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DOCTORAL THESIS

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

FROM REVOLUTION TO REFORM:

THE IRANIAN STATE LEFT INTACTED

Seçkin KOÇ

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Seçkin KOÇ tarafından hazırlanmış ve sunulmuş **"From Revolution To Reform: The Iranian State Left Intacted"** başlıklı tezi kabul edilmiştir.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this doctoral thesis titled as "From Revolution to Reform: The Iranian State Left Intacted" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honour.

17 /01/ 2015

Seçkin KOÇ

ABSTRACT
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The 1979 Iranian Revolution was called as one of the unexpected and political turmoil of the 20th century. It was called as 'unexpected' fact, because no one believed to fall the Shah from the throne. Even the Ayatollah Khomeini was seen initially as a hero, the '*estebdat*' (autocratic) period came back for the 'other' revolutionary groups, who had different political argument from the *ulama*. We claimed that 'the autocratic period came back', because the particular structure (about the absolute authority and administration) to Iran was not change from the monarchy to the Islamic republic.

Starting this point of view, we shaped our hypothesis on the Iranian state structure. We deeply concentrated on the period of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, because the revolution dynamics gathered around the rising power of the Shah after the 1953 coup d'état. We aimed to link up today's Iran and its socio-political attitude with analyzing the stationary state structure of Iran.

During the research period, we had difficulty in accessing the sources in Iran, because quite a few sources and writers were suspended from Iranian libraries and Iran. For this reason, we cannot gloss some important Persian remarks. We tried to strengthen our hypothesis for accessing the English versions of the above mention remarks.

With this study, we aimed to demonstrate the Iranian intacted state structure from the monarchy and to show the never-ending conflict between the state and the society.

Keywords: The Iranian State Structure, The State-Society Conflict, Revolution and Reform, Modernization, The State Capitalism, The Cameralist System

ÖZET

Doktora Tezi

DEVRİMDEN REFORMA: DEĞİŞMEDEN KALAN İRAN DEVLET YAPISI

Seçkin KOÇ

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
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1979 İran devrimi 20. yüzyılın beklenmedik politik karmaşalarından birisi olarak anılır. İran devrimi 'beklenmedik' bir durum olarak anılır, çünkü kimse Şah'ın devrileceğine inanmamıştır. Her ne kadar ilk başlarda Ayetullah Humeyni bir kahraman olarak görülse de, Ulema'dan farklı siyasi süşünclere sahip diğer politik gruplar için 'istibdat' dönemi geri gelmiştir. 'Otokratik dönemin geri geldiğini' öne sürüyoruz, çünkü bize göre İran'a özgü mutlak otorite algısı ve yönetim şekli monarşiden İslami cumhuriyete geçişte bir değişikliğe uğramamıştır.

Bu noktadan hareketle hipotezimizi İran devlet yapısı üzerinde şekillendirdik. Özellikle Mahammad Reza Pahlavi dönemine yoğunlaştık; zira devrim dinamikleri özellikle 1953 darbesinden sonra Şah'ın artan gücünün etrafından toplanmıştı. Değişmeyen İran devlet yapısını değerlendirerek bugünkü İran ve onun sosyo-politik tutumu ile bir bağlantı kurmayı amaçladık.

Araştırma süresince İran'daki kaynaklara ulaşma noktasında zorluklar yaşadık, çünkü oldukça fazla sayıda kaynak ve yazar İran kütüphanelerinden ve İran'dan uzaklaştırılmıştır. Bu nedenle bazı önemli Farsça görüşlere dipnot düşemedik. Söz konusu bu görüşlere İngilizce kaynaklar üzerinden ulaşarak hipotezimizi güçlendirmeye çalıştık.

Bu çalışma ile monarşiden bu yana değişmeden kalan devlet yapısını kanıtlamayı ve devlet ile toplum arasındaki bitmek bilmeye çatışmayı göstermeyi amaçladık.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İran Devlet Yapısı, Devlet-Toplum Çatışması, Devrim ve Reform, Modernleşme, Devlet Kapitalizmi, Kameralist Sistem

FROM REVOLUTION TO REFORM:

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INTRODUCTION

"Die revolution is wie Saturn, sie frißt ihre eigenen kinder."
(Revolution is like Saturn, it devours its own children)
Georg Büchner / Danton's Death

Iran. A country which alternates in between revolutions and reforms.

The 20th century began with the reform works of the Qajar dynasty, and this attempt ended up the Constitutional Revolution which paves the way of the throne for the Pahlavi. In the second half of this century, another reform process was conducted by favor of the Shah and called as the 'White Revolution'. However the 'white' breeze turned to the 'green' and the Iranians were driven away with another revolution and its remnants. 35 years after this revolution, Iran is talking about the requirement of a reform movement in these days. In a word, Iran and its core mind left 'nearly' intact.

With this study we tried to deepen in the Iranian state structure and its socio-political background. As well as we concentrated on the period of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, we touched on the Islamic pattern of the 'new' republic for understanding the religion-state antagonism. Even if the regime changed with the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the power possession of the state and operating the authority did not change in the transition from the monarchy to the republic. Indeed this dissertation aimed to open a perspective about the Iranian state behavior.

The Iranian and Western researchers have evaluated the regional and global impacts of the Iranian Revolution since 1979. Especially between 1979 and 1983, two important questions occupied the related literature: Was the 1979 rebellion an 'Islamic' Revolution? If it was, how it became fact? For understanding the reasoning of the Iranian revolution, a political sociology study of mine can be examined.[1]

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[1] Seçkin Berber, "İran İslam Devrimini Anlamak", **Doğu-Batı Yol Ayrımında İran: İdeoloji, Devlet ve Dış Politika,** (Ed. Barış Adıbelli), IQ Press, İstanbul, 2012

However, this study predicates on the bimillennial Iranian state mind and the struggle arena between the social stratums and the state apparatus.

The theoretical base of the dissertation was prepared in the first chapter, 'Change and Continuity: Iranian State Structure'. The historical, sociological and political background of the Iranian state structure was supported with two important arguments of Max Weber: The modern state phenomenon, as the agent of change; and the traditional authority in the Weberian typology, as the element of continuity.

For explaining the modern state, the modernization process was considered on a preferential basis in this chapter. The modern state was the main agent of modernization and its institutions can be functioned as the facilitator for the adaptation of the society from the traditional to the modern. However, the differences of the Western and non-Western practices were the challenge for the modern state. We also concentrated on the divergence between these two practices and highlighted the features of the Iranian modernization as an illustration for the non-Western character in the first chapter.

The Iranian state structure is based on the traditional authority and includes a religious dependent as well. The non-Western characteristic of Iranian modernization created the remnants of the traditional authority in a modernizing polity. Actually, the Shah aimed to create a Western type (modern) society; on the other hand he used his authority by way of Persian (traditional) history. The major failed point of the Iranian modernization was implicit in this approach, and we tried to show how the traditional authority administered (or could not administer) the modernized society.

At this point, the Ayatollah took a stand against the Shah as a charismatic authority. The Shah founded a bureaucratic network with the modernization project; on the contrary the Ayatollah used his charismatic authority for consolidating the religious power on the society. In a subsection of the first chapter, we tried to explain also this everlasting struggle between the political/secular and religious/spiritual powers.

We canalized to the society in the second chapter, 'Iranian Society in Transition: State Capitalism and the Dissidents'. The theoretical background was

deepened through the state capitalism approach, and we touched on the changing social configuration between the White Revolution (1963) and the Iranian Revolution (1979).

The capitalism was seen as the natural scope of modernization. Actually, the legal authority typology of Weber can provide this scope for capitalism; because the institutions of the modern state found this structure. However, the capitalist approach can turn into a state-centered capitalism in hands of a traditional authority as in the Iranian system. The Shah constituted a state-directed capitalism through the White Revolution and its related reform projects. We conceptualized the Iranian state capitalism in the first instance; then we focused on the responses of the social classes against the Shah's reform project.

Ironically, the incompatible social classes (the *ulama*, the *bazaris* and the leftist articulation) got together 'against the Shah' just before the 1979 Revolution in Iran. However, their expectations for the future of Iran were very different. Hence, we highlighted the position of these different social groups in the revolution process, and pointed out how the Iranian state capitalism concluded with a rebellion.

The dictated reform movement stemmed from the Shah's modernization ideal, and he controlled this system with the bureaucrats who were loyal to himself. The Pahlavi type of administration shared similarity with the cameralist system, which is a way of transforming politics into administration and ruled by experts. For this reason, we concentrated on the Iranian administration system in the final chapter, 'The Monarchical Administration and the Revolutionary Challengers'.

The cameralist structure was a German type of administration system. When the Prussia had fallen behind the European modernization and capitalism, it gained strength with the cameralist approach and established a centralized, unified and modernized nation. The Shah used this type of administration for consolidating the modernization process. The cameralist experts (technocrats, engineers and academicians) became the Shah's bureaucrats, and these bureaucrats modernized the Iran 'from above'.

In the first subsection of the final chapter, we were framed the administration politics of the Pahlavi monarchy. This convergence refreshed our hypothesis in the previous chapters, and provided a deepened approach for the Iranian state structure. In addition, we saw through the cameralist structure how Iran slides into the revolution. A state-centered and elitist administration becomes distant from the society, and this fact creates a conflict between two major components: state and society.

Starting this point of view, we focused on the state-society conflict in the second subsection of the final chapter. The revolutionary challengers and their inter se conflict was the subject of this subsection. Because of this internal fracture we named the 1979 Iranian Revolution as a 'trapped' revolution. The only winner of the Iranian Revolution was the *ulama*, and the other challengers put away in the first years of the revolution (between 1979 and 1983). Because the revolution and its following process was not the major point of this dissertation, we did not enlarge on. However, we referred to the 'new' administration for looking to the continuing state structure from the Pahlavi monarchy to the Islamic Republic in the final subsection.

The Iranian Revolution was not only an 'urban' phenomenon; it was also a 'state issue'. The Iranian state structure and the society characteristic are inclined to conflict. With this dissertation, we want to make a humbly contribution to the literature about this issue of conflict.

CHAPTER ONE

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: IRANIAN STATE STRUCTURE

"Every country has a certain type of regime.

Ours is a one-person regime."[2]

Reza Shah

"The authority of the 'eternal yesterday',

i.e. of the mores sanctified through

the unimaginably ancient recognition

and habitual orientation to conform.

This is 'traditional' domination' exercised by

the patriarch and the patrimonial prince of yore."[3]

Max Weber

Iran has an idiosyncratic -*sui generis*- 'state mind', comes of its Persian origins, and it emphasizes the 'monistic sovereignty'[4]. This monistic view draws its

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[2]

[3]Max Weber, **Essays in Sociology,** (Trans. H.H.Gerth and C. Wright Mills), Oxford University Press, New York, 1946, p.115

[4]In here, the term of monistic sovereignty is used for getting a kind of description about absoluteness. However, the monistic sovereignty is known fundamentally by John Austin's theory in the literature. He regarded as an exponent on the monistic theory in his book "The Province of Jurisprudence Determined" (1832). According to Austin, in every state there exists an authority to whom a large mass of citizen show compliance. This authority is absolute, unlimited and indivisible. See for Austin's theory: Wilfred Rumble, **The Thought of John Austin: Jurisprudence Colonial Reform, and the British Constitution,** Dover: Athlone Press, London, 1985; "John Austin", **Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,** (Ed. Edward Zalta) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/austin-john/ (11.08.2012). Apart from Austin's particular approach, the monistic sovereignty leans on the view of *state of nature*. In Machiavelli's **Prince,** Hobbes' **Leviathan,** or Bodin's **The Six Books of**

strength from the Iranian sedentariness. Iranians did never live nomadically like Turks or Arabic tribes. They had founded states, as well empires, "more or less within the same borders as their great-grandparents"[5] in the 2500 years. Even though their territory was invaded two times -once by Alexander the Great and the other by Arabs-, their sedentary identity had penetrated into the whole structures and systems during this period. 'Becoming Iran' has stemmed from such a behavior.

The fundamental Iranian characteristic has lied behind the state-society conflict. The monistic tendency of the state has created continually rebellion and chaos,[6] there of the society is quite familiar to 'revolutionize'. Albeit the social structure of the last 35 years was dramatically different from the Iran of the beginning of the century, the ingrained Iranian identity was not so much different from its predecessors. The ruler was still the main coordinator of the authority, and its traditional attitude was integrated to the 'modern apparatus'.

The 'changing' part of the state structure has leaned on these modern institutions. Between the two revolutions, Iran was modernized and capitalized with the 'etatism' by the Pahlavi dynasty. However, the core state tools were kept by the 'continuing' traditional behavior. In other words, 'another state' was not constituted after the monarchy, as the claim of the 'new (Islamic) regime'. The power, which was attributed to the Shah and his bureaucrats, was assigned to the new patronage of the Islamic state. And the 'changing' and 'continuing' parts had coalesced under the 'restructuration' of Iranian state. In this chapter, the 'changing' part of Iranian state will conceptualize with the 'modern state' argument and its background; the 'continuing' part will be based on the 'traditional authority' approach, which derives from the right of the hereditary rulers.

Commonweal, the absoluteness was portrayed through the monistic power. Altough the theory of the monistic sovereignty is not completely a subject for this study, it will used here for conceptualizing the Iranian state structure.
[5]Ervand Abrahamian, **A History of Modern Iran,** Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, p.1
[6]Katouzian, **The Persians: Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Iran,** p.5

1.1. CHANGE: MODERN STATE AS A WESTERN PHENOMENON

Today's written 'World History' is a Western civilization story. The West portrays you with a different code and identity through the problematizing of the East (non-West), and structures its own civilization genre. The Western history and world envisagement has strengthened the East-West separation, which is subjected to the 'selfdom of the West' and the 'otherness of the East'.[7] The Western main paradigm is attributed to the 'change', 'progress' and 'modernization', involved the scientific and technological sophistication, the supremacy in political, military and economic spheres and the rational values in the orientation of state, society and individual.

The term of 'modern' had entered to the Western literature with a religious point of view in the 5th century. In Latin texts, the word *modernus* was used for comparing the Pagan and Christian societies and the Pagans were represented with 'old', the Christians symbolized with the 'new', namely 'modern'. However, the term of 'modern' had founded its candid meaning with the Renaissance and the Enlightenment - its complement period.[8] The 'modernism', which was derived from the word of 'modern', described the 'new' (nontraditional) activities or art, architecture, literature, religious faith, social organization and cultural tendencies during the Enlightenment[9] period in the Europe.[10]

The quit from the traditional (post-medieval historical period), cited as the 'modernity' (distinct from the modern era and modernism), had emphasized the progress, development and innovation in the sociological, philosophical, cultural and economical subjects. The origin of the modernity was based on the Western

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[7] John M. Hobson, **Batı Medeniyetinin Doğulu Kökenleri,** (Trans. Esra Erment), Yapı Kredi Press, İstanbul, 2004, pp.8-9

[8] Ahmet Demirhan, **Modernlik,** İnsan Press, İstanbul, 2004, pp.17-22

[9] The transition from a God-centered world order to human-centered view was the main characteristic of the Enlightenment period. The Cartesian approach, the progressive conception of history and the universalism in the knowledge and free thought are the components of the Enlightenment. For the Enlightenment period, see: Norman Geras and Robert Wokler, **The Enlightenment and Modernity,** Pelgrave MacMillan, London, 2000; Stephen Eric Bronner, **Reclaiming the Enlightenment,** Columbia University Press, 2004

[10] For the movement of modernism, see: Astradur Eysteinsson, **The Concept of Modernism,** Cornell University Press, New York, 1992; Peter Nicholls, **Modernisms: A Literary Guide**, MacMillan, London, 1995

historical transformation and included *capitalism*, *industrialization*, *secularization* and *rationalization* in the intellectual, political and cultural life. According to Marshall Berman, the modernity was periodized into three phases: the 'Early' modernity (1453-1789), the 'Classical' modernity (1789-1914) and the 'Late' modernity (1914-1989). And the second phase was known as the 'modernization' and shapened under the development of the industrial capitalism.[11]

The era of modernity was characterized by *industrialization*[12] and *rationalization*[13]. The sociological approaches about industrialization gathered around Durkheim's, Marx's and Weber's theories, and mainly it was discussed through consequences of capitalism. According to Karl Marx, the basis of the modernity was the emergence of capitalism and the revolutionary bourgeoisie. As well as Marx, Emile Durkheim stressed the rising bourgeoisie as a 'new' revolutionary social class and referred to capitalism the 'new' mode of production, implemented by it. Or for Max Weber, rationalization was the fundamental impulse of the modernity, and it had initiated a transition in the socio-economic, socio-politic and socio-cultural fields.[14]

Politically, the modernity had found its meaning with Niccolo Machiavelli's studies, which rejected the Aristotelian politics and proposed the realistic approach within the state behavior. Machiavelli's political doctrines had influenced the 'modern state' argument, and the following thinkers of him created a colossal literature about this subject. Starting with the English Civil War (1642-1651), the American Revolution (1775-1783) and the French Revolution (1789-1799), the philosophers had began questioning the political subjects such as sovereignty, authority, power and the physical force of state, society, nation, etc.

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[11] Marshall Berman, **The Experience of Modernity,** Viking Pinguin, New York 1988, pp.16-17
[12] Industrialization was seen as the principal agent in the making of modern society and interrelated with urbanization and rationalization. The social differentiations explained through the effects of industrialization on the society. For detailed argument about the theories of industrialization, see: Lewis Abbott, **Theories of Industrial Modernization and Development: A Review,** Industrial Systems Research, Manchester, 3rd Edition, 2011; John Walton, "Theory and Research on Industrialization", **Annual Review of Sociology,** Vol. 13, (1987), pp.89-108
[13] Rationalization formed as the main concept of capitalism and was presented firstly by Max Weber in **the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism**. 'Modernity', 'Post-modernity', 'urbanization', 'secularization' and 'industrialization' are the further objectives of rationalization as well.
[14] Gerard Delanty, "Modernity", **Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology**, (Ed. George Ritzer), Blackwell Publishing, 2007

Moreover, modernity had a direct response to the sociology, referred the social conditions, processes and discourses of the Enlightenment. Anthony Giddens described it as

> " (...) a shorthand term for modern society, or industrial civilization. Portrayed in more detail, it is associated with (1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as open to transformation, by human intervention; (2) a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production and a market economy; (3) a certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy. Largely as a result of these characteristics, modernity is vastly more dynamic than any previous type of social order. It is a society -more technically, a complex of institutions- which, unlike any preceding culture, lives in the future, rather than the past."[15]

Also it can be said that the process of 'modernization' had began as 'the action of the modernity' in the Europe and spread around the world during 19th and 20th centuries. Its theoretical background (the modernization theory) concentrated on the internal factor of a country or society and their development from the traditional to the modern. On that note, the term of modernization has a special meaning for explaining the 'modern state' argument. Instead of the modern state formed a strong citizenship through a common cultural and social integration, and turned itself into the principal agent of the modernization.[16]

1.1.1 Iranian Modernization in Perspective

Modernization can be defined as a 'society adaptation process', depended on the knowledge and developed, the functional institutions. Theoretically, the term of modernization means an evolution period, which includes the disentangling of the 'traditional/old' social, cultural and political structures, values and principles. It tries to practice more sophisticated and modern aims such as legitimacy, participation,

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[15] Anthony Giddens and Christopher Pierson, **Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity**, Stanford University Press, 1998, p.94

[16] Nazım İrem, "Kültür, Demokrasi ve Modernite: Geleneksel Formüller ve Yükselen Eleştiriler", **Muhafazakar Düşünce,** Yıl:2, Sayı:5, (Yaz 2005), p.90

institutionalization, stabilization, democracy, welfare, equality, integration, bureaucratization, security, justice and rationalization.[17]

Modernization denotes, in general, the change of five fields: political, social, cultural, economic and intellectual fields. The *political modernization* comprises the key institutions, such as political parties, right to vote, parliaments, in the decision making mechanisms. The *social modernization* is composed of the informatics knowledge, the (over)urbanization, the population increase (due to the control of the epidemic illnesses), the reducing of the traditional authority and the maturation of individual. The *cultural modernization* is mostly tied to the secularization and the national ideology. The *economic modernization* shelters the subjects of division of labor, business administration techniques, fabrication, mechanization, and large-scale commercial organizations. And the *intellectual modernization* includes the rational, positive, secular, universal arguments in the free thought perspective.[18]

At bottom, the modernization corresponds to the social, economic, political and cultural change of the non-Western societies toward *Westernization*[19]. They -the non-Westerns- actualize the rapid, radical and compulsory transformation proceeded from their inner (or sometimes exterior) structures. And these structures predicate the reformation on the state idea in the modernization process. The state idea requires the positioning of legal regulations, adapted from the fundamental rights between the individuals and state. Thus the modernization caused 'the constitution movements', which was started by the administrative elites (from an inner but an upper structure), during the 19th century in the Islamic (non-Western) societies. For instance, in Iran, the constitutional movement had begun with the guarantee pursuit of the opposition

[17]Halis Çetin, "Gelenek ve Değişim Arasında Kriz: Türk modernleşmesi", **Doğu Batı Düşünce Dergisi,** Sayı 23, (Aralık 2003), p.12

[18]Celal Metin, **Emperyalist Çağda Modernleşme: Türk Modernleşmesi ve İran (1800-1941),** Phoenix Press, Ankara, 2011, p.28

[19]Westernizations a cultural adaptation process of the non-Western societies in areas such as industry,technology, law, politics,economics, lifestyle, religion, philosophy and values. For some scholars, Westernization is a pervasive equivalent of modernization, and uses the institutions of modernity for penetrating into the 'other' cultures.

in 1890, and then the first constitution had prepared with the proclaiming of the Constitutional Monarchy by the opposition between 1906 and 1907.[20]

Admittedly, it cannot be mentioned a monotype modernization within the inner or exterior structures, because of the different features of societies. For Cyril Black, the successor moderns cannot improve 'modern institutions' model such the precursor (Western) moderns. Some societies (non-Western) can found quite easily the centralized-political institutions, but some cannot; some societies keep step with the industrial manner of life, but some have to overcome the complications arising from the traditional beliefs and practices.[21]

In the Islamic societies, like Iran, the strong nature of the traditional belief and culture accompanies the challenge of the centralized-political authority, and it presents a civilization genre depending on the faith's realm of existence. The individuals, societies and states can live in this realm of existence with the predetermined rules within the certain 'faith' lines and fields.[22]Also, the long-period state tradition of Islamic societies has obstructed the change and transformation of their inner structure. Especially, the political and cultural dynamics has resisted over the economic and technological factors, because of the distantness of 'the modernization mind'.

In Iran, the modernization steps did not become fact concurrently with the modernization mind. Mostly the institutions had modeled from the West by the Qajar dynasty, but the social structure did not be prepared for the process, and the society's reactions excluded. Because of this circumstances, a problematical modernization process had began in the beginning of the 20th century and continued during the Pahlavi dynasty. The modernization began with the configuration of the education and production structures in Iran. In time, the 'educated' individuals demanded the change of the economic, political and cultural structures, and their expectations

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[20] For the constitutional movement in Iran, see: Mangol Bayat Philip, **Iran's First Revolution**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991; Janet Afary, **The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: 1906-1911,** Columbia University Press, New York, 1996
[21]Cyril Edwin Black, **The Dynamics of Modernization,** Harper & Row Press, New York, 1966, pp.63-64
[22]Roy R. Andersen and Robert F. Seibert, **Politics and Change in the Middle East,** New Jersey: Rentice-Hall Inc., 1987, pp.110-111

deepened toward the modernization argument. This modernization attitude entailed the restructuration of the state, and its instruments, the change of regime, the restatement of the socio-economic relations, the political and social integration and founding a 'new' ideology.

Actually, the language, history and culture occupy an important place in the Western societies, and the integration pursuit from center to periphery causes the development of a political, national and bureaucratic tone. The desire of change stems from the inner circle of the society, and it is the pioneer component of the transformation. However, the non-Western (Islamic) structures, as well Iran, are based on the basis of the traditional-agricultural societies, and they are devoid of the propellant power for constructing the modern industrial systems.[23] This system is called as the 'bureaucratic modernization', and the state mechanisms lead or impose modernizing to society. In other words, the bureaucratic modernization leans on the evolvement tendency from the top (the state elites) to the bottom (the community) with reforms (restoration) in many traditional societies.

According to Black, the modernization achievement of a society depends on its own original tradition, priorities and sources, the cultural development and the competence of the elites. Every society has its own experience in the way of modernization, and every inner dynamics and historical practices diversify this process. However, it is possible to specify the general characteristics of the 'political modernization', rather than the other types of modernization, for the whole societies, and the only common history and political background about this fact depends chronologically on the French Revolution in 1789. [24]

Because of this chronological priority of the West, the followers (non-West) are faced with the disadvantages and advantages as well. The affordability of the technology seems as the main advantage, but the conflicted institutions (the 'old-traditional' and the 'new-modern') take effects within the substituted values. In this context, Black suggests to differentiate the applicable functions of the modernization

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[23] Manfred Halpern, **The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa,** Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1963, p.53

[24] Black, **The Dynamics of Modernization,** pp.92-93

and the 'foreign' institutional manners in the traditional societies.[25] Even though these traditional societies become a prototype of the metropolis samples with the exterior dynamics (colonizing), the modernization process fails because of the above mentioned facts.

Apart from that, the modernization desire of the non-Western societies is based on the positivist belief system, which is the 'credo' for the Western mind. As Şükrü Hanioğlu mentioned, the 'modernization' is seemed as the 'Westernization' during the 19th and 20th centuries.[26] The administrative elites are sent abroad for the Western-type education or learning the technical knowledge, and mostly these elites, who have a secular training and active role on the modernization, have weak ties with the traditional-rural areas.[27] However, their political or bureaucratic positions come of the strong ruler ship rights of a traditional authority (state). In general, these bureaucrats are laic, positivist, nationalist and revolutionary persons, who belong to the middle or upper-middle class, nontraditional and urbanized families.[28]

Essentially, the political and intellectual leaders want to modernize immediately their societies at the Western level, but they passes over the multifaceted and continuous development of the West on the basis of modernity principles. As well as the West imposes on this principles as the compulsory and irrevocable facts. As from the last half of the 19th century, the modernization perception of the non-Western opinion turned into an ideological structure, which includes indispensable dogmas. In this sense, the heavy costs and disappointments of these non-Western societies originate from this ideological tone of modernization.[29]

As a result, the 'non-Western' modernization is a sudden and unexpected change process by favor of the state. For Reşat Kasaba, 'being modern' rises as an exterior choice, adapted from the results of the inner crash, not a contd of the inner development. And the administrative elites (intellectuals, army and bureaucrats)

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[25]**Ibid.,**p.101

[26]Şükrü Hanioğlu, "Batılılaşma: Giriş", **Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi**, Volume:5, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Press, İstanbul, 1992, p.148

[27]Levent Köker, **Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi**, İletişim Press, İstanbul, 6. Edition, 2000, p.53

[28]Ronald Dore, "Modernization: The Bourgeoisie", **International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences**, (Ed. David Sills), Volume 10, The Macmillian Com. & The Free Press, 1968, p.408

[29] Köker, **Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi,** pp.49-50

undertake the 'guiding' mission of the modernization. They take the conceptualization of the modernity, such as freedom, equality, unity and progress, and they cast a dominant role to the secularism, nationalism and democracy, but they cannot achieve to internalize this subject from the bottom to the top.[30]

The modernization practice had begun during the Qajar dynasty[31] in Iran, and was continued by the Pahlavi in the 20th century. However, this state-directed modernization cannot reach the target because of the inability and discontinuity of the leaders and the intensity of the public opposition. As Ervand Abrahamian mentioned, the modernization initiatives were incomplete due to the conflict between the political demands and religious control since the beginning of the twentieth century. The most significant attempts were realized with the suppress of religious and social powers, and this fact finally posed a 'revolution'.[32]

When reifying the characterization of the Iran modernization, we can stress five features about it:

- Iran had long and bureaucratic experiences in the state tradition. This fact had provided to achieve a unity and territorial integrity of the state, called as the 'Iranian state mind'.
- Even though Iran was exposed to the 'foreign' intervention (the yclept 'occupation syndrome' of Iran) in some periods, it was not totally colonized. For this reason, the Iranian state mind had not misshaped, it was designed within the scope of the modernization.
- The reforms were for strengthening the state, not for developing the rural area. Therefore the holistic power of society came from the traditional culture, stayed as the untouched part. The modernization was not connected to the interior and dictated through the suppress by the state and its institutions.

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[30]Reşat Kasaba, "Eski ile Yeni Arasında Kemalizm ve Modernizm", **Türkiye'de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik,** (Eds. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba), Tarih Vakfı Yurt Press, İstanbul,1999, pp.22-25

[31] The first drive for modernization was led by Prince Abbas Mirza, and the second was initiated by Mirza Muhammad Taqi Khan Farahani, better known as the Amir Kabir (The Great Lord). For details see: Ervand Abrahamian, **Iran Between Two Revolutions**, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1982, pp.52-53

[32]**Ibid.,**pp.140-141

- The bourgeoisie did not rise in Iran because of the historical causes. The absence of the bourgeoisie set the state both the demanding and requesting position, and the state's existence became the starting point of the modernization process.
- The modernity-follower leaders and administrators were tied to their inner causes for modernization. They had ignored the Iranian's rooted and stationary social structures and (religious) ties.[33]

The advanced technical developments and the certain rules in the political and public fields facilitate the life in the West. The Iranian authorities had admired to these circumstances, but the significative dynamics has leaned to the need of the change. In other respects, the bureaucratic elements were not monolithic and continuous in Iran. The passive voice of the society and the traditional factors, especially the *ulama,* has resisted to the abovementioned monolithic bureaucracy. For this reason, the state remained in between the protection of the Shia identity and the balance necessity in the inner and exterior intervention.

In Iran, the modern institutionalization was limited with the ruler ship of the political leaders; if they failed, their initiatives were idle. The political elites attributed an ideological meaning to the modernization for 'saving the state'. And this argument ('saving the state') was tied to rationalize the state apparatus and to strengthen the sovereignty. At this position, the secular state structure encountered the Shia ulama, and the community situated substantially against the state. This mental crash of society had caused the 1979 Revolution in Iran.

1.1.2. Modern State: The Agent of Change

After the geographical explorations and the development of the rationalization, the secular world view had became widespread, the Western-Christian mind and the manner of life had underwent a change. The circumstance was seen and perceived as a new era and concentrated on the 'new' concepts such as

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[33] Black, **The Dynamics of Modernization,** pp. 120-124

scientific knowledge, new techniques, economic welfare, employment increase, job share, political participation and liberty. The Enlightenment idea had turned to the rationalization with the criticism of religious and traditional institutions. On the one hand, modernization appropriated secularism, humanism, universalism and states, which are adapted from democracy and rule of law; on the other hand, the 'ethnocentrique' approach of the modernization placed the West at the center and saw the non-Western world as 'primitive' stage of the history and civilization. [34]

In spite of appearance, the non-Western civilizations have an incredible ripeness in the artistic and spiritual fields, but they did not live a seismic transformation in the 'world of thought' like the West. Hence, the obedient man of the community (*ummah*) does not contemporary the responsible citizen of the 'modern state'. Dariush Shayegan entitles this situation as "scholastic fossilization"[35] and highlights the "instrumentalize of religion"[36] problematique through the contradictory of Islamic paradigm. Meanwhile this paradigm is put up against the 'modernity', it does not hang back to use the tools of the 'modern state' for reinforcing its sovereignty at the present time, as Weber mentioned it in concept of *the traditional authority*.

The modern state, which has a strong army, widespread bureaucracy and big economic investments, keeps hold of the legislative and judgment powers and use of force with the 'sovereignty' mind. The 'strong state' argument finds place itself with modernization and capitalization. For legitimizing this circumstance, the personal rights and the social assent get drawn into the capableness of the sovereign state. Basically this state identification and precedence is the sequent of capitalization and modernization period and arises from the social transformation.

The capitalist relations of production and the modern state[37] have shaped concurrently after the third stage (the industrial society) of history of humanity. The

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[34] For modernity and modernization, as a historical development idea, see: Metin, **Emperyalist Çağda Modernleşme: Türk Modernleşmesi ve İran (1800-1941),** pp. 24-42

[35] Daryush Shayegan, **Yaralı Bilinç,** Metis Press, İstanbul, 2012, pp.46-52

[36] **Ibid.,** pp. 53-65

[37] The origin of the compulsory form of human association -the state- was lean on the fundamental observations of the ancient time philosophers. For instance, "Plato (BC 427 - BC 347) and Aristotle (BC 384 - BC 322) viewed state, also *polis*, as an organism, which was the individual amplified to a

state's control power (its physical force) becomes inevitable, because of the big and complicated job share structures of the industrial societies. Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936) termed these circumstances as the transformation from *Gemeinschaft* (community) to *Gesellschaft* (society) in the modern state. In *Gemeinschaft*, the pre-industrial social networks, people lives together within the frame of their mutual feelings and bonds, which are felt as a goal to be, keep up. The solidarity spirit and the common will are managed sincerely by this social consciousness. According to Tönnies, the social status comes from inborn in this constant structure, for this reason, it can be mentioned a restricted social change. However law, contract, rationalization, monetary economy and public opinion take the place of this traditional structure in *Gesellshaft*. The public sphere gives way to 'private/ personal space', and the self interest becomes the primary value in the society. Moreover, the social ties are often instrumental and superficial, with exploitation increasingly the norm. After all, *Gemeinschaft* yields to *Gesellschaft* in the modernization period.[38]

The ruler ship starts to be centralized with modernity, and the modern state leans on the legal-rational authority, as Weber conceptualized. Within this period, the feudal structure had disintegrated and the bureaucratic mechanisms gained strength. While a directly sovereignty and ownership relationship exist between the state and the king in the traditional administration form, the legitimacy of the authority becomes impersonal in the modern state. The loyalty of the public servants is to the

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larger scale."Either for Cicero (BC 106 - BC 43), the state became efficient through "the people's affair -**the Commonwealth**- that is a specific type of association in which individuals are united by a common agreement about law and rights and by the desire to participate in mutual advantages."Besides, the successor of the ancient time philosophers, such as Saint Augustinius (354 - 430) or Niccolo Machiavelli (1469 - 1527), challenged to their argument and emphasized the 'divine' and 'absolute' authority of the state. Under any circumstances, many scholars believed that the mark of the modern times' state argument was based considerably on the Thomas Hobbes's (1588 - 1679) **Leviathan.** Actually, Hobbes' **Leviathan** made an impression on materialistic philosophy and ontology, and his argument has not formed basis directly to the modern state. However, without Hobbes' claim, John Locke or Jean-Jacques Rousseau cannot improve the "social contract theory" as a challenge, which is addressed the questions of the origin of society and the legitimacy of the authority of the state over the individual, or David Hume cannot deride the hypothetical humanity root of the state. Hugo Grotius (1583 - 1645), Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679), Samuel Pufendorf (1632 - 1694), John Locke (1632 - 1704), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 - 1778) and Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804)) are among the most prominent of 17th and 18th century theorists of social contract. Briefly stated, the 'modern state' is a fundamental political form of the modern times, and its theoretical and connectional principles have basis on the European intellectual transformation. See more details: David Boucher, **Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present**, Oxford University Press, 1998

[38] Veysel Bozkurt, **Değişen Dünyada Sosyoloji,** Ekin Press, Bursa, 2009, 4. Edition, pp.159-160

rules, not to the king. As well as, the term of 'citizenship' widens, and so every citizen becomes directly related with the country's sovereignty. The intermediary structures, which are influential in the relation between state and individuals, are put away.

It is unquestionable that, the political authority cannot be evaluated as a modern notion or a creation of the modernity. It was always there, where the society was formed. However, the political authority differs from societal structures because of its transformative nature, and it comes into existence to the modern state, with a heavy and slow 'opening'. Therefore, the modern state is called as the 'institutionalized political authority', from Thomas Hobbes into the present.

According to Hobbes, "during the time men live without a 'common power' to keep them all in awe[39], they are in that condition which is called warre; and such a warre as is of every man against every man."[40] The only way to frame a 'common power' is to authorize 'one man' (or an assembly of men) -the 'great Leviathan'-, and this authority is invested with power (physical force) forming the wills of them all to peace at home and against their enemies abroad.[41] Even though the Marxist tradition drifts apart Hobbesian argument in general of the political theory, it highlights the existence of the state as an admission that society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself and it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel.[42]

However, for founding the modern state argument, the most referenced source is Weber's definition. For him, the 'statehood' has not an intimate goal or end, and there are no exclusive and peculiar tasks for taking in hand some political associations.[43]

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[39]According to Hobbes argued that every person is willing to fight one another because of "the natural condition of mankind". For this reason, a common power -called as *Leviathan*- should keep them all in awe.
[40]Thomas Hobbes, (1651). **Leviathan,** (Ed. Edwin Curley), Hackett Publishing, 1994, p.75
[41]**Ibid.,** pp. 227-231
[42]Christopher Pierson, **The Modern State,** Routledge, London, 2004, p.7
[43] Max Weber, "Politics as Vocation", **From Marx to Weber,** (Eds. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1970, pp. 77-78

"The modern state possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of orders claims binding authority, not only over members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it. (…) The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and continuous operation."[44]

Christopher Pierson categorizes the mechanism of the modern state in eight parts, starting from the Weber's (abovementioned) common definition: the control of the means of violence, territoriality, sovereignty, constitutionality, impersonal power, the public bureaucracy, authority (legitimacy) and citizenship.[45] Starting this categorization, the modern state can be structured under three major pillars:

- the physical pillar of the modern state (control of the means of violence, territoriality and sovereignty)
- the rational pillar of the modern state (bureaucracy and impersonal power)
- the legal pillar of the modern state (constitutionality, authority and citizenship)

If one needs to define a particular form of the state, it will be the 'modern state' as a *political association*, namely, the *use of physical force*. The statutory violence-monopoly is one of the institutional dimensions of the modernity, as Anthony Giddens classified. When the modern state monopolizes this power in itself, the use of violence between individuals or groups becomes legal through two institutions: the police and the army.[46] Certainly, the physical force is not the only or usual tool of the modern state, but using the physical force is intrinsic to it by Weber.

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[44] Max Weber, **Economy and Society: An Outline Interpretive Sociology,** (Trans. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich), University of California Press, 1978, pp. 54-56
[45] Pierson, **The Modern State,** p.6
[46] Anthony Giddens, **Modernliğin Sonuçları,** (Trans. E.Kuşdil), Ayrıntı Press, İstanbul, 1998, pp. 57-58

The police and the army are the institutions, used the physical force on behalf of the 'state'.[47]

The ironic part of this feature hides on the paradoxical fact: the utilization from the police protection and the protection from the police violence are on the same perspective, and it is called as "the balancing power of the violence monopoly"[48]. According to Zygmunt Bauman, just as the nuclear energy, that is both a fertile source and an alarming and mass weapon, the monopolizing over the physical force is seen as a civilization process, which comes of the birth of human being, and the barbarity of mankind is rasped with the physical force of the modern state.[49]This suppressive power of the modern state could be turned to a slyness in the historical cases, much the same the SAVAK *(Sâzemân-e Ettelâ'ât va Amniyat-e Keshvar),* the Organization of Intelligence and National Security, operated as the secret police mission from 1957 to 1979 during the Mohammad Reza Pahlavi period in Iran; or the *Pasdaran (Sepâh-e Pâsdârân-e Engelâb-e Eslâmi),* the Revolutionary Guards, was founded after the Iranian Revolution as a 'special' branch of Iran's military, which is still directly tied to the supreme authority (the head of the state).

The *territoriality*, the another physical feature of the modern state, is recognized by a wide range thinkers and scholars, from Thomas Hobbes to Friedrich Engels and Max Weber to contemporary theorists such as Michael Mann and Anthony Giddens. As Pierson mentioned, the earlier and extensive political forms (the pre-modern empires) were tended to the territorial limits, which are set by ill-defined frontiers rather than by the clearly demarcated borders. Rules were concentrated at the centre of the empire, but outlying areas were managed by a temporary administration. Considerable autonomy was allowed to local systems of governance, so long as the expectations of the imperial authority could be satisfied.[50]

Whereas the frontiers pertained the modern states, are the lines, which are specified geographically and separated two or more states. Also, the frontiers are the

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[47] Max Weber, **Sosyoloji Yazırları**,(Trans. Taha Parla), İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, pp.132-133

[48] Nobert Elias, "Şiddet ve Medeniyet: Fiziki Şiddet Üzerine Devlet Tekeli ve Bunun İhlali", **Sivil Toplum ve Devlet: Avrupa'da Yeni Yaklaşımlar**,(Ed. John Keane), (Trans. E. Akın and the others), Ayrıntı Yayınları, İstanbul,1993, p.199

[49]Zygmunt Bauman, **Modernite ve Holocaust,** (Trans. Süha Serthabiboğlu), Sarmal Press, İstanbul, 1997, p.131

[50] Pierson, **The Modern State***, p.9

lines, identified the sovereignty of the states. With the frontiers, the physical feature of the modern state becomes visible, and the state's jurisdiction is known as a permanent fact of the world's landscape. Moreover, the territoriality brings the 'nation' in the modern state argument. Because, the nation may be taken to describe "a collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to unitary administration"[51] by Giddens. Indeed, the 'nation-state' phenomenon rises through the territoriality feature of the modern state.

The last physical feature of the modern state is *sovereignty,* and it can be said that its concept comes up with the modern state argument. Fundamentally, the sovereignty brings the modern state into view, and it is the founder of the modern political, and also juridical, conceptualization. The sovereignty is an idea that is a final and absolute authority within the limits of its jurisdiction in the political community. Jean Bodin, the French philosopher, was the very first user of the sovereignty concept, but the most uncompromising statement of this fact is founded in *Leviathan* by Hobbes. According to Bodin, the sovereignty idea has three features:[52]

1. Sovereignty is power, which cannot be limited with another power. Also its 'absolute' essence involves the 'law-maker', 'law-extinctive' and 'law-exchanger' identity, which are the reflection of the sovereignty.

