

**DOKUZ EYLÜL UNIVERSITY**  
**GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM**  
**DOCTORAL THESIS**  
**Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)**

**EXPLAINING STATE-MUSLIM MINORITY  
RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: DIFFERENT  
PATHS TOWARD PEACE AND VIOLENCE**

**Anwar KOMA**

**Supervisor**

**Prof. Dr. Gul M. Kurtoglu ESKISAR**


**İZMİR- 2023**

## THESIS APPROVAL PAGE



## DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this doctoral thesis titled as “Explaining State-Muslim Minority Relations in Southeast Asia: Different Paths toward Peace and Violence” has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honor.



02/01/2023  
Anwar KOMA  
Imza

**ABSTRACT**  
**Doctoral Thesis**  
**Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)**  
**Explaining State-Muslim Minority Relations in Southeast Asia:**  
**Different Paths Toward Peace and Violence**  
**Anwar KOMA**

**Dokuz Eylul University**  
**Graduate School of Social Sciences**  
**Department of International Relations**  
**International Relations Program**

**This thesis examines the variations of the state-Muslim minority relations in Myanmar, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore. The key question is what are the underlying conditions that contributed to peace and violence between the states and Muslim minority groups in the selected cases. It uses a comparative method with limited first-hand findings supported by secondary data and resources. After critically reviewing the contending explanations, this thesis introduces the variations of the civil-military relations as the underlying condition that shaped different paths of the state-Muslim minority relations in the four cases. While military control empowers the persistence of state violence against Muslim minority groups in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines, civilian control not only constrains the state's use of violence against Muslim minorities but also reinforces peaceful relations between the state and Muslims in Singapore. As this overall pattern implies, the origin of state violence against Muslim minorities stems from the persistence of military control in those countries.**

**Keywords: State Violence, Civilian Control, Military Control, Muslim Minorities, South-East Asia.**

## **ÖZET**

### **Doktora Tezi**

## **Güneydoğu Asya'da Devlet-Müslüman Azınlık İlişkilerini Açıklamak: Barış ve Şiddete Yönelik Farklı Yollar**

**Anwar KOMA**

**Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi**

**Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü**

**Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı**

**İngilizce Uluslararası İlişkiler**

**Uluslararası İlişkiler Programı**

Bu tez, Myanmar, Tayland, Filipinler ve Singapur'daki devlet-Müslüman azınlık ilişkilerinin çeşitliliğini incelemektedir. Seçilen vakalarda, devletler ile Müslüman azınlık grupları arasındaki barış ve şiddete etkisi bulunan temel koşulların neler olduğu, çalışmanın temel sorusudur. Çalışma, ikincil kaynaklarla desteklenen sınırlı birinci elden bulguların kullanıldığı karşılaştırmalı bir yönteme sahiptir. Mevcut açıklamaları eleştirel bir şekilde inceledikten sonra bu tez, seçilen dört vaka üzerinden sivil-asker ilişkilerindeki çeşitliliğin, devlet-Müslüman azınlık ilişkilerindeki farklılığa sebep olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Myanmar, Tayland ve Filipinler'deki askeri rejimler, Müslüman azınlık gruplarına yönelik devlet şiddetinin süregelmesini güçlendirirken; Singapur'daki sivil idare sadece devletin Müslüman azınlıklara yönelik şiddet kullanımını kısıtlamakla kalmaz, aynı zamanda devlet ile Singapur'daki Müslümanlar arasındaki barışçıl ilişkileri güçlendirir. Bu genel yapının ifade ettiği üzere, Müslüman azınlıklara yönelik devlet şiddeti, bu ülkelerdeki askeri kontrolün devam etmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Devlet Şiddeti, Müslüman Azınlıklar, Devlet-Müslüman Azınlık İlişkileri, Güneydoğu Asya.

**EXPLAINING STATE-MUSLIM MINORITY RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST  
ASIA: DIFFERENT PATHS TOWARD PEACE AND VIOLENCE**

**CONTENTS**

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
DECLARATION	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	v
CONTENTS	vi
ABBREVIATIONS	x
LIST OF TABLES	xii
LIST OF FIGURES	xiii
LIST OF APPENDICES	xv
 INTRODUCTION	 1

**CHAPTER ONE**

**STATES-MUSLIM MINORITY RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

1.1. INTRODUCTION	13
1.2. THE REVIEW OF MUSLIM MINORITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA	14
1.3. THE DILEMMA OF MUSLIM MINORITIES AND CHALLENGES OF THE STATES	28
1.4. APPROACHES TO THE DYNAMICS OF THE STATES- MUSLIM RELATIONS	31
1.5. CONCLUSION	44

**CHAPTER TWO**  
**DIFFERENT PATHS OF STATE-MUSLIM MINORITY RELATIONS:**  
**MILITARY CONTROL AND VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIM**  
**MINORITIES**

2.1. INTRODUCTION	46
2.2. PATTERNS OF MUSLIM MINORITIES' ORGANIZATIONS: ARMED GROUP VS. POLITICAL ASSOCIATION	48
2.3. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND STATE VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIM MINORITIES	52
2.4. CONCLUSION	62

**CHAPTER THREE**  
**MILITARY DOMINANCE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIM**  
**MINORITIES IN RAKHINE STATE OF MYANMAR**

3.1. INTRODUCTION	64
3.2. BACKGROUND	66
3.3. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE'S VIOLENCE AGAINST ROHINGYA	68
3.3.1. During the Era of the Kingdoms (1430-1824)	69
3.3.2. During the Era of the Colonial Rule (1824-1942; 1942-1945; 1945- 1948)	71
3.3.3. During the Constitutional Democracy (1948-1962)	74
3.3.4. During the Military Rule (1962-2011)	77
3.3.5. During the New Democratic Rule (2011-2021)	80
3.4. MILITARY DOMINANCE IN MYANMAR STATE	83
3.5. MILITARY CONTROL AND VIOLENCE AGAINST ROHINGYA MINORITIES	87
3.6. CONCLUSION	94

**CHAPTER FOUR**  
**MILITARY CONTROL AND VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIM**  
**MINORITIES IN SOUTHERN THAILAND**

4.1. INTRODUCTION	96
4.2. BACKGROUND	98
4.3. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE VIOLENCE AGAINST MALAY-MUSLIM MINORITIES IN SOUTHERN THAILAND	101
4.4. MILITARY CONTROL IN THE THAI STATE	107
4.5. MILITARY CONTROL AND THE PERSISTENCE OF STATE VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIM MINORITIES IN SOUTHERN THAILAND	112
4.6. CONCLUSION	117

**CHAPTER FIVE**  
**MILITARY CONTROL AND STATE VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIM**  
**MINORITIES IN SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES**

5.1. INTRODUCTION	118
5.2. BACKGROUND	120
5.3. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE AND MUSLIM MINORITY RELATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES	121
5.4. MILITARY INFLUENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES STATE	124
5.5. MILITARY INFLUENCE AND VIOLENCE'S PERSISTENCE AGAINST MUSLIM MINORITIES IN MINDANAO	131
5.6. CONCLUSION	138

**CHAPTER SIX**  
**CIVILIAN DOMINANCE AND PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE**  
**STATE AND MUSLIM MINORITIES IN SINGAPORE**

6.1. INTRODUCTION	140
-------------------	-----



6.2. BACKGROUND	142
6.3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE AND MUSLIM MINORITY RELATIONS IN SINGAPORE	144
6.4. CIVILIAN SUPREMACY AND THE PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND MALAY-MUSLIM MINORITIES IN SINGAPORE	153
6.5. CONCLUSION	156
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	160
REFERENCES	169
APPENDICES	

## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AFP</b>	Armed Forces of the Philippines
<b>ARMM</b>	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
<b>ARSA</b>	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
<b>ASEAN</b>	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
<b>BIAF</b>	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
<b>BMA</b>	Bangsamoro Army
<b>BMLO</b>	Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization
<b>BNPP</b>	Barisan National Pembebasan Patani (National Liberation Front of Patani)
<b>BRN</b>	Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front)
<b>BRN-C</b>	Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (National Revolutionary Front)
<b>C-in-C</b>	Commander-in-Chief
<b>CAP</b>	Civil Society Assembly for Peace
<b>CMR</b>	Civil-military Relations
<b>DHRP</b>	Democracy and Human Rights Party
<b>FAR</b>	Fourth Front Army Region, Thailand
<b>FTU</b>	Fatoni University, Thailand
<b>GAMPAR</b>	Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (Associate of the Malays of Greater Patani)
<b>IRCC</b>	Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circle
<b>IRO</b>	Inter-Religious Organization
<b>ISOC</b>	International Security Operation Command
<b>JI</b>	Jemaah Islamiyah
<b>MFA</b>	Mayu Frontier administration
<b>MILF</b>	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
<b>MIM</b>	Muslim Independence Movement
<b>MNLF</b>	Moro National Liberation Front
<b>MUIS</b>	Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura
<b>NDPD</b>	National Democratic Party for Development

<b>NDPP</b>	National Democracy for Peace Party
<b>NLD</b>	National League for Democracy
<b>NSC</b>	National Security Council
<b>PAM</b>	Patriotic Association of Myanmar (known as Ma-Ba-Tha)
<b>PAP</b>	People's Action Party
<b>PKMS</b>	Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapore
<b>PPM</b>	Patani People Movement
<b>PSU</b>	Prince of Songkla University, Thailand
<b>PULO</b>	Patani United Liberation Organization
<b>RKK</b>	Runda Kumpulan Kecil (Small Group Patrol)
<b>RSO</b>	Rohingya solidary Organization
<b>RTAF</b>	Royal Thai Armed Forces
<b>SLORC</b>	State Law and Order Restoration Council
<b>SBPAC</b>	Southern Border Provinces Administration Center
<b>SEA</b>	Southeast Asia
<b>SAF</b>	Singapore Armed Forces
<b>TATMADAW</b>	Armed Forces of Myanmar

## LIST OF TABLES

<b>Table 1:</b> List of Muslim Minorities Countries in Southeast Asia	p. 5
<b>Table 2:</b> Active Muslim militants in Muslim minority countries in Southeast Asia (2012-2019)	p. 25
<b>Table 3:</b> Policy Approaches Towards Ethnic Minorities	p. 53
<b>Table 4:</b> Civil-Military Relations in SEA	p. 57
<b>Table 5:</b> Presence and Absence of Military Control and Political Outcomes	p. 58
<b>Table 6:</b> Key Events During Military Rule	p. 79
<b>Table 7:</b> Hate Speech against Rohingya by Key Military Juntas in Myanmar	p. 92
<b>Table 8:</b> Key Historical Development of Relations between Siam and Patani	p. 102
<b>Table 9:</b> Key State Policies Towards Conflict in Southern Thailand	p. 103
<b>Table 10:</b> Malay-Muslim Movements in Southern Thailand	p. 105
<b>Table 11:</b> Key Events of State Violence against Muslim Minorities in Southern Thailand	p. 106
<b>Table 12:</b> Features of Military Control in Thailand	p. 108
<b>Table 13:</b> Periods of the Military Control in Thailand	p. 110
<b>Table 14:</b> Coup Attempts in the Philippines	p. 130
<b>Table 15:</b> Legal Documents for State's Use of Violence against Muslim Minorities in Mindanao	p. 132
<b>Table 16:</b> Ethnic and Religious Identities in Singapore	p. 143
<b>Table 17:</b> Development of The State-Muslim Minority Relations in Singapore	p. 158
<b>Table 18:</b> Key Examples of State Violence against Muslim Minorities	p. 163
<b>Table 19:</b> Summary of Key Conditions and the Outcomes	p. 168

## LIST OF FIGURES

<b>Figure 1:</b> Minorities Under Threat in Southeast Asia	p. 15
<b>Figure 2:</b> Freedom of Religion in Muslim Minority Countries in SEA	p. 16
<b>Figure 3:</b> Minority Under Threat and Freedom of Religion in SEA	p. 17
<b>Figure 4:</b> GDP Per Capita of Muslim Minority Countries in SEA from 2010-2017	p. 18
<b>Figure 5:</b> Minority Under Threat and GDP per capita of Muslim minority Countries in SEA	p. 19
<b>Figure 6:</b> Level of Fundamental Rights in Muslim Minorities in SEA	p. 20
<b>Figure 7:</b> Level of Human Rights Violation in Muslim Minority Countries in SEA	p. 20
<b>Figure 8:</b> Level of Human Rights Violation in Muslim Minority Countries in Myanmar, Thailand, and The Philippines	p. 21
<b>Figure 9:</b> Relationship Between Human Rights Abuses and Minorities Under Threat in Muslim Minority Countries In SEA	p. 22
<b>Figure 10:</b> Impact of Terrorism in Muslim Minority Countries in SEA from 2010-2018	p. 24
<b>Figure 11:</b> Relationship between The Impact of Terrorism and the States' Policy Orientation (2010-2018)	p. 24
<b>Figure 12:</b> Level of freedom in the Muslim Minority Countries in SEA	p. 26
<b>Figure 13:</b> Relationship Between Level of Freedom and Minority Under Threat	p. 26
<b>Figure 14:</b> Fragile States and Level of Minority Under Threat in Muslim Minority Countries In SEA	p. 35
<b>Figure 15:</b> Preliminary Analysis of States' Ethnic Management in Muslim Minority Countries in SEA (2012-2019)	p. 37
<b>Figure 16:</b> Relationship between GDPs Per Capita and Impact of Terrorism in Muslim Minority Countries in SEA (2010-2018)	p. 40
<b>Figure 17:</b> Relationship between a Condition of Economic Wellbeing and Minorities Under Threats (2012-2018)	p. 41

<b>Figure 18:</b> Relationship Between the Impact of Terrorism and the States' Policy Orientation (2010-2018)	p. 44
<b>Figure 19:</b> Map of Burma/Myanmar	p. 66
<b>Figure 20:</b> Map of Thailand	p. 98
<b>Figure 21:</b> Map of the Philippines	p.120
<b>Figure 22:</b> Map of Singapore	p.142
<b>Figure 23:</b> Government Grant to MUIS 2011-2018	p.151



## **LIST OF APPENDICES**

<b>Appendix 1:</b> An Overview of The States-Muslim Minorities in Southeast Asia (2012-2019)	app.p.1
<b>Appendix 2:</b> Voter Turnout in Muslim Minority Countries in SEA (2010-2019)	app.p.2



## INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the differences in state-Muslim minority relations in Southeast Asia (SEA) in the 2010s. In general, it explores the conditions behind peaceful and violent relations between the states and Muslim minorities in Myanmar, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore. More specifically, it focuses on the conditions behind the violent relations between Muslims and the state in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines, and the peaceful relations between the state and Muslim minorities in Singapore. By this token, Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines represent those cases of state violence against Muslim minorities, while the case of Singapore illustrates peaceful relations. In order to compare these selected four cases, this thesis employs a new framework of civil-military relations (CMR) to examine its effect on the varying outcomes between states and the Muslim minorities.

Through its comparative analysis of the indicated four countries, this thesis aims to achieve two main goals. First, by examining the cases in Myanmar, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand as examples, this thesis maps the terrain on which state and minority relations in Southeast Asia have taken shape. Second, it seeks to provide a theoretical explanation for the varied outcomes of such relations in contemporary times. To fulfill these objectives, in connection to state-Muslim minorities relations in Southeast Asia, the thesis will re-examine the main explanations for ethnic conflict before introducing the new explanation. After reviewing the relevant literature and demonstrating its drawbacks, the study will introduce a theoretical account that concentrates on the effect of military control as its main explanatory variable for the peaceful or violent relations between the state and Muslim minorities in these four countries.

From a theoretical perspective, this study engages in a debate with other contending explanations for the state-Muslim minority relations in these countries, such as primordialism and instrumentalism. Many studies on the ethnic conflict in Myanmar and the Philippines tend to consider the colonial heritage to be responsible for the emergence and duration of violence (Croissant, 2018). The colonial heritage's deleterious effects are often explained with its divide-and-rule policy and ethnic



politics in the literature (Holt, 2016; Horowitz, 1985: 207–209; Kosem and Saleem, 2016; Perera, 2001: 6; Saleem, 2016; Yusuf, 2018). However, as this study shows, the violent relations between states and Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia occurred during the post-colonial era and were caused by the difference in civil-military relations, which can be distinguished by military control vis-à-vis civilian control. As the study outlines later, among eight countries in Southeast Asia with Muslim minorities, those that were under the civilian control did not encounter violence's persistence between the state and Muslim minorities.

From a practical perspective, this study addresses an important regional issue for Southeast Asia, which later transformed into a global problem. Specifically, the massive violence between the state and Muslims in Myanmar has caused a butterfly effect on other neighboring countries. For instance, monastic circles in Thailand have adopted a Buddhist discourse similar to their counterparts in Myanmar and Sri Lanka to spur hostility towards Muslims in Thailand in recent years (Buaban, 2020). This discourse is based on their fear of getting overpopulated and overtaken by Muslims in their country (McCargo, 2009: 15–18; Pathan, Tuansiri and Koma, 2018). Meanwhile, the state-Muslim relations in Thailand have not changed dramatically, however. In 2019 Thailand's general election, Buddhist chauvinists formed a social movement and a political party reminiscent of that of Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Hence, the spread of anti-Muslim sentiments from one country to another has been a new challenge for the relations between the states and the Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia.

In addition, the world media's attention and reactions of other countries toward the Rohingya crisis have brought the issue of state violence beyond the regional implications. For instance, global media outlets such as Reuters and CNN highlighted that The United Nations calls the violence in Myanmar a "textbook" case of ethnic cleansing (Nebehay and Lewis, 2017), the role of Facebook in fighting hate speech in Myanmar, and why it is failing (Stecklow, 2018), the role of Myanmar military in killing Rohingya found in mass grave (Griffiths and Olarn, 2018) and the role of UN in urging Myanmar's military leaders to be charged with genocide (McKirdy, 2018). These examples took the issue of Rohingya to be associated with the genocidal problem, hate speech, and the involvement of tech companies like

Facebook, which urged policymakers and global think tanks to think about the cause of state violence against ethno-religious minorities, a preventive mechanism for emerging state violence, and how to make the state and tech companies responsible for their parts. In 2019, Al Jazeera (2019) reported that Gambia accuses Myanmar of committing the genocide of the Rohingya, while Anadolu Agency headlined that the UK's decision to get involved in the Rohingya dispute before the International Court of Justice has been praised. (Khaliq, 2022). Similarly, in 2022, The New York Times reports that the United States will recognize the military role in committing Myanmar genocide, while CNN and Reuters also highlight U.S. declaration on Myanmar's military commission of genocide against Rohingya (Hansler, 2022; Jakes, 2022). Thus, after 2016, state violence in Myanmar against Rohingya Muslims became a sort of globalized issue.

Aside from having regional and later global ramifications, understanding the dynamics behind the peaceful or violent relations between the Muslim minorities and the states in these examples can help to explain some of the persistent patterns of Muslim militants in the region. The ongoing violence between most of these states and Muslim minorities can create an environment that is favorable for the rise of militant Islam and extremist organizations, which can then feed a transnational network of terrorism. As Zachary Abuza (2003: 25) delineates Al-Qaida didn't just land in Southeast Asian and start a network from scratch. Instead, it selected groups that had already been established and had justified grievances that had been battling their individual state for a long time.

The legitimate grievances can be manifested in the form of socioeconomic, ethnoreligious, and political problems. These grievances can be used as a justification for transnational terrorist activities and link a domestic conflict to an international problem. As in the case of the Moro in the Philippines, the Abu Sayaf group used domestic grievance to link with Al-Qaida and justified their jihad against the state. Thus, the sustained violence between a state and a Muslim minority in one country can ultimately provide a fertile ground for the growth of the global Muslim militants.

In short, studying violent and peaceful relations between states and Muslim minorities has both theoretical and practical implications that are relevant to all

countries in the region and beyond. The impact of persistent violence between the states and Muslim minorities translates into domestic violence and regional instability. Therefore, their relations in recent years demand a systematic and comprehensive analysis that can offer an explanation of the diverging outcomes.

a) Methodology: This study uses a comparative method with limited first-hand findings supported by secondary data and resources. The comparative case study is used to explore the characteristics of states and Muslim minority relations in eight countries in the SEA (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam). This is to map the general patterns in the region so that the difference in relations can provide a comparative background for the selected case studies. The comparative method examines two contrasting outcomes of violent and peaceful relations and provides details on their different trajectories. In particular, the study makes use of Mill's method of difference to arrive at a conclusion.

The data for this study relies on open-accessed information, government and non-government publications, and academic works. The dataset analysis employs data from Freedom House, Minority at Risk, Fragile States Index, EIU Democracy Index, CIA World Factbook, World Bank Indicators, Human Development Index, Current International Religious Freedom Report, Pew Research Center, and The Commonwealth, to understand an overview of the state-Muslim minority relations in SEA. Besides, the websites of English-newspapers of each country will be observed. In the case of Thailand, open-accessed information on Thai-online newspapers is compiled as an additional resource.

b) Overview: Before concentrating on the four main countries of focus for this study, an overall view of Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia is useful. Overall taken, the data shows that the average ratio of Muslim minorities constitutes 4 percent of the total in eight countries, making up 14 million. More specifically, Muslims in Singapore, the Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam make up 14, 6, 4.3, 4.3, 1.9, 1, 0.2, and 0.1 percent, respectively. While most of the countries have peaceful relations with their Muslim minorities, three countries have experienced persistent violence between the state and Muslim minorities in the 2010s. The thesis uses a threshold of two percent of Muslim

minorities in a country for case selection purposes because a population of less than two percent is likely to have little political significance. Thus, Singapore is selected for the case of peaceful relations between the state and Muslim minorities. The Philippines, Thailand, and Myanmar are chosen for the case of violent relations.

**Table 1: List of Muslim Minorities Countries in Southeast Asia**

No	Country	Total population	% Of Muslims	Relations	Key Issues
1	Singapore	5,995,991	14	Peaceful	Cooperation
2	The Philippines	114,597,229	6	Persistent violence	Securitization, militarization, insurgency
3	Myanmar	55,622,506	4.3	Persistent Violence	Securitization, militarization, insurgency
4	Thailand	68,615,858	4.3	Persistent violence	Securitization, militarization, insurgency
5	Cambodia	16,449,519	1.9	Peaceful	Cooperation
6	Laos	7,234,171	1	Peaceful	Cooperation
7	Timor-Leste	1,321,929	0.2	Peaceful	Cooperation
8	Vietnam	97,040,334	0.1	Peaceful	n/a

Source: Bajunid, 1999; Bajunid, 2008; Central Intelligence Agency, 2018; Central Intelligence Agency, 2019; Central Intelligence Agency, 2022b.

Note: data from 2008-2022.

c) Key Terms and Concepts: There are key terms that constitute the background and scope of this study. The discussion that follows in the subsequent chapters connects the dot between the following key terms and concepts.

1. Ethno-religious minorities; The term “ethno-religious minorities” is borrowed from the works of Yusuf (2009) and Fox (2003). It refers to the ethnically homogenous groups in Myanmar, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore, who define themselves along with an Islamic religious identity. In this sense, a conflation of ethnicity and Islam makes Muslim minorities distinct from the dominant

majorities in society. According to Yusuf (2009: 47), Malay Muslims prioritize their ethnic identity and see the world through the lens of their faith, or agama. Thus, ethnic identity shapes how people interpret and experience life's ceremonial, mythic/narrative, experiential/emotional, ethical, legal, social, material, and political components. An ethnicized vision of Islam is created when ethnicity and religion are combined.

2. Muslim minorities; Muslim minorities are a group-based category and is defined in opposition to the majority members of society. In most cases, a Muslim minority is viewed as an ethnoreligious group, while a majority is a national group (Capotorti, 1979: 568). Muslim minorities in this thesis refer to a minority group who define their ethnic group based on Islamic identity. They are distinct from the majority in their language, religion, and culture. In the words of Lee Kuaw Yew, he reaffirmed the distinctiveness of Malay-Muslim minorities in Singapore: "...we were progressing very nicely until the surge of Islam came...I would say, today, we can integrate all religions and races except Islam... I think the Muslims socially do not cause any trouble, but they are distinct and separate" (Kwang et al., 2011: 228; Rahim, 2003: 170). Because there exists more than one group of Muslim minorities in the countries selected, this thesis merely focuses on the largest ethnic groups of Muslim minorities in each country, which are Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, Malay-Muslims in Thailand and Singapore, and Bangsamoro Muslims in the Philippines.

3. Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar; Rohingya is an ethnically homogeneous minority concentrated in the Rakhine State in western Myanmar. They speak a dialect of the Chittagonian Bengali language – the Rohingya dialect – and profess Islam as their religion. Their language and religion are different from the Buddhist majority in Myanmar. Therefore, Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic group with a unique culture, social-cultural organizations, and ethnic characteristics.

4. Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand; Malay-Muslims in Patani/southern Thailand are referred to as an ethnically homogeneous minority concentrated in the Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces. They speak the dialect of the Malay-Patani language and profess Islam as their religion. Their language and religion are different

from the Buddhist majority in Thailand. They call themselves '*nayu*' (Malayu Muslim) as opposed to '*siyae*' (Thai Buddhist).

5. Bangsamoro Muslims in Mindanao, southern Philippines; Bangsamoro is an ethnically homogeneous minority concentrated in the Mindanao region of the Philippines. They speak a dialect of Maguindanao, Marano, Tausug, and Cebuano and profess Islam as their religion. Their language and religion are different from the Christian majority in the Philippines.

6. Malay-Muslims in Singapore; Malay-Muslims in Singapore are also defined as the ethnically homogeneous minority who speak Malay and profess Islam as their religion. Their language and religion are different from the Chinese majority in Singapore. They are seen as a distinct ethno-religious group, having a common identity based on Malayness, such as the Malay language, Malay dress, and Muslim names (Kadir, 2004).

7. The state; This study uses the Weberian notion of the state. According to Weber (1958: 82), the state is "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory". Thus, the distinct feature of the states is "the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence" against its members within the boundary of nation-states. When discussing the state in this thesis, the issue is about who runs the state: whether it is civilian control or military control. In this sense, the military is, by law, a legitimate representative of the state who has a license to kill or eliminate an existential threat to the state. In Thailand, as well as in Myanmar and in the Philippines, the military has dominated the domain of internal security issues since its formation of the modern state. Tatmadaw in Myanmar, Royal Thai Armed Forces in Thailand, and Armed Forces (AFP) of the Philippines in the Philippines are the military organizations that have been the leading state agency in dealing with Muslim minorities in their respective countries. Their dominance in national politics can be observed through civil-military relations. For instance, military-ruled Myanmar from 1962 to 2011 and from 2021 to the present day, while in Thailand military had successfully staged a coup 13 times from 1932 to 2014. Also, AFP in the Philippines constantly exerts its interventionist tendency in national politics (Hernandez, 2007).

8. Civilian control; This study uses a new framework of civil-military relations, which focuses on a continuum between civilian control on the one side and military control on the other side. Civilian control is not merely the absence of military coups and lack of direct military rule over national politics. This thesis employs Croissant et al. (2011; 2012)'s definition of civilian control, which refers to "civilians having the exclusive authority to decide on national policies and their implementation." In particular, Croissant et al. assert:

*Under civilian control, civilians can freely choose to delegate decision-making power and the implementation of certain policies to the military, while the military has no autonomous decision-making power outside those areas specifically defined by civilians. Furthermore, it is civilians alone who determine which particular policies, or policy aspects, the military implements, and civilians also define the boundaries between policy-making and policy-implementation (Croissant et al., 2011: 78).*

Civilian control can be analyzed via control over five key policy decision-making domains. In general, these domains include elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, external defense, and military organization. However, this thesis only focuses on the domain of internal security, which exclusively pertains to Muslim minorities. Though degrees of civilian control can be divided into high, medium, and low levels, this study remodifies the three levels into two. As it aims to demonstrate later on, full control of civilian-led government corresponds with a high degree of civilian control, while the medium and low degree is considered as the condition of military control.

9. Military control; Military control is viewed as the opposite of civilian control. A high degree of military control is a condition where the military controls all five key domains of decision-making. A medium degree of military control, or military influence, is a condition that the military shares power with the civilian-led government in a certain domain of policy decision-making. The medium and high degree is therefore viewed as a condition of military control. In this condition, the military may act as a moderator, guardian, and ruler of a state (Nordlinger, 1976).

10. State violence; State violence in this study refers to the state use of physical forces against Muslim minorities or the violent outcome committed by mainly military against a member of Muslim minorities. Ordinarily, polices are not part of the military. However, when the military dominates over civilians, it also

ensures that the police follow its directives. State violence can be manifested in a variety of forms ranging from a violent operation, violent repression, massacre, torture, and forced disappearance to ethnic cleansing. Among all of these actions, ethnic cleansing is an extreme form of state violence against minorities. According to the UN documents, it is referred to a removal of an ethnically homogenous group:

*... 'Ethnic cleansing' means rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area... [and] a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas (Commission of Experts, 1993: 33; UN Security Council, 1994: 130).*

It is different from genocide, a war crime, and crimes against humanity in the sense that ethnic cleansing does not have a legal base in international law, nor is it recognized in the domestic legal system. In this study, it is referred to the massive number of deaths and destruction of minorities' houses as well as the large-scale exodus of ethno-religious minorities. Essentially, ethnic cleansing is used interchangeably with extreme violence and is associated with the expulsion, removal, clearance, and forced extermination of minorities.

11. Securitization; This study draws its idea of securitization from Buzan, Weaver, and Wilde's work (1998), titled "Security: A New Framework for Analysis." According to this view, securitization is a process of moving a political problem from the sphere of normal politics to the politics of exception:

*Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization...(meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying action outside the normal bounds of political procedure (Buzan et al., 1998: 23–24).*

This process covers the idea of the policymakers, policy design, and policy implementation. It also includes legislating new laws to permit state use of extraordinary measures, such as militarization. In all of the selected cases, Muslim minorities have been, temporarily or extendedly, subjected to state securitization. Nevertheless, securitization per se may not always lead to militarization: While the Singapore case shows that the civilian-led government securitized Malay-Muslim minorities after the event of 9/11, such a process did not lead to militarization. The Singapore case is an important example where the state was restrained from the use



of violence against Malay-Muslim groups. State securitization can thus be a precondition of state militarization.

12. Militarization; For the purposes of this study, militarization is the process of increasing the military presence in the controlled areas in which the minorities are concentrated. It starts from legitimizing the use of physical forces against minorities to its implementation. When militarization increases, it contributes to human rights violations and restrictions on political freedom. The most severe result is genocide and ethnic cleansing. According to Earl Conteh-Morgan, the term "militarization" can be described as follows:

*The increased deployment and accumulation of capabilities –armed forces, arms transfers, and military bases– as a result of factors such as the war on terrorism, piracy, domestic rebellions against incumbent regimes, and a logical need to protect expanding geopolitical and economic interests as part of the quiet and ongoing great-power rivalry on the continent, or as a result of expected great power responsibilities. Militarization is therefore comprised of arms transfers, troop deployment, peacekeeping activities, military engagement against terrorist groups, anti-piracy activities, military training and advising, and the establishment of military bases (Conteh-Morgan, 2019: 78).*

In this study, militarization is the key mechanism of military control to commit and sustain state violence against Muslim minorities. It begins from military control over internal security issues, declaration of extraordinary measures such as emergency laws, and mobilization of military troops to control a target area. Once the troops are stationed, military operations start to affect everyday lives. Its impacts include checkpoint installation, detention of suspects without charge, torture, forced disappearance, and extrajudicial killings.

Outline of the thesis: The divisions that follow the introduction consist of six chapters. Chapter one examines the contending explanations of the state-Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia. The chapter uses dataset observations to overview the key alternative explanations from primordialist and instrumentalist approaches. It argues that colonial heritages, strong state traditions, and economic rivalry cannot completely explain the divergent outcomes in these four countries.

Chapter two demonstrates the main argument of this thesis. As the overview in the previous chapter indicates, all eight states with Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia can be described as strong states (except Timor-Leste) and hybrid/flawed democracies. Yet they have experienced divergent outcomes, in the form of peaceful

and violent. For instance, Malaysia and Singapore, as former British colonial states, did not have chronic violent relations with minorities as in Myanmar. Instead, as this chapter illustrates, the state's institutional variations between civilian control and military control constitute a determinant of peaceful or violent relations between the state and Muslim minorities. When military control becomes protracted, as in the case of Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines, it contributes to persistent violence between the states and Muslim minorities. On the contrary, when civilian control is maintained, as in the case of Singapore, peaceful cooperation between the state and Muslim minorities is possible.

Chapter three discusses the case of the Rohingya minorities in Myanmar. Among all selected cases, Rohingya in Myanmar suffered the most severe violence between the state and Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia. Myanmar case refutes primordialist arguments that focus on colonial legacies and ancient hatred. Because the origin of state violence against Rohingya did not begin in the early days of colonial rule, the current violence was instead a post-colonial phenomenon. Indeed, prior to 1962, Rohingyas were considered a part of the nation, and yet they were subject to the state's violence only later. The root of state violence goes back to the era of military rule since 1962. The military rule used a legal mechanism to provide legitimacy for the state's use of force against Rohingya. Hence, the state reproduced persistent violence against Rohingya in 1978 and 1991-1992, after which the military junta fully controlled the state. Even during the democratic transition in the 2010s, the military still retained the veto power in key domains of decision-making. Thus, military control over Myanmar politics in the 2010s structured state violence against Rohingya in the recent time.

Chapter four and Chapter five examine state violence against Muslim minorities in Thailand and the Philippines. Similar to the Myanmar case, it argues that the persistent violence recurs because of the persistence of military control in national politics. The cases of Thailand and the Philippines show constant military control over counterinsurgency and internal security. Nevertheless, both cases differed with Myanmar only in the degree of violence. While Rohingya in Myanmar experienced extreme violence, the latter cases faced low-intensity violence. This study does not focus on the difference in degree, however. Thus, the cases of

Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines fall under the same category of state violence against minorities. These cases demonstrate that after military control took place, the military has a common practice of using and maintaining securitization and militarization against minorities.

Chapter six discusses state-Muslim minority relations in Singapore. The analysis of Singapore cases will further support the argument for the effect of civilian control as an institutional constrain for the state violence against Muslim minorities. The civilian government in Singapore, under the persistent leadership of the People's Action Party (PAP), was able to establish the tradition of civilian control over Singapore's Armed Force (SAF). In essence, the Singapore case not only shows the such condition structured in the absence of militarization but also promotes a state soft policy approach towards Malay-Muslims. Thus, the study will conclude by showing that the significance of different types of civil-military relations (state's institution) accounts for the different relations between the state and Muslim minorities in the selected cases.

