars/>, (05.01.2019)

³⁷⁵ Kamer Kasim, "Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Regional Implication and Peace Process", **Caucasus International**, Vol.2, No.1, 2012, p. 98.

obtains over one million Internal Displaced Persons from Karabakh and seven surrounding cities. President Ilham Aliyev stated “Mountainous Karabakh conflict solution is main condition to ensure the regional peace. Without the solution of this issue, no other issue can be solved in the region”.⁽³⁷⁶⁾

Azerbaijan has always stood on the side of a peaceful solution with Armenia. At the opening of the World Religion Leaders Baku summit stated that “We have to do so, every conflicts found solution. We must do so, people have pleasant, and friendly communication with each other. In this work politicians work may not be enough”.⁽³⁷⁷⁾

Beside the positive approach, the Azerbaijani government holds some priorities. Azerbaijan demands from Armenia’s to withdraw their deployed armies from the occupied territories with no condition, considering the UN Security Resolution articles 822, 853, 874, and 884.⁽³⁷⁸⁾ The Nagorno-Karabakh’s status should be determined under the auspices of the Republic of Azerbaijan while people from both sides continue to live together in the region. Nonetheless, Azerbaijan is impatient with status quo, thus, Azerbaijan is persisting on peace settlement over the conflict. The Azerbaijani government also would increase its military capability to get ready for any bad circumstance. President Ilham Aliyev several times, mentioned on his speech- that Azerbaijani army is capable of returning its occupied territories if any time need emerges.⁽³⁷⁹⁾ The current policy of the Azerbaijani government may change from time to time. For instance, after the April War in 2016, the Azerbaijani government is ready to make an operation to get back the occupied territories.⁽³⁸⁰⁾

³⁷⁶ “Dağlıq Qarabağ Münaqişəsinin Nizama Salınması Azərbaycanın Xarici Siyasətində Əsas Proioret İstiqamətdir”, [Mountainous Karabakh conflict’s solution is the prior direction on the foreign policy of Azerbaijan], **Karabakh.az**, <http://www.karabakh.az/news/?lang=az&i=153>, (06.01.2019)

³⁷⁷ Ramiz Mehdiyev, “Ermənistan-Azərbaycan, Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişəsi Ermənistanın vətəndaş cəmiyyəti kontekstində”, [Armenian-Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the context of Armenian civilsociety], **Azertag.az**, <https://azertag.az/store/files/SARIYYA/RAMIZ%20MEHDIYEV%20MAQALA.pdf>, (05.01.2019), p.4.

³⁷⁸ “1993 UN Security Council Resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh”, **US Department of State Archive**.

³⁷⁹ “İlham Əliyev Azərbaycan Silahlı Qüvvələrinin 100 illiyi münasibətilə keçirilən təntənəli hərbi paradı olub”, [Ilham Aliyev has been in the parade aimed for the 100 years anniversary of the creation of the Azerbaijani Military Forces], **President.az**, <https://president.az/articles/29165>, (06.01.2019)

³⁸⁰ “Aprel döyüşləri: hərbi tariximizin şanlı səhifəsi- FOTO- VİDEO”, [Aprel War: glorious page of our war history –PHOTO-VIDEO], **1news.az**, <http://1news.az/az/news/aprel-doyusleri-herb-tariximiz-sanli-sehifesi>, (06.01.2019)

The Azerbaijani government arranges its foreign policy in regards to Nagorno-Karabakh, by measuring the tension in the society. During the April War in 2016, social tension was too high and the government considered this as a support to get an intention to go further. But sometimes, social attitude towards the conflict stands on the side of a peaceful resolution, which the government considers to have negotiation.⁽³⁸¹⁾ The policy of Azerbaijan depends on attitudes of Armenia also. If Armenia insists on holding the occupied territories, the Azerbaijani government deters it with its increased military capacity. However, at the end Azerbaijan pursues its policy on the side of peace settlement, still keeping unchanged position in the context of its territorial integrity. The negotiation process over the conflict is ongoing. In the regards of the conflict, Azerbaijan government's position is constructive and relies on the international law. Azerbaijan is also loyal to the peace negotiations, but Armenia continues its manipulative acts on continuation of the status quo.⁽³⁸²⁾

4.2.2. Policy of Armenia

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict stays as one of the main issues in foreign policy of Armenian. Armenian foreign policy supports the conflict settlement based on several principles- the people's rights of self-determination in Nagorno-Karabakh need to be recognized. Additionally, insecurity in the region bounds Armenia to pursue an independent communication under its jurisdiction of Armenia. Finally, Armenia demands an international guarantee for the security of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia is searching for a single solution package.⁽³⁸³⁾ The claim of 'people's rights of self-determination' is one of the International Covenant on Civil and Political

³⁸¹ "Mayor Zaur Məmmədov: Aprel döyüşləri ordu xalqın birliinin sarsılmazlığını bütün dünyaya göstərdi", [Major Zaur Mammadov: April War showed the world the unbreakable univfication of the military and civil relations], **Azertag.az**, 02.04.2016, https://azertag.az/xeber/Mayor_Zaur_Memmedov_Aprel_doyusleri_ordu_ile_xalqin_birliyinin_sarsilmazligini_bütün_dunyaya_gosterdi-1264334, (07.04.2019)

³⁸² "Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişəsi: Azərbaycanın mövqeyi dəyişməzdir", [Mountainous Karabakh Conflict: The position of the Azerbaijan is unchangeable], **AzTV.az**, 20.04.2016, <http://www.aztv.az/readnews.php?lang=az&id=27134>, (13.04.2019)

³⁸³ Anahit Shirinyan, "Armenia's Foreign Policy Balancing in an Age of Uncertainty", **Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme**, Research Paper, March, 2019, p.6.

Rights (ICCPR) confirmed articles. However, the differences between peoples and minorities are a crucial issue to recall. The reason is Armenians in Azerbaijan cannot be termed as ‘people’, considering the fact that they have a motherland in Armenia. Legally they are classified as national minorities. Thus, Article of the same covenant gives the rights they accept, emphasizing that “...Minorities...shall not be denied the right...to enjoy their common culture, to profess their own religion, or to use their common language.” The term, self-determination allows the Armenian minorities in Nagorno-Karabakh to obtain an internal right of self-determination to take part the in political movement of Azerbaijan, by pursuing their economic, cultural and social developments. However, self-determination does not necessarily mean separation, which is approved by the United Nations Security Council :⁽³⁸⁴⁾ “Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs concerning the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair... the territorial integrity of sovereign and independent states.”⁽³⁸⁵⁾

The foreign policy of Armenia is specifically stated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official website; however, the peaceful negotiation on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan was not mentioned at all. Armenian Foreign Policy insists on keeping the occupied region under the Armenian jurisdiction. In other words, negotiation over the Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan was totally forgotten, thus it seems like Armenian foreign policy does not see necessity to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh’s official status as an issue with Azerbaijan.⁽³⁸⁶⁾

In fact, the foreign of policy of Armenia is underpinned in regards to building and keeping close relations with Russia. Perhaps, the reason is that Russia demonstrated partiality towards Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The official website of the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh Republic states that, Azerbaijan refuses to get in contact with the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh so called republic, in bilateral or trilateral negotiation process, thus neglects to have a

³⁸⁴ Cornell, JSAMES, p.20.

³⁸⁵“General Assembly”, **United Nations**, A/RES/2625 (XXV), 24.10.1970, <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/25A1C8E35B23161C852570C4006E50AB>, (06.01.2019)

³⁸⁶ “Nagorno-Karabakh Issue”, **Mfa.am**, <https://www.mfa.am/en/nagorno-karabakh-issue>, (05.12.2018)

solution. Therefore, the demand from Armenia is Azerbaijan's recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as a party to take a seat on negotiation process. According to Yerevan, Azerbaijan delays the ultimate way of resolution and makes long-run contribution on status quo.⁽³⁸⁷⁾

The core concern of Armenian foreign policy is the security hardship underpinned by its closed border situation with Turkey and the unresolved Azerbaijan and Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which isolated Armenia and bounded it getting benefit from the regional pipeline politics. Multiple attempts were carried for betterment of Turkey and Armenia relations; however, Turkey's strong position on the side of Azerbaijan made it unsuccessful. Therefore, Armenia prefers to get close to Russia for its security concerns and at the same time its economic concerns.⁽³⁸⁸⁾

The 'Velvet Revolution' in 2018, brought uncertainty, as well as high expectation about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's solidarity on Armenian unchanged policy over the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement persisted, however, he was benign on continuing peace negotiation. Nikol Pashinyan mentioned that the former two presidents of Armenians were born in Karabakh, and unlike them, he was not from the region. Therefore, he did not represent the region but he represents Armenia and he was willing to participate in a peace negotiation on behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet he has insisted that Azerbaijan should be involved in the negotiation process. But Azerbaijan refused this proposal.⁽³⁸⁹⁾

Pashinyan's government retained a dedicated attitude towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in comparison to his predecessors. According to Pashinyan the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be settled peacefully and he is ready for that, however, the separated land should be an integral part of Armenia. He refused to answer the question during the first meeting of foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia with the co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group in July 11, 2018, regarding

³⁸⁷“Bilateral negotiations between the NKR and Azerbaijan”, **Nkr.am**, <http://www.nkr.am/en/karabakh-azerbaijan-negotiations>, (06.01.2019)

³⁸⁸ Shirinyan, p.2.

³⁸⁹“Pashinyan: Karabakh conflict settlement should take into consideration interests of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan”, **Arka.am**, Yerevan, http://arka.am/en/news/politics/pashinyan_karabakh_conflict_settlement_should_take_into_consideration_interests_of_armenia_nagorno_k/, (07.01.2019)

the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh's return to Azerbaijan. He stated that, Armenians as a whole, should make a decision in this regard.⁽³⁹⁰⁾

Pashinyan's Brussels meeting held in May 14, 2019 with Ilahm Aliyev the president of Azerbaijan and during the meeting, they managed to talk about the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. He repeated his previous thought-that "Azerbaijan's refusal on not going to the negotiation process with the Karabakh will sustain the obstacles for peace. In fact, conflict has third party-Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, we consider the conflict should be resolved under peaceful condition".⁽³⁹¹⁾

4.2.3. Decrease of troublemakers and Increase peacemakers

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict brought disaster for both sides, but mostly occupied was suffered. Since the ceasefire agreement, both sides sit several times on the negotiation table, by forgetting the society. They have forgotten what will be the reaction of the society if the conflict ends up. However, society should not be underestimated. Because the cost of conflict left many psychological traumas over the people and it has been transmitted from one generation to another, which means if peace is going to happen it will be only on the paper such as a 'political peace'. Society and the state officials demonstrated their thoughts towards the negative. The two governments should consider this issue which can cause another type of conflict.⁽³⁹²⁾

As long as troublemakers are increasing within the both societies, upcoming peace will be under threat, and new conflict will be inevitable. In this regard, both

³⁹⁰ Natalia Konarzewska, "Is Armenia's Foreign Policy Changing?", **The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst**, 25.09.2018, <https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13535-is-armenias-foreign-policy-changing?.html>, (06.01.2019)

³⁹¹ "Əliyevlə Pashinyan Brüsseldə görüşüblər", [Aliyev and Pashinyan meeting held in Brussels], 14.05.2019, **Azadliq.org**, <https://www.azadliq.org/a/%C9%99liyevl%C9%99pa%C5%9Finyanbr%C3%BCsseld%C9%99g%C3%B6r%C3%BC%C5%9F%C3%BCbl%C9%99r/29939487.html>, (06.01.2019)

³⁹² The same thoughts were performed on the author's speech in the regional conference held in Georgia, Tbilisi on 16-18 May 2013, under the auspices of the Ministry of the Youth and Sport of Georgia supported by the Berghof Foundation is credible Berlin based organization is dealing with the conflict resolution and peace settlement. The title of the conference was 'Conflicts and Peace-building in South Caucasus', that author was invites as a young analyst to deliver the speech in the regards of 'Existing Youth peace-building initiatives on the South Caucasus'.

Azerbaijan and Armenia should ask once again; what type of peace they can obtain? Azerbaijan works hard for its territorial integrity and for the government peace only can be real issue when the Azerbaijan's occupied territories returned. If that scenario happens, Armenians will appear in the Azerbaijani cities and the Azerbaijani people in Armenian cities. How real is that scenario? Obviously, political elite cannot expect the positive attitude or toleration towards the people who lost their parents, families, children and so forth during the conflict, and now they cannot live peacefully with them. It doesn't seem real at the moment!⁽³⁹³⁾

In each country, troublemakers and peacemakers exist and will exist in future. Broadly, who are they? Starting from the Azerbaijani society usually, troublemakers are considered stereotypically uneducated people with no emotional intelligence, who behaves aggressively if they were asked anytime in the regard of conflict, because of the tragedy they faced. By contrast, peacemakers are understood as people that have proper education and have glimpse of an idea about the conflict. However, it is very conditional, meaning even educated people can be 'troublemakers' in certain situation. Since Azerbaijan and Armenia got their independence, people had an opportunity to go out of the country. How people would or should react if Armenians and Azerbaijanis appear at the same place? Are they ready to prevent potential provocation? The same things are applicable for Armenian society as well. The Azerbaijani lieutenant Ramil Safarov killed the Armenian officer Gurgen Markuryan, when he abused the Azerbaijani flag and threatened him, which happened in Hungary, Budapest under the supervision of the NATO/Partnership for Peace center where partner countries military officers were invited for a three years English course. Ramil Safarov was one of the citizens of Azerbaijan whose region is still under the occupation of Armenia, he was an eye-witnessed of the conflict.⁽³⁹⁴⁾

International organizations are gathering the Azerbaijani and Armenian partners in the same arena for starting communication. Sometimes, it has successful

³⁹³ Joshua Kucera, "Peace? Not so fast, many Armenians and Azerbaijanis say", **Euroianet.org**, 18.01.2019, <https://eurasianet.org/peace-not-so-fast-many-armenians-and-azerbaijanis-say>, (24.01.2019)

³⁹⁴ "Azəri subay, Ermeni subayı öldürdü-2004-02-20", [Azerbaijani officer killed Armenian officer-2004-02-20], **Amerikaninsesi.com**, 20.02.2004, <https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/a-17-a-2004-02-20-19-1-87932342/819191.html>, (06.01.2019)

impact, but sometimes with a futile because the issue is very sensitive.⁽³⁹⁵⁾ People, apart the permission of the each government are under the pressure to have in-depth communication with the opposite country's people outside of the country, the reason is fear of being labeled as a betrayer. Then, how should people behave if the certain condition emerges? The answer is very irrational, and conditional or unknown. Concerning Azerbaijan, the government does not have such a certain behavior package for the people getting in communication that would disperse conflict, and friendship. The government should consider that, particularly youth are potentially the highest category in the society that has an opportunity to go out of the country for education purposes, where they will share the same classrooms and seminars with the Armenians. If they don't know how to react towards provocative approach, the country will get the political challenge in international media; that Azerbaijan is acting aggressively which were the reasons of starting conflict also.⁽³⁹⁶⁾

In 2019 January, the BBC Azerbaijan had an interview in both cities Baku and Yerevan to measure the attitude of people towards the preparation of the people for the peace settlement and readiness of the people living together if peace emerges. The answers were very diverse in both sides. Regarding Yerevan, during the interview surprisingly most of the old generation appreciated the initiative, however, stating that it can happen if Azerbaijan stops demanding the return of the occupied territory- because the cost of territory was too bloody for Armenia. By contrast the young interviewers took the friendship position, which was impossible between Armenia and Azerbaijan.⁽³⁹⁷⁾

The Baku interview respondents gave various answers also, meaning that some of them said that it could be a biggest mistake to trust once again Armenians. Few old people said, peace is inevitable because they do not want young people to die in a war. However, young men responded that peace is impossible.⁽³⁹⁸⁾

³⁹⁵ "What we do", **EPNK**, <http://www.epnk.org/about-us/what-we-do>, (09.01.2019)

³⁹⁶ "Facilitating Dialogue: EU-Funded NGOs and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", **Ngo-monitor.org**, 12.12.2018, <https://www.ngo-monitor.org/reports/facilitating-dialogue-eu-funded-ngos-and-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/>, (08.01.2019)

³⁹⁷ "Ermənilərlə Azərbaycanlılar barışa bilərmə? –Yerevanda # sorğu", [Can Armenian and Azerbaijan reconcile # survey in Yerevan], **BBC News Azərbaycanca**, **BBC News Azerbaijan**, VIDEO, 19.12.2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vk2yIKDkSmY>, (07.02.2019)

³⁹⁸ "Ermənilərlə Azərbaycanlılar barışa bilərmə? Bakıda- # sorğu", [Can Armenian and Azerbaijan reconcile- # survey in Baku], **BBC News Azərbaycanca**, **BBC News Azerbaijan**, VIDEO, 18.01.2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7LeEAjDZvg>, (09.02.2019)

The recent changes in Armenia have been arisen new hope for taking negotiations process to the prosperity. Actually, Saint Petersburg, Dushanbe, and Davos negotiations, unofficial meetings of the presidents, as well as negotiations of the foreign ministers in Paris have resulted with increasing of the confidence and mutual works. This was intended to establish a direct contact line between state officials and preparation of people for peace. However, because of the unknown content, and the lack of articulate explanation, this formula faced with hard reaction publicly. Although, leaders should take into consideration the frame of mind in society, people on each side for a long time have been preparing for 'war' rather than 'peace'. The intention of 'societal preparation for peace' was aimed to pay attention of the deficiencies in up to now negotiation process and its influence. In the context of regulatory negotiation a new diplomatic competition is pursued by the two sides rather relying on compromise, they strengthen their certain position on negotiations. Broadly, Nikol Pashinyan, insists on acceptance of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the negotiation. On the other side, the president Ilham Aliyev intends to increase the role of the leader of Karabakh Azerbaijani community as a professional diplomat.⁽³⁹⁹⁾

In 2019 January 16, the Azerbaijani and Armenian Foreign Ministers Paris meeting announced positive outcomes. Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan spokesperson Leyla Abdullayeva told to the BBC News Azerbaijani that the parties' foreign ministers agreed on Wednesday to 'take concrete measures to prepare the population for peace' as discussed in Paris. Leyla Abdullayeva also said that the word 'people' mentioned in the statement and in all other relevant documents is always included the 'Armenian and Azerbaijani' population- 'it means that the documents are intended for both nations, and the resumption of contacts between the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh that will play a very significant role in the preparation of peace for both sides,'. Chatham House Fellow Zaur Shiriyev stated, "It will take long time process, whereas serious steps can be taken to reconcile the basic principles of the conflict settlement," and he added,

³⁹⁹Leyla Əliyeva, "Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişəsi: 'Sülhə yox, müharibəyə' ideyası altında yetişdirilən cəmiyyətdə sülh necə yaradılacaq?", [Leila Aliyeva, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: How to create peace in a society grown under the idea of 'not peace but war?'], **BBC News Azərbaycanca/ BBC News Azerbaijan**, 22.02.2019, <https://www.bbc.com/azeri/azerbaijan-47311106>, (26.09.2019)

“preparation of the population for peace is not enough, but also economic cooperation initiatives and security issues should be taken into consideration.” Deputy of parliament Aydin Mirzazade attracted the attention to the fact that the “positive statement” is not detailed. He stated that “The current government has not come to power in the wave of Karabakh, and the intolerance of social problems of the population has led them to power, and Pashinyan does not have a clear vision of the conflict, but people can hope that we will try to pursue a different policy from Kocharyan and Sargsyan”.⁽⁴⁰⁰⁾

The Azerbaijani government and people had positive expectation from the new Armenian government concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: nevertheless, the hopes were not realized as expected. Pashinyan’s attitude became tremendously strong; stating the occupied territories outside of Nagorno-Karabakh are part of the de-facto authorities’ territory, and declared that “in the future Nagorno-Karabakh will have to become fully-fledged part of the Armenian territory”.⁽⁴⁰¹⁾

4.2.4. Impact of Regional Economic Development

Economy was disastrous in Azerbaijan and Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These economic calamities continued even after ceasefire. However, Azerbaijan was luckier comparing to Armenia that started to investigate its natural resources. In September, 1994 Azerbaijan signed the “treaty of century” that played the main role on becoming the foundation of the socio-economic development of Azerbaijan.⁽⁴⁰²⁾ Being the richest oil supplier country in the region opened new doors to Azerbaijan and for the betterment of its life standards. Being

⁴⁰⁰ “Azərbaycan və erməni əhalisi sülhə necə hazırlanacaq”, [How will the population of Azerbaijan and Armenia be prepared for the peace], **BBC News Azərbaycanca/ BBC News Azerbaijan**, 17.01.2019, <https://www.bbc.com/azeri/azerbaijan-46901795>, (22.01.2019)

⁴⁰¹ Zaur Shiriyeu, “Perception in Azerbaijan of the Impact of Revolutionary Changes in Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process”, in the Political Transition and Conflicts in the South Caucasus, Caucasus Edition, **Journal of Conflict Transformation**, Part: II, Vol. 3, Issue. 2, 2018.