2. Sovereignty is a perpetual process. The right of sovereignty is transferred from the successor to the follower, in this way; the act and the implementation are combined within the sovereign (the king) as *auctoritas* (authority) and *potestas* (power).

3. Sovereignty cannot be separated. The sovereign (the king) represents the 'sovereignty', but its power cannot consign to the king. The kings are not a part of the sovereignty; they are the representatives of the visibility and embodiment.

Furthermore, for Hobbes, who called as the "eponym"[53] of the modern state, "the members of the commonwealth have come together and agreed to constitute a

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[51] Anthony Giddens, **The Nation-State and Violence,** Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985, p.116

[52] Levent Köker and Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, **Kral Devlet ya da Ölümlü Tanrı**, İmge Press, Ankara, 1994, pp.23-25

[53] Abdurrahman Saygılı, "Modern Devletin Çıplak Sureti", **Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi,** Vol.59, No.1, (2010), p.80

sovereign power to rule over them. The terms of the contract are irrevocable and, since members of the commonwealth have mutually willed the creation of the sovereign, they are deemed to have vicariously willed all of its actions. Since the initial agreement between the members of the commonwealth, the sovereign power can be freed from his subjections."[54]

The significative and 'rational' features of the modern state are based on *bureaucracy* and *impersonal power*. The bureaucracy is an indispensable tool, like an engine room, for the modern state. According to Weber, the bureaucracy is a generic form of administration in all large-scale organizations of the modern society, including the modern capitalist corporations and the modern army. In addition, it is a particular form of the more general process of rationalization, which is identified with modernization by Weber.[55]

The fixed rules (written documents and files) and procedures (the specialized knowledge and expertise) constitute the base core of the *bureaucracy*. The arbitrariness is at variance with the bureaucracy and its hierarchical responsibilities. The officers act not in their personal capacities or connections; they are only the occupier of the public office. For Weber, the bureaucratic organizations are the products of the market economy due to the technical superiority of capitalism. *Bureaucracy* is regarded as the rational exercising of authority over human beings by him.[56]

However, the nature of 'political issue' creates a contradiction in the routine character of the *bureaucracy*. The politics is more dynamic and value-laden then bureaucracy, and the continuation of a regime is a political concern; the bureaucratic structure was rebuilt for administrating the public and state, even if the regime changed.[57] In addition to that, the *impersonal power* of the state reinforces the bureaucratic structure through the rule of law; not rule of men. Because the rule-guidedness will provide the objective determination in the public and state affairs, but the rule of men will create a political field within a subjective and arbitrary

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[54] Pierson, **The Modern State,** p.11
[55] **Ibid.,** p.16
[56] Weber, **Economy and Society: An Outline Interpretive Sociology,** p.223
[57] David Beetham, **Max Weber and The Theory of Modern Politics,** Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985, p.14

system. Also the bureaucratic structure and the impersonal power are the rational pillar of the modern state.

> "Within a constitutional order, those who exercise state power must do so in ways which are themselves lawful, constitutional and constrained by publicly acknowledged procedures. They are generally seen to act not upon a personal basis, but rather because of their public position as the occupants of particular offices of state."[58]

The abolition of the personal authority of a monarchical rule had constituted the *impersonal power* of the state, which is, also, the base of the bourgeois state, during the industrial revolution in Europe, especially in England and France. The centralization of the authority abolished the local and noble political figures, and "appeal to traditional rights was obsolete vis-a-vis the impersonal power of the bourgeois state. Whilst, under the ancient regime, it was possible to indicate to the possessors of personal rule the limits of their rule – even if at risk to life and limb –, the representation of political interests resulting from the centralization of power practice demanded the support of public opinion."[59]

Hereby, the 'legal' feature of the modern state was constituted through the impersonal power of the authority in the nineteenth century Europe. First of all, the *constitutionality* provides the base of legal-political process for the authority. Justifying the state's basic political arrangements establish the existence of the state itself and an administrative order for the bureaucratic system as well. However, in the patriarchal states, constitutionality has differentiated from its modern state origins. As Pierson mentioned, "the patriarchic political powers do exercise a form of power which, at least formally, is public, rule-governed and subject to lawful reform. These characteristics may be as often honored in the breach as in the observance, but they do help to locate the state in modernity."[60]

Also the *legitimate authority* puts account the *constitutionality* of the modern state for distributing its power into the state institutions as well. The *legitimate*

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[58] Pierson, **The Modern State,** p.15
[59] Heide Gerstenberger, **Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois State,**(Trans. David Fernbach), Brill Press, Leiden, 2007, p.622
[60] Pierson, **The Modern State,** p.14

authority is indicative of the actions of the state and its effective power on population. *The legitimate authority* differs from the traditional or charismatic authorities, which are based on a particular or immemorial leader. *The legitimate authority* is embodies on the legal principles through an impartial bureaucratic and judicial state apparatus, and it expresses the will of the people. Within the scope of *the legitimate authority*, "*the citizens* are seen to attribute legitimacy to the modern state on the grounds that it is the appropriate embodiment of 'a consistent system of abstract laws' impartially administered by a rule-governed and non-partisan civil service."[61]

Actually, the *citizenship* was there from the Ancient time, but it reaches a pivotal position with the existence of the modern state. Undoubtedly, the role of the French revolution cannot be denied in this centralization of the citizen. Within the scope of the revolution's background, the citizen becomes the 'new' subject of the state and gains a universal-legal status. As Pierson highlights, "citizen status in the modern world typically denotes a mixture of entitlements or rights of participation and a series of attendant obligations or duties."[62] In other words, the 'state' is transformed into a 'nation'; the 'national subject' is transformed into 'citizenship' in the modern state.

The significant/main source of this state legitimacy was 'the rule of law' in the modern societies, as mentioned above. Franz Neumann defines 'the rule of law' as *Rechtsstaat*[63] that is "the invention of the liberal bourgeoisie"[64] for him. Neumann points at the liberal thought that is the basis of the liberal (modern) state. Because, the development of the economic relations (capitalism) make essential the legal safety and predictability, and it can be provide only with the objectivity and the abstraction of the law. However, the monistic power of the authority exposes the individuals to an arbitrary administration. For this reason, 'the rule of law' constitutes the political structure of the system of law in the modern state.[65]

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[61]**Ibid.,** p.18
[62]**Ibid.,** p.21
[63] For the difference of the rule of law and Rechtstaat, see: Franz Neumann, **The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society,** Berg Publishers, 1986, p.186
[64]Franz Neumann, "Rechtstaat, The Division of Powers and Socialism", **Social Democracy and the Rule of Law,** (Eds. Franz Neumann and Otto Kirscheimer), Allen & Unwin, 1987, p.67
[65]Ertuğ Tombuş, "Demokratik Meşrutiyet İlkesi olarak Hukuk Devleti", **Doğu Batı Düşünce Dergisi,** No:21, pp.74-77

Also the modern state was in use for good reasons as a Western phenomenon. Because its base leans on the Western (European) feudal structure, this structure facilitates the transition to the modern state in two terms: i) the lack of a centralized political power; ii) the role of the independent classes (land lords, religious intellectuals and merchants). Whereas these two factors were not seen in the non-Western societies. They had experienced the capitalism, also the main pillar of the modern state, through the strong authority (centralized power). In these societies, the modern state was founded as the result of the Western influence with the modernization process.

"The lack of the pre-capitalist relationships in the framework of the feudal system emanated from the traditionalist nature of Islamic ideology in state-building. In general, the Western feudal system found its underlying theoretical and pragmatic building block in the Christian culture signs contrary to their Islamic counterparts prepared the ground for transition to the new capitalist order. Quite the contrary, the Islamic cultural signs formed a pre-capitalist order which was opposed to the feudal system. Islam claimed a new different order. (Islamic Ummah System)."[66]

As we return to Iranian state structure, we face with the same background. Because of the lack of the feudal structure, that is called as 'the Asiatic mode of production' or 'orientalist despotism' by Marx and Engels. In the Iranian pre-capitalist period, the political factors did not allow to exist the modern state perception. In addition to this circumstance, Islam was the principal component in the state-society relations and affected the political, economic and social structure in Iran.

Politically, Islam and the 'earthly' administration were the independent pillars, and at the same time, they were inseparable things. The duality creates a celestial and transcendental political structure in Iran as well. Because the politics tries to establish a divine authority in the earth, which shapes with the traditions of the elect. In addition, the economic activities are encouraged by the Islamic

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[66] Rasoul Afzali and Mojtaba Ghadiri Ma'som, "Background of the Modern Territorial State in Iran", **An Iranian Quarterly,** Vol.7, No:2-3, (Fall 2005-Winter 2006), p.38

doctrines, but they are not different from the religious thought and practice. The economy is seen as a tool, which applies to reproduce religious unity and solidarity. On the contrary of the Western capitalist view, the economic activities cannot maximize the individual benefits. The individuals joined to the economic activities through the group benefit, and the groups participate to these activities to make a living and to be annihilated in the true owner, namely God.[67]

1.2. ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY: REMNANTS OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURES IN A MODERNIZING POLITY

"What was the authority?"[68] With this question, Hannah Arendt tries to connect the nexus of the authority to the 'past' in her significant study *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (1961).* Because she believes "authority has vanished from the modern world"[69]. Whereas the authority protects still its position from the family, the smallest unit of the society, to the much more complicated systems (companies or states) in today's modern world. Actually, her argument, disconnecting the authority from the 'modern' world and attributing it to the 'other', is in contradiction with the Roman-centric view of the political though, which is strongly supported in the same article by her. As the starting point of many political theorists, the paradigms arise from ultimately the questioning of the 'human nature' that alternates between 'evil' and 'goodness'.

Within this context, it is essential composing a terminology for the discipline of the political science that tries to understand the states behaviors based upon the human nature. Some concepts can be favored instead of 'state', such as 'sovereign', 'hegemon', 'ruler' or in general 'authority'. Authority's etymological origin is based on *autocritas* from the ancient Rome, and refers the influence or the ability to rally

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[67]**Ibid.,**p.45
[68] Hannah Arendt, "What is the Authority?", **Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought,** The Viking Press, 1961, p.1
[69]**Ibid.,** p.1

support around his will. The *auctor* is "is qui auget"[70], who augments the act or the juridical situation of another; and the *auctoritas* symbolizes the mysterious 'power of command' of heroic Roman figures.[71] However, *auctoritas* used principally in political sphere, because of its connection to the Roman Senate's authority (*auctoritas patrum*).

According to Arendt, the Roman origin of the authority was rediscovered in the course of the 18th century American Revolution, as an alternative (Western) way of thinking: absolutism.[72] One of the conventional examples of an absolute monarch was Louis XIV of France, and his alleged statement summarizes the fundamental principle of absolutism: *'L'état c'est moi',* also literally "the state, it is me"[73]. Even though the absolutist ruler is not restrained by any other power, there might be limits, stemmed from: "(i) other people with power who counteract the ruler's authority; (ii) legal or constitutional limits on a ruler's power; (iii) other groups who challenge the absolute power of the state."[74] Which means the absolute state bounded up the influential groups with a legal framework and this framework is constructed by ruler and generated later on the modern state.

In short, the power to rule or control is attributed to the term of the 'authority' in the political science. The authority can be upright in one person, in a specific position, in a law system or sometimes in dogmas, and it implies this preeminence that is accepted, legitimated, recognized, obeyed or respected.[75]

In spite of appearance, the jurisdiction of political authority, the handling of sovereignty, the balance between freedom and authority and the requirements of political obligations are the main arguments of politics, which are discussed from the ancient time philosophers. In Plato's *Republic,* the authority is framed as Philosopher-Kings, who exercises wisdom and virtue in governance. However,

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[70] James B. Greenough, "Latin Etymologies", **Harvard Studies in Classical Philology**, Volume 4, 1893, p. 12
[71] **Ibid.,** p.12
[72] Hannah Arendt (1965).,**On Revolution,** Penguin Books, 1990, p.214
[73] See for Louis XIV of France: Anthony Levi, **Louis XIV,** Carroll & Graf Publishers, New York, 2004
[74] Garrett Ward Shaldon , "Absolutism", **Encyclopedia of Political Thought**, Facts on File Inc, New York, 2001,p.21
[75] Garrett Ward Sheldon "Authority", **Encyclopedia of Political Thought,** Facts on File Inc., New York, 2001, p.24

Aristotle views the best authority as the collective deliberation of *polis* (city-states) made up of well-educated, virtuous and civic-minded citizens. According to Cicero, respectable authority should envelop the whole Roman Empire (*Commonwealth*). Besides, for Confucius, who had lived almost four hundred years before Cicero in a very far away geography, an authority would succeed to power on the basis of the moral merits of a unified royal state instead of lineage. After the ancients, the 'religious'[76] political tradition assigns a 'divine' meaning to the authority that can judge or punish human as the name of God or savior. During the Medieval Age, the Christian church, the European kings, the Chinese emperors or the Persian shahs were the only servants of God and they were accountable only to God for their actions.

In the Islamic history of thought, two types of authority are mentioned: religious and political authority. The religious authority is fed on the divine message, which is sent by the *Koran*[77]. Its legitimacy is based on the religious texts, and correspondingly, the only source of this authority is metaphysical, that is away from social and materialist facts. The religious authority specifies the rules of obedience through the *Koran*, and it is lawful in the sight of individuals because of its ontological meaning. In this authority perception, *Allah* is the only and absolute sovereign above the law as well He uses his legitimacy through the law in the earth. Herewith, it can be claimed, the religious authority finds its meaning in the immanent and transcendent nature of *Allah*[78] (its ontological meaning) with this dichotomy in the Islamic thought.

In the meantime, the authority is a humane fact as well for the Islamic approach and strengthens its legitimacy from the political power, which is identified as 'state' in the historical period of Islam. The Islamic political history refers generally the Islamic state mind. For this reason, *Siyasatnamas* (the books of

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[76] Judeo-Christian, Islamic, Hindu or Budist traditions.

[77] We come across four type of authority in the Koran: Allah, Hz. Mohammad /Prophet, Sultan or Shah or King/ Head of the State and Ulama /Religious Scholar.

[78] Ibn Arabi, who is called as the 'great master' in the Islamic philosophy, concentrated on the Islamic jurisprudence as well he worked on the authority argument. The dichotomy about the immanent and transcendent nature of *Allah* was detailed in the several studies of Arabi. For the further information about this dichotomy, see: A.E. Afifi, *Muhyiddin İbnu'l-Arabi'nin Tasavvuf Felsefesi*, (Trans. Mehmet Dağ), Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, Chapter 2

governments) are the important sources for understanding this mind. It was highlightened in these manuscripts that 'the head of the state' as the upmost power and the sultanate mission comes from the divine as well as hereditary authority. In spite of the existence of the political authority consists in the favor of the God, the ruler is the only power above the realm and the national subject. In other words, the political authority is supported by the source of the religious authority.

Historically, from Achaemenids to the present, Iranian's political culture leans on monistic dynamics as well. The monarchic rulers and today's supreme leader refer as the only authority and political-religious power. The ruler's power is dependent on the divine authority, and the sovereign reigns on behalf of *Allah,* as the only law. The authority is named as *shahanshah*, means 'king of kings' from Achaemenids to Pahlavi dynasty, and as 'supreme leader' nowadays, who uses the state power from a hierarchical cosmology and political culture: God (both in Zoroastrianism[79] and in Islam), ruler and ruled; so universe, country and region.[80]

When Europe had quaked with an unrestrainable turmoil and began the criticism of Christianity[81] with Martin Luther's elimination of the Church hegemony, the perception of the authority had been switched from the religious sphere to the politics. Thus, the sovereignty had reduced from the top of the 'divine' pyramid to the secular level in the Western world. Much less the European intellectuals[82] were locked in a close embrace with the transformation from tradition to modernity along the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the most authoritative source about

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[79]For details, see: Mary Boyce, **Zoroastrianism, Its Antiquity and Constant Vigour,** Mazda Publishers, Costa Mesa,1993
[80] Gene R. Garthwaite, **İran Tarihi,** İnkılap Press, İstanbul, 2011, p.11
[81] Daryush Shayegan claims that the non-Western religions -especially Islam, Hinduism and Budism- had not experienced a challenge and questioning in itself, like Christianity. Because of that, 'philosophy', as an autonomous discipline of thought, is exactly a Western fact. For instance, Islamic philosophy predicates on the celebration of the existence of God, or it attributes human's salvation to a 'savior'. See for detailed the perspective: Daryush Shayegan, **Melez Bilinç,** (Trans. Haldun Bayrı), Metis Press, İstanbul, 2013, pp.49-60
[82] The European transformation began at first the scientific and philosophical spheres, but it affected afterwards and deeply the whole political, economic, social, cultural, religious and even demographical structure of Europe. However, the non-Western civilizations came just on the modernity fact at the summit of the European 'Enlightenment', and, as Daryush Shayegan mentioned, "missed partially the rendezvous of the history", which designs the destiny of the world.

'statehood' was founded by Max Weber. Weber's approaches tended towards a more formal and legalistic 'authority'[83], which is identified as the 'modern state'.

For the very reason, Arendt, who deals with nature of power, the subjects of politics, direct democracy, authority and totalitarianism, attributes the authority concept to the East as the tagalong of traditionalism. Because the authority concept includes an obedience-persuasion relation in hierarchy of the society and this hierarchical order takes its power from religion and tradition, much the same in the Eastern society. Arendt highlights the organic nexus between traditional authority and the religious identity[84] and defines the terms of 'tyranny', 'authority' and 'totalitarianism' within the same concept. On the other hand, she refers argumentatively the Western attitude about the using of the tools for converting the authority-power through liberalism, and calls these circumstances as "the liberal identification of totalitarianism with authoritarianism"[85].

In addition to Arendt, Karl Popper, who calls as 'the veteran of positivism', grounds the assertion of the authority on the empirical knowledge, which can be testable with the validity of historical sources. According to Popper, the metaphysical ideas behind the questions have genetic origins. Different from Descartes school or the epistemology of Kant, the most important source of our knowledge -apart from inborn knowledge- is tradition, and knowledge cannot start from nothing -from a *tabula rasa*- nor yet from observation. The advance of knowledge consists in the modification of earlier knowledge, also tradition. Starting this point of view, Popper ties the authority concept to these genetic origins, and attributes the fact above 'human authority'.[86]

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[83]Except the major argument of Weber's authority theory, we can find an overview about it in the other thinkers' approaches. Especially, "Thomas Hobbes and John Locke legitimate political authority comes from a "social contract" among the people who submit to authority by the consent of the governed. (…) In Marxist theory, political authority comes from economics and history. Also the social class that controls the economic production commands political authority. (…) For fascist theory, authority is rooted in the race and nation and concentrated in the leader who uses power with no restraints. (…) Various radical theories want to place authority in the outcasts of society and in those least prepared to rule (educationally, economically, politically) to diminish the preponderance of authority." "Authority", *Encyclopedia of Political Thought*, p. 25

[84] Arendt, "What is the Authority?", p.2

[85]**Ibıd.,**p.4

[86]Karl Popper, "Knowledge without Authority", **The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge,(**Eds.Troels Eggers Hansen), Routledge Chapman and Hall, 2009, pp.50-54

Nevertheless, Weberian studies provide a paramount literature that forms around the Western sociology approach of knowledge, religious, politics, economy, law and art. Although the Islamic societies problematize within the scope of modernization theory since 1950s, the modernization theory represents the concepts about "political balance, institutional development and underdevelopment"[87] which are imputed only to the non-Western societies by Weber. In this sense, his comparative studies of rationalization and patrimonialism effect the modernization theory on a large scale.

Weber has not an independent sign about Islam, and also, this fact obstructs to follow his source about Islam. His orientalist approach separates West and East through rationalization, patrimonialism, bureaucracy-democracy dilemma and secularism. Furthermore, Weber attributes the source of authority to a dialectical positivism, on the contrary of the metaphysical origins of the non-Western perspective. According to him, the patrimonialistic and traditional perception on the authority pertains to the 'irrational' non-Western (especially Islamic) structure, which takes a stand against the rational-modern society. In substance, the Islamic authority perception supports Weber's point of views on several counts, but the sanctification of the Western uniqueness continues to support "the bifurcation of civilization"[88].

This study is not directly related to the criticism of modernization or orientalism. It is aimed to evaluate the typology concerning the authority behaviors that is mainly identified with traditionalism. In this respect, the non-Western, especially Islamic and Iranian, state structure serves as a paradigm about it, and Weber's approaches frame its general argument.

1.2.1. Weberian Framework: Forms of Authority and Power Structures

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[87]İsmail Coşkun, "Modernleşme Kuramı Üzerine", **Sosyoloji Dergisi,** Volume: 3, No:1, (1989), p.296
[88] Korkut Tuna, **Şehirlerin Ortaya Çıkış ve Yaygınlaşması Üzerine Sosyolojik Bir Deneme,** Edebiyat Fakültesi Press, İstanbul,1987, p.72

"In all cases 'authority' must be distinguished from 'power', being a relation *de jure* not necessarily *de facto:*"[89] Because authority is the right to act (not the power to act), and in company with the power, authority can create its own systems and beliefs. Also, this position gives rise to an inclination for using the two terms as though they were synonymous. On that note, power has a physical force and ability to influence the community, but then authority can be 'personalized' through the justification and right to exercise the power. With this perspective, three kinds of authority are identified by Max Weber.

Weber's conception on 'the typology of authority' is very important to understand modernity, rationalization, capitalism and bureaucracy, which rooted in the past, but have still been discussed today. Weber's sense of science has been lived from positivism and spiritualism, which is predominant in the tradition of German philosophy. Weber accepts the society as an organic continuum and looks to the society as a big functional totality. On the other hand, he puts the governing function (state) up against the political cluster (society) and explained the imperium-subservience relation in terms of sociological dimension.[90] According to him, state, as the only source of the legitimate power, consists of the sovereignty relation 'human-on-human'.

Weber questions why and in which conditions the subservience can be controlled by the imperium. Because, for him, politics is the struggle for power between these two sides and it can be explained with the typology of authority. He categorizes these 'pure types' with regard to their legality thesis: *charismatic* (in which a leader leads by virtue of magical powers or unique qualities), *rational (legal),* (in which acts are authorized by normative rules), and *traditional* (in which immemorial tradition confers legitimacy).[91]It should not be forgotten that classification is an 'ideal typology' and these 'pure' forms are not found scarcely in

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[89] Roger Scruton, "Authority", **The Pelgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought**, Pelgrave and Macmillan, New York, Third Edition, 2007, p.48

[90] For the dialect of economy-politics, see: Raymond Aron, **Sosyolojik Düşüncenin Evreleri,**(Trans. Korkmaz Alemdar), Bilgi Press, Ankara, 2000, p. 508-509

[91]Max Weber, "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule", **Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions,** (Trans. Hans Gerth),Vol.4, No.1(1958), pp.1-11

history. The authority in historical reality consists of compounding, modifying and adapting of these types.

In Weberian approach, the candid thought is 'charisma'[92] (the gift of grace), and Weber uses it as an analytical category. According to him, the entire creative movements in history had begun with a charismatic revolution in itself. In this sense, *the charismatic authority* means a converter power (a cornerstone) in a specific historical period. It is not a result of a collective 'dasein' or it is not dependent on a class or circle; it is intrinsic to individuals.[93]

> "He (charismatic authority) is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader. In primitive circumstances this peculiar kind of deference is paid to prophets, to people with a reputation for therapeutic or legal wisdom, to leaders in the hunt, and hero's inn war. It is very often thought of as resting on magical powers. (…) What is alone important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his 'followers' and or 'disciples'."[94]

So there are several elements of formulation of the charismatic authority:

- The charismatic leader is created always by his followers, and the charismatic authority is rooted in the belief system of the followers. The omnipotence, the omniscience and the moral perfection are intrinsic to the charismatic authority.

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[92] "The concept of 'charisma' is taken from the vocabulary of early Christianity. For the Christian religious organization Rudolf Shom, in his Kirchenrecht, was the first to clarify substance of the concept, even though he did not use the same terminology." See: Max Weber, **The Theory of Social and Economic Organization**,(Trans. and eds. A.M.Henderson and Talcott Parsons), New York: Oxford University Press, 1947, p.338

[93] "The 'natural' leaders –in times of psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious, political distress- have been neither officeholders nor incumbents of an 'occupation' in the present sense of the word, that is, men who have acquired expert knowledge and who serve for remuneration. The natural leaders in distress have been holders of specific gifts of the body and spirit; and these gifts have been believed to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody. The concept of 'charisma' is here used in a completely 'value-neutral' sense." See: Max Weber, **Essays in Sociology,** p.245

[94] Weber, **The Theory of Social and Economic Organization**, p.359

- The charismatic authority perceives his followers as having obligations or duties toward him and he perceives himself as deriving his morality and legitimating from a special relationship with God or history.
- The behavior of the charismatic leader in power is anti-bureaucratic. His economic, political and administrative affairs are treated with disdain by him, and he surrounds himself with disciples chosen for their devotion rather than a staff selected by more formal means.
- The charismatic authority is unstable, tending to be transformed through time. Because of this behavior, the inevitable failures obstruct the rationalized involvement of the mundane affairs of the state.[95]

In other words, the charismatic authority does not recognize the assignment procedures or systems, and not include notions like career, salary or expertness. He does not identify auditing body or appellate procedure, domestic or functional realm of authority, and does not allow permanent institutions independent from personal charisma. Also in Weberian perspective, 'charisma' is positioned across the entire institutional routines, which generates from *tradition*, and the uniform operations, hinges on a *rational* administration. This case runs for the economic life as well. Because, charismatic authority finds off-putting the whole -methodological or rational- financial gains, and rejects the whole economic attitudes.[96]

Whereas, Joseph Schumpeter highlights the personal capitalism, which in its pure form is the antithesis of bureaucratic organization, through the charisma. According to Schumpeter, the economy is based largely on the traditional behavior in the undeveloped state, and this traditional behavior bounds to the possibilities for conscious economic activity. The charismatic authority arises under the bourgeois capitalism -the entrepreneurship in Schumpeter's theory-, and breaks the crust of convention for creating a new wealth.[97]

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[95]Richard R. Fagen, "Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro", **The Western Political Quarterly,** Volume 18, No:2, Part 1, (June 1965), pp.275-276
[96] Weber, **Essays in Sociology,** p. 328-329
[97] Joseph A. Schumpeter, **The Theory of Economic Development**, Harward University Press, Cambridge, 1934, p.89

However, it is impossible to continue the pure and stable position of the charismatic authority. Because of the need of discipline expanding and the security pursuit, charisma is pushed to the permanent institutionalization. It means that the status of leader's sympathizers becomes legalized in terms of their economic interests. In other words the charismatic authority should change its economic objector nature for attaining the executive activities. For Weber, economy specifies the position of the power, and the legitimacy claim of the authority is identified after a routinization period.[98]

It can be said that the charismatic authority rises during the conflict times between the two other -rational and traditional- authorities, as a transitional stage. The charismatic authority is not related to the legislation idea, like the other authority types; it is a 'norm imposer'. On the other hand, the legal-rational and traditional authorities are subject to the 'legislation' and take their own power from the rational constitution (legal-rational authority) and the customary law (traditional authority).

We witness to the usage of the charismatic authority in Iran both the Shah and the Ayatollah. Especially the descendant Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, was in the arbitrary treatments according to the unstable character of the charismatic authority. On the one hand, he tries to found his legal-rational authority through the Western style institutions -in education, economy/trade or administrative spheres-, on the other hand, he did not break the traditional identity of Iran, and so he shelters behind the charismatic authority, when he called as a 'despotic' (traditional) leader. As for Ayatollah Khomeini, he was a traditional authority due to his clergy identity. He draws his strength from the traditional authority, which is adorned with the customary and *sharia* law. However, Khomeini appears as a norm imposer since the position of *Velayat-e Faqih,* and he conducts his charismatic authority with the support of his votaries.

The permanent institutionalization period is based on the procedures, and it is applied administratively and judicially in accordance with specific principles. The purest type of *legal (rational) authority* employs a bureaucratic administrative staff. Only the leader of the organization occupies his position of authority by virtue of

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[98] Max Weber, **Bürokrasi ve Otorite,** (Trans. Bahadır Akın), İletişim Press, İstanbul, 2005, p.88-90

appropriation, of election, or of having been designated for the succession. However his authority consists in a sphere of legal competence.[99] After this perspective Weber highlights the criteria of the whole -pure- administrative staff under the supreme authority:[100]

- They are personally free and dependent on the authority only with the official obligations.

- They are a part of a clearly defined hierarchy in the office.

- Every staff has a well defined sphere of competence in the legal sense.

- Free selection and contractual relationship are the major requirements of the office. (Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications, tested by examination of guaranteed by diplomas. They are appointed, not elected.)

- They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part with a right to pensions. (The salary scale is primarily graded according to rank in the hierarchy or the responsibility of the position.)

- There is a system of promotion and constitutes a career.

- This authority type is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office.

Bureaucracy and capitalism are used as the organizational form by the *legal (rational) authority,* and Weber refers to the rationality concept for the portrayal of 'capitalist economic efficiency', 'private ownership' and 'bureaucratic authority'.[101] Weber analyzes capitalism through the organizational form (bureaucracy) of legal authority, and claimed that bureaucracy is the most rational (and common) tool of founding and performing the authority on people. According to him, bureaucracy is the rational tool because of its structure that is grounded on accuracy, stability, discipline and reliability, and its governance percept, which is based on the technical

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[99] Weber, **The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,** p.333
[100] **Ibid***.,* p.333-334
[101] According to Weber, this structuring pertains to the Western society because of its 'profit motive' and 'rational discipline'. Such an impersonal and computable system cannot seen in non-Western societies by Weber. For detailed information about the non-Western societies, see: Lütfi Sunar, **Marx ve Weber'de Doğu Toplumları,** Ayrıntı Press, İstanbul, 2012

knowledge. Thus, this rational tool becomes an irrevocable form of governance due to its computable results.[102]

However, the power struggle between democracy and bureaucracy is became disputable the legitimacy of the rational (legal) authority. When bureaucracy avoids the power to take decision, which belongs to the legislative and executive organs, the rational authority loses its legitimacy. The bureaucratic administration restrains in time the individual to an 'iron cage' that all areas of the society rationalize and specialize. The rationality spirit rules science and art as well as the legal, administrative, social and economic life of modern people. And the monotony of science and art constitutes an impediment in front of the critical thinking, which is the base of progression. The only way to get rid of this 'iron cage' of the modern bureaucratic order is such like another movement: irrationality. At this point, Weber highlights the importance of the charismatic authority as a dynamic, and also irrational, logic. Without the charismatic component, it is impossible to follow a coherent policy in this day and age, and in the absence of the charismatic authority, state can be dragged to the sovereignty of the politicians and the leaderless democracy.[103]

Weber describes *the traditional authority* as the institutionalized appearance of 'charisma'. In traditional authority, the sovereign (a person or a group) introduces its legitimacy thesis through the sanctity of powers, which are coming from the past and always existing. The executants of authority are identified by the traditional rules, and the individual's authority comes of his traditional position, not his *personality*.

> "A system of imperative co-ordination will be called 'traditional' if legitimacy is claimed for it and believed in on the basis of the sanctity of the order and attendant powers of control as they have been handed down from the past, 'have always existed'. (…) The object of obedience is the personal authority of the individual which he enjoys by virtue of his traditional status. The organized group exercising authority is, in the simplest case, primarily based on relations

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[102] Weber, **Bürokrasi ve Otorite,** p.50
[103] Anthony Giddens, **Max Weber Düşüncesinde Siyaset ve Sosyoloji,** Vadi Press, Ankara, 1992, p.48

of personal loyalty, cultivated through a common process of education. The person exercising authority is not a 'superior', but a personal 'chief'."[104]

In traditional authority, the person, who holds the power in hand, heads like the personal retainers; rules the national subject, not the members of an association. The relations between the administrative staff and the chief are related to the personal loyalty to the chief, not the impersonal obligation of office. The obedience is not owed to enacted rules, but to the person who occupies a position of authority by tradition or who has been chosen for such a position authority by tradition or who has been chosen for such a position on a traditional basis.[105]

Arendt mentions about this fact as "the concept of authority in terms of rulers and the ruled"[106]. The various forms of government -an apparatus of the modern state- are opposed to one-man ruled. In this context, the ruler is seen as the head of the household (a patriarch), who established themselves as monarchs at home before they join to constitute the public-political realm. According to Arendt, "ruling itself and the distinction between rulers and ruled belong to a sphere which precedes the political realm, and what distinguishes it from the 'economic' sphere of the household is that the polis is based upon the principle of equality and knows no differentiation between rulers and ruled. This distinction calls today as the private and the public spheres."[107]

In addition to this ruler-ruled concept, it should be highlighted that the leader's actions are principles of substantive ethical common sense, justice or utilitarian expediency. These are not formal principles as in the case of legal authority. In addition, the typical administrative staff is recruited for his personal royalty (households, clients, slaves) or favorite relations (vassals) with the chief. In a sense, a clearly defined sphere of competence, a rational order between superior-subordinate relationship, a regular system in the organizational structure or fixed salaries are absent in the pure type of traditional authority.[108] This moral-political

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[104] Weber, **The Theory of Social and Economic Organization**, p.341
[105] **Ibid.,** p.341
[106] Arendt, "What is Authority?", p.15
[107] Ibid., p.15
[108] Traditional authority is separated by two in itself: patrimonialism and feudalism. Weber, **The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.,** p.342-343

standard over identifies with the Islamic state structure; we can find traces of the 'moral' duties of the ruler in the political textures such as *Siyasatnamas.*

In substance, Weber leans considerably his general argument on the 'rationalization'. It is the source of social modernization and capitalism (legal-rational behavior), which are intrinsic to the West. The non-Western state structure is called as *Herrschaft* that has a certain nexus with the traditional authority. While we have a look at the non-Western societies, we come across two kinds absence of rationalization: the social rationalization, also secularism, and the administrative rationalization, known as bureaucracy. The non-capitalist Islamic societies can be a good sample about these circumstances.

1.2.2. East-West Analysis through the Traditional Authority

The mindset tension between the East and the West[109] is not a geographical or a distance issue; it is not a "hollow classification"[110]. Actually it is disintegration under the title of identity, includes socio-cultural, socio-politic and socio-psychological facts. The West, with the homogeneous human texture, is descriptive of the East over its own self. After this name giving process, the East tries to hold its own human harmony through customs and traditions. Interestingly, this East-West separation leans on the modern times; the resemblance of both of them can be seen obviously until the sixteenth century. However, a dichotomy had begun, mainly, with the downfall of feudalism and the ascent of European Enlightenment.

This dichotomy was stated within the four civilizations by Arnold J. Toynbee: Arabic/Islamic, Confucian, Hindu/Brahmin and Western/Christian. The former three forms the Oriental cultural system that is an inductive mode of thinking; and the latter one is the main component of the Occidental framework, which is accepted as

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[109]The terms of the 'West' is mentioned the European world and the 'East' the Islamic world in this study.
[110] Alev Alatlı, "Doğu-Batı İçi Boş Bir Tasnif", **Doğu Batı Düşünce Dergisi,** Sayı 2, (Şubat, Mart, Nisan 1998), p.97

the deductive manner. According to Toynbee, this deductive way of thinking gives an analytic concrete reality, which is based on conditioned textual analysis, to the West independently of the holistic absolute reality of the East.[111] But only the analysis-based Western civilization atomizes the economy as well as feudalism, and individualizes within the separation of God and the world. Whereas, the integration-based Orient -East- presents spiritual behaviors in the earthly structure, and this fact results in the centralized (state) systems, which cannot become individualizing.

Apart from the Confucian and Hindu/Brahmin civilizations, which are seen as the 'Far East' by the Western point of view, the Islamic and Christian civilizations are in a state of ceaselessness conflict. Actually, the 'religion' does not have the same connotation for Muslims as the word 'religion' has for Christians. As Bernard Lewis mentioned, their religious and political backgrounds are different, and this 'otherness' creates *sui generis* state and society structures.[112]

> "Islam is not merely a system of belief and worship, a compartment of life, so to speak, distinct from other compartments which are the concern of nonreligious authorities administering nonreligious laws. It is rather the whole of life, and its rules include civil, criminal, and even what we would call constitutional law.(…) In classical Islamic history there could be no clash between pope and emperor, since the caliph, the titular head of the Islamic state and community, combined in himself both political and religious -though not spiritual- authority. There could be neither conflict nor cooperation, neither separation not association between church and state, since the governing institution of Islam combined both functions."[113]

The world of Islam has an everlasting and single polity ideal that was a caliph during the central religious power or regional monarchs within the extended Islamic realm until the modern times, or the present authorities, taken their powers from state apparatus. The modernization aim (between the final half of 19th century and the first three-quarters of 20th century) of the Eastern-Islamic countries, especially Iran and Ottoman-Turkish state, are faced with the frustration and the resistance at the

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[111] Arnold Joseph Toynbee, **Civilization on Trial and the World and the West**, Meridian Books, New York, 1958, p.24-26
[112] Bernard Lewis, **Islam and the West,** New York: Oxford University Press, 1993,p.4
[113] **Ibid.,**p.4

whole new apparatus of public and private life, and should cope with coup d'etat or revolution. Actually, the modern instruments of state policy derive from the Western originals, but the state power arises from the traditional authority, which pertains to the Islamic heritage.

According to Lewis, this fact is the big paradox of the Muslim state. On the one hand, it tries to found a modern state, which is constituted with the 'new' military, economic (capitalist), politic (bureaucratic) and social (secular) systems; on the other hand, the strength of religion and clergies cannot be dissociated from this modern institutions.[114] For instance, in Turkey, Kemalist ideology could prove integrating the laicism principle to the state and social structure with a sharp and dramatic transformation. However, that was not the same case in Iran. The clergies alienated from the state function between two revolutions in Iran. The Shahs, Reza Pahlavi and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, founded Western style institutions and structure, but they did the Persian-inherited and religion-symbolized coronations, and use the state power as a traditional authority during their dynasty. Thus the sharing of the power brought the revolution and changed only the regime, not the authority's structure.

Within this perspective, the West, also the adjusted part of the East, is identified with rational thought. Especially in Weberian approach, rationalism is inscribed to the West with a chauvinistic mentality. Weber constructs the 'East and West' differentiation through the argument of traditional authority. Also, Weber reinforces this approach with the claim of the absence of Western capitalism, rationalism and modernism. Weberian capitalism definition has two main constituents: the capitalist spirit and the economic rationalization. For Weber, the capitalist organization is not enough single-handedly for founding its 'spirit'; Protestantism seals the train's way like a switchman. Thus, with this criticism of Christianity, the capitalist mind shapes social, political and economic rationalization.

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[114] **Ibid.,** p.41

Moreover, the modernization fact underlies beneath this rationalization that is imputed to the Western uniqueness by Weber.[115]

On the other hand, Islamic thought does not skip such like a critical period. As Nazım İrem highlighted, the theme of modernity progressed with a strong reaction to the Christian theology in the Western world. Especially the base of the political and social theory shaped around the original sin in Christianity since St.Augustine. The natal (bad) nature of human went through the phase of the self-criticism during the Enlightenment period, and arrived the 'modern man'. For İrem, a different human, politics and administrative mentality was constituted in the Islamic geography, because of the lack of the 'original sin' perception in Islamic theology.[116]

Until 14th century, Islamic philosophical thought had contributed to the natural, physical and social sciences in its catalytic geography. However, this attempt, which acts with the sustentation anxiety of Islamic ontological substructure, could not catch an Islamic Enlightenment period. While Europe became upside down with the Enlightenment, that builds another structure with the demolished material, Islamic world was obliged to live the tercentenary belatedness. Under these circumstances, the East had to follow the phases of capitalism, modernism and rationalism, which are dedicated to the West.

From this point of view, the certain features of the traditional societies are determined again by Weber. First of all, Weber grounds the Western differentiation on the entity of the Greek society. According to Weber, the Greek civilization represents dynamism. Especially, the *polis* city-type was different from the water-based patrimonial and religious oriented structure of the Near East societies. This differentiation shows you in the military character, too. On the contrary of the independent military class, called as knight in the West, the army was nourished,

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[115]Sunar, **Marx ve Weber'de Doğu Toplumları,** p.180 Apart from this approach, some scholars criticized the Weberian (West and East) differentiation through the insufficient source of Weber's study about the East. During 1980s, many sociological-orientalist studies centralized around Weberian literature. But ironically, these critics (scholars) evaluate the world in the axis of West, like Weber. For the criticism of Weber, see: Maxime Rodison, **İslamiyet ve Kapitalizm,**(Trans. Orhan Suda), İstanbul: Gün Yayınları, 1969; Toby E. Huff and Wolfgang Schluchter (eds.), **Max Weber and Islam,** New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000. For the ironic position of these critics (scholars), see: Sunar, **Marx ve Weber'de Doğu Toplumları,** pp.133-139

[116]İrem, "Kültür, Demokrasi ve Modernite: Geleneksel Formüller ve Yükselen Eleştiriler",p.82

equipped and managed by the sovereign and its bureaucracy in the Near East. This position had created a despotic authority and an unquestioned subservient national subject.[117]

Secondly, Weber concentrates on the differentiation of the political system and describes three types of authority in this perspective. The pure type of the rational-legal authority, based on law and impersonal character of the obedience, is imputed on the Western character. The certain and hierarchical organization structure, the existence of the technical rules and norms and the propertylessness in the tools of statecraft are an important distinction point. Weber places the traditional authority on the contrary of the Western pattern and based it on *gerontocracy*[118], *patriarchy*[119] and *patrimonialism.* The first two types, gerontocracy and patriarchy, have not economical base, but patrimonialism is the overemphasized sovereignty form, for Weber.