The conclusion chapter summarizes the key findings into four points, including common sufferings, common patterns, key conditions, and the breakaway path of state violence. It shows that while the Singapore case can break a path of violent relations between the state and Muslim minorities, the rest are frozen up in their violent relations because of the structural condition of military control. Military control is prone to violence's persistence because it not only maintains securitization but also reinforces militarization of the area in which the minorities are concentrated. The existence and operation of militarization reaffirm the state-dominant way of dealing with dissent minorities. By this token, minorities' armed resistance emerged not as a cause of the violence's persistence but as to respond to state militarization. After taking into account the four case studies, the study suggests that unless the condition of military dominance in national politics changes, the violent relations between the states and Muslim minorities continue to persist.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **STATES-MUSLIM MINORITY RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

#### **1.1. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter reviews the state of affairs of the state-Muslim minority relations in Southeast Asia (SEA). Its first aim is to give a literature review on the condition of the Muslim minorities in their respective countries and what the academic literature has so far revealed about their relations with the states. The study uses the Minority Under Threat Index as a starting point to examine Muslim minorities' conditions and investigates its relationship with other factors. The second aim of this chapter is to survey possible explanations that capture the dynamics of the states-Muslim minority relations in recent times. Thus, the following chapters are divided into three parts. The first part gives an overview of their situation by observing open accessed data from the People under Threat, World Justice Project, The World Bank, Global Terrorism Database, Global Terrorism Index, Freedom House, Fragile State Index, and International IDEA. These resources include their conditions on minority risk, religious freedom, sociopolitical dimension, economic factor, and challenges they face in non-Muslim countries. Overall, the first part will show how minority risk is associated with other conditions. Part two examines the paradoxes of the Muslim minorities and the states in SEA and shows that it has never been easy to manage minority issues in modern nation-states. On the one hand, the question of double loyalty is a common feature challenging the Muslim minority. On the other hand, state repression and human rights abuse against the minorities can hardly resolve resistance from the minorities. Part three discusses three main explanations that can be used as lens to understand the state-Muslim relations in SEA. Based on the above backdrop, it will uncover the weaknesses of the available explanations before introducing a more systematic analysis of the subject under study.

## **1.2. THE REVIEW OF MUSLIM MINORITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**


Southeast Asia (SEA) consists of 681 million people living in 11 different countries, which were formed under one single regional organization known as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), except Timor-Leste (United Nations Population Division, 2022). In other words, ASEAN has 10 state members without Timor-Leste. Its members are divided into two categories based on membership entry and economic disparity. First group consists of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines. The second group comprises of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam or known as CLMV (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012). Eight out of these countries have Muslim-minorities, which are Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Timor-Leste. Overall, there are around 4 percent, or 12.5 million Muslims, who live as a minority in SEA countries (see Table 1). However, when combined between Muslim majorities and minorities in SEA, they constitute a significant number of its population; more than 220 million Muslims reside in the region (Mehden, 2009).

Islam and Muslims are not new to the region; there is a good record of Muslims settling in all 11 countries before their independence. However, new nation-states in SEA emerged after the postcolonial era and consequently shaped the region in the forms of Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority features. Though Muslim populations in SEA are large, only three countries can be classified as Muslim-majority – Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. On the contrary, SEA is the region of Muslim-minority countries, which consists of five predominant Theravada Buddhism, two Roman Catholicism, and one none identified majority. At the top of the pool, Muslims in Singapore constitute 14 percent of its population, while in the Philippines, Thailand, and Myanmar, they constitute 6, 4.3, and 4.3 percent, respectively. The rest have less than 2 percent of Muslims. Recognition of Islam has been a uniform practice in all of these states (See Appendix 1).

Muslim minorities are groups that have distinct ethnic and religious identities in their respective countries. Muslim minorities are under threat in five countries under review. According to the People under Threat report, these threats include the risk of genocide, mass killing, and systematic violent repression (Minority Rights

Group International, 2018a: 2). In this report, Myanmar stands out as the riskiest country for minorities, whereas the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam have been respectively caught in a considerably strained relation between the state and minorities. Singapore and Timor-Leste, however, have no record of minorities under threat between 2010-2019 (See Figure 1). In particular, Muslim minorities in Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand, respectively, have the highest record of people under threat from 2010-2019. No significant record of violent relations between the states and Muslim minorities was recently found in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

**Figure 1: Minorities Under Threat in Southeast Asia**




Source: Minority Rights Group International, 2018.

Note: There is no data on minorities under threat in Singapore and Timor-Leste, which indicates that there is no serious violence against Muslim minorities in these two countries.

Although religious freedom in each country differs from one another, relatively harsh religious suppression in the 2010s is rare except for the case of Rohingya in Myanmar. According to the data from International IDEA, although Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar have had the most restrictions on religious freedom, it is only in Myanmar that the condition of Muslim minorities has deteriorated worst in


recent years. Meanwhile, the condition of religious freedom in those countries with less than two percent Muslim population has been relatively better-off, with Timor-Leste as the most tolerant of religious diversity (See Figure 2). These data are also in line with the U.S. Department of the State's Report on International Religious Freedom, which shows that from 2012-2017 Muslim minorities in Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Timor-Leste had relatively non-violent, cooperative relations with their respective states. However, the level of religious freedom, in general, does not directly relate to the severity of the Muslim minority threat faced in these countries (See Figure 3). For instance, Thailand and the Philippines performed well in the religious freedom indicator but also faced Muslim militants in their southern regions. However, Laos and Vietnam were safe from Muslim militants even though they scored worse than Thailand and the Philippines. Thus, it can be concluded here that the presence of the Minority Under Threat is not depended on the level of freedom of religions. In other words, the higher level of freedom of religion does not restrain the outcome of Minority Under Threat.

**Figure 2:** Freedom of Religion in Muslim Minority Countries in SEA



Source: International IDEA, 2017.

**Figure 3:** Minority Under Threat and Freedom of Religion in SEA



Source: Minority Rights Group International, 2018; International IDEA, 2017.


Note: MM = Myanmar, TH = Thailand, PH = Philippines, LA = Laos, and CM = Cambodia. This figure shows the incoherent relationship between levels of freedom of religions and Minority Under Threat. In the Philippines, interestingly, minorities seem to be under higher threat than in Thailand, but they also obtain a higher level of freedom of religion. Thus, obtaining a higher level of religious freedom does not mean that it would protect minorities from threatening.

The socio-economic conditions in these eight countries are also different. Generally, the member countries in ASEAN fall into two main groups: the first and the latecomers. While the former, which in this review consists of Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines, are better off in terms of economic performance, the latter, which includes Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (known as CLMV), have less wellbeing (See Figure 4). This figure shows that the levels of GDP per capita in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines from 2010-2017 have constant growth without any significant change. Besides, a closer look at the relationship between economic indicators and minorities under threat does not reveal a pattern of clear interdependence. For instance, although Thailand and the Philippines are better-off in terms of economic wellbeing, they also have trouble with their minorities. Meanwhile, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, which perform poorly in economic



terms, have less trouble with minorities. It is only in Myanmar's case that it shows a low score in both economic and minority threat indicators. Figure 5 shows that the relationship between minority in threat and GDP per capita does not establish a coherent pattern. Thus, if economic factor determines the outcome of Minority Under Threat, then Thailand, Myanmar, and the Philippines would have experienced different outcomes. But the figures show that despite the difference in economic condition, the three countries also experience the same outcome of violence against Muslim minorities.


**Figure 4:** GDP Per Capita of Muslim Minority Countries in SEA from 2010-2017



Source: The World Bank, 2014, 2019.

Note: The data exclude Singapore because it scores much higher than the rest of the countries in SEA. Interestingly, Thailand's GDP per capita is vastly different from that of the Philippines and Myanmar, but it experiences a similar outcome of state violence against Muslim minorities. It suggests that economic conditions cannot account for the common outcome.

**Figure 5:** Minority Under Threat and GDP per capita of Muslim minority Countries in SEA




Source: Minority Rights Group International, 2018; The World Bank, 2014; The World Bank, 2019.

Note: Though Thailand, Myanmar, and the Philippines attained economic conditions differently, they all reached a similar outcome of state violence against Muslim minorities. The differences in the economic conditions cannot account for a similar outcome.

Besides, their political conditions also demonstrate a divergent outcome of their relations with the state. For instance, Muslim minorities in Singapore have been relatively better than their fellow Muslims in other countries in terms of economic development and political rights (See Figures 5 and 6) (Mutalib, 2009: 160-180). On the contrary, Muslim minorities in Myanmar have been encountering the severest political difficulty as Rohingyas' struggle to have the basic political rights of citizenship has been in limbo (Human Rights Watch, 2013; Parnini, 2013; Yegar, 2018). In the Philippines and Thailand, the issue of separatist movements and violence in their southern regions has been prioritized as a national security issue. The states' suppression and violence have also often caught the attention of domestic and international observers as their record of human rights violations have been significantly high (See Figure 7 and 8). On top of that, the impact of transnational Islamic militants, such as Al-Qaida, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and the Islamic State (ISIS), after 9/11, triggered the governments in SEA to participate in fighting 'the


war of terror’ and monitor Muslims’ activities closely (Abuza, 2003). Overall taken, the countries in SEA that have had the most troubled relations with their Muslim minorities in the 2010s are Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines, respectively.

**Figure 6:** Level of Fundamental Rights in Muslim Minorities in SEA




Source: World Justice Project, 2019.

**Figure 7:** Level of Human Rights Violation in Muslim Minority Countries in SEA



Source: The Fund for Peace, 2018; The Fund for Peace, 2022.

**Figure 8:** Level of Human Rights Violation in Muslim Minority Countries in Myanmar, Thailand, and The Philippines



Source: The Fund for Peace, 2018; The Fund for Peace, 2022.


Note: The indicator examines whether there is widespread abuse of legal, political, and social rights, including those of individuals, groups, and institutions. The indicator also takes into account incidents of violence directed towards civilians that are motivated by politics as opposed to criminal activity. The figure shows that Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines have a higher level of human rights violations than other countries in the SEA.

Furthermore, states-Muslim minority relations can also be considered through the lens of human rights violations. Approached from this perspective, Rohingyas in western Myanmar, Moros in the southern Philippines, and Malay Muslims in southern Thailand have been the most under threat in SEA, respectively. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights described the situation in the Rakhine State of Myanmar in 2017 that “the situation seems a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (United Nations, 2017). According to Minority Rights Group International’s report in 2018, military forces and local Buddhist militias started targeting Muslim Rohingya in ‘clearing operations’ in Rakhine state after militant Rohingyas attacked security personnel in August 2017. The government has also made the Rohingya stateless, and they have long endured systematic persecution. Nearly 700,000 Rohingya have

fled their homes, and more than 10,000 had died by the end of the year as a result of widespread sexual violence, mass executions of Rohingya people, and burning of hundreds of villages (Minority Rights Group International, 2019).

The data from the Fragile State Index and People Under Threats’ report confirm a positive relationship between human rights abuses and minority rights violations (See Figure 9). In the latter’s report, Singapore and Timor-Leste are not listed as countries under monitoring, unlike the other six countries, which have had a problem with minorities. These two countries, by the same token, score relatively higher than the other countries in the human rights indicator of the former’s report. Conversely, Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines generally performed very poorly in the last eight accumulative years of the human rights score, in which they obtained 9.2, 8.2, and 9.8, respectively. Listed under the latter’s report, Muslim minorities under threat are the Rohingya-Muslims in Myanmar, Malay-Muslims in Thailand, and Moro-Muslims in the Philippines. These three cases constitute the key instances of the violent relations between the states and Muslim minorities.

**Figure 9:** Relationship Between Human Rights Abuses and Minorities Under Threat in Muslim Minority Countries In SEA




Source: Minority Rights Group International, 2018; The Fund for Peace, 2022.

Note: no data on Minority Under Threat in the Singapore case.

In addition, their status of being minorities in the non-Muslim rules raises a concern of being alienated and discriminated against as second-class citizens and outsiders for these people. The term *Kala* and *Bengali* in Burmese, *Kheak* in Thai, and *Moro* in Pilipino discourse denotes pejorative connotation and is used to look down and jeopardize Muslim minorities (Andre, 2016; Blanchetti-Revelli, 2003; Gowing, 1975; Keyes, 2010; Wade, 2017; Yusuf, 2017a). This overall humiliating and negative attitudes toward the Muslim people are evidence that reinforces their vulnerable status as minorities. The invention and existence of these terms are arguably used to justify the states' securitization and anti-Muslim movements in these countries, too. Aphornsuwan (2012), Winichakul (1994; 2017), and Keyes (2010) observe that the narrative of Muslim separatism and the pejorative term of *Kheak* in Thailand are not only important for justifying the state action in confronting the national threat but also significant for constructing Thai national identity; a negative identification of who is not us as a boundary-setting of who we are. In the past, Muslim minorities in Singapore were not safe from the state's racial discrimination, too, as they were excluded from working in Singapore's Armed Forces (Walsh, 2007).


Furthermore, it might be worth observing the condition of democracy in SEA. The data of Freedom House demonstrates that from 2015-2019 majorities of Muslim minorities have not been living in a free society (See Figure 10). While Timor-Leste, the Philippines, and Singapore scored relatively higher than the rest, respectively ranging from 51 to 66, Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia constitute a second group of the pool, having a score between 29-31. Laos and Vietnam have been performing very poorly, obtaining a score of 12.4 and 20, respectively. However, this revelation does not suggest a general relationship between a regime type and the treatment of Muslim minorities. For instance, Thailand and Myanmar fall into the same group, but the condition of Muslim minorities in those two countries differs considerably. It does not also constitute an interdependent relationship between the freedom rate and the level of minorities under threat (See Figure 11). Myanmar's case after the 2015 election suggests a contradiction between democracy and human rights protection. This raises the question of whether democracy can protect minorities more effectively than other regimes.

**Figure 10:** Level of freedom in the Muslim Minority Countries in SEA



Source: Freedom House, 2022.

**Figure 11:** Level of Freedom and Minority Under Threat in in SEA



Source: Minority Rights Group International, 2018; Freedom House, 2022.

Note: MM= Myanmar, TH= Thailand, PH= the Philippines, LA= Laos, CM= Cambodia, VN= Vietnam.

Nevertheless, the burgeoning studies of states-Muslim minorities in the literature have largely been to explore the role and impact of Muslim militants in SEA. In other words, the literature seems to portray that the emergence of Muslim

separatism is the cause of violence between the states and Muslim minorities, and this leads scholars to focus on the effects of Muslim separatist fronts. In comparison, in the 2010s, the Philippines had the largest number of Muslim militant groups in the region, while in Thailand and Myanmar, there exists one main active military front, which is known as BRN-Coordinate in the former and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in the latter country (See Table 2). In effect, the Philippines and Thailand states have been severely confronted with Muslim terrorism/insurgencies, while Myanmar and the rest of the region faced less impact, respectively (See Figure 12). Although the Philippines and Thailand have higher rates of terrorism than Myanmar does, Myanmar has treated its Muslim minorities the toughest. Thus, the data reveal a contradicting result: while Myanmar is less affected by the bottom-up attack of insurgents if compared to the Philippines and Thailand, the state's response to Muslims (Rohingyas and other Muslims) in the country has been more severe than the rest (See Figure 13). The existing literature has not adequately addressed or solved this puzzle so far.<sup>1</sup>

**Table 2: Active Muslim militants in Muslim minority countries in Southeast Asia (2012-2019)**

	Thailand	Myanmar	The Philippines
Active Militant groups	National Revolutionary Front (BRN, est. 1960), Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK, est. 2002), Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO, est. 1968).	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA, est. 2013).	Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF, est. 1972), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, est. 1977), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF, est. 2008), The Justice for Islamic Movement (JIM, est. 2013) Maute Group (est. 2012), Abu Sayyaf Group* (ASG, est. 1991), Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI, est. 1990).
Total	3	1	6


Source: University of Maryland, 2017; Global Terrorism Database, 2017; U.S. Department of State, 2018; U.S. Department of State, 1997; Stanford University, 2018.

Note: \* listed as foreign terrorist organizations under the U.S. Bureau of Counterterrorism.

<sup>1</sup> A part of my answer on this puzzle is the effect of the triangulated conditions that caused divergent outcomes between Myanmar and Thailand (Koma and Tuansiri, 2022a). However, when comparing four cases, the effect of the triangulated conditions is weak to explain peace and violence between the states and Muslim minorities.




**Figure 12:** Impact of Terrorism in Muslim Minority Countries in SEA from 2010-2018



Source: The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018.

Note: this figure consists of all terrorist activities, which include non-Muslim terrorism too. The figure shows that terrorism is higher in the Philippines and Thailand, and yet Myanmar has reacted harshest to its Muslim minorities.

**Figure 13:** Relationship between The Impact of Terrorism and the States' Policy Orientation toward Muslim Minorities in SEA (2010-2018)



Source: Samukkhethum, 2016; The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018.

Note: This graph shows three types of countries: The first group is significantly affected by terrorist attacks, while the second group experienced a medium impact of terrorism. The third is minimally affected by a terrorist attack. In Thailand, Myanmar, and the Philippines, Muslim militants are called terrorists. However, it shows that the states' responses to Muslim armed fronts in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines did not correspond with the level of terrorism impact.

In addition, violence against Rohingya in Myanmar has triggered a puzzle about the reasons behind the differences in the state response to Muslim minorities in SEA. During the 2010s, Myanmar was an outstanding case when compared to the other countries because state violence affected not only Rohingyas in the Rakhine state but also the Muslim minorities in other parts of the country. At the international level, it also caused regional instability in 2014 following the Rohingya maritime exodus to Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. Furthermore, there is evidence of the echo effect that the rise of Buddhist chauvinism in Myanmar triggered the emergence of the Buddhist chauvinist movement in Thailand, too (Buaban, 2020; Sombatpoonsiri, 2022). Notwithstanding the Thai state did not buy an agenda of Buddhist chauvinism, state violence against Malay Muslims persists to the present day. Thus, an effect of social movement in the SEA tends to be epiphenomenal.

The above descriptions showed that state violence in the form of human rights abuse is significantly associated with an increase of minorities under threat. In other words, when associating the Minority Under Threat Index with other factors, minorities in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines faced difficulty from state violence and human rights violations. By this token, Muslim minorities were the victims of state violence; they were not the first mover to engage with the states violently, similar to Hafiz's (2003) findings on the effect of state repression on the emergence of Muslim militants. This revelation does not support the commonly held view that Muslim rebellions are the key driver for the prolonged ethnic conflicts in SEA. Indeed, the states and Muslim minorities in SEA have all faced challenges in constructing their engagement in the modern state system.

### 1.3. THE DILEMMA OF MUSLIM MINORITIES AND CHALLENGES OF THE STATES

Muslim minorities are a group that is demographically subordinate to the country's main culture, culturally dominant in a specific region, and imperiled by the influx of settlers from the dominant culture into their ancestral territory. They are in a dilemma of political engagement in the post-colonial states because of double loyalty. It emerged from having a distinct religious-political tradition, identity, and institution (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996: 21; Saleem, 2016). Thus, the question of political loyalty for Muslim minorities in the modern state was a challenging one. A commonly held but unverified view is that when they are happened to be in a non-Muslim state, Muslims tend to revolt and demand an independent state.

*Muslims aspire to live in a Muslim state; serious problems of identity confront those who cannot, and this occasionally results in crisis. Muslims everywhere perceive themselves as belonging to the integral, undivided community of Islam, the Ummah, a concept which is a core tenet in the political-religious thought of Islam (Yegar, 2002: 364).*

This general perception is supported by a series of Muslim separatism and a rise of radical Muslims around the world. In SEA, three out of eight Muslim-minority countries have a record of Muslim militants and separatism. This phenomenon essentially raises a central concern of Muslim minorities living in the modern state system on “how to live as equals with non-Muslims in the same state” (Gowing, 1975: 27).

It also shows a paradox the Muslim minorities often face in their homeland. On the one hand, as a member of a Muslim community, they belong to the Islamic nation (Ummah) and are obliged to follow the Islamic rules. On the other hand, as a citizen of a nation-state, they belong to non-Muslim rules.<sup>2</sup> For some observers, to be a Muslim and a citizen of the non-Muslim rules is paradoxical and irreconcilable between religious and national loyalties (Gowing, 1975; Ramadan, 2015; Yegar, 2002). In this sense, Muslims can hardly be loyal to their Islamic religion and non-Islamic nation-states at the same time. Thus, the paradox seems to be a choice

---

<sup>2</sup> In the context of Western Muslims, Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori illustrate a rather different concern that the dilemma was between a priority of migration to the West (*dar al-kufr*) for economic wellbeing and that of residing in the abode of Islam (*dar al-Islam*). (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996: 144–145)

positing between integration and secession (Yegar, 2002). However, it is not always the case between Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims may rebel against a government in Muslim countries if they feel it is not sufficiently Islamic, as Malaysia experienced recently. Therefore, it appears that extremist Muslims are more worried about this dilemma than moderate Muslims.

However, peace and violence are two different paths for Muslim politics. Gul Kurtoglu (2003: 16) provides a compelling analysis that for Islamists to live according to Islamic rules in the Muslim world, they have three options: (1) to exit the society, (2) to change the system with violence, and (3) to enter into the existing political system peacefully. Interestingly, these options can also be observed in Muslim minority countries but in a different fashion. First, instead of pressing to change the political system violently, Muslim minorities' armed groups act violently to separate the country. Second, instead of entering the political system to change it peacefully, they would rather stay in the system, improve it if possible, and are tolerant of non-Muslim rules. The example of the first option is a case of Muslim separatism, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) in Thailand, and ARSA in Myanmar, while the example of the second option is a feature of the engaged and moderate Muslims, who prefer to negotiate their political demands in the peaceful means (Satha-Anand, 2004). As chapter II will show, the existence of the second group is prevalent in Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Myanmar.

Not only Muslim minorities, states also encounter various challenges in managing Muslim minorities because they have to deal with the dilemma of ethnic pluralism (Kymlicka, 1996; Kymlicka, 2004). According to Weber's widely used definition of the state, a state is "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 1958: 82). It entails at least two effects. On the one hand, it has to preserve what Benedict Anderson (2006) calls an "imagined community" and what Thongchai Winichakul (1994) conceptualizes as "the geo-body of the nation", all of which are based on a value of homogenization and the moral rights to rule (Esman, 1994: 5). On the other hand, the state is also obliged to promote the value of ethnic pluralism, cultural diversity, and the protection of universal human rights. As a result, this

dilemma of inclusivism vs. exclusivism generates two ideal types of politics: civic and ethnocentric characteristics. While the former is the essential feature of the democratic system, the latter is locked in violence and a democratic-deficits regime. At one point, Ornanong Benbourenane stressed on a boomeranged effect of state violence as a cause of protracted separatist movements: “The authoritarian regime tended to use coercive measures as a common means to suppress the suspected separatists. This measure led to human rights violations and alienated the population while intensifying separatist retaliation against the government” (Benbourenane, 2012: 160).

The challenge of minorities’ management is common for the modern nation-state as its duties are to maintain at least three functions: nation-building, socio-economic development, and protection of human rights and civil liberties (Almond et al., 2004: 1-20). In the same vein, Samudavanija (2002: 3-13) is of the view that a developing state can hardly balance a center of gravity when it has to choose between three dimensions of security, development, and participation. If failed to balance, the result may be political decay. For most SEA states, there is the further added dilemma of achieving these functions despite the negative legacy of colonial policies and in a relatively short time. Thus, it is a challenge for a state in SEA in the 21<sup>st</sup> CE to handle the ethnic minority issue with care.

The above dilemma has explicitly been elucidated by Peter Gowing (1975) in explaining the condition of Muslim minorities in Thailand and the Philippines. He makes an analogy of an encounter between the state and minorities as reminiscent of an encounter between an “irresistible force” and “immovable objects,” which renders that in the process of confrontation, “something has got to give,” and as such, the process determines the outcome of peace or violence (Gowing, 1975: 37). As opposed to a condition of Muslim majority countries, Hefner (2009) and Pitsuwan (1982) highlight that Muslim minorities often face the irresistible force of a state who has a cosmology different from theirs. For instance, in the words’ of a key scholar of Southeast Asia: “In Thailand, by contrast, the Muslim minority confronts a state that is centralizing, Buddhist-dominated, and intent on forging a national culture in which Islam is conspicuous by its absence” (Hefner, 2009: 31). Hence, the confrontation, on the one hand, manifested in deadly violence between the state and Muslim

militants and, on the other hand, formed cooperative relations. Thus far, what can account for the dynamics of state-Muslim minority relations in SEA in recent years? This puzzle remains unexplored systematically, however. The following sections attempt to review the relevant explanations of the state-Muslim minority relations in SEA as discussed in the literature.

#### **1.4. APPROACHES TO THE DYNAMICS OF THE STATES- MUSLIM RELATIONS**

This section aims to give a survey of approaches that attempted to account for the dynamics of states-Muslim minority relations in SEA. As has been discussed earlier, their relations fall broadly into two types of peaceful and violent engagements. Three countries, namely Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines, have been caught in Muslim insurgencies, whereas the rest of them in SEA are safe from that attack. Since 2012, however, Myanmar state has become a crucial case if compared with the rest for dealing with the Muslim minorities in its countries by committing a heavy-handed operation, which later was described as ethnic cleansing. This section will provide what would be a possible explanation for the different outcomes of states-Muslim minorities in SEA. The guiding questions are what are the factors that shape the state-Muslim minorities and why some states committed violence, but others refrain from doing similar action?

The contending explanations of the states-Muslim minorities in SEA fall under three main approaches. The first account is based on an explanation of primordial proponents who assert that ancient hatred, sons of the soil, and colonial legacies are the main sources of modern violence between different ethnicities (Bayar, 2009; Furnivall, 1956; Geertz, 1963; Horowitz, 1985; Kaplan, 2014). They also view ethnicity as a fixed and given quality that plays a large role in formulating political conflict in modern states. Accordingly, because of the innate essence of a group's differences, ethnic conflict is inevitable. In other words, the primordialist outlook frames religious identities as fixed, homogeneous, and resistant to change (e.g., Huntington's Clash of Civilizations debate). However, the Islamic ummah on a global level and even within a country (e.g., the Aceh movement in Indonesia)

suggests that this is rarely the case. In the absence of a uniform identity, it becomes difficult to explain the state-Muslim relations in SEA with fixed identities leading to fixed conflicts.

This approach particularly focuses on the role of colonial legacies, which shaped how Muslim minorities engaged with non-Muslim counterparts. Muslims in Myanmar and the Philippines, for instance, had been colonies for long periods of time. Che Man (1990) stresses that the colonial policies of suppression have triggered a rise of Muslim separatism in southern Thailand and the Philippines. Similarly, in the case of Thailand, the separatists have responded to the Siamese internal policies of colonization, whereas in the Philippines, the Moro fronts were formed to confront the Spanish and U.S. colonial rules.

According to the proponents of colonial legacy explanation, in Myanmar's case, the British empire brought new immigrants (i.e., the Rohingyas) from British India into Burma, which consequently made a demographic change in the new land. Later, the Rohingya joined the British army to fight against Japanese invaders during World War II. Meanwhile, the Buddhist Arakanese sided with the Japanese front to fight against the British. This event is an example of 'ancient hatred' between Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine state. One correspondence unveils the consequence of the ethnic conflict: "Eventually, the two communities separated into distinct areas, the Arakanese in the south supporting the Japanese and the Chittagonian in the north supporting the British" (Ware, 2015: 5). In the case of the southern Philippines and Thailand, colonial powers' impact on a new state's demarcation gradually led to a rise in separatist movements. For instance, the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty changed the position of Malays in the Patani Kingdom without their participation, and as a consequence, a group of elites embarked on separatism. Thus, this explanation suggests that the effect of ancient hatred is real and long-lasting: once it was created in the past, it consequently shaped the present condition.

However, the ancient hatred explanation tends to exaggerate the impact of rooted animosity in the past between two antagonist groups. In the post-colonial regime of Burma, Rohingyas and their Buddhist counterparts resumed their peaceful relations as a daily experience. When Wade (2017) visits the local cinema hut in

Buthidaung, a northern city in Rakhine state, after 2012 violent events in Rakhine state, he observes socialization between the members of two groups:

*Rohingya and Rakhine still came together, not to trade goods or to labour alongside one another, but as social peer. They sat side by side on the benches, hollering as the game fizzed on in all its intensity. The hut didn't have the functional basis of a marketplace – it was a zone of purely voluntary interaction where religious and ethnic identity seemingly had no bearing (Wade, 2017: 243).*

Likewise, though ancient hatreds between Buddhists and Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand persists in their poets, hate speeches, and fairy tales, such animosities do not prevent them from cooperating and socializing with each other. Hence, existing ancient hatreds per se are not powerful enough to cause state violence against minorities.

In addition to the effect of ancient hatreds, colonial rules and policies tend to have had far-reaching impacts in constructing the social structure of these countries. Horowitz (1985; 156–168) observes that the policy of 'divide and rule' and immigration that colonial powers implemented during their rule had permanently changed the balance of demography and later shifted the position of ethnic groups in the new social structure. In some cases, this eventually created an opportunity for some groups to be better off, and as a result, they were caught into either backward or advanced groups, and the group comparison became a source of the conflict. He also provides that the path to secession depends on an association of groups and regions, and as such, separatism emerges as a result of the interaction between relative group position and relative geographical position (Horowitz, 1985: 234). In his classification, he includes the Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand in the backward group and region, which demonstrates that in such conditions, separatism was not only inevitable but also early attempted and frequent despite its economic costs (Horowitz, 1985: 257). However, his analysis of the Muslim minorities seems to be overgeneralized by depicting Muslim separatism as a unified whole of Muslim minorities in the country, and it ignores the diversity within Muslim societies: Not all Muslim minorities in those countries can be confined into one unified goal. On the contrary, Muslim separatists tend to be a minority within the minority group.

Thus, the argument that colonial legacies can singlehandedly account for the present state-Muslim minority relations cannot be taken as a verified statement. On




the one hand, among the eight countries in SEA with Muslim minorities, Myanmar and the Philippines have a colonial past and were caught in strained relations between the state and the minorities. On the other hand, Thailand, which has no record of being formally colonized, has also experienced Muslim separatism. Similarly, those countries with less than two percent Muslim population had also been ruled under colonial powers, but their relations with Muslims show no record in the recent years of violence and Muslim rebellion. Thus, though the critical juncture in the past may influence to shape some parts of the present, its effect cannot be viewed as a general trend. Horowitz observes that “history can be a weapon, and tradition can fuel ethnic conflict, but a current conflict cannot generally be explained by simply calling it as a reviewed form of an earlier conflict” (Horowitz, 1985: 99).

The second account rests on the effectiveness of the state's capacity to deal with nation-building efforts and the state policy orientations towards Muslim minorities. First, the effectiveness of the state can be understood from the state failure index. According to Rotberg (2003: 1), nation-states fail because they can no longer provide their people with political goods due to internal violence. In the same vein, Huntington (2006: 1-3) suggests that political disorder in the third world reflected not a salience of the regime type but a degree of state governability. In other words, this account suggests that a ‘state failure’ is likely to cause minorities’ vulnerability and encourages the rise of Muslim separatism, and in effect, it ultimately shapes the state-Muslim minority relations. Samudavanija (2002: 1-13) argues that a state is essential for the country because it has to pursue three goals: maintaining security, providing development, and guaranteeing participation. By this token, he contends that the reality in Southeast Asia was that the state had often chosen to prioritize the first two goals of building a nation-state. As a result, states in SEA generally scored very poorly in the Democratic Index and, as a consequence, left the issue of human rights and civil liberties in limbo. Under the Fragile State Index, there is a positive relationship between minorities’ threats and the weak states in SEA that poorly provide public goods. The data suggest that the more the state becomes fragile, the more minorities are at risk (See Figure 14). However, state failure and strength should be seen as a consequence of civil-military relations. As

the study will point out later, this fragility is widespread in the cases of military-controlled states.

**Figure 14:** Fragile States and Level of Minority Under Threat in Muslim Minority Countries In SEA



Source: Minority Rights Group International, 2018; The Fund for Peace, 2018.

Furthermore, state policy orientations are linked to the success of minority integration and minorities' response. In many cases, forced integration tends to influence state-minority relations in a negative way. Under the new nation-state, one of the uniform practices of the state is to homogenize all groups in society under the idea of nationalism (Gellner, 1994). This nation-building effort determines how minorities would integrate themselves into national unity. The states of Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines have relatively failed to integrate Rohingya, Malay, and Moro Muslims, which consequently resulted in a series of resistances and separatist movements against the center. The failure of integration - such as the inability to speak a national language fluently- provides a pretext for the separation because it intensifies an already existing level of discrimination and marginalization (Yusuf, 2007; Yusuf, 2017a). In short, on the one hand, the state's effort to assimilate Muslim minorities has negatively caused an existential threat to Muslim's ethno-religious identity. On the other, their failure to become fully integrated reinforces a sense of alienation. As a result of that, it has also raised a concern of

ethnic solidarity to defend their tradition and identity. Pitsuwan observes that “the more aggressive the central government has become in its pursuit of national development and integration, the more violent the reactions from the Malay minority have become” (Pitsuwan, 1982: 218). Since nation-building is an unfinished project, the role of the state is important in determining the outcome of their relations with Muslim minorities.


Thus, a state policy implementation is significant for the rise of separatism and can influence how it deals with Muslim militants. According to McCargo (2008), the state's lack of legitimacy is what led to the perpetuation of Malay-Muslim separatists. It is because the Thai state tends to implement contradicting courses of action in order to manage Malay-Muslim minorities in Thailand. On the one hand, it maintains a practice of human rights violations such as tortures, extrajudicial killings, and forced disappearance. On the other, it promotes accommodation, affirmative actions, and special treatment, such as quotas of university admission and scholarship for Malay-Muslims. These state policy implementations did not demonstrate a policy consistency.

Besides, when a government changes its policy orientation from forced assimilation to benign integration, the resistance from Muslim militants also transforms (Benbourenane, 2012: 143-150). In this sense, the determinant of peace and violence has not been in the hands of minorities but rather in the state. As Sandra Ruth Leavitt (2007: ii) stressed, the key factor in state-minority relations is government actions - not fundamental characteristics of minorities. Muslim minorities' complaints, resources, rhetorical frames, and political chances are all greatly impacted by state behavior, which in turn influences their decision to use social mobilization tactics.

Furthermore, a study of ethnic conflict management unveils that different states have responded to minorities with a wide range of policies. Somsak Samukkethum (2016) demonstrates that, in general, states have managed minority issues through either one of six policy options: ranging from less to more tolerance, namely genocide, ethnic cleansing, assimilation, integration, accommodation, and ethnic federalism. By analyzing the report on International Religious Freedom and People Under Threats from 2012-2018 (Minority Rights Group International, 2018b;

U.S. Department of State, 1998), the situation in Myanmar can be described as ethnic cleansing. Meanwhile, the current situation of the state's response in Singapore and Cambodia can be viewed as accommodation, and in the Philippines a partial concession of autonomy to the minority group. The state's response in Laos and Vietnam can also be put at some points between assimilation and integration (See Figure 15). Taken overall, it is possible to conclude that the majority of states in SEA have responded to Muslim minorities in a rather moderate or tolerant tone.