⁴⁰² “Əsrin müqaviləsi müstəqil Azərbaycanın iqtisadi inkişafının əsasını təşkil edir”, [Treaty of the Century is the basis of the economic development of independent Azerbaijan], **Yap.org.az**, 19.09.2017, <http://yap.org.az/az/view/interview/453/esrin-muqavilesi-musteqil-azerbaycanin-iqtisadi-inkishafinin-esasini-teskil-edir>, (09.01.2019)

economically independent turned international eyes on Azerbaijan as an important regional actor and future partner. Several regional energy projects started under the Azerbaijan's leadership, on the triangle of Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey.⁽⁴⁰³⁾ However, Armenia stayed out of these energy projects by occupying the Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions. Armenia doesn't have only close border with Azerbaijan but Turkey's solidarity towards Azerbaijan also closed borders to Armenia.⁽⁴⁰⁴⁾ But Armenia is still asking Turkey to open the border but the AK party government has disregarded this. Because of the Armenian diaspora's pressure, Armenia shut all the communication channels with Turkey. Having hostile relations they don't see any positive development for the future.⁽⁴⁰⁵⁾

Armenia's isolation from the regional transport and projects put Armenia on trap to depend on Russia's economy. However, Armenia per se desires to take part in regional projects. At the Munich Security Conference in 2018, the Armenian president emphasized economic development of the country, but it seems people do not feel the economic growth. During that conference the Azerbaijani diplomat Sadi Jafarov, delivered a statement that, "if there was no policy of ethnic cleansing of Armenia against Azerbaijan, and then probably today, Armenia could have benefitted from those projects". South Caucasus region is hosting geo-economic and geopolitical projects one after another and international actors are willing to welcome new Caspian projects for the future. New Baku-Tbilisi-Kars rail line project is a clear example of regional friendship, and is a common benefit for the regional and internal development. Armenia still remains isolated as such from the regional projects, which is a big loss.⁽⁴⁰⁶⁾

An active politician Levon Barseghyan stated that, "If nothing changes, Armenia will be left as an island, and everyone will forget about Armenia". Armenia only watches the celebration of the new released project from the border. Aram Abrahamyan the editor of the daily Aravot, mentioned that, "every day the

⁴⁰³“Azərbaycan-Gürcüstan-Türkiye Bölgesel İşbirliğinin Başarı Örneği”, [Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Success Example of Regional Cooperation], Policy Brief, **Kadir Has University-CIES**, March, 2015.

⁴⁰⁴ Kamer Kasım, “Türkiye-Ermenistan sınır kapısı”, [Turkey-Armania border gate], **Newtimes.az**, 02.12.2014, <http://newtimes.az/az/reasons/conflicts/3214/>, (09.01.2019)

⁴⁰⁵ Rashid Shirinov, “Erdogan: Armenian isolated itself from all the regional projects”, **Azernews.az**, <https://www.azernews.az/aggression/123627.html>, 07.12. 2017, (08.02.2019)

⁴⁰⁶“Armenia's Isolation form the Regional Projects”, **Cbc.az**, 19.02.2018, http://cbc.az/en/en/v_story/armenias-isolation-from-regional-projects, (10.01.2019)

government tells us our economy can flourish without opening the Turkish border and without Karabakh problem, and the government propaganda succeeds with the common people”. However the reality is different, because the ongoing status quo is costly for Armenia, the director of the research group, Artashes Kazakhetsyan said that, “if there are no changes, there is no prosperity”.⁽⁴⁰⁷⁾

Thus, de facto Nagorno-Karabakh’s economy heavily depends on the Armenian and Armenian diaspora for infrastructure, goods and other developments, as well as personal income. The economy is considerably dependent on imports. According to the Nagorno-Karabakh’s national statistical service, in 2014, 31 million dollars value products were imported to the region, whereas, the export rate was lower as 64 million dollars. Furthermore, the Nagorno-Karabakh’s imports from Armenia was approximately 93% of region’s total import volume in 2014, and 88% of the export volume were from Armenia. Thus, Nagorno-Karabakh’s more than half of budget has consistent dependency on Armenia.⁽⁴⁰⁸⁾

By all findings, the question emerges that, what will be the benefit of Azerbaijan and Armenia in the regards of the Nagorno-Karabakh’s solution? The opening of the Armenia’s border would allow it to improve its integration into regional trade, including a potential 13% increase in trade with Turkey. The normalization of communication and relation with Azerbaijan, whose population is more than three times the size of Armenia’s 3 million people, will allow the latter to significantly decrease its military expenditures and permit fiscal savings on defense of 2% GDP per year. Regarding to Azerbaijan, the territorial integrity process will be completed and over 1 million IDPs will return their motherland, the ground road to Nakhcivan will be open to make transportation easier between Azerbaijan and Turkey rather than through Georgia. Azerbaijan will invest in alternative economic sector by using oil income for the sustainable economy.⁽⁴⁰⁹⁾

⁴⁰⁷ Susan Sachs, “Armenia’s Isolations Grows Only Deeper”, *The New York Times*, 26.12.2004, <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/26/world/europe/armenias-isolation-grows-only-deeper.html>, (12.01.2019)

⁴⁰⁸ George Welton and Bret Barrowman, “The Political Economy of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh”, *ISSICEU Policy Brief*, Geowel Research, Tbilisi, July 13, 2016.

⁴⁰⁹ Violetta Rusheva, “Nagorno-Karabakh Resolution could bring economic gains to Armenia and Azerbaijan,” *Neweurope.eu*, 01.02.2019, <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/nagorno-karabakh-resolution-could-bring-economic-gains-to-armenia-and-azerbaijan/>, (03.03.2019)

In the scenario of the full resolution, both countries will get benefit from the huge savings on conflict and military related expenditures. Furthermore, the benefit of peace could bring gains in the long run domain of energy and water sector. This would mainly benefit Armenia, deferring the need for investment into expensive new power plants as the country could import electricity during the dry season. Mutual agreement of shared water resources will also have impact, but mostly will be beneficial for Azerbaijan where water is scarce. A more efficient joint usage of water resources would lead more and better quality water arriving to Azerbaijan from the Kur-Aras⁽⁴¹⁰⁾ basin, which is the main freshwater source. However, these are not easy gains, to get them all, in advance all both parties should resolve the conflict.⁽⁴¹¹⁾

4.3. ROLES OF THE EXTERNAL ACTORS

4.3.1. Russia's Involvement in the Conflict Resolution

In December 1994, in the Budapest summit the decision of deployment of the international peacekeeping forces to the Nagorno-Karabakh region was adopted by the OSCE⁽⁴¹²⁾ in order to preserve the ceasefire and continue the peace settlement negotiations. Unfortunately, year and half passed but no positive improvement observed in this regard; the OSCE became unable to deploy its peacekeeping forces into the entitled enclave, where was occupied forcefully by Armenia. The underlined decision constituted the OSCE's highest profile and representation in the South Caucasus conflict resolution, as well as in every parts of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Actually, the OSCE's engagement with the CIS and particularly with the South Caucasus countries received an affirmation from

⁴¹⁰ Aras River starts from Turkey and then flows along the borders Azerbaijan and Turkey on the area of Nakhchivan, and covers up Turkey –Armenian border, where it flows between Iran and Azerbaijan, which goes through Azerbaijan to the Kur River, is an east flowing river south of the Greater Caucasus Mountains and goes into the Caspian Sea.

⁴¹¹ David Saha and Et.al, "The Economic effect of resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of Armenia and Azerbaijan",The study has been financed by the European Union, **BE Berlin Economics GmbH**, June 15, 2018.

⁴¹² The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) shifted from its original name to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe happened in December 1994. In this thesis, OSCE will be used mostly in order to refer both organizations.

Moscow, because Russia demonstrated once again that it has a regional interest based on its near abroad policy in the South Caucasus. Although the dissolution of the Soviet Union, gave an opportunity to the South Caucasus countries to regain their independence, Russia did not stop pursuing its irrevocable interests over the region, which created a problem for the OSCE to implement its constructive measures in the region. One of the significant challenges for the OSCE is to demonstrate a comprehensive response to the conflict in the post-Soviet space. And most importantly these challenges are ongoing.⁽⁴¹³⁾

Russia has pursued policies over Transcaucasia that underline the incongruity of its policy processes. Obviously, Russia had a prompt political and military occurrence in every regional crisis, which historically happened in 1992-1994 period with the Russian intervention in the framework of maintaining the regional peace. Russia uses this reason as sustaining its military bases in the conflicting zone in the South Caucasus.⁽⁴¹⁴⁾

Currently among the South Caucasus countries Azerbaijan and Armenia, remain as the members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), because after 2008 incident Georgia terminated its membership, furthermore, Georgia together with Azerbaijan left the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 1999, however, Armenia remains as a member. Despite that, Azerbaijan and Georgia let those organizations; they could not left the regional tensions behind. In comparison to them, Armenia historically had political, social, cultural, religious, military, and economic ties. Considering the Armenian had large Christian population, is not deniable fact that Russia keeps its strategic partnership with Armenia. Russian troops since the Soviet era remain in Armenia and there always has been a high need from the Armenian side to maintain the Russian troops, which deactivate the Armenia's military role that could not guarantee its border securities with Turkey and Iran, therefore, Russia takes the responsibility of guarding and monitoring those borders. However, Azerbaijan and Russia build up relations based on energy benefits, and more importantly the emerged Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

⁴¹³ Stephen Blank, "Russia, the OSCE, and Security in the Caucasus", **Helsinki Monitor**, Vol.6, No.3, 1995, pp.65-67.

⁴¹⁴ Pavel K.Baev, "Russian Military Thinking and the 'Near Abroad'", **Jane's Intelligence Review**, Vol.6, No: 12, December, 1994, pp. 531-532

underpinned the interstate relations became more intensive. Obviously, Azerbaijan has never been the strategic partner of Russia; however, both countries increased their interstate relations in the recent years. Finally, the third South Caucasian state Georgia, cut off its relations with Russia after 2008 incident, when Russia officially announced its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that Georgia always considered them as integral part of Georgia. As a result, Georgian-Russian relations have marginally changed.⁽⁴¹⁵⁾

The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia ended up with a ceasefire in 1994 by Russia's political sponsorship and as a result, it came into effect, nonetheless, peace negotiations failed to bring the resolution of the conflict. In fact, the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia faced bloodiest and dozens of killing annually, particularly the incidents happened with an infrequent sniper shots. Therefore, the borderline between two sides is most militarized border in the world. Nevertheless, the OSCE Minsk Group has direct involvement into the Nagorno-Karabakh peace settlement negotiations, but Russia itself besides being one of the co-Chairs, act separately to organize roundtable for negotiations. The OSCE Minsk Group consists of the US, France, Russia, Germany, Sweden, Turkey, Italy, Finland, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Belarus. In all peace negotiations, Armenia raises an issue of Nagorno-Karabakh's participation in the negotiations as an independent state, which always gets rejection by Azerbaijan.⁽⁴¹⁶⁾

One of the three co-chairs countries of the Minsk Group, Russia has the longest history of direct involvement with the parties to the conflict and is the most geographically proximate. In both, 1994 and 2016, hostilities between the parties halted through Russia's unilateral brokering of ceasefire agreements. Moscow's relationship with Armenia is particularly strong as it was mentioned before. Russia deployed around 5,000 military forces to maintain permanently in Armenia, because Armenia is a member of Collective Security Organization that was created by Russia's initiative. Moscow and Yerevan have agreements that would facilitate the Russian military intervention in the fact of foreign aggression, as well as further

⁴¹⁵ Jose A. Pena-Ramos, "The Impact of Russian Intervention in Post-Soviet Secessionist Conflict in the South Caucasus on Russian Geo-energy Interests", **International Journal of Conflict and Violence**, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2017, p.5.

⁴¹⁶ Pena-Ramos, p.8.

integration of their militaries; Yerevan also has access to heavily subsidized sales of the Russian arms. Russian companies dominate Armenia's energy, mining, and telecommunications sectors. Russia is Armenia's top trading partner-making up 27 percent of Armenia's total trade in 2016 and accounted for some 40 percent of Armenia's total cumulative foreign direct investment in 2014, according to the Congressional Research Service.⁽⁴¹⁷⁾

Despite this strategic alignment with Yerevan, Russia is also the principal weapons supplier to Azerbaijan. Since 2013, reportedly Baku has around four billion dollars of Russian military equipment, which includes artillery system, tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles. Azerbaijan's 69 percent arms imports came from Russia, as reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2016.⁽⁴¹⁸⁾ Accordingly, Russia remains as a main arms supplier for both countries, which indicated as 51% for Azerbaijan and 96% of Armenia's arms imports between 2007 and 2011.⁽⁴¹⁹⁾

After the dissolution of Soviet Union, Russia's public image was an enemy for Azerbaijan, considering Russian military attack and killing of unarmed civilians on January 20, 1990, which made that day written to the Azerbaijan's modern history as 'Black January'. This tragic incident is not the only reason public opinion lost the trust on Russia's positive impact on peaceful settlement on entitled conflict, whereas, some other views also exist, that Russia is main actor, which accelerated the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, using Armenia as a bridge because of its regional primacy. However, from time to time, Russia's imperialistic policy was replaced with its paternalistic mediating. Many experts in the realm of South Caucasus had a common agreement on the statement that Russia has everlasting interest on the continuation of Nagorno-Karabakh, via its co-chairs representation Russia has direct involvement into the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement and mediation process, and by this involvement Russia maintain its role over the region. One of the main tools Russia uses is providing military munitions to both conflicting parties in order

⁴¹⁷ CSCE-Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "In Brief: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", **Helsinki Commission Report**, p.4.

⁴¹⁸ International Crisis Group-ICG, "Nagorno-Karabakh's Gathering War Clouds", **Europe Report No: 244**, June 01, 2017.

⁴¹⁹ Paul Holtom, and Et.al, "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2011", **Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Fact Sheet**, March, 2012, pp.7-8.

to make dependent on Moscow. This could be a particular reason to realize the regional dynamics could not host any constructive changes in regards to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement cannot be imagined without Kremlin's affirmation. Therefore, Russia uses its maximum efforts to maintain the regional status-quo.⁽⁴²⁰⁾

Significantly, Russia seems an ironic actor in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. From time to time, Russia was associated with shadow power as standing behind Armenia; on the other hand, in the screen Russia demonstrated its maximum willingness to settle the conflict peacefully. Thus, the ineffectiveness of the OSCE Minsk Group's mission over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict forwarded Russia's mission in front to act as paternalistic and influential within the conflict resolution process. Since the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia in every opportunity tries to highlight other mediators that it has unique position in the region and in the conflict settlement process, because conflicting parties were part of the Soviet Union. This ex-membership gives Russia right to be more active in the process. This claim could have been found in many searches, for instance, in Russian politicians' speeches or Russian president's political maneuver.⁽⁴²¹⁾

In the early 1993, the government in Russia decided to take a historic initiative, to end up the ongoing conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia by proposing its self-developed measurements and conduct its principles apart from the OSCE. Russia's independent effort to take the control of mediation process established uncertainty and political clashes between the OSCE and Russia. Thus, during the negotiation process, the former president of Armenia, Ter Petrosyan stated as such: "...the impression is created that the mediating countries and international organizations are not interested so much in settling the conflict, as in settling their own accounts and relationships, which are unconnected with it."⁽⁴²²⁾

⁴²⁰ Rasif Huseynov, "Russia's involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Unhelpful and unpromising", **Foreignpolicynews.org**, 03.06.2016, <http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/06/03/russias-involvement-in-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-unhelpful-and-unpromising/>, (19.11.2018)

⁴²¹ Bahar Basher, "Third party mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh: Part of the cure or part of the disease?", **The International Strategic Research Organization**, Vol. 3, Issue. 5, 2008, p.97.

⁴²² Thomas De Waal, **Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War**, New York University Press, New York/London, 2003, p. 254.

4.3.2. Turkey's Policy About the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Turkey, sharing one of the strategic and important borders with South Caucasus, has a potential role on influencing the establishment of an environment for peace settlement and maintaining regional stability. Obviously, within the last two decades the foreign policy of Turkey constructively oriented to conduct political implications in neighborhoods on regional issues. More precisely, the foreign policy prioritizes being an actor on the regional conflict resolution process, particularly in its neighborhood.⁽⁴²³⁾

The South Caucasus became one of the core concerns for Turkey since January 1990, when Baku suffered under the Soviet tanks killing unarmed civilians in the city. In addition, Azerbaijan districts in the Nagorno-Karabakh region confronted with the Armenia's aggression and military forces attacked on defenseless civilians and killed dozens of people. In Turkey, the increasing social and political sympathy towards the Azerbaijani Turks became a hot issue. Despite of all these, the government projected a very tentative approach towards the incident happened in January 20th, persistently stated the incident was purely part of an internal affairs of the Soviet government which entered the city with its military forces to refuse an unsuccessful attempt on declaration of the Azerbaijan's independence. Former Turkey's president realized consistent flights to Baku in 1991, as well as at the same year on March he took a trip to Moscow, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. It was a historic attempt when Volkan Vural a Turkish ambassador in Moscow realized a visit to Yerevan to conduct a discussion on betterment of the interstate relations that happened months later. The Turkish government presumably had concise political measurements towards the regional issues; therefore, it was estimated to adopt full recognition of the all-former Soviet republics' independence in advance, before other western states, particularly the United States. Turkey recognized the independence of Azerbaijan on November 9, 1991. Turkey

⁴²³ Aybars Gorgulu and Onnik Krikorian, "Turkey's South Caucasus Agenda: The Role of State and Non-State Actors", **Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation-TESEV Foreign Policy Programme and Eurasia Partnership Foundation**, July, 2012, pp.1-2.

continuingly recognized all other former Soviet republics' independence with Suleyman Demirel's government on December 19.⁽⁴²⁴⁾

Turkey demonstrated high political and social support to Azerbaijan that ended up Turkey has decided to close its border with Armenia. Besides complaining, Armenia did the first diplomatic attempt in 2008, to reopen the closed border with Turkey and restore the bilateral relations. The diplomatic attempt proposed over Turkey-Armenia football match which was called 'football diplomacy' that president of Armenia, Serzh Sarkisian sent an official invitation to former president of Turkey, Abdullah Gül to attend interstate football match in the framework of world cup qualification. Regarding to new foreign policy line of Turkey, restoration of the bilateral relations with Armenia was also an appropriate attempt for an entitled foreign policy. The positive side of the renewal of the bilateral relations would allow Turkey to grab a particular role as an independent mediator between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Moreover, these political movements would be considered as a successful improvement of Turkey's foreign policy towards the regional participation as a key actor.⁽⁴²⁵⁾

Turkey, since the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had a limited influence over the conflict settlement, and most importantly, Turkey could not play a major role in the South Caucasus. Turkey presumably desires to play active role being a real economic accelerator of the region; however, Turkey relies on its political unanimity with Azerbaijan that caused Turkey to maintain a closed border policy with Armenia. This situation keeps Turkey to stand out of the active economic involvement. Overall, the general foreign policy vision of Turkey particularly concentrated on improving its strategic role in neighborhood regions, and conducting zero problem policies with the regional countries.⁽⁴²⁶⁾

Turkey's first diplomatic gesture towards the Armenian aggression demonstrated in April 1993, when Azerbaijan's Kelbajar province occupied by the

⁴²⁴ Burcu Gultekin Punshman, "Turkey's Interest and Strategies in the South Caucasus", **Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey-TEPAV**, Evaluation Note, No: 201226, May, 2012, p.2.