In Weber's *Economy and Society*, patrimonialism is referred as the form of government, which is based on the ruler family-household. The ruler's authority is personal-familial and the system of the household is the archetype for the political administration. The patrimonial rulers cite "age-old powers"[120] -sacred tradition- as the basis of their political authority, and their power is depended on arbitrariness. Mostly, the arbitrary rule is seen as an analogous form of feudalism, but feudalism refers to just one period of European history, and the arbitrary attitude is imputed generally to the Eastern states and societies.[121]

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[117] Sunar, **Marx ve Weber'de Doğu Toplumları,** p.165

[118] A gerontocracy is a form of oligarchic rule in which an entity is ruled by leaders who are significantly older than most of the adult population. Often these political structures are such that political power within the ruling class accumulates with age, making the oldest holders of the most power. These holding may not be in formal leadership position, but often dominate these who are. Gerontocracy is also common in religious theocratic states or organizations such as Iran and the Vatican, in which leadership is concentrated in the hands of religious elders.

[119] Patriarchy literally means the rule of the father and comes from the Greek. Historically, the term patriarchy was used to refer to autocratic rule by the male head of a family. However, in modern times, it refers to social systems in which power is primarily held by adult men.

[120] Weber, **Economy and Society: An Outline Interpretive Sociology,** p.226

[121] Especially, Homa Kotouzian refers the "arbitrary rule" to the Iranian state structure. See for comparison between European feudalism and Iranian state structure: Homa Katouzian, **Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society,** Routledge Curzon, London, 2003, Chapters 1,2,3 and 5

The ancestral authority -patrimonialism-, also *auctoritas maiorum*, has strong connection with the traditional authority, according to Arendt.

"If one wants to this attitude to the hierarchical order established by authority and to visualize this hierarchy in the familiar image of the pyramid. (…) It is in this primarily political context that the past was sanctified through tradition. Tradition preserved the past by handing down from one generation to the next the testimony of the ancestors, who first had witnessed and created the sacred founding and then augmented it by their authority throughout the centuries. As long as this tradition was uninterrupted, authority was inviolate; and to act without authority and tradition, without accepted, time-honored standards and models, without the help of the wisdom of the founding fathers, was inconceivable."[122]

Weber considers patriarchy as the chief pillar of patrimonialism.[123] For him, "patrimonial domination is thus a special case of patriarchal domination. Domestic authority decentralized through assignment of land and sometimes of equipment tos ons of the house or other dependents."[124] In other words, Weber speaks a patrimonial state when the ruler organizes his political power over extra-patrimonial areas and political subjects just for exercising his patriarchal power.[125] The patriarchal domination is seen the purest logical form of the traditional authority by Weber. Because patriarchy is the historical seed of patrimonialism and Weber believes that a genetic extension of the patterns of governance in a ruler's family household can be explained with the politico-economic continuity in the historical period.

While the state is characterized as a form of administrative domination, politics is specified with the power struggle within the state by a staff and administrative hierarchy. This state domination was called as *Herrschaft* by Weber and it means the resistance acceptance of commands, not the acknowledgement of any particular authority to rule. Also, "*Herrschaft* is the probability that a command

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[122] Arendt, "What is the Authority?", p.19
[123] Their linguistic connection -'patrimony' derives from the Latin word *patrimonium* for paternal estate- is also conceptual and sociological.
[124] Weber, **Economy and Society: An Outline Interpretive Sociology,** p.1011
[125] **Ibid.,** p.1013

with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons."[126] Moreover, *Herrschaft* in the state is a kind of power that is strictly limited to the organizations in which personal commands are sent down in a hierarchy and strictly obeyed.

On the one hand, *Herrschaft* requires the condition of the human action towards the leaders, who claim to bearers of legitimate power; on the other hand, the control over the material goods is necessary for the imposition of physical force. This fact includes controlling over the personal administrative staff and the material means of administration. Also it should be consider that *Herrschaft* legitimates the domination as the logic to which all actors have to submit if they are to lead followers into the political struggles.[127]

In addition to this, Weber distinguishes patrimonialism from the other type of tradition, feudalism:

"The structure of feudal relationship can be contrasted with the wide realm of discretion and the related instability of power positions under pure patrimonialism. Occidental feudalism is a marginal case of patrimonialism that tends towards stereotyped and fixed relationships between lord and vassals. As the household with its patriarchal domestic communism evolves, in the age of the capitalist bourgeoisie, into the associated enterprise based on contract and specified individual rights, so the large patrimonial estate leads to the equally contractual allegiance of the feudatory relationship in the age of knightly militarism."[128]

The third feature of the Eastern political system is depended on patrimonial bureaucracy by Weber. He describes the patrimonial bureaucracy as irrational, because it does not allow the professional specialization and the job share, adapted from ability. The patrimonial sovereignty is based on the ruler's legitimacy, and the continuity of people's welfare is provided by the favor of the ruler, who gives the authorization to the loyal bureaucrats. In addition to this, Weber highlights the

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[126] Peter Breiner, **Max Weber and Democratic Politics,** Cornell University Press, New York, 1996, p.129
[127]**Ibid.,** p.130
[128] Weber, **Economy and Society: An Outline Interpretive Sociology,** p.1070

relation between bureaucratization and the monetization of economy. In patrimonial bureaucracy, the salaries can be paid as real right or taxes can be collected as estate. The administrator class might seize the people's assets or products in exchange for the organization of public works of providing the security, and this circumstance creates a personal connection between the ruler and the administrative officers. This character of the land ownership, agriculture and army are based on the bureaucratic centric system, by Weber.[129]

Fourthly, Weber gravitates towards the judiciary rationalization and its related economical, political and social backgrounds. He thinks that the West has a special position in terms of doing and running the law system. It is claimed by Weber, that the rationalization of the jurisprudence did not occur in the East, because of its conditions, and he correlates the appearance of bourgeoisie with the formal law rationalization. Forasmuch as, the modern rational capitalism needs the technical tools, and it can be provide only with the formal rules, which constitutes the chief pillar of the political and commercial capitalism, also 'bourgeoisie'.[130]

Consequently, Weber frames his actions and perceptions in his cult sign, *the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, as a Western thinker. His mentality patterns discriminates the 'other' culture and asserts that only the West has a universal and rational breeding ground.[131]The fact of modern state gets off in this ground as well. Actually, since the dramatic transformation of the Europe, the world lives in the modern times, and the modern state is an imperious result of this period. On the other hand, the non-Western societies are not a part of this historical revisionism and missed the opportunity of designing its own structure. Especially, the Islamic world is constrained to pattern their state and society structures after the modernity.

Apart from this perspective, if we will return to the Iranian structure, we can find the supportive arguments about the above mentioned conceptualization. First of all, there are many epistles for the attitude of the sovereign in the moral, politics,

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[129] Sunar, **Marx ve Weber'de Doğu Toplumları,** pp.189-192
[130]**Ibid.,**p.207
[131] Max Weber, **The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,**(Trans. Stephen Kalberg), New York: Oxford University Press, Fourth edition, 2009, p.205

state administration and daily life. For example, *Shahname* was the paramount source about this subject, or *Kalilagh and Demnagh* was another written work, which comprises of the state authority, in Persian. Generally, the vertical hierarchy highlighted in these texts, and the elements of the state[132] headlined. The ruler *vuzera(s)*'s (viziers), national subject, castles, defense and offense forces, treasure and allies are this elements of the state, and all of them belong to the authority.[133]

The lower parts of the society and state have ground economically the state, and the authority conducts these lower parts as their 'father' (patriarchic feature of the Iranian state). In addition, the sovereign's authority arises from the managing law of the world, given by the divine authority. In Iranian *Siyasatnamas,* the state is made up of the power (force) and the might of the authority. As for that the politics is the way of the reinforcement and protection of the sovereign's authority. In other words the good politics comes of the personal virtue of the ruler (the charismatic part of the authority).[134]

According to Halil İnalcık, the absolute authority of a sovereign can be limited only by the justice thought in the Iranian state tradition. In *Pendnamas* (it's a kind of fabl, which gives advice to the ruler); the justice is dependent on the sovereign's benefits. Also, the justice is manifested as the grace and the gift of the ruler in his council (*Divan*).[135]Briefly, the material and spiritual authorities had combined in the ruler's personality during the historical period in Iran. This fact did not change today's Islamic Republic. The regime may be changed from monarchy to republic, but this mentioned state mind is still continuing.

At this point, İnalcık highlights the significant position of the customary *(sultanî)* law. In addition to the *Sharia* law, the customary law reinforced the authority's ruler ship in Iran. The *ulama* did not accept the customary law as legitimate, because for them, the four sectarians finalized the exact form of the law, called as *Sharia*. However, the sovereign preferred to legalize his own authority area

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[132] These elements can be found in the modern state features as well.
[133] Halil İnalcık, "Kutadgu Bilig'de Türk ve İran Siyaset Nazariye ve Gelenekleri", **Türk Kültürü Araştırmaları,** (1966), p.262
[134] Mahmut Arslan, "Eski İran Devlet Geleneği ve Siyasetnameler", **Sosyoloji Dergisi,** No:1, (1989), p.234
[135] İnalcık, "Kutadgu Bilig'de Türk ve İran Siyaset Nazariye ve Gelenekleri", p.270

with the customary law. This contradiction was the main characteristic of the state-ulama conflict in Iran.[136]

Fundamentally, "the state was able to do whatever it willed, including the arbitrary destruction and confiscation of the life and property of the highest men in the land, so long as it had the physical power to do it"[137]. Hence the ruler's willpower was not restricted by any inviolable law or tradition. The scope of his authority could bind only up his physical accessibility. Because, integrating the political culture with the divine authority was very common in Iranian history. The ancient and main factor of Iranian state structure, and also socio-cultural structure, was the consubstantiality of Divine Grace (*farr*) and state. Also, it can be asserted this alliance had regional -Mesopotamia- and traditional backgrounds. The Middle Eastern civilization[138] depended on the spiritual personality of the king from the period of Hammurabi. In this perspective, the king was the aboveground representative of God, and the king was justified, as 'good one', in the universal struggle between 'good and evil'.[139] Which means the divinity role of state was emphasized via the king in this common geography.

In Iran, the ruler was united with the divine authority, and the state structure was created through this hierarchical divinity throughout history. The ruler was said to have the right to succession because he possessed Grace; his rule was both legitimate and just for the same reason; and he lost Divine Grace and his legitimacy when they became unjust.[140] Nevertheless, the notion of Divine Grace was not unknown in the old Iranian chronicles. Ferdowsi's *Shahnameh* (The Book of Kings), as national epic, repeated the role and significance of Divine Grace. God sent kings

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[136]Halil İnalcık, "Örfi-Sultani Hukuk ve Fatih'in Kanunları", **Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasi İlimler ve Hukuk Dergisi**, Cilt 13, Sayı:2, pp.102-103

[137] Homa Katouzian, "State and Society under Reza Shah", (Eds. Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher), **Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah,** London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, p.13

[138]Divine right of king did not only pertain to the Middle Eastern history. The Divine right of king was based on the theory of sacred king and the doctrine of the two swords Saint Augustine, in his famous book 'The City of God', and his follower Thomas Aquinas were concentrated on these theories. See for detailed information: Boucher, **Political Theories of International Relations**; Larry Arnhart, **Siyasi Düşünce Tarihi: Plato'dan Rawl's,** Adres Press, İstanbul 2005; Donald Tannenbaum and David Schultz, **Siyasi Düşünce Tarihi: Filozoflar ve Fikirleri,** Adres Press, İstanbul, 2008

[139] Ira M. Lapidus, **A History of Islamic Societies,** Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p.5

[140] Katouzian, **The Persians: Ancient, Medieval and Modern Iran,** *p.397*

to preserve His people from one another, and granted the king's divine effulgence (*farr izadi*) in order to establish his kingship, salvaging the divine land (*sarzamin ahuraii*). Moreover, the king's fate is depended on Divine 'will' rather than the (in) competence of the state of the ruler himself.[141]

The Iranian state mind has taken own power from this consubstantiality of Divine Grace and the ruler.[142] Because of that, the ruler has not need to record his authority to any worldly institution or person.[143] This system points a constant integration between the 'worldly' and 'spiritual' fields; and this 'worldly' range includes the terrestrial ownership as well. Also, the state monopolized the power through agricultural land.[144] In addition, the private ownership[145] was on the ruler's ordinance in the arbitrary rule.

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[141] Touraj Atabaki, **Iran in the 20th Century: Historiography and Political Culture,** I.B. Tauris, London, 2009, p.73

[142] This identity is called as 'the consubstantiality of religion and state' by Amir Ahmad Fekri. However, I prefer to concentrate on the major perspectives of arbitrary rule. For me, the religion and state consubstantiality is not quite enough for understanding this theory. For instance, it was tried to establish a 'secular' state structure during the Pahlavi dynasty. The struggle between shah and ulama occurred in the context of 'modern and traditional'. Whereas, the coronation ceremony of Reza Shah highlighted the historical continuity of state rule that was grounded on the holiness of ruler. Even though some Muslim symbols were used and some verses from Koran were read, Reza Shah wanted to emphasized the continuity of the throne through its 'very distant past', which was based on divine myths and legends. Even if the Pahlavi dynasty established a secular state structure, they did not reject the 'will power', comes from God.

[143] The consubstantiality of state-religion was based on the Eastern and Islamic societies, not Western and Christian societies. In Christianity, the Roman church and the state had different powers and different hierarchical order in the Medieval Europe. The both did not combine each other with a spiritual tie; even they came across in the matter of sharing the authority. Whereas, there was not any institution like the Roman church in Islam. The entire, worldly and spiritual, authority had gathered on the ruler (state). For the comparative analysis for this issue, see: Amir Ahmad Fekri, **Tarihsel Gelişim Sürecinde İran Devrimi,** Mızrak Press, İstanbul 2011, pp.47-57

[144] The state assigned the lands especially to members of the royal household, state functionaries and other magnates. There was no contractual security of title to ownership and no automatic rights of bequest. For this reason, the arbitrary rule is different from feudalism.

[145] It should be highlighted that the Iranian geographical conditions had been decisive about the private ownership. The extent of two great mountains, the Alborz in the North and the Zagros in the south-west, and the two wide deserts, Dasht-e Kavir and Dasht-e Lut both in the east, have naturally divided the Iranian population into relatively isolated groups. Nevertheless, the scarcity of water has played a major role in a number of key sociological factors including the nature of Iranian state and society. The arable land and the keeping livestock of the country was correlated with natural rain waters, streamlets or subterranean water channels. Relating to this situation, the Iranians settled in small, isolated and almost self-sufficient villages. Moreover, the channel system, known as *qanat* and based on the ancient times, was founded and controlled by the state. Also Katozian explains the state-society conflict through this argument: "The aridity of the land and isolation of the social units to which it was related thus combined to prevent the rise of a feudal society and state such as prevailed throughout much of European history. (…) Instead, the state exercised arbitrary power over all. (…) In feudal society landlords formed the ruling classes, which were first and foremost represented by the

Therewith, the typical Iranian land has influence the absence of private ownership (the base of capitalism). Karl Marx refers the state monopoly of land ownership and irrigation system as 'oriental despotism', and responds to Friedrich Engels, why there is not private ownership in the East, by means of this point of view. For Marx, the absence of private ownership is the foremost key factor of understanding the Eastern structure. The reason of this situation is tied to climate and the nature of land by Marx. And the necessity of the foundation of water system creates the state domination on society. On the condition of solving this challenge, state emerges as the only ownership of land. In this system, individual, as a part of society, has 'the right of use' of the land, not the 'ownership' of it. For this reason, the autonomous individuals, Marx paid importance, cannot appear in the Eastern societies.[146]

On the other hand, Weber sees the 'water based patrimonialism' as the significative factor of Eastern societies; and the coast -based dynamics of Western societies- is seen as a civilization maturity by him. In the water based patrimonialism, societies were obliged to migrate because of the water overflowing; and this situation complicated a centralized state structure. For Weber, this kind of a state structure has strengthened the ruler's power and control on the society. Whereas, the coast based civilization, based on Rome and Ancient Greek, has created a strong and firm bureaucratic tie between state (center) and its periphery.[147]In brief, both Marx and Weber had emphasized the 'uniqueness' of the West regarding the Eastern 'non-feudal'[148] state structure; and both accounted for the absence of private ownership through the natural and climatic reasons.

By all means the privileged (bureaucratic) class had ascendancy over of the Iranian state. Because, the rules gave rise to the intensive bureaucratic and military

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state. The state was thus dependent on and representative of the ruling classes. In Iran, the landlords and other social classes depended on the state. (…) The state stood over and above the social pyramid and looked upon the society, (…) and had the power both to assign land to a person, thus turning him into a landlord, and to withdraw the title from an existing landlord and give it to someone else."Katouzian, **The Persians: Ancient, Medieval and Modern Iran**, pp.3-5

[146]Sunar, **Marx ve Weber'de Doğu Toplumları**,p.95

[147] **Ibid.,** p.161

[148]Marx had asked to Engels, in his letters during 1853, why Easterns could not reach to 'even' feudalism. He had believed, that Eastern societies could construct the system of private ownership through feudal state structure. See: Amir Ahmad Fekri, **Tarihsel Gelişim Sürecinde İran Devrimi,** p.63

power except the state monopoly of property rights. However, this class could be owned property only by favor of the ruler, if he did not withdraw this benefit at any time.[149]Exceptionally, some tribes (such as Bakhtiyari[150] and Afshar) had their own bureaucrat during the 18th and 19th centuries; they protected *ulama* and conducted some particular lands. But nevertheless, they were not 'the state'.[151]

Fundamentally, this state monopolized power did not mean that its administration was highly centralized. Even though Iranian states were more or less centralized depending on social, economic and cultural factors, power was still always concentrated in the hands of the central government. This meant that the provincial governor was appointed by the shah, ran his province arbitrarily at the shah's pleasure and would be dismissed any time the shah desired.[152]This arbitrariness of the state cannot be constrained by an independent law. Naturally there were public rules and regulations, but law may change at any moment and without any established procedures. And this arbitrary government is named as *estebdad.*[153]

Within this content, it should be said that the law typically provides a regulatory relationship between state and society, as well as within the society itself. Also the law covers the rights and obligations of individuals, social groups and the state; and it is generally inviolable or usually difficult to change. In Iran, such written or unwritten laws did not exist. Before Islam, the body of rules was composed of customary practices; and they were shaped by cardinal ruling class. An extensive and elaborate civil and criminal code was constructed by the *Shari'a* in Islamic period. However, this kind of a canon law could exist various interpretations; and there was not a particular, planned and ordered procedures.

As long as the will of state was not obstructed, this system could be applied. Also the ruler's will have predominated from 'law' - *Shari'a*. This dichotomy of the

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[149] Katouzian, **Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectif of State and Society,** p.38
[150] Bakhtiyari tribe had an special position in Iran history. Bakhtiyari tribe was seemed as both security threat and the descendant khans and shahs. See for understanding the tribes' impact over of the state: Gene R.Garthwaite, **Khans and Shahs: A History of the Bakhtiyari Tribe in Iran**, I.B.Tauris, New York, 2009
[151] Gartwaite, **İran Tarihi**, p.9
[152] Katouzian, **The Persians: Ancient, Mediavel and Modern Iran,** p.396
[153] Katouzian, **Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectif of State and Society,** *p.41*

judicial system was the other side of the consubstantiality of state-religion. Albeit the ruler need to confirm his power through the divine authority, the superior and lawmaker position of a religious institution was not acceptable for him. On the other hand, "since law was arbitrary, so was 'politics'. The word *'siyasat'* -politics- was generally used the art of governing the realm successfully, as in the title of Nezam al-Molk's *Siyasatnameh.* However the words *Siyasat, Siyasi* and *Siyasatmadar* were translated from French during and after the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1907). Until an appropriate word, politics did not exist in Iran."[154]Because, the arbitrariness of the state penetrated to the organic nexus between 'politics' and 'law' in Iran.

Consequently, the arbitrariness character of the traditional state authority was faced with the challenge of the modernity during the Pahlavi dynasty. Both Shahs put account the nationalism discourse for overcoming the religious background of the Iranian state. The traditional authority was strengthened with the Iranian legends and nationalistic loyalty to the Persian history. Whereas, the religious pillar wrapped up the power of the charismatic leadership, and the Islamic background was put against the argument of the Iranian nationalism.

1.2.3. Two Responses to the Challenge of Modernity: Nationalist Mobilization through Bureaucracy versus the Power of Charisma

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Iranians witnessed a profound struggle between two men: Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini. Their ideational tendencies had contradistinctive characters, but ironically, both individual personalities lived on the patriarchal structure of Iranian society. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi modeled the modernization on the state and society and used the discourse of Iranian nationalization for expanding his authority on the one hand; Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini was launched as the charismatic-religious authority against the Pahlavi modernization on the other hand. And these

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[154]Katouzian, **Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society**, p.42-43

two reciprocal responses have formed the ideological base of 1979 Iranian Revolution.

The fact that nationalism has been the determining ideology in Iranian social and political life. The 'Iranian' phenomenon was not only a geographical description; it was based on, also, apparent preferences in the culture. Moreover, nationalism was perceived as an ideology by the various fractions in Iran - such as secular nationalists, religious nationalists or leftist nationalists. However the Pahlavi nationalism regarded as a complementary process for the preservation of the elites, who were the watchdog of secular modernization, and this embedded interpretation of nationalism identified with the Pahlavi ideational tendency.

Granted that in general, nationalism concept surfaced after the French Revolution of 1789 in Europe. Many of the parameters about defining the modern state erupted during this period. The citizenship, also one of the important features of the modern state, underlined through the patriotism and national allegiance. The sense of belonging was the main rhetoric of nationalism and expanded to the East, where the old and languorous dynasties dominated the Persian, Anatolia and Arab geography, through the scientific rationality and positivism, such as secularism, capitalism or republicanism.

The theory of nationalism[155] consists in the national histories and myths. Also the history of Persia was linked to the Arian myth and the metaphors of Zoroaster by the Pahlavi dynasty. This approach was chosen, because the European literary culture had been familiar with Persia through the medium of classical and Biblical text since the Arian and Zoroastrianism times. Whereas the religion of Shia has a great influence on the Iranian identity as well, and the religious orthodoxy regarded as antithetical to the progress and modernization of Iran.[156]

However the challenge has began at this point for the Shia *ulama,* because the nationalism interpretation of them necessitated to take a stand against modernization

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[155] For the critical analysis about the theory of nationalism, see: Umut Özkırımlı, **Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction,** Pelgrave MacMillan, London, Second Edition, 2010
[156]Ali Ansari, **The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran***,* Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp.9, 16, 25

on the one hand, caused to come close to their only rival –the Arab clergy- in the religious arena on the other hand. No wonder Islam has a nationalistic view as well, and Islamic nationalism does not pertain only to Iran. But the superiority struggle between the Pahlavi nationalism and religious identity became the major fact in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Islamic nationalism was a collision domain for Iran due to the Sunni influence in the Islamic world.[157]Especially, the rise of Pan Arabism and the Nasserist nationalism experiment marginalized the Sunni factor in the Islamic world during the 1960s. And firstly, the Shia discourse could not present a view for this rising nationalism wave. Ayatollah Khomeini, as a charismatic leadership for all Muslims, propounded an Islamic state model for the Islamic *ummah*[158] (the community of believers) in the pre-revolution period (in 1970s), but the nationalist rhetoric was not a part of this ideology.[159]

Fundamentally, all Muslims are considered as one nationality for the (Sunni) Islamic view, and the *millah* (nation) is positioned along religious lines in the Islamic state. And this state gives a socio-political identity to every religious and cultural group (Muslim and non-Muslim) according to the ontological perspective of Islam. But the nationalist-Islamic duality had become blurred in the modernization period of Iran and the Arab world, and the secular nationalism and the Islamic *ummah* perspective separated against Western expansionism. As Binnaz Toprak mentioned

"In the case of countries under colonial rule with incipient nationalist movements, religion became a symbol of identity with the cultural heritage of the indigenous peoples which the colonial powers had attempted to destroy. Hence religion was used as an effective tool for social and political mobilization

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[157] For the conflict between nationalism and Islam in the Arab world, see: Zhongmin Liu, "The Relations between Nationalism and Islam in the Middle East", **Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia),** Vol.2, No.1, (2008), pp.69-78

[158] The Islamic concept of *ummah* originated under Prophet Mohammad in the seventh century and it is the Muslim form of a nation. Prophet Mohammad was the first citizen of this nation, and also he is the teacher and guide of the community, established the first Islamic state, which does not recognize any geographical, linguistic or racial barriers. According to the Koran usage, the term *ummah* means not only an ideological community, but also the set of beliefs within a community, an exemplar of a community, a more committed group of people within a community and a lifetime of a community. For more details about the *ummah,* see: Adbullah Al-Ahsan, **Ummah or Nation? Identity Crisis in Contemporary Muslim Society,** Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1992

[159] Henry Munson, "Islam, Nationalism and Resentment of Foreign Domination", **Middle East Policy,** Vol.10, No.2 (2003) pp.42-43

by nationalist leaders bent upon implanting a sense of pride in national culture and values."[160]

At this point, the Iranian clergy were distended from the other Muslim state about the nationalism interpretation. "The Shia *ulama* generally rejected nationalism, and Ayatollah Khomeini considered it as the source of all misfortunes of Muslim. Those who wish to revive nationalism are confronting Islam."[161] Also he counted nationalism as a Western product of political development, and for him, the modern-nation state phenomenon classified the society between the upper and lower, or the ruling and ruled classes.[162]

Whereas, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's nationalism, which was launched as the Western tool for penetrating within the Iranian culture by Ayatollah Khomeini, separated the Iranian identity from the Arabic feature as well; but he celebrated the pre-Islamic past, and insisted on the continuity of Iranian culture despite Islam and the Arab conquest. The Pahlavi nationalism shaped with the themes and motifs of Islamic civilization, but it is distant from the Shia rules and values. The Pahlavi dynasty celebrated the antiquity of Arian monarchy and established a secular-nationalist structure.[163]

Consequently, the Iranian people were confused about their identities, whether their primary loyalty belongs to the Iranian state or Islamic (religious) root. The modern state phenomenon had managed Iran during the Pahlavi dynasty, and tries to fill the administrative gap. But revivalism of Islamic social and political movements were opposed the state pressure, and also, the Iranian people were obliged to gravitate towards gathering under the single roof of the religious institution.

In other words, the ideological challenge between Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini occurred within these two responses:

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[160] Muhittin Ataman, "Islamic Perspective on Ethnicity and Nationalism: Diversity or Uniformity?", **Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol**. 23, No.1, (2003), p.97
[161]**Ibid.,** p.99
[162]**Ibid.,** p.99
[163]Sami Zubaida, "Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions", **Nations and Nationalism,** Vol.10, No.4, (2004), p.416

1. **The conflict between national and religious identity:** The Pahlavi nationalism concentrated on the Iranian identity that includes culture, history (pre-Islamic), language and mythos. Starting this point of view, the political identity was founded on the modern state, and the society was modernized through the Shah's nationalism perception. However, Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized to a universal religious community (*ummah*), and the Islamic state was seen as the ideal archetype of political organization.

2. **The conflict between secularization and Islamization:** Nationalism was accepted one of the important pillar of secularization in the Pahlavi monarchy. Whereas Ayatollah Khomeini supported the integration of politics and religion, the combination of law, culture, education and religion.

The nationalistic development idea of the Pahlavi dynasty encountered with the abovementioned challenge in the 1960s, especially after the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini. The followers of the Ayatollah appeared with high winds of the Shah's nationalism, which was used, also, as a legalizer of his sovereignty. The Pahlavi regime ignored the religious dimension of the Iranian identity and created an official discourse versus the *ulama*'s approach. In response to the Shah's modernization tool, also nationalism theory, the religious rhetoric confronted with a stronger ideological groundwork. Such as Murtaza Mutahhari and Ali Shariati, who were the veteran Islamic thinkers, improved the Marxist-Islamic discourse, which emphasized also the equality of people, as an alternative against the nationalism.[164]Ironically, the 1979 Iranian Revolution occurred through the moral elements of the Iranian identity, but the national identity was weakened consciously for the benefit of the religious elements.

The Pahlavi modernism has desired to institute a surrounding identity, which makes emphasis to the industrial development, cultural modernism, technical rationalism and secularism, for the Iranian people. Starting this point of view, the Iranian nationalism should cover the all subnational elements, and the intellectuals in the Pahlavi period highlighted the trivet with the Persian language, the Arian

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[164] Hamid Ahmedi, "İran'da Din ve Milliyet: Dayanışma mı? Çekişme mi*?",* **İran: Ulusal Kimlik İnşası,** (Trans. Hakkı Uygur), İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2009, pp.46-47

background and the Zoroastrianism. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi counted nationalism as the main engine of the 'Iranian modernization' project.[165]

> "Reza Shah had sent his son to be educated in Switzerland, in large part because he believed that 'modern' Iran required a new type of monarch, essentially a constitutional monarch, albeit one who could navigate and manage the politics of a country in the throes of a political, social and economic revolution. Mohammad Reza Shah's educational sojourn in the West has sometimes been blamed for his lack of understanding and appreciation of his people, but in his understanding of his religion, in his determination to cultivate the *ulama,* and indeed his view and attitude seemed rooted in tradition and contrary to the views of the Constitutionalists."[166]

Whereas the percentage of the literacy and the urbanization increased, the industrial middle class expanded and a new intellectual class, queried the monarchical authority, rose in the Pahlavi modernization period. These people started to show an interest in the concepts, which take place against nationalism such as equality or freedom. For this reason, these people criticized the pro-Shah circle and the national sovereignty argument and stayed against the continuity of the monarchy and its embedded institutions. Because the 'equal' citizenship phenomenon could not find chance in the Pahlavi nationalism.[167]

The Pahlavi nationalism was seen as an elite ideology (lateral nationalism), and far from the demotic nationalism. The Iranian 'nation' had taken form in a process of Shah's ideological personalization, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi transformed the economical structure and prevented the communist threat through the loyalty of the bureaucratic and upper classes to himself. He did it for his power consolidation through the traditional authority. On the other hand, Ayatollah Khomeini was seen as an alternative and charismatic authority against the crown, and the Shah's nationalism encountered with the power of charisma.

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[165] Hüseyin Beşiriyye, "İran'da Siyasal İdeoloji ve Toplumsal Kimlik", **İran: Ulusal Kimlik İnşası,** (Ed. Hamid Ahmedi), (Trans. Hakkı Uygur), İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2009, pp.79-80
[166] Ansari, **The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran,** p.147
[167] Ahmed Eşref, "İran'da Ulusal ve Etnik Kimlik Krizi", **İran: Ulusal Kimlik İnşası,** (Ed. Hamid Ahmedi), (Trans. Hakkı Uygur), İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2009, p.116

As a matter of fact both -The Shah's and the Ayatollah's- conceptualizations have been similarities for the dimension of ruler as a guardian and protector of the Iranians. But the singular difference between these two concepts was the knowledge base from which they drew their authority. In the pre-revolutionary period, the Ayatollah consolidated his power through the charismatic leadership and did draw on a rich legacy of Islamic law and Shia political thought; whereas, the Shah was seen as traditional-imperial decree by the Iranians because of his authoritarian ruler ship.

> "Written and disseminated in 1971 in the aftermath of the Shah's White Revolution and the redistribution of landed estates by imperial decree, the notion that an Islamic government was a government of laws must have been attractive. The fact that, as Khomeini clarified, these were Divine laws which could not altered and to which everyone was subject only further enhanced their appeal, particularly in the context of Shah's growing power after the dramatic increase in the oil price. What Khomeini appeared to be suggesting was that Islamic law protected people from arbitrary government. (…) and Khomeini's belief that the clergy had been foremost in the defense of people's rights."[168]

The Divine laws and its connection with the authority have been effected the Iranians sense and spirituality, and the Ayatollah was counted as the only considerable transformative potential by them. His revolutionary rhetoric was the willingness to condemn and destroy everything the Shah's regime had built. In brief the Ayatollah drew a 'charismatic leadership' as a revolutionary challenger for the Iranians.

The main features of the charismatic authority were the perception of the heroic mission of a leader and esteeming of the leader's greatness by his followers. Considerably, the charismatic leadership was shaped around the strong ideological and religious figures. The charm of the charismatic leader made their followers go behind this leader without questioning them. Weber concentrated on the social

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[168] Ansari, **The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran,**p.196

conditions and its psychological background, which the leader exist, for analyzing the strong and symbiotic nexus between the charismatic leader and his followers.[169]

In the pre-revolutionary period, especially between 1970 and 1979, the Iranian people aspired a strong leadership for recovering the political and social situations. The grassroots movements aroused expectation of the change, and the people supported actively the Ayatollah and his revolutionary speech.

Fundamentally, "the charisma is the greatest revolutionary force"[170] as Weber mentioned. It works by altering the situations of action and changing the attitudes of the people towards the problematique. According to Weber, charisma can involve an internal reorientation born out of suffering, conflicts or enthusiasm, but its function can change from the central directions or attitudes of (his) actions because of the structural and different problems of the world.[171]

After the commitment of the followers, the leadership can be bifurcated as a 'personalized' and 'socialized' authority. The Shah was criticized mostly due to his personalized authority by the Ayatollah. Whereas, Khomeini became, ironically, an authoritarian-personalized leader during the post-revolutionary period; or he was already an autocratic ruler, which eclipsed by his power of 'charisma'. And the disenchantment of the revolutionary challengers came with the rapid and sudden change of the political and social structure. The formalization and bureaucratization of the 'new' Islamic state reduced the charismatic leadership of the Ayatollah, and he became a traditional authority in the very first process of the revolution.

The charismatic figure rises generally after chaotic social circumstances. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi perpetuated the bureaucratic nationalization with the elites and did not recognize the 'others' socio-political expectations. The Iranian resentment towards the monarchy was taken notice by the Shi'i *ulama*, and the charismatic authority rises through Ayatollah Khomeini as the voice of the people

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[169] Ian Kershaw, "Working Towards the Führer Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler Dictatorship", **Contemporary European History,** Vol.2, No.2, (July 1993), pp.111-112
[170] Weber, **The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,** p.363
[171]**Ibid.,** p.363

and the will of God.[172]The actions of a charismatic figure can accord with an ideology to fit his position in the social and political fields.[173] Ayatollah Khomeini's esoteric charm and his ideology *(Velayat-e Faqih)* affected the Iranians when he was in exile. The people regarded Khomeini as a revolutionary charisma for liberating from the Pahlavi monarchy.

Consequently, two responses -Pahlavi nationalism and Ayatollah's charismatic leadership- came across in the modernization process of Iran. The Pahlavi state structure was based on the industrial and state-centered capitalism, and got strength from the nationalistic approach for consolidating its authority. The eternal, heterogeneous authority of the Shah failed in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Whereas the 'new' Islamic state offered a stance against the imperial West, and promised to become free from the Pahlavi monarchy. Its ideological and revolutionary rhetoric appealed to the Iranians, but at the end of the revolution, even as the (new) state pressure remained, the society failed.

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[172] Nikki Keddie, **Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution,** Yale Univetsiy Press, London, 2003, p.149, 157
[173] Monika Horstman, "Charisma, Transfer of Charisma and Cannon in North Indian Bhakti", **Charisma and Cannon: Essays on the Religious History of the Indian Subcontinent***, (Ed. Vasudha Dalmia and the others), Oxford University Press, 2001, p.180

CHAPTER TWO

IRANIAN SOCIETY IN TRASITION:

STATE CAPITALISM AND THE DISSIDENTS

"**The Guardian:** Your Majesty, on what do you base your prediction that within a generation, Iran will be one of the five most advanced countries in the world?

Mohammad Reza Shah: Energy, diligence of our people, our hegemony. Of course, a few demonstrate. Just imagine Iranians, if they are Iranians, demonstrating against their leader after what we have done for the country. It is true hegemony that we have in our country. Everybody is behind their monarch, with their souls, with their hearts."[174]

"Gentlemen, I warn you of danger!

Iranian army, I warn you of danger!

Iranian politicians, I warn you of danger!

Iranian merchants, I warn you of danger!

Ulama of Iran, *maraje'* of Islam, I warn you of danger!"[175]

Ayatollah Khomeini

The Iran Revolution was the foremost rebellion versus the state authority and its representative: The Shah. Even though the Iranians joined to the street demonstration between 1977 and 1979, the revolution dynamics were borned with the *estebdat* (absolute authority) regulations of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The

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[174]**The Guardian,** 19 January 1974

[175] Hamid Algar, **Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini,** Mizan Press, Berkeley, 1981, p.181

masses, the *ulama*, the *bazaris* (small traders, merchants and shopkeepers) and the intelligentsia (secular-liberal reformists and leftist revolutionaries), who were connected with the very incompatible ideologies, got together only 'against the Shah'. However, their roots about the promising future were different. The liberals were disposed to change the autocratic and traditional structure of the state, but the difficile *ulama* and its pecuniary resource, also the *bazaar*, wanted to found a theocratic order through the Islamic awakening of the Muslim people (*ummah*).

The *ulama* consider the street demonstrations throughout 1977-1979 in the perspective of the Islamic principles and concentrated on an 'Islamic Revolution'. As Hamid Algar implied that the clergy front had a high opinion of the Islamic revival approach, regarded the restoration of Islamic norms and principles within the scope of the Islamic state that was founded by the Prophet Mohammad and Imam Ali, who was the son-in-law and successor of the Prophet.[176] Thus, Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini's doctrine, *Velayat-e Faqih*, represented the direct rule of Muslim jurisprudents and supports the active and direct involvement of the clergy in the administration level.[177]

On the other hand, the secular front (nationalists and liberals) highlighted the socio-economic and political suppressions of the Pahlavi dynasty and concentrated on the civil and political rights for the Iranian people. This secular intellectuals and bourgeoisie wanted to discrown the Shah and to end his monopolistic economy policies. However, they have been faced the *ulama's* desire down: the clergy front was resolved turning to the system of 1400 years before. When the deported and charismatic leader of the *ulama*, Ayatollah Khomeini, returned to Iran in the 1th February of 1979, the big struggle between the secular front and the Muslim

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[176] Hamid Algar, **Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran: Four Lectures,** Islamic Publications International, 2001, p.15

[177] On the other hand, some proponent clergies, such as Ayatollah Sayyed Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, which are called as the 'quietists', were against the active role of the ulama in the legitimacy. They do not see any historical and theological justification for the doctrine of Ayatollah Khomeini. The 'quietists' see the ulama's role in Shi'ite communities as limiting and standing up to the inevitable oppression of the state. For detailed argument, see: Nikki Keddie, "Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism", **Comparative Studies in Society and History,** Volume 4, 1961, pp.265-295; Mohammad Ayoob, "The Revolutionary Thrust of Islamic Political Tradition", **Third World Quarterly,** Vol.3, No:2, (April 1981), pp. 269-276

fundamentalists began in this instance, and it run until the theocratic order suppressed the other front.

At the same time, the leftist political front gathered against capitalism and the American imperialism. This front wanted to establish an independent socialist state, but the fractions failed to agree about the context of it. For example, the Tudeh Party, which followed the pro-Soviet ideology, interiorized the Leninist theory, but conversely the Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas, the main engine of the street demonstration and the forefront in the revolution movement, criticized the Tudeh and saw its ideology only Soviet-oriented, not Marxist-centered. As a matter of fact, the Tudeh has chosen to support the *ulama*'s way at the first stage of the revolution. And another leftist political group, the People's Mujahedin, stayed ideologically against Khomeini and his followers. In any case, the leftist movement was gone out or demolished after the revolution -between 1979 and 1983- by the Islamic Republic.[178]

The Iranian social classes positioned inside these mentioned political fronts. Fundamentally, the Iranian society has been a complex structure. The subdivision of the classes -as upper, middle and lower- is not enough for forming this structure, because some social groups have existed both classes and (urban or rural) areas. Before revolution, the Shah, the royal family and the political-industrial elites constituted the upper class in Iran. Naturally, the actors of the upper class changed in the post-revolutionary period, but establishing a concern with 'the state sources' did not substantially differ. The 'Islamic' industrialists, financiers, merchants and landowners have been taken the place of the monarchic order. This is the main component of the rentier state structure.

Moreover, the position of the working class did not changed significantly as well. The industrialization project of the Shah provided the impetus for the expansion of this class. However, the unionization right of this class was brought under monarchy control or allowed on a limited scale. When the street demonstration began, the working class supported strongly the socialist discourse, but its rights were not given after the revolution. Especially, the women, who are the chief pillar

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[178] For detailed information about the leftist movement in Iran and its position during and after the revolution, see: Maziar Behrooz, **Rebels With a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran**, I.B.Tauris, London, 2000

of the working class, were pressured and bounded to the home with the Islamic administration.

Starting this point of view, we tried to concentrate the state-society relation under the capitalism fact, which is the main component of the modernization, both in the Pahlavi dynasty and the Islamic Republic. Moreover, the interrelation of this political fronts and social groups are the other perspective of this chapter.