**Figure 15:** Preliminary Analysis of States' Ethnic Management in Muslim Minority Countries in SEA (2012-2019)



Source: Samukkhethum, 2016: 165-170; Author's Analysis.

Note: 1= ethnic federalism, 2= accommodation, 3 = integration, 4 = assimilation, 5 = ethnic cleansing, 6 = genocide. Laos and Vietnam shall fall in between integration and assimilation.

Nevertheless, the above framework (Figure 15) provides a misleading explanation and does not reflect reality on the ground. First, Thailand and the Philippines' policy orientations toward Muslim minorities cannot be solely categorized as integration and ethnic federalism, respectively, because the main parts of their policy enforcement are concentrated on militarization. Second, the policy of integration and cultural assimilation does not necessarily constitute a cause of ethnic

mobilization against the states. For instance, the state-Muslim minority relations in Laos and Cambodia did not turn out to be violent. In contrast, Thailand, which implements an integration policy, too, engages with its Muslim minorities violently. Hence, positing an analysis from the point of policy orientation reveals an inconsistent pattern of state-Muslim minority relations. It does not point out the source of policy design and implementation. As the later chapters will show, policy orientation should be seen as a reflection of whether military or civilian controls the states.


In addition, a counterargument to the top-down analysis, which bases its argument on the bottom-up approach, demonstrates that it is the social forces and movements that have shaped the direction of the action of the states to date. For instance, Sascha Helbardt *et al.* (2013) argue that when politics becomes a tool for implementing religious practices, an outcome can easily be violent, as in the case of Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Yusuf (2018) also highlights that a rise of Buddhist chauvinism, such as the Ma Ba Tha movement, was influential in a heavy-handed operation toward the suppression of the Muslims in Myanmar, especially Rohingyas, in recent years. Taken from this perspective, a state is not isolated from the society at large but is rather an aggregation of political interests in which the dominant social force has an influential role in shaping state-society relations. This debate raises the theoretical question of which approach can best capture the dynamics of state-society relations. While a state-centric approach stresses an autonomous characteristic of the state over the society, the society-centric approach, however, presses on the increasing power of dominant social forces in shaping public decision-making.

Besides the political dimension, which has been analyzed in the aforementioned paragraphs, studies of ethnic conflict suggest that economic conditions in Muslim minority areas tend to be associated with the rise of separatism. In Thailand and the Philippines case, the concentrated Muslim regions in their southern part are the poorest in the countries. Pitsuwan (1982: 18–19) begins his analysis of Malay-Muslim separatism in Thailand by pointing out that, in the past, separatist groups had been bolstered by this deteriorating situation, which has led to the Malay-Muslims' centrifugal tendency. Undoubtedly, this has become one of the main grievances and justifications for the rise of separatist movements around the

globe. As Horowitz (1985: 257) demonstrates, a backward group in the backward region tends to secede due to at least three reasons: the denial of proportionality in civil service, symbolic issues like language and religion, and an influx of advanced civil servants into bureaucracy. In Thailand, the proposal of Haji Sulong in 1947 attempted to change the condition before he was forced to disappear by the Thai security officers. This example from Thailand is not far from what Horowitz (1985) had described, and such reasons were used as a pretext for separatism in the southern Philippines and northeast Myanmar as well (Che Man, 1987; Pitsuwan, 1982: 152; Ringuet, 2002; Yegar, 2002).

Therefore, if a condition of economic well-being determines the state relations with Muslim minorities, it can be assumed that a state with a higher GDP per capita is likely to bypass Muslim separatism and have cooperative relations with minorities. However, the data of the World Bank do not suggest a conclusive statement on a positive relationship between economic development and peaceful relations (See Figure 16). Both high and low economic well-being countries, such as Singapore and Cambodia, do not have a record of violence between Muslims and the state, whereas Thailand, Philippines, and Myanmar – countries that have a record of violence between the state and Muslims – have a different level of economic development. When comparing a condition of economic wellbeing with minorities under threats, the data suggests that there are three groups of countries that can be characterized by a relatively low economic wellbeing with a high risk of minorities, a relatively better economic wellbeing with a medium risk of minorities, and a mixture of the high and low economic wellbeing with low risk of minorities. While Myanmar falls under the first group, Thailand and the Philippines constitute the second, and the residuals make up the third and fourth groups (See Figure 17). Thus, a lower economic condition is not a necessary factor leading to a high risk of ethnic cleansing, as the data from the case of Cambodia and Laos had shown.


**Figure 16:** Relationship between GDPs Per Capita and Impact of Terrorism in Muslim Minority Countries in SEA (2010-2018)



Source: The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018; The World Bank, 2019.

Note: The graph demonstrates four groups of countries; the first is a high impact of terrorism with a middle GDP per capita (e.g., Myanmar), the second is a high impact of terrorism with a medium level of GDP per capita (e.g., Thailand and the Philippines), the third is a low impact of terrorism with a low GDP per capita (e.g., Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Timor-Leste), and the last is a high level of GDP per capita and low level of terrorism impact (e.g., Singapore).

**Figure 17:** Relationship between a Condition of Economic Wellbeing and Minorities Under Threats (2012-2018)



Source: Minority Rights Group International, 2018; The World Bank, 2019.

Note: this figure shows three classes of countries; first is a high threat of minorities with a low GDP per capita, second is a medium threat of minorities with a medium GDP per capita, and third is a low threat of minorities with a mixture of high and low GDP per capita.

The third account concentrates on the salience of a national security threat or securitization as a determinant of state-minorities relations. Because of the emergence of the nation-state system, ethnic pluralism in SEA countries has become a fundamental reality. Muslim minorities who view themselves as an indigenous group having a distinct identity and institution and by no choice living in non-Muslim rules appeared to demand independence. As a result, their demand challenged the foundation of the nation-state and national unity, which laid on the value of sovereignty. Thus, Muslim separatism, as manifested in the case of Moros, Malay-Muslims, and Rohingyas in three different countries, shaped how the state engages in its activities with Muslim minorities. The case of Somchai Nilaphaijit's extrajudicial killing in Thailand demonstrated that anyone associated with helping the potential threat was also considered a threat to the state's security, even though he was engaging with the justice system peacefully (Satha-Anand, 2009). In this sense, the minorities' relations with the state have always been viewed as skeptical and violent since the dawn of independence.




In many cases, a debate on Islamic threats in SEA revolves around the role of Islamic schools or *Madrasah* and their association with violence. There exists a record of Islamic schools that get involved in preaching jihad and training Muslim militants. Robert Hefner (2009: 34), for instance, stressed that Malays in Thailand have started to perceive Islamic schools as both symbols and tools of resistance to Thai rule, which is exacerbated by a feeling of political disenfranchisement. This kind of perception reinforces a state to monitor, control, and sometime securitize Islamic schools. However, the state at the same time accommodates some Muslim educators who want to operate Islamic education. Joseph Liow (2009), for instance, points out that Yala Islamic University (Fatoni University), which was established by a Saudi-trained scholar, was helped financially by Arab donors and welcomed in restive southern Thailand by the state to preach Salafi-based education. Similarly, Bjorn Blengsli (2009) and Makenna and Abdula (2009) highlighted this trend in Cambodia and the Philippines, respectively. Thus, this suggests that a state chose to securitize certain Muslims and accommodate some others.

Culturalist explanation also reinforces the securitization of Muslims by showing that their values and culture are exclusivist and not compatible with Western or Buddhist values, and as such, it denotes Islam and Muslims as a threat. Samuel Huntington, for instance, argues that the pervasiveness of conflicts after the end of the cold war has been fought based on a salience of religious or cultural affinities (Huntington, 1998). The event of 9/11 and the rise of Islamic terrorist networks recently have also sustained his argument of a clash of civilizations, and in effect, it does not only justify a war on terror but also reinforces an industry of Islamophobia around the globe (Green, 2015: 205-232; Lean, 2012; Osman, 2017: 20). Besides, the recent rise of Buddhist chauvinism in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand may also be considered under this account because they have claimed to defend Buddhism and national identity from the threat of growing Islam and global terrorism. Arjun Appadurai (2006: 52) links such phenomenon to we/they questions and argues that the majority's fear of small numbers, as manifested in the form of predatory identities, happens when they work to narrow the distance between the majority and the purity of the country as a whole. In doing so, minorities may

become a target of the attack, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, and in effect, insurgencies as a means of retaliation may shape the state-Muslim minority relation.

If this account holds a valid assumption, a state with a higher impact of terrorism should have a higher score of violation of human rights and minorities under threats as well. However, the empirical data do not suggest a strong relationship between the two. On the contrary, it suggests that an act of insurgencies and terrorism does not lead to a uniform practice of states' intensive repression. For instance, the Philippines has been a country that was significantly affected by terrorism in recent years, but the state's response to minorities has been less severe than that of Myanmar. Myanmar, on the opposite, faced fewer attacks by Muslim insurgents but scored higher in threatening Muslim minorities (See Figure 18). Furthermore, a closer observation suggests that a juxtaposition of the impact of terrorism and the states' policy orientation constitutes three classes of countries; first is a group of a high impact of terrorism with a state's mixture of accommodation and repression, second is a medium impact of terrorism with a heavy-handed state's operation, and third is a low impact of terrorism with a moderate state's policy orientation. Thailand and the Philippines fall into the first category, while Myanmar alone constitutes a second group, and the rest forms the third group. Thus, it shows that the state's heavy-handed operation is not significantly associated with the level of terrorism impact. A state with higher Muslim terrorism, such as the Philippines, may take a moderate tone in dealing with Muslim minorities.

**Figure 18:** Relationship Between the Impact of Terrorism and the States' Policy Orientation (2010-2018)



Source: Samukkhethum, 2016: 165-170; The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018.

Note: this figure constitutes three classes of countries; first is a high impact of terrorism with a state's mixture of accommodation and repression, second is a medium impact of terrorism with a heavy-handed state's operation, and third is a low impact of terrorism with a moderate state's policy orientation.

## 1.5. CONCLUSION

The above discussion reveals that the salience of the nexus between violence and the activism of Muslim separatism preoccupies the literature on the relations between the state and Muslim minorities. A commonly held view but unverified is that Muslim minorities tend to rebel if they have the opportunity.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, such a statement should not be taken for granted because most Muslim minorities can coexist with the state and non-Muslim fellows. Furthermore, within each country, it is common to see well-integrated Muslim minorities who played an essential role in their respective countries. This group of Muslims tends to engage with the state peacefully (Bajunid, 1999; Crouch, 2016; Yusuf, 2007; Scupin, 1998; Shah et al.,

<sup>3</sup> One crucial note is important however: a crucial number of four to five percent of Muslim minorities having a regional concentration in the country has a record of Muslim separatism. In the case reviewed, Philippines, Thailand, and Myanmar contain this characteristic. But Singapore having 14 percent of Muslim minority of six million shows no record of separatism recently.

2019; Yahprung, 2014), and their existence is more common than the Muslim militants. Thus, it may not be incorrect to assess that the key explanations on the state-Muslim minorities reviewed above offer an incomplete picture of its dynamics in recent years because it fails to establish a causal effect of defining conditions, which leads to the varying outcomes between the state and Muslim minorities.

Besides, the mainstream approaches to explaining the dynamics are inadequate to account for recent state violence against Muslim minorities because proponents of primordialism, weak state argument, and the securitization approach fail to realize the effect of civil-military relations. First, primordialism fails to depict the recent construction of new institutions - military control - because it primarily focuses on the effect of colonial legacies and ancient animosity. In addition, the state failure explanation fails to account for state violence because it neglects the impact of military control that causes it in the first place. Finally, the implementation of state policy is not powerful enough to explain state violence unless a hardline policy orientation is shaped by military control. As the case of Myanmar will show, state violence against Rohingya Muslims emerged when military rule started in 1962. In addition, a condition of weak state capacity is instead one of the consequences of military control, while securitization does not automatically lead to the persistence of state violence. As the Singapore case will reaffirm, the securitization of Muslim minorities can be temporal and restrained under the condition of civilian control. Instead, militarization acts as a causal mechanism of sustained state violence in most cases. In short, the aforementioned explanations neglect the crucial question of who controls the state and ignore the structural condition that shaped the way a state sustains militarization. The next chapter puts forward to examine the effect of military control as a sufficient condition that contributed to the violent relations between the state and Muslim minorities.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **DIFFERENT PATHS OF STATE-MUSLIM MINORITY RELATIONS: MILITARY CONTROL AND VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIM MINORITIES**

#### **2.1. INTRODUCTION**

Although violent conflicts between the states and their Muslim minorities in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines have taken place for decades, the condition behind their peaceful and violent relations in Southeast Asia (SEA) are still not fully comprehended. After gaining independence from the Western colonizers, many states in SEA started to face a new challenge with their Muslim minorities: a violent conflict between the state and some armed groups in those Muslim minorities. Building peaceful relations between the modern state and its minorities in the post-colonial era has been an intricate task. Three cases under study fail to establish peaceful relations, while Singapore successfully sustains its peaceful relations with Muslim minorities.

One of the mainstream explanations places an emphasis on a state's accommodation policy towards Muslim minorities as a solution to violent conflict. However, the accommodation policy per se is not the solution for establishing peaceful relations. For instance, the state's accommodation for Muslim minorities in Thailand and the Philippines does not prevent violent relations between them from sustaining. Thus, states implementing the policy of accommodation can lead to both outcomes: maintaining their peaceful relations and persisting violent engagement. The existing studies on the state violence and ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia do not offer a systematic explanation of the relations between the states and Muslim minorities in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines – countries where violent conflict persists. The puzzles of this subject remain unsolved: what is the explanatory condition that accounts for the different political outcomes of the state-Muslim minority relations?

This chapter examines the conditions that led to the diverging paths of state-Muslim minority relations in those four countries in two steps. First, it re-examines

the salience of Muslim minorities' integration. The mainstream explanations portray that Muslim minorities' unwillingness to integrate with a larger society is a key factor for ethnic mobilization and armed violence. This account provides a minority-centric explanation that problematizes minorities' identity issues and ethnic mobilization. This chapter, however, illustrates that it is insufficient to concentrate on those people who do not want to integrate because, on the one hand, unintegration does not show a direct causal relationship with violence, and on the other, their ethnic mobilization is a costly task. In other words, to mobilize their ethnic members to use violence against a state, it is not easy for ethnic leaders to overcome the problem of collective action. Because ethnic mobilization is not a cause but mostly a reaction to state violence and suppression, the imperative is the role of organizational variation among Muslim minorities. This chapter differentiates between the forms of Muslim minority organizations into political associations and armed groups. Part of the argument is that the former is a dominant mode of Muslim minorities' engagement, while the latter represents only a handful of those who find no other means to deal with the states except violence. By this token, Muslim minorities tend to prefer organizing political associations or civil society organizations in order to advance their specific demands.

Next, the chapter addresses the state's institutional difference as an explanatory variable to account for the persistence of violence against Muslim minorities. It also demonstrates that, instead of state policy choices towards minorities, the most significant condition is the civil-military relations (CMR): the question of who governs the state. Because of the influence of the minority-centric explanation (Che Man, 1990; Kundnani, 2007; Kymlicka, 1996, 2009; Yegar, 1972, 2002), differences between civilian control vs. military control and its impact on minorities have been understudied. Based on the CMR explanation, the role of the state is the first mover of the violent conflict between the states and the minorities. Essentially, the state under military control is different from the state under civilian control, and this difference significantly matters. This chapter demonstrates that civilian control is not a uniform practice across the states in SEA. A much more dominant feature is military control: a condition that a military institution has full command or influence over key policy domains, especially on internal security

issues. While the impact of military control in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines is used as cases of state violence against Muslim minorities, the effect of civilian control in Singapore constitutes an example of the peaceful relations between the state and Muslim minorities.

More specifically, the chapter argues that, in the short term, a condition of military control reinforces a process of securitization (a hardline policy orientation), whereas a form of civilian control restricts the state policy choices and implementation otherwise available to the military government. In other words, while the civilian government is accountable to its constituencies, the military government is not. In the long run, a form of civilian control that restricts the state's implementation of hard policy orientations creates and maintains peaceful engagement between the state and the minorities. On the contrary, a condition of military control structures the violent way in which the state deals with minorities and becomes a self-reinforcing mechanism of militarization. In the worst case, such as in Myanmar, the military used both legal mechanisms and physical forces to commit ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya minorities.

The rest of the chapter is divided into two parts. The first part addresses the patterns of Muslim minority organizations by distinguishing them into armed groups and political associations. The findings show that it is tenuous to take an active operation of the minorities' armed group as an independent variable to explain the violent relations between the states and Muslim minorities. The final part introduces military control as an explanatory variable and discusses its impacts on state-Muslim minority relations. In essence, this chapter argues that the condition of military control is a prominent factor in the state violence against Muslim minorities in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines.

## **2.2. PATTERNS OF MUSLIM MINORITIES' ORGANIZATIONS: ARMED GROUP VS. POLITICAL ASSOCIATION**

Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia have been living for centuries in Thailand, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Singapore. They share a common identity, which makes them culturally different from the other members of different ethnic

groups in their respective societies. For instance, many of the Muslim minorities have a distinct attire that is in line with Islamic traditions, such as hijab, and observe halal food. As a result of their differences, some of them have been able to integrate into society, while others have failed to do so.

As a result, the literature on SEA and Muslim minorities addresses the political violence between the state and Muslim minorities by dividing the minorities into integrated and unintegrated groups (Bajunid, 1999, 2005; Yusuf, 2007; Yusuf, 2009). The former is not a part of the problem because they have already become a full member of a new national identity, while the latter has remained a challenge for a state to integrate them into a new political loyalty and national identity. These are the dilemma between the state and Muslim minorities (Gowing, 1975), which was already mentioned in the previous chapter. According to this explanation, the conflict between the states and Muslim minorities is likely to persist as long as the minorities fail to transform their primordial identity and become a part of national identity. Taken as such, the struggle is shown as due to the identity conflict between the unintegrated ethnic groups and the state.

However, as far as Muslim minorities are concerned, categorizing them into two different groups does not explain the persistence of violence between the states and Muslim minorities. First, although an unintegrated group of Muslim minorities has been a part of resisting force against the states' policies, it is not a uniform practice. In southern Thailand, for instance, the unintegrated group of Malay-Muslims has organized political associations and civil society organizations instead of armed groups to openly demand self-determination and autonomy. These groups, such as the Patani, the Motive, and Civil Society Assembly for Peace (CAP), are opposed to using violence as a means to communicate with the state. Thus, Muslim minorities who disagree with the state policy of ethnic assimilation do not always use violent means to resist the states.

Furthermore, unlike the arguments in the literature, the emergence of Muslim separatist fronts in the three countries has not been due to an unwillingness to integrate with their larger society. Instead, their emergence is a result of the state's suppression of Muslim minorities. In the Philippines' case, Nur Misuari, the leader of MNLF, who was integrated into the larger Philippine society and a former lecturer at



the University of the Philippines, has established an armed front because of the state repression of the Moro in Mindanao. Barbara Whittingham-Jones (1947) presents a similar picture of the 1947 state repression in Patani, Thailand.

*Everywhere I went, it was the same tale of systematic oppression and of a deliberate campaign to de-nationalise the population. Deepest resentment is aroused by the ban on Malay education. Prohibitions against Malay schools..., are now being reinforced. All along my route, I saw school buildings closed and deserted. Even purely Islamic schools are being included in the ban. Although one or two Malay schools still survived, notably in Yala and in Banghara (Naradhivas), several had been obliged to close down only a day or so immediately preceding my visit. As the Malays refuse to send their children to Siamese schools, and have so far stubbornly refused to acquire even a rudimentary knowledge of the Siamese language, (during the whole of my visit I found only one haji, a former district officer, able to read and write Siamese), this educational starvation is retarding their entire social and economic development (Whittingham-Jones, 1947: 8).*

In southern Thailand, the 1940s were a pivotal decade for Muslim separatism. As a result of the creation of the new nation-states and the state's repression of minorities, minority armed organizations erupted in Southeast Asia. In a situation in which a political space is unavailable while facing state oppression, unintegrated Muslim minorities are likely to take up violent means to respond to the state. Nevertheless, when political space was opened to them, they also took political, non-violent channels to negotiate their demands with the state.

Because the difference does not end at the division between an integrated and unintegrated minority, a deeper layer needs to be considered. That is, there are differences within the unintegrated minorities. An organization of unintegrated minority groups can be divided into political associations and armed fronts. The former uses political association as a means to deal with the state, while the latter employs armed struggle as the only way to demand their goals. Examples of the second groups are the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and Barisan Revolusi National-Coordinate (BRN-C) in southern Thailand, ARSA in Myanmar, and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines. These groups have a common belief that violent means are the most effective way, if not the only way, to deal with the state. In short, they are significantly different from the former groups in their means to achieve their goal.

Instead of organizing an armed front, Muslim minorities in the four countries under examination have a common practice of organizing political associations ranging from political parties, civil society organizations, and learning centers (Bajunid, 2005; Farrelly, 2016; Satha-Anand, 2001; Shah et al., 2019). Examples of active political associations in Thailand are Muslims in national politics, Prachachat political party, Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand, Civil Society Assembly for Peace, Muslim Attorney Center Foundation, Assalam Group, and Fatoni University. Similar examples can also be found in Myanmar, such as the All-Myanmar Islamic Religious Organization, Democracy and Human Rights Party (DHRP), National Democratic Party for Development (NDPD), and National Democracy for Peace Party (NDPP). Altogether taken, this finding indicates that civic engagement seems to be the prevalent style among Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia.

Hence, contrary to the popular belief that Muslim minorities are likely to rebel if they have a chance (Yegar, 2002), based on the above discussion, a few summaries are due. First, rebellions of Muslim minorities against a state are not a uniform practice across the cases in Southeast Asia. The Singapore case shows that the Malay Muslims have persistently engaged with the state peacefully without forming armed separatist groups. In other countries, Muslim minorities have widely formed political associations to interact with the state and participate in national politics. Only in a situation where the state has been repressive and oppressive against their demands do they form armed groups to fight against the state. However, compared to the political associations, the size and number of armed groups are much smaller.

Second, the activism of Muslim rebellion seems to be reactionary instead of pre-emptive. In those cases where the Muslim armed groups are active, their emergencies usually follow the state's repressive policy. It is, therefore, possible to argue that they formed an armed front due to their grievances in political lives caused by the brutal policies of states. Policies such as assimilation, militarization, and securitization, are all seen as repressive undertakings against Muslim minorities. When no political space was available to them, they developed an anti-state ideology

and mobilized their co-ethnics against the state. Thus, an existence of an armed group is instead a product of state policy.

Finally, the above discussion indicates that political association and civic engagement are prevalent styles among Muslim minorities in the states in Southeast Asia. These findings also suggest the insufficiency of Muslim minority rebellions as the primary explanatory factor to account for the state-Muslim minority relations. While the role of ethnic minorities is important, these studies point out that their reactions need to be reinvestigated along the state arrangement to explain the dynamics of state-Muslim minority relations. In other words, minorities' armed groups may be a contributing condition for state violence, but it cannot sufficiently explain the state's persistent violence. The following section introduces the state's institutional variation in civil-military relations as a key independent variable to account for the protracted violence against Muslim minorities in SEA.

### **2.3. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND STATE VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIM MINORITIES**

In studying politics, the state is at the core of the focus for understanding ethnic conflict. In all cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide, states play a key role in making it or preventing it from happening. State involvement is always an arbitrary force for the eruption and prevention of ethnic violence. Because a state possesses a legitimate use of physical forces against any groups within society, the question of who governs the state is crucial to examine the violence against ethnic minorities. All states share the common feature of institutional prerogatives, but states also differ in their policy orientations towards ethnic minorities. Thus, a question about the impact of the state is the key to understanding why state violence occurs in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines but not in Singapore.

A mainstream scholarship viewing from top-down analysis generally concentrates on the state policies toward minorities (Juliano et al., 2019; Kymlicka, 2009; Miller, 2012; Noi Wong, 2001; Samukkhethum, 2016). According to this view, state responses can roughly be divided into two: hardline and soft policy orientations. In comparison, the former refers to the state's hardline approach to the use of

violence or oppression against minorities, which includes the forms of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and assimilation. Meanwhile, the latter refers to the state's soft approach to negotiation and acceptance of cultural diversity, which are manifested in the forms of integration, accommodation, and ethnic autonomy. Thus, the outcome of the state-minority relations, according to this view, is dependent on the state policy orientations. In other words, minorities are subject to state violence because of the state policy and its implementation, regardless of who governs the state.

**Table 3: Policy Approaches Towards Ethnic Minorities**

Policy approaches	State policies	Manifestation of policy
Soft (non-violent)	Ethnic autonomy	Inclusion
	Accommodation	
	Integration	
Hard-line (violent)	Assimilation	Exclusion
	Ethnic cleansing	
	Genocide	
		-De jure – legal enforcement
		-De facto – physical forces

Source: Juliano, Ordoñez, and La Viña, 2019; Samukkhethum, 2016.

Nevertheless, as far as the policy orientations-based explanations are concerned, the differences in diverse state responses do not end there. First, the state's soft policy orientation, such as accommodation and ethnic autonomy, cannot be taken for granted. In the case of Singapore's ethnic accommodation, the policy is a result of the top-down political authority, which has been under the robust control of the civilian government. On the contrary, in the case of Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines, where the military has dominated the reserve policy domains, especially concerning internal security issues, the policy orientation towards Muslim minorities is the product of military control. Thus, state policy orientation cannot be taken for granted as an independent variable for violence against minorities.

Furthermore, an implementation of the soft policy orientation does not guarantee that minorities are safe from state repression. In Thailand and the Philippines, where the states use soft policy orientations such as ethnic integration

and accommodation, the states do not cease to use militarization and securitization of minorities either. In these cases, the states' use of the militarization of the areas where minorities live, along with other accommodative policies, indicates that peaceful relations between the state and the minorities do not stem from the level of policymaking. Because a set of policies does not emerge from thin air; instead, it derives from a ruling government. Who is controlling the state is the key to understanding a policy design.

Thus, the origin of policymaking stemmed from the structural condition of state dominance. Civilian dominance is different from military control in the sense that the former is directly tied to voters while the latter is not. In the case of Singapore, continued civilian control was responsible for the existence of the policy of cultural coexistence and the lack of state repression of the Malay minority. In Thailand, Myanmar, and the Philippines, because of the persistence of military control, the state has structured securitization and militarization as mainstream states policy. Overall taken, the findings indicate that the effect of civil-military relations (CMR) plays the most important role in determining the outcome of state-Muslim minority relations.

Contrary to the conventional belief that centered on the state policy orientations, an underlying condition of the peaceful and violent relations between the state and Muslim minorities lies in the effect of civil-military relations. In essence, what determines the outcome is the question of whether the civilians or military governs the state or not and who controls the agenda of the internal security issue. In a condition that civilian rule prevails, the civilian government controls the agenda of the internal security issue, and the military is its subordinate. In these cases, the civilian government must have full command of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense. In a reverse condition, the military government controls all key policy issues, while the civilian government or politicians have less authority and asymmetrical political power vis-à-vis the military.

The literature review in the previous chapter reveals that the question of who governs the state and how it affects the outcome of state-minority relations has received insufficient attention from scholars. The primary focus of the discussion of the civil-military relations has typically been on the factors that lead to military

control or vice versa, the military's function in the modern state, and the connection between military rule and democracy. Although it is generally understood in this field of study that political influence by the military does not favor democracy, the effect of military control on minorities remains an unanswered puzzle. However, the cases under examination indicate that the effect of a democratic regime is not an underlying condition for the peaceful relations between Muslim minorities and the state. For instance, peaceful relations between the state and Malay Muslims in Singapore did not occur in democratic settings. The lack of military influence over politics in Southeast Asia tends to protect ethno-religious minorities from state violence. On the contrary, violent relations between the two tend to persist because of the condition of military control, which is active in the cases of Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines.

Thus, military control is at the core of the puzzle in this study: what is a condition leading to violent relations between the state and Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia? Emerging studies of the CMR in SEA suggest that the relationship between civilians and the military is best seen in how the military vis-à-vis civilian government is able to control key policy domains, which centers on the ministry of home affairs and internal security issues. According to Croissant et al. (2010: 958), “This area entails all decisions regarding the preservation and restoration of domestic law and orders, ranging from counterinsurgency operation, counterterrorism, and domestic intelligence-gathering up to daily law enforcement and border control.” Thus, in a condition of civilian control, a civilian government has full command of policy design and implementation on the minorities’ issue.

Civilian control is often seen as a dichotomy of military control, and its effects lead to different political outcomes. This study employs a concept of civilian control from Croissant et al.’s works (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). In their description, a condition of civilian control centers on the distribution of decision-making power:

*Distribution of decision-making power in which civilians alone have the authority to decide on national politics and their implementation. Under civilian control, civilians can freely choose to delegate decision-making power and the implementation of certain policies to the military, while the military has no autonomous decision-making power outside those areas specifically defined by civilians. Furthermore, it is civilians alone who determine which particular policies, or policy aspects, the military implements, and civilians also define the boundaries between policy-making and policy-implementation. Moreover,*

*civilian authorities must possess sanctioning power vis-à-vis the military, and they can – in principle – revise their decision at any time (Croissant et al., 2010: 955).*

This definition of civilian control moves beyond the fallacy of coup-ism and places emphasis on the persistent control over the political institution. A significant degree of military influence can dominate the domain of internal security under the guise of the civilian control if the military and civilian government have symbiotic relationships. CMR during the Marcos administration in the Philippines fell into this situation in which the politician leadership used military institutions as their tool to stay in power (Hernandez, 1985; Hernandez, 2007).

Therefore, civilian control can accordingly be divided into three main levels: low, medium, and high (Croissant et al., 2010). First, a low level of civilian control refers to a condition that the civilians do not have a decision-making power or are completely barred from forming a government. In other words, this condition occurs when the military possesses full control of the decision-making power. Myanmar, from the Ne Win administration in 1962 till 2011, is an example of this condition. In short, a low degree of civilian control refers to the condition that the military has full control of decision-making power in all policy domains.

Furthermore, a medium degree of civilian control refers to a condition the military can dominate or exert its power over a certain domain of policymaking, especially on the issue of internal security. This level can also be defined as the military influence. According to Aknur (2005: 15), it occurs in a situation when civilian leaders may restrict the military in some policy domains, but they cannot interfere into certain areas in which the military holds its institutional power or informal control. The CMR in the Philippines and Thailand, most of the time, falls under this type. Myanmar during 2011-2021, which was under the National League for Democracy's administration, similarly suffered from the military domination in the domain of internal security and home affairs. Likewise, violence in the south of Thailand during the Thaksin administration (2001-2006) before the 2006 coup was under the command of the military, not the politician leaders. Thus, military control is more than a problem of military intervention and coup.

Finally, a high degree of civilian control refers to a situation in which the civilian government has full command and control over all key policy decision-

making. This level fits into a prescriptive definition of Huntington's (1957) military professionalism, in which the military is subordinate to a civilian government, and its role is mainly restricted to the external security. The CMR in Singapore, from its independence, is a prime example of this category, which shows no historical record of military intervention in politics. The Singapore Army Force (SAF) is rather used as another common pool of talent and serves as a training center for recruiting national elites into other civil servants (Kwok, 2010: 58; Laksmana, 2017: 355–358). Thus, a high civilian control in the Singapore case shows no military institutional prerogatives in internal security policymaking on the one hand and maintains civilian oversight of the internal security operation on the other hand.

**Table 4: Civil-Military Relations in SEA**

Control of the state	Cases	References
Military dominance	Myanmar (1964-2011), Thailand's military coups	Biswas, 2020; Croissant and Lorenz, 2018a: 429; Myoe, 2009; Myoe, 2014; Oo, 2020.
Military control	Myanmar (2011-2021), Thailand, and the Philippines	Chambers, 2011, 2012, 2014; Chambers and Waitoolkiat, 2017; Chambers and Waitoolkiat, 2016; Jitpiromsri, 2013; Lee, 2020; Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri, 2011.
Civilian dominance	Singapore	Alagappa, 2001; Croissant and Lorenz, 2018b; Kwok, 2010; Tan, 2001.

Source: Biswas, 2020; Croissant and Lorenz, 2018a: 429; Myoe, 2009; Myoe, 2014; Oo, 2020; Chambers, 2011, 2012, 2014; Chambers and Waitoolkiat, 2017; Chambers and Waitoolkiat, 2016; Jitpiromsri, 2013; Lee, 2020; Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri, 2011; Alagappa, 2001; Croissant and Lorenz, 2018b; Kwok, 2010; Tan, 2001.



Nevertheless, Croissant et al. (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) does not give a clue on how military control affects state-minority relations. Based on the findings of this study, the effects of military control on ethno-religious minorities are paramount because of the state securitization and militarization of minorities. The findings suggest that the presence of military control strongly contributed to the violent outcome between the states and the Muslim minorities. This suggestion is derived from an analysis of the cases of Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines. On the contrary, an absence of the military control is found with an absence of violence between the state and the Malay Muslim minorities in Singapore. As mentioned above, the explanatory variable is not the state's policy choices toward minorities. This is because a military government, such as in Thailand and Myanmar, also used a soft policy approach towards the minorities while at the same time employing militarization too. Thus, the causal and independent variable of state violence against Muslim minorities, which is seen through Mill's method of difference, is the absence and the presence of military control. The table 5 shows the causation between the absence or the presence of military control and the peaceful and violent relations between the states and Muslim minorities in four cases under this review.

**Table 5: Presence and Absence of Military Control and Political Outcomes**

Cases	Presence	Absence	Outcomes
Military control in Myanmar	/		Violence against Rohingya Muslim minorities in Rakhine state, Myanmar
Military control in Thailand	/		Violence against Malay Muslim minorities in southern Thailand
Military control in the Philippines	/		Violence against Bangsamoro Muslim minorities in Mindanao, the Philippines.
Military control in Singapore		/	Peaceful relations with Malay Muslim minorities in

Source: Author's Analysis.