⁴²⁵ Efe Chaman and Ali Akyurt, "Caucasus and Central Asia in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Time has come for a New Regional Policy", **Alternative Turkish Journals of International Relations**, Vol.10, No:2/3, 2011, <http://alternatives.yalova.edu.tr/article/view/5000150670/5000136813>, (21.11.2018), p.57.

⁴²⁶ Mustafa Aydin, "Turkey's Caucasus Policy", **Turkish Foreign Policy-Old Problems, New Parameters**, (Ed. Antonio Marquina), Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation (UNISCI), Discussion Paper, No: 23, Spain, May, 2010, pp.186-189.

Armenian forces. Turkey immediately cut off the diplomatic relations with Armenia that was newly established after the dissolution of Soviet Union, as well as terminated the train route, which used to be active once a week in the direction from Kars and Gyumri during the Soviet time.⁽⁴²⁷⁾

This fact once again increased the social Armenian attitude over the Nagorno-Karabakh war, that Azerbaijanis and Turks are the same nations.⁽⁴²⁸⁾ Presumably it was the predicament of Armenian minorities in Anatolia before the Soviet Union was created that had cultivated the Armenian faith that without Soviet Union's umbrella it was not possible to live with Azerbaijanis. It was kind of retribution of the Armenian nationalists towards the 'Azerbaijani Turks', handling the 1915 historical dilemma that the Armenian minorities suffered in Anatolia, and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh used that vengeance against Azerbaijanis. They justified their aggressive attack and cleansing of Azerbaijanis by using the 1915 historical dilemma. The picture in Nagorno-Karabakh against the Azerbaijani Turks created kind of a moral responsibility in Turkey by seeing the hardship of Azerbaijanis. Furthermore, Armenia literally pursued its historical 'greater Armenia' conception in Nagorno-Karabakh, but intrinsically that plan was not only intended to capture the land from Azerbaijan, but Turkey also was part of the plan. This political and nationalist intention alerted Turkey to have a political concern on irredentist policy of Armenia.⁽⁴²⁹⁾

It is important to state that, in spite of the cultural, national, and political ties of Azerbaijan and Turkey was strong and consistent, Azerbaijan has never officially asked for a military intervention of Turkey into the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. According to the Mehmet Novruzoglu Aliyev was a former ambassador of Azerbaijan to Turkey in Ankara, stated that the Azerbaijan's political expectation on that time was from Turkey use its western alliance sufficiently to make them hear

⁴²⁷ Gulshan Pashayeva and Nigar Goksel, "The Interplay of the approaches of Turkey, Russia and United States to the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh", **SAM Center for Strategic Studies**, Part I, Baku, 2011, p.6.

⁴²⁸ David D. Laitin and Ronald Grigor Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a way out of Karabakh," **Middle East Policy Council**, Vol .7, No. 1, October ,1999.

⁴²⁹ Pashayeva and Goksel, p.7.

true story of Azerbaijan in the region, and by this political network world would know about the regional dynamics with its real faces.⁽⁴³⁰⁾

Nevertheless, Turkey tried to maintain its neutral mediation attempt. However, it did not last long. If that mediation would last long, in the eyes of Armenia, Turkey would have to make compromises. The Khojaly massacre in February 26, 1992 killed dozens of the Azerbaijani population in Karabakh, which created a huge public demonstration including anti-Armenian slogans in Turkey. Hundred thousands of people in the streets were demanding from the Turkish government to conduct a military intervention in the favor of Azerbaijan. Turkish President Turgut Ozal stated on several occasions that Armenia's act is unacceptable and Armenia needs to be frightened. This statement shockingly distracted Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora, and led them to disprove Turkey. Right after the following days, Turkey increased its pro-Azerbaijani position, as long as the Azerbaijani territories were intensively attacked by the Armenian forces.⁽⁴³¹⁾

The right-wing party increased the public anger toward the Armenian separatists who conducted a massacre against the Azerbaijani Turks civilians in Karabakh. In order to calm down the public tension the, former prime minister Suleyman Demirel particularly emphasized that if Turkey realized a military intervention on the side of Azerbaijan, the outcome of this action will be beneficial for Armenia, gathering the whole world behind it.⁽⁴³²⁾

Nevertheless, Turkey and Armenia recognized each other as an independent country with no diplomatic relations, since April 1993, because of the Armenia's military attack towards the territories of Azerbaijan. However, when AK Party (Justice and Development Partiy) came to power, its rulers developed certain conditions, to reopen the borderline between Turkey and Armenia: firstly, Armenia should rely on the treaties of Moscow and Kars, which requires a definitive recognition of the current land border; Second, Armenia should terminate its consistent claim over 1915 historical dilemma as so-called "Armenian genocide"; and third, there should be an immediate withdrawal of the Armenian military forces

⁴³⁰ Svante E. Cornell, "Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Delicate Balance", **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 34, No: 1, January, 1998, pp. 60-61.

⁴³¹ Cornell (1998), p.60.

⁴³² Cornell (1998), p.66.

from the Azerbaijan's occupied territories. Armenia however persistently asked for reopening of the borders without any preconditions.⁽⁴³³⁾

Turkey continues its close economic ties with Azerbaijan, meaning Turkey positions as the main passage point for exporting the Azerbaijan's oil via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, Nabucco-West gas pipeline, and the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP). Furthermore, right after Azerbaijan gained its independence in 1991, Baku and Ankara established their mutual military cooperation. They developed a defense pack, meaning in any event if a third party may attack either side then mutual military assistance should be operated, in addition, cooperative projects on weaponry production, and last but not least, cooperative military trainings and deepened logistical programs.⁽⁴³⁴⁾

Azerbaijan and Armenia pursue their independent and different expectations from Turkey, considering that Turkey holds a chair in the OSCE Minsk Group being as one of the permanent member.⁽⁴³⁵⁾ Turkey also understands that as long as the regional security in the South Caucasus is in danger, sharing its border with those countries would affect its own security and territorial stability.⁽⁴³⁶⁾

According to the former, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, due to Turkey's geographical position it has to pay attention to fighting terrorism and maintaining regional security. Turkish new foreign policy agenda needs to endorse the reduction of the regional problems in neighborhoods, where the security is not fixed, and develop its relations with those regions for an immediate action to end up with zero regional problems result. This requires an implementation of balanced diplomacy and multi-geographical foreign policy, emphasizing Turkey as an important regional actor.⁽⁴³⁷⁾

If Turkey pursues a completely independent foreign policy in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh towards the South Caucasus region, certainly Turkey will need to curb several necessities. Considering that Turkey is a NATO member country,

⁴³³ Kevork Oskanian, "Turkey's global strategy: Turkey and the Caucasus", **London School of Economics and Political Science**, (Ed. Nicholas Kitchen), IDEAS reports, London, UK, 2011.p.25.

⁴³⁴ Oskanian, p. 26.

⁴³⁵ "History: The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)", **Mfa.gov.tr**, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-and-the-organization-for-security-and-cooperation-in-europe-osce.en.mfa>, (30.11.2018)

⁴³⁶ Aydin, pp. 186-189.

⁴³⁷ Chaman and Akyurt, p. 57.

Turkey is obliged to rely on decisions of organization by staying neutral.⁽⁴³⁸⁾ Moreover, Turkey has political intention to be member of the European Union since 1987, however, if Turkey gets involved into any regional war, that would negatively affect this process.⁽⁴³⁹⁾ Turkey's trade relations with Russia was in high level, and Turkey's involvement into a regional war in the South Caucasus would be considered an extra problem and Ankara politically would not like to endanger its mutual relations. Turkey's stepped back diplomatic position from one side had a positive effect on restraining the intensification of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to involve Turkey and Russia in a full-scale regional war. Most importantly, Russia could not accept Turkey's involvement to share the region, because Russia considered its existence in the region as one and only hegemonic power.⁽⁴⁴⁰⁾ Besides an external constraint over Turkey, there were internal policies Turkey was obliged to rely on. According to the Kemalism doctrine, Turkey was not allowed to realize an active involvement into internal issues of other countries.⁽⁴⁴¹⁾ Turkey had very limited expertise to be one of the co-Chairs in the mediation process.⁽⁴⁴²⁾ Obviously, Turkey's closed border relations with Armenia, and Armenia's insisting policy on the recognition of 1915 Armenian so-called genocide, lowered Turkey's position in the Nagorno-Karabakh mediation process with no surprise.⁽⁴⁴³⁾

4.3.3. EU's Policy About the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

The EU is interested in the South Caucasus due to several reasons. First, energy resources in the South Caucasus placed put the region in the EU's economic agenda, because the South Caucasus could become a huge energy supplier for the EU. Over the two decades, the South Caucasus boosted up its experience on oil and

⁴³⁸ Cornell, JSAMES, p. 15.

⁴³⁹ Nathalie Tocci, "Turkey and the European Union: A Journey in the Unknown", **Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings**, Turkey Project Policy Paper, November 05, 2014.

⁴⁴⁰ Cornell, JSAMES, p.15.

⁴⁴¹ "Synopsis of the Turkey's Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy", **Republic of Turkey-Ministry of Foreign Affairs**, 2011. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>, (02.12.2018)

⁴⁴² Kasim, pp. 95, 99, 100.

⁴⁴³ "Turkey's role in the Nagorno-Karabakh war: a potential resource for peace", **Caucasus Edition, Journal of Conflict Transformation**, 15.07.2013, <http://caucasusedition.net/turkeys-role-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-war-a-potential-resource-for-peace/>, (04.12.2018)

gas production as well as transportation. Particularly, Azerbaijan's oil production from the Caspian Sea is very important. In 2005, the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan oil pipeline is completed, and the oil project started to give its benefits to the European markets from its major Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea. In addition, there is another oil field in the Caspian Sea called Shahdeniz to carry Azerbaijan's oil to the European markets. European markets have been impatient to consume the Caspian energy resources and to cut off its strong energy dependency from Russia. The South Caucasus is an attractive region not only for its natural resources but also for its geographic and strategic location that the region places on the East-West's cross roads in terms of logistics, military, trade, and other terms of communication.⁽⁴⁴⁴⁾

However, the European Union stay little bit away from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement, particularly after 2008. The EU increased its role in Georgia by appointing a special representative. The only effort the EU has done was to deliver its institutional assistance beyond the OSCE-led Minsk Group mediation process.⁽⁴⁴⁵⁾

After the ceasefire agreement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the OSCE members obtained a particular measurement on deploying the international peacekeeping forces into the region to maintain the stability, which was not received a full endorsement from the Europeans. According to the decision adopted on June 4, 1992 in Oslo, NATO would conduct a military intervention in order to terminate the regional crisis based on the OSCE mandate, which was called as CSCE at that time.⁽⁴⁴⁶⁾⁽⁴⁴⁷⁾

The EU has a relationship with Azerbaijan and Armenia based on Eastern Partnership program and the European Neighborhood Policy. The fundamental and

⁴⁴⁴Leila Alieva, "EU and South Caucasus", **Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research**, CAP Discussion Paper, December, 2006, p.1.

⁴⁴⁵Esmira Jafarova, "EU Conflict Resolution Policy Towards the South Caucasus", P&P Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, **Connections: The Quarterly Journal**, 2011, <http://connections-qj.org/article/eu-conflict-resolution-policy-towards-south-caucasus>, (19.03.2019)

⁴⁴⁶"Final Communiqu", Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo June 4, Ministerial Communiqu, **Nato.int**, 27.10.2000, <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm>, (03.12.2018)

⁴⁴⁷Damien Helly, "Role of the EU in the Security of the South Caucasus: A Compromised Specificity?". P&P Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, **Connections: The Quarterly Journal**, Vol.1, No.3, September, 2002, p.71.

structural objectives of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is reinforcing the stability, prosperity and regional security in the EU's neighboring countries, which politically puts the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in EU's agenda as a prior interest. However, according to the Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreements and Association Agreements, the Eastern Partnership Program concentrates on improving the relationship with the South Caucasus and Eastern European countries.⁽⁴⁴⁸⁾

In the European Neighborhood Policy's recent implementation reports, the involvement of the EU in the regional conflict was outlined. The OSCE Minsk Group receives full endorsement and political support by the EU as one of the prior issue.⁽⁴⁴⁹⁾ France takes a sit as the OSCE Minsk Group co-Chairs, however, France represents itself rather than interests at the union. The EU contributes to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement process based on its funded civil society programme that runs by the European Partnership for Peace Settlement of the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK) initiative. The EU provides a financial allowance for the EPNK via its Stability Instrument. Moreover, the EU provides other alternative funding for the regional Civil Society Organizations (CSO) through the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), as well as Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA-LA), and European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) mechanisms. Thus, the EU assigned a Philip Lefort as a European Union Special Representative to the South Caucasus. Philip Lefort started its mission in 2011 as EUSR in the region and served until June 30, 2014 with an extension of his mandate.⁽⁴⁵⁰⁾⁽⁴⁵¹⁾

Table. The EU's political contributions to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict:

INSTRUMENT	YEAR	AIM
------------	------	-----

⁴⁴⁸ Klever, p. 6.

⁴⁴⁹“ENP Country Progress Report 2013 – Azerbaijan” and “ENP Country Progress Report 2013- Armenia”, (PDF), **MEMO European Commission**, Brussels, March 27, 2014.

⁴⁵⁰“New EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia”, **Delegation of the European Union to Turkey**, 13561/11 PRESSE 284, Brussels, 26.08.2011, <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/eeas-news/new-eu-special-representative-south-caucasus-and-crisis-georgia-3698>, (17.12.2018)

⁴⁵¹“EUSR Lefort for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia steps down”, **Policy Observatory**, 31.01.2014, <https://policyobservatory.eup-unga.eu/en/site-rss/item/66-eusr-lefort-for-the-south-caucasus-and-the-crisis-in-georgia-steps-down.html>, (17.12.2018)

OSCE Minsk Group was created by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. ⁽⁴⁵²⁾	1992	To encourage the peaceful, negotiated resolutions to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was developed and implemented by the European Commission. ⁽⁴⁵³⁾	2004	The ENP with its limited deal to conduct its effective and useful in statements in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement process. However, the main commitment of ENP based on EU is to find out a consensus in the Action Plans that seeks a mutual agreement between partner countries in any specific (vis-a-vis) conflict resolution and prevention process. It aims to consult closely with the OSCE in order to strengthen its engagement in the conflict resolution process. In the Action Plan the resolving, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is number 1 priority for Azerbaijan but number 7 for Armenia. In addition, it aims to increase the political support to OSCE Minsk Group.
The EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus (EUSR). ⁽⁴⁵⁴⁾	2017	The EUSR's primary focused activities to deal the regional issues in Georgia, however, the EU has broaden its

⁴⁵² Executive Summary, "Report of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs' Field Assessment Mission to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh", **OSCE.org**, <https://www.osce.org/mg/76209?download=true>, (18.12.2018)

⁴⁵³ Wolff, p.2.

⁴⁵⁴ "EU Special Representatives", European Union External Action, **Eeas.europa.eu**, 25.11.2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage_en/3606/EU%20Special%20Representatives, (23.12.2019)

		operation with the EUSR Border Support Team since 2005 which dealt the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by having another political advisor based on Baku. More importantly, EUSR gives priority to the issue of Georgia rather than the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, though this scenario may be unfortunate from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution perspective.
The Role of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). ⁽⁴⁵⁵⁾	2005	PACE adopted a resolution 1416 to provide an environment to exchange the issues of frozen conflicts. It offers a platform to experience the conflict settlement measures in broader spectrum because of its broad membership. The organized forum is also a follow up opportunity for PACE members to carry out the discussed information to their countries and continue on lobbying the peaceful conflict resolution process via supporting democratic consolidation of the countries and affected regions. Through its 1416, Resolution the Assembly recalls the parties for their

On November 13, 2017 Mr. Toivo Klaar was appointed as European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus in order to deal with 2008 of conflict crisis in Georgia, and also contribute and encourage other regional conflicting parties Azerbaijan and Armenia for peace settlement over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Every representative who was appointed by EU is obliged to act on behalf of the EU's interests in the region to consolidate regional peace, rule of law and stability.

⁴⁵⁵ Parliamentary Assembly, "Resolution 1416 -The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference", **Council of Europe**, 2005.

		urgent compliance on the UN Resolutions 833, 852, 874, and 884.
The Eastern Partnership Program (EaP). ⁽⁴⁵⁶⁾	2009	The EaP's main goal is to accelerate political association and strengthen the economic integration between EU and Azerbaijan and Armenia. In this integration process, both countries should obey on European values, standards, and structures and its progress. The main of the EaP to promote the good governance, democracy, encourage sectoral reforms (including environmental protection), strengthen energy security, and encourage people-to-people contacts, in addition, offer extra funding via supporting economic and social development in order to reduce socio-economic imbalances via increasing

⁴⁵⁶ “Three Eastern Partnership neighbors in the South Caucasus”, European Parliament| Fact Sheets on the European Union, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/172/three-eastern-partnership-neighbours-in-the-south-caucasus>, (28.12.2018)

		stability.
--	--	------------

The EU has a particular interest over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement with ‘peaceful resolution’. Azerbaijan and Armenian interstate conflict is a disturbing regional problem for the fundamental structure of the European Union security.⁽⁴⁵⁷⁾ Yet, the South Caucasus region is not significantly strategic region for the most member states of the EU. The South Caucasus countries always have to take a back seat in comparison to Balkan countries as well as other Eastern Partnership Countries-Ukraine, Moldova and even Belarus.⁽⁴⁵⁸⁾

The EU as a supranational organization is undoubtedly getting global endorsement with its growing influence in every sector. Therefore, for the South Caucasus countries there is no other alternative to replace the EU, considering its comprehensively structured political and economic ties with the regional countries. Yet, the current situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict correlates with the three significant interlinked features. Although since the ceasefire agreement the OSCE Minsk Group took the main role on leading an intensive peace negotiation process, until now, no positive outcome has been achieved. Negotiations are in deadlock, with no definite results. There is also an actual and factual point that both parties within the nine years have demonstrated full commitment on finding mutually beneficial political solutions, whereas unfortunately, no essential achievement has been recorded. That is also true that the situation between two sides is not anymore a sensitive deadlock. The frequent border escalation challenges the stability in the line of contact and predicts an inevitable fighting soon or later in the region, as long as mediators and including conflicting parties do not obtain a real progress on peace settlement.⁽⁴⁵⁹⁾

Particularly, there are other three key issues we need to focus on in the context of Azerbaijan and Armenia relations over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory, which politically requires a certain conflict management that may construct

⁴⁵⁷Elkhan Nuriyev, “EU Policy in the South Caucasus : A view from Azerbaijan”,**Center for European Policy Studies –CEPS**, Working Documents No.272, July, 2007.p. 10

⁴⁵⁸International Crisis Group-ICG,“ Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role”, **Europe Report № 173**, March 20, 2006.

⁴⁵⁹ Arman Grigorian, “The EU and Karabakh Conflict”, **The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU**, Institute for Security Studies, Chailiot Papers № 65, Paris, December, 2003, pp. 131-132.

successful conflict prevention. First, is a readiness and willingness of the ENP on the road to shoulder the political and financial costs of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's outcome that would be successfully resolved and potential powerful regional conflict might be prevented. Second, is asking a concrete and straightforward question to the EU, whether the EU is persistent on its relations with the South Caucasus. This question may lead to further political debate of finding out the maximum size of EU map, or how we do understand and estimate the starting and ending point of the EU's neighborhood. Third, if the South Caucasus region does not achieve a regional peace over the entitled conflict settlement, the EU in this context is not obliged, and should not be any further relying on multilateral structure to find out other measurements for better progress. An important and final point is significant to underline; obviously, the EU obtains a practical experience and political instrument on conflict settlement and crisis management. However, not all EU's measurements have a positive nature; certainly most of them could demonstrate complete failures and calamities.⁽⁴⁶⁰⁾

The EU, together using its institutional instruments for reaching out constructively better and peaceful achievements, it increasingly motivates the regional civil society developments and assist them to work cooperatively for reducing the longevity in conflict settlement. The EU refers its initiative for the regional civil society development through the European Partnership for Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK). Its main goal is to accelerate of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformation via consistent peacebuilding exercises. In this regard, the EU prioritizes building up a sustainable cooperation with the local partners in the South Caucasus to implement a wide scope of projects and programmes. There are three working areas: providing a transparent arena for media initiatives, at the same time balancing media coverage that might will reduce barriers for conflict settlement; the conflict resolution process should create an incentive for involving the Conflict Affected Groups (CAG) to become part of the process by contributing a practical data; a public policy should be included in the negotiation process and facilitate an effective environment for this.