2.1. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF STATE CAPITALISM

The origin of capitalism[179] has risen in the scope of the Western modernization and was seen as "the natural condition of humanity that it conforms to the laws of nature and basic human inclinations"[180]. The commercialization model of the economic development was the natural outcome of the rationalization process, and the regulations became increasingly with an evolving division of labor, which was also accompanied by technical improvements in the instruments of production. Capitalism[181] (the commercial society) has been represented a maturation of age-old commercial practices and their liberation from political and cultural constraints.[182]

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[179] The term capitalism was derived from the ancient Latin word *capitale*, means "the head of movable property" and as Fernand Braudel highlighted, and it was used firstly in the modern sense by Louis Blanc (1850) and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1861). For details, see: Fernand Braudel, **The Wheels of Commerce: Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century,** Harper and Row, 1979, p.232-233,237; The term was brought in the literature with the comprehensive study, **Das Kapital***,* by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
[180] Ellen Meiksins Wood, **The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View,** Verso Press, London, 2002, p.1
[181] Before Marx and Engels, the British-Liberal thinker John Locke was framed the origin of capitalism through the argument of 'private property' in his study *Second Treatise of Government* (1690). According to Locke, "the private property comes from a person mixing his labor or work with the common unowned earth or nature (granted to humankind by God) and producing new value. Then money is invented to represent that labor-produced value and property. If enough money is saved and used to buy other people's labor, which produces more value or profit, the money 'earns' more wealth or 'interest' for the owner. Money that produces more wealth is 'capital'. So capitalism is an economy dominated by invested capital, wage labor, banks and interest, production of commodities (goods produced for exchange or sale), and material incentives." For details, see: "Capitalism/Capitalist", **Encyclopedia of Political Thought,**
[182] Wood, **The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View,** p.10-11

Basically, *the capitalistic mode of production*[183] was characterized as a system of primarily private ownership of the means of production with a legal framework on the commerce and the physical infrastructure, which is provided by the state. And the capitalist stage of development (the bourgeois society) was represented as the most advanced form of social organization. Because, the working classes would come to power after the transformation from aristocratic society to capitalist society, and it will reach and rule the world after the fall of the capitalist society.[184] Actually, capitalism gained its strength by colonialism, which turned later on imperialism, industrialization and nationalism during the 19th and 20th centuries.[185] These processes kept together with a satisfactory and inevitable development and provided the basis for the capitalism's viability.[186]

Fundamentally, the role of the state was limited in the industrialized capitalism. For the market society, the state provides the legal framework for the operations and assists the expansion beyond the country's shores and aims. Whereas capitalism can be run by the state hand as well, and it is called as *state capitalism* or *paternalistic capitalism* in some cases. According to Raymond Wiliams, the *state capitalism* forms an economic system in which the commercial activities are undertaken by the state and its institutions in a capitalist manner (managing and organizing the production and the wage of labor).[187] The *paternalistic capitalism*[188]

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[183] Karl Marx preferred to use this term instead of capitalism.

[184] Karl Marx (1867).,**Capital: A Critique of Political Economy – The Process of Capitalist Production,** (Ed. Friedrich Engels), Volume 1, New York: Casimo Book, 2007, p.163-166

[185] Capitalism was not simply a product of economy; it had also a 'political' side as well. Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Jean-Baptiste Say and John Stuart Mill, the British-Classical school of economic thought in the late eighteenth century, concentrated on the analyses of political economy within the perspective of the production, distribution and exchange of goods. According to them; "capitalism, properly speaking, is not just an economic system based on market exchange, private property, wage labor, and sophisticated financial instrument. Capitalism, more precisely, is a market economy ruled by, or in the interests of, capitalists." For details, see: Michael Merrill, "Putting 'Capitalism' in its Place: A Review of Recent Literature", **The William and Mary Quarterly,** Vol.52, No.2, April 1995, p.317

[186] Douglas Down, **Capitalism and Its Economics: A Critical History,** Pluto Press, London, 2000, p.4

[187] Raymond Williams, "Capitalism", **Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society**, Oxford University Press, 1986, p.52

[188] Actually, the concept of the paternalistic capitalism is used by Andreas Papandreou in his namesake study (Paternalistic Capitalism-1972). In his concept, the paternalistic capitalism expects much more from the state, rather than the free market. For Papandreaou, the paternalistic capitalism relies on the social regulation of aggregate demand, and it will be adequate to the task of removing from the market their planned output at the controlled prices. This action falls upon the state through its fiscal policy and monetary management. In addition, the taxation is the chosen instrument of the

can be described herein as a subtitle of the *state capitalism*, which is seen particularly in the paternalistic structures.

The state-directed capitalism created and endorsed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, but term's origin leaned on the socialist movement from the late nineteenth century. Firstly, Wilhelm Liebknecht was used this term: "Nobody has shown more distinctively than I, that state socialism is really state capitalism!"[189] After Liebknecht, Michail Bakunin and Jan Maclav Machajski presented this concept - *state capitalism*- as the new type of society and socialism.[190] During the World War, Nicholai Bukharin described the new stage of capitalism -*state capitalism*-, which the all national sectors and social institutions had become managed by the state.[191] However, the positive meaning of this term was brought in by Lenin after the October Revolution. Also, the term *state capitalism* has been used by various socialist, anarchists, Marxists and Leninists.[192]

In the literature, the concept of *state capitalism* is identified with a very incomplete set of labels: 'state organized private-property monopoly capitalism', 'managerial society', 'administrative capitalism', 'bureaucratic collectivism', 'totalitarian state economy', 'status capitalism', 'neo-mercantilism', 'economy of force' or 'state socialism'.[193] According to Anton Pannekoek, the *state capitalism* comprises two kinds of forms: In the first form, the state performs as a capitalist employer and guides the workers for the interests of the state. The industrial system planned, financed and managed by the state and the administrative staffs of the industries are appointed by the authority in this economic form's of the state capitalism. The second form is a condition, which capitalist enterprises are controlled

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state for achieving the managing, and also the revenues of the state have to be large enough in relation to national income to perform this role effectively. Thus, a large state is welcomed by the managerial-capitalist elite. For detailed information about the paternalistic capitalism, see: Andreas G. Papandreou, **Paternalistic Capitalism,** University of Minnesota Press, Minesota, 1972

[189]Wilhelm Liebknecht (1896)., "Our Recent Congress", (Trans. Ted Crawford), **Juctice,** 2007, p.4 www.marxist.org (05.01.2014)

[190] Michael S. Fox, "Ante Ciliga, Trotskii and State Capitalism: Theory, Tactics and Re-evaluation during the Purge Era, 1935-1939", **Slavic Review,** No:1, (Spring 1991), pp.127-143

[191] Nicholai Bukharin (1915).,**Imperialism and World Economy,** Merlin Press, London, 1975, p.158

[192] In the literature, the term was used by Emma Goldman, Murray Bookchin, Gavril Myasnikov, Karl Kautsky, Leon Trotsky, Ante Ciliga, Otto Rühle, Anton Pannekoek and Nikita Khrushchev.

[193] Friedrich Pollock, "State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations", **The Essential Frankfurt School Reader**,(Eds.,Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt), Urizen Books, New York, 1990, p.72

by the state. The owner of the enterprise is not the only director and the owner's power being restricted so long as some sort of social insurance system for the workers is accepted.[194] In either forms, capitalist instruments are under the state's trump.

On the other hand, Friedrich Pollock bisects the *state capitalism* on the basis of the types of regime: totalitarian and democratic forms:

> "Under a totalitarian form of state capitalism, the state is the power instrument of a new ruling group, which has resulted from the merger of the most powerful vested interests, the top-ranking personnel in industrial and business management, the higher strata of the state bureaucracy (including the military) and the leading figures of the victorious party's bureaucracy. Under a democratic form of state capitalism, the state has the same controlling functions but is itself controlled by the people. It is based on institutions which prevent the bureaucracy from transforming its administrative position into an instrument of power and thus laying the basis for transshipping the democratic system into a totalitarian one."[195]

By all manner of means, the heritage of the *state capitalism* lied down the world's changing conjuncture during the twentieth century. Especially during the Cold War period, capitalism and socialism encountered with one another in both political and economic fields. Socialism was associated with conservatism, and conservatism was positioned against liberalism, which is the base of capitalism. The conservatives interiorized the 'managed capitalism', called as Keynesian economy politics, and its social partner: *state capitalism.*

Whereas, the industrialization appeared as the result of capitalism before this state-directed version. The modern transportation and communication tools -the railroad, the steamship and the telegraph- built and operated the new type of business enterprise, and these new forms of transformation and communication permitted the rise of modern mass marketing and production in the last half of the 19th century.

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[194] Anton Pannekoek, "State Capitalism and Dictatorship", **International Council Correspondence**, Vol 3, No.1, (January 1937), p.1
[195] Pollock, "State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations", p.73

The decision about the operations, employment, output and the allocation of resources for the future operations were made by salaried managers, and undoubtedly that they were not the owners of the enterprise. This new tools and the new type of economic man provided a central dynamic for continuing economic growth and transformation, and it would called latter on as 'industrialization period of the world'.[196]

> "An integrated market providing cheap necessities of life for a growing mass of consumers and responding to already well-established competitive pressures created a new and specific 'logic of process', the outcome of which was industrial capitalism. That market, and the social property relations in which it was rooted, provided not only the means but also the need to produce consumer goods on a new scale, and also to produce them cost-effectively, in ways detennined by the imperatives of competition, accumulation, and profit-maximization, together with their requirements for improving labor-productivity."[197]

In addition to this, industrial capitalism is a social system as well. It is founded as the ultimate goal of achieving the individual ownership of means of production, protecting the individual rights and establishing the separation of the economy and the state. The base of capitalism turns around the creation of the social harmony through the individual interests. Moreover capitalism implies the political and social effects, which are managed by staticism. Whereas, for the liberal capitalist view, the state power is the main obstacle of the political development and civil society. Joseph Schumpeter defines this fact in his valuable work *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*:

> "Capitalism is by nature a form or method of economic change which is not only dynamic, but it can never remain static. Indeed capitalism remains alive with the process of creative destruction."[198]

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[196]Alfred D. Chandler Jr.,**The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism,** Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 2004, pp.1-2
[197]Wood, **The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View,** p.143
[198] Joseph Schumpeter, **Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,** Routledge, London, 1994, p.123

Whereas, the *state capitalism* is an organized hierarchy, and the state supposed to protect this structure on the contrary of the mobility and openness of industrial capitalism. The *state capitalism* regards the industrial capitalism as an irregular anomaly. Whereas, the liberal economists have anti-Keynesian views, and according to them, capitalism faces crises because of the state's control on the supply and demand of money. Actually, this main contradiction leans on the state theory, and the state-directed capitalism finds its origin long before the industrial capitalism; it can find its nexus in the absolutism[199] as well.

In the industrial capitalism, the people meet each other as agents of the exchange process, such as buyers or sellers. However, the capitalist relationship between people is constituted with scope of commander or command in the *state capitalism*. This commanding issue depends on the first place of the position of political authority. While the profit motive keeps the economic mechanism of society moving, the profit motive replaced the power motive in the *state capitalism*.[200]

Actually, capitalism is comprised of three levels -markets, institutions, political authority-, and the third level (political authority) stresses the role of human agency in capitalism. Because the political authority has an administrative opportunity, and it saves the responsibility to shape the capitalistic system in the favor of the certain interest groups over the others. In addition to this, the political and economic markets designate the political system of governance and the economic system, which the political and economic actors enter into rivalry with each other for power in this system.[201]

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[199] Especially Perry Anderson concentrates on the capitalism argument through the feudal background of Europe. For him, feudalism was a mode of production, also an organic unity of economy and polity, and took the form of a chain of parcellized sovereignties in the hierarchical conditions. Herein, the state authority was divided among the feudal lords and itself, and the lordship was an political and economic unity as well. However, this feudal tie was weakened vis-a-vis the growth of the commodity economy during the Enlightenment fact and its background. According to Anderson, this displacement of politico-legal coercion was concluded in countenance of the absolutist state, and it rose with capitalism. In spite of appearance, absolutism was not a capitalist of pre-capitalist model for the state authority. It was the follow-up of feudalism and its basic structure. On the other hand, it was the most important emphasis within the scope of the development of *state capitalism*. For detailed argument, see: Perry Anderson, **Lineages of the Absolutist State,** Verso Press, London, 1974
[200]Pollock, "State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations", p.78
[201] Bruce R. Scott, **The Concept of Capitalism,** Springer Press, Heiledberg 2009, pp.4-5

On the other hand, the political authority controls the production and distribution in the *state capitalism* as well. The state intervenes to the entrepreneurial functions and it is responsible directly (or indirectly) maintaining, expanding and improving of the production and distribution. The profit motive plays still and important role in the *state capitalism*, but the personal initiative is dependent on the managerial bureaucracy or the controlling groups, who are appointed by the state or the only authority. The decisions and the actions are oriented for the aim of strengthening the power of this administrative staffs, and the individual interests are subordinated for the common (group) interest.[202]

In some cases, the theory of *state capitalism* bears a resemblance to the theory of *bureaucratic collectivism.*[203] Both theories are based on the view of collective ownership. Especially, Tony Cliff mentioned in his study *State Capitalism in Russia* that the world system transformation can be provided with the *state capitalism,* which is developed by Lenin. According to Cliff, Lenin's theory can clarify the monopoly and competition dialectic with the *state capitalism* fact.[204] In addition, Nikolai Bukharin stressed the position of the finance issue and claimed that the finance capital removed the production anarchy in the big capitalist states.[205] Whereas this kind of a structure had pumped the 'national monopoly' and the 'centralization of the capital' in the developing and dependent countries. The Pahlavi monarchy in Iran was the most known case in this category (developing and dependent countries).

In the capitalist society, the structures of classes and their interaction to each other are shaped with the socio-economic interests of the state and classes. The bourgeois, the middle class, the working class and the political functionaries are the classes of the capitalist state, and they concentrates on the ownership of the means of production, the authority in economic decision-making and skills in relation to production. The interests of the working and middle classes are not always in

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[202]Pollock, "State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations",p.81

[203]This kind of state owns the means of production for distributing the surplus among an elite party bureaucracy (nomenklatura, rather than among the working class. The bureaucratic collectivism is used generally by Trotskyists to describe the nature of the Soviet Union under the rule of Joseph Stalin.

[204] Tony Cliff, **State Capitalism in Russia,** Pluto Press, London, 1974, p.170

[205] Nikolai Bukharin, **Dönüşüm Dönemi Ekonomisi**, Pencere Press, İstanbul, 1989, p.14

correspondence with the interest of the dominant upper class and the state. Only a viable democratic process can entail to reduce the political and social inequality gap.[206] This fact called as the *class power structure*.

The concept of 'civil society' is also the major component of the *class power structure* in capitalism. These social activities, organizations and initiatives are placed into the state's political and economic structures. The civil society includes the voluntary associations, trade unions, workers' committees, political parties, religious associations, the organizations of women and youth. On the other hand, there is a descriptive differentiation about the civil society as well. For example the liberals connect the civil society with the individuality and private property (market system), but the leftist movements sees it as a democratic activity.[207] However, in any case, "requires a willingness to recognize that the social totality shaping civil society is a sphere of inequality and conflict - and that maybe revitalizing civil society requires heightened levels of political struggle over state policy rather than good manners and civil discourse."[208]

However, in a *state power structure*, the dominant classes, that is in sight to the state apparatus, influences the state, which often imposes order in class struggles in favor of the dominant class's interests. "As such, the capitalist state in neither the mere instrument of the dominant class nor a neutral arbitrator between classes. Rather, it is the balance of power among classes and social groups. And states that are centralized, despotic, theocratic, bureaucratized, religious or militarized in nature do not enjoy a balance of power with civil society, and thus cannot sustain a democracy."[209]

Moreover, the political considerations play an important position in this system as well; because the state institutions can be manipulate the market outcomes for the political purposes. The state-owned enterprises and the national corporations

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[206] Dietrich Rueshemeyer and the others, **Capitalist Development and Democracy**, University of Chicago Press, 1992,p.245
[207] John Hall, **Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison**, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, p.6
[208] John Ehrenberg, **Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea,** New York University Press,1999, p.249
[209] Farhad Nomani and Sohrab Behdad, "Labor Rights and the Democracy Movement in Iran: Building a Social Democracy", **Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights**, Vol.10, Issue 4, (2012), p.215

are the primary actors of the *state capitalism*, and the 'business' needs to link closely to the 'politics'. Because the domestic instabilities can be threaten the common interest. "The one essential feature of state capitalism is the existence of close ties binding together those who govern a country and those who run its enterprises."[210]

The political intervention constitutes the ultimate source of both multilayered class relations and the consequent economic exploitation of one class by the other. Franz Oppenheimer stressed the political position of the state through this market system, and called it as the *political capitalism* as well.[211] "The state, as the institutionalization of the political means, necessarily generates a process of continuing class conflict since the political means, by its very nature, creates a series of negative sum relationships –that is, one individual or group gains only at the expense of another"[212].

It can be said that the capitalism had developed primarily in England around the world. With the industrial revolution, every component was rebuilt with the capitalism argument in England: 'capitalist democracy', 'capitalist industry', 'capitalist production', 'capitalist urbanization' and so on. Actually, "the modernization could proceed in England without the huge reservoir of conservative and reactionary forces that existed at certain points in Germany and Japan."[213]

By the reason of the independence of the nobility from the crown, the progress of commercial agriculture, the growth of a trading and manufacturing class with its own strong economic base and the disappearance of the peasant problem, England reached to the industrial capitalism and the free-market system. The other capitalism cases, such as France, Germany or Japan, entered to the capitalistic world through high degree independence with state.[214] On the other hand, some states, such as China and Russia were characterized as cases of *state capitalism* as well. Both states did not go through the phases of mercantilism and modernization like

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[210]Ian Bremmer, "State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?", **Foreign Affairs**, (May/June 2009), p.5
[211]Franz Oppenheimer, **The State,** Free Life Editions, New York, 1973, p.74
[212]Walter E. Grinder and John Hagel, "Toward a Theory of State Capitalism: Ultimate Decision-Making and Class Structure", **Journal of Libertarian Studies,** Vol.1, No:1, p.68
[213]Barrington Moore Jr.,**Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World,** Penguin University Books, London, 1974, p.30
[214]**Ibid.,** p.40

European contemporaries. They founded a strong centralized state structure and controlled the whole economic, social and political circumstances with the state apparatus.

2.1.1. State Capitalism in Iran

The state-directed capitalism can be seen in an Islamic structure as well. Fundamentally, the Islamic capitalism was formed as the 'commercial capitalism' in the medieval era. The unstable structure of the commercial capitalism was required to arrange with the Islamic commands and prohibitions (from the *Koran* and *hadiths*). Neither the Islamic law nor the Muslim administrators had autonomous attitudes from the authority. At this point, the Islamic state (authority) modeled as a 'home (domestic) economy' (*İlmu't-Tedbîru'l-Menzîl*), which is inspired from Aristotle's philosophy.

The aim of the home economy was managing the households, consisted of wife(s), children and slaves, organizing their relations. Progressing the goodness and avoiding from the badness was the main issue in the structure of home economy. The head of household (husband) was the only authority, which creates and manages this domestic order. In the Islamic view, the position of the head of household was a moral system, and the state authority was originated basically from this perspective. The ruler was responsible from the national subject and his power came from a moral level, which shapes with the Islamic approach. Moreover, the commercial activities of the household were regarded necessary in the Islamic view. However, they were seen as the tools of the life maintainability for the whole house. Also, these activities were not accepted for the individuals profit like in the modern times capitalism.[215]

As its standards, Islam is not adaptable to the capitalist system. Founding an independent economic structure cannot seen in the industrial capitalism, because of the background of the traditional authority. The economy had not been an

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[215] Subhi Y. Labib, "Ortaçağ İslam Dünyasında Kapitalizm", (Trans. Mustafa Alican), **The History School,** No:14, (Spring-Summer 2013), pp.242-243

independent sector due to the transcendental nature of power in Islam. Although the industrial capitalism entered to the Islamic world within the modernization experiences during the late 19th century, the cultural sign of Islam brings about a different system from the one brought about by Christianity. Because of that capitalism took place through the European domination into the Islamic world and the modernization struggle began between the state and the society. Even though modernization penetrated the Islamic thought, law and regulations, the social and cultural components did not finish the struggle with the industrial capitalism and its values.

On the other hand, the Weberian view was seen as the phenomenon for explaining the Islamic argument in the Western academic life. Weber's basic contrast was based on the challenge of Western tradition of Puritan asceticism to the Eastern mystical ethics.[216] The connection between the religions and capitalism was framed *in Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904)* by Weber, and his thesis about the patrimonial domination highlighted the perception of Islamic capitalism.

According to Talcott Parsons, (for Weberian approach) capitalism arose in the material conditions, and the modern rational bourgeois capitalism appeared as a dominant phenomenon only in the West.[217] Actually, Weber attempt to demonstrate the mutual reinforcement between economic and religious ethics, but he failed about it.[218] Because "the Weber's 'interpretative explanation' had never faced the problem of whether a complex meaning system such as 'Islam' can be unambiguously treated as a religion."[219]

According to Bryan Turner, "the Islamic institutions were incompatible with capitalism because they had been dominated by a long history of patrimonialism. Islamic beliefs were certainly influential but still secondary to patrimonial

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[216] Sami Zubaida, "Economic and Political Activism in Islam", **Economy and Society,** Vol.1, Issue 3, (1972), p. 309

[217] Talcott Parsons, **The Structure of Social Action,** Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, Volume 1, 1949, p.512

[218] Ferdinand Kolegar, "The Concept of Rationalization and Cultural Pessimism in Max Weber's Sociology", **Sociological Quarterly,** Vol. 5, Issue 4, (1964), p.362

[219] Bryan S. Turner, "Islam, Capitalism and the Weber Theses", **The British Journal of Sociology***, Vol.25, No:2, (July 1974), p.233

conditioning."[220] Weber saw Islam as a 'national Arabic warrior religion'[221] and this fact was the base of the patrimonial (feudal) structure.[222]

Even though capitalism developed against a warrior identity and in 'a Protestant salvation' condition, Islam grew with 'the Holy War on the name of God' argument. The occidentalist approach criticizes Weber on the doctrine of class relation. Weber evaluates Christianity on the 'itinerant artificer and craftsman' perspective and he believed that this perspective creates an urban middle class, which is the main pillar of capitalism. Whereas, Islam was linked with the Bedouin warriors, and this warlike motive was seen as the main obstacle in front of the development of capitalism by Weber.

In addition, the Weber's sociology of law separated the law making attitude, which is the main component of capitalism as well. The Islamic legal judgments were arbitrary and shaped above two pillars: the customary law and the *Shari'a* (depended on the *Koran*). The law makers did not follow the general principles or *ad hoc* law procedures in Islam. For Weber, these arbitrary factors shaped on a particularistic an irrational ground. Because of this lack of a systematic formal law tradition, the rational capitalism could not really progress in the Islamic societies.

In Weberian view, the lawyers and the entrepreneurs were drawn from the same social class and shared the common interests. The social context of institutionalization of law and the political autonomy was crucial for capitalist contractual relations. However the instability and inflexibility of the patrimonial ruler ship cannot provide this kind of circumstances in Islam. In addition, the patrimonial bureaucracy was far away from the capitalist industrialization because of the Islamic view about the right of private property. The decline of the money economy and the

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[220]**Ibid.,** p.231

[221]According to Weber, two important social groups were blocked establishing the connection between Islam and capitalism: the warrior group and the Sufi brotherhoods. Weber saw Sufism as a mass religiosity which enabled Islam to reach its conquered subjects through their indigenous symbolism and ritual. For detailed argument, see: Turner, "Islam, Capitalism and the Weber Theses", pp.234-235

[222] Max Weber, **The Sociology of Religion**,(Trans. Ephraim Fischoff), Beacon Press, London, 1993,p.264

increasing arbitrariness in law, land rights and civic relations were developed in the inversely proportional, and Weber called as *sultanism*.[223]

Apart from the Weberian approach or its criticism, the term of justice is consolidated with the unequal moral values in the Islamic system. As Lewis stressed, there is a structure in Islam, which is shaped on the sovereign's (ruler, men, free people or Muslims etc.) superiority above the national subject, women, children, slaves or non-Moslems.[224] This sufferable inequality is formed with the societal mechanism -not the individual rights-as the systematical function of Islam. As Maxime Rodinson mentioned, this Islamic system seems distant from the economic and social structure of capitalism.[225]

According to Rodinson, the Islamic system comprises the denominational contradictions because of the closure about the alternatives of the ownership relations. However, he points that the structural conditions at the expansion period of Islam were very different than at the present time. Especially, the contemporary class contradictions could not be understands with that time's conditions. Starting this point of view, Radinson presents that the components, originated from the Islamic belief systematic, does not prevent historically the capitalist growth. For him, the capital form of the Medieval Islamic era was not so much different than the European's structure. In this way, he precipitates that Islam does not pose an obstacle in the first level of the modern capitalism.[226]

Actually, there is not a direct connection between Islam and capitalism, as Rodinson mentioned. Because, the *Koran*, as the primary source of Islam, does not imply an economy-politic perspective. It is more of a sociological regulation and does not discuss the right of ownership. On the other hand, 'doing well for the name of God' was used as the economical activity by the rightist Muslims as well. As a result, producing for the market can be explained through the *Koran* and the tradition.[227]

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[223] Weber, **Economy and Society,** Vol.3, p.1097
[224]Bernard Lewis, "İslam Devrimi", **Tarih ve Toplum Dergisi,** Cilt: 15, Sayı: 85, (1991), p.51
[225]Rodinson, **İslamiyet ve Kapitalizm,** pp. 103-104
[226]**Ibid.,** p.28, 60-64
[227]**Ibid.,** p.46, 56-57

Starting from the 'Islamic capitalism' doctrine, we can say that Islam can signify itself with a strong and authoritarian statism in capitalism; and Iran can be a special case about it. The state-dependent capitalism (like modernization) was a characteristic of Iran since the Qajar dynasty. The Iranian society did not experience capitalism or modernization with the way of gradualism. The process of modernization was managed by the state and capitalism was taken into the country through the state authority.

The authoritarian state structure has appeared despite the legislative regulations with the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1907) in Iran.[228]However, the organic coercion behavior of the state has shown his face during the Pahlavi era – in the consolidation of the Iranian national unity, its single national identity and the (aggressive) aim of economic development. For gaining legitimacy and controlling the sources (such as financial resources, mass media and educational institutions), the state intervened in the society and generated a dependent class to it. "The political system in Iran has persistently subjected the economic system to its control. In an overview of Iranian history, it is always visible that just those people could become wealthy and possess economic power that could also build contracts with the political system and the government's officials and proceed to conduct their economic plans and actions with their approval."[229]

It is a known fact that the state power has been transcended from the society in Iran; it is a genetic code. The state has strengthened its exclusive power before the society, and the social classes were dominated by the absolute authority of the state. When the capitalist structure has arose with the modernity movement in Iran, a bourgeois class, coming from the old landowners, was springed by the state. This state-dependent base of the Iranian bourgeoisie has faced imposing the state's

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[228] For detailed information about the theorizing of Iran capitalism in Constitutional Revolution, see: Kamran Matin, "Democracy without Capitalism: Retheorizing Iran's Constitutional Revolution", **Middle East Critique**, Vol.21, No:1, (Spring 2012), pp.37-56

[229] Rahman Ghahremanpour, "Capitalism and Political Development in Iran", **An Iranian Quarterly**, Vol.5, No:4, (Spring 2004), p.73

policies both in the monarchic and republican eras.[230] Therefore, the etatism was constituted in Iran during the 20th century.

The Pahlavi monarchy monopolized its power and authority through oil industry, and this circumstance brought about a strict social disintegration. The Iranian civil society marginalized under the authority of Reza Pahlavi, and the central government turned up pressure on the traditional groups -*ulama* and *bazaar*- and the working class with the modern reforms, which were launched by the arbitrary and authoritarian state institutions. These social groups were forced to accept these unwelcome reforms of the modern and capitalist economic system. Actually, the preference of weakening the resistance of these groups against the authority created a deep-seated and extended grassroots movement. This movement began in the period of 'father' Pahlavi, and came into focus in the era of his 'son'. The dual position of the administration (the Shah and the clergy) along the Qajar era removed with the modernization project in the Pahlavi dynasty. The state established a monistic and centralized authority above the society.[231]

On the other hand, the ruling elites maintained and protected the close and direct relation with the political system. The ruling class surrendered to the state authority when they thought that the protection of the system depended on the acceptance of the change, and this change cannot be perceived as a threat by the system. However the 'marginalized' groups (intellectuals, working class, *ulama*, *bazaar*, women and youth) , called as in this manner by the state, were included in the state's blacklist because of their opposing position.[232]

The obstacles of the political circumstances and the modernization process displayed the structural barriers that are rooted in the lack of capitalism in Iran during the 20th century. Especially, the absence of the rationality, the failure to the administrative change, despotism, the conspiracy theory and the socio-psychological bases of political nondevelopment, the lack of formation of the civil society, the

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[230] Mohammad Amjad, **Iran: From Royal Dictatorship to Theocracy,** (Trans. Hossein Moftakhari), Center for Recognition of Islam and Iran, Tehran, 2001, p.150
[231] Masood Kamali, **Civil Society, State and Modernization in Contemporary Iran**, (Trans. Kamal Pouladi), Center for Recognition of Islam and Iran, Tehran, 2002, p.182, 249
[232] Ghahremanpour, "Capitalism and Political Development in Iran", p.75

persistence of autocracy, the rentier state structure and the arbitrary nature of the political power are the above-stated obstacles in Iran.[233]

Actually, this state capitalism structure was depended on the oil industry in Iran, and this structure was created substantially during the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. When he succeeded to the throne instead of his father, it was hoped that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi will allow more freedom than before. However the Western admiration of the Pahlavi administration did not change in the reign of the son, and because of that, the Iranian people acted with suspicion towards the monarchy. Also this Western admiration had been the 'Achilles' heel' of the Pahlavi monarchy.

This suspicion of Iranians was majorly based on the British domination. Because, Britain kept niggardly the oil drilling rights, and Iranians was living on the poor and lover conditions than British in their respective country. From 1941 to 1953, the nationalist wave involved Iran, and Mohammad Mosaddegh was seen as a savior. Especially, his move of the oil nationalization prompted a confidential intervention by America and Britain, and the suspicion about the foreign involvement became real with the CIA-organized coup d'état in 1953. Thus the Shah was put into power with the plenary authority by these foreigners. From this date on, the most Iranians believed that "a foreign conspiracy in alliance with domestic conservative forces had been the root cause of the failure to nationalize Iranian oil had a strong influence on the development of a discourse of economic independence throughout the 1960s and 1970s."[234] And as Fred Halliday mentioned, "before 1950s foreign investments outside the oil sector was minute. In the period following the coup it developed rapidly, mostly in the form of investment in subsidiaries of multinationals, in partnership with the state or with indigenous private capital."[235]

The Shah created a circle that composed a loyal bourgeois to the royal family during the 1950s and 1960s. He acted as if Mosaddegh and his national front did not exist in Iran. On the other hand, he recognized the changing world conjuncture and

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[233]**Ibid.,** p.85
[234] Evaleila Pesaran, "Towards and Anti-Western Stance: The Economic Discourse of Iran's 1979 Revolution", **Iranian Studies,** Vol.41, No:5, (December 2008), p.696
[235] Fred Halliday, **Iran: Dictatorship and Development,** Penguin Press, London, 1978, p.153

the restlessness of Iranian people. For this reason, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi declared the White Revolution, consisting of a set of reforms, in 1963. This reform package included on large scale industrialization, but is met with reaction of clergy and landowners. Ayatollah Khomeini was the main opponent against the monarchy in that time. Khomeini thought that the 'White House effect' was the only 'white' thing in this revolution. For him, the Shah strengthened the economic privileges and the effect of the foreign powers increased with this 'white' initiative. Also, there is a remark that the 'White' Revolution triggered off the 'Green' Revolution during the 1960s.[236]

Actually, the modernization and its industrial effects succeeded at the first stage. A relative economic welfare and social developments were observed in the 1960s. The inflation was kept low; a new and educated middle class was created; and the education opportunity for everybody improved steeply. However, the distribution of income was not fair. The state capitalism was depended on the oil industry and the distribution of the oil revenues. From the coup d'état (1953) to the Iran Revolution (1979), the oil revenues had jumped from 34 million dollars to 20 billion dollars, and the cumulative oil income came to as much as 54 billion dollars. This income was divided among the princely palaces, royal grand tours, major festivals, solid gold bathtubs, nuclear projects and ultra-sophisticated (NATO) weapons. Nearly 30 billion dollars oil income was spent on economic and social project in the course of the five each year's Development Plans.[237]

In point of fact, the industrialization project was adapted from the economic stabilization program of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the early 1960s. Whereas it had its own social costs and unfavorable economic consequences. The economy policy concentrated on the rapid economic growth, but very little attention

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[236]Rachid Omar, "İran: Bir Devrimin Anatomisi", **Al Jazeera Turk Documentary**, http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/izle/iran-bir-devrimin-anatomisi (12.02.2014)
[237] Ervand Abrahamian, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution", **MERIP Reports,** No:87, (May 1980), p.22

was paid to the distributional and structural implications of this project.[238] As Mohammad Hashem Pesaran mentioned,

> "This growth strategy was based on the bogus assumption that the benefits of high rates of growth would somehow automatically 'trickle down' from the rich to the low income groups, and on the erroneous belief that the magnitude of the Gross National Product, particularly in a major oil-exporting country like Iran, can be regarded as satisfactory yardstick for the economy's development and progress. The benefits of rising real income, even if they did 'trickle down', were not enough to improve or even stop the unfavorable trend in the distribution of income and wealth among households and geographical regions, as well as between rural and urban areas that existed in the early 1960s."[239]

Also, Pesaran summarized the reasons of these unfavorable socio-economic conditions in his article. First of all, the liberal economy policies created a local wealthy industrial class (elites), who had a close and political connection with the Shah and the royal family. These industrialists (approximately fifty entrepreneurs) owned the bulk of the large-scale private sector industries and constituted a dependent capitalist class from the import-substitution strategy. In addition to this, this import-substituting firms increased costs of imports to the other firms, and tended to buy their required capital and products from their foreign partners. This position damaged the 'forward' and 'backward' linkages to the domestic suppliers.[240]

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi[241] had created his own dependent capitalist class and shared Iran's oil revenues mostly with these industrial entrepreneurs. In this picture, the foreign firms provided technology, managerial skills and finance capital to these industrial elites in return for business partnership and easy access to Iran's expanding market. "Substantial and rising oil revenues and the implementation of development plans through the granting of government contracts to the private sector

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[238] Mohammad Hashem Pesaran, "The System of Dependent Capitalism in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Iran", **International Journal of Middle East Studies,** Vol.14, No.4, (November 1982), p.507
[239]**Ibid.,** p.507
[240]**Ibid.,** p.509
[241]This state behavior was not only intrinsic to the Pahlavi dynasty. As Ahmad Ashraf highlighted it was seen in the Safavids and Qajars as well. For detailed argument, see: Ahmad Ashraf, "Historical Obstacles to the Development of a Bourgeoisie in Iran", **Iranian Studies,** Vol.2, Issue 2-3, (1969), pp.54-79

were instrumental in centralizing and strengthening the Shah's economic as well as political authority over the bourgeoisie, and were crucial in creating the dependent capitalist class that surfaced over the relatively short period of 1963-1978."[242]

2.2. CHANGING SOCIAL CONFIGURATION IN IRAN

The major economic and social changes had taken place in the urban areas during the Pahlavi Dynasty. However, the political maturity cannot emerge after decades of social and economic development. The gained political rights with the Constitutional Revolution (1906) and the political experiences on the first quarter of twentieth century were forfeited during the autocratic rule of Reza Shah (1925-1941). After the abdication of Reza Shah (August 1941), Iran tried to restorate the constitutional monarchy politically as well as socially and economically. However, Mohammad Reza Shah, who replaced his father Reza Shah, succeeded reestablishing an autocratic monarchy, apparently believing that social and economic gains could not be made under a democratic form of government.[243]

The Pahlavi administration came across a communal reconciling during these autocratic years. As Dabashi mentioned, "there major ideological formations and their corresponding politics emerged out of the anticolonial struggles of Iranians throughout the twentieth century: *nationalism, socialism and Islamism.*"[244] Iran witnessed to the competition between these three ideologies, but at the same time, the parties of these ideologies campaigned all together against the Pahlavi dynasty in the political field. Also the left movement, includes communists, socialists and social democrats, was probably the most suppressed and interfering group in the political circumstances of the twentieth century.

The general opinion was that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ruled 'personally' Iran between 1953 and 1978. Because, from the coronation (1941) to the coup d'état

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[242] Pesaran, "The System of Dependent Capitalism in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Iran", p.511
[243] Habib Ladjevardi, **Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran,** Syracuse University Press, London, 1985, pp.xiv-xv
[244] Hamid Dabashi, **Iran: A People Interrupted,** The New Press, London, 2007, p.72

(1953), Iran was politically in chaos and the young Shah could not take initiatives. After the fall of Mosaddegh's government with a coup d'état on the hand of the 'foreign sponsors' (America and Britain), the dictatorship of the Shah had began. He consolidated the domestic and foreign allies of the Pahlavi monarchy and eliminated the National Front and Tudeh Party, which were the paramount actors during the Mosaddeq period, in the first two years of the coup d'état. After that, his concentration turned to the economic and industrial boom between 1955 and 1960. And this fact was followed by the economic depression and the power struggle from 1960 to 1963.[245] So which dynamics did shape the 1979 Iranian Revolution? And how did the 'White' Revolution turn into the 'Green'?

2.2.1. From the 'White' to the 'Green' Revolution

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi declared the 'White Revolution'[246] because of the problems in both domestic and international spheres in 1963. Because the White Revolution would become the most important substitution project after the economic recession years since 1953. "It was intended to be a bloodless revolution from above aimed at fulfilling the expectations of an increasingly politically aware general public as well as an ambitious and growing professional socio-economic group, and as such anticipating and preventing what many considered to be the danger of a bloody revolution from below."[247]

This reform package included the land reform, the nationalization of woods and forests, and the women's suffrage, the creation of a literacy corps to combat illiteracy, the industrial profit sharing and the denationalization of some state

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[245] Katouzian, **The Persians: Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Iran,** pp.253-254

[246] With this reform program, the Shah strengthen the traditional state authority and took it a step further towards Westernization. He aimed to get rid of the influence of landlords and to create a new base of support among the peasants and working class. For equalizing the legitimacy debates of the White Revolution, the Shah called for a national referendum in 1963, and it was accepted with a overwhelming majority. However, it was realized after a little while, that the White Revolution lacked the technical, managerial and organizational power it needed to succeed. See: Sussan Siavoshi, **Liberal Nationalism in Iran: The Failure of a Movement,** Westview Press, Colorado, 1990

[247] Ali Ansari,"The Myth of the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah, 'Modernization' and the Consolidation of Power", **Middle Eastern Studies,** Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 2001), p.2

industries for financing this program.[248] Even though the White Revolution has been created a recovery wave in the social classes, it was rejected and criticized by two strong groups: the clergies and the landowners. And this split caused top it the state (the Shah) against the society (the opposition movement) in the long term.

According to the mutual opinion, America encouraged the Shah so as to declare a reform program for keeping Iran from the communism and Soviet bloc. In other respects, the Shah aimed to catch the growing speed of Japan and Germany and wanted to create a modernized Iran with the oil revenues. However, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi could not build a viable industrial base because of the high-speed growth. The tremendous cash entered to the country with the high price of oil selling, but the Shah directed this money to the modernization and infrastructure works. Economically, this action created inflation, and the Iranians could not be adapted to the social alteration so fast.

The White Revolution was seen as the strategy for legitimating of Pahlavi monarchy. Ali Ansari took a stand against the monarchy and supported that "the Shah tried to harness the White Revolution as a vehicle for unifying the country by ostensibly giving peasants a stake in the economic welfare of the state, while at the same time of course being grateful to their sovereign for having released them from their 'servitude' to ruthless and exploitative landlords. These landlords, included not only the aristocracy but members of the *bazaar* and *ulama*, were characterized as the 'feudal' reactionary enemy, in a direct borrowing of language from the West, which can have meant little to most Iranian peasants."[249]

Fundamentally, the state authority took the land from the landlords and gave it to the peasants with a fair price below the market value with the land reform. In addition, the state provided the long-reaching loan facility at the very low interest rates for the peasants. Millions of Iranian people brought their freedom, and a new class, the commercial farmers, occurred with this movement. However, the half of the rural population could not obtain lands because of the insufficient technical calculations and the disorderly administrative impediments. The result of this fact,

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[248]Katouzian, **The Persians: Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Iran,** p.260
[249]Ansari,"The Myth of the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah, 'Modernization' and the Consolidation of Power", p.3

the rural population separated into three groups: 'the prosperous farmers', who were taken the real benefit from the land reform and became a village headman or a bailiff; 'the small landowners', who stayed as the sharecroppers in a land; and 'the village laborers', who tried to survive as the farm hands or shepherds. And finally, the second and the third group were obliged to migrate from the rural to the urban for living and working.[250]

The land reform must be seen as an attempt by the Shah and his political elite. They, first of all, preserved their control over the whole opposition movements (the clergy and the nationalist fronts), the urban bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy. Both of these groups, although for differing reasons, opposed the government's economic policies, which were designed for industrializing Iran through the expansion of foreign investment and control. For their point of view, this land reform package would prepare the way for capitalist-oriented development which in turn would broaden the investment possibilities for American corporations.[251]

Another class, the industrial class, was included in the scope of this reform package (The White Revolution). The manufacturing plants and factories were sold or privatized on behalf of the government sources. This fact created the factory owners class, who help to industrialize the Iran. In addition, the industrial workers class (in private sector) began to take share out of profit. In this period, small mills were opened, specialized in clothing, food, cement, tiles and home appliances; big textile, machine tools and car assembly factories were founded by the new industrial patronage.[252] However, the capitalist industrialization has been brought the division of labor fact (the work specialization) in its wake as well. The working class faced with the capitalist reality and was obliged to steer for specialization and education, but among other things, the industrial masters preferred to employ the default labor force.