Once a military institution is established, such as the national armed force, it has its own life, and it is difficult to be reformed. Even when its old role is outdated, such as a counterinsurgency operation against the threat of communism during the cold war, the military institution can expand its role to cover a new security threat. The role expansion to deal with a new internal security threat, which Stepan (1973) calls 'new professionalism' (also McCann, 1979), is a justification for the existence and continuation of the old institution (Pawakapan, 2021). Consequently, the persistence of the military control has had a paramount impact on the state-Muslim minority relations. For the immediate effect, military control insists on the securitization and militarization against minorities. In the cases of Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines, it is a uniform practice for the states to use forces to control the territories in which the insurgents are active - such as in Rakhine state, in Patani, and in Mindanao. Thus, the use of force has been set up as an operation mode in dealing with the minorities. In a long run, this mode structures violent relations between the states and insurgents in all violent cases.

Securitization and militarization are two intertwined terms in security studies. While the former is a process in which a state determines a certain group as an existential threat to its sovereignty and survival, militarization is a process in which the state increases its physical forces in a certain area that becomes a threat to its sovereignty (Buzan et al., 1998: 23). Both processes operate in a similar condition of high politics or the state of exception, which needs extraordinary measures to deal with the defined threats. Although securitization often precedes militarization because it provides legitimacy for mobilizing troops and physical forces against dangerous targets, the former does not automatically lead to the latter.

The case of Malay-Muslims in Singapore works in the opposite direction, however. Both processes operate under the logic of "security is about the survival," and "a destruction of the enemy" is the goal (Buzan et al., 1998: 21; Croissant et al., 2010: 976). In the case of Rohingya, the state under military control defines the Rohingya group as an existential threat to the Burman-dominated nation.

Consequently, the state used militarization of the Rakhine state and suppressed them in 2017. The state uses securitization by dividing 'us vs. them' to provide a license to kill resistant minorities. Militarization is more dangerous for the existence of minorities here because while the military is equipped with legitimate use of physical forces, they are indoctrinated to destroy the existence of resistant minorities.

Nevertheless, according to the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, the opposite of securitization is desecuritization and politicization – a sphere of transition to normal politics. In this condition, a state deals with all sorts of political and security problems through a political process without the use of extraordinary measures. In this sense, politicization is more conducive to the persistence of a peaceful outcome. This outcome happened to the Malay-Muslims in Singapore in the post-9/11 era, especially when the state detected an engagement of its citizens with the Jamaat Islami (JI) network. Instead of using militarization, the state used securitization along with rehabilitation and reintegration approaches to deal with the minorities. Afterward, the PAP desecuritized the issue and resumed a process of normal politics with the Malay-Muslims. Thus, because of a restriction of the civilian-led government, the civilian control in Singapore showed a tendency to use non-violent means to deal with its Muslim minorities.

Essentially, this is not to deny that conditions of military control on the one hand and civilian supremacy on the other can similarly lead to securitization. In the latter condition, however, military institution merely acts as a supportive organ and instrument of the civilian-led government, not the core policy decisionmaker, as happened in the case of Singapore. On the contrary, during the military rule, the military can quickly develop a securitization policy towards the militarization of the minorities because such an attitude of xenophobia and existential threat provides legitimacy to militarize and destroy the resistant minorities. When securitization is absent, it does constrain state use of forces on the one hand and fosters ethnic coexistence on the other hand.

Hence, solving the violent relations on the ground between a state and armed minorities is not simply a matter of policy design or policy implementation. The origin of the massive violence stemmed from the military control. It is quite ironic to hope for a successful peace process provided by a military government, not only

because militaries have been occupied by a security mindset but also because building peaceful relations begins with desecuritization and demilitarization. However, these processes come with a high cost. It means that the military would lose their existing jobs, and their justification for military control and role expansion is no longer valid. In essence, the real issue lies in civil-military relations in national politics as it structures policy choices in the first place. Because of that, the persistence of military control is the self-reinforcing mechanism of the violence between states and armed minorities. In short, the findings suggest that if there is no civilian control, there are no peaceful relations between the state and armed minorities.

Nevertheless, civil-military relations as a framework to account for state violence has limitations, too. While a difference between military control vis-à-vis civilian control provides explanatory power to explain a dividing line between peaceful and violent cases, it does not explain the different levels of violence. In other words, a condition of military control explains the persistence of violence against Muslim minorities, but it does not explain why low-intensity violence in the case of Thailand and the Philippines did not amount to excessive violence, like the case of Rohingya in Myanmar. It is contended that the low violence did not exceed the level of ethnic cleansing or genocide because of the triangulated mechanism: a presence of an inclusionary political institution and an absence of powerful religious nationalism (Tuansiri and Koma, 2021). The inclusionary factor is related to a preventive mechanism of ethnic cleansing and genocide. In other words, when Malay Muslim minorities are included in the state's apparatus and become a relatively strong minority group, the cost of making excessive violence also increases. The religious nationalism and exclusionary type of military are concerned with an absence of a generative mechanism of high violence in Thailand. This is in line with an explanation that is based on political inclusion and a rise of religious nationalism (Hafez, 2003; Kyaw, 2016; Yusuf, 2017b, 2017a).

Another drawback of this framework is its limitation to account for difference within a country level. For instance, a critics may arise that even though their numbers are small, there are Muslims in other parts of the country too. Why don't they become violent despite restrictions and repression? In other words, why do not

Muslim minorities in different parts of the country react violently and similarly to military control? First, CMR as a framework is fitted for a cross-country comparative analysis because it takes a nation-state as a unit of analysis. When using it to examine local difference, it may not yield an explanatory leverage. Second, according to the argument in this study, Muslim minorities turn to violence because of state securitization and militarization against them. Therefore, because Muslims in other regions did not encounter similar condition of militarization and state of exception in which Muslims in the conflict-affected areas face, there is no incentive for them to become violent.

## **2.4. CONCLUSION**

Theoretically, a state is differentiated from other organizations by its monopoly of the legitimate use of violence under its territory (Tilly, 1985; Weber, 1958b). Military and other security agencies are the key state apparatus that monopolizes the use of physical forces. Thus, no other state agencies, except the military and police, have the legitimacy to use violence against civilians. In a situation where the Muslim minority resists violently against the state, the state has at least two options to make; one is to suppress, and the other is to accommodate. This choice depends on whether the civilians or the military control the state or not. If the former condition prevails, reconciliation is more likely the choice. However, if the latter is the case, then violent repression against the resistant minorities is more likely to continue. The persistence of violence prolongs because the military control often maintains impunity for state acts of violence against minorities. Thus, in a condition of military control, not only does it permit a license to kill those who they deem as a threat, but it also increases the guarantee that their acts of violence will go unpunished. On the contrary, when civilians control the state, violent acts of a state against minorities are subject to accountability. The latter condition increases the chance that military acts of violence can be punished. The case of Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand and Bangsamoro in the southern Philippines illustrate this point well.

Therefore, if the civilians dominate the state, the state violence against minorities is less likely to occur. If, however, the military controls or partially influences the key policy domains, then the possibility of state violence against minorities arises. Thus, military control acts as a generative mechanism for reproducing violence against minorities, while civilian control serves as a long-run preventive mechanism of violence.

Overall taken, this chapter has argued that military control is the key determinant of state-Muslim minority relations in the three cases. It does not only condition the state policy choices towards armed minorities but also reinforces the vicious cycle of violent operations between the state and the armed groups. Kymlicka's (2004) arguments on security vs. justice further support this viewpoint. He suggests that the difference between outcomes of state-minority relations in the east and the west is due to the way in which a state frames a minority rights issue. While states in the west view the issue based on justice for minorities, post-communist states assert it through a lens of state security. In other words, civilian governments in the western world deal with minority rights through an idea of justice, while a military-controlled government in the east cannot get rid of the security paradigm. Because of that, two different types of state organizations have contributed to divergent political outcomes. As can be seen, the advantage of the military control is that the military government can completely control the securitization and militarization process. While military control can maintain a certain degree of order and law enforcement, it also maintains a self-reinforcing mechanism of violence between the state and armed groups. To get rid of the security mindset and state violence against minorities, the civilian government must replace the military government and institutionalize civilian control as a *modus operandi* of civil-military relations. Singapore's case underlines the prominence of civilian rule as a key variable for peaceful relations, while the cases of military control in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines illustrate its effects on violent relations between the states and Muslim minorities.

### **CHAPTER THREE**

#### **MILITARY DOMINANCE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIM MINORITIES IN RAKHINE STATE OF MYANMAR**

“Muslims of Arakan certainly belong to the indigenous races of Burma....”

Sao Shwe Thaik, Burma’s First President, 1958 (Rogers, 2012).

“I can no longer live in Burma. Every day the government gives us trouble. I left there, thinking that it would be better if I died at sea.”

A Rohingya survivor (Tin, 2009).

“It is totally impossible to accept illegal Rohingyas...”

General Thein Sein, 8<sup>th</sup> President of Myanmar, 2012. (Mizzima, 2012).

“We have already let the world know that we don't have Rohingya in our country. Bengalis in Rakhine state are not Myanmar citizens, and they are just people who come and stay in the country”.

General Min Aung Hlaing, 2017 (Al Jazeera, 2017b).

“The Bengali problem was a long-standing one which has become an unfinished job despite the efforts of the previous governments to solve it. The government in office is taking great care in solving the problem.”

General Min Aung Hlaing, Command-in-Chief, 2017 (Al Jazeera, 2017b).

### **3.1. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter examines the underlying condition behind violent relations between the state and Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. The state’s use of violence against the Rohingya in Rakhine state in 2017 represents an extreme case of the state-Muslim minority relations in southeast Asia. After analyzing the developments of the state-Rohingya relations in different periods, the chapter argues that military

control significantly determines the persistence of state violence. The rest of the chapter is divided into four parts: part one provides basic background about Myanmar case, including the geography, demography, critical concerns on Muslim issues. Part two deals with the dynamics of the state-Rohingya Muslim minority relations by tracing back to five different political periods. This part shows that violence between the state and Rohingya minorities started to sustain after the emergence of military rule. Part three taps into civil-military relations in Burma/Myanmar and demonstrates that military dominance is the defining feature of Myanmar's politics. Part four argues that military control on national politics and internal security issues directly contributed to securitization and militarization of Rohingya. Part five concludes that Myanmar case provides a clear example of the effect of military dominance on state violence against the minorities.

Contrary to the commonly held view that a persistence of state violence against Rohingya is accredited to either colonial legacies or recent democratization, this chapter argues that violence's persistence is the legacy of military control. Violence against Rohingya that erupted in 2017 military clearance operation cannot be considered as an isolated and recent phenomenon because a similar pattern of violence can be traced back to the 1978 Nagamin operations against Rohingya. Burma military emerged as the key actor in leading the way toward country's independence. Later, it became the guardian of the state in the post-colonial state. After 1962 military coup, military directly dominated national politics and internal security issues until 2015. Although civilian-led government replaced military regime in 2015-2020, military remained in a dominant position, controlling security policy reserved domains. In short, a persistence of military dominance initiated and reproduced securitization and militarization of the minority. When militarization of the target areas becomes institutionalized, it is difficult to alter because doing so can be costly, counterproductive, and ineffective.



### 3.2. BACKGROUND

**Figure 19:** Map of Burma/Myanmar



Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021.

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar is previously known as Burma. In 1989, the military-ruled government changed its country's name from Burma to Myanmar. It is located between five countries: Thailand from the south and the east, Lao from the east, China from the north-east, India from the north-west, Bangladesh from the west, and the Bengal Gulf from the west. As of 2021, the total population of Myanmar is 54 million (The World Bank, 2022a). Muslims constitute four percent of the total population, which is approximately 2.2 million people. According to the World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2022a), Buddhism constitutes the dominant religion (87%), while Christianity (6.2%) and Islam (4.3%) follow as the second and third largest religions in the country. Burman is the dominant race (68%), while Shan (9%) and Karen (7%) constitute the second and third largest groups. Burmese is the only official language. Myanmar based its citizenship on the 135 national races; Rohingya are not included in the national race. Before independence, the British Empire and the Japanese troops used to occupy Burma for considerable periods.

Muslims in Myanmar are scattered throughout the country, but the majority of Muslim minorities are concentrated in the Rakhine state of Western Myanmar, especially in Muangdaw, Buthiduang, and Rattiduang. This group of Muslims called themselves Rohingya. In the 2014 Census (Associated Press, 2014; Reuters, 2015), Rohingya were not coded in the census, and around one million residents in the Rakhine state were identified as unidentifiable. Based on that incident, it is assumed that the Rohingya population in Myanmar may amount to one million. State violence against Rohingya recurred in 1978, 1991, 1992, 2012, and 2017, all of which caused a mass exodus of Rohingya to the neighboring countries. In the present time, Rohingya remain a stateless group in Myanmar, and the country has now turned to military rule since 2021.

From 2012-2022, the Rohingya crisis became one of the leading subjects in the study of genocide, ethnic conflict, Muslim minorities, and state violence. Nevertheless, it is far from having a consensus on what really causes violent conflict. On the one hand, proponents of primordialism assert that the British legacies had structured the way in which different ethnic groups in Myanmar formed a sense of enemy among themselves (Ahmed, 2017; Crouch, 2016b; Furnivall, 1956; Yusuf,

2017b). These include ancient hatred between Rohingya Muslims and Buddhists, a divide-and-rule system, the British's preferential treatment for Rohingya, and labor immigration. On the other hand, proponents of rational choice theory and instrumentalism contend that democratization and security dilemma are the cause of the recent violence mainly because of military insecurity and its fear of political defeat (Ware and Laoutides, 2018; Zin, 2015). Thus, while the former accounts for the long historical effect of colonial legacies, the latter focuses on the recent emergence of new factor as the determinant of the violent outcome. However, state violence was not entirely a recent occurrence, nor was the effect of the colonial legacy so powerful to account for violence in the present time. First, state violence against Rohingya in 2017 was not the first-time event; the same pattern of violence repeated in the past. Second, Myanmar's Tatmadaw was not a legacy of the British administration. Its goals and missions were created in the post-colonial state to serve modern Myanmar. Besides, if any colonial institutions remain active in the present day, its impact is not only epiphenomenal to shape the constant violence against Rohingya but also less powerful to compete with Tatmadaw's rule of the country. Therefore, this thesis introduces an alternative explanation that focuses on the effect of military dominance on internal security issues. As the subsequent sections will show, Rohingya encountered persistent violence only after the emergence of military rule in 1962. Prior to that period, Rohingya enjoyed equal status in Burma and served in military service. Violent relations between the state and Rohingya became sustained after the military-dominated government established legal mechanisms to support its securitization and militarization against the Rohingya.

### **3.3. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE'S VIOLENCE AGAINST ROHINGYA**

The origins and development of the state's violence against Rohingyas can be addressed by analyzing the five different periods of Myanmar's political history. In doing so, this section traces back the key events from the period of its pre-modern kingdom to the new democratic regime (2011-2020) to find out a key condition that structures recent state-Rohingya relations. The merit of surveying these historical periods is that it can provide a solid pattern of whether the recent violence is

inherited from the past or a new problem created by political elites or not. Besides, a comparison between the five periods of Burmese political history can shed some light on how state violence against Rohingya originated. The first two periods cover the pre-modern kingdoms and colonial rule; the third includes a short period of constitutional democracy, and the fourth extends over the military junta's rule from 1962 to 2012. The contemporary period of Myanmar's politics covers from 2012 till the military staged the coup again in 2021.

### **3.3.1. During the Era of the Kingdoms (1430-1824)**

Muslims' existence in Myanmar and the Rakhine state predated the formation of the modern Myanmar nation-state, and their relations with political rulers from 1430-1784 had been relatively cooperative and peaceful. They had a crucial part in the Arakan kingdom's history when Naramaikhla (the King of the Arakan Kingdom) regained his leadership (Yegar, 1972: 18–19; Berlie, 2008: 48). Arakan kings not only showed their accommodation of Muslim traditions by adopting Muslim names and using coins written the word '*kalima*' but also appointed Muslims to the royal service and special units of the army (Alam, 1999: 13; Crouch, 2016: vii). In the form of vertical relations, Rohingya and Kaman Muslims also served in important posts, such as ministers and the army in the ancient Arakan Kingdom of Mrauk-U (Alam, 1999: 54). As it can be seen, during the reign which the kings governed society, they enjoyed high social status as a member of the kingdom, and their existence therein appeared to be a constructive force rather than a threat to the kingdom.

In the form of horizontal relations, Rohingyas and Buddhists lived together in cooperation without having a record of anti-Muslim sentiment and ethnic violence. Unlike the notion of 'Buddhism under siege' that contemporary Buddhists may now perceive (Lehr, 2019: 159), Buddhists did not express their fear of Muslims during the Arakan kingdoms. A survey of literature on Rohingya shows no record of horizontal violence between them except in the case of Shah Shuja (Berlie, 2008; Smith, 2019; Yegar, 1972, 2002; Yunus, 1994; Zan and Chan, 2005). On the contrary, the ethnic harmony between the two groups went far to the extent that

mixed marriages became a common practice of the day without public resistance (Yegar, 1972: 7). Thus, throughout this period, Muslims not only enjoyed freedom of religion and social inclusion but also played an important role in serving the kings.

Essentially, this period is seen as the golden age of the Muslim community in Arakan. Minar and Halim (2020: 133) describe this period as the ‘peak of its flourishing’; Alam (1999: 14) views it as ‘the heydays of the Muslims in Arakan.’ In the words of Myint-U (2006: 73), “this was the start of a new golden age for this country”, where a remarkably hybrid Buddhist-Islamic court was installed. In a similar vein, Smith notes: “A particular zenith was the rise of the capital at Mrauk-U during the 15th to 17th centuries CE. Although the kings were Buddhists, they also used Islamic titles, issued coins in the Persian script, and had close inter-connection with the politics of Bengal” (Smith, 2019: 13). Thus, the review of the above historical features suggests that Rohingyas and their Buddhist counterparts should equally be viewed as natives of the Arakan, as they both recently claimed.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, the existing relations and their great time dramatically changed in 1784 after the Burmese king of the Konbaung Dynasty conquered Arakan. This event disrupted the long cooperation between the Rohingya and Arakan rulers and marked the unpleasant beginning of the oppressive relations between the new Burmese rulers and the Rohingya. As a result of the war, more than 20,000 people became captives, 40,000 were executed, and no less than 100,000 people took refuge in Bengal (Cockett, 2015: 36; Hamilton, 1992: 82; Smith, 2019: 14). As a consequence, the Rohingya became hostile to the new kingdom; ethnic Rakhains also developed a sense of Arakanness against Burmese colonizers during the same time period. However, the Burmese’s violent destruction of the Arakan kingdoms and their people should not be seen as genocide or ethnic cleansing in the modern sense because, unlike modern warfare, it was a consequence of pre-modern warfare between kingdoms within which the damage and hurting of the enemy were a prerequisite of the victory (Schelling, 1966: 21). In short, the global system of the

---

<sup>4</sup> It is beyond the scope of this study to justify who is more native than the others. However, it is worth noting that they both enjoyed relatively equal membership during this period. Francis Buchanan’s work (1799) indicates that “*Rovingaw*” [the word of Rohingya] existed before the British conquest of Burma.

past does not resemble that of the modern days (Harff, 2019: 5). Burmese rule over Arakan, however, ended in 1824 after the British arrived.

To sum up, this period was not a case of violence against the Rohingya. On the contrary, it showed evidence of the cooperative relations between Arakan rulers and Rohingyas which resulted from the inclusionary practices of the ancient kingdoms. In the absolute form of politics in which the kings sat on top of the political hierarchy, ran the state, and defined the scope of membership, the inclusionary model and king's friendly view toward their subjects matters. Due to the pluralistic and inclusionary character of the kingdoms, Rohingya enjoyed substantial racial harmony and peace. Unlike the high impact of Buddhist chauvinism in Myanmar's post-2011 election (Beech, 2013; Kyaw, 2016), there is no record regarding the impact of Buddhist chauvinism during those days. Buddhists in Arakan did not develop a sense of Rohingya's scapegoating, nor was the 'Buddhism under siege' idea expressed. Thus, Rohingya and other Muslim ethnicities were not marginalized during this period. Instead, they were part and parcel of the Arakan society. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the state's violence against Rohingyas does not originate from this period.

### **3.3.2. During the Era of the Colonial Rule (1824-1942; 1942-1945; 1945- 1948)**

The British victory over the Burmese kings in 3 battles between 1824-1885 (61 years) brought substantial change into Burman society and the Rohingya vis-a-vis their counterparts. First, they governed Burma as a part of British India from 1824 and abolished the old system of monarchy in 1885. As a result, these events reinforced the rise of Buddhist nationalist movements fighting against the foreign colonizer. Second, they brought a new influx of Indians into Burma, which consequently helped foster anti-Indian feelings among the Burmese. Third, during World War II, the British made a key alliance with the Rohingya in fighting against Japanese troops who sided with the Buddhists in Arakan. This turn of events dramatically resulted in ethnic hostility between the Rohingya and Rakhine

Buddhists. More importantly, these events negatively reshaped the overall horizontal relations between Rohingyas and Rakhine Buddhists ever since.

After living for forty years in oppression under the Burmese kings, the Rohingya started to see improvements during British rule. From the beginning, the British employed the Indian and local Muslims, such as Rohingya, to work and support their empire in Burma. They had a friendly view of Muslims in Arakan as opposed to their antagonistic views of the Rakhine Buddhists. According to "Burmese Outpost," the writing of a British officer in Arakan (Irwin, 1946: 23–25), Rohingya/Muslims in Arakan were viewed as "more trustworthy," "more courageous," loyal and patient, "handy and diligent people," as opposed to the Mugh/Buddhists in Arakan. This friendly view also corresponded with their accommodating actions toward Muslim minorities in Burma. Yegar (1972: 29-70) shows that several Muslim associations had flourished during this time, with no less than 45 civic and religious organizations between 1908-1939 (29 years) in the form of foundations, societies, associations, movements, schools, conferences, club, and hospital. In a similar vein, Crouch (2016: 69-98) asserts that Anglo-Muhammadan Law was introduced into the land during this period, thus showing that the Islamic legal system was not peculiar to Myanmar's legal system. In addition, the British also promised to offer Rohingya the Muslim National Area in return for their fight against the Japanese (Human Rights Watch, 2000: 6; Silverstein, 1980: 50–51; Yegar, 1972: 96). Thus, this cooperation was largely due to the preferential treatment the British provided to Muslims and the reciprocal interests they exchanged between the rulers and the ruled.

Nevertheless, the British policies and their preferential treatment of Muslims in Burma had negative consequences on Muslim minorities, such as the emergence of ethnic violence in Burma and the rise of Buddhist nationalism. The colonial legacies resulted in the anti-Indian riot in 1930 and the anti-Muslim riot in 1938.<sup>5</sup> In the latter event, the Buddhist chauvinist movements, such as Tathana Mamaka Young Monks Association took a leading role in mobilizing the masses; consequently, this event created another Buddhist nationalist organization - All

---

<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that the Indians in Burma were mostly viewed as Muslims, and as such an anti-Indian event was also be referred to anti-Muslim.

Burma Young Monks Association (Lehr, 2018: 171; Riot Inquiry Committee and Braund, 1939: 6–15). As a result of these anti-Muslim organizations, 181 people were killed, 872 people were injured, and several mosques were destroyed (Riot Inquiry Committee and Braund, 1939: 281). In connection to the rise of Buddhist nationalism at the time, unlike in the previous era, the mixed marriage between the Muslims and non-Muslim Burmese, which once was normally practiced, was now seen as a threat to the Burmese culture and Buddhism (Riot Inquiry Committee, 1939: 29-33; Yegar, 1972: 33). Altogether these events appear to be the first scar of physical violence between the Buddhists and Muslims in Burma.

If the 1938 anti-Muslim riot profoundly shaped the new ethno-religious relations in mainland Burma, the violent event in 1941-1948 also set up a critical juncture on Rohingya-Buddhist relations in Arakan. As the British and Japanese had been waging war against each other in Burma during World War II, Muslims in Arakan and on the mainland were pro-British, while the Burmese and Rakhine Buddhists were pro-Japanese and anti-British. Since the 1941–1942 war in Arakan between Muslims and Buddhists, their lands and previous tolerance have been ripped apart. Jilani recalls the violent event of 1942 as follows:

*The Magh [Buddhists] fell upon the innocent Muslims of Chanbilli village of Minbya Township. The carnage was unbelievable, and hundreds of Muslims including children and women, met their fatal end. Many Muslims jumped into the river and hid in the forest. People in water were shot dead. With their long swords the Maghs butchered the half-dead men, women and children. Those still alive in the carnage were stabbed with the pointed spears and cut them into pieces. Rohingya girls and women after having been raped were murdered and the children were mercilessly slaughtered by throwing them upward and putting the sharp side of the long-dahs or swords under them. The breasts of the women were peeled (Jilani, 2006).*

As a consequence of the violence, the ethno-religious relations between Rohingya and Mugh worsened. As Irwin observes:

*The result of this “War” was roughly that the Maugh [Buddhist] took over the Southern half of the country and the Mussulman [Muslims] the Northern. Whilst it lasted it was a pretty bloody affair. Where the Maugh predominated whole villages of Moslems were put to the sword, and vice versa (Irwin, 1946: 23).*

This was the first ethno-religious violence between Muslims and Buddhists in Arakan, which resulted in more than 100,000 deaths, the destruction of 300 villages, and 80,000 refugees (Alam, 1999: 22). It had a far-reaching effect. Yegar also notes that during the military rule after 1962, “The Arakanese conducted propaganda



against the Rohingya, accusing them of being pro-Pakistan and of aspiring to annexation to Pakistan, and cast suspicion upon their loyalty to the country” (Yegar, 1972: 98). Above all, their friend-enemy distinction had never been more concrete until this event broke out; their political decisions to side with different major powers at the time marked the turning point of their antagonist relations.

To sum up, this period shows that the emergence of ethno-religious conflict begun to shape new relations between Buddhists and Muslims, but it does not affect the colonial state policies toward Rohingya yet. Thus, this period shows a lack of state violence against Rohingya. Ethnic conflict between Rakhine and Rohingya and the problem of state violence are two different categories. While the vertical relations between Rohingya and British rulers were cooperative, the horizontal relations between Buddhists and Muslims were detrimental. Unlike the previous era, the mainstream explanation shows that, in the mainland cities, Buddhist chauvinism started to grow in this period, and one of its targets was Muslim minorities. In the Arakan state, ethnic nationalism also formed its new ethnic identities, as Arakan Buddhists and Rohingyas started to distinguish themselves vis-a-vis their external alliances. Compared to the previous era, it appears that the formation of Buddhist and ethnic nationalism during this period was a new exclusionary feature of society, which shaped the horizontal relations between Buddhists and Muslims. Thus, while state violence against Muslim minorities in Burma was uncommon during this period, ethnic violence as a result of nationalism began to grow.

### **3.3.3. During the Constitutional Democracy (1948-1962)**

The previous sections have shown that a long period of peace between the state authorities and Rohingya-Muslim minorities in Burma during the previous eras was a normal outcome of their relations. The concept of citizenship was not introduced yet until the country gained independence in 1948. Nonetheless, the issue of citizenship was not their primary concern during this period because the Rohingyas were considered members of the new political community. As the country was on the nation-building project, the civilian-led government accepted them as one of the indigenous groups of the country. This recognition of ethnic diversity was a

feature of the inclusionary political institutions at the time. As Farzana (2010: 98) notes: “When U Nu [the first Prime Minister of Burma] came to power, a Shan and a Karen [ethnic minority] were appointed as president and army chief-of-staff, respectively.” Thus, from the beginning, Burma started building its new nation-state in an inclusive way.

During this period, the systematic exclusion of the Rohingya in Burma’s politics had not yet appeared as the main feature of the state and Rohingya relations. Between 1948 and 1962, before General Ne Win staged a coup, the mainstream view portrays that it was a democratic period for Burma, whereby political channels were open for negotiations. Muslim associations were active and numerous, and Rohingyas were not yet seen as an existential threat (Shah et al., 2019: 8). Although there existed a group of militant Rohingyas who demanded a separation of the Arakan from Burma to join East Pakistan, this demand was rejected by the prime minister of Pakistan at the time. The first Rohingya militant group, Mujahidin militant group, was active from 1947-61, demanding separation but was unsuccessful. According to the documents entitled “The Mujahid Revolt in Arakan in 1952” from the British Foreign Office:

*The rebels called themselves mujahids, or “soldiers of the holy war,” but they are occasionally referred to as “Muslim pyaukkyas”, i.e., Muslim guerrillas. Their avowed aim is the formation of a Muslim State in the two townships, and though it has not at all times been clear whether this State was to be associated with Burma or with Pakistan, it is obvious that, if formed, it must gravitate towards the latter.... The emergence of Rohingya militants was resulted from the group’s insecurity because of the emergence of the new nation-state (British Foreign Office, 1952: 5).*

Nonetheless, as a result of the armed revolt, Rohingya were not excluded from Burma’s politics. Furthermore, under the 1947 Union Residents Registration Act, the civilian government issued the National Registration Card to Rohingya in 1952. In 1954, U Nu, the first Prime Minister, demonstrated a recognition that the Rohingya were a legitimate ethnic group in Burma. In his words, “The people living in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships are Rohingya, ethnics of Burma” (Wantanasombut, 2013: 5).

In a similar vein, Zarni and Cowley (2014: 695) point out that during Myanmar's formative years of independence, the Rohingya were acknowledged as an indigenous ethnic minority deserving of a homeland in Myanmar. In a radio speech

to the nation in 1954, Prime Minister U Nu emphasized the Rohingya's political commitment to the mainly Buddhist government. Similarly, in the words of the Minister of Defense at the time, he says, "The Rohingya have the equal status of nationality with Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Mon, Rakhine and Shan" (Wantanasombut, 2013: 5). Besides, the first President's statement was explicit on Rohingya status: "Muslims of Arakan certainly belong to the indigenous races of Burma. If they do not belong to the indigenous races, we also cannot be taken as indigenous races" (Rogers, 2012). Hence, according to the view of Burma's political leaders at the time, the issue of Rohingya's political membership in Burma was not controversial; they were de facto and de jure members of the country from its formation.

In the mid-1954, the military carried out the first military operation against the Rohingya insurgents under the name Monsoon and subsequently defeated them in 1961. This operation was not done without political appeasement to Rohingya in return, however. In order to appease Rohingya, the state granted a special zone of military administration called the Mayu Frontier Administration on 1 May 1961.<sup>6</sup> These events show that although the state used violence to deal with Rohingya insurgents, it also had the idea of granting a separate political unit for Rohingya under Burma's sovereignty. In short, this was a time that the state still considered the Rohingya as a part of the nation even though they had demanded a separate administration.

The mainstream explanation discussed above, which focused on the rise of the Rohingya militants on the one hand and the state policy of accommodation during the civilian administration on the other hand, however, provides an incomplete picture of the state-Rohingya Muslim relations. First, although the existence of Rohingya militants ceased in 1961, the state violence against them did not stop. Second, the policy of accommodation was not the only way the state dealt with the Rohingya at the time. What is missing is the link between the Burma Army and the state commission of violence against the Rohingya during the constitutional democracy.

One of the commonly held but unverified views is that the state committed violence against the minority because of the active operation of the minorities'

---

<sup>6</sup> However, the military regime abolished this zone in 1964 after the coup.

militant groups. Nevertheless, the contrasting view is more convincing because the emergence of the minorities' armed groups was due to the environment of insecurity that engulfed them in the first place. The activism of the militant group should not be seen as a cause but rather a consequence of the state policy implementation and the context of insecurity. When political channels opened to them, however, they participated in national, formal politics (Lwin, 2012).

To sum up, during this first democratic period, the state introduced violence as a means to encounter the Rohingya militants. However, at the same time, the state also implemented a soft policy approach toward Rohingya too. Meanwhile, during the same period, Rohingya as a group were not yet as weak as they are today. They were able to represent themselves in the parliament and consequently succeeded in demanding a separate zone for themselves. The Rohingya were able to engage completely in parliament during this formative phase, but they also used violence as a form of protest against the government.

#### **3.3.4. During the Military Rule (1962-2011)**

Myanmar Armed Forces, which is known as 'Tatmadaw,' had laid its influence in national politics since the nationalist struggle against colonial rules; it did not emerge as a key player in politics lately after the military intervention. Nevertheless, the state-Rohingya relations dramatically changed after the military staged a coup in 1962. After General Ne Win successfully ran the state, the military junta built an ethnocratic state. Brown (1995: 36) points out that an ethnocratic state is in operation when "the state acts as the agency of the dominant ethnic community in terms of its ideologies, its policies, and its resources distribution." In effect, from 1962-2011, the military rule successfully institutionalized militarization and political exclusion against the Rohingya minorities. Rohingyas were first forced to leave state security apparatus, such as the police and military, and later they were prevented from being a part of the state institutions. Yegar describes as follows:

*Muslims were not accepted for the military service. The government replaced Muslim civil servants, policemen, and headmen by Arakanese who increasingly offended the Muslim community, discriminating against them, putting their elders to ridicule, treating them as Kalas, and even extorting money and bribes from them, and arresting them arbitrarily. The authorities made no effort at all*

*to correct the wrongs against the Rohingya by means of educational facilities and economic improvement (Yegar, 1972: 98).*

Thus, the functioning of military control and the implementation of militarization preceded the violent state measures against Rohingya. It occurred in the forms of *de jure* and *de facto* exclusion. The former refers to legal tools of exclusion that makes minorities become non-national, illegal migrants, or stateless people, while the latter refers to the use of physical forces, supported by the *de jure* exclusion, that oppresses, abuse, kill, and exterminate minorities. Berlie states that “After 1962, Rohingyas started to be seen as ‘foreigners,’ and in the 1970s, instead of being Arakanese as before, they were deemed by the Burmans to be Indians or Pakistanis, and even more often Bangladeshis who have settled illegally in Arakan” (Berlie, 2008: 54). In 1974, the state enacted a new immigration law, which introduced the Foreign Registration Card (FRC) to Rohingyas - informally called a white card. Subsequently, the state carried out Operation Nagamin (King Dragon Operation) in 1978, which led to severe human rights abuse, mass killing, and the mass exodus of the Rohingya (Wade, 2017: 92). This event is referred to as the first wave of vertical violence against Rohingya (Zarni and Cowley, 2014: 707). Later, in 1982 the state enacted the citizenship law, which classified citizens into three groups: full, associate, and naturalized citizens. Criteria for full citizenship were later introduced based on the 135 national races from which Rohingya were officially excluded.

The *de jure* and *de facto* exclusion of the Burmese ethnocratic state is also seen in and coincides with the military junta’s predatory view against Rohingya. In 1982 General Ne Win stated his antagonistic view against Rohingya that “if we were to allow them [Rohingya] to get into positions where they can decide the destiny of the State, and if they were to betray us, we would be in trouble” (Wade, 2017: 51). Soon after the law was introduced, it opened a door for horizontal violence to escalate. In 1983 an anti-Muslim riot broke out, and in 1988 the society also witnessed the Buddhist-Muslim conflict in the Shan state.