⁴⁶⁰ Stefan Wolff, "The European Union and the Conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh Territory", **Committee on Member States' Obligations Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe**, Report, Berlin, November 4-5, 2007, pp.5-6.

Therefore, EU's civil society development initiative program EPNK is collaborating with the five organizations since June 2010. They are International Alert, Conciliation Resources, Kvinna till Kvinna, Crisis Management Initiative, and London Information Network on Conflicts and State Building (LINKS).⁽⁴⁶¹⁾

Considerably, the EU as an organization has frequently been classified as a normative power pursuer, which means, the EU does not use power in order to impose its goals, on the contrary, the EU increasingly uses and spreads out its normative power that seems influential.⁽⁴⁶²⁾ That is also factual issue that, EU's approach to the conflict resolution is seen via low political initiatives. Presumably, the conflict resolution could have been ended up in a long-run by promoting the local and regional development projects and possibility by people-to-people cooperation. This might have been a credible view for EU. However, Azerbaijan have been refusing to collaborate with the Nagorno-Karabakh's local authorities as an another negotiation party, which certainly will give a certain legitimacy to the regional government, which is unacceptable for Azerbaijan.⁽⁴⁶³⁾ The EU's indirect participation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict negotiations might lead to the perception that the EU does not build a strong and interrelated relationship with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The EU did not use its maximum efforts on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution; in Nagorno-Karabakh, it made limited assistance for the peace settlement. There is a regional expectation from the EU to increase its proactive role and develop a political and institutional visibility in regard to conflict resolution process.⁽⁴⁶⁴⁾

⁴⁶¹ Klever, p.8.

⁴⁶² David Janssen, "The Impact of the European Union on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, Vol.11, № 1, p.156.

⁴⁶³ Janssen, p.165.

⁴⁶⁴ Anna Poghosyan, "EU's Current and Possible Role in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Resolution Process", *Caucasus Edition: Journals of Conflict Transformation*, **Academia.edu**, https://www.academia.edu/1157957/EU_s_Current_and_Possible_Role_in_the_Nagorno-Karabakh_Conflict_Resolution_Process, (29.11.2018), p. 2.

4.3.4. Role of the United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is not directly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. However, at the mid-stages of the conflict in 1993, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) ratified four resolutions as the articles 822, 853, 874, and 884. Thus, in March 14, 2008, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution numbered 62/243, in the framework of the ‘2005 UN’s fact finding mission’. The context of the resolution was calling an immediate withdrawal of the Armenian military forces from the occupied Azerbaijan’s territories for the respect of territorial integrity. However, the resolution was confronted with the co-Chairs of the Minsk Group’s refusal voting, referring to the reason that the Minsk process was disregarded. Unfortunately, the UN resolutions and demanded measures have not been conducted till now, and the UN could not demonstrate further initiative, but seems not present in the resolution process.⁽⁴⁶⁵⁾

Although, beside Security Council resolutions the UN has never hold up a direct involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but still the UN continues and reinforces its independent relationships with Azerbaijan and Armenia. They build up cooperation in the framework of ‘capacity building’ and ‘confidence building’ for being prepared for a peace settlement over the underlined conflict, and they continue various project-oriented collaboration. The Republic of Azerbaijan was admitted to the UN in the UN General Assembly’s 46th session in March 2, 1992.⁽⁴⁶⁶⁾ In the same year the UN also admitted Armenia.⁽⁴⁶⁷⁾

The United Nation Secretary General and the Security Council put the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a priority in their agenda. The Secretary General conducted a very personal initiative on sending the first fact-finding mission to Nagorno-Karabakh.⁽⁴⁶⁸⁾ In March 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh welcomed UN’s first fact-finding mission right after Armenia’s aggressive attack to the Azerbaijan’s provinces. For this, mission the former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance was

⁴⁶⁵ Klever, p.8.

⁴⁶⁶“Azerbaijan and UN relations”, **Mfa.gov.az**, Updated: 05.05.2014, <http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/751>, (27.12.2018)

⁴⁶⁷“UN in Armenia”, **Un.am**, <http://www.un.am/en/p/united-nations-in-armenia>, (27.12.2018)

⁴⁶⁸ Oliver Paye and Eric Remacle, “UN and OSCE Policies in Transcaucasia”, **Contested Borders in the Caucasus**, (Ed. Bruno Coppieters), VUB Press, Bruxelles, 1996, <http://hdl.handle.net/2078.3/151503>, (28.03.2019), p.4.

appointed because of his previous successful mission in former Yugoslavia. On his previous mission, he persistently convinced the fighting groups in Croatia, to terminate the war and respect and accept a peacekeeping operation of the UN by establishing ceasefire. The same things happened in his South Caucasus mission, where he demonstrated high support for Jiri Dienstbier who was a mediator of the CSCE (current OSCE). Besides these, the UN delivered other similar structured missions to the region in May and October 1992.⁽⁴⁶⁹⁾

Armenia's usage of chemical weapons was the first charged investigation based on the fact-finding mission in July 1992.⁽⁴⁷⁰⁾ The UN Secretary General started to act seriously after seeing the result of the Armenian assault in Fizuli and Kelbajar districts in April 1993. The Secretary General requested the Security Council to inform the Chief Representatives who were newly appointed to the UN offices in Azerbaijan and Armenia, to determine the seriousness of the situation on the ground. The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh derived the Secretary General to deliver a report.⁽⁴⁷¹⁾ In May 1992, the Nagorno-Karabakh statement was issued by the Security Council, following two months after the CSCE's (OSCE) first statement against the Armenia attack in the Lachin district.⁽⁴⁷²⁾

The escalation of the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh made the Security Council members to demonstrate their severe concern over the worsening of the situation in the region and breakaway of the ceasefire agreements. The members of the Security Council also have shown high concern about the CSCE (OSCE) conducted peace process. In January 1993, Azerbaijan established a barrier against Armenia, and consequently, the UN Security Council explicitly announced worries over the difficulties in carrying out the basic support of goods to Nakhchivan and Armenia.⁽⁴⁷³⁾ After Armenia's attack to Fizuli and Kelbajar and the surrounding districts of Nagorno-Karabakh in April 1993, the UN Secretary General was requested by the Security Council to report the ongoing situation in the hostile

⁴⁶⁹ Pye and Remacle, *UN and OSCE Policies in Transcaucasia*, p. 4.

⁴⁷⁰ "19. The situation relating to Nagorno-Karabakh: Initial Proceedings", Chapter VIII. Reportoire of the Practice of the Security Council, **UN.org**, https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-92/Chapter%208/EUROPE/item%2019_Nagorny-Karabakh.pdf, (19.03.2019), p. 470.

⁴⁷¹ UN Security Council, "Security Council Resolution 822 (1993) Armenia-Azerbaijan", S/RES/822, **Refworld.org**, 30.04.1993, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f15764.html>, (19.03.2019)

⁴⁷² United Nations, "Security Council", Distr. General, **S/23496**, January 29, 1992.

⁴⁷³ United Nations, "Security Council", Distr. General, **S/25199**, January 29, 1993.

area.⁽⁴⁷⁴⁾ One week later Secretary General's report was published stating that: "the intensification of fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, especially the recent attacks against the Kelbajar and Fizuli districts of Azerbaijan a serious threat to the maintenance of international peace and security in the entire South Caucasus region".⁽⁴⁷⁵⁾

The Security Council executed similar issue as general statements concerning Armenia's entanglement into the Nagorno-Karabakh war, craving from all the regional states out there to deviate from any kind of animosity and from any intervention and interference.⁽⁴⁷⁶⁾ However, in July 1993, the Security Council stimulated the Armenian government to endure and extend its authority to attain an agreement by Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian minorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan with an approval according to the Security Council's Resolutions, and referred proposals of the CSCE (OSCE) Minsk Group.⁽⁴⁷⁷⁾ In November 1993, the request was repeated again by the Security Council, the Armenian government must guarantee that Armenian involved forces were not facilitated by particular means in order to continue Armenia's military lobby.⁽⁴⁷⁸⁾ The Security Council sent a request to international community to restrain the contribution of munitions and arms that obviously might evolve the regional fighting intensively and accelerate the territorial occupation to further stages.⁽⁴⁷⁹⁾

The United Nations provided humanitarian support and adopted a resolution. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) delivered its help to 53.000 miserable people and continued this assistance during 1993. By the end of the 1994, the UNHCR decided to increase its humanitarian assistance to around 300.000 people. However, the internally displaced persons were not organization's target, only refugees crossed an international border. Azerbaijan had over one million internally displaced persons. Thus, UNHCR provided a financial assistance to Azerbaijan. This act could have been explained with two main factors: First is the

⁴⁷⁴ United Nations, "Security Council", Distr. General, S/25539, April 6, 1993.

⁴⁷⁵ United Nations, "Security General", Distr. General, S/25600, April 14, 1993, p.3.

⁴⁷⁶ United Nations Security Council, "**Resolution 874**", Distr. General, S/RES/874, Para. 10, October 14, 1993, p.2.

⁴⁷⁷ United Nations Security Council, "**Resolution 853**", Distr. General, S/RES/853, July 29, 1993.

⁴⁷⁸ United Nations Security Council, "**Resolution 884**", Distr. General, S/RES/884, Para.2, November 12, 1993.

⁴⁷⁹ United Nations Security Council adopted similar arms embargoes with the "Resolutions: 713-Former Yugoslavia, 733-Somalia, 788-Liberia, 841-Haiti, and 918-Rwanda".

Armenian lobby factor, the powerful Armenian groups' committed highly influential attitudes during the policy-making process, which presumably evaluated Azerbaijan indifferently and even with hostile attitude. Second is media factor, TV channel was absent, yet it could have played an important role; if the ongoing situation was presented frequently, that would influence western governments towards taking immediate actions.⁽⁴⁸⁰⁾

In September 24, 2004, at the General Assembly's 59th session, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev repeatedly stated Azerbaijan's main concern since its membership to the UN, has been to turn the international communities' attention towards the Armenian aggression and its occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan. In addition, the conflict still is unsettled, and Azerbaijan pursues its constant and persistent expectation from the UN to conduct an action on Armenian to withdraw its military forces from the occupied territories to let forcefully displaced people return their homes.⁽⁴⁸¹⁾

4.3.5. Role of NATO

NATO has a growing interest for establishing security and maintaining regional stability in South Caucasus region. NATO has been involved in the South Caucasus aiming to promote regional security particularly for Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia and to enhance cooperation. NATO and the South Caucasus countries built up cooperation in 1994 that started primarily with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The program's main intention was to have an intensive military and political partnership with countries within the European continent that are not member of NATO. NATO aimed to increase the stability in the region and to reduce the threats for peace by this cooperation. Moreover, it is considered that institutional

⁴⁸⁰ Cornell, JSAMES, p.10.

⁴⁸¹ "Statement by H.E. Mr. Ilham Aliyev President of the Republic of Azerbaijan at the General Debate of the 59th session of the General Assembly", **United Nations**, New York, 24.09.2004, <https://www.un.org/webcast/ga/59/statements/azeeng040924.pdf>, (18.12.2018)

and democratic development will increase with this cooperation, which will also strengthen the regional commitment.⁽⁴⁸²⁾

The PfP was particularly designed to support the defense and structural security system adequately to stand prepared for an upcoming security threats, as well as taking democratic control for civilians over the military and enhancing transparency in budgeting and defense planning. Furthermore, the program intends establishing betterment on intensive dialogue and communication between PfP and NATO countries in order to conduct cooperative peacekeeping operations with other NATO countries.⁽⁴⁸³⁾

NATO's engagement with the regional countries in the South Caucasus is very crucial point that this engagement should not be associated with NATO membership or no-membership. The PfP program is comprehensively designed partnership program to reinforce political and military relationships between NATO members and non-members countries. Even it goes further to increase the political and military bridges between non-member countries. Through this program, regional countries are engaged to conduct military reform within the country and increase internal and regional security, which obviously adds additional positive effect and political development in the regional counties. Through the PfP program the South Caucasus has been engaged in various training programs in terms of peacekeeping mission, which led them to understand a new way of military thinking, which is different from the Soviet military understanding, and a new generation would bring diversity and structural change in the military system.⁽⁴⁸⁴⁾

In the region, Georgia and Azerbaijan are actively cooperating with NATO within the partnership mission, however, Armenia's relations stands quite limited. Azerbaijan and Georgia even sent one infantry battalion to Kosovo, under the umbrella of Turkish team, which was part of NATO's KFOR peacekeeping operations. Azerbaijan also sent battalion to Afghanistan and Iraq for the peacekeeping mission. The reason for Armenia's limited cooperation with NATO of

⁴⁸² Ministerial Communiques, "Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, January 10-11, 1994", **Nato.int**, 17.02. 2009, <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/comm94.htm>, (17.12.2018)

⁴⁸³ Grigorian, p.82.

⁴⁸⁴ Svante.E. Cornell, Roger N. McDermott, and William O'Malley, "Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO", **Central Asia-Caucasus Institute-CACI**, 2004, pp.66-76.

its strategic military cooperation with Russia made Armenia to have a very limited a relation with Turkey.⁽⁴⁸⁵⁾

In addition, the regional countries cooperate with NATO based on Operation Capability Concept (OCC) Evaluation and Feedback (E&F) program in order to achieve a higher level of NATO forces' interoperability. The OCC program was aimed to establish multidisciplinary and multipurpose military tool activities and trainings with member and non-member states, evaluating the preparation of the counterparts for any NATO related mission. The participation of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia started in 2008.⁽⁴⁸⁶⁾

NATO is not the only one organization has particular interest, but also the US; Russia, Iran, Turkey, as well as the CIS and the OSCE prioritize the South Caucasus region as a strategic location that needs sustainable stability and security. As it was mentioned above, NATO's Peace for Partnership program is considerably most constructive program promising changes in the region. In the South Caucasus region, the Peace for Partnership program is the only multilateral program that cooperate in regional countries with its security mechanisms.⁽⁴⁸⁷⁾

Obviously, after the collapse of Soviet Union, NATO has been seen an inevitable military ally. Therefore, countries in the South Caucasus are willing to cooperate with NATO in every sense beside the PfP program, though NATO approaches to the region very carefully. It is important to note that, though Armenia is a strategic partner of Russia even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in the following years Armenia managed to soften its historical animosity towards NATO. Because, for Armenia, NATO was a military organization and its historical enemy Turkey has been member of NATO, whereas Armenia was following Russian policy towards NATO. However, currently Armenia considers NATO as an important political spectrum to spread out its foreign policy. Nevertheless, Armenia does not have an aspiration to pursue NATO membership scenario as Georgia does, whereas,

⁴⁸⁵ Grigorian, p.83.

⁴⁸⁶ Author's own military experience held in 2007-2008 in the OCC-NATO-Azerbaijan Peacekeeping military base. He served as a booby-trap specialist and patrol team chat-man. Azerbaijan collected 13 points out of 15 during the evaluation exam.

⁴⁸⁷ Cornell and Et.al, CACI,(2004), p.7.

Yerevan has already ratified its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) on the road to NATO.⁽⁴⁸⁸⁾

On the contrary, Azerbaijan follows up completely different foreign and security policy based on its territorial integrity, giving high priority to the conflict resolution over Nagorno-Karabakh. The main and irreplaceable dedication of state policy is always continuing its cooperation and partnership with any international security organizations, as well as the CIS and NATO, by attracting their attention and international support for the conflict resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh, therefore, Azerbaijan desires NATO to provide peacekeeping forces by pursuing a direct involvement into the conflict resolution process. Unfortunately, because of the Armenian and Russian pressures, NATO rejected the possibility of this initiative several times. Yet, Armenia by using Russian support might block the possible involvement of NATO in the conflict resolution process.⁽⁴⁸⁹⁾

When Azerbaijan put embargo on Armenia over trade and transportation after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in response the US congress refused to provide military assistance to Azerbaijan. In the early 1992, Armenian lobby in the US congress managed the Freedom Support Act to impose 907a section. After the supportive behavior of Azerbaijan on United States' international anti-terrorism campaign, the US changed its policy.⁽⁴⁹⁰⁾

NATO representatives in general and the Secretary-General in particular, have always deferred to the UN and OSCE about the possible role for the alliance in the efforts to solve the unsettled Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Moreover, the same approach is observed for the South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. NATO has therefore not participated in the thus far unsuccessful negotiations in regional conflicts, which have been going on for many years. However, NATO's position should not be underestimated and Russia exclusion is not realist either.⁽⁴⁹¹⁾

⁴⁸⁸ Alberto Priego, "NATO cooperation towards South Caucasus", **Caucasian Review of International Affairs**, Vol.2 ,Issue.1, 2008, p.6

⁴⁸⁹ Priego, pp.7,8.

⁴⁹⁰ Cornell, CACI,(2004), p.57.

⁴⁹¹ Martin Malek, "NATO and South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on Different Tracks", *Connections, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes*, **Connections: The Quarterly Journal**, Vol.7, No.3, 2008, pp.44-45.

CONCLUSION

The outcomes of the thesis demonstrate wide range of understanding about the security dynamics in the South Caucasus region particularly about the on behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Analyzing the conflict within the Regional Security Complex Theory aimed to restructure the dynamics of the conflict and it is irrevocable impact over the entire region.

Over twenty-six year cease-fire status was an opportunity for Armenia and Azerbaijan to solve the conflict and to establish the interstate, indirectly regional peace. However, the solution was not and is not easy. Consequently, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict made all the involved actors to be in a complex interdependence. Regional security issue is not only important for Armenia and Azerbaijan, but for Turkey, Russia, Iran, Georgia, and the EU and the US as well. The predictability on peaceful solution over the conflict seems very hard and not soon, which proved itself not theoretically but practically as well. The April War-2016 changed the dynamics of the peace process and lost the hope that unaggressive behavior would not happen again. Certainly, distrustfulness exists between two states and will not disappear soon, even though; both tend to sit on the table for peace talks. International actors got involved in the negotiation process, what they accomplished during twenty-six years are important. Yet, Azerbaijani public opinion towards the Minsk Group action is not trustworthy, and their expectation is very low.

The present situation in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is no war, no peace. However, the recent development over the peace negotiation between Azerbaijan and Armenia structured the new initiative on preparation of the population for a peace. The visionary attempt is internationally accepted but locally either rejected or accepted. Azerbaijan agrees on a peace settlement only if Armenia returns occupied territories with no condition relying on the UN resolutions 822, 853, 874, and 884, and the Nagorno-Karabakh region should be under the control of Azerbaijan. However, the Armenian public view and the state approach is relatively the same, stating that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is their territory and peace should be established without any territorial integrity claim by Azerbaijan. This situation creates security dilemma between two sides. Consequently, both sides

politically focus on increasing their military capabilities for defensive purposes, which indirectly offend the opposite side, since the intention of either Armenia or Azerbaijan is unknown.

Obviously, the role of external actors on delaying the peace establishment is undeniable, such as Russia particularly. In spite of the Soviet Union has collapsed the South Caucasus states regained their independence, political decision of Russia in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict literally made both states to become dependent on Kremlin.

Another unclear issue is that the three permanent members of the Minsk Group are also permanent members of the UN. If UN Security Resolutions legally state the withdrawal of deployed Armenian forces from the Azerbaijan's occupied territories, why the Minsk Group with the same members does not bring those articles into force? Still the issue is unclear. Because Azerbaijan is referent object here and the Minsk Group is a securitizing actor.

The UN and the EU do not find a negotiated solution on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, then neorealist and realist arguments win, and regional dynamics answers all the queries of the RSCT. In the region, there is a security complex and will exist by the existence of Nagorno-Karabakh unsettled conflict, together with other regional conflicts. Yet, accordingly, the security complex should have not been measured only over the military-political context; impact of military conflict will damage economic relations internally, and externally which makes situation more complex. Therefore, desecuritization of the regional economy, regional environment, and regional peace is very difficult.

Thesis brought together approaches, policies, and interests of the international organizations and independent states towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The evaluation of the each actor's approach is different from another.