In addition, this industrialization thrust provided a momentum for the Iranian private sector. The Shah saw the private sector as the guide for the development of

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[250]Abrahamian, **A History of Modern Iran,** pp.131-139
[251] René Theberge, "Iran: Ten Years After the White Revolution", **MERIP Reports,** No. 18 (June, 1973), p.11
[252]Abrahamian, **A History of Modern Iran,** p.133

light industries, while the state handled the large-scale industrial projects. The textile industries, food processing, footwear and consumer goods represented as the boom fields of the private sector between 1963 and 1975. Also the private sector had reached 75 percent in total industrial production.[253]

Moreover, the Western-style education grew after the launching of the White Revolution as well. The modern schools were opened, and also instituting new educational policies designed to undercut clerical control over (religious) education. Women gained their rights for voting and electing as well.[254] However the clergies challenged strongly to the Shah about these subjects and stayed against the family law. They used their influence over the people who migrated from the rural area, and ganged up on the Shah with the *bazaar* class, which were the taskmaster of this migrating people.

Another and major development happened in the field of public administration with the White Revolution. "The Iranian political system, saddled with an old, established bureaucracy, has so far made little headway in administrative change. Nevertheless, some changes are on the horizon. For example, the quality of personnel has improved considerably in the NIOC, the Central Bank, and the Plan Organization. What is called the 'Administrative Revolution Conference' met in 1967 and was followed by the creation of the Government Department Evaluation Organization (GDEO). GDEO's primary function is to oversee administrative changes. Two of its guiding principles are the merit system in personnel recruitment and the abolition of 'unnecessary' rules and regulations. But not much else has been done. The Shah himself has been cited to have stated that 95 percent of government institutions were based on 'irrational and unsound principles'. Informed Tehran is themselves view the shortcomings of the administrative system as stemming not only from over centralization of authority in Tehran, and from overstaffing, inefficiency, and incompetence alone, but also from outworn attitudes."[255]

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[253] Nimah Mazaheri, "An 'Informal' Revolution: State-Business Conflict and Industrial Change in Iran", **Middle Eastern Studies,** Vol.44, No.4, (July 2008), p.589
[254] Abrahamian, **A History of Modern Iran,** p.134
[255] Rouhollah Ramazani, "Iran's 'White Revolution': A Study in Political Development*",* **International Journal of Middle East Studies,** Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr., 1974), pp. 131-132

Principally, Iran had enormous potential for economic growth. According to the Shah, Iran would become the world's most powerful industrialized country by the late 1980s. The annual GNP growth rate waved between %12 and %15 during the 1960s and 1970s. This increase has largely arisen from the vast increase in oil revenues (from 5 billion to over 23 billion dollars in the course of 1970s) but the huge mineral resources which remain largely untouched place Iran in an enviable position.[256]

> "The oil revenues had to filter down the public sectors that have all too frequently been starved of funds and the rate of inflation, officially described as 'imported inflation', has continued to accelerate at between 20% and 40% depending on which figures are used.(...) In spite of such grandiose expenditure, however, Iran still suffers from many of those familiar symptoms of underdevelopment: a slow and lethargic bureaucracy, conservative attitudes, air-conditioned planning, the gap between promise and performance, the growing gap between rich and poor, rural and urban sectors. (…)Agriculture is still the principal economic activity for the majority of Iranian people, but although it employs over 40% of the labor force, it accounts for less than 30% of the national income."[257]

Also, the traditional middle class was mainly under control by the Shah between 1953 and 1975. The regimes behold the bazaar, its associations and its connection with the clergy, but it did not try to destroy the bazaar economy and ignored the silent opposition, came from 'the *ulama-bazaar* alliance'. However, this fact failed with the conjuncture of the last half of 1970s. The Shah turned up pressure in 1975 and attacked to the bazaar until 1977, during the spiraling inflation. Simultaneously, the oppression above the religious leaders increased and the religious schools in Qum was closed down. In addition to this circumstance, because of the unplanned urbanization, the urban ranks of the unemployed grew up and found their representation into the Islamic discourse, which occurred as an alternative versus the Shah regime.

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[256] Keith Watson, "The Shah's White Revolution-Education and Reform in Iran", **Comparative Education,** Vol. 12, No. 1 (Mar., 1976), p.23
[257] **Ibid.,** p.25

"Two very different interpretations have been offered to explain the long-term causes of the Islamic revolution. One interpretation -accepted by supporters of the Pahlavi regime- claims that the revolution occurred because of the Shah modernized too much and too quickly for his traditional-minded and backward-looking people. The other -favored by opponents of the regime- argues that the revolution occurred because the Shah did not modernize fast enough and thoroughly enough to overcome his initial handicap being CIA-installed monarchy in an age of nationalism, neutralism and republicanism. (…) Both hare half right and half wrong; that the revolution came because the Shah modernized on the socioeconomic level and thus expanded the ranks of the modern middle class and the industrial working class, but failed to modernize on another level –the political level…"[258]

In the meantime, the upper class formed in the narrow circle of royal family, senior politicians, government and military officials, entrepreneurs, industrialists and commercial farmers. This class owned more than 85 percent of the large firms (insurance, banking, manufacturing and urban construction). However, the population of this class was not more than 5 percent of the whole country.[259] Also, the White Revolution was a program that was formulated for sustaining the political status quo by the elites and the Shah concentrated to the consolidating of his power through the modernization process.

According to Ervand Abrahamian, the socio-economic implications of the Pahlavi modernization project could be seen ideally in the field of education and industry. The state bureaucracy, the salaried middle class and the urban proletariat, which were the supporter of the Pahlavi regime, were the core elements of this socio-economic platform.[260] But still, because of the two major reasons, the socio-economic growth failed:

"First, the 1953 *coup* not only overthrew the popular leader Dr. Mossadegh, but also destroyed labor unions, Professional associations, and all independent political parties, and dug a wide, even unbridgeable, gulf between the regime and the two modern classes. Second, the regime further widened this gulf by

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[258] Abrahamian, **Iran Between Two Revolutions,** pp.426-427
[259] **Ibid.,** p.138
[260] Abrahamian, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution", p. 20

implementing policies benefiting the upper class rather than the middle and lower class, which had no pressure groups through which they could alter or peacefully oppose government decisions."[261]

That's a given that this modernization thrust had produced a professional and educated middle class. In addition, this new class demanded a participatory democracy and political freedom as well. Whereas, the Shah's reform included only the modernization of economy and social fields. The slobbering of political superstructure and the pressure of the political groups triggered the anti-Shah movement. The secular institutions, such as the student organizations, trade unions, political parties and Parliament, were prohibited or rendered functionally powerless by the Shah.

Eventually, Abrahamian divided the Iranian society by respecting two different living spaces: rural and urban areas. The first rural class was formed by the absentee farmers, the religious foundations, agro-businesses and the land lords; they were very close to the royal family. The second (independent farmers) and third (agricultural laborers) groups were benefited from the land reform as above mentioned. However, the urban classes divided into four groups within the scope of the industrial expansion. The upper class (no more than one thousand individuals) comprised of the royal family, aristocrats, veteran politicians and entrepreneurs, who were owned the 85 percent of the public and private sectors. The propertied middle class were composed of the bazaar community and clergies, who were numbered nearly one million families. On the other hand, the salaried middle class included the civil servants, teachers, school administrators, engineers, managers and white-collar workers, who were comprised of especially by women. And the group of people formed the working class, who grew nearly fivefold in the period between 1963 and 1977, because of the industrialization.[262] Briefly, Katouzian entitled the period of 1963-1978 as "a pseudo-modernist despotism based on oil"[263].

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[261]**Ibid.,** p.22
[262]**Ibid.,** pp.429-434
[263]Homa Katouzian, **Political Economy of Iran,** (Trans. Reza Nafisi and Kambiz Azizi), Markaz Press, Tehran, 1997, p.279

According to Gabriel Almond, 'the development movements of the countries' facilitate the fundamental framework of the 'civilization challengers'. In this context, he identifies four revolutionary challengers for the 'new nations': a *national* revolution, an *authority* revolution, a *participation* revolution, and a *welfare* revolution.[264] The goal of the Iranian socio-economic modernization had the highest priority in the era of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, especially after the 1960s. In the light of this circumstance, the White Revolution was called as a *welfare* revolution by Almond, because it was bound to have far-reaching implications for Iran's other basic goals.

The very first implication of the White Revolution was the domestic and international power consolidation of the Shah. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi envisaged a new and active role for Iran in the international field, and he attributed this approach to the socio-economic modernization project. Secondly, the Shah blessed the Iranian identity for solving the problematique of the national integration. The Azeri and Kurdish rebellions of 1945 had reflected the communal uprisings, but there is little doubt that the Soviet Union played the dominant role in the rise of the so-called autonomous republics. The Shah also used the socio-economic development project for preventing the Soviet hazard. In brief, the White Revolution was seen as the ultimate US answer to the economic breakdown of the 1950s, and the Pahlavi administration tried to give voice to a flatulent momentum for the Iranian society.

2.2.2. Social Articulations and Responses in the Pahlavi Monarchy

The Iranian society changed dramatically from the 'White' to the 'Green' Revolution. The political decision of the society was affected from the world conjuncture. The astatic economic and social reforms created a resistance, because of that the social classes positioned in their own and special structures against the state authority. On the other hand, the social classes interacted with each other as long as

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[264]Gabriel Almond, *Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory,* Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970, pp. 223-33.

the state institutions applied pressure. Some political fronts represented the social classes during this process, but in generally the social classes kept together under the title of a social perception: the stance against Shah. In this subtitle, we tried to summarize the main components of the 1979 Iran Revolution through the important social classes in Iran.

2.2.2.1. The Traditionalists: Ulama and Bazaar

The sociological perspectives show that the religious functionary has become politicized and proactive in the social changes. The politicization behavior of the clergy comes up generally with the formation of exclusive rule, centralization of power in the state and increased state reliance on the external factors in the Eastern countries. When the state reliance decreased, the religious institutions take responsibilities to establish an alliance between the state and the society. However, the politicization of the clergy arises with the government economic and political pressures over the middle and lower classes in the population.

On the other hand, the politicization of the religious functionary has adopted ideological shifts as well. As Misagh Parsa mentioned, "this ideological shift by clergy is facilitated in part by the fact that, like students, clerics are directly involved not in the production of material goods, but rather in the production, dissemination, and continuity of the moral and ideological bases of the social order. This engagement with theoretical explanations, justifications, and standards of judgment for the social order may at times stimulate and facilitate the clergy's ideological shift. Finally, their ideological shift and radicalization may be stimulated and intensified where alternative, revolutionary, challengers rise and struggle to transform the social structure."[265]

In this context, it can be said that the state policies influenced the social, political and economic status of the Iranian *ulama* in the Pahlavi monarchy. Actually,

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[265] Misagh Parsa, **States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua and the Philippines,** Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, p.131

the conceptual source of the 1979 Iran Revolution was based two important factors: the role of clergy and the perception of Iranians concerning the past experiences of the foreigner's intervention. The Shi'i *ulama* formed as a potential political and socio-cultural power throughout the Iranian history, because the *ulama* had been mentally and emotionally the most organized group in Iran.

On the other hand, the clergies had not certain behavior under the changing social, political and economic circumstances during the modernization period of Iran. The *ulama* showed different patterns especially in the Pahlavi era. Some of strongly resisted to the modernization; some of isolated themselves from the state policies; and some of gave their contribution to this process and cooperated with the state. At the same time, the Pahlavi monarchy preferred to keep the *ulama* or to suppress their counter voice about the state policies. Starting this point of view; the clergies have been chosen the passive neutrality in the Pahlavi period, for two reasons: i) the political circumstance shoved them; ii) and the Shah constituted his authority over the Persian heritage, instead of the Islamic past.

Actually, Reza Pahlavi adopted a friendly attitude towards the *ulama* in the first years of his reign. He respected to the religious community, and the *ulama* supported his actions for constituting the legitimacy. The government was responsible for protecting and defending the Shi'i faith as the official religion of Iran, and the *ulama* had to fulfill the temporal role of Reza Pahlavi as the guardian of the Shi'i community. However, the conflict between Reza Pahlavi and the *ulama* began with the modernization efforts after the 1925. Most especially, this reciprocal scrimmage surfaced after the reforms in the educational life, and Reza Pahlavi gravitated towards to use of force against the *ulama*.[266]

On the other hand, Reza Pahlavi was in the driving seat about the managing of *awqaf* (pious foundations)[267]. These foundations were the main source of income of the religious groups. The bazaar and the rural area (both the landowners and the peasants) were in connection with the *ulama* through this *awqaf* system. However,

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[266] Mohammad H. Faghfoory, "The Impact of Modernization on the Ulama in Iran: 1925-1941", **Iranian Studies,** Vol. 26, No. 3/4 , (Summer - Autumn,1993), pp.278-280
[267] In the contemporary Iran, the *bonyads* serves a similar function lke *awqafs.*

the duties (preservation of the endowed property, supervision over spending of the a*wqaf* revenues and supervision over proper maintenance of the *awqaf*) of this foundation were given to the government with the regulations of the Pahlavi constitution in 1934. The economic independence of the *ulama* was broken with this law, and the power of this class devastated as well. The state began to control over activities, which were traditionally the clergies' domain.[268]

> "Changes in the nature of the state and its relationship with and attitude toward the clergy naturally compelled the latter to assess their status and adopt appropriate strategies to cope with the new situation. Older and more established ulama chose to retire from politics, devote their time to scholarship, and rely on income from *khums* and *zakat* and other contributions from the faithful. They used their influence and contacts to get state scholarships for higher education for their sons and secure positions for them in the government. The younger ulama, however, having abandoned their clerical garb, either voluntarily or by force turned their efforts to acquiring new skills and a modem education. Thus, the professionalization of the ulama began a process which resulted in the transformation of the clergy into new elite circles. In the process they gained prominence in new professions, particularly in law, education, politics and state ad-ministration."[269]

In brief, the power of the *ulama* was divided and weakened by Reza Pahlavi. While the clergy with drew into the quietism between the 1930s to 1960s, the state leaned decidedly over the modernization thrust in the first and second periods[270] of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's administration.

The *ulama* got on the stage again with the bitterly criticizing of the Shah's White Revolution by Ayatollah Khomeini. A decade earlier a small number of politicized clergies stayed against the Shah due to the confrontation with Mosaddegh; most of them remained nonpolitical. However, after the White Revolution (1963) three different attitudes were seen among the clergies: i) Integration with the state apparatus and full dependence (this kind of clergies were called as the 'royal

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[268]Faghfoory, "The Impact of Modernization on the Ulama in Iran: 1925-1941"*,* pp.289-290
[269]**Ibid.,** pp.306-307
[270] We can divided the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi into three periods: i) the first period 1941-1953; ii) the second period 1953 - 1963; and ii) the third period 1963 - 1978.

ulama'); ii) the Grand Ayatollahs assumed a remote attitude to the Shah regime, and they connected to the community on a spiritual guidance; iii) Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters opposed clearly to the state through the corruption, bribery and pressure issues.[271]

Fundamentally, Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini was the preeminent among the clerics in the early 1960s. He became well known for his vociferous opposition to the Shah and protested against the White Revolution and its modern implications. He opposed to the land reform and claimed that it would have negative economic consequences. Moreover, he became the only political leader in the revolutionary period, because only he called for the overthrow of the Shah's regime during the 1960s and 1970s. His utter rejection of the government and unwillingness to compromise made him meritorious within the Iranian society.[272]

In addition to these circumstances, the *ulama* gained its power in due course of the Shah's struggle with the communism. An independent political party could not be active in Iran during 1960s and 1970s. The Shah was the absolute and only political representative of the Iran. On the other hand, the Shah did not stay back to connect with the *ulama* within the scope of war on communism. In this context, lots of clergies proceeded to train at the universities or in the villages and towns. At the beginning of the 1970s, eleven thousands of students had educated the traditional Shi'i religious education. Moreover, some important clergies did not support the way of Khomeini when he lived in exile. They stayed against the ideology of Khomeini (*Velayat-e Faqih*) and believed that the religious supremacy should be separated from the political authority.[273]

Moreover the secularization thrust and the modern educational system affected the *ulama* and its position in the community as well. The expansion of secular education and rising economic opportunities reduced the interests of many Iranians in traditional instruments. More importantly, a growing number of clerics

[271] William Millward, "Leadership in the Islamic Republic and the Hierarchy of Shi'a Islam", **Commentary,** No:39, (January 1994), p.4
[272] Parsa, **States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions**, pp.134-135
[273] Serkan Taflıoğlu, **Humeyni: İran İslam Devrimi,** Kripto Books, Ankara, 2010, p.77

lost their educational opportunities because of expanding the new educational institutions in the public and private sectors.[274]

In addition to the religious component, the mercantile connection was constituted between the state and the *bazaar* as well. Because "the *bazaaris* served to the state as the financial source of taxes, duties, custom dues, credit and curve for the political and military notables. In return, the governing notables provided the *bazaaris* with protection and overall administration of justice. Also supervised by the state were the daily activities of the *bazaar* concerning quality of products and merchandise as well as the fairness of prices and accuracy of weights. The state dealt with the *bazaari*s collectively, i.e., through the chief of merchants (*malek al-tojjar*) and headmen and masters of *aṣnaf*. These leaders of the *bazaar* were in contact with the governor of the town through the office of the town's mayor (*kalantar*). These offices were all intermediary offices involving dual roles as trustees of the *bazaar* (and city quarters in the case of mayor) and appointees of the state."[275]

Functionally, three types of *bazaar* was seen in the Iranian commercial life: i) the bazaar of Tehran, a strategic center for local, national and international trade; ii) the provincial bazaars for the wholesale and retail trade in the big cities and their hinterlands; and iii) the local bazaars, which retailers and peasant peddlers serve the town or rural areas.[276] However, the transition of the *bazaar* from the traditional to the modern form had caused inequalities within the trade community as a whole. During the Shah's modernization thrust, a general shift from the handicraft production to distributive materials was seen along with the specialization in trade and business agents.

Apart from the connection between the state and the *bazaar*, a strong consociation shaped the public life for many centuries in the urban Iran: the *bazaar* and the mosque. "These two principal networks made a world which the city dwellers organized their everyday communal life. Deriving from this communal

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[274] Parsa, **States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions,** p.138
[275] "Bazaar – Socioeconomic and Political Role", **Encyclopaedia Iranica,** Volume I http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bazar-iii (23.07.2014)
[276] Howard Rotblat, "Social Organization and Development in an Iranian Provincial Bazaar", **Economic Development and Cultural Change,** Vol.23, No.2, (January 1975), p.295

network was an active alliance between the *bazaar* and the mosque with political consequences of utmost significance in Iran."[277]

The clergies and the merchants were disposed to combine the religious guidance and the economic unit. On the one hand, the commercial activities were arranged as the interpreter of Islamic law; on the other hand, the pious foundations, depended on the religious education institutions and mosques, the taxes of the merchants (*zakat* and *houmous*) and the donations were the biggest source of income of the *ulama.* In this relation, the state threatened the privilege of the clergy class and the merchant class. According to Hamid Algar, the mosques were seen as 'the blessed harbor' against the state despotism, and the *ulama* used the *bazaar* always as a pressure tool devoted to the state.[278]

"The *bazaar* as a closely knit community, in part owing to its enclosed physical space, increased the merchants' awareness of each other's public activities. Paying one's religious taxes, contributing to charitable funds, and maintaining a generally good relationship with the *ulama* were all signs of piety and, as such, helpful to maintaining one's respect and honor in the *bazaar* community. For their part, the *ulama'* needed the mass adherence of the *bazaari*s as a basis for their own political power. Encountering the arbitrary and oppressive domination of the governing authority without countervailing powers of their own, the *bazaari*s needed the canopy of the *ulama*'s protection. Furthermore, the religious sentiment and traditional orientation of the *bazaari*s were reinforced by their ties with the *ulama*, by the physical setting of the *bazaar*, and by its communal character. These communal and ideological ties led the *bazaari*s and the *ulama* to share certain similarities in their life-style and world view."[279]

Fundamentally, the charitable trusts (*bonyads*) provided strong relations between the *ulama* and *bazaar.* And these *bonyads* did not only provide the humanitarian aid for the rural area and the poor people, they also helped to deliver the religious funds among the *ulama* and the commercial patronage. The *bonyad's*

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[277] **Ibid.**

[278] Hamid Algar, "20. Yüzyıl İran'ında Ulemanın Muhalif Rolü", (Ed. Edubekir Bagader), (Trans. Osman Bayraktar), **Modern Çağda Ulema,** İz Press, İstanbul, 1991, pp.281-282

[279] "Bazaar – Socioeconomic and Political Role", **Encyclopaedia Iranica,** Volume I http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bazar-iii (23.07.2014)

position continued in the Islamic Republic as well. In addition they expanded their financial resources when they took control of assets confiscated after the revolution from wealthy Iranians and the Pahlavi Foundation.[280]

> "In Iran, the creation of some populist organizations (*bonyads*) maintained the hegemony of revolutionary forces over the subordinated classes and assisted them to administer and pursue social welfare and reconstruction programs. Yet, they are a unique product of the 1979 revolution in the sense that the creation of an Islamic state was mainly based on Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine that the restoration of Muslim unity depended solely on the establishment of a government having the real interests of Muslims at heart."[281]

The fact of the matter is that the traditionalists -the *ulama* and the *bazaar*- criticized the capitalist mode of production of the Pahlavi regime, and promised to become free from the dependence and rentier economy. The religious system offered an Islamic economic framework on the basis of independence, self-sufficiency and distributional justice in practical terms. And for establishing this structure, the *bonyads* became an important instrument for the religious-commercial partnership. Because the *bonyads* provided a unique way to them for reconstruction of religious charities among lower class Iranians and contributed to the ideological and cultural needs of the 'new' Islamic state.[282]

All in all, the clergies faced much less difficulty than the leftist and liberal-nationalist movements. Because the articulation of their ideologies responded the popular demands, but the other two fronts' views and images sounded unfamiliar to the public, especially to the migrating rural population. In 1970s, the *ulama* developed a revolutionary Islamic discourse against the industrial and capitalist state. This discourse positioned against the renovation of the state and the Shah's reactionary violence. According to Amir Poursadigh, the revolutionary *ulama* borrowed the concepts, language and imagery from the full-fledged radicals and the leftist movement. Also the play of this revolutionary Islamic populism was against

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[280] David Thaler and the others, **Mullahs, Guards and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics,** National Defense Research Institute, Pittsburg, 2010, p.57
[281] Ali Saeidi, "The Accountability of Para-Governmental Organizations (Bonyads): The Case of Iranian Foundations", **Iranian Studies,** Vol. 37, No. 3 (September 2004), pp.479-480
[282] **Ibid.,** p.480

the old regime, but a 'new' conservative order was set up like 'intact'.[283] Also the *ulama* wanted to incorporate the (modern) state as well. Ironically it reached to this aim with the institutions of the state, and the state apparatus reinforced the clergy at the end of the day - after the revolution.

In brief, the state policies over the *ulama* began in the early 1960s and resulted in the breakdown of the alliance between the state and the clergy, but the response of the *ulama* was different till the revolutionary period. The highest religious leaders pursued the moderate politics. Because of their avoidance of the political confrontation with the state, the mosques remained open and the religious functionary had not the state pressure's share as the other classes. Thus, the revolutionary challengers could use the mosques for spreading a network by the time of the revolution. This situation greatly helped to Ayatollah Khomeini, at the same time.[284]

On the other hand, the other components of the traditionalist revolutionary Challenger, the *bazaaris* participated to the opposition movement during the revolutionary period (after 1975), not before. They restored the disruptive activities, business shutdowns and general strikes between 1977 and 1979. Also the capitalists had a very important position in the overthrow of the monarchy. For this reason, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had seen the *bazaaris* as a vestige of a backward Iran and cared always to protect the conditions of this class.

It should highlight that the Iranian public had invariably two sides throughout history: The urban population, also the merchant and the *bazaar* community, was the social and economic side; and the *ulama* was the cultural (religious) side, confronted always the authority. Starting this main characteristic of Iran, we can say that mainly these two components specified the structure of state-society conflict.

In general, it is expected that the capitalist class takes an active role, pursues disruptive tactics and joins to the other classes for overthrowing the government in the revolution times. However, "the capitalist may not join the struggles against the

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[283] Amir Poursadigh, **The Determinants of the Revolutionary Disintegration of the State in Iran**, Academic Dissertation in University of Tampere, 2003, p.99
[284] Parsa, **States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions,** p.145

government if rising class conflict and strong revolutionary challenger threaten the entire capitalist system. In such conditions, capitalists may become increasingly dependent on the state to contain the radicals and may thus attempt to steer the outcome of the conflicts in non-revolutionary directions."[285]

Arang Keshavarzian conceptualizes the Iranian *bazaar* in four different missions:

- **The bazaar as traditional type:** The *bazaar* is seen as a holistic way of life in this mission, and encompassed the traditional fields such as the economic forms, the political sensibilities, the social relations and the ideological persuasions. Also, as Ahmad Ashraf reinforced this approach, "the bazaar has served as the cradle of the traditional urban culture in Iran, and has maintained and reproduced its cultural elements in the face of modernization and development."[286]

- **The cultural representations of the bazaar:** Whether in Iran or in 'the Occident world', the popular view about the *bazaar* is shaped through the (Islamic) symbols and figures.

- **The bazaar as a social class:** The *bazaaris* were not a social class for the Marsixt approach, and called as generally the 'little bourgeois' in the Western literature. Whereas the *bazaar* had kept hold of the commercial pulse in the Eastern socio-economic structure. For this reason, the industrialization created competition in Iran, and the Eastern way of thinking stayed against the modernization process, and the *bazaar* became the prominent social class in the revolution period.

- **The bazaar as informal economy:** The urban marketplaces in the developing world are seen as an informal area. The *bazaar*, also, can provide an escape sphere from the state supervision, and covered an alternative (illegal) credit market for the middle and lower-middle classes.[287]

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[285]**Ibid.,** p.197
[286] Ahmad Ashraf, ''Bazaar and Mosque in Iran's Revolution,'' **MERIP Reports,** March–April 1983, p.16
[287] Arang Keshavarzian, **Bazaar and State in Iran,** Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pp.46-62

From this point forth, it can be said that the *bazaaris*[288] began to be determinative figure in Iran. But before the reign of Reza Pahlavi such kind of a special class and its members were represented by the landowners, or found a place inside the *ulama* for gaining the political and social interactions. The members of the *bazaar* had been very close to the traditional and Islamic -economic, social and political- systems, also, manner of life as well.

> "Bazaaris did not represent a single economic stratum. Although some bazaaris possessed small and medium-sized capital, many also represented very large commercial, financial, and industrial capital. Despite economic divisions, bazaaris often acted as a single social force during political crises and consequently their opposition to the state was crucial in widening insurgency against the regime. (…) Bazaaris were also important in the mobilization of other social groups because they often provided resources for such groups during large-scale political conflicts."[289]

Actually, the property owners (landlords, the 'new' industrial capitalists and big merchants) supported the state reforms and the argument of economic integration with the Western countries. However, the *bazaaris* stayed against the capitalist order because of the lack of capital to invest in the new and industrial technology. We saw this attitude of the *bazaaris* firstly in the nationalist oppositional movement (1940-1953). They wanted the economical and political independence during this period, because the domestic market of Iran was threatened by the foreign intervention. Starting this point of view, the *bazaar* gave its support to the working class with the strikes until the fall of nationalist government. During the 1940s, the middle class of Iran consisted of the *bazaaris,* workers and *ulama.*

However, this alliance failed with the promises of the state during the 1950s. The Shah gave some aids and benefits to the *bazaar* merchants through the long-term loans, and postponed their debts. The Shah wanted to reduce the tension, create a

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[288]*Bazaar* is a special name, means the market places in the city centers. The merchants, artisans and workers constitute the *bazaaris* for organizing the *bazaar.*
[289] Parsa, **States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions,** p.201

loyal and national middle class, and control the *bazaar*.[290] On the other hand, the Shah's White Revolution launched economic, social and political reforms, which effected the *bazaaris* position in the middle class. Especially, the breakage of the feudal and tribal nexus with the rural class started a new social dynamic in Iran. And the *bazaar* members kept out the circle of the new bourgeois class.

During 1960s, the state preferred to establish an interaction with the modern commercial areas (cooperatives, banks, supermarkets and department stores) rather than the *bazaar* communities. "The state sought to control the bazaar's economic activities in the form of regulating import/export privileges, restricting credit, and fixing prices, but prior to the 1960s there was a certain degree of futility surrounding state efforts to seriously dominate the bazaar."[291]

With this movement, the Shah planned to prevent the anti-regime activities, which could come from the *bazaaris*, who had a strong connection with the *ulama*. However, disregarding of the Shah to the *bazaar* members strengthened this connection during the 1970s. The rapidly increasing inflation, the high retail prices and the unemployment affected the working class at the first stage, and then also the *bazaar* lost their buyers. Basically, the Shah introduced programs at first for encouraging the merchants to invest in the industry sector. The *bazaaris* appeared to benefit from the state-guided modernization, but they felt under pressure with the rising costs and inflation during the second half of 1970s. As well as the oil revenues declined, the merchants have to cope with the higher taxes without to secure the bank loans.[292]

What's certain that the state modernization thrust positioned the *bazaaris* against the authority, and they came close to the *ulama* like the other opposition movements. The main feature of this anti-Shah coalition was considering the state policies. The *bazaar* and the mosques became the places of the public meetings

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[290] Mehmet Ufuk Tutan, "Bazaaris' Interests on the Iranian Economy: A Coalition with Ulama", **Ege Akademik Bakış,** Vol.8, No:1, (2008), p.261.
[291] Nimah Mazaheri, "State Repression in the Iranian Bazaar, 1975-1977: The Anti-Profiteering Campaign and an Impending Revolution", **Iranian Studies,** Vol.39, No:3, (September 2006), p.403
[292] Ghoncheh Tazmini, **Revolution and Reform in Russia and Iran: Modernization and Politics in Revolutionary States,** I.B.Tauris, New York, 2012, pp.187-188

before the protests or strikes.[293] Certainly, the *ulama* needed the *bazaar* and its members for financing the religious institutions. On the other hand, the *bazaar* was bound to the *ulama* because of the ideological discourse against the state authority. According to Katouzian, the background of this coalition arrived to the *bazaar*'s alienation from the modernization discourse of the state:

> "The bazaar greatly benefited from the oil bonanza of the 1960s and 1970s, but this did not turn it into a social base for the Shah's regime, mainly due to the absolute and arbitrary nature of that regime, which did not afford independence and participation to any social class, but partly also because of the bazaar's religious outlook and its alienation from official Westernism. In other words, the bazaar's grievance against the Shah's regime was largely political and cultural rather than economic."[294]

The *bazaar* did not function only as an economic institution; it was also the fundamental part of the urban morphology. Because of this mission, it can be said that the 1979 Iranian Revolution was planned in the backstreets of the Tehran *bazaar*. The Shah underrated the *bazaaris* social and political position. In the change from tradition to modern, he did not recognize the organic nexus between the *ulama* and the *bazaar*.

The Shah implemented a rapid and industrial development agenda, focused on founding a modern structure and ignoring the 'antiquated' traditional counterparts. The *ulama* could escape from the strong state pressure hiding behind the guerilla movements and the nationalists; they were not directly affected from the state persecutions. Moreover, the *bazaaris* did not show its hand until the anti-profiteering campaigns prior to the revolution. "The state's antipathy and opposition to the Bazaar was not institutionalized in a system of direct and bureaucratic monitoring, controlling, and mobilizing of bazaar economic and political activities. The state made only ad hoc and coercive attempts to control the bazaars."[295]

In brief, the *ulama* and *bazaar* solidarity was reinforced by the state policies in the pre-revolution period. The Shah's 'modernization from above' project and the

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[293] Nikki Keddie, **Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution,** p.32
[294] Katouzian, **The Persians: Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Iran,** p.358
[295] Keshavarzian, **Bazaar and State in Iran,** p.136

bureaucratic structure cannot achieve to integrate with these classes. On the contrary, the state-centered urbanization policies and deficient infrastructural developments expanded the value chain for the benefit of the traditionalists. In addition to that, "the natural leadership of that traditional sector, ideologically, politically, socially and culturally, was the clergy; but at the same time, the bazaar has served as the cradle of the traditional urban culture in Iran, and has maintained and reproduced its cultural elements in the face of modernization and development. This is a structurally important explanation for the survival of traditional sectors in Iranian society."[296]

2.2.2.2. The Losing Dissidents: Workers, Women and Youth

The modernization project of the Shah resulted in the growth of the dissidents. Especially, the well-known public activists -the working class, women and youth- engaged with the industrial and modern structure, and thus a 'new' middle class was born in Iran during the 1970s. This modern middle class was the important beneficiary of the new economic system and had high expectations from the state. However, they could not participate to the political process due to the absolute authority of the Shah. Their alienation in state created a strong dissenting voice and they became the pusher of the grassroots movements in the streets.[297]

The working class in Iran had a great potential for politicization and opposition to the government because of the high level of state intervention in capital accumulation and the nature of exclusive polity. In addition that, the industrial workers, the biggest segment in the working class, were employed by the state and their disputes were directed against the state for politicization. The potential of the Iranian working class for collective action grew as the size of the urban workforce enlarged due to the rapid economic development and industrialization.[298]

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[296] Ashraf, "Bazaar and Mosque in Iran's Revolution", p. 16
[297] Asef Bayat, **Street Politics: Poor People's Movements in Iran**, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997, p.36
[298] Parsa, **States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions**, p.165

On the other hand, the monarchic or republican, both administrations in Iran have ignored invariably the socio-economic and political demands of the working class throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Because of the characteristics of capitalist industrialization, the working class shapes organizationally and intellectually on the 'leftist' movement. Also the militancy and the organizational efficacy are referred with the working class, because of the revolt against the authority in the suppression times. And the leftist arguments provide the unionization perception and political representation for the working class. In Iran, the working class movement[299] was depended on such a background as well.

The history of the working class rose from the first trade union movement (1906) with the Constitutional Revolution in Iran. The constitution guaranteed the rights of association and assembly and provided the political context in which a labor union germinate and grow. Also the social democrats, who led mainly by middle class intellectuals, paid attention to the status of the working class. Until Reza Shah, the working class and social democrats urged themselves to make political demands and led to the industrial action. While the Communist movement[300] was triumphing in Russia, the collaboration in Iran between political parties and trade unions became closer and apparent.[301]

During the reign of Reza Pahlavi, the working class faced with two facts. The workers penetrated in Iran's oil industry and economy due to the industrialization project, and thus the labor movement ensured the strike power with this move. The

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[299]At the beginning of the twentieth century, a working class movement and various social democratic organizations were in contact with the Soviets appeared in Iran. Liberal ideas had emerged with the Constitutional Revolution between 1906-1911 in Rasht, Mashhad, Tabriz and Tehran. Moreover, the constitutional arrangements allowed the socialist trade unions and political organizations. Iranian.socialists were inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution and took part in autonomy struggles with the Iranian Communist Party in the 1920s.

[300]Before the October Revolution of 1917, the two countries -Russia and Britian- had been competing for commercial in Iran. However, the Soviet Revolution radically changed the role of these two powers. Russia had identified with the most reactionary elements in Iranian society and became the ally for the working class, with the long-term aim converting Iran into a communist state. Because of the communist influence, Britain supported constitutionalism and cooperated with the privileged classes to establish an autocratic monarchy. After the consolidation of Soviets' position in August 1919, Britain decided instead to sponsor a 'stable and strong' government in Iran rather than intervene directly in the country's affairs. For detailed information, see: Haideh Moghissi and Saeed Rahnema, "The Working Class and the Islamic State in Iran", **Socialist Register,** Vol.37, (2001), pp.197-218
[301] Ladjevardi, **Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran,** p.2,5

Central Council of Iranian Trade Unions became the largest union federation in the Middle East, and the Tudeh Party gained strength through this labor movement.[302] When Reza Pahlavi realized the power of the left-wing activity and the trade unions, he began to strike violent blows to the labor movement. However the size of the working class increased with the socialism wind and unionization. Briefly, it can be said that the labor activism came about during the period of Reza Pahlavi.[303]

The working class gained a strong representation after the abdication of Reza Pahlavi (especially between 1941-1953 periods) through the leftist movement.[304] The oil workers achieved to organize and constituted a council (Central United Council - *Showray-e Motahedeh Markazî*), which had 400.000 members and 186 affiliated unions.[305] And the Nationalist Front staked out a claim the working class in Abadan (the biggest oil facility of Iran) as well. However this triumph was ended by the CIA-sponsored coup d'état against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in August 1953.[306]

The 1953 coup d'état had dramatic and traumatic results for the Iranians. First of all, the power of the young Shah consolidated through the foreign intervention,

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[302] Andreas Malm and Shora Esmailian, **Iran on the Brink: Rising Workers and Threats of War***, Pluto Press, London, 2007, p.9

[303] Maghissi and Rahnema, "The Working Class and the Islamic State in Iran", p.199

[304] The 1941–1953 period was the interregnum between the two dictatorships, when activists from the 1920s reemerged from prison, exile and underground existence to form the Tudeh Party. With close ties to the Soviet Union, the party became a major political actor with formal links to the labor confederation, one of the largest in Asia. The other major force during this period was the National Front, a grouping of liberal and nationalist parties which favored constitutional rule and a strong parliament.

[305] Maghissi and Rahnema, "The Working Class and the Islamic State in Iran"p.199

[306] Kamran Nayeri and Alireza Nasab believed that the Tudeh Party caused an important breakage in the working class during its position in the 1950s:"The Tudeh party's influence on the Iranian working class has been disastrous. The leadership of the Central Council of the United Trade Unions of Iranian Workers and Toilers, which it came to control in 1946, was entirely imposed by the party and made up of key party cadre who were from the Iranian elite, not the working class. The Tudeh party used its influence in the labor movement to bargain with the capitalist regime. It put down militant labor strikes, including of oil workers in Aghajari, when it believed it was possible to wrestle concessions from the government. (…)This made it possible for the Shah's advancing army to overthrow the pro-Soviet government of Pishevari. The Tudeh party advocated oil concessions in the northern portions of Iran for Moscow when the government was considering oil concessions in the south for the West. The Tudeh party did not join the fight for nationalization of the Iranian oil industry led by Mossadegh. (…) When the coup succeeded, its most committed militants were given to the firing squads. Not surprisingly, the Tudeh party never regained its standing with the Iranian workers again."See: Kamran Nayeri and Alireza Nasab, "The Rise and Fall of the 1979 Iranian Revolution: Its Lessons for today", **the presented paper in Conferencia Internacional La obra de Carlos Marx**,http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/ar/libros/cuba/if/marx/documentos/22/The%20rise%20and%20fall%20of%20the%201979....pdf (14.02.2014)

and this case perpetuated subconsciously 'the foreign occupation syndrome' of the Iranians over the years. Secondly the oppression and the breaking down period began for the nationalist and leftist movement; also the liberals should be drawn to background during the 1950s. In addition, the linkup was lost between the working class and the political fronts (the leftists and nationalists), and the working class came close to the government in time.

> "The leftist forces comprehensively failed to make any real inroads into the working class. Not only did the various leftist groups never establish any real ties to the Iranian working class but the majority of their memberships were not themselves working class by origin. Here, again, they showed a remarkable resemblance to the experience of far leftist groups elsewhere, all of whom, like their Iranian counterparts, paid homage to the centrality of the working class as the agent of historical change, yet themselves remained marginal to that class. Indeed, as several contributors note, it was not leftist forces of any hue but rather the Islamists and Khomeini himself who most effectively spoke to and mobilized the huge numbers of urban poor in the revolutionary period."[307]

The working class was industrialized and modernized by the Shah during the 1950s and 1960s. The Shah wanted to create a loyal circle to him, and the white and blue collar workers could be the important pillar of this obedience. "This industrialization was based on a permanent war against labor. After the coup in 1953, the workplaces were turned into army barracks. Soldiers were permanently stationed at big factories, and colonel-managers routinely used batons and other physical means to repress the workers, while blue-collar SAVAK agents listened closely to all suspicious conversations on the shop-floor. The only unions allowed were the syndicates, whose representatives were selected by the state and who's only task was to inculcate reverence for the Shah into the labor force."[308]

At the same time, the life conditions of the working class had changed with the modernization project as well. With the White Revolution (1963), a 'new' middle class, which was mostly composed of this dependent and industrialized working

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[307] Stephanie Cronin (ed.), **Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives of the Iranian Left**, Routledge Curzon, London, 2004, p.5
[308] Malm and Esmailian, **Iran on the Brink: Rising Workers and Threats of War**, p.10

class, was born in Iran. And they had expectations from the Shah, who claimed that Iran and Iranian society will reach to the development level of Japan and Germany. This 'new' industrial working class overlapped with the 'progressive' development through Capitalism, and demanded the democratic rights in the modern state. But the Shah could not cope up with the rapid urbanization, and the oil-depended industrialization faced with an economic crisis in the first half of 1970s. The Shah failed and the Iranian workers got on the stage with the paralyzing strikes during the late 1970s, preferred to follow the *ulama* or the guerilla movement on the street demonstrations.

The main component of the revolution period was the capitalist penetration into the Iranian state and society structure. The working class consisted of the educated white-collar workers and the migrating blue-collar workers from the rural area. The rural area had undergone some important changes after the White Revolution. However the fundamental structure of it did not change. The working class was the main pillar of the production sector, but it cannot control the state's political or economic decisions. Even though the capitalist development had created a mighty working class, the rapid economic change could not correspond in the social platform and the haphazard urbanization affected the working class socially, economically and psychologically.