**Table 6: Key Events During Military Rule**

1962	Military Coup by General Ne Win
1974	Enactment of Immigration Law and the Foreign Registration Card (FRC); Rohingya were forced to own the FRC.
1978	Operation Nagamin (King Dragon Operation) against Rohingya
1982	Introduction of Citizenship Law; Rohingya became stateless people.
1988	8888 Uprisings The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)
1989	Establishment of the Central Committee for the Implementation of the Development of Border Areas and National Races
1991	Operation Pyi Thaya (Operation Clean and Beautiful Country) against the Rohingya.
1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishment of the Ministry for Progress of Border of Border Areas and National Races</li> <li>• Establishment of the Border Security Force (NaSaKa)</li> <li>• Prosperous Country Operation against Rohingya</li> </ul>
1994	Reestablishment of the Ministry for Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs
2011	Reestablishment of the Ministry of Border Affairs

Source: Myoe, 2014; Steinberg, 2010; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, 1998; Zarni and Cowley, 2014.

Although military rule had been challenged in the 1980s, its control over the state and national politics continued. After the high pressure from the monks and protestors in the popular 8888 uprisings in 1988, the regime reorganized itself into The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), but its general approach toward the Rohingyas has remained unchanged. This can be seen through the

establishment of the Ministry for the Progress of Border Areas and National Races in 1988, Operation Pyi Thaya (Operation Clean and Beautiful Country) in 1991, the establishment of the Border Security Force (Na Sa Ka) in 1992, and Prosperous Country Operation in the same year. The above actions were meant to restrict, control, and remove the Rohingya from the Rakhine state. As can be seen, the period after which the military took control of the state was a turning point in the Burma/Myanmar state-Rohingya minority relations.

To sum up, this period consisted of various critical events that shaped the state-Rohingya relations, but their overall relations dramatically worsened when the military government formed the ethnocratic state. The pattern of state violence against Rohingya appears to be in systematic steps. It did this by introducing discriminatory law (*de jure* exclusion) followed by using violence (*de facto* exclusion). In other words, the military government used the laws to legitimize the violence against Rohingya. In addition, the view of the military junta shows extreme animosity against the Rohingya as illegal migrants and existential threats. When considering the military's exclusionary view and violence against Rohingya, it appears that these two factors are correlated. Compared to the previous eras, the key difference is the forms of political membership and belonging in the political community, which included Rohingyas as their member; Rohingya was denied in the latter period. As opposed to the military rule under the ethnocratic state, the key feature in the previous eras was the inclusionary conditions. Both periods, however, appeared to have a similar outcome: violence against Rohingya. This means that the difference between political inclusion and exclusion cannot be taken as an explanatory variable to account for the state commission of violence against Rohingya.

### **3.3.5. During the New Democratic Rule (2011-2021)**

Myanmar made a significant turn to electoral democracy in 2011. The National League for Democracy (NLD) swept to victory in the 2015 election. Nevertheless, the regime change did not cause a difference in the conditions of the Rohingya. In 2012-2013, ethnic violence between Rohingya and Rakhine Buddhists

broke out on a massive scale in the Rakhine state, while in 2017, the military committed a large-scale crackdown against Rohingya. International communities called the latter event ethnic cleansing or genocide. As the previous sections have shown, the state's violence against Rohingya was not novel to Myanmar's political history. Because it was done during military rule as well as during democratic rule, regime change played little role in changing the political outcomes. Explaining why violence against Rohingya continues to occur despite the regime change is the aim of the next section, but this section aims to show how the history of violence against Rohingya recently evolved during the new democratic rule.

Although Myanmar was under a democratic transition during the period between 2011-2021, the relations between Rohingya Muslims and the state did not improve. On the contrary, their relations significantly worsened. This includes the denial of their status as citizens by the state, restriction of movement, education, healthcare, and other public goods. The new episode of horizontal violence started from the rape and murder of the Rakhine women in May 2012, which led to the revenge of 10 Muslims' lives in Taungup of the same state on 3 May 2012. Consequently, violence spread to other towns in Rakhine state in the same month. The violence in 2012 was considered to be a form of communal violence between the Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims (The Rakhine Inquiry Commission, 2013). However, this was the first wave of horizontal violence against the Rohingya during the democratic transition. In the 2014 census, Rohingyas were barred from identifying their identity in the survey. In the aftermath, they were not only barred from casting their voting in the 2015 general election but also no Muslim candidates in Myanmar's political parties were allowed to compete. Thus, it was the first time that Muslim minorities were barred from political participation entirely in Myanmar despite the regime change. The wave of state violence occurred in 2016-2017, after which the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) organized a coordinated attack on fifty police posts. The attack led to the army's commission of the "clearance operation" in Rakhine state. The latter action caused massive killings and an influx of refugees into Bangladesh. As a consequence, Myanmar state is now under a legal trial as a perpetrator of genocide against Rohingya in the International Court of



Justice (ICJ), and the army leaders are under investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The state's use of *de jure* and *de facto* exclusion, as appeared in the previous period, had also been repeatedly seen in this period too. Essentially, the 2014 census, the 2015 enactment of race and religion protection laws, the 2015 ban on Rohingya Muslims' political participation in the general election, and the 2017 declaration of the terrorist group on ARSA preceded and corresponded with the 2017 military's clearance operation against Rohingya. After the 2017 declaration, the state continued to use physical forces to burn villages, and rape, kill, and exterminate Rohingyas (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Fortify Rights, 2018, 2018; Habib et al., 2018; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2018; Public International Law and Policy Group, 2018). Above all, these were the state securitization developed during this period that prepared the ground for the use of violence against Rohingya. The *de jure* exclusion often appeared before the tools of *de facto* exclusion were implemented. This pattern of state securitization was the common feature that led to the use of violence against Rohingya in both periods: the military rule and the new democratic rule.

The securitization and militarization in this period not only coincided with the military's anti-Rohingya view but also correlated with the significant rise of Buddhist chauvinism. This condition is called an unholy alliance in Myanmar politics (Al Jazeera, 2019). It is a situation within which the military agenda is closely tied to the Buddhist chauvinist movements. They shared a common agenda of the anti-Rohingya and anti-National League for Democracy party (NLD). Since the military supported the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) to compete against the NLD in electoral politics, while Rohingya supported the NLD, Rohingya became a common political enemy of both the military and Buddhist chauvinists. The period of 2012-2015 was a prime time of the unholy alliance within which many discriminatory laws against the Muslims were enacted, and Rohingya was reconstructed as the existential threat to the Burman race and Buddhism (Bakali, 2021; Cheesman, 2017; Coconuts Yangon, 2017; Kyaw, 2012). This pretext allowed the above-mentioned exclusion to occur during this period as a dominant mode of political environment.

The effect of securitization eventually led Rohingya to become a weaker, subaltern group. This weakness can be seen in three aspects: stateless status, lack of political participation, and absence of state institutions facilitating Muslims' affairs. Prior to 2015, Muslims and Rohingya representatives were seen as working within the parliament. However, since 2015, they have been blocked from participating in politics altogether. Within those three mentioned aspects, participation in formal politics before 2015 has also been the only official channel available for Rohingya to negotiate with the state. Nevertheless, when it was closed, many of them turned to insurgents. The violent reaction of the weak Rohingya in the name of ARSA, in turn, provided a fertile ground for the state to respond with violence. In the situation that the military had been systematically prepared for the attack, the reaction of the weak acted as a good trigger for the large-scale crackdown.

To sum up, as the state violence against Rohingya was found in common both during the military rule and the new democratic rule, it was not a new phenomenon in this period at all but a continuity of the past practices from the military rule. The key common feature that appeared in both periods was the destructive role of the military and the systematic steps of using de jure tools before implementing de facto exclusion. The reproduction of the political exclusion during the new democratic regime can be explained by the continuity of the military control over the internal security agenda within the state, which will be explained in greater detail in the next section. Though securitization can be seen as a crucial condition leading to the use of violence against the Rohingya, the origin of such condition was derived from the military control while Buddhist chauvinist movements worked as supporting actor during the new democratic era in legitimizing and using state violence.

### **3.4. MILITARY DOMINANCE IN MYANMAR STATE**

Tatmadaw is the armed forces of Myanmar. General Aung San and his comrades established it during the nationalist movements against British occupation. Before Tatmadaw became institutionalized in the post-colonial state, it evolved from the Burmese Independence Army (BIA) in 1941, the Burma Defense Army under British control in 1942, and the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPEL) in

1945. The Ministry of Defense supervises Tatmadaw, but the de facto leader of Tatmadaw is the Commander-In-Chief (C-in-C), who controls the country's military capacities. In 1962, General Ne Win was the C-in-C and the leader of the army coup. Similarly, in 2021, General Min Aung Hlaing was also the C-in-C and the leader of the military coup. This pattern indicates that a de facto country leader with supreme command and control of the armed forces is the C-in-C of Tatmadaw. And the Tatmadaw is the most powerful organization in Myanmar's politics.

Tatmadaw's dominance in Myanmar's politics can be divided into five periods. During the constitutional democracy (1947-1962), even though Burma was a rising star of democratizing countries in the SEA, it failed to establish civilian control because it faced a backlash from the military. At the time, while Tatmadaw was in its formative periods, civilian control prevailed. However, the army came to play a leading role in politics when General Ne Win replaced the U Nu administration and installed a military caretaker government in 1958-1960. The three years in power brought a new change to the government; the significant one was an increase in military personnel in political positions (Hoadley, 2017). The civilian-led government resumed in 1960, but this time military came back in 1962 and installed a long-term military rule in the country. Hence, Burma's democratic regime ended with a military coup.

During the military rule (1962-2011), after the Revolutionary Council (RC) led by General Ne Win established the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) in 1962, it started to institutionalize the "Burmese Way to Socialism" as the dominant way of organizing the state. According to Croissant's framework of civil-military relations (2011), Tatmadaw completely controlled all five domains of the decision-making process: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, external defense, and military organization. Therefore, with the rise of the military, violence, and repression became a rule, especially to their political oppositions and ethno-religious minorities. As a well-known scholar on Myanmar studies asserts: "All key leaders were arrested, including those in the judiciary who might have declared the coup illegal. It became evident that considerable planning had taken place before the coup" (Steinberg, 2010: 63).

During the same period, various legal mechanisms had also been enacted to repress Rohingya and paved the way for the military to use physical force against them. These mechanisms include the 1974 Immigration Law, the 1975 State Protection Law, and the 1982 Citizenship Law. BSPP maintained its dominance in politics until 1988, when it encountered resistance from Burmese society. However, military dominance continued in a new organization: the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). A similar pattern also happened in 1997 when the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) led by General Than Shwe replaced the SLORC and ruled the country till 2011. Notwithstanding the change of the name, the military remained dominant in national politics, internal security issues, and counterinsurgency operations. As a result, human rights abuse, massacres, and repression against minorities and human rights activists were rampant (United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, 1998).

During the democratic transition (2011-2016), the military attempted to withdraw its direct control in politics as a ruler and took the role of the guardian of the state instead. As such, the SPDC transferred political power from the military to the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which was led by General Thein Sein (2011-2016) after the USDP won the election in 2010. The USDP led the semi-civilian government till its defeat to the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 2015 election. Notwithstanding the change in the form of organization, the military remained the dominant actor in national politics and internal security operations. In 2012, the military declared a state of emergency in the Rakhine state in order to control riots between Rohingya and Buddhists. Consequently, violence against Rohingya worsened, which triggered the emergence of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in 2013. In addition, the Thein Sein administration enacted a series of Race and Religion Protection Laws to control and suppress Muslim minorities in 2015. All in all, despite the military's attempt to transfer the power, military leaders still held veto powers and controlled policy-reserved domains in their hands.

During the newly electoral democracy (2015-2021), the military did not disappear from the political power, as many expected, but remained influential in the Parliament because the 2008 Constitution reserved 25 percent of seats for the

military. In addition, the civilian-led government could not have its prerogative to make a change in the Ministry of Defense, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs. Thus, despite the change in political regime and actors, the military remained dominant in policy-decision makings and internal security issues. In 2017, when the ARSA reacted violently against security forces in Rakhine state, the military immediately launched clearance operations against Rohingya without the green light from the civilian government. In any case, the top leaders of the military, who committed mass atrocities against civilians and ethnic minorities, had never faced punishment in the martial and domestic courts. Because the practice of impunity protected them effectively, securitization and militarization of minorities became the dominant mode of operation.

Overall taken, the military role in Burma's politics started during the nationalist struggle to fight against foreign rulers a decade ago before it gained independence. However, military dominance in Myanmar's national politics was consolidated after the military coup in 1962. Since then, the military has controlled the country until the present time. Thus, the political history of Myanmar cannot be isolated from the development of military control in the country. Scholars of civil-military relations in Myanmar show a common agreement on the influential role of Tatmadaw in Myanmar's politics. For instance, Nyein (2011: 24) depicts the Tatmadaw as the constant sentinel; Biswas (2020) defines it as "the garrison state"; some others view "the military in Myanmar is a state within a state" (Steinberg, 2010: 101). Not only because it had a long period of control in the country, but the Tatmadaw also institutionalized military rule as the dominant way of governing the country.

Myanmar case shows that when the military attempted to be a problem-solver of political problems, it became a source of a deeper and more protracted problem per se. According to Rasmussen (1999), the involvement of the military becomes problematic because of the character of the military and the military's principle of maximum force.

*It is not customary in war to ask for explanations of individual deaths or woundings...And while in military terms the impact of one bullet may be negligible, the political impact of one bullet is immense...The police are trained on the principle of minimum force, whereas the military operates on the principle of maximum force (Rasmussen, 1999).*

Tatmadaw proved that the way to restore peace and internal order in Myanmar was to use the maximum forces by increasing securitization and militarization against its political opponents and national threats. The evidence of its security solution was a series of military operations against Rohingya and the 2021 military coup against the NLD. As such, Myanmar can hardly get rid of political violence soon, primarily because of the Tatmadaw's dominance in national politics and its principle of maximum force.

### **3.5. MILITARY CONTROL AND VIOLENCE AGAINST ROHINGYA MINORITIES**

The previous sections have revealed that the use of violence against Rohingya is corresponded with military dominance in national politics and its rule in the form of the ethnocratic state. During the constitution democracy, Rohingya had equal status in Burma and Mujahid rebellion ended in 1961 after U NU agreed to established Maya Administration in the northern Arakan. The end of Mujahid armed group suggests that state-Rohingya relations would have entered a new phase of their peaceful cooperation. However, it was not the case. Following General Ne Win's military coup in 1962, he abolished Mayu Administration in 1964 and "declared Rohingya to be aliens and foreigner" (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 101). Because of such insecurity environment that engulfed Rohingya, various Rohingya armed groups, such as Rohingya Independent Front (RIF) and Rohingya Liberation Party (RLP), mushroomed again. In order to curb a rise of Muslim militants, military-controlled state implement securitization and militarization against Rohingya in northern Burma.

The occurrence of the persistent violence against Rohingya was not because of a commitment of a military as an actor alone but as the systematic policies of military-led government to eradicate existential threats of the nation. Ne Win was the first to establish de jure mechanism to deny Rohingyas' rights of citizenship, which happened through the enactment of 1974 immigration law and the 1982 citizenship law. Essentially, after the military junta established the State Protection Law 1975, the first wave of state violence against Rohingya occurred in 1978. According to the

government, the Nagamin operation in 1978 was initially to crack down illegal immigrants in the borderland regions (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 78). However, it turned out to be focused on a crackdown and illegalization of Rohingya in Arakan, which resulted in 200,000 Rohingyas fleeing to Bangladesh.

Securitization and militarization are the key features of military operation against Rohingya. Enacting new legal documents as mentioned in the previous paragraphs was an initial part of securitization. Military also employed “four cuts” strategy to combat Rohingya minorities. The Tatmadaw’s counterinsurgency policy, which was first implemented in the 1960s, was designed to cut off enemies’ access to recruits, food, money, and intelligence (Callahan, 2005: 223). In order to militarize a target area, military also declared curfews and the state of emergency. When this state of exception became a rule, military operations such as unwarranted searches, detention without charge, tortures, and extrajudicial killings started to suppress minorities. At this stage of militarization, law enforcement by the military becomes a “banality of evil” against minorities, to use Arendt’s term (2006) .

To find a cause of persistence of state violence against Rohingya, a point is not about what actor emerges first, but about what condition reinforces a pattern of state violence. At first, Mujahid rebellion could be a trigger for the state to use violence against them. However, after a dissolution of Mujahid, state violence against Rohingya still persists. Therefore, rather than the minority, the military-led state is a source of the problem. State violence persists because of the persistence of military rule and its control on internal security issues. It is because military dominance reinforces state militarization as a dominant way of countering minorities’ armed groups. The militarization forces Rohingya minorities to respond with violence, and the violent response establishes a feedback loop that sustains violence. This pattern of violence against Rohingya in the past can also be observed in the 2010s.

The post-2012 situation in Rakhine state provides a similar pattern of state violence against Rohingya. After the military junta was replaced by a new regime and the country began taking steps toward democratization in 2015, a reasonable expectation was a change in the conditions of the Rohingya. Indeed, as the NLD controlled the state after it won against the military backed USDP in the 2015

election, it attempted to promote democracy. NLD's ideology was to run the country according to democratic principles, support human rights, and promote inclusive political institutions. Thus, if the elected government had complete control over the policy agenda, violence against the Rohingya would not continue. Against this backdrop, the military, however, launched a large-scale clearance operation against the Rohingya again in 2017, during which the NLD was running the state.

Despite the fact that the civilian government has run the country from 2015-2020, state violence against Rohingyas continues. This violent action triggers the question of civil-military relations in Myanmar: who actually runs the state, and why does violence recur? The concise answer is that although the civilian government runs the state after the 2015 election, the 2008 constitution provides several reserved capacities for the military to manage internal security issues. The three reserved ministries, which were nominated by the Command-In-Chief, include the Ministries of Defense, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Border Affairs. Besides, the military also gains 25 percent of reserved seats in the parliament and reserved authority to make policy for the defense services (The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008: 262.a.2 and 323.b.2). All of these show that military remains the key political actor during the civilian administration.

Under this condition, the issue is moved from the question of civilian control of the state to that of the degree of civil-military relations: to what extent the civilian government is able to control the policy agenda pertaining to the Rohingya and internal security in Myanmar? Under civilian control, it is expected that the civilian government controls all key policy domains. Nonetheless, according to the 2008 constitution, it is impossible for the civilian government, the NLD, to have full control over the public policy agenda. As already stated, the rule of the game, which is prescribed by the 2008 constitution, reserved the domain of internal security exclusively to the defense service - the command-in-chief, General Min Aung Hlaing. Precisely, as article 339 of the constitution states: "The Defence Services shall lead in safeguarding the Union against all internal and external dangers" (The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008). Thus, it is unsurprising to see that the military acts as the key actor in using forces against the Rohingya, for they possess full command and legal ground over the internal security issue.



Recent studies on civil-military relations (CMR) in emerging democracies have introduced a new theory consisting of five different policymaking areas to capture the degree of civil control (Chambers, 2011, 2012; Croissant and Kuehn, 2009, 2011; Croissant, Kühn, Chambers, Völkel, and Wolf, 2011; Croissant and Walkenhorst, 2019). In Myanmar's case of the new democracy (2011-2021), a study showed that it is categorized in the middle-low level of civil control, a model of the civil-military coalition in which "militaries see themselves as the guardian of the state" and "the civilian appeasement of and acquiescence to the military" become the dominant mode of interaction (Chambers and Waitoolkia, 2017: 28–29). Thus, as the military remains a leading political institution over the domain of internal security concerning counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, the pattern of the state-Rohingya cannot significantly be altered. This is because when a certain path of the institutional arrangement has been designed and established, it is difficult to change.

The period of the new democracy in Myanmar was partly run by civilian administration; another part of the political power was preserved for the military. The military control over internal security was the key challenge for the state-Rohingya relations, for it reproduced a similar pattern to the past practice. The Myanmar case has shown that when the path of the state's violence is dependent on the military legacy, reversal comes at a hefty price. If the state remains under the high control of the military, then the political exclusion is reinforced, and violence against Rohingya can recur at any time. Unless the existing relations between civilians and the military are broken, the state violence against Rohingya can hardly be prevented.

Consider state violence against Rohingya in the post-2012. Rohingya, as an ethnic minority group, underwent a series of renewed securitization since 2012 and were locked up under increasingly exclusionary conditions. The legal tools of the de jure exclusion made them stateless and eventually encouraged them to become terrorists. By 2015, they were deprived of universal suffrage - the only political right many Rohingya possessed from the previous regimes. This extreme political exclusion had led many to join the ARSA - the only active Rohingya insurgent group. Above all, by 2016, they became a very weak minority, rendering them safe and easy targets for attack. As a consequence of their violent reaction to the military and police, it was high time for the military to launch a large-scale operation against

them in response. The use of violence did come in a vacuum, however. Before it took place, there existed a sign from the military side that the plan for the operation was under preparation. Hence, understanding the view of the Tatmadaw's leaders towards Muslims and Rohingya is a key to exploring the motivation of the military to use violence.

Violence against Rohingya in the post-2012 is a part of the bigger picture. As stated earlier, the state and Muslim relations in Burma changed significantly after the military took a coup in 1962. The military's view towards minorities, in general, and Muslims, in particular, shows an exclusionary tone and is in line with extremist Buddhist views. For instance, it excludes non-Burman ethnics from joining the military services. According to Berlie, "The government quickly replaced Muslim officials, policemen, and village headmen, treating them as though they were aliens in Arakan, and driving some of them into the resistance movement as early as 1947" (Berlie, 2008: 56). In the big picture, this exclusionary recruitment system was based on an idea of the Burman homogenization in which only Buddhists and Burman are trusted to serve in the military services. The process of exclusion was intensified during military rule. Such exclusivism bars minorities from being a part of the security and, as such, forms an institution of Buddhist Burmese-based domination.

Another sign of imminent violence can be observed in the military leaders' discriminatory rhetoric and hate speech. Their view of the Rohingya is crucial because they reflect the overall ideology and disposition of the military forces. Essentially, the military has not only portrayed Rohingya minorities as the other but also pointed them out as enemies. The idea of viewing Rohingya as a threat had long been well-known from the consistent speech of military leaders. In several statements of General Ne Win, General Thein Sein, and General Min Aung Hlaing, they demonstrate a similar tone of exclusion and otherness of Rohingya by denying their identity and citizenship. Table 7 shows their hate speeches against Rohingya and shows that their antagonistic view about them has been carried out continuously as a living heritage from 1982 to the present time.

**Table 7: Hate Speech against Rohingya by Key Military Juntas in Myanmar**

<p><b>General Thein Sein</b>, the President of Myanmar in 2012</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. “It is <i>totally impossible</i> to accept <i>illegal Rohingyas</i>” [emphasis added] (Mizzima, 2012).</li> <li>2. “We will take responsibility for our ethnic people, but it is impossible to accept the <i>illegally entered Rohingyas</i>, who are not our ethnicity,” he told Guterres, according to the president's official website. [emphasis added] (Mizzima, 2012).</li> <li>3. “We will <i>send them away</i> if any third country would accept them,” Thein Sein said. “This is what we are thinking is the solution to the issue.” [emphasis added] (Mizzima, 2012; Bangkok Post, 2012).</li> <li>4. “This [sending out] is what we are thinking is <i>the solution to the issue</i>.” [emphasis added] (Bangkok Post, 2012).</li> </ol>
<p><b>General Min Aung Hlaing</b>, the Commander-in-Chief of Tatmadaw</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. “We have already let the world know that <i>we don't have Rohingya</i> in our country,” Army chief Min Aung Hlaing said in a speech marking Myanmar's Armed Forces Day [emphasis added] (Al Jazeera, 2017c; Burma Task Force, 2017).</li> <li>2. “Bengalis in Rakhine state <i>are not Myanmar citizens</i>, and they are just people who come and stay in the country” [emphasis added] (Al Jazeera, 2017; Burma Task Force, 2017).</li> <li>3. “We have a <i>duty</i> to do what we should do according to the law and we also have a duty to protect our sovereignty <i>when it is harmed by political, religious and racial problems in the country</i>” [emphasis added]. (Al Jazeera, 2017c; Burma Task Force, 2017).</li> <li>4. “Regarding the rehabilitation of villages of our national races, for the national races [largely ethnic Rakhine] who fled their homes, first of all they must go back to their places. ...The important thing is to have our people in the region. It's necessary to have <i>control of our region with our national races</i>. We can't do anything if there are no people from our national races ... that is their rightful place” (Human Rights Watch, 2017).</li> <li>5. “Bengalis will never say that they arrive there happily,” he said, referring to the mass exodus of Rohingya (Reuters, 2018).</li> <li>6. “They will get sympathy and rights only if they say that they face a lot of hardships and persecution” (Reuters, 2018).</li> </ol>

Source: Mizzima, 2012; Bangkok Post, 2012; Al Jazeera, 2017c; Burma Task Force, 2017; Reuters, 2018.

The most recent examples of hate speech from Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander-In-Chief, states as follows:

*It has already been announced that there is no race termed Rohingya in Myanmar. The Bengalis in Rakhine State are not Myanmar nationals but immigrants. It will be seen that the victims coming out of the terrorist attacks committed by some Bengalis which took place in October 2016 resulted in political interference (Irrawaddy, 2017). The Bengali problem was a longstanding one which has become an unfinished job despite the efforts of the previous governments to solve it. The government in office is taking great care in solving the problem (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, 2018: 9).*

This information suggests that the exclusivist ideology of the military can be seen as a precondition to their heavy-handed actions toward Rohingya. Such ideology reflects a reason for the repeated large-scale military operations in 2016-2017.

Thus, as long as the military has been a leading actor in national politics and internal security issues, state violence against Rohingya can recur anytime. Even if the political change in 2015 had brought a new political actor into play, and the liberal ideology of the NLD seems friendly with minorities, it did not change the state-Rohingya relations. The emergence of a civilian-led government in Myanmar in 2015-2020 was a short period to establish new civil-military relations. Hence, the military operation against Rohingya in 2012 and 2017 reaffirmed two points. First, military dominance on national politics and internal security issues remains unchanged. Second, the aim of military operations against Rohingya was not only to restrict their political rights but also to eradicate them from the Rakhine state. Though it was not the NLD policy to do so, it could not prevent military operations against Rohingya from occurring.

Finally, a culture of impunity supports military dominance. So far, none of the top brasses from Tatmadaw, such as Min Aung Hlaing and Thein Sein, are subjected to legal accountability in the domestic court. Because legal institutions in the country did not do justice to the military and Rohingya minority, this situation urged Gambia to file a case to the International Court of Justice in 2019, accusing Myanmar military of committing genocide against Rohingya (Al Jazeera, 2019; Al Jazeera, 2022). Though the case shows that the military is the key perpetrator of the Rohingya genocide, military dominance in national politics is a more significant condition that has defined the direction of state-Rohingya relations.

### 3.6. CONCLUSION

This chapter has explained three main aspects of the effect of military dominance in Burma/Myanmar: the development of the state-Rohingya relations, military control in modern political history, and the militarization of Rohingya that shaped and reproduced the use of physical forces against them. The study reveals that its origin of violence was found in the aftermath of military rule. Later, the military government constituted the ethnocratic character of the state, and such political institutions were reinforced by de jure mechanisms and militarization. The former includes legal mechanisms and policy practices that support a regime of exclusionary citizenship. The latter concerns the routine acts of discrimination and the state's use of physical force against and expelling the Rohingya. In other words, the de jure mechanisms of exclusion, such as enacting exclusionary laws, often preceded the uses of de facto exclusion and militarization. When state militarization took place, it established military operations as a dominant way of dealing with the Rohingya problem. Consequently, state violence triggers a violent response from the Rohingya armed groups, and the reaction of the latter group also feeds another wave of state violence.

Importantly, state violence against the Rohingya that started during the constitutional period ended with the abolition of Mujahid armed groups. It was expected that new relations between the state and Muslim minorities would be more peaceful and cooperative. However, it did not happen. The post-1962 state violence against Muslims differs from its previous operations significantly. First, the civilian-led government dealt with Rohingya in the view that they were citizens of the country, while military rule defined them as illegal immigrants. Second, the civilian government used negotiation as a leading way to resolve the Rohingya problem, but the military implemented heavy-handed operations as a dominant way of dealing with them. Finally, Muslim armed groups ceased to exist when U Nu, the Prime Minister, accepted their demands. However, the arrival of military rule and its militarization caused Muslim minorities to form new armed fronts in order to deal with the state. This pattern of state-Rohingya relations recurred in 2012 after ARSA was formed because it found no other options viable. This historical development

demonstrates that Muslim minorities did not trust the military's way of resolving the violent conflict because a peaceful means is not the military's first option. Also, the military tends to implement securitization and militarization as a dominant way of resolving counterinsurgency. This dilemma persists in a feedback loop, reproducing state violence against minorities. Thailand case will demonstrate a similar pattern of military control that shaped persistent violence between the state and Muslim minorities in southern Thailand.



## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **MILITARY CONTROL AND VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIM MINORITIES IN SOUTHERN THAILAND**

“Arranging an uncompromising suppression in order to resolve the immediate problems; otherwise, the long-term problems would not be tackled; ... increasing military forces including additional joint operations with the police and civilian government officials.”

Policy about Insurgency in Southern Border Provinces, 1975.

(Tamthai and Boonchu, 2008 as cited in Jitpiromsri, 2013: 547).

“The message is clear: not only does Thailand’s military matter, it matters a lot more than most other Thai political actors.”

(Chambers, 2013a: xi).

“The focus of the policies was on the categorical suppression of insurgents by increasing military and police presence in the south, persuading some leaders of the insurgent movements to surrender, and negotiating with foreign countries that were sympathetic to the insurgency, persuading them to cease their activities in Thailand.” (Jitpiromsri, 2013: 547).

#### **4.1. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter tracks down the conditions behind the violent relations between the state and Malay-Muslim minorities in southern Thailand. Military control in Thailand is one of the major features of the violent evolution of state-Muslim minority relations in Southeast Asia, similar to the cases in Myanmar and the Philippines. Its implication also offers lessons for the comparative studies on state violence in SEA. First, the Thai case provides a remarkable example that rules out the colonial legacy-based explanation as the cause of state violence against minorities. Unlike Myanmar and the Philippines, Thailand had not been directly colonized by any colonial powers, but it had also suffered a similar problem with

Muslim minorities, which Myanmar and the Philippines also face. Second, the Thai case supports a historical institutionalist explanation. State violence can hardly be explained by temporal variables like the democratic transition because it is not a recent occurrence under the civilian government. But rather, it is the result of a protracted political process that depends on the dominance of military institutions. Lastly, since military rule in Thailand is an issue for national politics, changing the way the state interacts with the Muslim minority is directly tied to decision-making in Bangkok. Thus, the case suggests that a fundamental change would not take place in the southern border province if the condition of military control over Thai politics remains unchanged.

The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part shows that the ethno-religious conflict in southern Thailand can be reflected through the debate on name-calls between Patani vs. Pattani. It also demonstrates that contrasting views exist that explain violent relations between the state and Malay-Muslims in Thailand. However, the contrasting views neglect the significance of the condition of military control as the main factor in maintaining violent relations between the state and Muslim minorities. Part two illustrates the emergence of military control in the modern Thai nation-state by concentrating on the military's role expansion, which includes the development project and creation of state-supported mass organizations to infiltrate the society. Part three demonstrates the origin and dynamics of the state violence against Muslim minorities in southern Thailand by focusing on the dominant feature of militarization and the active role of the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC). The last part provides an argument that the persistence of military control is the main driving factor in maintaining violent relations between the state and Malay-Muslim minorities.



## 4.2. BACKGROUND

**Figure 20:** Map of Thailand



Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021.

Thailand is located in Southeast Asia, neighboring Malaysia in the south, Myanmar in the west, and Lao and Cambodia in the east. As of 2022, the total population of Thailand is 69.8 million. Muslims constitute four percent of the total population, which is approximately 2.7 million people. Muslims in Thailand are scattered throughout the country, but around 2 million of them are concentrated in five southernmost provinces. These are Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala, Satun, and Songkla. The first four provinces are considered Muslim-majority areas, but only Satun does not have a record of ethno-religious conflict between the state and Malay-Muslims. Except for Pattani, the rest of the four provinces have borders with Malaysia. The majority of Muslims in southern Thailand are ethnically Malay. Nonetheless, the local Malay language is only used widely in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. Muslims in Songkla and Satun speak Thai and southern dialects.

There are controversies about defining the name of the conflict-affected area in 'southern Thailand.' The contending terms include southern border provinces, Patani, and the deep south. Each term carries different meanings and memories. Malay-Muslims prefer to define the three southernmost provinces as 'Patani' with only one 't,' while the Thai state uses 'Pattani' – with a double 't' – to characterize it as a province. The state defines the areas that cover Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat as 'southern border provinces.' In addition, the term 'deep south,' widely used among scholars, was coined to reflect a severe and deep problem in the southern border provinces/Patani. The term 'deep south' is considered to be less political than the other terms. Because all of these names entail divergent meanings and memories to the related audience, the state and local Malays struggle to define the area on their own terms. According to Satha-Anand (1992) and Panjor (2018), the struggle over name-calling reflects the deep and historical problem between two different narratives. For Malay Muslims, Patani can be traced back to the old kingdom of Patani Darussalam,<sup>7</sup> while the state attempts to control the meaning of 'Pattani' as a province, not the ancient kingdom. This struggle over name-calling has persisted alongside the physical violence between the state and Malay-Muslim insurgents to date.

---

<sup>7</sup> Patani Darussalam or Sultan of Patani is a kingdom ruled by Malays from 15 CE to 1902 over today southern Thailand's region. A Patani king converted to Islam in around the middle of 15<sup>th</sup> century. Siam conquered Patani in 1902 and formally annexed it into Siam Kingdom in 1909.

Contrasting views exist that explain the protracted conflict in southern Thailand. While the top-down approach focuses on how the state designs and implements security policies toward Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand, the bottom-up approach concentrates on how Malay-Muslim minorities mobilize members of their ethnic group to fight against the state. On the one hand, the former tends to focus on the state policy of assimilation, integration, Thai nationalism, and resettlement as the main drivers of the prolonged conflict (Che Man, 2008; Noi Wong, 2001; Nuanpian, 2008). This approach explains that state action and policy profoundly structure the political outcome. Thus, peace and violence between the state and Malay-Muslims are the outcomes of the state policy. On the other hand, the bottom-up approach shows that Islam and Malay nationalism have been used as practical tools to mobilize Malay-Muslims to go against the state (Andre, 2012; Che Man, 1987; Hara, 2019; Nilsen and Hara, 2018; Pitsuwan, 1982; Wattana, 2006; Yegar, 2002). For instance, the justification of using jihad to fight against the Thai state and “shahidization” is done through the active role of ulama or religious leaders. Islam and ethnicity have been shown as the focal point of ethnic mobilization. Thus, this approach explains that the religious elites using Islam and ethnic sentiment are the leading actor in prolonging violence. Nevertheless, these two approaches tend to neglect the influence of military control as the leading cause of the violence's persistence.