Russia is a historical partner of Azerbaijan and Armenia during the Soviet Union and even it continued after the dissolution of Union. The South Caucasus countries were compelled mainly by their security concerns of statebuilding and nationbuilding ideology. This ideology was evolved after the Soviet Union particularly. Because, the regional states challenged by the state and regional security issues, considering those states were sort of weak states, in addition

territorial conflicts, made Russia to get involved in the region to conduct its support for radical movements and political instability. Certainly, Russia's support was not relatively pure peace-stabilizer, but the regional instability was inevitable opportunity for Russia to demonstrate its hegemonic status over the countries. The regional countries did not have an alternative not to accept the Russia support, because their condition was survival and their integration into the international system, which was delayed because of the regional instability. After gaining their independence, countries could not even manage to start the statebuilding process and develop their economies. There were three obstacles correlated with this objective. First, during the Soviet Union, the realist belief was very dominant for pursuing leadership. However, the process was implemented with two options: from one side open-minded and intellectual officials demonstrated democracy, whereas, on the other side people with strong communist ideology with no experience on management were the face of old tradition in the Soviet Union. The second generation was majority and forcefully replaced the first one, which brought hardship to solve the emerged security issues in the South Caucasus. Second obstacle was countries inability on maintaining the balance of power in the region. Although, considerable struggle of Azerbaijan and Georgia to catch the Western attention, but the attempts proved futile no matter their represented European identity at the early 90s. However, even though the regional states had been fully concentrated with realist logic, they could not stand so long in front of the Russia's intervention into the region because of the lacking balance of power. One of the particular reasons for this was, Russian policy was traditionally structured in the framework of ideological belief on 'divide and rule'. Although, there were numerous attempts to reformulate the party doctrine of Russia supporting radical movements on the line of their reconciliation and maintenance of their independence, but nothing has changed the Russian concrete policy. Armenia, took a position next to Russia by being 'loyal' to its historical ally, in addition to use Russian power on controlling the Nagorno-Karabakh region, because the region was mainly inhabited by Armenians, whereas the region was legally and officially under the control of Azerbaijan. This kind of separation improved the dedication and right track line of the integration process in the region. The third obstacle was the consequence of the

Russia's colonial approach to the region. During the Soviet Union time all the policy was implemented by Kremlin, Moscow, kind of from top to down, and after the dissolution of the Union, Russia stayed loyal to that political approach and continuingly demonstrated its power over the region to make them again depend on Moscow. For instance, Armenia even during the Soviet times was dependent from central government, and even after the collapse of Union, its independence did not change the scenario, but again received consistent financial support of Russia and other substantial aids from international communities in order survive in the regionally blockade location, which could not be normalized as long as Armenia could not attempt on betterment of its relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Considering all these three factors, Russia's fundamental intention to get back to the South Caucasus was to retain its traditional influence over the economically, and strategically important territory, which has an access to Europe and Asia. In order to strengthen its policies with the forcible methods, for instance, being actively silent, but giving its full support on separatist conflicts, as well as bounding the interlinked energy transition within the closed border condition. The dissolution of the Soviet Union gave independence to the countries in the South Caucasus, but still people from the region stayed economically dependent on Russia and serious numbers of immigrants took the route of Russia. Those people were cheap labor for Russia, and not using this advantage would be inevitable opportunity for Russia. From time to time, Russia showed up its toughness within the bureaucracy, by toughening visa requirements, and labeling them as guest workers, by extending the time of holding Russian citizenship for those people. Economically being dependent from Russia was very beneficial for Russia, because people from the South Caucasus region were financing their families. Beside economic dependence, Russia was imposing its political pressure over those republics during the elections.

From time to time, the political elites in Azerbaijan and Armenia had a desire to move forward towards the European and Western integration, which hypothetically could bring desirable conflict resolution and better social welfare. This attempt has been always Russia's observatory agenda and as a reward. Russia triggers the regional conflicts with political provocation that frighten countries.

Certainly, both Azerbaijan and Armenia do not have an intention to go into bloody war once again, considering the disastrous consequences, economically, socially, and politically. Therefore, Russia uses this fear as an advantage to maintain its hegemonic power over the region. Yet, the April War in 2016 was sort of testing for Russia to realize how far the countries could go and which country to take an advantage over another. During the Four-Day War, Azerbaijan recaptured several strategically important places, and both sides lost many soldiers. The duration was enough for Russia to watch the escalation of the conflict and warn them to stop the war. As a result Russia imposed its message to both countries that, particularly to Armenia sort of, 'if I close my eyes you will see what would happen'. By this secret message, Russia warns Armenia to continue its strategic partnership with Russia, rather than searching alternative Western ally. Overall message in the 'April War' was by Russia, 'I can let you start war, and I could warn them to stop'. Regarding to Azerbaijan, the fear was if Azerbaijan goes into a full-scale war with Armenia, the Karabakh war scenario would happen again that Azerbaijan military forces could be confronted with Russian forces behind Armenia.

Since the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement in 1994, Russia got involved into the mediation process as one of the peacemaker. However, its role on the negotiation process between Azerbaijan and Armenia seemed very limited. Because, by its involvement Russia did not support the territorial integrity of its neighboring countries, rather stand strongly on its traditional policy 'divide and rule'. This factual and actual point, created social and political opinion in the South Caucasus countries, believing the slogan 'the key of the Nagorno-Karabakh is in the Kremlin'. Therefore, Russia's support for the separatist movements made the South Caucasus' political elites to condemn Russia for its double standard attitude to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and for Georgia. Therefore, right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Armenia established a military alliance with Russia, reasoning the conflict over the Mountainous Karabakh with Azerbaijan, and on the other side Turkey's existence gave another distrustful fear to Armenia to act forward.

After the Soviet Union, beside interstate relations, Russia was actively promoting the Commonwealth Independent States as an important regional

organization. The main intention to create the CIS to remodel the Soviet Union, but actually it aimed to serve the Russian hegemonic interest, maintaining its historical influence over the post-Soviet Space. The second option was motivating the post-Soviet states with the newly formed political economic and social space that could have been better instrument for them to accelerate the reintegration process among them. The CIS seems very justifiable political instrument for Russia to continue its hegemonic status in the post-Soviet arena, particularly over the South Caucasus. By this Russia seemingly acts as a security provider, and the CIS will help countries to cooperate each other within the common market, and more importantly, they maintain the common cultural heritage through this cooperation. Azerbaijan and Georgia at the beginning did not join to the CIS. For Azerbaijan and Georgia, to join to the CIS was not particularly foreign policy and important issue, but in tactical manner, they pursued this political act after the failure of the first Post-Soviet leaders. By this joining actually, they managed to decrease the political pressure of Russia towards them. At the same time, this cooperation became an arena for them to raise their voices freely and build up partnership in which sector they desire. However, being the member of the CIS did not increase the security concern of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Yet, the integration process within the CIS, particularly between the South Caucasus states except Armenia for absolutely a natural process. It provided a facilitation an opportunity for them to raise their voice on the individually bases relating to their security concern, however, there was not any practical instrument to bring concrete resolution. Regarding to Armenia, its integration to CIS was an advantageous at the same time problematic, because it bounded its intention to continue its route to the West. Russia's strategic partnership with Armenia is also another fundamental obstacle, because it decreases the institutional, political, and economic reform, which requires liberalization of the government and democratic changes in statebuilding process, which could finalize the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. Considering that, Armenia's Russian border completely militarized with Russian troops, which signals the Armenian dependency on Russia's military power in terms of security and defense. Furthermore, there are two military bases located in the territory of Armenia, and during the 1992-1996 Russia transferred at least, one billion dollars cost military

munitions and equipment. Until 2003, Russia continued its military assistance to Armenia. The economic dependency of the South Caucasus states brought a social disaster into the countries by the dissolution of the Union. Because, before their independence they were serving for Moscow and had not been specialized fabric independently. Even in any country if there was factory for air-conditioner, or television, or cars, the parts of the product were coming from different countries within the Soviet Union. By this policy, Moscow managed to establish a complex interdependence. Therefore, after the Soviet Union those countries faced with economic crises, which led several problems, but more importantly ethnic conflicts. The emergence of the ethnic conflict in the region escalated and became full-scale bloody wars that caused humanitarian and political crisis. Certainly, the economic crisis had security implications over the region. Besides military and political influence, economic dependency of the South Caucasus states was also on the plan of Russia. Therefore, after the second half of the 90s Russia increased its policy towards the region concentrating mostly on economic dependency of the South Caucasus.

Azerbaijan gained its economic independence by signing the ‘contract of the century’ with the foreign oil companies, which increased Turkey’s regional role through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, as well as Georgia became part of the benefit. Only, Armenia became isolated from these regional projects, because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and remains dependent on Russia. Actually, Armenia’s economic dependency on Russia was and is a political advantage for Russia, to maintain its primacy over the region and stay absent on conflict resolution. Presumably, Russia’s ‘divide and rule’ policy will not change over the South Caucasus, otherwise, Russia would lose the regional countries, particularly Azerbaijan and Armenia’s political dependency on Russia, which would lead western alliance to realize political, institutional and economic occupation in the region. However, the fundamental concern about the Russia’s role in the South Caucasus region, particularly in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict produces a hypothetical question: Could the policy of Russia towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict change with the pro-western president? Would traditional Russian policy allow any western oriented president’s election? Most probably, after the Gorbachov

case, Russian political elites would not make the same mistake. However, these questions give open door for following research in the case of the predications happen. Russia is one of the permanent members of the UN, which adopted four resolutions about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. Moreover, Russia is one of the permanent co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Groups, which leads peace negotiations. In addition, Russia's has individual interest and paternalistic approach towards the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. If we correlate all these three puzzles, the political and social scenario that 'the key of the Nagorno-Karabakh is in Kremlin' proves its reality.

Besides Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia pursue their aspiration to continue their strategic partnership with the EU, NATO, and the UN. However, both countries have separate expectations and political vision from these organizations, as well as they have the same towards these countries. The European Union cooperates with the regional countries based on several projects; however, the EU pursues its direct involvement and political penetration in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. Thus, the EU practically provides assistance for the regional capacity and confidence building in Azerbaijan and Armenia through the projects, presumably believing that whenever those countries become ready institutionally, socially, and politically then they would manage to settle conflict in between. Yet, the EU continues its support via the OSCE Minsk Group mission, which is lacking to impact positive result since the ceasefire. Nevertheless, the OSCE Minsk Group has difficulties to protect its trustworthy reputation, but the EU continues its partnership with Azerbaijan and Armenia, but mostly with Azerbaijan becomes a priority because of its Caspian oil richness that could survive EU market from Russia's energy dependency. In fact, in comparison to conflicts in Georgia, the EU does not have much interest over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There are two reasons: First is Georgia willingly forgot its territorial issue and politically and publicly concentrated towards the EU integration, which was good for Russia and good for the EU. Russia received what it desired having South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the EU relaxed to see Georgia without Russian pressure that the EU never wanted to have political confrontation with Russia. In short, Georgia become completely independent country in the South Caucasus with no Russian involvement its dedication towards the EU integration. As

a result, Georgia signed an Association Agreement together with Moldova and Ukraine in June 2014. Second is Georgia did not knock EU's door with its territorial problem, but with its desire for institutional development and democratization, and obviously hope to be future EU membership. However, these scenarios do not work for Azerbaijan and Armenia. It would be better also explaining this option with two reasons: First is both countries have political dependency on Russia because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which the EU does not desire to get into mediation conflict with Russia that may lead another conflict of interest over the region. Second reason is both countries knock the EU's door with their individual problems. Azerbaijan always stepping in the EU institutions with its territorial integrity and tries to build up all the cooperation based on this issue and expect from them to conduct a resolution. In addition, Armenia goes to the EU for the institutional assistance for the democratization political, economic, and social reforms in this regard. The EU sees Russian barrier in every sectors in Armenia. Overall, the EU sees both countries with full of problem and obviously steps back little bit, but only attach on benefiting Azerbaijan's energy resources. The main concern here, what if Azerbaijan would be economically as poor as Armenia. Would the EU be continuing its partnership with these countries? Obviously, there is a concrete complex interdependence between Azerbaijan and the EU. Azerbaijan will never forget its territorial integrity, and the EU will not probably desire to get into confrontation with Russia because of Azerbaijan. How will the EU solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? What can the EU do in this regard, or what cannot the EU do? Nevertheless, there is lack of trust towards the Minsk Group mediation, but still Azerbaijan particularly without any choice hopes EU could and should do something instrumentally to bring the resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Although, NATO is a military organization both Azerbaijan and Armenia are still hoping that NATO should do more than it does in the establishment of regional stability. Obviously, both countries are in cooperation with NATO based on the PfP program but still NATO does not demonstrate full desire to interfere into the conflict. There is a dilemma in NATO's role in the South Caucasus: from one hand, NATO acts as security stabilizer in the region, on other hand NATO gives intensive military trainings for the Azerbaijan and Armenian soldiers. It seems NATO creates

an environment for offensive and defensive realism in the South Caucasus. From one side, helping each country to have full capability to defend itself, on the other side, this defensive policy indirectly offend each other without known each other's intention.

Regarding to the United Nations, only stands little away from the mediation process, and acts with kind of 'I have done my job' slogan, that its adopted resolutions could not get into force. The UN lost its credibility as an important political organ in the world. If the UN Security Council could not finalize its resolutions with an action, then what is the point of adopting them? Azerbaijan political elites, scholars, and even public opinion raise up the UN resolutions in every international opportunity facing with the Armenian representative, but still there is not a positive reaction. If Armenia is member of the UN, and accepts its institutional rules, then how it is possible that the UN cannot force Armenia to realize the adopted resolutions. There are several unanswered question in the regard to the UN's role on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Most probably, Armenian lobby uses its power over the political institutions in the United States. As a result, the Security Council's resolutions are on the air.

Besides all these, another neighboring country Turkey's presence in the region produces very factual arguments. Turkey's role in the South Caucasus has been increased after the collapse of Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Turkey started its foreign policy towards the region by recognizing the three regional countries, but after seeing the Armenian aggression over the territories of Azerbaijan, it cut off its border relationship with Armenia and remains it until now. Turkey has a very strong relationship with Azerbaijan in every sector, relying on the famous statement said by former president Haydar Aliyev, 'Azerbaijan and Turkey: One nation, two countries'. There is political and social belief for this statement. Turkey plays an important role on being part of the energy projects, carrying out the Caspian oil to European markets. Presumably, there are two fundamental reasons for Turkey that continues its closed border relations with Armenia. First, Armenia did not stop on demanding the recognition of the 1915 Armenian so called genocide, and Turkey's political elite condemns Armenia and other countries that approved this claim. Second reason is the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, that Turkey demands Armenia to

return all the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, Turkey has limited role on mediation process but continuous its full cooperation with Azerbaijan in the promotion of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Armenia's forceful military occupation of the sovereign country's territories. However, Armenia still wants the restoration of its communication and relationship with Turkey with no precondition. What if, Armenia stops its demanding on the recognition of the 1915 Armenian so called genocide, would Turkey open the doors for Armenia and continue its full support to Azerbaijan in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh? Yet, the first scenario presumably would not be never ever, and we will not have chance to see the Turkey's reaction on second concern. However, Turkey gives high importance to the South Caucasus because of the economic richness, and having a Turkic nation ally in the region is another political advantage for Turkey.

Azerbaijan will never stop demanding the Nagorno-Karabakh region as its integral part of the territory. In addition, asks for the international support for recognizing the Armenia's separatist aggression over the Azerbaijan's territory. In addition, Azerbaijan always states its militarily readiness to return its territories from Armenia, but Azerbaijan prioritize peaceful resolution in advance and asks Armenia to rely on the UN Security Council's four resolutions.

On contrary, Armenia stands on the similar demand, stating that Nagorno-Karabakh was historical part of Armenia and the conflict emerged based on right of self-determination. In addition, without any condition expect to normalize the relationship with Azerbaijan. Still Armenia sees the resolution only based on peace.

Over the 26 years since the ceasefire agreement, no result has been achieved. In addition, in Azerbaijan, there is a social fear that one more 26 years will pass out and still Nagorno-Karabakh will be under the Armenian occupation. On the other hand, Armenian people do not believe the conflict could end up in favor of Azerbaijan and people could not live in a friendly environment since after.

REFERENCES

Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 67, No. 4, December, 1952.

Aleksandra Kuszta, "Theoretical Foundations of Regional Security in International Relations: The overview", **Journal of Science of the Military Academy of Land Forces**, Vol. 49, No.1, 2017.

Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", **International Organization**, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992.

Alexander Wendt, **Social Theory of International Politics**, Cambridge Studies International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Ahmet Fuat Mütevellî, "Ermeni Soykırımını İddiaları Karşısında Gerçekler", [Ahmet Fuat Mutevellî, The Truth in front of the Armenian Claim on Genocide], **Ankara University Journal Database**, Vol. 12, 2001.

Anders Wivel, Security Dilemma, **International Encyclopedia of Political Science**, January, 2011.

A. N. Abbasbayli, P.Q.Darabadi, and Ə.G. İbrahimov, **Konfliktologiya Dərslik**, Bakı Dövlət Universiteti Nəşriyyatı, Bakı, 2006. [**Conflictology Textbook**, Baku State University Publishing, Baku, 2006].

"Azərbaycanlıların etnik təmizlənməsi. Xronologiya", [Ethnic Cleansing of Azerbaijanis. Chronology], **Sumqayıt 1988**, <http://sumqayit1988.org/az/ethnic/c>, (19.03.2018)

Aslan İsmayilov, **Sumqayıt: SSR'nin Süqutunun Başlanğıcı**, [Sumqayıt: The Begening of the USSR's end], Çəşioğlu, 2010.

Akif Nağı, **Qarabağ Müharibəsi: Qısa Tarix**, [Karabakh War: Short History], Azerbaijan National Library. Bakı/Baku, 2014.

Alexandros Peterson, "The 1992-1993 Georgia–Abkhazia War: A Forgotten Conflict", **Caucasian Review of International Affairs-CRIA**, Vol.2, No. 4, 2008.

Andre W.M. Gerrits and Max Bader, "Russian patronage over Abkhazia and south Ossetia: Implications for Conflict Resolution", **East European Politics**, Vol. 32, No: 3, July 20, 2016, pp. 297-313.

"An Overview of the Recent Conflicts and Abkhazia Today: The Abkhazian-Georgian Conflict 1998", **Discover Abkhazia**, 20.07.2015,

<https://www.discoverabkhazia.org/single-post/2015/07/20/An-Overview-of-the-Recent-Conflicts-Abkhazia-Today> , (22.04.2018)

“Armenian, Azerbaijani Presidents Agree on Preamble to ‘Madrid Principles’”, **Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty-Caucasus Report**, 26.01.2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/Armenian_Azerbaijani_Presidents_Agree_On_Preamble_To_Madrid_Principles/1940349.html, (18.12.2018)

Amanda Paul and Dennis Sammut, “Nagorno-Karabakh: It is time to bring peacekeeping and confidence building back on the agenda?”, **European Policy Center**, Discussion Paper, September 29, 2016.

Ali Abbasov, and Haroutiun Khachatrian, **The Karabakh Conflict, Variants of Settlement: Concepts and Reality**, 3rd edition, sponsored by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung South-Caucasus Co-ordination office, Areat/Noyan Tapan publishing, Baku, Yerevan, 2005.