> "In a discussion of the pre-revolutionary Iranian labor movement between 1965-75 two general assumptions prevail. One is that industrial labor did not make any attempt to organize itself into independent labor unions (trade unions, etc). The second is that the failure of laborers to organize themselves was due to the political repression under the Shah."[309]

The weaknesses of the Iranian working class shaped around the configuration of the working population, the mechanisms of state control and the insufficient relation between the workers and the leftist movement. The leftist intelligentsia could not develop effective communicative and political links with the workers. In addition to this the salaried middle class as a part of the working class was extremely

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[309] Assef Bayat, "Capital Accumulation, Political Control and Labour Organiation in Iran: 1965-1975", **Middle Eastern Studies,** Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1989), p.198

heterogeneous with diverse interests and demands. "These empirical and analytical confusions are inevitably reflected in the Left's formulation of its immediate revolutionary tasks: ascertaining its potential and actual allies and developing its political agenda for mobilizing the support of particular classes."[310]

On the other hand, the women attendance at the education life and universities (into the law, medicine and engineering fields, which were called generally as the 'men thing') had created an impact on the Iranian society, and the women had taken part in the working class from 1950s to the revolution.[311] The women 'liberation' project was directed by the Pahlavi monarchy and offered new opportunities in employment and education for the urban Iranian women. Abandoning the veils in public was the first step of modernization phenomenon, and creating a particular vision for the modern Iranian woman was the supplementary factor of this process.

According to this idea, "the Iranian woman was to be educated as any European or American woman and integrated into the workforce in increasingly prestigious professions. Not just a supportive companionate her husband, she was also to complement the modern Iranian man in the civic arena - her unveiled entrance into society 'chaperoned' by her modern male guardian. Yet the notion of the modern male guardian likewise reflected new social realities."[312]

Actually, the potential of the women covered with the modern education in the Pahlavi era, but their roles began to change through the Iranian modernization.[313] As the modernization[314] affected on the other classes, the women's

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[310] Saeed Rahnema, "The Left and the Struggle for Democracy in Iran", **Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives of the Iranian,** (Ed. S.Cronin), p.262

[311] Guity Nashat, "Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran", **Iranian Studies**, Vol.13, No:1/4, 1980, p.168

[312] Camron Michael Amin, **The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman: Gender, State Policy and Popular Culture 1865-1946,** University Press of Florida, 2002, p.1

[313] Especially, the women continued to join the public life until 1936, when the veil was banned by the Shah, Reza Pahlavi. And the women could return to use the veil after the abdication of him in 1941.

[314] Fundamentally, the 'rapid modernization from above' attitude was intrinsic to Iran and suchlike modernizing countries (for example Turkey). Especially Mohammad Reza Pahlavi paid his only attention to the modernization for perpetuating his authoritarian sovereignty. Because for him, Iran was a semi-agricultural and undeveloped country and for creating a modern, industrial and civilized country he elaborated a new ideology, called nationalism by himself.

cultural, economic and political perception had changed as well. However, the women's modernization contrasted with the patriarchic state order, and the attitude of the Shah called generally as 'tokenism'. Certainly, the socio-economic developments increased the female employment and literacy rate, and the state was obliged to include women into the industrial and political fields. However this women participation remained limited on the urban and educated levels; the 'other' women, who lived in the rural area or worked as the blue-collar mill hand, were kept away the socio-cultural and political utterance. Starting this point of view, they searched a representation in the political discourse during the revolution period.

> "The majority of Iranian women felt that their life style, religious beliefs and cultural identity were challenged, negated and ridiculed and at times were deprived from them by an imposed trend of the Shah's Westernization. In order to solve this dilemma, many women returned to their 'traditional roots', arising from an Islamic pattern of womanhood and ideologues like Dr. Shariati and certain other Shah's dissidents proposed. Haleh Afshar speaks of a phenomenon called 'Feminist Fundamentalism'."[315]

The women did not disapprove the increasing quality of education, acquiring the employment opportunities or the literacy within the society. However they were disappointed about the general pattern of inequality and the seclusion from the political realm. "Also, the conflict between their desired cultural frameworks with what the Shah's government propagated, encouraged them to reject the womanhood model propagated by the Shah's propaganda machinery that was not consistent with Iranian women's ideals."[316]

Fundamentally, women's awareness about the political and social issues increased during the Mosaddegh period, but they lapsed mandatorily into silence because of the suppression of the authority. Even though they gained right to vote in 1962 it could not change anything for women within the suppressive political system in the 1960s or 1970s.[317] During the pre-revolution period, women were actively on the street demonstrations. At the beginning, their number was small and social

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[315] Mohammad Hossein Hafezian, "Political Participation of Women and the Islamic Revolution of Iran", **An Iranian Quarterly,** Vol.3, No:3, Winter 2002, p.62
[316]**Ibid.,**p.64
[317] **Ibid.,** p.54

effects settled in the urban middle and upper classes, but the public participation of them encouraged the protesters.[318]

The women movement was divided into two opposing groups in the period from 1963 to the revolution. The first group had entered to the public arena by participating in political, bureaucratic and social institutions. These women were active in the government sponsored reforms and close to the royal circle. The second group "opposed to the regime attempted to challenge the state, but were denied participation. But there were occasions when in spite of ideological and partisan differences, common concerns and interests pertaining to women overlapped."[319]

The fact is that the women's condition was improved partly with the reforms in the Iranian social life, and "most of demands were achieved including women's suffrage and an increase in literacy and employment among women, as well as women's legal rights in the family and welfare programs for women. The number of female students increased from 94.000 to 1.800.000 at the primary level, from 7.000 to 824.000 at the secondary level, and from 500 to 43.000 at higher education in the period from 1946 to 1976."[320]

In addition to that the women workers entered to the different fields of study such as medicine, law, engineering, arts and education during the 1970s. This educational progress supported the rapid economic growth, led to employment opportunities for women from high skilled professional positions to all levels of governmental bureaucracy. Also they were employed in universities, in the army and police forces as judges, pilot or engineers.[321]

"The institutional changes that various educational and developmental projects brought about left an indelible impression and undoubtedly widened the horizons of expectation for women. Much credit can be given to individual women and their energy and determination to improve conditions in spite of

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[318] Mangol Bayat-Philipp, "Women and Revolution in Iran, 1905-1911", **Women in the Muslim World,** (Eds. Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie), Harward University Press, Cambridge, 1978, p. 296

[319] "Feminist Movements in the Pahlavi Period", **Encyclopaedia Iranica,** Volume I http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/feminist-movements-iii (23.07.2014)

[320] **Ibid.**

[321] Fatemeh Moghadam, " Commoditization of Sexuality and Female Labor Participation in Islam: Inplıcations for Iran, 1960-60", **In the Eye of the Storm: Women in Post-Revolutionary Iran,** (Eds. Mahnaz Afkhami and Erika Friedl),Syracuse Press, New York, 1994, pp. 84-85

bureaucratic obstacles, traditional conservative objections, and deeper, perhaps even more important, psychological barriers which meant that they were often held in contempt for being part of an autocratic establishment and, at the same time, not taken at all seriously, even by their own male colleagues, whether high up in the cabinet or lower down in the literacy corps and the army. These cultural barriers were also at work in revolutionary groups and guerrilla organizations. A widening gap between the rises of women's education, combined with rapid social mobilization, and the tightening of channels of political participation led to increasing discontent among educated women of the middle and lower-middle classes who, similar to their male counterparts, aspired for freedom of expression and participation in autonomous associations and political organizations. When the Pahlavi regime in its last few years and under external pressure began to accord more freedom, and the revolutionary coalition found an unprecedented opportunity for mass mobilization, a large number of women joined the demonstrations and strikes which were mobilized during the later stages of revolution in the fall and winter of 1978-79. "[322]

The 'woman' issue was always a struggle area between the traditionalists and moderns in Iran. It was identified through their ideological perspectives by both sides, and they visualized the 'woman' for consolidating their own power on the masses. The social and economic effects of the industrialization on the women did not taken into consideration by neither the Pahlavi regime nor the Islamic Republic. In this context, the women, like the Iranian youth, were the biggest dissident of the revolution.

The background of the modern education was based on the French system in Iran. The intellectual and political groups, which were impressed by the wave of modernization and Westernization, demanded the modern educational system, but they came up against the powerful opposition from the *ulama.* Iran was mainly a conservative state during the twentieth century and the traditional authority of the Shah was entrenched with the principles of the White Revolution in 1963. "The Western-educated government and administration mounted an active campaign to

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[322] "Feminist Movements in the Pahlavi Period", **Encyclopaedia Iranica,** Volume I
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/feminist-movements-iii (23.07.2014)

extend essential social services to the 65,000 scattered and isolated Iranian villages while encouraging the migration of the 75 per cent of the country's population living in rural areas to cities, towns and integrated village centers."[323]

Actually, the higher education had been encouraged for following the modernization project by the Pahlavi regime. The primary educational concern focused on university education throughout the reign of the Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. "The Shah's eagerness, bordering on impatience, to produce as fast as possible a highly trained cadre of component civil servants and army officers who would carry out the ambitious task of transforming the country into a modern state."[324] Moreover the university students, who studied abroad, generated the political activism against the Shah in Europe or United States. Especially the National Front gained a place among this student movement during the 1960s and 1970s.

In addition to that the women's access to education was expanded in the Pahlavi era as well. "The proportion of females in elementary schools rose from 21 percent of total enrollment in 1926-27 to 38 percent in 1976-77 and to 44 percent in 1986-87; in secondary schools from 5.7 percent to 35 and 40 percent respectively; and in universities from almost zero to 28 and 29 percent respectively."[325]

The growth of the middle class and the rise of social mobility have influenced the educational aspirations in Iran. 'To get a better job, get a better education' was the rule of the 'new' Iranian society. Simultaneously, the highly-trained manpower was wanted by the state because of the growing demand of the industrial system in all kinds and levels. Moreover, the higher education supplied specialist, required in different sectors. This situation tempted the students to obtain higher skills and qualifications.[326]

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[323] Ali Pour-Moghaddas, "Higher Education and Development in Iran", **Higher Education,** Vol. 4, No. 3 (Aug., 1975), p.369

[324] Wilhelm Eilers, "Education and Cultural Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era", **Iran under the Palavi's,** (ed.George Lenezowski), Hoover Institution Press, Standford, 1978, p.306

[325] "Education: General Survey of Modern Education", **Encyclopaedia Iranica,** Volume 1, p.vii, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/education-vii-general-survey-of-modern-education (22.07.2014)

[326] *Ibid.,* p.373

Some of these students were a part of the industrial and capitalist system and maintained the educated working classes in 1970s. On the other hand some of them continued kept going the political activism, because they acquaint themselves with the 'modern' times education and sciences, and their world-views diversified with the university education, and their social and cultural expectations increased from the state. However this circumstance epitomizes the major paradox of Iran: the conflict between religious piety and modernity. Starting this point of view, the Iranian youth tried to integrate Islam and Western ideologies in the political field during the 1970s, and the network of students, who studied inboard and abroad, facilitated the revolution.

> "Coming from more middle class backgrounds many Iranian students did not grow up in an environment which stressed Islam or fundamentalism. The Shah's modernization project had attempted to limit the role of religion in Iranian society and culture. Nonetheless, the 1970s saw a resurgence of Islam amongst the Iranian population, a result of the dissatisfaction of the forces of modernization policies and practices put in place by the secular Shah. This led to a more devout Iranian student body. Following the steps of other religious students, most Muslim Iranians found themselves in the midwest where there was already a Muslim community."[327]

Actually, the students and the women had been always the Achilles' heel in the revolutions because of their dynamic characteristics. The students acted as a vanguard in the ideological struggles, and opposed to the exclusive rule of the authoritarian Pahlavi regime and rising social inequalities. The revolutionary generation was borned and grew in the 1960s and 1970s, and the student movement was impressed by the pressure of the Pahlavi monarchy and SAVAK. This youth released some important political leaders and organizations as well.

During the 1960s, the student activism founded two crucial political-guerrilla organizations: The Iranian People's Feda'i Guerrillas (Fedaiyan) and the Iranian People's Mojahedin. These two guerilla movements launched against the regime in the 1970s and the students were the principal supporters of these organizations.

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[327] Andrea Nasrine Shahmohammadi, **Masked Resistance: The Iranian Student Movement in the United States 1977-1979,** Umi Dissertation Publishing, 2011, p.22

Ayatollah Khomeini called the students for struggling against the Shah's dictatorship and imperialism, and offered an alliance between the university people and the clergy. However, ironically, the student ideology remained largely within the secular, socialist camp during the 1970s; even a sizable minority advocated cooperation between the secular socialists and Islamic society.[328]

In addition to that, the abovementioned student organizations acknowledged that the reform program of the White Revolution had caused deep changes. "They both agreed that Iran's dependent capitalist system relied on state dictatorship and a capitalist class closely linked to that state, and that this arrangement was not in the people's interest. Hence, both groups agreed that the new social changes were fundamentally reactionary, their purpose to integrate Iran into the world capitalist system."[329] Also the student movement took a stand against the concept of White Revolution and the industrialization project of the Pahlavi monarchy. Because, they believed that the reforms were far from easing the class contradictions and conflicts in Iranian society.

Fundamentally, the 1979 Iranian Revolution was seen as a non-ideological and democratic challenge by the leftist movement, which arises from the Marxist and Islamic critiques of the Shah, and this movement gained strength from the university students and their street demonstrations. The diverse groups of students came together for fighting against the soul of Pahlavi monarchy. They had supported the 'armed propaganda theory' from the beginning of the 1970s to the revolution. These student organizations divided the process of armed struggle into two phases. In the first phase, they established the vanguard organization for attacking to the Shah's dictatorship. Their armed actions were propagandist and prepared the vanguard militarily, organizationally and politically for the participation of the people. And the second phase was a mass-based revolutionary movement, continued between 1977 and 1979 in the street demonstrations.[330]

In conclusion, the capital accumulation and the industrial expansion affected mostly the working class, students and women between 1963 and 1979 in Iran. The

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[328] Parsa, **States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions,** p.99
[329] Behrooz, **Rebels With a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran**, p.54
[330] **Ibid.,** p.59

growth of the oil revenues and the middle class incomes, the increasing demand for higher education and higher prestige attached the Iranians to a 'modernized' society. At the beginning of the reform project, these three classes were in the Shah's target point. However, he could not count up the socio-cultural effects of the White Revolution and the expectations of these classes.

The Shah tried to constitute a depended and loyal class to him. Also the land reform expedited the rural-urban migration, and this 'new' migrating class (the blue collars) started to work in the state-funded industrial factories or private sector. But the reform package was lacking of the socio-cultural integration perspective, and it has created a cultural anomaly in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s. The blue collars came close to the *ulama* during this period, because the mosques used for overcoming this socio-cultural exclusion by the traditional nexus. On the other hand, the White Revolution created an educated working class (the white collars) as well. Their high socio-economic and socio-cultural expectations rose, but the oil revenues of the state could not be transferred as it is said.

Another discourse of the White Revolution concerned the women, and the Shah did not approve to see the woman outside of the Western framework. The process, which began with the veil ban, was used by the traditional institutions, and not surprisingly, the main supporters of the Ayatollah were composed of the women in the revolutionary period. Furthermore, the student movement was compressed by the SAVAK under the cover of the communism threat. In short, the rising social expectations could not be satisfied by the Shah and his administration, and a big social indignance began in the 1970s. The Shah could not act prudentially and refused to hear the voice of the different classes.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MONARCHICAL ADMINISTRATION

AND

THE REVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGERS

"The situation in Iran seems to depend on a great joust under traditional emblems, those of the king and the saint, the armed sovereign and the destitute exile, the despot faced with the man who stands up bare-handed and is acclaimed by a people."[331]

Michel Foucault

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was a young man of about twenty-two, when he came to the throne. His father was discrowned and the Majlis was powerful rather than the monarchical administration network. He had attended Le Rosey, a school in Switzerland, but he returned to Iran for the military training when he was sixteen. Nevertheless, the Western education period in his life affected Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's political and ideological point of view in general. Two main approaches have given shape to the era of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi: modernization and (Aryanist) nationalization.[332]

The 'son' Pahlavi idealized the German type of administration and wished to be a powerful partner of United States both in financial and military fields. For constituting such a structure, he believed that he needs to have loyal administrative staff to himself. For Katouzian, "the Shah was lacked knowledge and experience and had a limited intellectual capacity. Dominated as he then was by older statesmen and political magnates, he was nevertheless skilful at political intrigue and maneuvering

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[331] Michel Foucault, "Of What Are the Iranians Dreaming?" **Nouvel Observateur** (October 1978)
[332] Katouzian, **The Persians: Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Iran,** p.231

and wished to have a strong say in civil government as well as army, which in effect he controlled."[333]

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ruled Iran between 1941 and 1953 in a time of turmoil and democracy pursuit. During this period, the Shah consolidated his power out of the country; and after the 1953 coup, his absolute government had begun domestically. He shaped a modern state in a traditional authority perspective. He integrated the state institutions into the strong and central bureaucratic administration. His traditional authority drew his power from the ethical common sense of Iran and its mission, originated from the past. In brief, the state was not ruled 'politically' by the Shah. He administered Iran 'technically' with a bureaucratic network. In fact making politics devolved on the society.

3.1. TRANSFORMING POLITICS INTO ADMINISTRATION AND RULED BY EXPERTS: IRANIAN MONARCHY AS A MODEL OF CAMERALIST STATE

Capitalism and its complicated relations of productions had transformed the feudal structure to the absolute monarchy. The decentralized state structure turned to the strong and centralized authority; the aristocrats had given their place to the bourgeoisie class. The military function of feudal lords was undertaken by the central state power and the mercantilist era in the economy had begun. This circumstance was the result of the Westphalian resolution and it was summarized with these main factors: i) mercantilism[334] in the state economy, ii) the war capability of the state (the armament), iii) the control and enacting power of the state under the public funding (the arrangement of the public finance), iv) the state capability in the decision

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[333] **Ibid.,** p.231
[334] The idea of the statecraft had necessitated the mercantilist philosophy in the economic and commercial life. The mercantilist idea presents the policies of developing the conservator economy mentality, strengthening the state power, increasing the revenues and population, extending the commercial activities etc. And for providing this idea, it was needed a strong army and centralized state structure as well.

making mechanism (the bureaucratic power of the state). In brief, these components foreshadow the modern state, as Immanuel Wallerstein appoints.[335]

On the other hand, Prussia had fallen behind the Europe when it was in a great transformation with the modernization and capitalism processes. Because of the dispersed political structure, the Prussia bourgeois did not constitute quickly the modern state and capitalism phenomenon in comparison with England and France during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Also, the centralized state argument gained strength with the *cameralist* approach in Prussia[336] and identified with it (as German type of state administration/mercantilism[337]) during the 18th and 19th centuries.

The German type of administration and military structure impressed mostly the rising and 'new' governments, such as Iran and Turkey, in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The German technocrats, engineers and academicians involved in the every aspect of the Iranian state during the period of Reza Pahlavi. From 1939 to 1941 Iran's major foreign trade partner was Germany with the 50 percent total trade. And the relation between Iran and Germany remained in the era of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as well. [338] Actually the Pahlavi dynasty intended to establish a modernized state and unified nation, and a 'new' type of administration, also cameralism, became the adhesive bond between Iran and the West at this point.

Cameralism can be seen as a belated aim for constructing the modern state structure. However, it is shaped only with the centralization and administration perception, not the whole argument of the modern state. Because of that, the pursuit of the modern state mostly had failed in the cameralistic implementation, like in Iran. Iran had needed a state consolidation, which was the follower of the modernization, during the Pahlavi dynasty. Especially the reforms accelerated in the period of

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[335] Immanuel Wallerstein, **Modern Dünya Sistemi (1600-1750),** (Trans. Latif Boyacı), Bakış Press, İstanbul, Vol.2, 2005 p.136
[336] The strong and centralized state argument strengthened during the era of Friedrich Wilhelm (1713-1740) and the Great Friedrich (1740-1786) in Prussia.
[337] For details, the differences and similarities of cameralism and mercantilism, see: Richard E. Wagner, " The Cameralists: Fertile Sources for a New Science of Public Finance", (Ed. Jürgen Georg Backhaus), **Handbook of the History of Economic Thought: Insights on the Founders of Modern Economics,** Springer Press, New York, p.128-129
[338] Keddie, **Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution,** p.101

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and he composed an administrative class, which was loyal to the royal family. This 'administration perception' was the base of *cameralism,* and the period of 1963-1979 in Iran can be understood through this conceptualization.

Also, cameralism[339] was a type of (state) capitalism, which concentrated on "the knowledge of state administration."[340]Cameralism provides a large centralized administrative apparatus to serve the needs of absolutist monarchs.[341] Contrary to the prevalent opinion, cameralism is not the theory and practice of 'economy'; it is 'politically' a technique (theory) of governing and administrating the state. The purposes of the state were paramount and they position above everything else. The cameralists[342] were seen as the servants of the state[343] and "the cameralist system was elaborated with the chief agents of the rulers, partly as mere classification of

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[339]The *cameral science (Kameralwissenschaften)* derived from the Latin word *camera (kammer),* which means the treasury room of the king. During the 18 century, this room was in use for the bureaucratic stuff because of the increasing finance requirements and the expanding the administrative office services. In that period, the public finance and treasury was called as 'cameralistic'. Thus, the *cameral science (Kameralwissenschaften)* has risen originally for founding the system of the public finance and managing the threasury of the monarchs in Prussia.

[340]Michel Foucault (1979), "Governmentality", **Public Sector Management,** (Eds. David McKevitt and Alan Lawton), Sage Publications, London, 1994, p.16

[341] The criticism of the cameralism was mainly based on the 'philosophical kingship' of Plato, and cameralism was seen as 'enlightened despotism', 'enlightened absolutism', 'benevolent despotism' or 'intellectuals elitism' during the late 19th and 20th centuries by the anti-monarchist. Fundamentally, the aim of cameralism was founding a strong and centralized administration through the monarchs and the bureaucrats. In other words, the state was formed with the 'administration mission', not the 'political power'. This approach was created by the 'philosophical kingship' (the most known kings were Charles III of Spain, Catherine II of Russia and Louise XVI of France in the 18th century. These cameralist kings were mostly influenced by Plato and his philosophy during the Enlightenment period), and supported by the intellectuals who were close contact with the ruler or ruling class. Starting this point of view cameralism was described as 'intellectual despotism' as well. Constitutively, the social change was not for upward in cameralism. The aspect of the change was from top to down (downward); in other words, the impulsion of change came from the 'State' to the 'Community' in this system. The State was the 'active actor'; the Community was the 'passive audience'. The State acted as the only part in the transformation of the Community, and this absolute behavior had created an autocrat and patrimonial structure, which arises within the intellectuals. The insisting right of the state was used by favor of the 'scholarliness'. Like in Jacobenism, conducting the society toward these elites was accepted in cameralism as well. For detailed argument, see: Derek Beales, "Philosophical Kingship and Enlightened Despotism", **The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought** (Eds. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler),Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, pp.514-524; Charles Ingrao, "The Problem of Enlightened Absolutism and German States", **The Journal of Modern History**, Vol.58, December 1986, pp.161-180

[342] According to Small, the bureaucrats and academicians were designated mainly as the cameralist administrator.

[343]Albion W.Small (1909).,**The Cameralists: The Pioneers of German Social Polity***,* Batoche Books, 2001, pp.20

practices which rulers had already adopted; partly as ways and means of an accomplishing more of the purposes which the state proposed."[344]

In Iran, a depended and 'new' bureaucratic and bourgeoisie class was reinforced with the large centralized administrative apparatus of the state during the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. In this way, the absolute power of the monarchy was increased, and the knowledge of the state administration, also the cameralist way of thinking, stayed at the center of the state circle within the authority of the Shah. Also the Shah bestowed the administration through the bureaucracy.

According to Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, who is the lead thinker of cameralism, the cameralist state system units tacitly the wills and forces, and for maintaining the wills and forces of human, a well-establish state structure is necessary. Starting this point of view, he firstly describes the duty of an individual in the society:

> "Individuals are free in this system and consider themselves to be free in so far as they are not coerced by others. This is why they are anxious to set up a state where institutions impose as few restrictions on the individual's freedom of action as possible. Individuals want to preserve themselves and enjoy their property. Consequently, one of the expectations that they associate with the establishment of a state concerns the provision of security. Individuals are anxious to cooperate with others in order to attain a real income that allows them to take delight in affluence; when they establish a state they wish to set up institutions that encourage or make possible this form of cooperation."[345]

Also, the state is not seen as an association of free individuals, which seeks the happiness of them. According to the cameralists, the state is the subject of the community that is administered by the rulers around the pursuit of common substantive interest. As Albion Small mentioned, "the salient fact about the cameralistic civic theory was its fundamental assumption of the paramount value of

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[344]**Ibid.,** p.20

[345]Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch, "Cameralism as 'political metaphysics': Human nature, the state, and natural law in the thought of Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi", **The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought,** Vol.16, No:3, p.418

the collective interests, or in other words the subordination of the interests of the individual to the interests of the community."[346]

Fundamentally, the society in the cameralist view is based on distinct closed environments. The individuals pass from one closed environment to another (from the family to the school or from the factory to the office) with the knowledge-based control. Because in cameralism, the knowledge-based society can establish in the perpetual training replaces, and the permanent education provides a permanent control on the society.[347]

Moreover, the abovementioned control can be provided by the highly trained professionals, also by the cameralists. Joseph Schumpeter called the cameralists as "consultant administrators"[348] because of their consultant mission to the authority and the royal patronage who ruled throughout those lands. "They were partly economists, partly political scientists, partly public administrators, and partly lawyers. They approached their subject matter in a manner that used all of these talents and capacities."[349]

The Shah had started out to build such like a 'knowledge-based society' ideal for Iran; and for that purpose, the state institutions had concentrated on the Western style education. They had sent the students abroad for training. While the number of the Persian students, who got training abroad, was approximately 2.000 at the beginning of the 1950s, this number rose dramatically 20.000 after the White Revolution and its education thrust. And the fields of study were mostly in 'technical' subjects such as medicine and engineering, or 'academic' fields in law and social science. [350]

The students, who were returned to Iran as doctor, engineer or academician, became the 'new' technocrats and bureaucrats in the administration of the Shah. With reference to the abovementioned components of the cameralist system, these technical politicians had structured the Iranian education system from the family to

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[346]Small, **The Cameralists: The Pioneers of German Social Polity**, p.16

[347]Adrian Mihalache, "Cameralism - It's Relevance for the Knowledge-Based Society",**Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology,** Volume 2, No: 2, Fall 2008, p.204

[348]Joseph A. Schumpeter, **History of Economic Analysis,** Oxford University Press, New York, 1954, p.143

[349]Wagner, " The Cameralists: Fertile Sources for a New Science of Public Finance", p.125

[350] George Baldwin, "Foreign-Educated Iranians: A Prpfile", **The Middle East Journal,** Vol.17, Issue 3, (1963), pp. 264-265

the school or from the factory to the office. Thus a Western style society and a bureaucratic class, superintended this society on behalf of the Shah, were constituted through the state apparatus.

On the other hand, for Karl Pribram, the cameralists were concerned with the police functions of the state and it is used as a tool for establishing the structure of public administration. This (police) function encompassed the public education, public health policy, environmental policy and even the regulation of the manufactures through the guild system (*Polizeigewerbe*).[351] They proposed the police function as the most appropriate way to establish a basis for national wealth, which would lead to further economic growth. Thus, cameralists designed and applied the police functions to foster economic development on the basis of human capital.[352]

Actually, this police function was a kind of economic 'pastorate' and a continuous control in the cameralist statecraft. "The core concept behind cameralist statecraft was the fact that the prosperity of a state depended upon the adoption of policies which fostered the improvement, materially and spiritually, of the citizenry. It meant that a ruler had to devise a means of increasing wealth by making the citizenry more productive, but not by looting them. It meant changing from a situation where the vast majority of the population were slaves, or virtual slaving beasts, to one in which people were assumed to be educable and improvable and therefore to a state policy which sought to implement such a policy."[353]

The police function of the Pahlavi state was reinforced by two important factors: the development administration plan and the oil link in the administrative level. The first one provided a general economic plan for the state, and the second one aimed to constitute a modern and industrialized economic structure with the oil revenues. However, these two factors increased the embedded relation between the West and Iran. And the Iranian public finance was canalized to the royal expenses by the administrators.

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[351] Karl Pribram, **A History of Economic Reasoning,** The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1983, p.96

[352] Ursula Backhaus, "Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717–1771): Health as Part of a State's Capital Endowment", (Ed. Jürgen Georg Backhaus), **The Beginnings of Political Economy: Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi,** Springer Press, New York, 2009, p.176

[353] Mihalache, "Cameralism – It's Relevance for the Knowledge-Based Society", p.202

Also, the public finance[354] was the other important pillar of cameralism as well. The cameralist public finance involved the whole state lands and enterprises as principal sources of revenue. Richard Wagner described this kind of a structure as the administration model like a business firm. Taxation occupied a secondary position in the source of revenue; because it was the last option for public finance, not the first source of revenue.[355]

> "The cameralist advice on the use of state budgets and other policy instruments to promote the happiness of the state and its subjects took place within a presumption that the state itself was located inside the economic order and not outside it. The state is but another participant within the economic order of a society. Civil society and the state are non-separable and co-emergent. This treatment of the state in relation to civil society contrasts sharply with various contemporary constructions where state and society are treated as autonomous and independent from each other. In this alternative construction, the state intervenes into civil society and its processes. (…) The cameralist ideal (…) was the state as a peaceful and productive participant within the economic order."[356]

Starting this point of view, Justi divides society within the scope of the working classes: i) the farming community (husbandmen, miners, cattle breeders, hunters etc.), ii) craftsmen, iii) merchants and traders.[357] The farming community is the largest class, and thus agriculture is considered the most important category. Even though the idea that the land 'produces everything' is highly appreciated, the cameralist economic policy focuses on the promotion of trade and industry. Because, for Justi, trade makes the greatest contribution to the wealth of a nation and brings the money into the country.[358]

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[354] For the base of public finance, see: Ceyhun Gürkan, "Modern Maliye Teorisinin Klasik Kökenleri: İbni Haldun'dan Post-Kameralizme Mali Düşünce", **Maliye Dergisi,** No: 164, Ocak-Haziran 2013, pp.1-26
[355] Wagner, "The Cameralists: Fertile Sources for a New Science of Public Finance p.134
[356] **Ibid.,** p.137
[357] It can be seen such kind of a society division in the White Revolution as well.
[358] Hans Frambach, "Cameralism and Labour in von Justi'sEconomic Thinking", (Ed. Jürgen Georg Backhaus), **The Beginnings of Political Economy: Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi**, Springer Press, New York, 2009, p.138

Justi differentiates the society through the `imagined` (false) and `common` (true) happiness. Common happiness is considered the ultimate objective of civil society and describes the welfare of all members of society in the sense of the common good. For Justi, to achieve common happiness government must be the highest power in a state and legislation is necessary which steers individual action in the right direction taking into consideration aspects of religion, morals and the fulfillment of duties. Justi stresses that the virtue of obedience makes externally and internally strong the state, and the virtue of fidelity unites the people for the common welfare.[359]

According to Justi, this common welfare grounds on the benefits of an economic process functioning on the basis of competition in the cameralist system. Because for him, all trade and industry need are supported by the benefits of free enterprise and functioning competition (laissez-faire attitude). However, cameralist trade and economic perspective shapes as 'laissez-faire plus watchfulness' differently from the core approach of the liberal economy. In cameralism, the government specifies the framework of this competition and intervenes and regulates the interests of the common good. "According to this freedom of commerce and industry is the unlimited authority of commercial people to undertake everything they consider advantageous for themselves insofar as this does not harm the common good and the welfare of the state."[360]

Starting to the point of view of this cameralist conceptualization, it can be said that the administrative processes, such as budgeting, planning, coordination and reform, of the state gained an upper hand in bureaucracy; and the conservatism to the bureaucrat's socialization within a particular milieu played a crucial role in the cameralist structure.

Especially Fred Riggs explains the 'Oriental' administrative behavior through the value patterns in bureaucracy. For him, overlapping, fossilization and attenuation in bureaucracy is the duality of this kind of an administrative behavior. On the one hand, the administration tried to being modern; on the other hand the traditional state behavior covered the modern institutions and facts. It is called as the 'epidemic characteristic' of the 'Oriental' bureaucracy by Riggs; and this characteristic involves

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[359]**Ibid.,** p.139
[360]**Ibid.,** p.140

selectivism, polyfunctionalism, formalism, nonenforcement, administrative prodigality, nepotism and normlessness as well.[361]

Actually, this characteristic shapes around the interlocking principles of bureaucratic actions. As Peter Cleaves highlights, the poor communication with the 'below' components (with society), the corruption rote, the indecisiveness and goal displacement in the administrative level are the failed points of the public administration. And these failed points are covered with the institutions of modern state, which try to expand their base and to enhance their capabilities in their task environments.[362] Also the cameralist approach provides to strengthen the authority's power with this kind of a bureaucratic administration through the centralized institutions or agencies.

This paradoxical circumstance is described as 'King's Dilemma' by Samuel Huntington, and he is tried to explain how a monarchical state structure is faced with the society's uprising (the revolution), because of the weakening of state sources of decision-making and legitimacy (the bureaucracy):

"Monarchical systems were involved in a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, centralization of power in the monarchy was necessary to promote social, cultural, and economic reform. On the other hand, this centralization made difficult or impossible the expansion of the power of the traditional polity and the assimilation into it of the new groups produced by modernization. The participation of these groups in politics seemingly could come only at the price of the monarchy."[363]

This dilemma is seen as the exclusive rule (centralization and repression), which may develop a personalistic administration or an autonomous personalist regimes (Sultanic regimes). Hence the cameralist structure coincides with this exclusive rule because of its nature of minimizing or eliminating the accountability of society in the public policies. As Misagh Parsa mentioned, "centralized, dynastic

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[361]Fred Rigss, **Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society,** Houghton Mifflin Press, Boston, 1964, pp.24-26
[362]Peter Cleaves, **Bureaucratic Politics and Administration in Chile,** University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1974, p.310
[363] Samuel Huntington, **Political Order in Changing Societies,** Yale University Press, New York, 2006, p.177

regimes are especially vulnerable because they restrict elite access to the polity and remain exclusive for prolonged periods without providing any option for change."[364]

The cameralist rhetoric gains a place within the scope of the 'imperial modernization' process. The Pahlavi dynasty, especially Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, tried to 'copy and paste' the Western social and cultural structure onto the traditional behavior of the Iranian state. Thus the anti-Shah activism, Iranian revolutionary practices and the Islamist revival were forms of resistance to the dead weight of the Western modernity, as Foucault asserted. However, the challengers of the revolution, especially *ulama* as the 'new' executive of the Iranian state, went into the state-driven modernization and the technical administration behavior whole heartedly with a 'new' repressive autocracy in the Islamic Republic.

Also the cameralist system served the large centralized administrative institutions to the absolutist monarchs, and strengthened the executive power of the authority. The features of the executive power attributed to the divine right of kings in the monarchies. In addition, the position of the public administration was crucial, but essentially subservient, in the cameralist system. For Justi, "the wisdom and perfection of a government consists in, among other things, government by the monarch himself, through his own insight, not merely through his ministers, and the concentration of all affairs in his strong hand."[365]

In other words, the public administration was still the chief pillar in the state affairs, but the expansive role of government was under the control of the king. "This belief of the cameralists in a strong unfettered and centralized executive would seem to fit well with their vision of the state as a purposive association. When one sees the state as legitimately engaged in the pursuit of a common and coherent set of substantive ends, when one stresses the 'merging of many wills into a single will', it is logical to advocate a powerful executive as the appropriate institutional mechanism by which those ends should be implemented. Indeed, from this point of view, a weak executive, because it lacked the power to impose a unified will, would be seen as destructive to the unity of the state."[366]

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[364]Parsa, **States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions: A Comperative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua and the Philipinnes,** p.11
[365] Small, **The Cameralists: The Pioneers of German Social Polity,** p.424
[366] Michael Spicer, "Cameralist Thought and Public Administration", **Journal of Management History,** Vol.4, No.3, (1998), p.157

3.1.1. The Cameralist Bureaucracy in the Pahlavi Era

The state capitalism engages generally in the accumulation of the administrative level and enforces the symbols of the polity to which all citizens are expected to adhere. Through the state rules and the authority values, the governors - bureaucrats, judges and military administrators- undertakes the regulation and managing mission of the state. Also the bureaucrats play a crucial role because they participate in shaping the instruments of governance and they are the principal interpreters of state policies.[367]

Under this circumstance, the bureaucracy becomes addicted to the absolute authority in the monarchical regimes. But then these 'state bureaucrats' obtain some important economic and political concessions as well. Especially in the cameralist structure, the bureaucrats become the strong implementers of the state capitalism, and the state authority can be alienated from the society because of the 'technical' or 'academic' guidance of its bureaucrats.

Simply, the argument of bureaucracy is based on stability and order in the administrative behavior. Essentially, as Ali Farazmand mentioned, "it is always there, whereas political processes change, political masters come and go, and mistakes are made in political changes and revolutions."[368]The Iranian organizational structure was influenced by the Western practices in the very beginning of the modernization. In Iran, a 'traditional' bureaucratic structure had shaped within the modernization process in the Qajar dynasty, continued and gained strength during the Pahlavis dynasty, and reformed with the Islamic Republic after the revolution. The regimes, the political or ideological actors and the authorities had changed, but the bureaucratic structure stayed at the same position in the state apparatus.

Actually, the development of capitalism and the increasing complexity of society have necessitated a rational and bureaucratized administration. The bureaucratic apparatus has developed through the technical superiority of the administration staff. In addition, the bureaucratic form of organization has formed

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[367] Milton Esman, "Public Administration and Conflict Management in Plural Societies: the Case for Representative Bureaucracy", **Public Administration and Development,** Vol.19, (1999), p.353
[368] Ali Farazmand, "Bureaucracy, Democracy and Public Administration: Editor's Brief Introduction to the Symposium", **Public Organization Review**, Volume 10, Issue 3, (September 2010), p.206

within the scope of the private sector, religious and political organizations (foundations). Because the power of the bureaucratization is attributed to the respect to the nonbureaucratic organizations by Weber.[369] For instance, the Shah did not drive a wedge between the clergy front after the exile of the Ayatollah. He supported the private sector and the 'royal' clergies through the royal foundations.

In addition to this, bureaucratization is seen as a functional response by the capitalist state to the pressures of class struggle which accompany the development of capitalism. For Lenin's argument, the bureaucratic organization separates from the society because of the special privileges of the bureaucrats. Also, they are positioned 'above the people', and their strong tie with the bourgeoisie prevents the active participation of the people to the democratic resolution process.[370]

There is a common view (the Leninst approach supports strongly this argument) that the strong bureaucracy hinders the democracy, especially, in the republican regimes. On the other hand, the Weberian view claims that a strong bureaucracy can be controlled with the rational (legal) authority even if the regime is monarchy. In Weber's conception, the bureaucratic and document-based administrations guarantee the highest degree of performance as the formally most rational type of authority.[371]

"He (Weber) maintained that in societies which have reached a certain degree of economic and social complexity, and in which the desirability of controlling the exercise of power through legal norms has been accepted, 'rational' or 'legal' authority is exercised through a bureaucracy. The structure and behaviour of the bureaucracy reflects the requirements of rational authority in such a type of society. In developing countries this type of bureaucracy does not seem to operate very effectively. To some extent critics of bureaucracy in developing countries are correct in attributing this failure to the problems of a change over to dealing with predominantly economic or 'development' problems as opposed

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[369] Weber, **Economy and Society,** p.973, 988
[370] Vladimir İlyich Lenin, **Devlet ve Devrim,** Agora Books, İstanbul, 2009, p.115-117
[371] Wolfgang Seibel, "Beyond Bureaucracy -Public Administration as Political Integrator and Non-Weberian Thought in Germany", **Public Administration Review**, September-October 2010, p.719

to law-and-order problem, although the change was not as abrupt as is sometimes supposed."[372]

On the other hand, the activities or duties of the state apparatus are arranged on the principles of a hierarchy and the administration of the state office follows general rules.[373] Also the arbitrariness or nepotism cannot be seen such kind of a bureaucratic structure as well as Iran. As an illustration, the traditional authority (the Shah) had constituted a depended and loyal class to himself through modernization and industrialization projects. A 'royal' bourgeoisie class raised the state capitalism, which is under the control of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and the bureaucracy was responsible from the distribution of income on behalf of the state. While the 'state' elites consolidated their power, the state was alienated from the society, because of the lack of a rational (legal) inspection mechanism.

Actually, the theory of modernization claimed to create an industrial society in the developing countries. "And both material benefits (capital and technology) and cultural patterns (institutions and values) were to be diffused or spread from the developed to the underdeveloped countries within each underdeveloped nation from the modern to the traditional sectors."[374] Also the 'development administration' concept had become current in the developing countries, and the state institutions were the propellant power of this system.