Although the studies on the conflict in southern Thailand have captured the attention of a wide range of political science scholars, only a handful of studies have concentrated on the impact of military rule. Among the leading works in the field, studies by Chambers explore how military control had affected the persistence of the conflict in southern Thailand. In “The Role of Security Forces in Thailand’s Deep South Counter-Insurgency,” Chambers and Waitoolkiat (2019) show that military control is the primary condition of protracted violence because it reinforces a hardline policy of repression. State repression reproduces a vicious cycle of violence and human rights abuse. This explanation is in line with the report on state torture and ill-treatment published by the Duayjai group (Duayjai Group, Cross Cultural Foundation, and Network for Patani Human Rights 2016; Duayjai Group, 2019). In “Militarization and Securitization in Thailand’s Deep South,” Chambers and

Waitoolkiat (2019: 98) also explain that the military has often challenged civilian control over policy in the deep south: “During the Yingluck government’s negotiating effort, the military denounced the peace talks and dismissed the BRN as being insincere in negotiations.” In general, these two works highlight military influence as the key political actor in directing policy concerning the conflict in southern Thailand. Thus, in order to understand the effect of military control in Thailand, the next sections will illustrate the development of state violence against Malay-Muslim minorities in southern Thailand and the background of military control in modern Thailand.

#### **4.3. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE VIOLENCE AGAINST MALAY-MUSLIM MINORITIES IN SOUTHERN THAILAND**

State violence against Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand is not a new phenomenon. The relationship between the kingdom of Siam and Patani can be traced back to the pre-modern period, during which the suzerainty system was used as the mainstream practice of inter-kingdom relations. A war between kingdoms was the key instrument of the power structure. At the time, Patani was an independent political entity that, in peacetime, sent a regular token to Siam as a sign of recognition. This practice shows that Patani was less powerful than Siam. Three key events shaped new relations between the two kingdoms at the time. After the zenith of the Patani kingdom during 1584-1624, Siam defeated the Patani in 1782. Then, Siam divided Patani into seven small governing units in 1808, but full control of the region was actualized in 1902 when Siam issued a legal document administering the seven units. This time, Siam appointed governors of the areas directly and ended the practice of Patani’s autonomy. As a result, the state violence against Malay-Muslim minorities intensified. As Chambers and Waitoolkiat (2019: 56) note, “from 1902 until 1944, military policy involved using harsh draconian laws and assimilation policies against the southern Malay-Muslim community.”

In 1905, Siam changed Patani’s political structure from seven to four administrative units. All these changes indicated that Siam had full control over Patani. In 1909 Siam signed a treaty known as the Bangkok Declaration with the

British. In effect, it demarcated borders between British Malaya and the kingdom of Siam, and the Patani region became a part of Siam officially. As a result, the Patani kingdom ceased to exist formally; on the contrary, Siam was able to centralize its power over the Patani in Bangkok.

**Table 8: Key Historical Development of Relations between Siam and Patani**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Key Historical Events</b>
1782	Siam defeated the Patani kingdom.
1786	Siam forcibly subjugated the sultanate of Patani, then quelled numerous later insurrections (Chambers and Waitoolkiat, 2019: 55)
1902	Siam divided Patani into seven provinces.
1905	Siam restructured the seven provinces into four provinces.
1909	Siam signed the Bangkok Declaration with the British. The Patani area belongs to Siam formally.
1932	A military coup changed Siam's absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy.

Source: Chambers and Waitoolkiat, 2019.

The above historical development shows the dynamics of their relations in the pre-modern era. The dividing line between the two eras in Thai political history is the political change from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy in 1932. By this token, the relations between Siam and its Malay-Muslim minorities can be differentiated by pre-modern and modern periods. The pre-modern period denotes a practice of absolute monarchy, which successfully centralized its power and ended Patani's autonomy. In contrast, the modern period began with a constitutional monarchy within which Malay-Muslim minorities in the modern Thai administration have been incorporated into the citizens of Thailand.

The relations between the Thai state and Malay-Muslim minorities in the modern era began with difficult and violent experiences. During the 1910s-1940s, the state enforced an assimilation policy toward Malay-Muslims in the south and suppressed them with forces. As Whittingham-Jones (1947: 8) reports;

*For alleged harboring of gang robbers, though without preferring a charge in court, the Siamese polices burn kampongs to the ground, blackmail the wealthier class of shopkeepers into paying thousands of ticals in 'protection money,' force their way into Malay homes, beat up their women and carry off much of the smaller and movable goods as they fancy.*

These suppressive conditions occurred during which Haji Sulong (a religious and spiritual leader) was active in resisting the state. In order to improve the situation, he and his colleagues from Pattani Islamic Council sent a 7-points-petition to the government in 1947, asking for the self-governing rule of the Patani people. As a result, he and his eldest son were forced to disappear. This tragic event reaffirmed Malay-Muslims that Thai state policies in dealing with the Patani Question were concentrated on using violence and oppression. Thus, in the 1960s-1970s, Malay-Muslim armed fronts started to grow, and the key actors included Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP), the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN).<sup>8</sup>

**Table 9: Key State Policies Towards Conflict in Southern Thailand**

Date	Key state policies towards conflict in southern Thailand
The 1910s	A hard-line security policy was enforced through 1907 and, later, the 1914 Martial Law Act.
The 1910s-1940s	Assimilation policy and militarization
The 1940s-1950s	Co-optive policies. Patronage of Islam Act was declared in 1946.
The 1980s	Thai <i>Romyen</i> policy
1981	Task Force CPM 43 was established.
	Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center [SBPAC] was established.
2002	Thaksin dismantled CPM 43 and SBPAC.
2007	SBPAC and CPM were re-established.
2008-2011	"Politics Leading the Military" under the Abhisit administration.

Source: Chambers and Waitookiat, 2019.

<sup>8</sup> In Songkla province, Muslim militants are active in four districts: Chana, Thepha, Saba Yoi, and Na Thawi. PULO is in English because it got inspiration from The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and wanted to connect with international actors.

In 1975, the National Security Council issued the “policy about the insurgency in southern border provinces,” which concentrated its implementation on suppression. In the document, it states as follows:

*Arranging an uncompromising suppression in order to resolve the immediate problems; otherwise, the long-term problems would not be tackled; ... increasing military forces including additional joint operations with the police and civilian government officials; ...and subjecting [military forces] to the command of the director of internal security of the southern border provinces. Increasing the budget to make available resources to solve the problem of a lack of weaponry, military hardware, vehicles, and [sufficient] stipends for officials... (Tamthai and Boonchu, 2008 as cited in Jitpiromsri, 2013: 547)*

The text above not only represents a hardline policy of the Thai state in solving the problem but also shows the idea of militarization of the area in the old days. According to the texts in the document, militarization in southern Thailand includes increasing military forces, budget, and weapons in order to suppress the armed groups. As a consequence, the hardline policy led to heavy-handed operations, including forced disappearance, mass killing, and torture, all of which had been used as a great source of ethnic mobilization against the state in retaliation.

Violent relations between the Thai state and Malay armed fronts gradually persisted during the 1960s-1990s, but the level of violence during this period was not significant until the conflict entered the 2000s. Overall, the violent conflict between the Thai state and Malay-Muslims in modern Thai history can be divided into two main periods. First is the pre-2004 ethnoreligious conflict, which started with the implementation of the assimilation policy and Thai nationalism in 1934. Until Haji Sulong, the key Muslim leader in Patani at the time, was forced to disappear in 1954 due to his activism against the Thai state, many Malay-Muslim insurgents started to confront the Thai state. In addition to BNPP, PULO, and BRN, Bersatu was formed as an umbrella organization in 1989. In short, in the first wave of violence, old Malay elites such as Tengku Mahmud Mahyideen and Tengku Jalal Nasir and religious scholars such as Hajji Sulong were the key actors in mobilizing the rebellion against Siam’s policies (Che Man, 1987). Their activism had been to respond to Siam’s assimilation policy and suppression.

**Table 10: Malay-Muslim Movements in Southern Thailand**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Malay-Muslim Movements</b>
1947	Haji Sulong established Patani People Movement.
1959	Adun Na Saiburi established the Patani National Liberation Front (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani, BNPP).
The 1960s	Ustaz Haji Abdul Karim Hassan established the National Revolutionary Front (Barisan Revolusi Nasional, BRN).
1968	Tengku Bira Kotanila founded the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO)
1986	BNPP changed its name to BIPP (Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani, the Patani Islamic Liberation Front)
1989	The Majelis Permesyuaratan Rakyat Melayu Patani (MPRMP; abbreviated to Bersatu or Unity) or Malay People's Consultative Council in English was founded.
2015	MARA Patani (a collection of representatives of insurgent groups) had been formed.

Source: Che Man, 1985, 1987, 2008; Jitpiromsri et al., 2020; McCargo, 2008; Wattana, 2006; Chalerm-Pinyorat, 2013.

State violence and oppression against the Malay minorities in the south have been the key justification for mobilizing Malay-Muslim movements. The key violent events included in the following table show that the state's preferred strategies for solving the conflict in southern Thailand have been repression and violence. Because Malay-ethnic leaders who encounter the Thai state most likely end up with state suppression and violence, Malay-Muslims tend to distrust a top-down policy orientation. The repressive experience in the past had reproduced a perception that the Thai state was not willing to solve the conflict, and if they wanted to solve the problem, the policy was centered on suppression and the use of force. This perception is not born out of thin air but accumulated from their daily experience on the ground. Thus, Malay-Muslim movements had shown a lack of trust in the Thai state's policy toward the conflict in southern Thailand. In comparison with Myanmar



case, both in Myanmar and Thailand, once the political path was closed or greatly narrowed down, violence became a viable option for the Muslim minorities

**Table 11: Key Events of State Violence against Muslim Minorities in Southern Thailand**

Date	Key Events on State Violence Against Malay-Muslims in Southern Thailand
April 26-28, 1948	After Haji Sulong was arrested, the <b>Dusun Nyur protest</b> took place in Narathiwat. As a result, the deaths of some 400 Malay-Muslims were reported.
1954	Haji Sulong and his eldest son disappeared. Forced disappearance.
November 29, 1975	Sapan Koto Murder; murder of five Malay Muslims at Koto Bridge, Bacho, Narathiwat. It was followed by a series of long protests against state authorities in Pattani.
March 12, 2004	Somchai Neelaphajit, the human rights lawyer, disappeared after defending Malay-Muslim suspects.
April 28, 2004	Krue Se Massacre, Pattani.
October 25, 2004	Tak Bai Massacre, Narathiwat.

Source: Satha-Anand, 1993, 2006, 2009; McCargo, 2008, 2006; Che Man, 1990.

The second period of violence is the post-2004 violent conflict between the state and the Malay-Muslim insurgents. It is viewed as a second wave of violence because the pattern and level of violence have changed from previous events.<sup>9</sup> The violence was re-escalated in 2001 after the gun raid from the army camp in Narathiwat province. During this time, many old actors from the minority side appeared to fade away from the scene except the BRN-Coordinate. The role of the old elites, such as descendants of the Raya family, was diminished. Religious

<sup>9</sup> The issue may arise on why Muslims in other regions don't become violent despite restrictions and repression. According to the argument in this study, Muslim minorities turn to violence because of state securitization and militarization against them. Because Muslims in other region did not encounter similar condition that Muslims in the south face, there is no incentive for them to become violent.

scholars and local leaders now lead the Malay-Muslim movements. Another key difference from the previous wave is the active role of civil society organizations in pressuring the state's policy toward solving the conflict in southern Thailand (Koma and Tuansiri, 2022b). In order to respond to the new wave, the state implemented militarization of the area as a dominant mode of operation to control the situation. As a result, violence and loss of lives have persisted to date. From 2004-2022, there were 21,485 violent incidents, 20,985 casualties, 13,641 injuries, and 7,377 deaths (Deep South Watch, 2022).

Thus, the origin of state violence against Malay-Muslim minorities in southern Thailand is not new but rather an old problem, emerging from Siam's incorporation of the Patani kingdom during the 1900s. The conflict evolved from the problem of the power struggle between the Siam elite vs. the Malay elite to an ethno-religious problem. At first, this ethno-religious conflict appeared to be between the Siam state and a small group of Malay elites. Although Siam implemented an assimilation policy in the 1940s and suppression against Malay-Muslim minorities, the conflict was still confined to a vertical form between the state agency and Malay separatist fronts. Nonetheless, the new wave of the conflict has been significantly transformed since 2004, after which the attacks were directed at civilians in the south.

#### **4.4. MILITARY CONTROL IN THE THAI STATE**

Military control in the Thai nation-state can be dated back to pre-modern Siam. Prior to 1887, Siam had no permanent military service yet. In times of war, everyone in the kingdom was obliged to join the battle, fighting for their kings. However, the encounter of Siam against the French and British armies during the 1880s prompted the king to think about self-defense and establish a standing army. King Chulalongkorn's Edict on Military Reform of 1887 was the key evidence of the emergence of Siam's modern standing army. Gradually, the military has become the backbone of the state's security and order. In the later periods, they also increasingly expanded their role to include non-security works such as development projects in rural areas (Pawakapan, 2021).

Ideally, professional soldiers should not get involved in politics; their expertise is the external defense and the use of force against external enemies (Huntington, 1957). Nonetheless, in modern Thai political history, they have been intervening in politics since 1932. In the 1932 coup, the military took a leading role in requesting the king to accept a new political system: a constitutional monarchy. Afterward, the Thai military has been a key political player not only in changing Thailand's political system but also controlling the direction of the country until now. This point is proven through the thirteen successful coups since 1932. Based on Chambers and Waitookiat's analysis, the modern history of the civil-military relations can be divided into thirteen periods, as shown in the table 12. For the 190 years of the thirteen periods, Thailand experienced six short periods of civilian control, which amounts to only 36 years, while military control occupies 164 years. In the most recent development, the military has ruled the country for eight years since the coup in 2014.

**Table 12: Features of Military Control in Thailand**

#	Periods	Feature	Civil/Military
1	Pre-1932	The permanent military institution was established in 1887 and played an important role in Siam's centralization.	n/a
2	1932-1947	Military domination is entrenched.	Military control
3	1947-1957	With the rise of the armed forces, 35% of the senate's seats were reserved for ex-military.	Military control
4	1957-1973	Military rule dominated national politics or known as Saritocracy. In 1968, 78% of the senate's seats were reserved for the military.	Military control
5	1973-1976	A weakened military period was a result of the popular protest.	Civilian control
6	1976-1980	The resurrection of the military in Thai politics was an outstanding feature.	Military control
7	1980-1988	Thailand's semi-democracy under Prem's administration was an outstanding feature.	Civilian control

8	1988-1992	A return of civilian control.	Civilian control
9	1992-2001	Civilian control of the retired military.	Civilian control
10	2001-2006	Civilian control under Thaksin's administration.	Civilian control
11	2006-2008	With the resurgence of the arch-royalist military, 31.4% of the legislative seats were reserved for the military.	Military control
12	2008-2014	A rise of camouflaged khaki clout	Civilian control
13	2014-2022	Military control under general Prayut's administration	Military control

Source: Chambers and Waitoolkiat, 2013.

Thus, if compared with other countries in Southeast Asia, Thailand's political history experiences the most frequent military intervention. Since June 1932, when the country transformed from an absolute monarchy to constitutional democracy, military control has been a key defining feature of Thai politics. As Paul Chambers (2013: 78) points out:

*Civilian control is yet unattainable because in Thailand, there exists a parallel state in which the military remains mostly unchecked by civilian monitoring. In this system, Thailand's armed forces are subservient to the country's monarch, who stands atop an informal structure of monarchical interactions among the palace, Privy Council, judiciary, and other arch-royalist groups. Military power has become entrenched, and it will be no unlikely in the foreseeable future to move towards demilitarization.*

A survey of the civil-military relations in Thailand shows a constant pattern of military influence in Thai politics. Since the permanent standing army was established in 1887, the military government took control of Thai politics in 1932-1944, 1947-1973, 1976-1988, 1991-1992, 2006-2008, and 2014-2022 (Table 13). However, the key organ of the military in managing internal security is the internal security operation command (ISOC), which was responsible for combating the Communist threat in the 1940s-1970s and readjusted its role in 1974 to cover non-security issues such as rural development. ISOC had been at the forefront of creating the two ultra-right-wing movements (Nawaphon and Krathing Daeng) in 1975 in order to confront the left-wing movements in the 1970s. As a consequence, the confrontation paved the way for the security forces to commit mass killings of

university students on 6<sup>th</sup> October 1976 at Thammasat University – this event is known as the 1976 massacre of university students. Its active role in controlling society has also resulted in many other state violence against democratic movements, such as Black May in 1992. Although the democratic regime was restored after the 1992 event, the military governance came back again in the 2006 and 2014 coups.

**Table 13: Periods of the Military Control in Thailand**

Year	Military influence in Thailand
1887	Establishment of a permanent standing army
1932-1944	Military governance
1947-1973	Military governance
1974	Readjustment of ISOC
1975	ISOC launched two ultra-right wings: <i>Nawaphon and Krathing Daeng</i>
1976-1988	Military governance
1991-1992	Military governance
2006-2008	Military governance
2014-present	Military governance

Source: Chambers, 2013b.

In theory, military coups are not only seen as an obstacle to democratization but also as an illegal act that violates the constitution. Nonetheless, none of the military coup leaders in Thailand had been charged with a legal sentence. On the contrary, the state had provided them with legal authority to take control the society. There are three key legal mechanisms that provide the military with authority to control politics. The first and oldest one is the martial law act, which was issued in 1914. The emergency decrees on public administration in a state of emergency and the internal security act, which were issued in 2005 and 2008, respectively, are the other security acts related to the securitization of Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand. Besides, Pawakapan (2021: 36) argued that the rationale for military control in Thailand is strongly linked to royal hegemony. Because military institutions and monarchy have a symbiotic relationship, the maintenance of royal hegemony strengthens the influence of the military in Thai society. Thus, in addition

to the legal foundation that supports the legitimacy of the military, they also have strong support from the monarchy. According to Chambers and Waitoolkiat (2016), this relationship can be defined as a ‘monarchized military.’

Significantly, although many national security threats wax and wane in different periods because of the changing situations, the dominant role of the military has persisted until today through the backup of the legal and royal-supported foundation and its role expansion. For instance, The Communist Suppression Operation Command (CSOC) rose to a prominent role during the counter-communism campaign in the 1960s, but after the communist threat no longer existed, the CSOC did not cease to exist. Instead, it was transformed into the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC) in 1974, which controls the operations of civilians, police, armed forces, paramilitaries, and state-dominated mass organizations in the securitization effort. At the present time, ISOC has expanded its role to cover development projects for security and civil affairs, which include establishing state-dominated mass organizations and remobilizing the royalist mass (Pawakapan, 2021: 91-119). Thus, through the military role expansion to cover civilian affairs and non-security issues, the military has been able to maintain its dominant role in Thai politics.

The influential role of the ISOC can be seen through its expanding activities to cover civil and non-security domains. Referring to its workplan, the Directorate of Civil Affairs involves supporting 4,741 royal development projects, fighting poverty, preserving natural resources, suppressing illicit drugs, and promoting a sufficiency economy (Pawakapan, 2021: 68). In addition, Pawakapan shows that, after 2006, ISOC has remobilized the royalist mass organizations by creating new state-supported groups and organizing public activities, which include the Village Scouts, the Professional and Community Leader Groups, Diamonds in the Mud program, Thai Big Bikes Love the Nation ISOC club, Off-roader Love the nation, Cultural Leaders Love the Nation, People’s Participation program, Thai National Defense Volunteers, the Reservists for National Security, Security Network of Executives, 700 of Community Radio Stations for Security, and Local Thinkers Love the Nation (Pawakapan, 2021: 128). The mission of these remobilizations is to show the strength of royalism and for mass surveillance. Because ISOC has branches in

provincial administrations around the country, its influence and domination have stretched throughout the country as well.

Studies on the Thai military and civil-military relations show that the ISOC is the key organization that both civilian and military governments attempt to control or make use of it to control the societies and other state organs. For instance, the Prem administration (1980-1988) used ISOC as a central unit to solve the conflict in southern Thailand, while the Thaksin administration (2001-2006) attempted to reform ISOC by restructuring positions in favor of civilian agencies in order to get rid of Prem's influence in the organization. For the latter attempt, Prime Minister Order No. 158/2545 (2002) allocated three positions of the deputy director for civilian agencies while appointing five commanders of armies as assistant directors. In the Prayut administration (2014-present), ISOC had been restructured in favor of military personnel, however. In a formal line of command, ISOC is placed under the Office of the Prime Minister, having the Prime Minister as the director, but the organizational structure was designed to serve as a reserved domain for military influence. According to Pawakapan (2021), ISOC was designed to be the army's political arm in order to control internal security issues:

*This means civilian agencies are under the power of the military in all matters concerning internal security. The provincial ISOC deputy directors are also army officers. ISOC has its own office at every provincial headquarters so that it can conveniently work with the MOI [Ministry of Interior], a relationship that continues to the present day (Pawakapan, 2021: 33).*

The coming back of military intervention since 2014, therefore, reaffirmed the persistence of military dominance in national politics, and ISOC remains the key actor in reinforcing state violence against Muslim minorities in the south.

#### **4.5. MILITARY CONTROL AND THE PERSISTENCE OF STATE VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIM MINORITIES IN SOUTHERN THAILAND**

In the past 20 years, the military was successful in establishing direct control over the Thai politics in the 2006 and 2014 coups. One of the justifications for the

former coup was Thaksin's failure to solve the conflict in southern Thailand.<sup>10</sup> Nonetheless, under the direct military control, the violent conflict did not improve either. On the contrary, the military has maintained a hardline policy towards the conflict in the south. After the general election in 2019, General Prayut's coalition successfully formed an elected government, thanks to the new constitution's mandate and election rules. In the present time, the military's direct influence over a domain of internal security and the violence between the state and Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand has been paramount.

Since the eruption of the violence between the state and Malay-Muslim insurgents in southern Thailand in 2004, the militarization of the deep south has become a military's key strategy for counterinsurgency efforts. As Srisompob Jitpiromsri (2013: 564) points out, "The tough enforcement of security arrangements in the deep south provinces has led to large-scale military mobilization and extensive militarization of the region during the eight years of counterinsurgency [2004-2012]." The state's key responsible apparatus in this domain includes the National Security Council on the high-policy level and the fourth internal security operations command (4th ISOC) on the implementation level. At the present time, the 4th ISOC has full command over the conflict-affected area in the deep south with approximately 2,000 security checkpoints and 163,422 military forces, spending 313,792.4 million baht over 16 years (8.9 billions USD) (Chambers et al., 2019: 6; Jitpiromsri, 2013: 563; Manager Online, 2020). Thus, the Thai state's militarization of the southern border provinces is clear not only on the policy level but also found in the experience on the ground between the military and local communities.

Military influence over the domain of internal security and Malay-Muslim insurgency has been a dominant feature of conflict management since 2004. After the 2006 Coup, the civilian government came back into the administration, but they refrained from dominating the operation of the violence in southern Thailand: the

---

<sup>10</sup> Thaksin Shinawatra was former police from 1973-1987 and a former Prime Ministry from 2001-2006. He formed Thai Rak Thai Parity (TRT) and won 2 general elections in 2001 and 2005. His controversial policies were the war on drug and readjustment of state institutions in southern Thailand. Military coup ousted him on 19<sup>th</sup> September 2006, accusing him of les majesty actions and government's failure to resolve violent conflict in southern Thailand. Now, he is a businessman and lives in exile in Dubai; his sister who was a former Prime Minister from 2011-2014 also lives in exile.



domain within which the military maintained its institutional prerogatives. A key reason was that their candidates in the southern border provinces miserably failed to win the vote. Later, the elected government under the military tutelage after the 2014 Coup strengthened its prerogatives by rendering institutional power to the 4th ISOC. It happened by merging the preexisting Southern Border Province Administrative Center (SBPAC), which was previously placed under the Office of the Prime Minister, but now was put under the 4th ISOC's organizational command. Previously, SBPAC had been seen as a civilian state agency working to promote development and rehabilitation issues, separating its line of command from the security institution. Now, the development issue has been subsumed to the security command, providing military institutions with more direct command over the area than before. The submission of SBPAC under the command of ISOC is the most striking sign of military control over the management of the conflict in the south.

Furthermore, the Thai state's militarization of the southern border provinces is found in the intensification of security personnel and the formation of mass organizations. These include an increase of paramilitary, regular police and Border Patrol Police, security volunteers (Or Sor), and state militias. Chambers (2020: 107) estimates that the overall number of security officials under the preview of the fourth region ISOC increased from 60,000 to over 70,000 personnel in 2015. As for the state militias, they include the village protection volunteers (Or Ror Bor), self-defense volunteers (Chor Ror Bor), iron lady unit, and sub-district defense volunteers (Chor Kor Tor). Hence, the state's capacity under the preview of ISOC to use physical forces against Malay-Muslim armed groups is not only strong but also the key factor for maintaining violence as the dominant strategy. Instead of upholding peaceful means, such as peace talks and negotiation, the military on the ground and its militias organizations maintain the hardline policy of securitization and militarization.

The impact of civil-military relations (CMR) in domestic politics has contributed to the persistent violence against Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand. The key question on the impact of CMR on the violence against Muslim minorities is who controls the issue of internal security and what its effect is. In other words, how the difference between military and civilian control affects the violent outcome. The

above explanation has given a clue that ISOC control over the state's policy is correlated with the continuity of state violence against Malay-Muslims. The presence of militarization in the area under military control had proven the presence of violent persistence over time. On the contrary, during the Yingluck Shinawatra's administration (2011-2014), the civilian government started a new move toward introducing a peace talk with the Malay-Muslim armed groups. However, once the military took direct control over Thai politics in 2014, they obscured peace talks and peace dialogue.

As the military is organized in a top-down manner, the degree to which the military controls national politics and internal security issues directly determines the outcome of the relations between the state and Malay minorities. As Chambers's findings (2011: 17) point out, "civilian control over Thailand's military is on the wane relative to the 1992-2006 period. Civilian rule over internal security is especially minimal, compared to other areas." Recent studies have similarly suggested that after the 2014 coup, the military consolidated its power over national politics and internal security issues (Chambers and Waitoolkiat, 2016; Chambers et al., 2019; Jitpiromsri, 2013). In this connection, because an act of violence becomes a military's duty, the military control over the issue of Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand significantly contributed to the violence in two steps: first is the legal authority, and the second is the repressive operation on the ground.

Since the second wave of violent eruption, the state has granted the military the use of force against Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand through three legal tools: martial law in 2004, the emergency decree in 2005, and the internal security law in 2008. These legal tools have provided the military not only amnesty and protection from accountability but also a green light for the use of physical force, violent operations, and violations of human rights. As noted, military operations against suspected Malay-Muslim insurgents occur regularly, which causes deaths and injuries every month. In October-December 2021, for example, there were three violent military operations against the suspected Malay insurgents in southern Thailand; as a result, more than ten people were claimed dead (Deep South Watch, 2021a). In addition, reports from civil society organizations on the state's repression of Malay-Muslim show a new normal of securitization. For instance, the report from

the Duay Jai organization reveals that from 2014-2015 they received 54 complaint cases from local people concerning torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by security officers (Duayjai Group et al., 2016). This data converges with the works of the Muslim Attorney Centre (Awaeputeh, 2021), which also announced that they received thousands of complaints from local Malays against the state's security forces. In short, southern Thailand's militarization by legal tools provides the military and other related security forces the legitimacy to use physical force against suspected Malay-Muslim insurgents. In this case, military control helped ensure that militarization against minorities persisted.

The puzzle of who controls the state is crucial in at least three aspects. First, military controls over domestic politics often breeds persistent violence against Muslim minorities because they are trained to solve security problems with the use of force. The military views that they can still control the area by means of militarization. Thus, when militarization is the dominant mode of resolution, it not only prolongs and complicates the violence but the violence also becomes 'self-perpetuating' (Jitpiromsri, 2013: 545).

Second, while the use of violence is only one of the means of conflict solution, the non-violent means of the solution is not the expertise of the military. Thus, the military tends to ignore the nonkilling way out, such as peace process autonomy and decentralization, for it needs a new set of skills and ideas to deal with the minority's resistance and demands. This is true when it is compared with a civilian government's initiatives on peace dialogue; the civilian administrations are more willing to run the peace process than military rule.

Lastly, as opposed to the civilian government, which is accountable to its local constituents, military control needs not to be concerned about local accountability and punishment. Since the formation of military control in Thailand serves to secure the monarchy's position, its legitimacy hangs on the king. So far, no military leaders have been charged for the military coup act, nor have they been sentenced because of human right violation in the southern conflict. Overall taken, military control, in part or in total, is prone to maintaining violence and hardline policies against resistant minorities.

#### 4.6. CONCLUSION

This chapter demonstrated that military dominance in national politics and internal security issues shaped securitization and militarization of Muslim minorities in southern Thailand. State violence against the minorities can be divided into two main waves: the pre-2004 and post-2004 sets of events. The pre-2004 conflict can be traced back to the 1902 conquest when the Siam kingdom successfully occupied the Patani kingdom. The post-2004 violence apparently began after the insurgent attack on the army camp in Narathiwat on 4th January 2004. In the same year, the state repressed Malay Muslims in two massacres: violence in Krue Ze and Tak Bai, which killed at least 200 Malay-Muslims. In order to respond to the new insurgency phase, the state used legal tools and militarization to control the situation. In addition, whereas the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center and the Civil-Military-Police Task Force were re-established in the south to resume their functions, the fourth internal security operations command (4th ISOC) under the preview of the Royal Thai Armed Force (RTAF) became the most prominent actor in countering Malay-Muslim insurgencies. As Chambers et al. (2019: 6) point out, "indeed, the powers of ISOC were strengthened such that army commanders would increasingly be calling the shots with regards to internal security." In short, after the eruption of the second wave of violence, the armed forces have complete control in the counterinsurgency against Malay-Muslims. Thus, under the military control of domestic politics and the direct command of the 4<sup>th</sup> ISOC, violence between the state and Malay-Muslim insurgents has persisted to date. For 17 years, the armed conflict between the state and Malay-Muslim insurgents has resulted in 21,235 violent incidents, 7,294 deaths, and 13,550 injuries (Deep South Watch, 2021b); the average per year is approximately 1,249 incidents, 429 deaths, and 797 injuries. These tolls of deaths and destruction have no sign of abate. Until Thai civil-military relations in Thailand transform from a military control regime to civilian control, the persistence of state violence in southern Thailand shall not be significantly altered.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **MILITARY CONTROL AND STATE VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIM MINORITIES IN SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES**

“Martial law gave the military the opportunity to get rid of civilian politicians who they believed were self-serving and had little respect for the majority of the people.”  
(Selochan, 2004: 66).

“The AFP looked more like Marcos’s Praetorian Guard than a properly professional military.”  
(Hedman, 2001: 178).

“An examination of the patterns in post-Marcos Philippines civil-military relations in five domains...indicates that the AFP remains a highly politicized institution”.  
(Lee, 2020: 1).

“Because of the Marcos experience, many military officers acquired the code that they can judge a government, and the Estrada revolt reinforced the belief that they have a right to replace a government....”

Former Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Rodolfo Biazon  
(Chambers, 2012: 138).

#### **5.1. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter examines the relations between the state and Moro-Muslim groups in the Philippines since the Marcos administration (1965-1986).<sup>11</sup> It particularly explores the conditions that contributed to the state violence against Muslim minorities that persisted from the 1960s until the present day. This chapter addresses the condition of state violence against Muslim minorities in Mindanao by seeking answers to the following questions. First, how have civil-military relations in

---

<sup>11</sup> This thesis uses the term ‘Bangsamoro’ and ‘the Moro’ interchangeably. It refers to the Muslim ethnic minorities residing in Mindanao – the southern part of the Philippines.

the Philippines shaped the state--Muslim minority relations in Mindanao? Second, what are the underlying conditions that led the Philippine government to use a hardline policy towards the Muslim groups? Finally, how has the condition of military influence in Philippine politics contributed to the persistent violence against Muslim minorities in Mindanao?

This chapter disproves the notion that whoever controls the state contributed to a similar political outcome regarding the state's relations with the Muslim minority. The chapter demonstrates that no one anticipated that the state violence against Muslim minorities in Mindanao would prolong. Due to the structural effect of national politics, which determines the main pattern of state involvement with minorities, persistence becomes a distinguishing characteristic. The chapter, in particular, shows how military influence in Philippine politics contributes to the government's aggression towards Muslim minorities in Mindanao. The military's hegemonic position in the field of internal security has resulted in the state's continuous use of violence against dissent minorities.

Hence, the case of the Philippines suggests that military control is a key condition to maintaining violence and proves an obstacle to peaceful relations between the state and Bangsamoro Muslim minorities. The cases of Thailand's Malay-Muslim and the Philippines' Moro represent a similar outcome of violence between the state and Muslim minorities. In both cases, armed insurgents by Muslim minorities have continued their violent engagement with the state in the southern parts of the country. However, the Moro case differs slightly from the Thai case in that the peace process between the two parties began to advance when a state of civilian government remained in place. The remaining part of the chapter, therefore, elaborates on the overview of the conflict in Mindanao and illustrates how the military influence has contributed to the persistence of violence between the state and the Moro Muslims. It also demonstrates that a transition from military dominance to civilian control has contributed to the improving relations between the state and the Muslims in recent years.

The rest of the chapter is divided into three parts. The first part overviews the background of the Philippine case and the dynamics of the relations between the state and Moro-Muslim minority groups. Part two examines the emergence and

development of military influence in Philippine national politics. It demonstrates that the military establishment did not previously have the same level of sway as it does today. Prior to the Marcos administration, its relationship with the civilian government was one of dependence on the civilian; now, it is in a strong position upon which the civilian governments must rely on their support. Thus, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has been able to exert its control on the key policy domains. The final part demonstrates that the condition of military influence in national politics has contributed to the persistence of state violence against Moro-Muslim minorities in the Philippines. It has reinforced the state violence through legal mechanisms, law enforcement, and the use of physical force against the Muslims in Mindanao.