Amanda Paul, “Nagorno-Karabakh – A ticking time bomb”, **European Policy Center**, 17.09.2010, https://epceu.webhosting.be/documents/uploads/pub_1148_nagorno-karabakh.pdf , (21.12.2018)

“Armenia/Azerbaijan: Deadly Fighting Erupts in Nagorno-Karabakh”, **Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty**, 04.03.2008, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1079580.html>, (22.12.2018)

“Azerbaijan: Baku Claims Three Dead in Karabakh Crossfire”, **Eurasianet.org/Azerbaijan**, 19.02.2010, <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-baku-claims-three-dead-in-karabakh-crossfire>, (23.12.2018)

“Armenian, Azerbaijan Clashes Continue In Karabakh”, **Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty**, 22.06.2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/Armenian_Azerbaijani_Clashes_Continue_In_Karabakh/2078581.html, (12.02.2019)

“Azerbaijan clarifying Nuland’s role in non-adoption of Karabakh resolution,” **Azvision.az**, 10.02.2016, <https://en.azvision.az/news/29979/azerbaijan-clarifying-nulands-role-in-non-adoption-of-karabakh-resolution.html>, (05.01.2019)

Agence France-Presse in Baku, “Armenian military helicopter shot down by Azerbaijani forces, killing three”, **TheGuardian.com**, 12.11.2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/12/azerbaijani-forces-shoot-down-armenian-military-helicopter>, (05.01.2019)

“Armenia to Switch to Karabakh ‘Deterrence’ Strategy”, **Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty**, Armenia, 19.02.2016, <https://www.rferl.org/a/armenian-karabakh-strategy-change-azerbaijan/27562092.html>, (04.02.2019)

“Armenian soldier fatally wounded and killed in Azerbaijani grenade explosion”, **Times.com**, 12.03.2016, <https://times.am/?p=162110&l=en>, (20.11.2018)

“Армяне разбомбили мечеть, погиб сельский житель”, [Armies are ravaged by the mysterious nature of village], **Musavat.com**, 16.04.2016, http://musavat.com/news/novosti-casa/armyane-razbombili-mecet-pogib-selskiy-zhitel_337378.html, (23.11.2018)

Aysel Bədəlova, “Ermənistan-Azərbaycan Münaqişəsində Rusya Faktoru”, **Qafqazşünasların 1-ci Beynəlxalq Formu 2-ci kitabı**, [Aysel Badalova “Russian Factor in the Armenian-Azerbaijan Conflict”, **First International Forum of the Caucasus Studies Scholars II Book**], Institute of the Caucasus Studies of ANAS, Scientific Papers, Baku, April 17-18, 2017.

“Azərbaycan hərbi xərclərini 1,123 milyard manat artırdı”, [Azerbaijan increased its military expenditure as 1,123 billion manat], **Azeri Defense**, 20.10.2017, <http://az.azeridefence.com/azerbaycan-herbi-xerclerini-1-123-milyard-manat-artirdi/>, (03.01.2019)

“2019-cu ildə Azərbaycan hərbi büdcəsi açıqlandı”, [In 2019 Azerbaijan released its military budget], **Banco.az**, 18.01.2019, <http://banco.az/az/news/2019-cu-ilde-azerbaycanin-herbi-budcesi-aciqlandi>, (29.01.2019)

“Azərbaycan, Pakistan`dan JF-17 savaş uçağı alıyor”, [Azerbaijan is buying JF-17 war jets from Pakistan], **Kokpit.aero**, 10.12.2018, <http://www.kokpit.aero/azerbaycan-pakistan-jf-17-satisi>, (04.01.2019)

“Azərbaycan İsraildən milyonlarca dollarlık kamikaze drone alıyor”, [Azerbaijan is buying million dollars kamikaze drones from Israel], **Tr.euronews.com**, 18.02.2019, <https://tr.euronews.com/2019/02/18/azerbaycan-israil-den-milyonlarca-dollarlik-kamikaze-drone-aliyor>, (04.01.2019)

“Aprel döyüşləri”- böyük zəfərin başlanğıcı”, [April War-the beginning of great victory], **Mod.gov.az**, 17.02.2018, <https://mod.gov.az/az/pre/21662.html>, (06.01.2019)

“Azərbaycan ordusu işğal olunmuş torpaqlarını azad etməyə hazırdır”, [Azerbaijani army is ready to release its occupied territories], **Mod.gov.az**, 20.03.2017, <https://mod.gov.az/az/news/azerbaycan-ordusu-iskal-olunmus-torpaqlarimizi-azad-etmeye-hazirdir-18015.html>, (05.01.2019)

“ADNA-da terrordan 8 il keçir”, [8 years have passed since ADNA terror], **Amerikaninsesi.com**, 30.04.2017, <https://www.amerikaninsesi.org/a/terror/3831678.html>, (06.01.2019)

“Azerbaijani model of multiculturalism and tolerance as a tool to prevent conflicts highlighted at landmark conference in Geneva”, **Multiculturalism.preslib.az**, http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_events-BUbjzSyRX.html, (05.01.2019)

“Aprel döyüşləri: hərbi tariximizin şanlı səhifəsi- FOTO- VIDEO”, [Aprel War: glorious page of our war history –PHOTO-VIDEO], **1news.az**, <http://1news.az/az/news/aprel-doyusleri-herb-tariximiz-sanli-sehifesi>, (06.01.2019)

“5 Azərbaycan əsgəri həlak olub”, [5 Azerbaijani soldiers died], **Azadliq.org**, 04.06.2012, <https://www.azadliq.org/a/24603945.html>, (24.12.2018).

Anahit Shirinyan, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy Balancing in an Age of Uncertainty”, **Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme**, Research Paper, March, 2019.

“Əliyevlə Pashinyan Brüsseldə görüşüblər”, [Aliyev and Pashinyan meeting held in Brussels], **Azadliq.org**, 14.05.2019 <https://www.azadliq.org/a/%C9%99liyevl%C9%99pa%C5%9Finyanbr%C3%BCsseld%C9%99g%C3%B6r%C3%BC%C5%9F%C3%BCbl%C9%99r/29939487.html>, (06.01.2019)

“Azəri subay, Ermeni subayı öldürdü-2004-02-20”, [Azerbaijani officer killed Armenian officer-2004-02-20], **Amerikaninsesi.com**, 20.02.2004, <https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/a-17-a-2004-02-20-19-1-87932342/819191.html>, (06.01.2019)

“Azərbaycan və erməni əhalisi sülhə necə hazırlanacaq”, [How will the population of Azerbaijan and Armenia be prepared for the peace], **BBC News Azərbaycanca/ BBC News Azerbaijan**, 17.01.2019, <https://www.bbc.com/azeri/azerbaijan-46901795>, (22.01.2019)

“Azərbaycan-Gürcüstan-Türkiye Bölgesel İşbirliğinin Başarı Örneği”, [Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Success Example of Regional Cooperation], **Kadir Has University-CIES**, Policy Brief, March, 2015.

“Armenia’s Isolation from the Regional Projects”, **Cbc.az**, 19.02.2018, http://cbc.az/en/en/v_story/armenias-isolation-from-regional-projects, (10.01.2019)

Aybars Gorgulu and Onnik Krikorian, “Turkey’s South Caucasus Agenda: The Role of State and Non-State Actors”, **Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation-TESEV Foreign Policy Programme and Eurasia Partnership Foundation**, July, 2012.

Arman Grigorian, “The EU and Karabakh Conflict”, **The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU**, Institute for Security Studies, Chailiot Papers № 65, Paris, December, 2003.

Anna Poghosyan, "EU's Current and Possible Role in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Resolution Process", Caucasus Edition: Journals of Conflict Transformation, **Academia.edu**, https://www.academia.edu/1157957/EU_s_Current_and_Possible_Role_in_the_Nagorno-Karabakh_Conflict_Resolution_Process, (29.11.2018)

Alice Hills, "Managing the Interface: Regional Security and Sub-state Politics in Africa", **African Security, Routledge**, Vol. 1, No. 2, December 8, 2008.

"Azerbaijan and UN relations", **Mfa.gov.az**, 05.05.2014, <http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/751>, (27.12.2018)

Alberto Priego, "NATO cooperation towards South Caucasus", **Caucasian Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 2, Issue.1, 2008.

"Azərbaycan və Ermənistan Prezidentlərinin Martın 29-da Vyanada görüşü gözlənilir", [Azerbaijani and Armenian Leaders are expected to meet in Vienna on March 29], **amerikaninsesi.az**, 25.03.2019, <https://www.amerikaninsesi.org/a/az%C9%99rbaycan-v%C9%99erm%C9%99nistanr%C9%99hb%C9%99rl%C9%99rininmart%C4%B1n-29-da-vyanadag%C3%B6r%C3%BC%C5%9F%C3%BC-g%C3%B6zl%C9%99nilir/4846824.html>, (28.01.2019)

Azerbaijani Multiculturalism, "General Information", **Multiculturalism.preslib.az**, http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a1.html, (05.01.2019)

Barry Buzan, **People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations**, A Member of the Harvester Press Group, 1983.

Bartel Heurlin and Kristensen, "International Security", **International Relations - Encyclopedia of Life Support System**, Vol. 2.

Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, **The Evaluation of International Security Studies**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009.

Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century", International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), **Blackwell Publishing**, Vol. 67, No. 3, July, 1991.

Bamzi Banchiri and Julie Blase, "International Security in the Age of Globalization", **Scribd**, 2014.

Barry Buzan, Olea Waever, and Jaap De Wilde, **Security: A New Framework For Analysis**, Lyne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998.

Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, **Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003.

Bruno Coppieters, “Conclusion: The Caucasus as a Security Complex”, **Contested Borders in the Caucasus**, 1996, <http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/conclusi.htm>, (30.03.2019)

“Beginning of the Conflict”, **Mfa.gov.az**, <http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/813>, (18.03.2018)

Bülent Aras, Musa Qasımlı və digərləri, Qarabağ: Bildiklərimiz və Bilmədiklərimiz, **Qafqaz Universiteti Beynəlxalq Münaqişələri Araşdırma Mərkəzi Nəşrləri, No: 002**, Bakı, 2010, [Bulent Aras, Musa Gasimli and Et.al, Karabakh: What we know, What we do not know, **Caucasus University International Strategic Research Center Publishing, No: 002**, Baku, 2010].

“Bishkek Protocol”, <https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Bishkek+Protocol>, (27.03.2018)

“Bishkek Protocol”, Peace Agreement Database-University of Edinburgh, **Peaceagreements.org**, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/310/Bishkek%20Protocol>, (17.01.2019)

Barry R. Rosen, **The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict**, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 1993.

“Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline”, **BP**, https://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/pipelines/BTC.html, (05.01.2019)

“Baku-Tbilisi-Kars rail line, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey”, **Railway Technology**, <https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/baku-tbilisi-kars/>, (05.01.2019)

“Bilateral negotiations between the NKR and Azerbaijan”, **Nkr.am**, <http://www.nkr.am/en/karabakh-azerbaijan-negotiations>, (06.01.2019)

Bahar Basher, “Third party mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh: Part of the cure or part of the disease?”, **The International Strategic Research Organization**, Vol. 3, Issue. 5, 2008.

Burcu Gultekin Punshman, “Turkey’s Interest and Strategies in the South Caucasus”, **Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey-TEPAV**, Evaluation Note, No: 201226, May, 2012.

Charles Glaser, “When Are Arms Races Dangerous?” **International Security**, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004.

Charles A.Kupchan, Enmity into Amity: How Peace Breaks Out, International Policy Analysis, **Friedrich Ebert Stiftung**, April, 2011.

Chaim D. Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” **International Security**, Vol. 20, No.4, 1996.

Cəlal Əliyev və Budaq Budaqov, **Türklər, Azərbaycanlılar, Ermənilər: Tarixi Həqiqətin Soyqırımı**, Azərbaycan Nəşriyyatı, Bakı, 2003, [Celal Aliyev and Budag Budagov, **Turks, Azerbaijanis, Armenians: Historical Truth of Genocide**, Azerbaijan Publication, Baku, 2003.]

Conciliation Resources, **Qarabağ Müzakirə Olunur**, Conciliation Resources Nəşrləri, Bakı, 2006, [**Karabakh has been discussing**, Conciliation Resources Publishing, Baku, 2006]

Charles King, The Five Day War-Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis, **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 87, No.6, November/December, 2008.

C.W. Blandy, Provocation, Deception, Entrapment: The Russo-Georgian Five Day War, Defense Academy of United Kingdom, **Advanced Research and Assessment Group**, Caucasus series 09/01, March, 2009.

Caucasus Edition, “From Resolution to Transformation: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and the Need for More Civil Society Engagement”, **Journal of Conflict Transformation**, 15.07.2013, <https://caucasusedition.net/from-resolution-to-transformation-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-and-the-need-for-more-civil-society-engagement/>, (22.10.2018)

Conciliation Resources, “Securing an Armenian – Azerbaijan Agreement: the roles of international and local security providers (SAAA)”, **Conciliation Resources Discussion Paper**, June, 2015.

“CSCE First Additional Meeting of the Council Helsinki 1992”, Summary of Conclusion, II, point 8, March 24, 1992.

CSCE Budapest Document 1994, “Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era”, “II Regional Issues, Intensification of CSCE action in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”, **Budapest Summit Declaration**, Budapest, December 6, 1994.

CSCE-Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “In Brief: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, **Helsinki Commission Report**, 15.06.2017, https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/Report%20-%20Nagorno-Karabakh%20-%20Design%20FINAL_0.pdf, (26.11.2018)

“Самвел Бабалян: Легко говорить, что вы в Баку будете пить чай. Скорее, наоборот”, [Samvel Babayan: It is easy to say that you will drink tea in Baku. Rather, the opposite is true], **Armenianreport.com**, 03.06.2016, <http://armenianreport.com/pubs/131568/>, (05.12.2018)

“Constitution: The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan”, Articles: 18 and 25, **Mfa.gov.az**, <http://www.mfa.gov.az/?options=content&id=164>, (05.01.2019)

David A.Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (Ed.), **Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World**, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.

Dağlıq Qarabağ: Tarixə baxış, “**Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin İşlər İdarəsinin Prezident Kitabxanası**”, Bakı, 2005, [Nagorno-Karabakh: To look at History, “**Presidential Library of the Presidential Affairs Department of the Republic of Azerbaijan**”, Baku, 2005].

Dennis Sammut and Nikola Cvetkovski, Confidence-Building Matters The Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict, **Verification Technology Information Centre-VERTIC**, London, March, 1996.

Davir J. Kremer, Renewed Confrontation in Georgia, Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 28, **Council on Foreign Relations**, March 17, 2016.

“Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States”, **Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act**, Helsinki, 1975.

David Adkinson, “The Conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference”, **Political Affairs Committee**, Doc.10364, November 29, 2004.

David O’Byrne, “European Investment Bank Approves \$1 Billion Funding for TANAP Gas Pipeline”, **Eurasianet.org**, 16.03.2018, <https://eurasianet.org/european-investment-bank-approves-1-billion-funding-for-tanap-gas-pipeline>, (05.01.2019)

“Dağlıq Qarabağ Münaqişəsinin Nizama Salınması Azərbaycanın Xarici Siyasətində Əsas Proioret İstiqamətdir”, [Mountainous Karabakh conflict’s solution is the prior direction on the foreign policy of Azerbaijan], **Karabakh.az**, <http://www.karabakh.az/news/?lang=az&i=153>, (06.01.2019)

“Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişəsi: Azərbaycanın mövqeyi dəyişməzdir”, [Mountainous Karabakh Conflict: The position of the Azerbaijan is unchangeable], **Aztv.az**, 20.10.2016, <http://www.aztv.az/readnews.php?lang=az&id=27134>, (13.04.2019)

David Saha, Richard Giucci, Mattias Lucke, Robert Kirchner, Veronika Movchan, and Georg Zachmann, “The Economic effect of resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of Armenia and Azerbaijan”, **The study has been financed by the European Union**, BE Berlin Economics GmbH, June 15, 2018.

David D. Laitin and Ronald Grigor Suny, “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a way out of Karabakh,” **Middle East Policy Council**, Vol .7, No. 1, October, 1999.

Damien Helly, "Role of the EU in the Security of the South Caucasus: A Compromised Specificity?". PFP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, **Connections: The Quarterly Journal**, Vol.1, No.3, September, 2002.

David Janssen, "The Impact of the European Union on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, Vol.11, No. 1.

Edward A. Kolodziej, **Security and International Relations**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005.

Emile Simpson, "Clausewitz's Theory of War and Victory Contemporary Conflict", **Exploring War's Character and Nature**, The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters, Vol. 47, No. 4, 2017-2018.

Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics", **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 3. No. 3, September 01, 1997.

Ermənistan-Azərbaycan, Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişəsi, Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin İşlər İdarəsi: Prezident Kitabxanası, [**Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict** , Office of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan: The Presidential Library], Bakı/Baku, 2005.

"Ermenistan-Azərbaycan Dağlıq Qarabağ Münaqişəsi", [Armenian-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict], **Prezident.az**, <https://static2.president.az/media/W1siZiIsIjIwMTgvMDMvMDkvOGowdDVxODhvc19EYV9sX3FfUWFyYWJhX19BWkUucGRmIlId?sha=c1feac0d3415a521>, (17.03.2018)

Elchin Eyyuboglu, "Sumgayit Slaughterer Grigoryan has been found", **Vestnikkavkaza.net**, 16.02.2016, <http://vestnikkavkaza.net/articles/Sumgayit-slaughterer-Grigoryan-has-been-found.html>, (22.03.2018).

Eldar Mahmudov, **Armenian Terror**, The State Commission of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Prisoners of War, Hostages and Missing Persons, Baku, 2005.

Emil J. Kirchner, "Theoretical Debates on Regional Security Governance", **Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies Global Governance Programme-97, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/40**, European University Institute, Italy, April, 2014.

Emma Klever, "The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan: An overview of the current situation", **European Movement International**, Brussels, September 24, 2013.

"Executive Summary", **OSCE-Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**, 24.03.2011, <https://www.osce.org/mg/76209> , (25.12.2018)

Emil Danielyan and Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Caucasus: Azerbaijan and Armenia Detail Karabakh Peace Plan”, **Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty**, 22.02.2001, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1095808.html>, (24.11.2018)

Elmar A.Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliye, “Azerbaijan and Armenian Eager to Revive Nagorno-Karabakh”, **Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst-CACI**, 23.01.2019, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13557-azerbaijan-and-armenia-eager-to-revive-nagorno-karabakh-peace-talks.html>, (15.01.2019)

Elkhan Alasgarov, “Davos meeting was deciding future of not only Karabakh, but also Armenia”, **Azernews.az**, 24.01.2019, <https://www.azernews.az/nation/144512.html>, (28.01.2019)

“Ermənistan 3 əsgərinin öldürüldüyünü bildirir”, [Armenia reported 3 soldiers were killed], **Azadliq.org**, 04.06.2012, <https://www.azadliq.org/a/24603074.html>, (24.12.2018)

“Ermenistan savunma bütçesi büyüyor ve Ermeni bütçesi modernleşiyor”, [Armenian defense budget is increasing and Armenian army is modernizing], **Ermenihaber.am**, 08.10.2018, <https://www.ermenihaber.am/tr/news/2018/10/08/Erm-enistan-ordusu-savunma-b%C3%BCt%C3%A7esi/138678>, (05.01.2019)

“Explainer: Why the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis matters”, **Radio Free Europe/ReadioLiberty**, 05.04.2016, <https://www.rferl.org/a/nagorno-karabakh-explainer-conflict-azerbaijan-armenia/27656158.html>, (05.01.2019)

“Ermənilərlə Azərbaycanlılar barışa bilərmə? –Yerevanda # sorğu”, [Can Armenian and Azerbaijan reconcile # survey in Yerevan], **BBC News Azərbaycanca, BBC News Azerbaijan**, VIDEO, 19.01.2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vk2yIKDkSmY>, (07.02.2019)

“Ermənilərlə Azərbaycanlılar barışa bilərmə? Bakıda– # sorğu”, [Can Armenian and Azerbaijan reconcile- # survey in Baku], **BBC News Azərbaycanca, BBC News Azerbaijan**, VIDEO, 18.01.2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7LeEAjDZvg>, (09.02.2019)

Efe Chaman and Ali Akyurt, “Caucasus and Central Asia in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Time has come for a New Regional Policy”, **Alternative Turkish Journals of International Relations**, Vol.10, No: 2/3, 2011, <http://alternatives.yalova.edu.tr/article/view/5000150670/5000136813>, (21.11.2018)

Esmira Jafarova, “EU Conflict Resolution Policy Towards the South Caucasus”, PFP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, **Connections The**

Quarterly Journal, 2011, <http://connections-qj.org/article/eu-conflict-resolution-policy-towards-south-caucasus> , (19.03.2019)

“ENP Country Progress Report 2013 – Azerbaijan” and “ENP Country Progress Report 2013-Armenia”, **MEMO European Commission**, Brussels, March 27, 2014.

“EUSR Lefort for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia steps down”, **Policy Observatory**, 31.01.2014, <https://policyobservatory.eup-unga.eu/en/site-rss/item/66-eusr-lefort-for-the-south-caucasus-and-the-crisis-in-georgia-steps-down.html>, (17.12.2018)

Elkhan Nuriyev, “EU Policy in the South Caucasus: A view from Azerbaijan”, **Center for European Policy Studies –CEPS**, Working Documents No.272, July, 2007.