From the White to the Green Revolution, the Iranian socio-economic structure was shaped through the development plans. Because the development administration is a manner for consolidating the state bureaucracy within the scope of cameralist system. The development administration is a 'technical' issue, like cameralist system, and a paternalistic and centralized state prefers to use this techniques for controlling the exclusive regime. Also the Shah transferred the control of bureaucratic institutions (education, administration and judicial system) from the religious components to the state. In Iran, the attitudes of the bureaucrats in the hierarchy had encouraged paternalism and reduced accessibility levels, and the

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[372] Robert Stephen Milne, "Bureaucracy and Development Administration", **Public Administration**, Volume 51, Issue 4, p.414
[373] **Ibid.,** p.415
[374] Gary Gereffi, "Wonder Drugs' and Transnational Corporations in Mexico: An Elaboration and a Limiting-Case Test of Dependency Theory", **Ph.D Dissertation Department of Sociology, Yale University,** 1980, p.51

bureaucracy made major contributions to the state in technical issues during the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The Iranian bureaucracy coordinated the expenditure of oil revenues with the development plans and the Plan and Bugdet Organization (*Sazman-e Barnama wa Budja*). The First Development Plan (1947) established a pattern for the following plans and constituted the foreign consulting forms, many of which were concerned only with engineering and infrastructure problems. The Iranian political and social atmosphere was not in view of these plans. The social welfare was seen generally in favor of economic development. In addition, the development plans concentrated on some specific project (in especial the industrial projects) rather than the economy as a whole. In other words, the development plans were used as an accelerator of the state capitalism.[375]

After the White Revolution, the expansion of the 'royal' bureaucracy gained power and prestige and some ministries, directed mainly toward economic development, came into existence. At the same time, the increasing authority of the bureaucracy overlapped other governmental organizations and encountered with the rest of officialdom. The 'new' bureaucratic elites, who stand by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, had to face with the patriarchic state structure. "The policy of placing extensive value on dynamism, youth, and education in the West or westernized education planted a bitter seed of resentment among the more traditional bureaucrats."[376]

> "The state bureaucracy grew from 12 ministries with some 150,000 civil servants to 19 ministries with over 304 000 civil servants. The new ministries included that of Labor and Social Services, Art and Culture, Housing and Town Planning, Information and Tourism, Science and Higher Education, Health and Social Welfare, and Rural Cooperatives and Village Affairs. As the bureaucracies proliferated, the administrative map was redrawn to make the provincial districts more manageable: The number of provinces thus increased from 10 to 23. They consisted of Tehran, Gillan, Mazandaran, Zanjan, Semnan, West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Khurasan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah,

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[375] "Administration in Iran", **Encyclopaedia Iranica,** Volume I, p. vii. The Pahlavi Period http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/administration-vii-pahlavi (16.07.2014)
[376] *Ibid.*

Hamedan, Isfahan, Chahar Mahal and Bakhtiyari, Boir Ahmad, Kerman, Sistan and Baluchistan, Fars, Bushire, Yazd, Ham, Hormozgan, Luristan, and Khuzistan."[377]

The Iranian bureaucracy shaped around a 'centralized' authority. For Gail Cook Johnson, "an organization, in fact, often deleted a top position from its organizational plan or permitted a family member to hold more than one position if the very important positions could only be filled singly by a professional manager. The manager-owner had direct participation in all aspects of the organization."[378] Also, the centralized planning resulted in highly centralized decision-making structures in Iran. The centralized control was achieved by a vertical bureaucratic integration, which was designed by the royal family.

Apart from the centralized authority, "the local magnates had acted as buffers between the rural population and the state."[379] Also the agricultural prices, water distribution or migration policies were canalized by these local authorities on behalf of the state. The farms were converted into the state cooperatives, and the natural agrarian structure wasted away in the eye of industrialization.

In brief, Iran became a 'rentier state' during the reign of the son Pahlavi, and as Skocpol mentioned, "the Shah's state was less embedded in society -especially rural society- than the agrarian bureaucracies. The state's main relationships to Iranian society were mediated through its expenditures -on the military, on development projects, on modern construction, on consumption subsidies, and the like. Suspended above its own people, the Iranian state bought them off, rearranged their lives, and repressed any dissidents among them. The Shah did not rule through, or in alliance with, any independent social class."[380]

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[377] Abrahamian, **Iran Between Two Revolutions,** p.438
[378] Gail Cook Johnson, **High-Level Manpower in Iran: From Hidden Conflict to Crisis,** Praeger Press, New York, 1980, p. 48
[379] Abrahamian, **Iran Between Two Revolutions,** p.439
[380] Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution", **Theory and Society,** Vol.11, No.3, (May 1982), p.268

3.1.2. Modernization From Above in the Iranian Cameralist System

Modernization hinges on generating and absorbing capacity of the society transformation, and it implies a deep, fundamental and continuing change in all systems. On the contrary to the modern system, the traditional structure challenges to this movement of change and protects its cult pillars such as religion-society relation or cultural bonds. In Iran, the traditional background of the society confronted dramatically to modernization, which was performed directly by the state and its institutions, and the power relations among these institutions were informal and personal.

The Irano-Islamic traditional structure has strengthened the institutionalized personalism. Because of this personalism, social and economic institutions were technically inefficient and poorly organized. The conflict attitude has marked all levels in Iranian society, classes and both private and public institutions. At the same time, this on-and-off relation between the state and the society has been a shifting and fluctuating balance. The complex and extraordinary structure protected by the favor of the abovementioned balance, which is composed of crisscrossing, overlapping and inter-locking lines of tension.[381]

> "The traditional Irano-Islamic system has presented a formidable barrier to the processes of modernization. Survival and advancement in this system have demanded a profound skill in personal maneuver and manipulation. Competence in a profession or occupational talent has seldom been the primary determinants for social, economic, or political success. Though the system itself puts a premium on skillful use of the techniques of power, it does little to produce the creativity and imagination that are needed to confront the challenge of modernization."[382]

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi tried to develop a comprehensive organization for the Iranian administration during his kingship. The administrative hierarchy of the Pahlavi state was highly centralized and responsive only to the Shah. The main target

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[381] James Bill, "Modernization and Reform from Above: The Case of Iran", **The Journal of Politics,** Vol.32, No.1, (February 1970), p.21

[382] **Ibid**., p.24

of this structure was protecting the Shah's authority and his throne from a potential threat such as military coup d'etat or political rival. In this system, the Shah was the only decision-making authority in every significant phase of Iran's political affairs.[383] For Khosrow Fatemi, "Iranian politics have rightly been described as 'politics of distrust' and the Shah was a master practitioner of the art of 'government by distrust'."[384]

In this perspective, the 'archaic' modernity had gained a place through the cameralistic view in the Iranian state, but this Western type of structure pit strictly the 'state' against the 'society' at the same time. While the state was shapened 'administratively' with this cameralistic approach by the Shah and his men, the society positioned 'politically' with a communitarian perception against them. This disintegration crystallized especially after the White Revolution in Iran, and we tried to understand this positioning through the spirit of public.

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi improved the administration mentality through the state capitalism and modernization in Iran. The ideal of creating a developmentalist and modern state was supported with these arguments by the administrative (bureaucratic) level. These bureaucrats refused to accept the traditional socio-political patterns of the Iranian society. And the cameralist system took place in this implementation, but its point of view turned to the autocratic administration because of the normlessness and arbitrariness characteristics of the Iranian authority.

As in the cameralistic view, the Pahlavi monarchy, which is the only executive of the state, was the subject of the community, and it was administered by the rulers around the pursuit of common substantive interest. The land and education reforms were developed for the society's (common) substantive interest by the Shah (the 'only' subject of the community) in the White Revolution. The cameralists, also the bureaucrats and academicians, who had education abroad -especially in Europe-, defended the state interest against the individual happiness; because this class saw the 'modernized' society in Europe and tried to establish 'administratively' this structure in Iran. However this expedited transformation recoiled on the Iranian society because of its dynamics different from Europe.

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[383] Khosrow Fatemi, "Leadership by Distrust: The Shah's Modus Operandi", **Middle East Journal**, Vol.36, No.1, (Winter 1982), p.49
[384] **Ibid.,** p.51

The Shah tried to create a new and loyal national subject and to enchain the different classes (workers, peasantry, woman and youth) herself with the discourse of 'equality' and 'liberty' (become free from the landlords and masculine system). He acted with the anticipation that the intellectuals and bureaucrats, who had studied in Europe and learned the function of modern political tools, could help for creating this new type of community in Iran. All the Shah's men had undertaken the mission of conducting the public space for the name of the state, like the cameralists. The civil society and politics was alienated from the administration tools and the state addressed to the community as the only decision maker.

The Iranian modernization process was seen always a dynamic force of transforming and reshaping of the structures, but its 'back' effects were forgotten by the government. Especially the Iranian provinces' background (their social, economic, cultural and demographic structure) affected the modernization level and it's the fertility pattern.[385]

For Katouzian, Iran has never been a feudal political economy and experienced capitalism through its natural way. Because of the lack of private property ownership, the land assignment system was based on the military-bureaucratic structure in the Iranian provinces. The Iranian agriculture and peasantry were not dependent on the state.[386] "The state drew its economic power from the exploitation of scattered and isolated village units, the agricultural surplus of which either directly requisitioned or assigned to landlords and tax farmers."[387]

> "The mosaic system in Iran is based on agricultural and tribal traditions, both of which are organized on hierarchical lines. Society is socially graded, and a pattern of dominance and submissions pervasive. The tenant is subservient to the landlord, the employee to the employer, the peasant to the city-dwelling elite which owns the land, the enlisted man to the officer. (…) The old mosaic system is incompatible with modern nationalism and posed a major problem to Reza Shah when he attempted to strengthen the central government and reform

[385]Ali A. Paydarfar and Reza Moini, "Modernization Process and Fertility Change in Pre- and Post-Islamic Revolution of Iran: A Cross-Provincial Analysis, 1966-1986", **Population Research and Policy Review**, Vol.14, No.1, (March 1995), p.73

[386] Katouzian, **Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society,** pp.68-69

[387] **Ibid.,** p.70

the country. Individuals owe their allegiance to their family, tribe, religion or other group before they owe it to the nation."[388]

The abovementioned structure was the main characteristic of the rural community of Iran. And the (new) 'modernized' urban community was added on this system with the reform movement. All in all, the Iranian society was dislocated with three traumatic and fast progresses -technological, social and state progresses- between 1963 and 1979. The citizen excluded from decision making process and planning of public space, and the state administration adapted the peripheral fordist societal program for promoting both growth and welfare. Moreover, the state characteristic had taken form with a high degree of autonomy from rooted interests of the upper class. "The Shah pushed economic development through agrarian reform and the transfer of economic surplus from agriculture to industry, promoting technological progress."[389]

> "The Pahlavi family used their political authority to ensure firstly, that they became business partners of most major manufacturing enterprises, hotel banks, and insurance companies; and secondly that by resort to bribery, arm-twisting and enforcement of changes in the country's trade and banking regulations, they created an appropriate environment for their own purposes, which often proved contrary to the objective of achieving balanced growth and a more equitable distribution of income."[390]

The Shah was seen as the founder and guarantor of the new order for Iran by 'his' bureaucrats and elites. In this way he consolidated his power within the scope of the 'new' administrative (cameralist) system, which was dependent upon the continuation and consolidation of the Pahlavi dynasty. "In other words, 'modernism' and 'Pahlavism' were to merge and become both synonymous and mutually

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[388] Richard Gable, "Culture and Administration in Iran", **Middle East Journal,** Vol.13, No.4, (Autumn 1959), pp.409-410
[389] Pousadigh, "The Determinanats of the Revolution Disintegration of the State in Iran", p.45
[390]Thomas Walton, "Economic Development and Revolutionary Upheavals in Iran", **Cambridge Journal of Economics,** No:3, September 1980, p.280

dependant. He also developed a vague notion of an alternative utopia, originally labeled the model society, and subsequently the 'Great Civilization'."[391]

"Probably his most controversial mythic construction was his utopian vision for the future. He began by arguing for the development of a 'model' country, which by the early 1970s had grown into the 'Great Civilization'. This was his conception of a new order which would successfully amalgamate monarchical tradition with 'modernity': a monarchy based on the support of a grateful and liberated peasantry."[392]

As Ansari mentioned, the myth of the savior was launched for reconstructing of the Pahlavi state. Because the economy prospered with the industrialization thrust, and the 'new' social classes were content with the modernity. The White Revolution succeeded in transforming the economic and social fields in Iran.[393] However, its sustainability failed after the shadow of the monarchy, which was covered with the 'modernization from above' project.

The Pahlavi type of modernization was a pillar of the Hegelian dialectical progression: a tripartite process consisting of a 'thesis' (modernization from above), contrasted to a rival 'anti-thesis' (revolution from below), with the two submerged in the resulting 'synthesis'(modernization from below). The 'modernization from above' process (thesis) implies state-guided and rapid economic, social and military transformations.[394]

In Iran, the development has derived from above and the administrative level implemented this transformation according to a set of preconceived ideals. The 'revolution from below' (anti-thesis) was situated the right across of the 'modernization from above' (thesis), and it leaded the social conflict and inherent contradictions. This social crash aimed to uproot the political, economic and

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[391]Ansari, "The Myth of the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah, 'Modernization' and the Consolidation of Power", p.3
[392] **Ibid.,** p.13
[393] **Ibid.,** p.20
[394] Tazmini, **Revolution and Reform in Russia and Iran: Modernization and Politics in Revolutionary States,** p.16

ideological institutions of the state. After this bilateral resolution, the 'modernization from below' (synthesis) occurred as the need for social and economic progress.[395]

As Ghoncheh Tazmini stressed, the 'constructive' character of the Pahlavi modernization (modernization from above) was the main contradiction of the Iranian 'deconstructive' revolution movement (revolution from below) in 1979. The 1979 revolutionary challengers stayed out the Western-imported modernization and the 'new' state concentrated on the renewal of existing structures.[396]

Essentially, the Pahlavi family had stayed at the center of the 'new' ruling class after the White Revolution. The bureaucrats and administrators of the Shah drawn into the traditional network, and their 'modern' business manner reinforced through the traditional patterns. "For example, the overall literacy program has been directly guided by the most powerful members of the political elite, including the Shah's sister and his Minister of Court."[397] Also the reform program of the Shah has been designed to build and strengthen the cameralist system and its implementing classes.

The 1979 Iranian revolution occurred after years of purposive state-driven modernization carried out against the backdrop of the repressive authority of Pahlavi dynasty; and also, the 'modernization from above'[398] fact was beset with the structural shortcomings in Iran. The impetus for modernization stemmed from the upper class -monarchy, elites and bureaucrats- with the desire of catching up the developed Western nations.

The monarchic leadership believed that modernization was limited to the expansion of industry, the deployment of infrastructure and military might. However these factors were only the outward expressions of the modern state; the core structure of Iranian state was shaped with the cameralist system and the traditional authority. Tazmini defined the Iranian modernization as the outdated political system. Because the 'modernization from above' effectively arised from hybrid tendencies in Iran: On the one hand the economic acceleration was pumped by the administration;

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[395] **Ibid.,** p.16
[396] **Ibid.,** p.17
[397] Bill, "Modernization and Reform From Above: The Case of Iran", p.33
[398] For historical patterns of 'modernization from above', see: Tazmini, **Revolution and Reform in Russia and Iran: Modernization and Politics in Revolutionary States,** pp.57-73

on the other hand, the increasing archaisation of the political institutions perpetuated the state contradiction.[399]

Actually, this dilemma about Iran's modernization can be attributed to the country's nationalist tendencies as well. Nationalism was used as a powerful feature in the social and political field during the Pahlavi dynasty. Especially, the territorial integrity combined with Iran's illustrious civilization by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Westernization was seen as the paramount method for dissociating Iran from the Arab past and jumping (and starting) to a modern cultural evolution. For Ulrich Beck, this dilemma was complicated more than the Eurocentric narratives of modernization. He called Iranian type of modernization as 'orthodox modernization', which means the disembedding and re-embedding of traditional social forms by industrial forms.[400]

On the other hand, the growing influence of the *ulama* and the communism shadow prompted the Shah to approach into the Western sphere of influence. The Shah's anxiety about the power of Tudeh Party and the role of the clergy on the rural community necessitated the reform movement. Moreover, there wasn't a consensus between the political fronts (the *ulama*, the National Front and the Leftist Movement) against the Shah administration during the reform years (1960s). This circumstance catalyzed the modernization thrust of the Shah and his men. Nationalism and modernism were used as a counter-ideology by them; and it was hoped that nationalism can mobilize the support for modernization program.[401]

Because the characteristic of Iranian culture and history have served to define what Iranians consider being nationalism. Especially, the liberal-nationalist discourse includes the idea of *watan* -nation, homeland or statehood-, and patriotism is connected to the regional attachment in Iran.[402] In addition to that, nationalism rejects the religious bound because of the close link with secularism. According to Naqavi, the national unity is based on common land, race or language, which

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[399] Tazmini, **Revolution and Reform in Russia and Iran: Modernization and Politics in Revolutionary States**, p.6

[400] Ulrich Beck, **Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order,** Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994, p.2

[401] Mehrzad Boroujerdi, **Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism,** Syracuse University Press, New York, 1996, pp.68-69

[402] Mansoor Moaddel, **Islamic Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism, Episode and Discourse**, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2005, p.6

necessitates that religion be kept separate from politics. In Iran, religion and mythology was intermeshed by the Pahlavi dynasty. However, the debate was not whether the state is secular or not for Iranians; it was about the inseparability of Shia as symbolism and mythology of the state.[403]

On the other hand, the Iranian nationalism shaped mostly after the 1953 coup d'état and strengthened with the (oil) industrialization during the 1960s. Stephen Kinzer argues that the coup d'état had an important effect on the emergence of the revolutionary Islamic movement, because the overthrowing of the Mosaddegh government ended up with the loss of the Iran's national interest.[404]

"The nationalization of the oil industry in Iran was a case of strong nationalism because it showed how Mosaddegh was determined to stand up for Iranian nationalism. He believed in a strong Iranian state and wanted to reap the benefits of the oil industry for Iran itself, after having the financial benefits of the oil industry siphoned off by foreigners."[405]

Ironically, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi suppressed the approaches and followers of Mosaddegh after the coup, but he seized upon the view of Iranian state argument and reaping the benefits of the oil industry. The shah directed the oil revenues to the industrialization and modernization projects, and he believed that the rapid development in economy will be leaping Iran over the Western modern states. Whereas the measureless growth of the Iranian economy carried with a social inequality and the national character of Iran returned to the Shah administration like an acock weapon.

Because, the weak bourgeoisie and the inflated bureaucracy was the major deficiency of the Iranian way of capitalism. The modern bourgeoisie was always limited in Iran because of the Iranian structure, much the same in the other Eastern societies. Additionally the state was alienated to the society during this (economic)

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[403] Mohammed Naqavi, **Islam and Nationalism,** Islamic Propagation Organization, Tehran, 1984, pp.3-5

[404] Stephen Kinzer, **All the Shah's Men: An Americak Coup and the Roots of the Middle East Terror**, John Wiley and Sons Inc., New Jersey, 2003, p.87

[405] Lisa Farhamy, **Iranian Nationalism,** The Public Purpose of American University Washington, Volume V, pp.24-25 http://www.american.edu/spa/publicpurpose/upload/iranian-nationalism.pdf (23.04.2014)

modernization process, because it was not designed to improve the welfare of the average citizen and to promote the living standards. The power status and imperial prestige became the primary goals of the economic development in the second half of 1970s. The Iranian society -especially the middle class- had changed with the growing expectations and needs during the same period.

Another characteristic of the 'modernization from above' was the ramification of the economic modernization in Iran. "Under the Shah development was solely inspired by great power aspirations, which necessitated an over-ambitious, accelerated industrialization program. This venture was made possible with abundant oil revenues, which transformed the country into a rentier state. However, the process was accompanied by discrepancies in wealth, widespread inflation, food shortages, higher imports, discriminatory policies and widespread corruption. Almost every segment of society felt alienated as a result of these pressures."[406]

After all, it can be said that the modernization process had some important consequences in the state-class relations as well. Firstly, the reforms reduced the economic power of the landed upper class in the rural area. Because of that the control over the peasantry and the ability to use peasants for political gains devolved on the Shah and his system. In addition, the landed upper class and the monarchy became opponents about the role of the state in the rural economy and class relations. Also the ulama-state relations changed as well; because the clergies opposed the reforms since they would considerably reduce the effects on the mosques.[407]

In brief, the cameralists (especially the bureaucrats) were the main propellant power of the 'modernization from above' fact. They provided to sustain the state capitalism and cameralist administration through the modern state institutions: executive, legislative and judicial powers of the legal authority. However, the Shah was situated 'above' these powers like a traditional authority. Besides the landlords and chieftains were pushed out of the administration circle after the centralization of the state. With a powerful army, a secret police (SAVAK) and a strong international support (USA), Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ruled Iran with an iron fist during the

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[406]Tazmini, **Revolution and Reform in Russia and Iran: Modernization and Politics in Revolutionary States**,p.136
[407] Shaul Bakhash, *the* **Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution**, Basic Books, New York, 1984, p.24

1960s and 1970s. However the centralized state apparatus rendered his regime vulnerable to challenge and overthrow.

3.2. A TRAPPED REVOLUTION

The complex interaction between the structural variables and the action of the monarchs prompted revolution in Iran. The human agency was determinative in the Iranian Revolution, and the ideologically driven challengers (*ulama*, nationalists and the leftist movement) shaped the characteristic of the revolution. After the multidimensional developments from the White to the Green Revolutions, the society became fragile, and it was faced with an (un)expected disintegration in the beginning of the 1979.

The bureaucratic modernization (modernization from above) had prepared the grounds for the revolution. The Shah and his administration excluded the political demands of the community; they approached to the society and to all the related subjects as a 'technical' issue. Also they ignored the political facts. Ironically, this cameralist structure did not change in the Islamic Republic. All the political and religious life came down to the 'techniques' and every component about the state linked up the cameralist system. The regime was changed by the revolutionary challengers, but the state structure stayed on intact.

3.2.1. The Revolutionary Challengers

The historians predicates 1789 on the French Revolution, but the revolution process, incident to the uprisings, had continued till the end of the first decade of 1800s, as Eric Hobsbawm gains attention for this situation in *the Age of Revolution: Europe: 1789-1848*. In other words, the revolutions and their 'after' processes continue because of the tractable characteristic of the revolution wind. The core impetus of revolutions shows tendency to the foundations of individual's rights, democracy or the rule of law. Ironically, this idealistic and collectivist conceptions favors the state power for overcoming the occlusion of the revolution process.

Similarly the others, the Iranian Revolution in February 1979 ended the ideology and force of the monarchy and founded a 'new' regime. The political landscape transformed during this revolution process (1979-1984), and the state-shattering argument turned to the association with the state apparatus of the 'old' regime. However, the unity of the revolutionary challengers separated soon after the triumph of the revolution, and the clerical establishment consolidated its power through the state apparatus. Mostly the leftist political front and the seculars incurred the wrath of the 'new' state, and at the end of the revolution process the Iranians were obliged to face the fact: "revolution is like Saturn, it devours its own children."[408]

What is certain that revolutions are not "singular phenomena for which it is possible to state a single invariant set of necessary conditions, sufficient conditions, and internal sequences"[409]. Moreover there are more theories of revolution[410] for explaining the variability of the different cases; because the potential of the revolutions are bound to the special and different characteristics of the societies. The revolutionary transfer of power entails the breakdown and obliteration of the 'old' regime, the creation a 'new' political, social and economic order and this 'new' order have to be a capacity for consolidating and perpetuating its power for a period of time. These are the core components of the revolution theorizing.[411]

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[408] "Die revolution is wie Saturn, sie frißt ihre eigenen kinder." Georg Büchner / Danton's Death

[409] Charles Tilly, **From Mobilization to Revolution,** Mc Graw-Hill Publishing Company, 1978, p. 158

[410] There is no consensus among scholars how the concept of revolution can be defined. Also most analysts are careful to distinguish revolution from other processes through which regimes are challenged, altered or modified. For example, Theda Skocpol emphasizes the transformation power of the 'below' components and the change of the social class structure. Or revolution has a mission for "overthrowing of the prevailing elite(s)", as Ekkart Zimmerman mentioned. On the other hand, Charles Tilly considers revolution "to be a forcible transfer of power over astate in the course of which at least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims **to** control the state, and some significant portion of the population subject to the State's jurisdiction acquiesces in the claims of each bloc". Whereas Hannah Arendt attributes to revolution a restrictive role and declares that it is the liberation from the oppression. For details about the revlution theorizing, see: Theda Skocpol, **States and Social Revolutions,** Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979; Charles Tilly, **European Revolutions: 1492-1992**, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1993; Ekkart Zimmerman, **Political Violence, Crises and Revolutions,** Schenkman Publishing, Cambridge, 1983; Hannah Arendt, **On Revolution**, Penguin Books, London, 1990.

[411] Dariush Zahedi, **The Iranian Revolution Then and Now: Indicators of Regime Instability**, Westview Press, Oxford, 2000, p.16

The rhetoric of "revolutions are not made; they come"[412] strengthens the abovementioned concept of revolutions, because they are purposefully made by the conscious actions of revolutionary challengers and incited the masses. But the structural defects of the state vary the process of the revolution (from bottom to up). Just as every state has its own logic and interests, every society and its fractal components may not be on the same wavelength, because of their different historical memories, political and social behaviors.

The Iranian Revolution was explained through three different approaches. In the first approach, the Khomeini and his ideology was seen as only the life saver from the socio-economic crisis, which peaked in the second half of the 1970s. This individual based theory claimed that the rapid and irregular development caused an upheaval, and the Shia undertook the guidance role of the social and political movements.[413] In the second theory, the *ulama* and its organizational power was seen as the main engine of the revolution.[414] However the class based revolution theory is the most common socio-economic model for explaining the Iranian Revolution. For this approach, the absolute authority hold on the control and the ownership of the means of production, and the revolution rose for the aim of this unequal economic order.[415]

Apart from the revolution theories, Tilly divided the revolution process into two: *the revolutionary situation* and the *revolutionary outcome*. For him, three important consequences generate *the revolutionary situation*: i) the appearance of revolutionary challengers seeking to gain control of the state; ii) the expression of support for the challengers from a significant proportion of the populace; and iii) the inability of the incumbents to suppress the challengers or extinguish people's support

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[412]Timothy Wickham-Crowley, **Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory,** M.E. Sharpe Press, New York, 1991, p.151

[413] Said Arjomand, **The Shadow of God and The Hidden Imam,** Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1979, pp.4-5; Abrahamian, **Iran Between Two Revolutions***,* p.6

[414] Keddie, **Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution**, p.223

[415] Nikki Keddie, "The Iranian Revolution in Comparative Prespective", **American Historical Review**, Volume 88, No. 3, (June 1983), p. 591.

for them, or both. On the other hand, *the revolutionary outcome* occurs after displacing the power holders and achieving to control over the state apparatus.[416]

> "The construction of dual power prior to revolution must be linked to those cases in which the masses are being mobilized to revolutionary activity, since it is the challengers for power who are the mobilizes. If this is true, then we might also postulate that where dual power exists prior to revolution, one is likely to find a state that has not collapsed due to its own internal and international pressures, but in good part has fallen because of pressures and demands placed upon it from within civil society."[417]

Robert Dix gains attention for the revolution behaviors of the patrimonial regimes, and highlights the position of the personalistic dictators. As he mentioned, the patrimonial regimes have little connections with the population, and moreover, there has not cohesion among the political elites. This circumstance increases the fragility of the state apparatus and facilitates the formation of cross-cutting alliances between the oppositional groups. In general, such alliances are indispensible for dislodging the ongoing system.[418]

Because of the competition among them for the distribution of power, actually, the unfolding and unpredictable process of revolution causes the loss of state effectiveness and the alienation of the classes from the state. Thus the part of the revolution masses will resist against the 'new' system, and this 'new' system will not avoid using the state apparatus for consolidating its power. Also this point is substantially the potential fall of revolution process.[419]

The challenging question about the Iranian revolution is that the revolutionary movement was 'cultural-religious' or 'socio-political'. The real success of the Iranian Revolution was the overthrow of the monarchy, but the main consequence of it has been the establishment of an Islamic state in Iran. At this point, it can be claimed that

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[416] Zahedi, **The Iranian Revolution Then and Now: Indicators of Regime Instability**, p.23
[417] Wickham-Crowley, **Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory,** p.167
[418] Zahedi, **The Iranian Revolution Then and Now: Indicators of Regime Instability**, p.24
[419] Jack Goldstone, "Predicting Revolutions: Why We Could (and Should) Have Foreseen the Revolutions of 1989-1991 in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe", **Debating Revolutions,** (Ed. Nikki Keddie), New York University Press, New York, 1995, p.44

the 'socio-political' ideals of the revolutionary process concealed unwittingly the 'cultural-religious' outcome of the revolution in Iran.

> "One alleged weakness of the state is the undermining of the state's social support, particularly by the elite, as a result of the monarchy's vigorous efforts at reform. This argument takes different forms depending on the affected group. For instance, the shah's land reforms of the 1960s threw the landed oligarchy into the opposition. The shah's industrialization policies and punitive price-control measures threw the traditional bazaari sector into the opposition. Harsh labor repression threw workers into the opposition. The overheated oil-boom economy led to the inflation of urban housing prices, throwing poor migrants into the opposition. Political repression threw intellectuals and the middle classes into the opposition. Secularizing reforms threw religious leaders into the opposition. In sum, the state destroyed its traditional class base while failing to generate a new class base of support."[420]

The structural factors of the Iranian revolution can be spitted on three: i) monarchical ideology and its administration, ii) the position of the international system, iii) reforms and the domestic challengers about it. The monarchical ideology and the educated layer of the monarchy (the cameralists) were formed with the Pahlavi nationalism. It leaned a central and national authority, which is independent from the Iran's backwardness - from Islam. Starting this point of view, the Pahlavi dynasty tried to weaken the religious power and supported the monarchical ideology, which stresses the glory of the pre-Islamic Imperial Iran.

In other respects, the monarchical ideology was based on the Iranian independence from the West and aimed to be the oil master in the international system. The Pahlavi administration used the large amount oil revenues for industrialization and modernization, but it left aside the political and social effects of this fact and did not hear the footstep of the 'revolution from below'.

As Hamid Dabashi mentioned, the industrialization of Pahlavi regime represented some important consequences and caused a 'revolution from below':

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[420]Charles Kurzman, "Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979", **American Sociological Review,** Vol. 61, No. 1 (Feb., 1996), p.157

- An expanded bourgeoisie that economically benefited from the boost but politically disenfranchised from any institutionally anchored democratic aspirations.
- Massive poverty and an economic underclass, the direct result of a state capitalism lucratively beneficial to the royal family.
- Rapid and grotesque urbanization and endemic impoverishment of the rural areas.
- A disgruntled bazaar merchant class that was equally unhappy with the incessant incorporation of the Iranian economy into a corner of global capitalism that left them vulnerable.
- An incensed clerical class poised to reignite its historical alliance with the bazaar against the monarchy.
- A secular and Islamist intellectual elite that had for decades cultivated a rebellious and antigovernmental body of revolutionary ideas.[421]

The 'revolution from below' fact was a deconstruction process of the existing system in Iran. It leaded to the social conflict and its chief concern was the uprooting and dismantling of the state's political, economic and ideological institutions. In this process, the paradoxical revolutionary allies come together against the paradoxical reformist Shah.

"The most striking aspect of the Iranian revolution is the fact that hostility towards the Shah resulted in unlikely alliances between historically antagonistic groups. The shah's pomposity, his detachment from his people, and his reckless modernization policies united disparate groups: the shared goal was ousting the shah. Here, we will explore the relationship between the shah's policies, the composition of the opposition, his waning support base and the rising tide of protest."[422]

However, the revolutionary situations are not enough single-handedly to make real the revolution. As Skocpol mentioned, there is a vanguard need for

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[421]Dabashi, **Iran: A People Interrupted**, p.145

[422]Tazmini, **Revolution and Reform in Russia and Iran: Modernization and Politics in Revolutionary States**, p.181

succeeding the social revolution, and there is need to set out the remake the society after the disintegration as well.[423] The vanguards were the political fronts in the Iranian Revolution. The *ulama*, the liberation and the leftist movements, as the revolutionary vanguards, started the rebellion and overthrowned the Shah without needing a tactical power.

The *ulama*, as the primarily front of the revolution, stayed against the preservation and the expansion of the Shah's power over the Iranian society. Whereas, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi believed that the clergies can provide the best defense against communism. The Shah hoped to pit the *ulama* against the communists, and he planned to weaken the one's power (*ulama*) and to remove the others (communists). However he did not consider the effects of the traditional religious infrastructure of mosques, which are under the *ulama*'s thumb. "Because, the clergy acted historically as an important intermediary between state and society; but the Shah perceived this group as a relic of the past and a treath to his vision of a modern Iran."[424]

The legislation power of the Pahlavi government and the Islamic law confronted during the 1960s and 1970s. The regulations in the civil law (right to divorce for women, legal marriage for both men and women, secular courts over family disputes and education possibilities for women) was not supported by the conservative structure. Especially Ayatollah Khomeini railed against the Shah during his exile years. He declared that the monarchy was incompatible with Islam, and called, for the first time in 1971, to overthrown the Iranian monarchy. Ayatollah Khomeini distinguished himself from the other major political groups which hoped to work within the framework of 1906 Constitution and maintain the monarchy. In this way, he became a fighter-hero against despotism in the eyes of the community.[425]

> "He (Khomeini) played the leading role in pushing the political discourse into
> the religious sphere by both the systemic repression of the non-religious
> political groups and his blind westernization which exacerbated greatly the
> Iranian identity crisis. Both the modernization/westernization and the

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[423] Skocpol, **States and Social Revolutions** , p.163
[424] Tazmini, **Revolution and Reform in Russia and Iran**, p.183
[425] Zhand Shakibi, **Revolutions and the Collapse of the Monarchy: Human Agency and the Making of Revolution in France, Russia and Iran,** I.B. Tauris, New York, 2007, p.206

elimination of the secular groups were policy choices made by the shah reflecting more than anything his personality. There was nothing structurally inevitable about them."[426]

The revolutionary discourse of the clergies formed around the warfare propaganda against America and back-and-forth arguments between the state ideology and the opposition. Also the *ulama*, as the main civil society constitution, politicized with the aim of retaining the penetration of the public space. The organization culture had existed already into the *ulama* since many centuries in comparison with the other political fronts. Furthermore, the intellectual clergies and their discourses raised the ground of the revolutionary idea. It can be shortly said, especially two of them, Ali Shari'ati and Ayatollah Khomeini, had special effects on the Iranian population in the revolution period.

Fundamentally, two different level of Islamic activism came together to establish an Islamic ideology for the state and society during the 1970s. The first group was called as the militant fundamentalists (*the Fedaiyan* and *the Mojaheddin*), and they advocated to build an Islamic state in Iran. After the exile of Khomeini, they accepted his leadership and would adopt his ideology of *Velayat-e Faqih* as the definition of its intended Islamic state. Ironically, these militant fundamentalists combined with the leftist (anti-democratic and anti-capitalist) worldview, their political discussions were popular among younger clerics and students in the 1970s.

The second group was mainly memorialized with Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani or Ali Shariati. Taleqani was a midranking member of the *ulama* in the 1960s and he was close to the National Front and the Islamic modernism of the Liberation movement in Iran. "He opened religion and politics up for discussion through Marxist view, and provided for a common language and frame of reference for the leftists and Islamic revolutionaries to use when speaking about the same socioeconomic issues. His ideas resonated with middle- and lower middle class youth who were looking for ways to bring leftist and Islamic worldviews into harmony."[427]

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[426]**Ibid.,** p.207

[427]Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, **Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty,** Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p.83

As for Ali Shari'ati (1933-1977) attempted to construct and popularize a modern Shi'i ideology in an alternative secular ground. He offered a positive theory of Islamic ideology, and his ideas still continue to be the subject of an important debate in the intellectual circles of the today's Islamic Republic. "His studies and encounters convinced him of the necessity for a single ideological basis if Iranian national liberation was to succeed. Rejecting Marxism, the alien ideology, he determined to create a full-fledged Islamic alternative, generously utilizing Marxist categories and concepts."[428]

Shari'ati's Islamic discourse penetrated mostly the educated middle class, women and youth. Because of his Islamic humanism, the liberals and seculars supported his ideology. Shari'ati's ideology was based on the individual preferences and choices, it was not lauded distinctively the professional clerical class to mediate between the believers and God. His idea about the Islamic reformism granted a sense of self-respect, collective and national identity and cultural authenticity.[429]

Shari'ati offered to found a system on the abovementioned cultural (Islamic-Iranian) identity against the Pahlavi nationalism. The Pahlavi regime pursued the identity of Iranian society on the pre-Islamic history, and also it separated Islamism from Iranism and introduced it as the source of humiliation and the cause of backwardness. Shari'ati moulded the European modernism and socialism into the Islamic awareness, but he formulated it not like a modernist imitator of the West.[430] Shari'ati's Marxist-Islamist remark influenced mostly the leftist movement in Iran. The Mujahadin and the Feda'i, which were the main student-guerilla movements in the revolutionary period, declared Shari'ati as their mentor. The Liberation movement, also, attributed its Islamic-nationalistic view to Shari'ati, used his humanitarian approaches in the social justice discourse as well.

On the other hand, Ayatollah Khomeini was the paramount leader of the insurgency, because the other political challengers against the Shah could not achieve to mobilize the masses. He orchestrated the highly organized revolutionary cadre among the clergy. This clergy cadre followed him with a genuine belief in the

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[428] Ali Mirsepassi, **Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran,** Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, p.115

[429]**Ibid.,** p.116

[430] Asghar Partuvi, "Shari'ati's Thinking: A Reaction to the One-Sided Solutions of Identity Crisis in the Pahlavi Era", **Iranian Quarterly,** Vol.2, No:4, Spring 2001, pp.127-128

sanctity of his leadership. Moreover, the leftist and nationalist fronts gathered around him for a common and strategic antagonism. The Iranian population saw Khomeini as the liberator.[431]

> "Khomeini understood that to convert his own religious and political agenda into a revolutionary movement, there had to be a single Islamic ideology that could mobilize the masses and could relate their divergent demands to the revolution's goals. (…) From 1977 to 1979 and more so after the revolution, Khomeini defined Islamic ideology in terms of demanding an Islamic state that would bring about social justice, empowering the poor, and freeing Iran from Western political and cultural influence. This ideology was as much based on a fundamentalist view of Islam as it was on political and economic populism. (…) It had all the elements of Marxist thought and practice, but it was couched in the symbolisms and language of Islam and pointed to an ideal order that, although Islamic in appearance and led by the ulama, bore strong resemblance to Marxist notions. (…) After the revolution, competition with the Left would lead Khomeini to selectively sharpen and blur distinctions between Islamic and leftist ideologies. This in turn allowed him to out maneuver and ultimately crush the Left in his drive to control the revolution."[432]

On the contrary of Shari'ati's ideological remarks for the Iranian society, Khomeini rose as a political figure in the revolution period. Before the revolution, "he never publicly told the Iranian people about his radical, theocratic ideology, and never mentioned doctrinal issues, such as the concept of *Velayat-e Faqih*. Even clerics and clerical students who supported Khomeini did not know anything about such concepts and plans."[433]

Khomeini's view of freedom from the dictatorship and imperialism was in tune with the liberal nationalists, but he added to this demand an administration plan which is covered with Islamic principles. Because he believed that an Islamic government would guarantee the national independence and provide political freedom for all Iranians. In this way, Khomeini was backed the support of the all

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[431]Dabashi, **Iran: A People Interrupted,** p.150
[432]Gheissari and Nasr, **Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty,** p.84
[433]Parsa, **States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions,** p.247

political fronts and the majority of the Iranian population, and rose as a charismatic political leader, not with his theocratic ideology.[434]

In general, the participation of the upper echelon of the Iranian *ulama* to the political struggle did not fade in the revolutionary period. They did not directly initiate the mobilization process because most of them recoiled at the sight of the political conflicts. During the struggle process, these upper echelon clergies responded to the political pressures and opened the mosques for the political mobilization. Also they just followed the events and left the leading role to Ayatollah Khomeini.

In other respects, the Liberation (National) movement (*Cephe-i Milli*) played an active role with Ayatollah Khomeini for the consolidation of the society against the Shah. This movement headed by Mehdi Bazargan, who became the prime minister of the Provisional Government and split from the National Front of Mosaddegh in 1961. Bazargan and his followers supported the Constitution of 1906, the monarchic system and both religious and political reforms, but then they underrated the power of the *ulama* and planned to use them as a catalyzator during the revolution consolidation. The Liberation front stayed against the radicalism of the Left and the fanaticism of the Right, and served itself as a bridge between the Shah and the reform oriented segment of the middle class.[435]

However, the Liberation Movement cannot succeed to gain an authority in the 'new' state, although it played an important role in the street insurgency. Because the Liberation and Leftist movements had been drastically weakened by the Shah administration and they were repressed and declared illegal during the 1960s and 1970s. This period reduced their capacity for large-scale mobilization. On the other side, Ayatollah Khomeini achieved to use very well the exile rhetoric, and his movement gained strength away from the country. As a result, the Liberation and Leftist movements could not present themselves as viable options to seize state power; Ayatollah Khomeini rose as the only alternative for the revolution.

The Shah's political war against the Left and the liberals resulted in a diminution of secular political discourse, left-wing organizational resources, and

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[434]**Ibid.,** p.248
[435]Mohsen Milani, **The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic,** Westview Press, Colorado, 1994, p.81

democratic institutions. The dominant language of protest and opposition against the Pahlavi state was religious, even though elements of other discourses (third worldist, Marxist, populist) were also present. When the army and monarchy collapsed in February 1979, the *ulama* were in a far more advantageous position than any other political force to assume power and to command popular allegiance.

Fundamentally, the Liberation (National) Movement was just a political front. It had a union of social philosophies and common goals (the independence of the country and the freedom of the people), but it had not a common motivation about the revolutionary arguments. Some scholars or intellectuals followed the nationalism argument, some motivated with the humanitarian feelings. On the other hand, its structure argument covered with the synthesis of Islam and nationalism. For this reason, this kind of a bemusement could not find a strong place within the masses.

In contrast to the moderate Liberation Movement, the Leftist front was anti-imperialist and it constituted its arguments over the oligarchic-comprador alliance in Iran. Between 1954 and 1970, a post-comintern context with no communist center began and the Cold War and U.S. hegemony reigned internationally. The Shah was closely identified with American global and regional economic and military interests. Regionally, the period was characterized by the rise of anti-zionist and anti-imperialist movements. Domestically, the Tudeh Party and the labor unions were suppressed and banned; a project for capitalist development was initiated and jointly undertaken by the second Pahlavi ruler, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in concert with Western, particularly American, capital. During this period, the locus of underground left activity shifted from the factory to the university.