## 5.2. BACKGROUND

**Figure 21:** Map of the Philippines



**Source:** Nations Online Project, n.d.

The Philippines' geography is different from the other countries examined in this study. As a country, the Philippines is an archipelago, so no land border and bridges connect the Philippines with other neighboring countries. However, the geographic difference does not render the country's exception from violent relations between the state and the Muslim minority. Two central problems have caused the state to engage with its minorities in internal security issues violently: one is the Muslim insurgency, and the other one is the Communist insurgency, all of which have their bases in the southern part of the country. This study only focuses on the violent relations between the state and Muslim minorities in Mindanao.

The Philippines has the largest population compared to other cases in this study. As of 2021, the country's total population is 111 million (The World Bank, 2022b). According to Central Intelligence Agency (2022b), the majority of Filipino profess Roman Catholicism (79.5%); Muslims constitute six percent of the total population, which is approximately 6.6 million people. They are scattered around the country, but most Muslims are concentrated in Mindanao, the southern part of the Philippines (Islam, 1998: 193; Nishikawa, 2010: 66). Muslims in Mindanao can be divided into 13 different ethnic groups, including the Maranao, Maguindanao, Tausug, Sama, Yakan, Sangil, Badjao, Kolibugan, Jama Mapun, Iranun, Palawanon, Kalagan, and Molbog (Ferrer, 2005: 140). Among all the above groups, Maranao, Maguindanao, and Tausug constitute the majority of Muslim populations in Mindanao.

### **5.3. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE AND MUSLIM MINORITY RELATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES**

Before the modern Philippine state gained independence on July 4, 1946, the history of Muslims in Mindanao can be divided into two main periods: pre-colonization and colonization. The pre-colonization period started from the 12<sup>th</sup> century to the arrival of Spanish troops in the 16<sup>th</sup> century (Domingo, 1995: 1). There is a record that Islam reached the Moro land or the southern Philippines in 1210 by Arab Muslim traders. By the 15<sup>th</sup> century, local political institutions adopted a form of Islamic governance with such titles as the Sultanate. These include the



Sultanate of Sulu (1457–1915), the Sultanate of Maguindanao (1500-1898), and the Confederation of Sultanates in Lanao (est. 1616). Therefore, Muslims in Mindanao had ruled themselves for centuries. A significant change in political administration in the southern Philippines took place when Spanish troops arrived.

Colonization periods of the Philippines began in 1521 after Spanish troops entered the land, which consequently Christianized the majority of people in the country. Since then, Muslims in the Philippines have been called ‘Moro,’ derived from the calling of the Muslims in Spain. The arrival of the Spanish had brought them into conflict with Muslims in Mindanao, which became a series of “Moro Wars” (1565–1898). However, the Spanish never succeeded in having complete control over the Moro. The control of the Philippines’ territory changed from the Spanish to the American in 1898, which consequently lasted for 48 years in 1946. Similarly, the Americans attempted by forces to incorporate Moro territories into their control, which eventually resulted in the Moro Rebellion (1899-1913) and the establishment of the Moro Province in 1903. However, American engagement with Moro yielded a different result; Mindanao’s annexation into the Philippines was completed in this period, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu (1914-1920) was established to administer the Muslim-dominated areas.

Therefore, since the invasion of the Spanish troops in 1565, the Moro people have fought in wars against the attempts to incorporate them into the center for 455 years. Unlike the cooperative relations between Rohingya and the British during the colonial periods. The Moro relations with colonial powers were full of violent engagement. They did have some autonomy during the Spanish rule and became insistent on hanging onto these rights after this autonomy was taken away during American Occupation and the nation-building process later. However, the pattern of engagement between the Moros and the state changed after the country gained independence. Previously, the key actors from the Moro side were the traditional elites like Sultans and Datus. In the new dawn, the traditional elites and organizations tend to be less powerful than new kinds of leaders and movements, such as Nur Misuari of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Murad Ibrahim of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Thus, the new engagement between the state and

the Moros in the post-colonial era depicts different stakeholders and the starting point.

Under the nation-state of the Philippines, the armed resistance of the Muslims started after the Jabidah Massacre in 1968: a key starting point of the Moros armed groups in the modern time. According to Ferrer (2005: 118), "In Mindanao, the beginnings of the present armed Moro resistance are pegged to the 1968 controversy called the Jabidah Massacre". Following the Massacre, Datu Udtog Matalam formed Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) in 1969, seeking to establish Islamic state. In the same year, Nur Misuari founded MNLF in order to demand independence from the Philippines. The emergence of these two movements indicates that Muslim minorities lost trust in the state, and they became violent in reaction to state violence.

In the post-1960s, Muslim minorities in Mindanao continuously lived with insecurity and violence. The key violent events against Muslims include Manili Massacre and Tacub Massacre in 1971 and the implementation of Martial Law in 1972. To respond to the insecurity, they also formed new movement called Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO) in 1971. At the same time, they also sought support from Muslim countries and organizations, such as Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and Libya. The above developments indicate that the 1960s was the formative period of the new Moro movements in order to respond to the insecurity and state violence.

In the 1970s, the commitment of the Moro armed groups started to pay-off. Positively, in 1976, the OIC gave the MNLF an observer status and recognized it as the sole representative for Muslim Filipinos, while, in 1976, the MNLF and the state signed the Tripoli Agreement to establish Autonomy Region in the Southern Philippines. This positive development, however, had caused a split between the Moros. In 1978, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) were formed to demand for a more profound autonomy. Thus, the 1970s was the period that international actors came into play and Moro armed groups started to expand.

The coming of the Estrada administration (1998-2001) had made the situation worse. In 2000, he declared the all-out war against MILF, which consequently caused 750,000 displaced persons and 1,000 deaths. With the new administration in 2001, Arroyo attempted to negotiate with Moro armed groups. As a result, the current wave of violence can be considered from a new development in 2001, the year the state and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed the Tripoli

Agreement II. However, while the state the civilian-led governments tried to use peaceful settlement with the Muslim armed groups in Mindanao, state violence against the Moro did not cease to exist. It was because the military operations had continued. Today, there are many armed groups in the area, but the MNLF and MILF are the main active groups negotiating Moro's demands for autonomy and self-determination. Over time, the Moro Problem has been caught with a security concern from the government side, and the state approached the problem with violent and non-violent means.

The Moro Problem had brought international players into play. Libya, under the leadership of Gadhafi, was perhaps the first significant mover in raising Moro's agenda in the OIC meeting and accomplished the Tripoli Agreement between the Philippine government and the MNLF in 1976. After the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) was first involved in the issue in 1972, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Malaysia also took part as mediators. In 1987, the historic Jeddah Accord was signed between the Philippines government and the MNLF again. The 2001 Tripoli Agreement II was a result of the Gadhafi's commitment. In addition, Malaysia has recently been playing an active role as a mediator for both sides to agree on a peace process, especially in the 2014 agreement. The latest outcome was the Rectification of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), which was dated January 25, 2019. In short, the relations between the state and Moro Muslims have waxed and waned, but the civilian government has attempted a peaceful way to resolve the protracted violence through the peace process, decentralization, and institutional accommodation. However, state violence against Moro persists because of military influence in national politics and its veto power in counterinsurgency against Moro armed groups in Mindanao.

#### **5.4. MILITARY INFLUENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES STATE**

Military influence in the Philippines dates back to the Marcos administration (1965-1986). However, its overall development from 1946-2022 can be divided into seven periods: the pre-Marcos administration (prior to 1965), the Marcos administration, the Aquino administration, the Ramos administration, the Estrada

administration, the Arroyo administration, and the Duterte administration. Nevertheless, its significant influence on national politics dramatically emerged from Marcos's declaration of Martial Law. Since then, new civil-military relations in the Philippines have turned into the military's upper hand.

Prior to the Marcos administration, the military institution and its directions depended on civilian control. The history of the Philippines military can be dated back to 1935 when the National Defense Act was enacted. From 1935-1946, the Philippine military joined forces with the U.S. Armed Forces Far East (USFFE) in fighting against Japanese troops. Until the rise of President Ferdinand Marcos in power in 1965, no significant move from the military side to encroach on civilian government was made to alter the asymmetric civil-military relations. Thus, in the pre-Marcos era, the military was dependent on the civilian government for their career development and policymaking (Chambers, 2012: 144).

During the Marcos administration (1965-1986), the President established a patronage system within the defense establishment in order to be his backup for law enforcement. As Selochan (2004: 64) points out,

*Concerned about the military's political ambition and believing that a closer relationship with senior officers would serve his long-term interests, Marcos retained the Defense portfolio for the first thirteen months of his administration. During this period, he reshuffled the officer corps, promoting officers favorable to his political agenda and retiring others less amenable. The military was subsequently enlisted to assist in his re-election campaign.*

As a result, the military power expanded significantly during the Marcos administration, while civilian control diminished. In short, military influence in national politics started to deepen during the Marcos administration.

Moreover, a significant event occurred in 1972 when Marcos declared Martial Law in order to fight against the Muslim separatists and Communist insurgents in the south. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was informed of the new move and gave consent to Marcos before the declaration. The enforcement of Martial Law entailed profound consequences. Most significantly, it allowed the military to replace civilian agencies in both civilian affairs and the private sectors. However, Marcos faced a backlash from the Pilipino society as a consequence. The turning point of Marcos' regime started after the assassination of Ninoy Aquino in 1983 – Marcos' opposition – which became one of the triggers for the emergence of

the People Power Movement in 1986. A faction of the AFP, which was called “Reform the Armed Forces Movement” (RAM), played an important role in ousting Marcos’s regime. During the Marcos administration, “the AFP managed to institutionalize counterinsurgencies that provided rents, weapons, and plunder” (Vartavarian, 2019: 15). These developments paved the path in which the AFP influenced national decision-making in the subsequent periods.

Thus, the Martial Law, an establishment of a patronage system between the President and Military, a reserved domain for counter-insurgency operations, and the direct intervention of the RAM against Marcos showed the development of military influence in three steps. First, Marcos established legal authority to allow the military to use extraordinary measures in order to control the situation of internal security. Second, Marcos introduced a symbiotic relationship between the President and the military organization, which allowed the senior military to get into political posts and control key policy domains. Third, the new fiction of the military, who disagreed with their senior brass, established an interventionist tendency. Hence, military intervention and involvement in politics have become a common practice of civil-military relations since the Marcos administration (Hernandez, 2007; Lee, 2020).

During the Aquino administration (1986-1992), the military continued to challenge civilian control through seven coup attempts. Though all coup attempts failed, “the Ramos-led military was generally granted informal control over the direction and character of Philippine policy toward insurgents, and many soldiers were able to engage in human rights violations with impunity” (Chambers, 2012: 149). The coup attempts and the impunity of the military reaffirm the “interventionist tendency” of the military to have direct control over national politics. According to Hernandez (2007: 79), the ‘interventionist tendency’ can be characterized by the followings:

*The military’s role expansion without civilian oversight institutions and a democratic political system; the role the AFP played in the 1986 and 2001 political successions and in providing political stability and regime survival in the 1980s and at present; the military’s role in countering communist insurgency and Moro separatism; and the absence of good governance which helped shape its interventionist role.*

Thus, AFP's role expansion in internal security and national politics reinforced an interventionist practice that the military is the key factor in maintaining the peace and security of the country.

During the Ramos administration (1992-1998), though direct military intervention seemed to be uncommon, his administration institutionalized military influence through institutional channels. For instance, he appointed five retired soldiers to his cabinet and many other security elites to important political posts. Besides, Ramos gave a general amnesty to the former coup plotters and promoted many of the soldiers who had been accused of human rights violations. Besides, as Chambers (2012: 149) points out, "in 1998, he decreed Republic Act 8551, which returned internal security operation from the police to the AFP". All of these developments indicate that the military influence in national politics, as well as in the domain of internal security issues, persisted.

During the Estrada administration (1998-2001), after he attempted to reform military influence in several ways, including reducing the number of retired militaries in political posts, the military gave him a pushback. The military asserted its power by withdrawing its support to Estrada, which resulted in EDSA II (People Power II). According to Chambers (2012: 148), "AFP Chief General Angelo Reyes telephoned the president to say that he was henceforth withdrawing this support from Estrada as president." At this junction, the AFP became the key institution to push for the unconstitutional transfer of power. As a consequence, the military influence started to rise again in the subsequent periods.

During the Arroyo administration (2001-2011), the military enjoyed several privileges because of its key role in the previous intervention as well as the current service to the President. The military not only supported her morally but also helped her in vote rigging and electoral fraud (Chambers, 2012: 149; Lee, 2020: 5). In return, Arroyo appointed a high number of retired militaries to civilian posts. However, Arroyo's government was secure because senior military brass continued to support it when it faced three challenges from the junior ranks of the military in 2003, 2006, and 2007. Besides, Arroyo increased the military power and budget in the domain of internal security by enacting the 2007 Human Security Act, which "allowed warrantless searches, arrests, and temporary detentions without charges by

security forces” (Chambers, 2012: 150). Thus, instead of the military’s dependence on the civilian government like in the pre-Marcos administration, now the military influence on the civilian government was a sign of civilians’ dependence on the military. The military no longer depended on its legitimacy and development in favor of the civilian government. The condition had been in a reversal.

During the Duterte administration (2011-2022), the AFP challenged civilian decision-making several times. As Vartavarian (2019: 15) points out,

*AFP senior officers did not comply with Duterte’s attempted tilt toward China as this would jeopardize training, weaponry, and security guarantees provided by the United States...[Besides,] Senior military commanders appear to be ignoring Duterte, even going so far as calling in American special operations forces during 2017’s Marawi City Siege without the President’s prior knowledge. In addition, the AFP has thus far refused to take part in the Drug War....*

By these tokens, first, the AFP challenged Duterte’s foreign policy directly regarding the move toward China. Second, the AFP had full command of the internal security issue, and they could just ignore a decision of the President on the counterinsurgency project. Third, AFP can refuse not to take part in the policy implementation. These pushbacks from the AFP show that the civilian government has no control and veto power over the military. Thus, instead of bringing the military under civilian control, Duterte aligned with the military as a political partner by supporting its modernization problem, increasing the budget, and acting with impunity (Arugay, 2021).

Thus said, the Philippine case shows a gradual transformation from the military’s dependence on the civilian government to the civilian elites’ dependence on the military. The shift was apparent since the post-1965 events. The military influence in national politics emerged from the patronage system during the Marcos administration, in which the civilian government needed a backup for its political survival. Since then, the military has infiltrated its influence in elite recruitment, policymaking, internal security domain, national defense, and military organization. The military becomes a protector of the people and the state. When the military withdraws its support and loyalty to any government, no civilian government survives. This dominant role of military influence in politics remains a key feature of civil-military relations in the Philippines, Thailand, and Myanmar.

If examined from the old framework of civil-military relations (CMR), the Philippines may appear to have been working under civilian control since the end of Marcos's administration in 1986. However, when viewed through the lens of the new CMR framework (Croissant and Kuehn, 2009; Croissant et al., 2010, 2011; Croissant et al., 2011; Croissant, Kuehn, and Lorenz, 2012), civilian control in the Philippines has been plagued by a number of limitations and should be categorized by the extent of the military influence. In this condition, the armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) showed an 'interventionist tendency' and exerted its power in key policy domains, especially internal security and counterinsurgency (Hernandez, 2007). As Chambers (2012: 156) points out,

*Civilians traditionally granted carte blanche authority to the military in the area of internal security, allowing soldiers to deepen their influence over this and other crucial policymaking areas...[and] In fact, soldiers have informally continued to successfully breach this control in internal security, and to some extent, public policy.*

Thus, although since 1986, the Philippines' national politics has been safe from direct military intervention, military influence in vital decision-making has been paramount.

In addition, the military influence in politics has been forged through symbiotic relations between the elected government and the militaries and the veto power in the decision-making process. While the symbiotic relations occurred because the weak civilian-led government needed support from the AFP to run the state, the veto power was used when the AFP demanded the maintenance of its involvement in internal security or withdrew its support to the government. The latter event happened to the Estrada administration in 2001 when the armed forces withheld their allegiance to the government (Chambers, 2012: 156). Lee (2020) points out a condition of the military influence in the Philippines:

*The AFP remains a highly politicized institution... [and it] retains its role as veto players in the Philippines political system, and civilian political leaders are therefore compelled to ignore military indiscretion, human rights infractions, and pander instead to the institution's corporate interests (Lee, 2020: 16).*

Therefore, the AFP is no longer performing a role of a professional soldier in Huntington's sense (1957) but as a critical political actor in national politics.



**Table 14: Coup Attempts in the Philippines**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Coup attempts</b>
February 1986	When Marcos' military vice leader General Fidel Ramos and a small group of mutineers led by Enrile and Ponce break away, it sparks a popular uprising that installs political neophyte Corazon Aquino as president.
July 1986	The Manila Hotel is taken over by about 400 Marcos supporters, who then announce the establishment of a rebel government. After 38 hours, Aquino puts an end to the uprising. Twenty push-ups were performed by the mutineers as punishment.
January 1987	The private Channel 7 television station in Manila is taken over by 300 pro-Marcos soldiers, who stay there for two days before turning themselves into the authorities.
August 1987	As part of an attempted military coup, rebel officers under the command of the charismatic Colonel Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan occupy army headquarters. Before the rebels are crushed after 18 hours, 53 individuals are dead.
December 1, 1989	The Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), a fiction in the AFP, attempted to stage a coup against the government of Philippine President Corazon Aquino but failed.
January 2001	Top military and police officials, including Defence Secretary Orlando Mercado, Military Chief General Angelo Reyes, and the disgraced president Joseph Estrada's vice president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, helped put Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in power through a popular movement supported by the church.
July 2003	A one-day mutiny by approximately 300 junior personnel results in the seizure of a lavish apartment in Manila's financial sector. It is known as the Oakwood mutiny.
February 16, 2006	During a weekend reunion of the nation's military academy in a northern mountain resort, Arroyo's allies discover a conspiracy by rebel troops to seize power.
November 29, 2007	In the opulent Peninsula Hotel in Manila, about two dozen soldiers—of whom about half are facing prosecution for a botched rebellion in 2003—hunker down and demand the ouster of President Arroyo.

Source: Chambers, 2012; Lee, 2020; Murdoch, 2007.

## **5.5. MILITARY INFLUENCE AND VIOLENCE'S PERSISTENCE AGAINST MUSLIM MINORITIES IN MINDANAO**

In the case that a military is no longer a subordinate unit to the civilian government, such as in the Philippines case, it possesses not only a veto power on internal security issues but also on public policymaking concerning the use of violence against ethno-religious minorities. State violence against ethnic groups occurred after the state militarization took place to control an area where ethnic minorities are concentrated. However, militarization can only be implemented once there is a legal framework in place that permits it. Thus, the starting point of militarization can be traced back to the enactment of a legal document that permits the military to mobilize and use physical forces against targeted minorities. In the case of the Philippines, the declaration of Martial Law, the President's Orders, and the Human Security Act are the key examples of the legal tools that allowed AFP and police – security forces - to use physical force against Moro-Muslim minorities.

In the condition of the military influence in national politics, the military had a strong backup for impunity. A practice of impunity is essential because it allows militarization to take place without accountability. This practice lays a strong foundation for human rights violations, tortures, and heavy-handed operations. If this practice does not exist as a pre-condition of militarization, we can assume that the military influence over national politics is weak. In this latter condition, militarization cannot take place effectively because their military operation against ethno-religious minorities is subject to legal accountability. In other words, a choice of using violence becomes costly for the state actors if their violent operation is accountable. However, this strategy is reversed when a legal authority protects an act of using violence as legitimate enforcement. Thus, the existence of legal authority profoundly structures the way in which the military can use violence against minorities (See Table 15).

**Table 15: Legal Documents for State’s Use of Violence against Muslim Minorities in Mindanao**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Legal documents that provide legitimacy for the state's use of forces against Moro-Muslim Minorities</b>
1972	Marcos issued Executive Order No. 1081, Martial law declaration
1998	Republic Act No. 8551. The role of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in counter-insurgency functions; Sec.3 “...the primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security.”
2007	Human Security Act. The act allows warrantless searches, arrests, and temporary detentions without charges by security forces.
2017-2019	Proclamation No. 216. Declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
2017-2022	National Security Policy
2020	Republic Act No. 11479; Anti-Terrorism Act

Source: Chambers, 2012; Congress of the Philippines, 1998; President of the Philippines, 2017.

Throughout the history of state violence against Moro-Muslim minorities, several legal mechanisms provided legitimacy for APF and the police forces to use violence against dissent minorities. These include the 1972 Martial Law, 1998 Republic Act No. 8551, 2007 Human Security Act, and 2020 Republic Act No. 11479 (Anti-Terrorism Act). For example, in the Republic Act No. 8551, section 3 under the role of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in counter-insurgency functions provides legitimacy for the police to suppress and use extraordinary measures against suspects: “...the primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security.” Proclamation No. 216., which declared a state of martial law, also suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. These legal texts, followed by the Human Security Act, are examples that provide legitimacy for the

security forces to commit warrantless searches, arrests, and temporary detentions without charges by security forces.

As can be seen, from the Marcos administration to the Duterte administration, the common practice of state violence began with the formation of legal authority, which paved the way for the military's use of violence against minorities. Unfortunately, the consequence of the extraordinary measures was far-reaching beyond the expectation of the civilian government. The legal mechanism helped the AFP to expand its role from the domain of external defense to internal security. This means that the AFP is the key political actor in maintaining the civilian government. As Chambers (2012: 150) points out:

*The new law allowed warrantless searches, arrests, and temporary detentions without charges by security forces. The result, in internal security today, is that the military still has more influence than do civilians because the major input considered by the National Security Council and cabinet cluster is still based on the APF assessment.*

The AFP has been a veto player in the domain of internal security and counterinsurgency significantly, which contributed to its role expansion. This has been formally done through legal means and national policies. The above-mentioned laws provide the military's authority and license to kill. These laws not only made the military 'a primacy in internal security but also allowed the military to use force without accountability and punishment (Chambers, 2012: 150; Lee, 2020: 10). Meanwhile, the policies that expanded its power in the internal security domain include Estrada's total war in 2000 and Arroyo's all-out war against Moro Muslim insurgents in Mindanao. Besides, according to Lee (2020: 9–11), because of its involvement in internal security issues, the AFP has enjoyed unimpeded operational control and role expansion during Duterte's administration too. Thus, because the AFP dominated the domain of internal security, a response to the Bangsamoro insurgency is under the veto power of the armed forces, and militarization of Mindanao has been a key strategy. This condition of military influence contributed to the persistence of the violence. In short, all of these had strengthened the military power vis-à-vis the civilian control, especially on the counter-insurgency operations in Mindanao.

A conventional way of countering insurgency is to use military operations in order to control the situation and curb the rise of minorities' armed groups. However,

its effects are far-reaching. This has happened from the Marcos administration until the present day. The first scar is the Jabidah Massacre in 1968, which killed eleven Muslims. While the repressive government policies, such as the resettlement of the Homestead Program, had been implemented in Mindanao, the military offensive also continued. Furthermore, in the 1970s, the government formed an extreme Christian group called 'Ilaga' to fight as a paramilitary against Moro-Muslims in Mindanao, which consequently resulted in the 1971 Manili Massacre (65 Moro-Muslims were killed). In 1974, the military committed the Palimbang Massacre, which killed 1,500 people in Mindanao. Besides, in 2000 Estrada government declared an 'all-out war policy' towards the MILF, which resulted in a series of military operations: More than 1,000 were killed, and 700,000 civilians were displaced. All of these events show that violence has become a common strategy of the state to combat the Muslim insurgency, which has resulted in significant amounts of destruction and loss of lives.

Estrada's 'all-out war' operations in 2000 reinforced a conventional way of full militarization in the counter-insurgency campaign. According to "In Assertion of Sovereignty: The 2000 Campaign Against the MILF", it explains the process of militarization as follows:

*Planning for the military operation thus commenced, with Oplan Balangai serving as the take-off point for subsequent plans. Balangai was the overall internal security operations (ISO) plan of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) at that time, with communist insurgents being the explicitly stated priority, given the fact that it is the New People's Army that is the foremost challenge to Philippine security and stability then. Nonetheless, the plan had provisions for shifting attention to the Muslim secessionists if negotiations with them would fail. A contingency plan called Pisces-Alfa was then drawn out contemplating various courses of action for certain scenarios. Subsequently, the AFP Southern Command (SOUTHCAM), which covered the areas where the MILF operated, prepared Contingency Plan Sovereign Shield. AFP forces were mobilized. The SOUTHCAM's combat power including men and materiel were enhanced by other AFP units from less critical areas in Luzon and the Visayas. Several additional Philippine Army units were placed under SOUTHCAM's operational control. Philippine Navy forces in Mindanao were so organized as to provide sealift and maritime interdiction in support of ground operations. Its Philippine Marine Corps was to be involved in the ground operations, too. Close air support, troop insertion and extraction, if necessary, air patrol, air surveillance and reconnaissance, evacuation and aerial supply were to be provided by the Air Force Composite Tactical Wing covering Mindanao. Combat support elements, both intelligence and engineering, were readied. The Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Units (CAFGUs) were to be utilized. Specific roles to be played by the national police were also laid out (Pobre and Quilop, 2008: xxiv-xxv).*

The text shows that the process of militarization includes not only the AFP's active role but also the involvement of other military forces and police. However, the MILF did not disappear after this series of military operations, and the state violence persisted.

The AFP and police join forces to maintain the militarization in Mindanao. It is estimated that, out of 120,000 soldiers, the AFP had mobilized 55,000 armed forces in Mindanao (Buchanan, 2011: 29). The presence of military troops and police forces was only the tip of the iceberg in fostering state violence because they are not the only security providers on the ground. Indeed, AFP and police formed and supported civilian militias to maintain security on the ground, and their main strategies were to maintain checkpoints and the military's presence in the area. The key approach of security forces is to emphasize law enforcement. By this token, law enforcement is the tricky phrase used by military and security forces in order to introduce violence against suspicious minorities. Thus, by using law enforcement, the security force was permitted to use extraordinary measures such as detention without charge, forced disappearance, and torture against the suspects. Although this military strategy of adopting the language of law enforcement appears shrewd in terms of public communication, it heightens Moro-Muslims' mistrust of security forces. In summary, using force against suspects without charge is the essence of military law enforcement. It perpetuates a cycle of violence.

The AFP insists that a demilitarization process in Mindanao is not the right direction for resolving the conflict in Mindanao. Like the military policy in southern Thailand, the Philippine military believes that demilitarization will most likely lead to the destabilization of the area. This paradox is a critical juncture in decision-making. Because the presence of militarization relies on special laws, its presence cannot go hand in hand with respecting human rights, and human rights abuse is another form of state violence. However, there is no assurance that the local administration would be able to keep the peace and order between various ethnic groups if the area is not militarized.

However, critics may ask why the military offensives in the Philippines case did not amount to ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Moro-Muslim minorities, as in the case of Myanmar. Some nuances need to be elaborated on here.

Although the AFP's dominance over internal security acts as a sufficient condition to maintain the violence, it is insufficient to produce ethnic cleansing against the minorities. The Philippine political institutions allow Bangsamoro Muslims to be a part of the state. This inclusionary condition can be seen by establishing new institutions for Muslim affairs at both national and local levels. The national level of inclusion includes the establishment of the Ministry of Muslim Affairs, the Presidential Assistance on National Minorities (PANAMIN), the Office for Muslim Affairs (OMA), and the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF). Meanwhile, the local level of political inclusion includes the formation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC), and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The goals of this endeavor are to satisfy the demands of Muslim minorities. In effect, it has set a formal channel for the state and the minorities to negotiate. Muslim minorities have actively affected policies in this official setting, contesting the effect of the military on counterinsurgency. Hence, as opposed to the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar, political inclusion in the Philippines has acted as a preventive mechanism against ethnic cleansing.

In the present time, while the state employs militarization of the area, on the one hand, it also facilitates the peace process and decentralization on the other hand. The latter task should be accredited to the civilian leadership, which attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully. The new institutions mentioned above, such as BARMM, are examples of the conflict transformation effort. The Philippine case has made significant progress in terms of decentralization, using non-violent means to resolve the violent conflict between the state and the resistant minorities. Although international actors should also be accredited for this progress, civilian control is a key factor in forging this outcome of conciliation. Nevertheless, while the function of a moderate degree of civilian control paves the way toward reconciliation, it does not affect the persistence of violence. Therefore, making the military out of national politics is the first step in preventing the ongoing violence against minorities. Violence against Muslim minorities is likely to persist if this situation of military sway cannot be changed.

Overall taken, the current violence in the southern Philippines can be altered in two directions: positive and negative trajectories. In the former trajectory, if other factors held constant, demilitarization could lead to a peaceful outcome between the state and the minorities in the long run. In the latter trajectory, if the condition of the military influence holds constant, militarization and an emergence of an exclusionary political system are more likely to worsen the current situation. In short, the Philippine case shows the effect of military influence in the internal security domain and the counterinsurgency effort towards the persistence of violence between the state and resistant Bangsamoro minorities. However, due to the indirect influence of the AFP, the civilian-led government had made progress in the peace process and decentralization significantly.

The cases of Thailand and the Philippines have shown a paradox of policy orientations. On the one hand, demilitarization of the areas is required to move away from path-dependent violence. On the other hand, demilitarization means an increase of more risks for the weaker order of the areas. In Thailand's case, if the demilitarization takes place, Buddhist minorities in the deep south become an easy target of the Muslim insurgents. This dilemma has also been true in the case of Mindanao, where Christians and other minorities in the area become a target of attack by the Muslim insurgents. Thus, a policy of demilitarization alone without other supportive political mechanisms being provided can hardly be reasonable.

Nevertheless, the civilian-led governments in the Philippines have shown their political effort to decentralize political power in the selected areas while the process of agreed disarmament from both sides also takes place. Besides, an effort to incorporate minority armies into the state institutions occurred after a series of negotiations. In short, in order to get out of the paradox of policy orientations, demilitarization is required to take place from both sides (the state and the minorities) while the decentralization and peace process is being undertaken. This political solution is difficult because, without a condition of civilian control, the military can veto to maintain its dominant strategy of using violence.



## 5.6. CONCLUSION

Because the military control, in this case, is not as clear-cut as in the Myanmar and Thailand cases, the Philippines case requires a deeper analysis to show that military control is the key driver for state violence against the Moro Muslim Minorities in Mindanao. First, the AFP had a poor record of successful coups against civilian governments. This piece of evidence supports critics that civil-military relations in the Philippines appear to be the case of civilian control. However, when examined closely, it is found that the military has become the backbone of all civilian governments. If the AFP refuses to support any government, none is likely to survive. Thus, although the AFP did not intervene in national politics directly by a military coup, its influence on key policy domains is paramount; it does not only have policy-reserved areas but also acts as a veto player.

Second, critics may argue that though the AFP's influence in national politics is undeniable, its role in resolving the state-Muslim relations in the Philippines cannot be taken for granted. As explained in the previous parts, these relations cannot be isolated from national politics because the armed conflict in Mindanao is a part of internal security issues. In the condition that the AFP is a veto player in national politics, resolving the Moro insurgency is the reserved domain of the military. By this token, the state provides the military with legal mechanisms in order to provide legitimacy for the use of physical force and prevent them from liability, accountability, and legal punishment. Thus, the military has been privileged with a practice of impunity.

Lastly, the condition of military influence in the key policy areas contributed to the persistence of the violent relations between the state and Moro-Muslim minorities in three ways. First, the state established a legal authority and protection for the military to reinforce military operations against the Moro-Muslim minorities in Mindanao. In other words, this phase is complete when the securitization of Moro-Muslim minorities is in place. However, securitization may not necessarily be prolonged and is a different phase from militarization. Second, the militarization of the area starts to take place after the securitization of religious minorities is complete. This phase is concerned with a state action or policy implementation, which includes

law enforcement, military operations, detention, unwarranted searches, torture, and diverse forms of human rights abuse. Thus, under the condition of military influence, military operation and a hardline policy become the mainstream approach to resolving the religious conflict. Finally, with a practice of impunity, the institutionalization of militarization can hardly be altered because a change of the embedded process is costly, time-consuming, and difficult. On the contrary, it is easier and less time-consuming to reproduce and maintain an existing process of securitization and militarization. Hence, a cycle of violent relations between the state and Moro-Muslim minorities continues to persist unless the condition of military influence in national politics is diluted.



## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **CIVILIAN DOMINANCE AND PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND MUSLIM MINORITIES IN SINGAPORE**

“A tradition of civilian supremacy plays an equally important role in deterring the military from intervention. Singapore quickly established this tradition when its military was reformed following independence....”

(Walsh, 2007: 271).

“We were progressing very nicely until the surge of Islam came...I would say, today, we can integrate all religions and races except Islam... I think the Muslims socially do not cause any trouble, but they are distinct and separate”.

Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of Singapore, 2010.

(Rahim, 2012: 170).

“It would be a very tricky business for the PAP to put a Malay officer who was very religious, and who had family ties in Malaysia, in charge of a machine-gun unit.”

Lee Kuan Yew.

(Rahim, 2009: 92).

#### **6.1. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter examines the condition behind peaceful relations between the state and Muslim minorities in Singapore. Although the Singapore case represents a peaceful outcome, it does not mean that the state had totally refrained from using securitization against Muslim minorities. On the contrary, when the state under civilian control implemented securitization against Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11, the securitization did not automatically lead to militarization. Thus, this chapter argues that the general theoretical argument of civilian control explains the peaceful relations between the state and Muslim minorities better. First, it shows that securitization is not the same as militarization. The implementation of the former does not necessarily contribute to the latter. The two processes should be seen in

different phases of policy orientations. Second, the absence of military influence in decision-making prompts civilian control to engage with minorities constructively and peacefully. Finally, civilian dominance fosters dynamics of civic engagement as a dominant way of resolving minority problems.

Singapore is a Chinese-dominated society, a highly economically advanced country, and a multiracial-based island. Managing ethnoreligious minorities has not been an easy task for the policymakers in Singapore, though. Nevertheless, Singapore's case differs from the other three cases examined in this study because it demonstrates a history of peaceful relations between the state and Muslim minorities. Thus, this chapter aims to investigate the factors that affect the harmonious relationships between the state and the Muslim minority in Singapore. First, it examines how civilian supremacy in Singapore contributed to the peaceful relations between the state and Malay-Muslims. Second, it shows that while the military's domination of politics can increase the chances of state violence or violent state repression against minorities, on the contrary, the civilian-led government is less likely to adopt militarization, which leads to the persistence of state violence.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The first part discusses the background of the Singapore case by displaying basic information about its geography, demographic composition, and critical concerns about the state-Muslim minority relations. The second part illustrates key developments of the state and Muslim relations from its pre-independence periods to the present time. The third part examines the rise of civilian control and the impact of the prolonged leadership of the People's Action Party (PAP) over the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) in Singapore politics. Thus, this study sheds some light on the effect of civilian control, as the most powerful political condition, on the outcomes of the state-Muslim minority relation, as opposed to the minority-centric explanation. The final part concludes that, at the central domain of the state, civilian supremacy constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition to explain the peaceful outcome.