“Ermənistan-Azərbaycan Dağlıq-Qarabağ Münaqişəsi”, [Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict], **President.az**, <https://static2.president.az/media/W1siZiIsIjIwMTgvMDMvMDkvOGowdDVxODhvc19EYV9sX3FfUWFyYWJhX19BWkUucGRmIlId?sha=c1feac0d3415a521>, (22.02.2019)

“EU Special Representatives”, European Union External Action, **Eeas.europe.eu**, 25.11.2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage_en/3606/EU%20Special%20Representatives, (23.12.2019)

Elnur Hajaliyev, “Milli azadlıq hərəkatının zirvəsi”, [The peak of the national liberation movement], № 13, S. 4, Azerbaijan, **Elibrary.az**, 20.01.2016, http://www.elibrary.az/docs/qazet/qzt2016_198.htm, (22.11.2018)

Fakhreddin Soltani, Saeid Naji, and Reza Ekhtiari Amiri, “Level of Analysis in International Relations and Regional Security Complex Theory”. **Macrothink Institute-Journal of Public Administration and Governance**, Vol.4, No.4, Malaysia, 2014.

Fatmir Xheladini, “Regional Security Complex: The Macedonian Context”, **European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies**, Vol. 1, Issue. 6, September/December 2016.

Fredrick Soderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (Ed.), **Theories of New Regionalism**, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Fredrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State”, **International Organization**, Vol. 40, No.4, 1986, pp. 753-775.

Fredrich Kortachowil, “Errors have their advantage”, **International Organization**, The MIT Press, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1984.

Farhad Mammadov and Azad Garibov, “South Caucasus as a Regional Security Complex: Divergence of Identity and Interdependence of Security”, **Cooperation in Eurasia: Linking Identity, Security, and Development**, 2018.

Fuller Liz “Nagorno-Karabakh: mediators take the process public,” **Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty**, 30.06.2006, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1069596.html>, (19.11.2018)

Fariz Ismailzade, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Current Trends and Future Scenarios”, **Istituto Affari Internazionali**, IAI Working Papers 11 | 29, November , 2011.

“Fatal Armenian-Azeri border clash”. **BBC News/new.bbc.co.uk**, 05.03.2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7278483.stm>, (22.12.2018)

“Fall of the Soviet Union”, **The Cold War Museum**, http://www.coldwar.org/articles/90s/fall_of_the_soviet_union.asp, (03.01.2019)

“Füzuli və Cəbrayıl rayonlarının işğalından 25 il ötür”, [25 years passed out of occupation of the Jabrayil and Fuzuli regions], **Dailykarabakh.com**, 23.08.2018, <https://www.dailykarabakh.com/news.php?id=8958&lang=az>, (04.01.2019)

“Forest Brothers”, **Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium**, <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/forest-brothers>, (05.01.2019)

“Foreign Policy of Armenia”, **Mfa.am**, <https://www.mfa.am/en/foreign-policy/>, (06.01.2019)

“Facilitating Dialogue: EU-Funded NGOs and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, **Ngo-monitor.org**, 12.12.2018, <https://www.ngo-monitor.org/reports/facilitating-dialogue-eu-funded-ngos-and-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/>, (08.01.2019)

“Final Communiqué”, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo June 4, Ministerial Communiqué, **Nato.int**, 27.10.2000, <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm>, (03.12.2018)

Ganja Nugroho, “Constructivism and International Relations Theories”, **Global and Strategies**, January/June, 2008.

Greenberg Research.Inc, “Country Report Georgia-Abkhazia”, **People on War project by the International Committee of the Red Cross-ICRC**, Geneva, November, 1999.

George Tarkhan-Mouravi, “The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict in a Regional Context”, Political Analysis and Commentaries, **Policy Documentation Center–PDC and Institute for Policy Studies**, Georgia, 1996.

George Tarkhan-Mouravi, “Conflict in South Ossetia: Current Problems and Respective of IDP Return, Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict: Researching Peace/Collection of Georgian Papers”, **GFSIS-George Mason University**, 2011.

Gulshan Pashayeva and Stephen Blank, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Towards The Resolution Of The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, **Center for Strategic Studies-SAM Review**, Vol.16, Baku, December, 2016.

“General Assembly adopts resolution reaffirming territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, demanding withdrawal of all Armenian forces”, Plenary 86th Meeting (AM), GA/10693, **Un.org**, 10.03.2008, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/ga10693.doc.htm>, (23.12.2018)

Gunel Shukurova and Khayala Gadimova, “The Impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the regional prosperity of the South Caucasus”, **Newseasterneurope.eu**, 23.04.2018, <http://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/04/23/impact-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-regional-prosperity-south-caucasus/>, (04.01.2019)

“Göyçə mahalı, Zod kəndi”, [Goycha district, Zod village], **Vetensesi.qmkdk.gov.az**, http://vetensesi.qmkdk.gov.az/news_content.php?id=1237, (05.01.2019)

“General Assembly”, **United Nations**, A/RES/2625 (XXV), 24.11.1970, <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/25A1C8E35B23161C852570C4006E50AB>, (06.01.2019)

George Welton and Bret Barrowman, “The Political Economy of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh”, **ISSICEU Policy Brief**, Geowel Research, Tbilisi, July 13, 2016.

Gulshan Pashayeva and Nigar Goksel, “The Interplay of the approaches of Turkey, Russia and United States to the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh”, **SAM-Center for Strategic Studies**, Part I, Baku, 2011.

Human Rights Watch, “Georgia-Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia’s Role in the Conflict”, **Human Rights Watch Arms Project**, Helsinki, Vol. 7, No.7, March, 1995.

Holger Stritzel, “Security in Translation: Securitization Theory and the Localization of Threat”, **Securitization Theory and Copenhagen School**, Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2014.

Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond”, **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 13, Issue.3, September 01, 2007.

Həbib Rəhimov, “Azərbaycanlılar Ermənistan SSR Ərazisində”, Qərbi Azərbaycan [Habib Rahimov, Azerbaijanis in the territory of Armenia SSR, Western Azerbaijan], **West-land.az**, <http://www.westland.az/index.php?mod=static&page=ssr16>, (18.03.2018)

Humanitar Tədqiqatlar Cəmiyyəti, **Qarabağ Müzakirə Olunur**, Bakı, 2006, [Conciliation Resources, **Karabakh Has Been Discussing**, Baku, 2006.]

Hungarian OSCE Chairmanship, **Mandate of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE**, Minsk Conference, Doc.525/25, Vienna, March 23, 1995.

“Heavy shelling rocks fragile ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh,” **Reuters**, 11.03.2016, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN0WD18E>, (05.01.2019)

“History: The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)”, **Mfa.gov.tr**, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-and-the-organization-for-security-and-cooperation-in-europe-osce.en.mfa>, (30.11.2018)

“İran`da 35 Milyondan Çok Azerbaycan Türk`ü Yaşıyor”, [More than 35 million Azerbaijani Turks are living in Iran], **Gundem.be**, <http://www.gundem.be/tr/ayhan-demirci/iran-da-35-milyondan-cok-azerbaycan-turk-u-yasiyor>, (30.03.2019)

İlgar Niftaliyev, “1988: The Final Stage of the Deportation of Azerbaijanis from Armenia”, **IRS Karabakh**, Vol.4, No. 19, 2014.

İslam Tekushev, Sergey Markedonov and Kiril Shevchenko (Ed), “Abkhazia: Between the Past and the Future”, **Medium-Orient**, Prague, 2013.

International Crisis Group-ICG, “Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia”, **Europe, Report No.159**, Tbilisi/Brussels, November 26, 2004.

International Crisis Group-ICG, “Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly”, **Europe Report № 183**, June 07, 2007

International Crisis Group-ICG, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing The Conflict From The Ground”, **Europe Report No. 166**, Tbilisi/Brussels, September 14, 2005.

International Crisis Group-ICG, “Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Plan for Peace”, **Europe Report No: 167**, October 11, 2005.

International Crisis Group-ICG, “Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role”, **Europe Report № 173**, March 20, 2006.

“Information About Khojaly Genocide”, **The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Republic of Azerbaijan-OMBUDSMAN**, <http://www.ombudsman.gov.az/en/view/pages/163/>, (14.03.2018)

International Crisis Group-ICG, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War”, **Europe Report No: 187**, November 14, 2007.

International Crisis Group-ICG, “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War”, **Europe Policy Briefing No: 60**, Tbilisi, Baku, Istanbul, Brussels, February 08, 2011.

International Crisis Group-ICG, “Nagorno-Karabakh New Opening, or More Peril?”, **Europe Report No: 239**, July 04, 2016.

International Crisis Group-ICG, “Nagorno-Karabakh’s Gathering War Clouds”, **Europe Report No: 244**, June 01, 2017.

Isabella Langerak, “Regime Stability in Azerbaijan”, **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, 2014.

“İlham Əliyev Azərbaycan Silahlı Qüvvələrinin 100 illiyi münasibətilə keçirilən təntənəli hərbi paradda olub”, [Ilham Aliyev has been in the parade aimed for the 100 years anniversary of the creation of the Azerbaijani Military Forces], **President.az**, <https://president.az/articles/29165>, (06.01.2019)

Ieva Karpaviciute, **Analysis of Regional Security Dynamics. Internal and External Factors and Their Interplay**, Vytautas Magnus University, Social Science, Political Science (02 S), Kaunas, 2010.

John Baylis, “The Concept of Security in International Relations”, **Globalization and Environmental Challenges, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace**, Vol. 3, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008.

Jennifer Jackson-Preece, **Security in International Relations**, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011.

Jessica da Silva Correia de Oliveira, “The Place of the Region in IR”, **Contexto Internacional**, Vol. 39, No.1, January/April, 2017.

John A. Agnew, “Arguing with Regions”, **Regional Studies**, Vol. 47, No.1, January, 2013.

John A. Agnew, “Regions on the mind does not equal regions of the mind”, **Progress in Human Geography**, Los Angeles, Vol. 23, No.1, 1999.

Jef Huysmans, “Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security”, **Alternatives**, Vol. 27. Issue.1, February, 2002.

John Ackerman, Barak Carlson and Young Han, “Constructivism and Security”, Air Command Staff College, **Maxwell AFB**, 2010.

Jannatkhan Eyvazov, "Some Aspects of the Theory of Regional Security Complexes as Applied to Studies of the Political System in the Post-Soviet Space", **Central Asia and the Caucasus**, Vol. 12, Issue. 2, 2011.

Jannatkhan Eyvazov, "The Regional Security System in the Post-Soviet Space: Formation and Present Political Structure", **Journal of Economics and Political Sciences**, No. 1(10), Baku, March, 2018.

Julian Dember and Johanna Speyer, "Georgia (Abkhazia) 1992-1993", **Peace Research Institute Frankfurt Member of the Leibniz Association (PRIF | HSKF)**, October 15, 2015.

Jim Nichol, "Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008: Context and Implication for US interests", **CRS Report for Congress - Congressional Research Service**, March 03, 2009.

"Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group", **OSCE-Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**, Vienna, 29.03.2019, <https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/415643>, (29.01.2019)

Joshua Kucera, "Peace? Not so fast, many Armenians and Azerbaijanis say", **Euroianet.org**, 18.07.2019, <https://eurasianet.org/peace-not-so-fast-many-armenians-and-azerbaijanis-say>, (24.01.2019)

Jose A. Pena-Ramos, "The Impact of Russian Intervention in Post-Soviet Secessionist Conflict in the South Caucasus on Russian Geo-energy Interests", **International Journal of Conflict and Violence**, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2017.

Kortachowil,F. "Errors have their advantage", **International Organization**, The MIT Press, Vol. 38, No.2, 1984.

Kalvalı Həsənov, "**And Yerimiz**", Steyk KM nəşriyyat, Gəncə, Sentyabr, 2001, [Kalvali Hasanov, "**Place of Oath**", Steyk KM Publishing, Ganja, September, 2001]

Kosolapov.N,"Конфликты постсоветского пространства и современная конфликтология". **Мировая экономика и международные отношения**, [Conflicts in Post-Soviet Space and modern conflictology], **World Economy and International Relations**. No:10, 1995.

"Karabakh Causality toll disputed". **BBC News/new.bbc.co.uk**, March 9, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7278871.stm>, (22.12.2018)

"Karabakh War Causality Update: Armenia puts April death toll at 92", **Armenianow.com**,14.04.2016,<https://www.armenianow.com/en/karabakh/2016/04/14/armenia-casualties-update-karabakh-april/951/>, (22.11.2018)

“Kəlbəcər rayonu İsti su (1948)”,[Kelbejer rayon hot water (1948)], VIDEO, Youtube.com, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BafjJIJs3xA>, (04.01.2019)

Kamer Kasim, “Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Regional Implication and Peace Process”, **Caucasus International**, Vol.2, No.1, 2012.

Kamer Kasım, “Türkiye-Ermenistan sınır kapısı”, [Turkey-Armania border gate], **newtimes.az**, 02.12.2014, <http://newtimes.az/az/relations/conflicts/3214/>, (09.01.2019)

Kevork Oskanian, “Turkey’s global strategy: Turkey and the Caucasus”, **London School of Economics and Political Science**, (Ed. Nicholas Kitchen), IDEAS reports, London, UK, 2011.

Lisbon Document 1996, “Lisbon Summit 1996”, **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**, DOC.S/1/96, Annex 1, Lisbon, 1996.

Levon Zourabian, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement Revisited: Is Peace Achievable?”, **Demokratizatsiya**, 2006, http://demokratizatsiya.pub/archievs/14_2_p62330187w3k6794.pdf, (10.01.2019)

Laurence Broers, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Defaulting War”, Chatham House, Russia and Eurasia Program, **The Royal Institute of International Affairs**, July, 2016.

L. Freedman, “Perception and Misperception in International Politics” by Robert Jervis, **Royal Institute of International Affairs**, Vol. 54, No. 1, 1978.

Leyla Əliyeva, “Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişəsi: ‘Sülhə yox, müharibəyə’ ideyası altında yetişdirilən cəmiyyətdə sülh necə yaradılacaq?”, [Leila Aliyeva, “Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: How to create peace in a society grown under the idea of ‘not peace but war’?”], **BBC News Azərbaycanca/ BBC News Azerbaijan**, 22.02.2019, <https://www.bbc.com/azeri/azerbaijan-47311106>, (26.09.2019)

Leila Alieva, “EU and South Caucasus”, **Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research**, CAP Discussion Paper, December, 2006.

Michael C.Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 47, 2003.

Michaela Cruden, **Regional Security Complex Theory: Southeast Asia and the South Pacific**, Research Commons, University of Waikato, 2011.

Marianne Stone, “Security According to Buzan: A Compressive Security Analysis”, **Security Discussion Papers Series 1**, 2009.

Melita Kuburas, "Ethnic Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh", **Review of European and Russian Affairs**, Vol. 6, Issue.1, 2011.

Murtuz Alasgarov, **Tragic pages of our history: Genocide**, Edition of the Milli Majlis of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Baku, 2000.

Mushvig Mehdiyev, "23 Later, Bishek Protocol has Remained Unfulfilled", **Caspiannews.com**, 05.05.2017, <https://caspiannnews.com/news-detail/23-year-later-bishkek-protocol-remains-unfulfilled-1493989931285/>, (28.12.2018)

Michael Emerson, "On the Forming and Reforming of Stability Pacts: From the Balkans To The Caucasus", **Center for European Policy Studies**, CEPS Policy Brief No.4, May, 2001.

Michael J. Baranick and Samuel Schwabe, "In Pursuit of Peace in Peace Nagorno-Karabakh", **The International Symposium on Military Operational Research (ISMOR)**, December 18, 2006.

"19 Mart metro partlayışı: unutmırıq, bağışlamırıq", [March 19 metro bombing: unforgotten, unforgiveable], **Day.az**, 19.03.2014, <https://news.day.az/society/475645.html>, (05.01.2019)

"Meşə Qardaşları haqda şok açıqlamakar!", [Shocking facts about the Forest Brothers], **Mediainfo.az**, 14.05.2011, <http://mediainfo.az/kriminal/1616>, (05.01.2019)

Magdalena Kozub-Karkut, "Between Realism and Social Constructivism: 'Region' in Regional Security Complexes Theory and Security Communities Theory", **International Relations in Asia, Africa and the Americas| Global Politics in the 21st Century: Between Regional Cooperation and Conflict** (Ed. Andrzej Mania and Marchin Grabowski), Peter Lang, Berlin, 2019.

Mairbek Vatchagaev, "Dagestani Jamaat Expands Operations into Azerbaijan", **The Jamestown Foundation, North Caucasus Weekly**, Vol.9, Issue: 44, 24.11.2008, <https://jamestown.org/program/dagestani-jamaat-expands-operations-into-azerbaijan/>, (05.01.2019)

"Milli azlıqlar", "Azərbaycan Respublikasında mədəni müxtəliflik, [Ethnic minorities, Cultural Diversity in the Republic of Azerbaijan], **Mfa.gov.az**, <http://mfa.gov.az/az/content/114>, (05.01.2019)

"Mayor Zaur Məmmədov: Aprel döyüşləri ordu xalqın birliinin sarsılmazlığını bütün dünyaya göstərdi", [Major Zaur Mammadov: April War showed the world the unbreakable univfication of the military and civil relations], **Azertag.az**, 02.04. 2016, https://azertag.az/xeber/Mayor_Zaur_Memmedov_Aprel_doyusleri_ordu_ile_x_alqin_birliyinin_sarsilmazligini_butun_dunyaya_gosterdi-1264334, (07.04.2019)

Mustafa Aydın, “Turkey’s Caucasus Policy”, **Turkish Foreign Policy-Old Problems, New Parameters**, (Ed. Antonio Marquina), Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation (UNISCI), Discussion Paper, No: 23, Spain, 2010.

Ministerial Communiques, “Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, January 10-11, 1994” , **Nato.int**, 17.02.2009, <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/comm94.htm>, (17.12.2018)

Martin Malek, “NATO and South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on Different Tracks”, Connections, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, **Connections: The Quarterly Journal**, Vol.7, No.3, 2008.

Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, **World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations**, University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

Nazim Mustafa, “Azərbaycanlıların əzəli torpaqlarından sonuncu 1988-1989-cu illər deportasiyası”, **Sağlam Gələcəyə Doğru Gənclər İctimai Birliyi** , [The last stage deportation of Azerbaijani’s ancient lands in 1988-1989, **Towards to the Healthy Future Public Union**] ,<http://deportasiya.az/en/Home/ReadNews/311>, (20.03.2018)

Natella Akaba and Iraklii Khintba, “Transformation of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict: Rethinking the Paradigm”, **Conciliation Resource**, London, February 14, 2011.

Nadia Milanova, “The territory-identity nexus in the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh: implications for OSCE peace efforts”. **JEMIE - Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority issues in Europe**, Issue.2, Belgium, 2003.

Naira Bulghadarian, “Armenia, Azerbaijan Report More Deadly Skirmishes”, **azatutyun.am**, 2011, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/24350911.html>, (24.12.2018)

Naila Bagirova and Hasmik Mkrtchyan, “Five more killed in clashes between Azerbaijanis, ethnic Armenians”, **Baku/Yerevan Reuters**, 02.08.2014, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-armenia-azerbaijan-conflict/five-more-killed-in-clashes-between-azeris-ethnic-armenians-idUKKBN0G20EP20140802>, (25.12.2018)

“Never Take Peace in Europe for Granted, Say Speakers as Security Council Holds Open Debate on Region’s Protracted Conflicts,” **United Nations Security Council, 7886th Meeting (AM), SC12724**, 21.02. 2017, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12724.doc.htm>, (17.12.2018)

“Nagorno-Karabakh: Affected civilians of both sides of conflict wait for peace and justice to come”, **International Federation for Human Rights-FIDH situation**

note,https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/20160713_nagorno_karabakh_situation_note_en_final.pdf, (05.01.2019)

“NABUCCO-West Gas Pipeline”, **Hydrocarbons Technology**, <https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/nabuccopipeline/>, (05.01.2019)

Natalia Konarzewska, “Is Armenia’s Foreign Policy Changing?”, **The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst**, 25.09.2018, <https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13535-is-armenias-foreign-policy-changing?.html>, (06.01.2019)

Nathalie Tocci, “Turkey and the European Union: A Journey in the Unknown”, **Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings**, Turkey Project Policy Paper, 05.11.2014.