In the early 1960s there was a brief resurgence of dissident activity, mainly by the National Front. In what Abrahamian has called a 'dress rehearsal' for the 1978–79 Revolution, protests in 1963 against the Shah's autocracy and growing ties to the U.S. involved students, teachers, *bazaaris*, the Tudeh Party[436], and a leading

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[436]The Tudeh Party recruited intellectuals and white-collar workers into the party apparatus. It directed its newspapers, journals, and penodicals toward the intelligentsia. The influence of the Tudeh was so pervasive that the meaning of *rushanfekr* changed again. *Rushanfekr* had been a subjective term describing the intellectuals who wanted rapid change. In the 1930s, it had been an objective term characterizing the salaried occupations and modern educated professionals, especially teachers, doctors, engineers, lawyers, and civil servants. However, it became a subjective term describing the radical middle class that wanted through economic, social, and political changes after 1940s.In the period of 1970–78 emerged a new type of Left from the Tudeh Party, also from the 'old' left:

cleric who was subsequently exiled –Ayatollah Khomeini.[437] However, the Leftist front re-established with the guerilla movement[438] and the arms struggle against the repression of the state during 1970s. The strategy of the guerilla movement became widespread among the students after the constant defeats of the Tudeh Party. However this 'new' leftist movement will find its origin with the Tudeh Party experiences as well.

It should not be forgotten that these three socio-politic tendencies specified the state-society conflict during the twentieth century in Iran: the religious tendency, the Iranian nationalism and communism. These tendencies come into existence as three different political fronts in the revolution period. On the one hand, they struggled against the state; on the other hand, they were competed to each other about their different portrayal of modernization, westernization, social justice, national dependence or popular sovereignty. Every movement offered its own solution, but only the clergies taken the opportunity of controlling the state power. The nationalists transformed after the revolution and most of them were attuned to the religious structure. The most oppressed group had been the leftist-Marxists; and at the same time, the only failed revolutionary group was them as well.

The leftist movement failed in Iran, because they cannot understand the inner dynamics of the society in Iran. Between 1953 and 1979, the relentless state

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political-military organizations espousing armed struggle against the Pahlavi regime as the regional pillar of U.S. imperialism. In Iran, this period was seen the full formulation of an anti-imperialist paradigm which posited a military strategy of revolution and a vague socio-economic program. During these years, guerrilla activity was undertaken principally by the Organization of the Iranian People's Fedayee Guerrillas (OIPFG, or Fedayee), and the Organization of the Mojahedin of the People of Iran (OMPI, or Mojahedin), in addition to smaller guerrilla groups. These groups were referred to as the 'militant left' or 'new left'.

[437] Abrahamian, **Iran Between Two Revolutions,** p.320

[438] Two guerilla movements emerged inside Iran during the 1970s: The People's Mojahedin (*Mojahedin-e Khalq*) and the People's Feda'is (*Feda'iyan-e Khalq*). The Mojahedin founded in the mid-1960s and its founders arrested in June 1963. After that, the young Mojahedins believed that the only avenue open to them was armed struggle. Between 1963 and 1971, the Mojahedin had spent their time for theoretical and organizational preparation, trying to square their Muslim and pro-Mosaddeq background with modern revolutionary ideas and methods (also Marxist analysis). Because of the ideological conflict, a group of students founded a new guerilla organization in 1975: Struggle for the Liberation of the Iranian Working Class *(Peykar bara-ye Azadi-ye Tabaqeh-ye Kargar-e Iran)*

On the other hand, the Feda'i guerillas organization was formed in 1971 and it was the most significant guerilla groups until the downfall of the monarchic regime. The bases of their thesis leans on the necessity of the armed actions by a vanguard group as the only way to challenge the regime. Their basic ideological framework was similar to that of the Tudeh Party. There were pro-Soviet but independent, and although critical of the past leadership of the Tudeh Party. Nevertheless they considered it as the original Marxist-Leninist organization of Iran. For details about the guerilla movements in Iran, see: Behrooz, **Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran,** Chapter 2

oppression alienated them from the social reality, and they concentrated on the ideological perspectives of the state-society conflict. In this period, the Shah regime did not target the institutional locality of the clergies, its pressure fronted to some religious personality (such as Khomeini or Shariati). But then, both the institutions and leaders of the leftist movement suffered systematically the rage of the regime during the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. This circumstance kindled the young generation, who were also affected from the world conjuncture (the rise of the Marxist ideology).[439]

In addition to that, the Iranian social class structure was determinative on the revolution period and the failure of the left. The urban population was controlled by the *ulama* and the *bazaaris*, the socio-economic scope of the religious front; and on the other hand, there wasn't a revolutionary potential or sense in the rural area. Under this circumstance, the Leftist movement could not find a strong place for propagating its revolutionary ideology in the big and industrial cities or in the uninitiated rural area.

Moreover, the demographic and infrastructural base of the Pahlavi regime identified the content of the revolution as well. "The bifurcated class formation, between the merchant class and the poor (and pious) on one side and the ruling elite and the modern (mostly secular) middle class on the other, finally came to a head-on collision in the course of the revolutionary period, when the political populism of Ayatollah Khomeini displaced the endemic elitism of the secular left and liberal politics, by preaching a radical Islamism predicated on the innate political propensities of Shi'i Islam."[440]

Besides the abovementioned political front, the 'revolution from above' swept away the key social classes; also the *bazaar* was the one of them. "In the 1970s, there was very little solidarity in the *bazaaris* due to the economic strafication and organizational weaknesses. Disagreements between wealthy merchants and those who were less affluent were common. However, the price control campaign radicalized the *bazaaris*, who put ideological differences aside and mobilized against

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[439] Behrooz, **Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran,** p.240
[440] Dabashi, **Iran: A People Interrupted,** pp.144-145

the government. The *bazaar* activism became more pronounced after the country-wide strikes between 1977 and 1979. "[441]

Their mobilization showed the correlation between the modernization policies and the non-institutionalized expressions of the protest. The *bazaaris* alienated from the state because of the political repression, rapid industrialization and its restless effects and arbitrary policies of the government (such as the anti-profiteering campaign). This circumstance reshaped the social relation between the classes and strengthened their opposition voice.

However, another important social class -the workers- did not played ball in the revolutionary struggle, because the state was the largest employer in Iran. With owning almost 200 factories and workshops, a considerable number of the laboring class was government employed. In addition, the state was the leading investor of the private sector and multi-national corporations. Also the government performed a conciliatory position towards the working class. Whereas, their demands increased during the industrialization period, and the highly skilled and educated workers wanted to live in the 'modern' expectations. But the economic conditions failed after the 1974, and the working class has to face the state capitalism and its results.

Between 1977 and 1979, the working class joined the strikes as well, but this participation had not an ideological aspect. The Iranian labor was concerned only with the economic issues: inflation, living standards, wages, loans and health insurance. They had not revolutionary ideals such as overthrowing the royals and the monarchic class and establishing an Islamic state. However, the revolutionary momentum set the working class in motion as well. After the wide spectrum strikes, they faced to the Khomeini's representatives against the state.[442]

And the students played active role in the revolutionary challenging more than the *bazaaris* and the working class. They came mostly from the upper classes, and they had an idealistic world view about the social justice, freedom and democracy. Generally they supported the secular ideologies such as Marxism and nationalism; but some had been members of the National front as well even it showed signs of a growing conservatism after the fall of Mossadegh. The student movement radicalized after the state repression. A remarkable part of the students

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[441] Tazmini, **Revolution and Reform in Russia and Iran,** p.187
[442]**Ibid.,** p.191

supported the politics of Khomeini, but most of them were attracted to the example of guerilla movements in Cuba, Vietnam and China. The Fedayeen and the Mojahedin formed themselves through these cases. Unfortunately, hundreds of them perished between 1971 and 1979 in the armed confrontations with security forces, and most of them were executed or exposed to torture by SAVAK.[443]

Interestingly, the Western states did not foresee the coming and hidden reality of the Islamic Republic before the triumph of the revolution. Every one -even USA- saw the riot of the Iranians against the Shah as the humanitarian reaction after a long-term pressure, and they did not suspect that the revolution would turn out the Western ideals – freedom, independence, democracy and social justice. However, as Katouzian stressed, the Iranian Revolution did not remind of the Western type of revolutions. "This (the Iranian Revolution) was not a bourgeois capitalist revolution; it was not a liberal-democratic revolution; it was not a socialist revolution. Various ideologies were represented, of which the most dominant were the Islamic tendencies."[444]

In brief, the disparate social groups and political views came together for removing the Shah under the control of the *ulama* directed struggle. At the beginning of the revolution movement there was not a goal of establishing a theocracy. Only Ayatollah Khomeini planed to found an Islamic Republic in the future of Iran.

3.2.2. The 'New' Administration in Iran

Revolutions have pointed politically and socially the history and they have both domestic and international consequences in the post-revolutionary periods. "The common universalizing tendency of revolutionaries, the common rhetoric against the prevailing international status quo, and the common attempt to create qualitatively different societies and global orders are all indicative of the common causes of revolutionary change. It is the similar international origins of disruptive social change that best explains the tendency for all revolutionary leaderships to pursue

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[443]Fred Halliday, **Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East**, I.B. Tauris, New York, 1996, p.56
[444] Katouzian, **The Persians: Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Iran,** p.325

'anti-systemic' objectives and to direct their rhetoric against the international status quo."[445]

As Halliday highlighted, the political revolution and overthrowing of the Pahlavi regime were achieved by the before mentioned and triumphant masses. However the limitations and dangers showed the face in the first year of the revolution.[446] "Despite the victory of the revolution movement and the destruction of the imperial regime, much of the old state machine itself remains in place. The level of socioeconomic transformation has been so far limited, with rhetoric going rather further than actual policy."[447] And also, he summarized the future of the 'new' state just at the very beginning of it:

> "The very role of the Islam also involves major difficulties for the revolution. Clearly it provided the ideology and much of the leadership of the revolutionary movement, and there is a socially radical current within the Islamic movement aiming, albeit in rather vague terms, at a socio-economic transformation. But by its very nature the Islamic movement is extremely hierarchical and therefore antidemocratic; it could provide the justification and the forces for a suppression of all dissent, especially from the secular left. Secondly, its position on women and on issues of personal morality generally is extremely repressive and, by any socialist standards, reactionary; socialists should not be afraid to say this, out of some misplaced sense of solidarity. Thirdly, there is no evidence that the Islamic forces, under whatever particular label, can in practice provide a lasting political and socioeconomic alternative to the Iranian people."[448]

The Islamic Republic was labeled 'rogue' state after the revolution process in the international arena; the Iranians were alienated from the world with the 'new' socialization project of Islamic Republic. This fact was the main dilemma of the revolutionary challengers and Iranian people in the post-revolutionary period.

The revolution coalition was ideologically heterogeneous in Iran. The revolutionary fronts had different political arguments. The debate over the content of

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[445] Maryam Panah, **The Islamic Republic and The World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution,** Pluto Press, London, 2007, p.6
[446] Fred Halliday, "Iran's Revolution: The First Year", **MERIP Reports,** No:88, (June 1980), p.4
[447] **Ibid.**
[448] **Ibid.**

their ideologies became more important after the revolution. Even though the Iranian believed that the revolution and overthrowing of the Pahlavi was the absolute good for Iran, a deep division among them shaped during the power consolidation process, after February 1979. Also, the role of ideology initiated to discuss the rise to power of the religious leadership in Iran and the post-revolutionary outcome of a clerical-led state.[449]

Actually, the nationalists and liberals were seen the key groups for consolidation of the state power after the Shah. Thus, Mehdi Bazargan, who was religiously advocates the Islamic modernism, was appointed as the revolution's first prime minister, and came from the Nationalist front. Bazargan tried to establish a bridge between democratic dimension and Islamic movement. However, the nationalists and the liberals, who supported the democratic system, lacked a common ideology. They straggled politically and had not an utter concept of the revolution. Whereas Ayatollah Khomeini, who leaded to the clergies, presented his predetermined ideology -*Velayat-e Faqih*- as the base of the new constitution. This fact was attributed to the lack of future vision of the democrats in Iran by Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr:

"Democracies result from negotiated transitions of power when political mobilization of the middle class compels authoritarian regimes to accept change. The mobilization is then captured in new constitutional frameworks and democratic institutions. Revolutions happen when mobilization extends to the lower classes, and its size and scope of activities overwhelms political institutions. The tidal wave of revolutionary mobilization does not favor democratic consolidation. In a social revolution, democracy falls victim to mass mobilization."[450]

In the aftermath of the Revolution, the *ulama* and the Liberation Movement replaced on the old administration and run with a provisional government till a permanent system established. An executive Revolutionary Council founded and the leading religious figures were beset by the state institutions. The state power

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[449]Goldstone, "Predicting Revolutions: Why We Could (and Should) Have Foreseen the Revolutions of 1989-1991 in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe", p.15

[450] Gheissari and Nasr, **Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty,** p.81

concentrated in the hand of a compact clerical group, and they detracted the social and economic problems, which were the main components of the revolution. The xenophobia was exaggerative pumped by the 'new' state institutions and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic was declared as the only way out from the foreign (especially US) focal points, also from "the common enemy of the Islamic world"[451].

The period of extremism, between 1979 and 1983, pushed Iran toward the military violence, social uncertainty, personal disillusionment and political chaos. "The Pahlavi government had centralized power in the hands of one man who refused to introduce any modicum of serious political participation into his rule."[452] For this reason, a political organization could not grow up in Iran, and the masses did not organize under the roof of a political party. The Iranian Revolution was not a political attempt; it was socio-cultural.

Furthermore, "an estimated 200,000 members of the bureaucratic intelligentsia have left Iran in the past three years. As a result, there is a severe shortage of those with the professional capacity to help construct a new system (e.g., engineers, economists, agronomists, administrators, teachers, physicians, planners, technicians, and social scientists)."[453] The clerical patronage filled the void in the state institutions after the Shah administration.

The clerical rise in the 'new' system undeceived the moderates and they found themselves unable to promote law and order or common sense. The state institutions, controlled by the clerics (such as revolutionary committees, Islamic tribunals and foundations), weakened the authority of government, consisted of the Liberation movement, and the seculars and leftists were pushed out of the administration circle by the Islamists. However "the seculars and leftists advocated revolutionary trials, expropriation of the land and property of wealthy counterrevolutionaries, the establishment of workers' councils and other measures designed to usher in an anti-imperialist socialist order. The Khomeinists were also

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[451] Ayatullah Ruhullah Khomeini, **Sahifeh-e Nur,** Volume 10, November 1979,p.242
[452] James Bill, "Power and Religion in Revolutionary Iran", **Middle East Journal**, Vol.36, No.1, (Winter 1982), p.28
[453] **Ibid.,** p.29

much encouraged by the squabbles, ideological fragmentation and political inexperience and ineptitude of the secularists."[454]

Moreover, the revolutionary challengers aimed at the judiciary mission of the state before overthrowing of the Shah. The Pahlavi judiciary system was based on the secular law, and the influence of the *ulama* was limited in the country's legal system. However the revolution provided an opportunity for the *ulama* to rebuild the judiciary system and to bring under control the state through the Islamic law-system. "The revolutionary leaders would in the early years of the revolution rely on their own ad hoc procedures to fulfill the tasks of the state. The revolution's antistate attitude was best captured in a widely posted declaration that it preferred *mota'ahhed* (the ideologically committed) over *motekhasses* (the specialist). What mattered was ideology, not expertise. Revolution was the end, and its ascendance would come at the expense of the state."[455]

Starting this point of view, a constitution drafts was prepared, and the main clause of the 'new' constitution was based on the mandate of the *Velayat-e Faqih* (guardianship of the jurists). The extensive powers of the religious leadership were guaranteed by the additional clauses as well. "The Islamic Republic's leaders used the anti-imperialist rhetoric to suppress the demands of various social groups for social and political rights and freedoms by denouncing them as agents of imperialism and counter-revolution, and also by professing an Islamic populism – arhetorical claim to represent the masses – and therefore forging popular unity. Khomeini denounced human rights as the rights of the superpowers."[456] This anti-imperialistic rhetoric provided a vanguard position for the Islamic Republic against the potential threat of intervention. However, the Islamic Republic found itself in a situation of international isolation and the ideological approach gave impetus to the *ulama* for promoting the policy of Iranian Revolution abroad as well.

The revolutionary challenge of *ulama* expanded in several ways. First of all, the clerical front achieved to reconstruct the Islamic revolutionary discourse. "Even in the initial stage of the revolution, the first priority for Khomeini and his followers

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[454]Fakhreddin Azimi, **The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule,** Harward University Press, New York, 2008, p.358
[455]Gheissari and Nasr, **Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty,** p. 86
[456] Panah, **The Islamic Republic and The World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution,** p.58

was the radicalization of the ulama, pressuring them to take an active part in the revolution."[457] In addition, the religious rituals and symbolic structure of the revolution provided an effective channel for maintaining the continuity of the revolution wind.[458]

Actually, the big challenge for Iranian new system –the Islamic Republic- had surfaced with the discourse of the republicanism and Islamism. The constitution referendum, in April 1979, confirmed that Iran was formally designated as an Islamic Republic. The republican components pointed at the democratic values and the revolution ideals. The choice of a republican form of government was connected with the 'anti-monarchic' revolution ideal. For the Islamic Republic perception, the governmental system was planned with the Islamic concerns, and the political structure and people's position in the state shaped through the republican system.

However, the leading role and privileged status of the cleric class was indisputably guaranteed in the constitution and the theocratic voice of it designed through the hegemony of the *ulama*. This republican eclipse of Iranian 'new' regime used the successor state institution for founding the 'new' political form. In fact, the clerical tutelage lived through the Iranian-cameralist administration structure. The religious paternalism demarcates technically (like a cameralist state) the concept of citizenship in the Islamic Republic through the 'new' Islamic-bureaucratic class. And above this elite-bureaucratic class, the absolute power, also the *Rahbar*, occupied the state through the traditional authority, just as the Shah.

"The amalgamation of elements relating to the pattern of dictatorship, the pattern of superficial democracy, and of the pseudo-democracy in the power structure of the Islamic Republic has become the main origin of contradictions, changes and different interpretations of the nature of this system. The structure of the Islamic Republic's Constitution like some old mixes constitutions is combined of differing elements of elective autocracy, aristocracy or oligarchy (clerical stratum) and democracy (direct election of the President and Parliament). The Islamic Republic's system has on the one hand certain

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[457]Mansoor Moaddel, "Ideology as Episodic Discourse: The Case of the Iranian Revolution", **American Sociological Review,** Vol.57, No.3, (June 1992), p.366
[458] **Ibid.**

ideological and structural characteristics of the omnipotent state, and enjoys certain potential democratic traits on the other."[459]

Starting this point of view, the Islamic Republic found its basis on the constitution with the following characteristics:[460]

- Governance and administration of the country's affairs rely on public votes (Article 6)

- The election of the President and the Parliament are done by people, and the duration of his/her presidency is limited as four years (Article 114).

- The formalization of the Cabinet is subject to the vote of confidence by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Article 123)

- The constitution has provided for political responsibility to the extent of impeachment and legal liability to the extent of trial and conviction for the *Rahbar* (Articles 111 and 142), for the President (Articles 110, 122, 134, 140 and 142), and for the ministers (Articles 137, 140 and 142).

However, the conceptual and legislative frameworks did not work in practical terms because of the theocratic behavior of the Islamic Republic. Weber had stated this problem as 'the church-state problem' and explained the failed point of charismatic authority through this argument. As Weber stressed "whenever hierocratic charisma is stronger than political authority it seeks to degrade it, if it does not appropriate it outright. Since political power claims a competing charisma of its own, it may be made to appear as the work of Satan."[461] *Velayat-e Faqih* is based on such a hierocracy as the guardians of the Shia tradition as well.

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[459] Mohammad Hossein Hafezian, "A Theoretical Approach to the Relationship between Republicanism and Islamicity in the Islamic Republic of Iran's System", **An Iranian Quarterly**, Vol.4, No:3-4, Winter-Spring 2003, p.147
[460] **Ibid.,** p.151
[461] Weber, **Economy and Society**, p.1163

As in the cameralist approach, the theory of *Velayat-e Faqih*[462] was converted a highly technical and specific legal discussion of the rights of administrator into a theocratic political theory. Khomeini sees the Islamic government different from the representative or constitutional monarchies. For him, the Islamic government implements the concerns of the separation of powers and the mandate of the clergy governs and administers the country by favor of the Sacred Law. Thus, he had rejected the separation of religion and politics, and the supreme leader, who inspired divinely on behalf of the hidden Imam, would lead and guide to the community of believers, and also, the clergies are the implementers of the Islamic law.[463]

Clearly, neither the leftists nor the nationalists had such a theory or ideology to reinforce the Islamic administration. On the other hand, Khomeini did not describe the limits of the government control or the social function of the state or the background of the Islamic economic process as well. He only concentrated on justifying the right to rule of the religious components and structured the *Velayat-e Faqih*[464] ideology with this perception. Gheissari and Nasr named Khomeini's approach as "the Shia version of Plato's Republic in which the Guardian Jurist would be the Philosopher King."[465]

Khomeini was not interested with the function or (economically) development of the Islamic state. He only focused on the moral and the ideological foundation of the state. "When Khomeini became Iran's *de facto* ruler in 1979, he never associated himself with the state and did not deal with the details of policy making. Revolutionary Iran was led by a ruler who symbolized the state yet simultaneously stood opposed to it."[466]

Interestingly, the grand ayatollahs were alive at the time of revolution, and Khomeini was one of the least representatives among them. In addition, his ideological view about merging the spiritual and political powers was against the predominant current of political quiescence and quietism. However, Khomeini's

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[462] *Velayat-e Faqih* can be translated as 'rule of the jurisconsult','guardianship of the jurist','mandate of the jurist','trusteeship of the jurist','the discretionary authority of the jurist' or ' the governance of the jurist'.

[463] Said Amir Arjomand, "The State and Khomeini's Islamic Order", **Iranian Studies**, Vol.13, No:1/4, p.154

[464] For the theological argument of *Velayat-e Faqih*, see: Shahrough Akhavi, "Contending Discourses in Shi'i Law on the Doctrine of Wilāyat al-Faqīh", **Iranian Studies**, Vol. 29, No. 3/4, pp. 229-268

[465] Gheissari and Nasr, **Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty,** p.87

[466] **Ibid.,** p.87

charismatic and popular appeal over the wide cross-section of the populace and his rigid intransigence deemphasized his ideological disintegration.[467] He became the leader of the revolution with the masses strong desire; this is why the clerical class was obliged to follow the people's claim.

Since the very beginning, Khomeini concentrated on the Islamic Revolution against the Shah. Even the leading clerics emphasized on a clerical autonomy with the monarchical administration, the Ayatollah had not a program for a post-Shah society; he consolidated an Islamic government and defined is as the contrast of the monarchy. "As late as January 1979, Khomeini's reference to 'an Islamic Republic that guarantees freedom of the people, independence of the country, and attainment of social justice' would hardly have given the public much insight into the specific policies of the Iranian government in the 1980s."[468]

It is clear that the post-revolutionary process of Iran was fluxional and fragile. Because every political fronts had their own agenda and ideological perspective for administrating the state apparatus. They had deeply disintegrations about the past and the future of Iran. This fact precluded the broad consensus on the foundation of a new system. In addition to that, there were no leader may compete with Khomeini. Because the other political fronts were in a jam (in themselves) and they could not allow the rise a common leader; only the clergy front followed unquestioningly to Khomeini as its leader.

The clerical tutelage penetrated gradually to the state apparatus. The religious legitimacy was consolidated and institutionalized under the Khomeini's charismatic authority, and the clergy cadre formed as the new elites and cameralist class in Iran. "Resistance to clerical rule provoked suppression, brutalization, a spiral of violence and revenge, a dehumanizing atmosphere of terror fueled by religious or ideological zeal. It also invigorated the regime, which seemed to thrive on crisis and confrontation. The scale of opposition facing the regime had led it to conclude that it could not survive without a massive crackdown."[469]

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[467] Zahedi, **The Iranian Revolution Then and Now: Indicators of Regime Instability,** p.67
[468] Gene Burns, "Ideology, Culture and Ambiguity: The Revolutionary Process in Iran", **Theory and Society,** Vol.25, No.3, (June 1996), p.361
[469] Azimi, **The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule,** p.365

The administrative structure in the post-revolutionary process was based on the clerical tutelage, and the new bureaucrats were clergies as well. The two important institutions of the state, the judiciary and the military functions, were in the *ulama*'s pocket. However the many revolutionary bureaucrats were wide of the administration ability and the bureaucratic hierarchy was based primarily on nonrational criteria. In this period, the political and public frustration was intense than the modernization process of the Pahlavi era. And the 'intact' state structure had been continued with the new cameralists[470] –the clerical tutelage- from the revolution.

Out of the starting gate of the revolution, the new agencies replaced and designed the state in accordance with the Islamic regime. "The new institutions surfaced in an ad hoc manner to address needs as they emerged, and they grew organically to fill the void that was left by the collapse of the old order; they interacted in a complex manner to provide the necessary functions of a state, managing the society and the economy. In time, however, this tangled web would undergo change to become more efficient in its operations, bound by new norms and procedures."[471]

The 'new' institutions, such as the Revolutionary Guard, had been added to the state structure in the post-revolutionary process, but the main administrative apparatus remained in the Islamic Republic as well. The function of the *Rahbar* corresponded with the Shah. The traditional authority, which was used by the Shah, had islamicised on the *Rahbar*'s hand. The *Velayat-e Faqih* was a state-design idea as the modernization project of the Shah. Even though the roots of their ideologies could be different, the functions and methods of this state-design perception corresponded to each other. Both authorities used his own conception for transforming the society through the state and its apparatus.

In the Iranian institutionalized theocracy, the *Rahbar* was the official head of the state, the spiritual guide of the nation and the commander in chief of the armed

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[470]These new cameralists perceived themselves as the only interpreters of Islam. Their moral superiority and technical proficiency about administration could advance the society, and they were seen as the true representatives of Iranian traditional culture by the Iranians.
[471] Gheissari and Nasr, **Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty**, pp.88-89

forces.[472]In terms of the constitution, he can appoint or dismiss the administrative staff such as the members of the Council of Guardians and Expediency Council, the commanders of the Revolutionary Guard and the security forces, the head of the judiciary, the chief of the armed forces, the heads of the *Bonyads* (foundations). In addition, he can also sign or reject the decree of the elected president.[473]

The Assembly of Experts is elected by the people, but they must be approved by the twelve-member Council of Guardians, who is under the supreme leaders' thumb and half of its members appointed by the *Rahbar* among qualified clerics. The constitutional acceptability of the legislation, enacted by the Majles, and the presidency are authorized by the Council of Guardians and its decisions have not justified as well.[474] On the other hand, the economic, political, public and foreign policies are determined by the President. He ranks executively after the supreme leader in the power structure of Iran.[475] Technically, the president positions administratively above the top-ranking officers such as the Revolutionary Guard or the clerics. However the chief of these officers are contingent upon the supreme leader and this fact provides superiority to their institutions in practical terms.

Another state institution, the *Majles,* functions, generally, tolerating so long as it does not threaten the established order. "In addition to being empowered to enact legislation, the *Majles* must also approve all of the president's cabinet members. After approving the minister, the Majles is further empowered to oversee and evaluate their conduct and, if it deems necessary, hold impeachment proceedings in order to dismiss them. With members elected to four-year terms, the composition of each *Majles*, although manipulated by the Council of Guardians' election screening process, has until now had a determining bearing on the policy orientation of each government."[476]

The ruling clerical elites have established a new state system for guarantying their power. To preclude the possibility of coup d'etat in the post-revolution process,

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[472] Jahangir Amuzegar, "Islamic Fundamentalism in Action: The Case of Iran", **Middle East Policy**, Vol.4 (1 and 2), September 1995, p.22

[473]Anoushiravan Ehteshami, **After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic**, Routledge Press, London, 1995, pp.48-49

[474]Zahedi, **The Iranian Revolution Then and Now: Indicators of Regime Instability**, pp.158-159

[475] Ahmad Ashraf, "Charisma, Theocracy and Men of Power in Postrevolutionary Iran", (Eds. Myron Weiner and Ali Banuazizi), **The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan**, Syracuse University Press, New York, 1994, p.141

[476] Zahedi, **The Iranian Revolution Then and Now: Indicators of Regime Instability,** p.160

they have founded a fragmented security apparatus. Also the *Sepah-e Pasdaran* (the Revolutionary Guard) and the *Basij* (the volunteer militia power) were founded such like an aim and overshadowed the Iranian army. "The regular army, which, as in the time of the shah's rule, still derives its rank-and-file members through conscription, has been the victim of so many purges since the revolution that its capacity to take part in autonomous institutional behavior has been emasculated. Since it is composed almost entirely of conscripts, the army is not considered to be sufficiently loyal to impose internal security. It is, therefore, directed completely toward external defense. The Revolutionary Guard, by contrast, created shortly after the revolution (with its own ground, naval, and air branches) to balance the influence of the army, is considered more reliable and (is) used to block the mobilization of groups and classes."[477]

For Gheissari and Nasr, the 'new' system created a "dual state in which the old machinery of state, though *enduring extensive* screens and personnel changes, especially at top levels, remained intact. They functioned alongside parallel institutions that were loyal to the revolutionary elite, who were determined to secure for themselves the same bureaucratic turf as soon as possible."[478] Thus the cameralist state structure was protected by the clerical bureaucrats, and they established a more technical administration than the system of the monarchy.

Khomeini modeled a non-western construction for the state, and theoretically the norms and ideology of the 'new' state prevailed against the 'old' regime. Just as the Pahlavi modernization was inspired from the western social, cultural and economic values, the Islamic Republic used the anti-western rhetoric, but the same state institution operating its power. Ironically, Khomeini created a police state with the *Pasdaran* and *Basij* something like the SAVAK of the monarchy. Moreover, he consolidated the power of the state capitalism through the religious foundations (*bonyads*) as well. The capitalist economic system was covered with the Islamic rules, and the planned economy attitude was continued under the Islamic government's control.

In addition, the pathetic carnage of the revolutionary challengers had begun after the consolidating of the power of Iranian 'new' state. "Khomeini ordered the

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[477]**Ibid.,** p.163
[478] Gheissari and Nasr, **Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty,** p.89

swift and brutal execution of anyone who even seemed to challenge his vision of an Islamic Republic. Old army officers and aging former politicians were arrested and summarily executed, as were young revolutionaries, juvenile activists, Kurdish rebels, women protesting the imposition of a medieval code of conduct of them, everyone who dared to market he slightest public protest against the cruel theocracy that Khomeini had dreamed, ordered, legislated, and institutionalized with unsurpassed punishment, ascetic precision and mystical conviction."[479]

Essentially, the Iranian 'new' state retained many characteristics of its predecessor. The 'new' constitution and administration system shifted the helm to a coercive and stronger Islamic attitude; and as before, the revolution failed. "The monarchy had blocked all political safety valves; whether inadvertently or otherwise, the Islamic regime would not do so. The oligarchic exercise of power and the multiplicity of factional clusters in the Islamic regime would make it, in certain respects, less vulnerable than its autocratic predecessor."[480]

Apart from the state issue, the revolution was an urban phenomenon as well. The social and cultural life was affected from the new Islamic system and the gender discrimination, the unlawful executions and the ubiquity of various agencies of surveillance kept 'the oppressive state perception' going on the populace. The institutionalization of oligarchic clerical rule and creating a 'Shi'ite society' was the most important and far-reaching consequence of the revolution. The 'new' ruling class maintained the provincial sociocultural outlook, and they consociated with the *bazaaris* as the cont'd of the state capitalism structure. At this point, the many other social strata -the middle and lower rural classes and the peasantry- had kept out the circle of fair income distribution same as before.

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[479] Dabashi, **Iran: A People Interrupted,** p.163
[480] Azimi, **The Quest for Democracy in Iran,** p.413

CONCLUSION

"Arbitrary rule (*estebdad*) and chaos (*harj-o-marj*)
are two sides of the same coin."[481]

Seyyed Mohammad Khatami

Mohammad Khatami, who is the one of the key figure of the Iranian politics, the important leader of the reform movement after the revolution and the fifth president of the Islamic Republic, summarized the Iranian structure with the abovementioned statement. In Iran, the state tended towards absolute and arbitrary rule, and the society tended to rebellion and chaos under these circumstances.[482] And this '*sui generis*' structure sealed the future of Iranians.

From the Pahlavi monarchy to the Islamic Republic, the power possession of the socio-political groups changed, and also the 'modern state' phenomenon of the Shah was reshaped in the hands of the 'new' religious administration. However, the way of establishing the authority is still continuing through the traditional origin of Iran.

The major failed point of the Pahlavi administration was the goal of modernization the society from 'above'. In the East, where the modernity action rose, the society went through a long adaptation process during two centuries. Whereas the Iranian society dynamics were very different from the East. Because of this reason, the modernization attack of the Shah turned to the 'Westernization' project, and for the rapid and compulsory transformation, the society was not integrated to the modernization project.

The desire of change, which stems from the inner circle of the society, attested to a strong societal power in the Western country. They lived the period of criticizing the religion and redefining the 'state' argument with the Enlightenment. Islam and Islamic societies did not live such a process. They became distanced from the features of the modern state - especially impersonal power of the authority and

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[481] Katouzian, **The Persians: Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Iran,** p.354
[482] **Ibid.,** p.5

constitutionality. Even though the Reza Pahlavi succeeded to the throne with a constitutional revolution, he and his son put account the constitutional rights for consolidating the power of the monarchy. Indeed, this arbitrariness based on the traditional authority fact in Iran.

The state of Shah featured the Weberian modern state in some ways. *Territoriality* was attributed to the modern state through the nation-state argument. The Shah established the fact of 'Iranian nation' with his nationalist mobilization movement. Another feature of the modern state, also *citizenship,* was mediated through these practices as well. In addition to this, he provided this 'nationalist mobilization' position with a strong bureaucratic network. In this way he engaged to the rational feature of the modern state; also to *bureaucracy.*

However, the eight features of the modern state have integrity with the *legal authority* in the Weberian typology. Because, for Weber, the legal authority is the only implementing agency of the modern state. However, the Shah's modernization process was conducted with the observance of the *traditional authority.* In fact this gross irony was concluded with the revolution in Iran.

The Shah used the *physical force* of the modern state through the SAVAK (The Organization of Intelligence and National Security), and his suppressive power turned to a tragic history for Iran. Otherwise, he could not separate his monarchical position from the state sovereignty, and having an *impersonal power* in the modern state could not become fact in the Pahlavi dynasty. In addition to that, *the authority legitimacy* cannot found in Iran because of the Shah's bureaucratic and royal network.

The remnants of the traditional authority prevented to establish a modern state in Iran. Because the Shah was an 'absolute' and 'arbitrary' authority and Iran was a patrimonial state. Actually there was not a big transformation from past to today. Still the state authority (the Supreme Leader) has an 'absolute' and 'arbitrary' power, and Iran is bound up its patriarchal background. In brief, the Iranian state structure stayed mostly as intact from the Pahlavi monarchy to the Islamic Republic.

Actually, two responses challenged to the modernity in Iran: The traditional authority of the Shah and the charismatic power of the Ayatollah. The first one was painted himself and his project ('creating a modern state') into a corner and the

modernization process failed; the second one took already a stand against the modernity and succeeded with his strong argument about it. In conclusion, the conflict between national and religious identity of Iran or secularization and Islamization ended up with a revolution.

The state structure was based on the industrial and state-centered capitalism in the Pahlavi era. In addition, the Shah got strength from his nationalistic approach for consolidating his authority. The eternal and heterogeneous authority of the Shah failed in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Whereas the Ayatollah offered a stance against the 'imperial' West and promised become free from the Pahlavi monarchy. The ideological and revolutionary rhetoric of the Ayatollah appealed to the Iranians, but at the end of the revolution the state pressure passed in other hands (from the Pahlavi dynasty to the *ulama*), and the society failed again.

When we return to the state-directed capitalism of the Shah, we come across the industrialization fact of Iran. The Shah created a dependent capitalist class to himself, and the Iranian oil revenues were shared among the industrial entrepreneurs. The liberal economy policies created local wealthy industrial elites, and these elites had a close and political connection with the Shah and the royal family. In this structure, the foreign partners provided technology, managerial skills and finance capital to the industrial elites in return for business partnership and easy Access to Iran's expanding market.

The power of the Shah and foreigners increased with the initiatives of the White Revolution. Whereas the White Revolution was launched as a great reform project for the rural class (the migrating groups from the rural area to the big and industrial cities), it lost its charm for the urban proletariat and the salaried middle class in the medium term. The educational and cultural reforms run short for these social classes because of the abovementioned system. When the privilege class gets rich, these 'new' and growing urban class (the migrating rural class, the urban proletariat and the salaried middle class) were disappointed about the White Revolution.

At this point the 'white' breeze turned to the 'green' for the benefit of the clergies, who were the gross challengers against the Shah's policies. Even though the clergies faced much less difficulty than the leftist and liberal-nationalist movements,

their approaches responded the popular demands of the society, for that matter they were approved especially in the migrating rural population, who were the most effected group of the society from the practices of industrialization.

In addition to this, another social class, also the *bazaar* was the important component in the dissident movement. The Iranian bazaar has served as the cradle of the traditional urban culture in Iran and shaped with cultural representation (Islamic symbols and figures). In addition to that the *bazaar* was the only alternative for the middle and lower-middle classes against the industrial market. The *ulama* established a strong connection among the abovementioned classes through the *bazaaris* and their traditionalist discourse. The partnership of *ulama* and *bazaar* created a bigger wave than the rest during the revolution period.

The truth is that the Shah -Mohammad Reza Pahlavi- ruled Iran between 1941 and 1979 in a time of turmoil and democracy pursuit. On the other hand he shaped his 'modern state' in a traditional authority perspective. He integrated the state institutions into his 'personnel power', which was supported with a strong and central bureaucratic administration. The state was not ruled 'politically' by the Shah; making politics devolved on the society. The Shah only transferred the administration model from the West and established a 'technical' administrative level with the cameralists.

Cameralism is a of the state capitalism and provides a large and centralized administrative institutions to serve the needs of absolutist monarchs. Actually, it is a 'technique' of governing the state. The purposes of the state were paramount and they position above everything else. He created a 'new' bourgeoisie, which was loyal to his highness and royal family, with the industrialization project, and a strong bureaucracy, consisting of technocrats and police, with the cameralist system. This kind of a modernization -'the modernization from above'- is the main characteristic of the cameralist system.

In conclusion, 'the modern state' was an ideal for the Shah. It was his main goal. However, he concentrated only on the word sense of 'being modern'. He put the elements of the modern state in the Iranian traditional social life for the modernization acquisition. In addition to that, he regarded the (oil) industrialization as the project for the enrichment.

He put the modernization and industrialization processes into practice with a rapid and 'above dictated' method. The Iranians did not experience this process on their own. Moreover, the Shah established a loyal and cameralist staff for shaping the state capitalism. In other respects, the demands of the society changed and increased with the modernization and industrialization projects of the Shah. Further the state was unaware of a group of people, who migrated from the rural area to the industrial cities. These people migrated to the urban system, but their beliefs and way of life were not in rapport with it. In addition to these circumstances, the political groups (the spokesman of this 'new' urban class) were silenced with the state pressure.

In brief, the Shah did all this things for the community, but he steered gradually away from the Iranians authenticity. He believed that the state will be much powerful with his 'personal' authority. In fact, 'the Shah' became 'the state'; but he lost his throne in a long run.

What about the state?

The Iranian state structure is still continuing with its all magnificence! The regime had changed with the revolution in Iran. The people did the revolution from 'below'. But because of the ill fate of the revolutions, these people had given their 'own' revolution to the state authority.

In today's Iran, the *Rahbar* (also the Supreme Leader) is in the leading position of the Shah. Certainly, a spiritual mission and a charismatic figure are added to the traditional authority, but the state subsists under the dominance of the state authority much the same in the Shah period. We can see the institutions of the modern state phenomenon in today's Islamic Republic. Iran has a constitution grounds on the *Velayat-e Faqih* ideology and the citizenship of the Iran Islamic Republic. The state shows its physical power through the existence of the Revolutionary Guard. Or the separation of power (the sovereignty principle of the modern state) rides on the supreme authority much the same in the Shah's state. There is also the cameralist structure in the bureaucratic and administrative level, composed of technocrats and technical staff (the clergies). Even though the Islamic regime is ageist the capitalist figure, it rules the economy with an 'illegal' way of

state capitalism.[483] In a word, the Iranians alternate in between revolutions and reforms, and the state left intact.

The Chinese philosophy was predicated on the unity of the great antimony between '*Yin and Yang*'. These two opposite parts constitute the unity and each one exist in the 'other's reality. William Blake called this philosophy as well: "without contraries, there is no progression". And also the dialectic phenomenology of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is based on the approach as well.

The Shah and the *ulama* were the two opposite parts of the same coin. At the same time they served on the unity, also on the same structure: The Iranian state structure. One of increased and wanted to exclude the other one. The Shah ignored the religious background of the Iranian tradition. His power rose and rose and rose, then he and his royal network plunged down from the pinnacle of his power. Then the time of *ulama* has begun.

However, the primary component has forgotten in this scuffle: the society. The state and the society were the two important (and also opposite) parts of the unity. Up to the present, the Iranian state dominated the society in a patriarchal position. If one day it arises from this 'hard' arena, the Iranians 'trapped' sense will run thin by the time of progress.

This study was dedicated to the Iranian 'trapped' generation, borned after the revolution.

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[483] For detailed argument about this subject, see: Seçkin Berber, "İran'ın Ekonomi Politikası, Yaptırımların Etkisi ve İkilemleri", **Bilge Strateji,** Volume 5, No:9, Fall 2013, pp.61-84

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