“Nagorno-Karabakh Issue”, **Mfa.am**, <https://www.mfa.am/en/nagorno-karabakh-issue>, (05.12.2018)

“New EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia”, **Delegation of the European Union to Turkey**, 13561/11 PRESSE 284, Brussels, 26.04.2011, <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/eeas-news/new-eu-special-representative-south-caucasus-and-crisis-georgia-3698>, (17.12.2018)

Ole Waeber, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, **On Security**, (Ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz), Columbia University Press, New York, 1998.

Özge Nur Ögütücü, “Regional Security Complex Theory and The South Caucasus Security Perceptions and Their Reflections on Regional Level”, **AVIM Report No:7**, August, 2014.

“OSCE Minsk Group, Madrid Document”, **ICC Legal Tools Database**, .11.2007, <https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0b80bb/pdf>, (23.12.2018)

“OSCE, EU Condemn Karabakh Armed Incident”, **Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty**, Caucasus Report, 24.06.2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/OSCE_EU_Condemn_Karabakh_Armed_Incident/2079009.html, (23.12.2018)

“Over 20 Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers killed in Jan-Feb” **Intellinew.com**, 29.03.2016, <https://www.intellinews.com/over-20-armenian-and-azerbaijani-soldiers-killed-in-jan-feb-93829/>, (27.12.2018)

“OSCE Minsk Group Calls for ending Hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh (Video)”, **SputnikNews.com**, 02.04.2016, <https://sputniknews.com/europe/201604021037378602-nagorno-karabakhconflict-osce/>, (05.12.2018)

“OSCE Minsk Group to Discuss Nagorno-Karabakh Escalated Tensions on April 5”, **SputnikNews.com**, 02.04.2016, <https://sputniknews.com/politics/201604021037386131-osce-conflict-minsk/>, (05.12.2018)

Oliver Paye, and Eric Remacle, “UN and OSCE Policies in Transcaucasia”, **Contested Borders in the Caucasus**, (Ed. Bruno Coppieters), VUB Press, Bruxelles, 1996, <http://hdl.handle.net/2078.3/151503> , (28.03.2019)

P.Terrence Hopmann, “Minsk Group Mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Confronting an Intractable Conflict”, **Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik-IFSH**, OSCE Yearbook 2014, Baden, 2015.

“Press Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group”, **OSCE-Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**, Bern, 19.12.2015, <https://www.osce.org/mg/211456>, (27.12.2018)

“PACE President calls for respect of ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh”, **Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe**, 03.04.2016, <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-ViewEN.asp?newsid=6094&lang=2&cat=15>, (29.11.2018)

“Paşinyan Qarabağ münaqişəsinin sülh yolu ilə həllində alternativ görmür”, [Pashinyan does not see alternative to the peaceful solution over Nagorno-Karabakh], **Old.armradio.am**, 30.03.2018, <http://old.armradio.am/az/2018/05/30/pasinyan-qarabag-munaqis%C9%99sinin-sulh-yolu-il%C9%99-h%C9%99lind%C9%99alternativ-gormur/>, (04.01.2019)

Paul Roe, “The Interstate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflicts as a ‘Tragedy’?” **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.36, No.2, March, 1999.

“Pashinyan: Karabakh conflict settlement should take into consideration interests of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan”, **Arka.am**, Yerevan, http://arka.am/en/news/politics/pashinyan_karabakh_conflict_settlement_should_take_into_consideration_interests_of_armenia_nagorno_k/, (07.01.2019)

Pavel K.Baev, “Russian Military Thinking and the 'Near Abroad’”, **Jane's Intelligence Review**, Vol.6, No: 12, December, 1994.

Parliamentary Assembly, “Resolution 1416 -The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference”, **Council of Europe**, 2005.

Paul Holtom, Mark Bromley, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2011”, **Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Fact Sheet**, March, 2012.

QAT (Qarabağ Azadlıq Təşkilatı), Qarabağ Dünən, Bu gün və Sabah, **7-ci elmi-əməli konfransının materialları toplusu**, Bakı, Qanun, 2008, [GFT (Garabag Freedom Organization), Garabag Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, **The collection of the 7th scientific-practical conference's materials**, Baku, Qanun, 2008].

Rick Fawn, "Regions and Their study: wherefrom, what for and where to?", **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 35, February, 2009.

Rita Taureck, "Securitization theory and securitization studies", **Journal of International Relations and Development**, The University of Warwick, Vol. 9, Issue.1, March, 2006.

"Rusiyada miqrantlara münasibət dəyişməyə başlayıb", [Russia has changed its treatment towards migrants], **Azadliq.org**, 27.10.2017, <https://www.azadliq.org/a/moskvamiqrantlar/28819934.html>, (30.03.2019).

Reha Yilmaz and Elnur Ismayilov, "Etnik Çatışma Teorileri Işığında Dağlık Karabağ Sorunu", [Nagorno-Karabakh Problem in the light of Ethnic Conflict], **Bilgesam**, Report No. 37, Istanbul, 2011.

Reza Deghaty and Betty Blair, "Black January: Baku 1990, Behind the Scenes: A Photojournalist's Perspective", **Azerbaijan International**, 1998.

Rəşad Cəfərli, "Qarabağ Savaşı Belə Başladı", [Rashad Jafarli, Thus Karabakh War Started], **Azerbaijan News**, 22.02.2015, <http://1905.az/qarabag-savasi-bel%C9%99-basladi/>, (14.01.2018)

Rexane Dehdashti-Rasmussen, "The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh: Causes, the Status of Negotiations, and Prospects", **Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik-IFSH**, OSCE Yearbook 2006, Baden, 2007.

Robert M. Cutler, "The Key West Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh: Preparing Peace in the South Caucasus?", **Institute for Policy Studies**, 01.04.2001, https://ipsdc.org/the_key_west_conference_on_nagornokarabakh_preparing_peace_in_the_south_caucasus/, (22.01.2019)

Ruzanna Stepanian, "Armenian officials deny Russian role in 1999 parliament carnage", **ArmeniaLiberty.org**, 04.05.2005, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1576814.html>, (17.11.2018)

"Rusya Ermenistana silah satışına devam ediyor: Hedefte Azerbaycan var ", [Russia continues on selling arms to Armenia: Azerbaijan is on the target], **OldQha.com.ua**, 04.2018, <http://old.qha.com.ua/tr/askeri-guvenlik/rusya-ermenistan-a-silah-satisina-devam-ediyor-hedefte-azerbaycan-var/168532/>, (06.01.2019)

Ramiz Mehdiyev, "Ermənistan-Azərbaycan, Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişəsi Ermənistanın vətəndaş cəmiyyəti kontekstində", [Armenian-Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the context of Armenian civilsociety], **Azertag.az**,

<https://azertag.az/store/files/SARIYYA/RAMIZ%20MEHDIYEV%20MAQALA.pdf>, (05.01.2019)

Rashid Shirinov, “Erdogan: Armenian isolated itself from all the regional projects”, **azernews.az**, 07.12.2017, <https://www.azernews.az/aggression/123627.html>, (08.02.2019)

Rasif Huseynov, “Russia’s involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Unhelpful and unpromising”, **Foreignpolicynews.org**, 03.06.2016, <http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/06/03/russias-involvement-in-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-unhelpful-and-unpromising/>, (19.11.2018)

Robert E. Kelly, “Security Theory in the New Regionalism”, **International Studies Review**, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2007.

Ramazan Erdağ, **Regional Security Complex Theory and the Middle East and North Africa. Libya in the Arap Spring**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 28.03.2017, pp.7-19.

Richard J. Kilroy Jr; Rodriguez Sumano Abelardo; Hataley Todd, Security Inequalities in North America: Reassessing Regional Security Complex Theory, **Journal of Strategic Security**, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2017.

Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis”, **Security Studies**, Vol.18, No.3, 08 October, 2009.

Shiping Tang, “Fear in International Politics: Two Positions”, **International Studies Review**, Vol. 10, No. 3, September, 2008.

“Report of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs’ Field Assessment Mission to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh”, **Executive Summary**, <https://www.osce.org/mg/76209?download=true>, (18.12.2018)

Svante E. Cornell, “Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered”, **Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies**, (JSAMES), Vol. 20, No. 4, 1997.

“Sumqayıt hadisələri-27-29 Fevral 1988”, [Sumgayit incidents 27-29 February 1988], **Anl.az**, http://anl.az/down/meqale/adalet/adalet_fevral2009/70529.htm, (21.03.2019).

“Sumqayıt hadisələri: Qanlı erməni təxribatının 31 il ötür”, [Sumgayit incidents: 31 years pass through bloody Armenian provocation], **Yeniavaz.com**, 28.02.2019, <https://www.yeniavaz.com/az/newscontent/znewscontent/100318/sumqayit-hadiseleri-qanli-ermeni-texribatindan-31-il-otur>, (23.03.2019).

Stephen D. Shenfield, Origin and Evolutions of the Georgian and Abkhaz Conflict, **Abkhazworld.com**, 15.10.2008, <https://abkhazworld.com/aw/conflict/31-origins-and-evolutions-of-the-georgian-abkhaz-conflict>, (28.03.2018)

Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson, "Russia's War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World", **Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI) and Silk Road Studies Program-A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center**, August, 2008.

Svante E. Cornell, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", **Department of East European Studies, (EES)**, Report no. 46, Uppsala University, 1999.

Sabine Freizer, "Twenty years after the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire: an opportunity to move towards more inclusive conflict resolution", **Caucasus Survey**, Vol.1, No.2, April, 2014.

Shamkhal Abilov, "OSCE Minsk Group: Proposals and Failure, the View from Azerbaijan", **Insight Turkey, Persistent Rise of China Global Challenges and Regional Dynamics**, Vol.20, No.1, 2018.

Shawn Wayne, "Continuous Violations of Ceasefire", **Georgiatoday.ge**, 23.07. 2018, <http://georgiatoday.ge/news/11464/Continuous-Violation-Of-Ceasefire> (19.12.2018)

"State Department about meeting Kerry with Ilahm Aliyev", **Flnka.ru**, 31.03. 2016, <https://flnka.ru/english/news/12889-state-department-about-meeting-kerry-with-aliyev.html>, (05.01.2019)

Seymur Mammadov, "Why did Armenia lose the April War", **The Jerusalem Post**, 02.04.2018, <https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Why-did-Armenia-lose-the-April-War-547746>, (08.01.2019)

Shiping Tang, "Security Dilemma and ethnic conflict: toward a dynamic of integrative theory of ethnic conflict", **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 37, No.2, April, 2011.

Seymur Kazimov, "Nardaran hadisələrinin siyasi tərəfləri və gələcək fəsadları", [The political sides and future complication of the Nardaran incident], 02.12. 2015, **BBC.az**, https://www.bbc.com/azeri/azerbaijan/2015/12/151202_nardaran_aftermath, (07.01.2019)

"Son dönemlerde Türkiyede düzenlenen terör saldırıları", [Terror attacks in Turkey in last years], **Sozcu.com**, 01.01.2017, <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/son-donemde-turkiyede-duzenlenen-teror-saldirilari-1526510/c>, (06.01.2019)

Susan Sachs, "Armenia's Isolations Grows Only Deeper", **The New York Times**, 26.12.2004, <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/26/world/europe/armenias-isolation-grows-only-deeper.html>, (12.01.2019)

Stephen Blank, "Russia, the OSCE, and Security in the Caucasus", **Helsinki Monitor**, Vol.6, No.3, 1995.

Svante E. Cornell, "Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Delicate Balance", **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 34, No: 1, January, 1998.

Svante.E. Cornell, Roger N. McDermott, and William O'Malley, "Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO", **Central Asia-Caucasus Institute**, 2004.

"Synopsis of the Turkey's Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy", **Republic of Turkey-Ministry of Foreign Affairs**, 2011, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>, (02.12.2018)

Stefan Wolff, "The European Union and the Conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh Territory", **Committee on Member States' Obligations Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe**, Report, Berlin, November 4-5, 2007.

"Statement by H.E. Mr. Ilham Aliyev President of the Republic of Azerbaijan at the General Debate of the 59th session of the General Assembly", **United Nations**, New York, 24.09.2004, <https://www.un.org/webcast/ga/59/statements/azeeng040924.pdf>, (18.12.2018)

Sergey Markedenov, "The ethno-political conflict in Abkhazia: origins, dynamics and implications for regional security", **Abkhazia: Between the Past and the Future**, (Ed. Islam Tekushev, Sergey Markedonov, and Kiril Shevchenko), Medium-Orient, Prague, 2013.

Tamaki.T, **Levels of analysis of the International System**, (Ed. Kavalski, E.), Encounters with World Affairs: An Introduction to International Relations, Loughborough University's Institutional Repository, 2015.

Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context", **European Journal of International Relations**, June 03, 2005.

Theo Farrell, "Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of Research Program", **International Studies Review**, Vol. 4, Issue. 1, 2002.

Thomas De Waal, "Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process", **Survival: Global Politics and Strategy**, Vol. 52, No.4, July 21, 2010.

“The Bishkek Protocol”, **United Nations Peacemaker**, <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Bishkek%20Protocol.pdf>, (10.01.2018)

“The Bishkek Protocol”, **ICC Legal Tools Database**, <https://www.legaltools.org/doc/83d2bc/pdf/>, (13.01.2019)

The Occupied Territory, “State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan”, **Qmkdk.gov.az**, <http://www.qmkdk.gov.az/en/pages/16.html>, (29.03.2018)

Tim Potier, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Ever Closer to a Settlement, Step-by-Step”, **Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik-IFSH**, OSCE Yearbook 2009, Baden, 2010.

Thomas De Waal, “Remarking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process”, **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**, 01.08.2010, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/08/01/remaking-nagorno-karabakh-peace-process/3ldh>, (27.12.2018)

Thomas De Waal, **Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War**, New York University Press, New York/London, 2003.

Tabib Huseynov, “Mountainous Karabakh: New Paradigms for Peace and Development in 21st Century”, **Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, International Negotiations**, Vol.15, Issue.1, January 01, 2010.

“Three Azerbaijani Soldiers Killed Near Nagorno-Karabakh”, **Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty**, 18.02.2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/Three_Azerbaijani_Soldiers_Killed_Near_NagornoKarabakh/1962175.html, (23.12.2018)

“The ceasefire regime is still being violated by the units of the Armenian Armed Forces”. **Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan**, 06.04.2016, <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/the-ceasefire-regime-is-still-being-violated-by-the-units-of-the-armenian-armed-forces-12794.html>, (27.11.2018)

“Top EU Diplomat Mogherini Calls for End to Fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh”, **SputnikNews.com**, 02.04.2016, <https://sputniknews.com/politics/201604021037381544-mogherini-nagorn-karabakh/>, (27.11.2018)

Thomas De Waal, “Prisoners of the Caucasus: Resolving the Karabakh Security Dilemma”, **Carnegie Europe**, 16.06.2016, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/06/16/prisoners-of-caucasus-resolving-karabakh-security-dilemma/jlyq>, (13.12.2018)

Thomas De Waal, “The Karabakh Truce Under Threat”, **Carnegieendowment.org**, Commentary, 12.02.2015, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/02/12/karabakh-truce-under-threat/i242>, (25.12.2018)

“Əsrin Müqaviləsi”, “Treaty of Century”, **Minenergy.gov.az**, <http://www.minenergy.gov.az/index.php/az/19-energetika/neft/315-esrinmuqavilesi>, (02.01.2019)

“The state has always focused on the solution of the problems of refugees and internally displaced persons”, **Qmkdk.gov.az**, <http://www.qmkdk.gov.az/en/pages/3.html>, (03.01.2019)

“The danger of no peace, no war in Nagorno-Karabakh”, **Turkishpolicy.com**, 21.03.2018, <http://turkishpolicy.com/article/900/the-danger-of-no-peace-no-war-in-nagorno-karabakh>, (04.01.2019)

Tracey German, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia: Security Issues in the Caucasus”, **Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs**, Vol.32, No.2, 2012.

“Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline”, **TANAP**, <https://www.tanap.com/corporate/about-us/>, (06.01.2019)

“Three Eastern Partnership neighbors in the South Caucasus”, European Parliament| Fact Sheets on the European Union, **Europarl.europa.eu**, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/172/three-eastern-partnership-neighbours-in-the-south-caucasus>, (28.12.2018)

“Əsrin müqaviləsi müstəqil Azərbaycanın iqtisadi inkişafının əsasını təşkil edir”, [Treaty of the Century is the basis of the economic development of independent Azerbaijan], **Yap.org.az**, 19.09.2017, <http://yap.org.az/az/view/interview/453/esrin-muqavilesi-musteqil-azerbaycanin-iqtisadi-inkishafinin-esasini-teshkil-edir>, (09.01.2019)

“Turkey’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh war: a potential resource for peace”, **Caucasus Edition, Journal of Conflict Transformation**, 15.07.2013, <http://caucasusedition.net/turkeys-role-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-war-a-potential-resource-for-peace/>, (04.12.2018)

“19. The situation relating to Nagorno-Karabakh: Initial Proceedings”, Chapter VIII. Reportoire of the Practice of the Security Council, **UN.org**, https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/8992/Chapter%208/EUROPE/item%2019_Nagorny-Karabakh.pdf, (19.03.2019)

United Nations Security Council, “**Resolution 884**”, Adopted at the Security Council’s 3313th meeting, S/RES/884(1993), November 12, 1993.

“Тенсек ООН призвал немедленно прекратить столкновения в Карабахе”, [UN Secretary-General urged immediately stop the clashes in Karabakh], **Ria.ru**, 02.04.2016, <https://ria.ru/20160402/1401551089.html>, (28.11.2018)

“Ümumi xülasə”, “General Summary”, **Mfa.gov.az**, <http://mfa.gov.az/content/835>, (04.01.2019)

“1993 UN Security Council Resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh” **US Department of State Archive**, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/13508.htm>, (04.01.2019)

“UN in Armenia”, **Un.am**, <http://www.un.am/en/p/united-nations-in-armenia>, (27.12.2018)

Vladimir Sulovic, “Meaning of Security and Theory of Securitization”, **Belgrade Center for Security Policy**, October 05, 2010.

Vali Kouzegar Kaleji and Shirin Akiner, “South Caucasus as a Regional Security Complex”, **Research Institute of Strategic Studies**, Tehran, 2014.

Vidadi İsayev, “**Hardan gəlir bu Köç**”, Azərinəşr, Bakı, 1995, Səh.119, [Vidadi İsayev, “**Where does this immigration come from?**” Azerpublishing, Baku, 1995].

Vladimir Kazimirov, “Karabakh and UN Security Council Resolutions”, Highlights, XII, 2004, **Vn.kazimirov.ru**, <http://vn.kazimirov.ru/k100eng.htm>, (21.12.2018)

Vladimir Dargachev, “Сражался и погиб как мужчина”, [He Fought and Died like a Man], **Газета.ru**, 12.04.2016, https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/04/07_a_8165687.shtml?updated, (05.12.2018)

Violetta Rusheva, “Nagorno-Karabakh Resolution could bring economic gains to Armenia and Azerbaijan”, **Neweurope.eu**, 01.02.2019, <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/nagorno-karabakh-resolution-could-bring-economic-gains-to-armenia-and-azerbaijan/>, (03.03.2019)

“War in Abkhazia, Main Facts 1992-1993”, **Caucasian Knot**, 17.08.2017, <http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/40479/>, (18.04.2018)

“Who we are”, **OSCE-Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**, <https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/108306>, (29.12.2018)

“What we do”, **EPNK**, <http://www.epnk.org/about-us/what-we-do>, (09.01.2019)

“Xocalı soyqırımını hakkında məlumat”, [Information About the Khojaly Genocide], **Ombudsman.gov.az**, <http://www.ombudsman.gov.az/az/view/pages/163>, (03.01.2019)

Zaur Shiryev, “The ‘Four-Day War’: Changing Paradigms in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, 2017.

Zaur Shiryev, “Azerbaijan Wrestles with Rising Iranian Influence”, **Eurasianet.org**, <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-wrestles-with-rising-iranian-influence>, (17.05.2019)

Zaur Shiryev, “Perception in Azerbaijan of the Impact of Revolutionary Changes in Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process”, in the Political Transition and Conflicts in the South Caucasus, Caucasus Edition, **Journal of Conflict Transformation**, Part: II, Vol. 3, Issue. 2, 2018.