## 6.2. BACKGROUND

**Figure 22:** Map of Singapore



Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021.

The Republic of Singapore is a city-state island located between Malaysia and Indonesia; it has two bridges connecting the island to the Johor state of Malaysia. Demographically, Singapore comprises the Chinese majority (74 percent) and Malay minority (13.4 percent), while religiously, 33.2 percent identify themselves with Buddhism, 18.8 percent with Christianity, and 14 percent with Islam. As Malay Muslims are the largest ethnic minority and the third in terms of religious affiliation, the constitution provides a reserved special position for Malay Muslim ethnicity to be included in a presidential position. Thus, in Singapore, there is no restriction on citizenship acquisition based on race, ethnicity, and religion. Singapore has been upholding a character of authoritarian secularism: a secular authoritarian state, since its inception. (Rahim, 2012).

**Table 16: Ethnic and Religious Identities in Singapore**

	Ethnic identity		Religious identity	
Total population: 5.6 million				
Main ethnic group: Chinese	Chinese	74 %	Buddhism	31.1 %
	Malay	13.4 %	Christianity	18.9 %
			Islam	15.6 %

Source: Singapore Department of Statistics, 2020; Statista, 2022.

Singapore had gone through crucial stages of political development before becoming an independent state. First, it turned into a British colony in 1819 and later experienced Japanese occupation. Then the island was then incorporated into the Malaysian Federation in 1963 but was separated from the Federation in 1965. Its current governmental type is a parliamentary republic, currently having Halimah Jacob as the chief of state since September 2017 and Lee Hsien Loong as the head of government since August 2014. People's Action Party (PAP)-led government has been up and running since the country split from the Malaya Federation.

Although Singapore's case represents a category of peaceful relations between the state and Muslim minorities, Malay-Muslim minorities suffered a wide range of state policies' discrimination, such as an official exclusion of Malay-Muslims in security sectors and no-hijab policy (Kadir, 2004; Rahim, 2012; Walsh, 2007: 273). As is evident, racial discrimination against Muslims and the issue of their loyalty to Singapore have been crucial concerns in the state's dealings with the Muslim minority. The existence of discrimination against minorities does not necessarily lead to a violent outcome. Instead, the absence of military control and the presence of civilian supremacy is the key to understanding the condition behind peaceful relations.

Therefore, the civilian-led government has been reinforcing multiculturalism and racial coexistence, despite the fact that racial discrimination against ethno-religious minorities persists in Singapore. According to Eng and Mathews (2016: 3), the state's dominant approach towards minorities is a policy of multiculturalism: "a position that assumes and accepts the innate differences among groups and seeks to

preserve them.” As Malay ethnic groups are the dominant Muslim minorities in the country, the state has recognized their existence and ‘indigenous statuses’ since the early days. The estimated number of Muslims in the country is 780,000. The country has recognized Malay as an official language among the other three official languages - English, Mandarin, and Tamil - but English is the lingua franca. Essentially, the revised 1991 constitution secures a “reserved election for the community that has not held the office of President for five or more consecutive terms” (Government of Singapore, 1965: art. 19B; Government of Singapore, 2017: sec. 9), which allows a member of the Malay-Muslim community to contest among themselves for the office. Also, various laws, such as the 1966 Administration of Muslim Law Act, incorporated Muslim institutions into the state apparatus; these mechanisms make Muslims a part of the state apparatus.

### **6.3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE AND MUSLIM MINORITY RELATIONS IN SINGAPORE**

In the pre-colonial period, Singapore was known as Temasek. Around the 14<sup>th</sup> Century, a king embraced Islam and groomed himself with the Muslim title, including Iskandar Shah. Later, the political administration of the island was linked to the Malay Kingdoms: the Sultanate of Malacca and the Sultanate of Johor, respectively. In other words, Singapore was a part of the Malay world, which was predominated by Malay people and culture. Upon the arrival of the Dutch East India Company and British East India Company in the early 19<sup>th</sup> Century, political power on the island had been handed over to the colonial rules. Around the same period, the Chinese began to migrate from southern China to Singapore (Tong, 2005).

In the colonial period, the political history of Singapore was similar to Burma. Initially, the British ruled the island from 1818 till their defeat by the Japanese in 1942. However, unlike the case of Burma, the British-Japanese War did not cause a racial division between the Malays and local Chinese in Singapore. After the Japanese occupation of the island ended in 1945, the People’s Action Party (PAP) emerged as the key actor in Singapore’s politics in the 1959 election. During this time, the crucial political question was whether the island should be merged with

Malaysia or not. The leaders of the PAP, such as Lee Kuan Yew, believed that the benefit of the merger would outweigh it; Singapore was then incorporated into Malaysian Federation in 1963. However, subsequently, racial violence became significantly worse in Malaysia, and in 1964, the first racial tension between Chinese and Malays took place on the island, which consequently led to a big debate over the issue of Singapore's separation from the federation. Finally, Singapore was split from the federation in 1965.

Nevertheless, no mass killings between the Muslim minority and Chinese have been recorded since then; the state and Malay minorities have had a long-standing practice of multiculturalism and civic engagement. Furthermore, the Muslim minorities were present and active before Singapore's split from the Malaysian Federation. In religious matters, Singapore's Chief Kadi was set up in 1906 to deal with Islamic affairs until its role. In 1915, Muslim Advisory Board was initiated as a part of a state institution to oversee Muslim affairs in a political matter before it was replaced by the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) in 1968. Then, in 1949 Inter-Religious Organization (IRO) was established to engage in interfaith communities.

On 20 February 1961, the Singapore Malay National Organization (PKMS) was established as a political association, which was "originally formed with the sole purpose of championing and protecting the rights of the Malays in Singapore" (Singapore Malay National Organisation, 2019). This institutional development corresponds with the uncertainty of the post-independent state, which had just split from Malaya. However, after Singapore's separation from Malaya in 1965, PKMS has not been successful in Singaporean politics; it has not gained any seat in the Parliament. The party's failure indicates that Malay-Muslims in Singapore do not favor ethnic politics, which concentrates its policies exclusively on Malay ethnicity. Until the present time, PKMS has worked in opposition to the ruling party – The People's Action Party.

Nevertheless, the state has worked to strengthen its racial and religious relationships with Muslims, and its advancement serves as an example of tactics that are both inclusive and engaging. The country's inclusionary political system had paid fruitful outcomes. After the institutionalization of Islam was formalized, the state



introduced the Administration of the Muslim Law Act (AMLA) on 1 July 1968, which gave birth to the MUIS, the office of Mufti, and the Syariah Court. In terms of a political institution, it initiated The Presidential Council for Minority Rights (PCMR) in 1970 and the Council for the Development of Singapore Malay/Muslim Community in 1982. After the rise of religious revivalism in the 1980s, the state passed the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act on 31 March 1992, giving birth to the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony (PCRH). In short, prior to 9/11, religious inclusion had been a defining feature of state-Muslim minority relations.

The events in the post 9/11 are crucial for the renewed state-Muslim relations in Singapore, and it shows that the state used securitization to curb Muslims' network that was associated with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Because JI's goal was "to create a Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic state) in the region through the use of violence," its operations in Singapore were an existential threat to national security (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003: 6). In the counter-terrorist operations, the state detained 34 JI members in Singapore in 2002. As a result, the Internal Security Department (ISD) recommended three ways to counter terrorism in Singapore: enhancing security measures, policing the spread of terrorist and extremist ideology, and strengthening social cohesion and religious harmony (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003: 21–23). Instead of concentrating on the military approach, the Singaporean government is aware of how crucial an ideological reaction is to counterterrorism efforts (Bin Hassan and Pereire, 2006).

The state strengthened its involvement with the Muslim community by fostering more inclusiveness in racial and religious relations as opposed to suppressing Muslim minorities. It started with the launch of The Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles (IRCCs) in 2002, the Religious Rehabilitation Group by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2003, the National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC) under the purview of the prime minister office in 2004 after the declaration of religious harmony in 2003, and Community Engagement Program (CEP) in 2006. These new initiatives were called "soft law mechanisms" to curb any religious tensions and reduce the terrorist threat (Tan, 2009). In addition, MUIS initiated the Harmony Centre in 2007 to foster interfaith dialogue.

In short, the state is involved with Muslim minorities in both securitization and soft measures, but overall development shows that the civilian government has tackled the racial and religious relations challenges through inclusive engagement. The key development concentrates on the constitution and the state policies towards minorities, all of which will be discussed in the following sections: the constitution and Muslim minorities, legal status and Muslim minorities, government policy and Muslim organizations, and securitization of Muslim minorities.

First, the constitution of Singapore provides the guarantee of the security of Muslim minorities. The constitution itself is significant evidence of the inclusionary policy system concerning the Muslim minorities in Singapore. In the long run, this structural feature also aids in the replication of a state accommodation mechanism. The constitution provides Muslim minorities with political recognition as well as legal protection. The constitution clearly demonstrates the group's position and legal recognition by using its ethnic name.

Eight words of “Malay” appear in the Singapore constitution, while only five words of “Chinese” are mentioned therein. The first word of “Malay” was mentioned in chapter 1 (The President), under the Article 19B/4/a, which states: “The Legislature may, by law, provide for the establishment of one or more committees to decide, for the purposes of this Article, whether a person belongs to the Chinese community, the Malay community or the Indian or other minority communities” (Government of Singapore, 1965). Then, it was mentioned in article 19B/6/b to describe a Malay community. According to the constitution, a “person belonging to the Malay community means any person, whether of the Malay race or otherwise, who considers himself to be a member of the Malay community and who is generally accepted as a member of the Malay community by that community” (Government of Singapore, 1965). It shows that Malay identity and existence are first and foremost recognized by law and in the constitution.<sup>12</sup> Essentially, the constitution places emphasis on ethno-religious identity.

The state, by its constitution, also gives Malay-Muslim minorities a special position in the political realm. Under the general provisions, the section on minorities

---

<sup>12</sup> ‘Malay’ is referred to as a member of an ethnic group, while ‘Muslim’ is a member of religious group. However, the quality of ethnicity and religious identity is often intertwined. This study focuses on the importance of Muslim identity.

and special position of Malays, article 152/1 states, “It shall be the responsibility of the Government constantly to care for the interests of the racial and religious minorities in Singapore.” Article 152/2 reiterates:

*The Government shall exercise its functions in such manner as to recognize the special position of the Malays, who are the indigenous people of Singapore, and accordingly it shall be the responsibility of the Government to protect, safeguard, support, foster and promote their political, educational, religious, economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay language (Government of Singapore, 1965).*

Under the section on the Muslim religion, Article 153 states, “The Legislature shall by law make provision for regulating Muslim religious affairs and for constituting a Council to advise the President in matters relating to the Muslim religion.” In addition, under the section on official languages and national language, Article 153A/1 states that Malay, Mandarin, Tamil, and English shall be the four official languages in Singapore. Article 153A/2 supports that “The national language shall be the Malay language and shall be in the Roman script.” It shows that Malay Muslim minorities are not only protected under the constitution of Singapore, but their language is also recognized as part and parcel of the national identity. In this sense, as a minority group, the Malay is not politically vulnerable because a secular-based constitution provides a guarantee for the protection of ethnic identity.<sup>13</sup>

In addition, the constitution and laws promote cultural diversity and minority rights. The constitution gave birth to the president council for minority rights (PCMR) in 1970 and the maintenance of religious harmony act (MRHA) in 1992. Thus, under the office of the presidency, the two central bodies function to keep ethnic and religious harmony by monitoring racial-based harmful activities and providing punishment for hateful crimes. One is the PCMR, and the other one is the president council for religious harmony (PCRH). These high-level executive functions serve to promote minority rights and prevent religious tension within the country. They also show that its political institutions are inclusive of all minorities. From a top-down perspective, the country’s constitution paves the way for religious and ethnic inclusion as well as cultural coexistence.

---

<sup>13</sup> Identification of ethnic community is based on double recognition from inside and outside communities.

Second, the legal status of Muslim Minorities is strong. In the case of Singapore, civilian control had a substantial impact on establishing the crucial position of the Muslim minority and reinforcing a prevalent style of civic engagement. These were done through legal and institutional channels. Legally, the constitution of Singapore vigorously protects and recognizes the status of Muslims in the country. As stated above, Articles 19B/4/a, 19B/6/b, 152/1, 152/2, 153, 153A/1, and 153A/2 demonstrate the protection and special position of the Malay Muslim minorities in Singapore. The section on the history of Muslim minorities in Singapore also suggests that they were organized as a civic association and institution before independence. This prevalent style of Muslim minority practice has continued until the present time. The effect of this is the strong institutionalization of Muslim affairs in the state. This includes the reservation of the presidency position for the Malay community. Another example is the role of MUIS. The MUIS has been the main organ of the state to reach out and engage with Muslim minorities. In addition, Muslim minorities were not considered guests of the country. Instead, their status had been formalized as ‘indigenous’ in the constitution.

Besides, the persistent civilian control allowed the inclusionary political system to continue; Malay-Muslims in Singapore are free to compete with members of other religious groups to get into the state administration. Members of Parliament (MPs) are key to building political power in a condition of civilian control. Because they are a representative of their communities and a bridge between the state and their ethnic groups, their existence indicates their ethnic status in national politics. So far, Singapore has 13 sets of parliaments, and its present 13th Parliament consists of 100 members, of which 12 people are Muslims (Parliament of Singapore, 2017). Twelve percent of the MPs were the representatives of the 14 percent Malay ethnic group in the country. Besides the role of the ethnic Malay MPs, many other Muslim-based institutions are also working to deal with Muslim affairs. By this token, they are far from being vulnerable. Thus, the challenge of Muslims in Singapore goes beyond the deprivation of fundamental civil and political rights such as citizenship status or government suppression. Instead, their agenda has been to improve their human development, cultural coexistence, and social cohesion. In short, the vital status of Malay-Muslim minorities in Singapore politics is a product of the existing

conditions of civilian control. In this condition, it does not encourage religious movements to occur.

Third, civilian-led government policies and Muslim organizations support mutual cooperation and peaceful relations. The state delegates its authority to Muslim communities to govern themselves in dealing with Islamic affairs through the institutionalization of Islam. The central policy related to Muslim minorities in Singapore is centered on policy and the existence of the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore or known as 'MUIS.' the MUIS is the body of the state, and its role and function are to serve Muslim/Malay communities in relation to the state. It aims at building "a gracious Muslim community of excellence that inspires and radiates blessings to all" with a mission "to work with the community in developing a profound religious life and dynamic institutions" (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, 2020). In particular, its role is to manage Muslim affairs:

*To see that the many and varied interests of Singapore's Muslim community are looked after. In this regard, MUIS is responsible for the promotion of religious, social, educational, economic, and cultural activities in accordance with the principles and traditions of Islam as enshrined in the Holy Quran and Sunnah (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, 1968).*


The experts on Muslim studies in Singapore assert, "Singapore's policies towards religion, for example, the policies of MUIS, involve strategies of upgrading to bring about the positive management of religion" (Nasir et al., 2010: 32). Under the authority of MUIS, it oversees three other institutions: Mufti, a committee of Fatwa, and Halal certificate. These authorities not only deal with religious matters but are also involved in the sociopolitical affair of Muslims, such as the rehabilitation of former Muslim extremists, providing scholarships, and organizing social cohesion projects. Its strategic priority aims "to set the Islamic agenda, shape religious life and forge the Singaporean Muslim Identity" (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore:1). Its Fatwa has been instrumental in integrating religious issues with national and civil duties (Ibrahim, 2017).<sup>14</sup> Thus, the existence of the MUIS is an element of the inclusion of Muslim minorities into the state apparatus.

---

<sup>14</sup> For instance, the Mufti of the country in 2017 asserts that "finding answer to new questions is not a straightforward as conveniently saying let's go back to Quran and Sunnah. A responsible fatwa authority is one that provides guidance to the real challenges faced by communities" (Ibrahim, 2017).

The state supports MUIS through annual government grants. From 2011 to 2018, the annual grant increased from 3.5 million dollars in 2011 to 13.7 million dollars in 2018 (Figure 23). The grant was divided into a grant in aid and a reinvestment fund. According to the annual report, “the Grant-In-Aid is used to fund key positions, public communication and community outreach, research and community development, and religious education development. The reinvestment fund is used to strengthen the board’s leadership, cybersecurity, and ICT infrastructure, as well as to provide support for the Singaporean Muslim community” (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, 2019: 103). MUIS has to report to the Minister-In-Charge of Muslim Affairs and the Ministry of Community Development (Ibrahim, 1994: 72; Shah et al., 2019: 12). Through political recognition and financial support, the peaceful state-Muslim minority relations have been sustained, and it has become a model for other Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia.

**Figure 23: Government Grant to MUIS 2011-2018**



Source: Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.

The civilian leadership has frequently engaged in religious events of Muslim minorities. During the fasting month of Ramadan, there is no record that the government leaders had a concrete policy to host an Iftar reception to celebrate cultural diversity, but high-level policymakers joined Iftar programs across the country. For instance, in 2017, President Tony Tan Keng Yam joined the Iftar at

Yusof Ishak Mosque (Huiwen, 2017), Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong also joined the iftar at the Al-Muttaqin Mosque (Yong, 2017), and in 2018 he joined the program at the Maarof Mosque (Baharudin, 2018). In 2019 this practice of the state-Muslim minority engagement at a societal level also continued (The Straits Times, 2019b; Yee, 2019). An engagement between the Muslim minorities and the government demonstrates a positive sign of social and cultural coexistence.

Indeed, political inclusion and state accommodation are allowed to operate in the first place because the condition of civilian supremacy prevails. The state-Malay minority relations suggest that when civilian control has been institutionalized, it maintains peaceful relations between the state and Muslim minorities. Thus, political inclusion may be a supportive condition for the persistence of peaceful cooperation between the state and the minorities, but it is insufficient to prevent violence against minorities. The following section will illustrate the effect of civilian control on the persistence of peaceful cooperation between the state and Malay-Muslims in Singapore.

Lastly, the securitization of Malay-Muslim minorities in Singapore was temporal and short-term. In the aftermath of the 9/11 event, the civilian government fought the war on terror alongside the USA in fighting against terrorist networks in Southeast Asia (Abuza, 2003; Abuza and Clarke, 2019). In 2002, the state securitized Muslim minorities in the political sector in order to maintain national security. As mentioned earlier, the case of 31 detainees, who were involved with the JI, was on high alert, and Singapore policymakers were aware that if the country were affected by instability and terrorist issues, its economy would be severely affected. Thus, securitization of terrorism has been on the top security agenda for the country till the present time. However, there was no public record of militarization. On the contrary, Minister of Home Affairs, Kasiviswanathan Shanmugam, points out that to curb the impact of global terrorism, Singapore needs to prevent the social securitization of Muslim minorities. In his words: “if non-Muslim Singaporeans develop Islamophobic attitudes, they will be playing right into the hands of terrorists who want Muslims marginalised in order to create fertile ground for the recruitment of terrorists” (Ang, 2016).

In addition, the civilian-led government tends to pay more attention to the issue of religious and racial harmony as a preventive measure. Nasir and his colleagues (2010: 115) assert that “[t]he security issue for Singapore hinges to a large extent on sustaining ‘racial harmony’ internally and avoiding security threats emerging in the region around racial and ethnic conflict.” Based on that, Singapore takes a ‘soft legal mechanism’ to curb and regulate a potential threat (Tan, 2009). In 2019, the Minister of Foreign Affairs asserted that Singapore faced three main challenges: polarization, radicalization, and cyber threats. In response, they concentrated on a proactive approach that addressed the problems: “The first is to address the social disruption brought about by technological advancements; second, to promote interfaith dialogue and enact laws to fight fake news; and third, to take a multi-faceted approach to tackle cyber threats” (The Straits Times, 2019a). Thus, instead of militarizing against the Muslim minority group, the policymakers attempted to promote minority rights and social cohesion.

#### **6.4. CIVILIAN SUPREMACY AND THE PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND MALAY-MUSLIM MINORITIES IN SINGAPORE**

The above overview has shown the development of political history concerning the state-Muslim minority relations in Singapore. It demonstrated that a prevalent condition of political inclusion and a strong status of Muslim minorities in Singapore had been reproduced through legal mechanisms such as the constitution and other laws and the institutionalization of Muslim minorities such as the role of MUIS and other state bodies. Nonetheless, all of these positive outcomes were allowed to happen in the first place because Singapore’s state has been controlled by the civilian-led government and the absence of military intervention. In other words, the origin of peace relations is derived from civilian control. The high level of civilian control provides the most theoretical leverage to explain the peaceful relations between the state and Malay-Muslim minorities. In short, the most significant impact of civilian control over the state-Malay-Muslim minority relations



has been the restriction of the state to use violence: the absence of state militarization.

The origin of Singapore's new nation-state is quite different from other cases in Southeast Asia because it had not emerged from the struggle between the local natives against colonial powers; Singapore's independence was a result of a British withdrawal from Malaya and the Chinese-dominated island's expulsion from the Malaysia Federation. As such, The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) did not involve in the struggle and the emergence of the new nation-state. As Yong (2011: 151) observes, "The emergence and subsequent development of the SAF were largely driven by the PAP's preoccupation with state-building in post-1965 Singapore."

The civilian rule under the People's Action Party (PAP) had set a firm ground for the SAF to be subordinate to the civilian-led government by defining national security based on military, civil, economic, social, and psychological principles – the total defense doctrine. Accordingly, Tan Tai Yong (2001: 289) contents that "because national security is not the exclusive domain of the armed forces, there is no justification for the military whatsoever to lay claim to political power and material resources even in the severest of circumstances." Similarly, Croissant and Lorenz (2018b: 276) view that, since its independence, the PAP had made the SAF "the most modern and professional militaries in Southeast Asia." This starting point allowed civilians to control military and political institutions from the early stages of state-building.

Because the roles between the military and civilian institutions are fused, the PAP makes use of the military institutions as "a common pool of national elites" in order to recruit, train, and prepare talents to work in other administrative and political positions if they are desired (Kwok, 2010: 58; Tan, 2001: 290). For instance, a scholar-soldier program introduced in 1971 aimed to attract middle-career talents from the SAF to study at the top universities in exchange for a return to serve in key administrative positions (Laksmana, 2017: 358). This fusion strategy differed from the symbiotic relations between the two institutions in the Philippines' case because the SAF has no institutional prerogatives in any policy domain, which civilians strictly control. Instead, this 'dual-career scheme' opens an institutional channel for the senior SAF officers who desire to shift their career paths and work in various

governmental services. Therefore, the civilian-led government in Singapore has long been controlling the key policy decision-making domains by employing a strategy of civil-military fusion.

The persistence of civilian supremacy had institutionalized subordination of the SAF via a legal and institutional mechanism. Legally, the constitution has made a clear statement of anti-coup attempts by mentioning, “No surrender of sovereignty or relinquishment of control over the Police Force or the Armed Forces except by referendum” (Government of Singapore, 1965: 3). Subsequently, it also restricts the SAF and the police force’s power expansion by the 1972 Singapore Armed Force Acts and the 2004 Police Force Act. Institutionally, the ministry of defense, which is under full command of civilian control, oversees the policy and implementation of the SAF. Civilians also control the council of the armed forces: a top institution that makes essential decisions on security issues. Thus, this condition has structured the way in which the PAP firmly maintains civilian supremacy over the military institution. As a result, over its 57 years of state-building, Singapore has faced no attempts of military intervention. According to Walsh (2007), this condition was maintained because of the path dependency of civilian supremacy:

*A tradition of civilian supremacy plays an equally important role in deterring the military from intervention. Singapore quickly established this tradition when its military was before following independence, in large part because of the fact that most of its new senior leaders were appointed from the civil service rather than from within the existing command structure (mostly because of a desire to remove ethnic Malay from military leadership) (Walsh, 2007: 271).*

The persistence of civilian control brings advantages to peaceful relations between the state and the Muslim minority in Singapore in at least two ways. First, in line with the literature of a new framework for understanding civil-military relations, the condition of civilian control restricts using military means to solve conflicts. Two key historical events are evidence of the state constraints. One is the aftermath of the 1964 racial riot, and the other is the discovery of the JI network in Singapore. In the aftermath of the two events, the state did not develop an increase of militarization over Malay communities. On the contrary, the civilian government has developed an institutional channel, working with the Malay-Muslim communities, to curb religious extremism in the country. The discovery of the JI network in Singapore was a shocking moment both for the government and Malay-Muslim groups. However, the

state chose a soft policy approach and engaged with MUIS in order to govern the Malay-Muslim group.

Second, the civilian-led government has helped foster civic engagement from Muslim minority organizations. The same example of JI's arrest can be used to support this point. After the imprisonment of the JI members in Singapore, the reaction of the Malay-Muslim group had been in support of the state approach, that is, to condemn the act of terrorism as a deviant act in Islam.

*From shocked disbelief that such a network had evolved in Singapore, Muslim organizations came out in support of the arrests. All condemned the planned actions of the JI members and pointed out that such actions were not Islamic. Most felt that JI member had been let astray by external or foreign elements (Kadir, 2004: 303).*

This event let Muslim organizations actively work with government agencies to overcome any localized Muslim grievances. The key at this juncture is the increasing role of civic associations and political parties. Malay-Muslims are not only engaged in national politics, but they have also formed numerous numbers of civil society organizations. Essentially, they were integrated into the leading political party, playing a key role since the country's formation. By these tokens, as the People's Action Party, the civilian-led government, has successfully institutionalized a condition of civilian control over the military institution, the Muslim politicians played a key role in governing Muslim affairs in the country.

Essentially, the Singapore case testifies that when the necessary and sufficient condition of reproducing violence – military control – is absent, any supportive variables for reinforcing violence also vastly decrease.

## **6.5. CONCLUSION**

This chapter examined the condition behind the peaceful cooperation between the state and Muslim minorities in Singapore and argued that the persistence of civilian control in the Singapore case has led to such an outcome. The PAP, a civilian-led government, has reinforced the condition of civilian control by setting the necessary laws to curtail the military's institutional prerogative and making a model of civil-military fusion. The condition of civilian control persists because the civilian-led government successfully institutionalized professional soldiers on the

one hand and opened an institutional channel for them to transition from a military career to other administrative positions if they so desired on the other hand. Nevertheless, when civilian control prevails, it contributes to the absence of militarization of the Malay-Muslim minorities and the presence of the vital status of Muslim minorities. These three contributing variables help reinforce the existence of civilian control. It functions as a feedback loop to maintain civilian dominance. As a result, this feedback loop reinforces itself, maintaining peaceful relations between the state and Muslim minorities.

In comparison with the other cases examined in this thesis, the findings from the Singapore case demonstrate that civilian control is *sine qua non* for the persistence of peaceful relations between the state and Muslim minorities. This outcome occurs because such a condition did not appear in other cases that experienced different levels of violent outcomes. Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines are all caught with varying levels of military control. In addition, when checked across other similar cases of civilian control in the regions such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Laos, the result shows that the condition of civilian control alone constitutes a necessary and sufficient condition for sustaining peaceful relations between the state and the minorities.

Besides, when checked across the cases that obtain the presence of political inclusion, such as Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore, we find that it does not correspond to the presence of a peaceful outcome. For instance, though there is a condition of political inclusion in Thailand and the Philippines, such existence has not prevented violent relations from ceasing. In both cases, violent relations between the state and the Muslim minorities have persisted. Thus, the only outstanding condition is the presence of the civilian control in the Singapore case, which corresponds to the presence of non-violent outcomes. In sum the condition behind the peaceful relations between the state and Muslim minorities seems to be mostly dependent on the persistence of civilian control.

**Table 17: Development of The State-Muslim Minority Relations in Singapore**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Description</b>
1880	Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance
1906	Singapore's Chief Kadi
1915	Muslim Advisory Board was set up
1949	Inter-Religious Organization (IRO) was established
February 20, 1961	The Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (PKMS) or Singapore Malay National Organization was established.
1964	Racial riot in Singapore between Chinese and Malay-Muslims
August 9, 1965	Independence
1965	Implementing the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA).
1968	establishment of the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, or Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS)
1968	Appointment of Mufti
1968	Syariah Court
1970	The Presidential Council for Minority Rights (PCMR) is founded.
1977	The first Minister-In-Charge of Muslim Affairs, Dr. Ahmad Mattar, was appointed. Until now, 4 Muslims have served in this position. All these positions were appointed.
1980	Majlis Pendidikan Anak-Anak Islam (MENDAKI - Council for the Development of Singapore Malay/Muslim Community) was established (Kadir, 2004: 339). In general, Singaporean Muslims are doing worse in economic conditions than their Chinese counterparts.
June 15, 1990	The bill to maintain religious harmony was approved. (The maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill)
March 31, 1992	MRHA, or the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, is in force.
1992	Presidential Council for Religious Harmony (PCRH) was set up.
September 11, 2001	World Trade Center was attacked in New York.
January 4, 2002	Tudung controversy (Kadir, 2004: 336)
January 2002	Thirteen people were detained for being suspected of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Singapore decided to arrest JI members because of the pressure of the USA's policy on counterterrorism.
2002	The Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles (IRCCs) were initiated.
July 1, 2003	White Paper (a paper presented to the Parliament) on the Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism
2003	Declaration of Religious Harmony

2003	Ministry of Home Affairs launched the Religious Rehabilitation Group for the former JI members.
2004	The National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC), under the purview of the prime minister's office, was established.
2006	The community Engagement Program (CEP) was launched.
2007	MUIS initiated Harmony Center
2017	Halima Jacob was selected as the President of the country

Source: Kwang, 2019; Mathews, 2016; Musa and Taib, 2015; National Library Board, 2014; The Government of Singapore, 1968; The Government of Singapore, 1992.



## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis attempted to explore the conditions behind the persistence of peaceful and violent relations between the states and Muslim minorities in Myanmar, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore. It showed that the divergent point of the peaceful and violent paths lies in the different features of civil-military relations in national politics and its control over the internal security issue. On the one hand, military control has contributed to the persistence of violence between the states and Muslim minority armed groups. On the other hand, civilian control has shaped a different route toward peaceful and cooperative relations between the state and Muslim minorities. In other words, the military, as a violent expert and violent entrepreneur, is not fitted for resolving political problems because it is trained to implement the principle of maximum force in warfare (Rasmussen, 1999: 35). The non-violent pattern needs different sets of principles and paradigms to resolve violent conflict (Satha-Anand, 1981).

Proponents of institutionalism may argue that an effect of political inclusion and integration shapes the state-Muslim minority relations better. For instance, the multiculturalism policy and Muslim inclusion in Singapore determine peaceful engagement between the state and Muslim minorities and prevent them from turning violent against the state. Nonetheless, such mentioned policies and practices also existed in Thailand and the Philippines cases, but they yielded a different outcome. From a comparative perspective, the implementation of political inclusion through the legal and institutional channels has not eliminated the tendency of state violence against Muslim minorities. Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines' cases demonstrated a similar pattern of political inclusion in which the Muslim minorities are accessible to the political system and gain preferential treatment from the states, yet only Malay-Muslims in Singapore are safe from state violence. Thus, an examination of three cases suggests that while political inclusion of Muslim minorities may have fostered minorities' integration into the larger nation, inclusion per se is not sufficient to ensure an absence of state violence against Muslim minorities in Thailand and the Philippines.

The thesis has focused on the effect of the state as the first mover. But the point is not about a state in its entirety. A state composes of many organizations and institutions, such as public universities, state-run banks, state-run TV channels, public hospitals, parliament, courts, police, office of the prime minister, and armed forces. These state institutions work for different missions and have different roles. However, there is one factor in a state that determines its whole body, and when this factor becomes its dominant condition, such a state shall have a certain way of dealing with Muslim minorities. That factor is military control. Thus, who controls a state matters most significantly.

Hence, any change in the state-Muslim minority relations is more likely to come from a change in civil-military relations. If the military remains the dominant actor in national politics and controls the key policy domains (Croissant and Kuehn, 2009; Croissant et al., 2012), then state violence against Muslim minorities is more likely to persist. After all, it seems to have two way-outs of resolving the persistence of state violence in the selected cases. One is to make the military non-violent, and the other is to take the military out of politics. In both scenarios, it seems to be infeasible in the near future in the case of Myanmar and Thailand. The Philippines case is more hopeful because military control in national politics is indirect, and it allows civilian governments to survive for a long period of time. Meanwhile, the Singapore case is a clear example of civilian control contributing to the persistence of peaceful relations between the state and Muslim minorities.

The rest of the chapter summarizes its key findings into four points: the common suffering, the similar pattern of state violence, the key common conditions contributing to state violence, and the breakaway path. The Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines cases form a common pool of similarities in having common sufferings, common patterns of state violence, and similar conditions of military control. On the contrary, the Singapore case shows the difference in the effect civil-military relations have on state-Muslim minority relations.



Common Sufferings; Muslim minorities in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines cases have suffered from a similar form of state violence. These include ethnic cleansing, mass killings, kidnapping, detention without charge, forced appearance, extrajudicial killings, rapes, oppression, torture, and other kinds of human rights violations. Similar hardline policies had also been found, such as relocation and resettlement of non-locals into the Muslims' concentrated areas, policies of cultural assimilation and integration, and military operations. All of these violent sufferings are in the collective memories of the Muslim minorities' victimhood (Mohamad, 2018). These common features are not derived from a myth but from the real-life experiences that Muslims, as a minority, suffered from state violence in these countries.

These common sufferings can easily be accumulated and used by the primordialist leaders of Muslim minorities who believe that their ethno-religious identity is the essence of their existence. Many Muslim minorities' armed groups, such as MNLF and MILF in Mindanao, BRN in southern Thailand, and ARSA in Myanmar, emerged from the mobilization of the common sufferings they persistently faced in their difficult daily lives (Che Man, 1990; Pitsuwan, 1982). Though it has not been easy for the primordialist leaders to overcome the collective action problem because life sacrifice is costly, the persistence of state violence in many forms reinforces the belief that a violent response is the only way to communicate with the state and express their grievances. Thus, common sufferings prompt ethno-religious minorities to use violence as a communicative action in order to respond to state policies and their oppressive policy implementations.

**Table 18: Key Examples of State Violence against Muslim Minorities**

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Key Examples of State Violence against Muslim Minorities</b>
Myanmar	Operation Monsoon (1954), Operation Dragon King (1978), Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation (1991–1992), Clearance Operation (2017)
Thailand	Dusun-Nyor Massacre (1948), Haji Sulong’s Forced Disappearance (1954), Sapan Koto Killing (1975), Krue Se Massacre (2004), Tak Bai (2004), Somchai Neelapaijit’s forced disappearance (2004)
The Philippines	Jabidah Massacre (1968), Manili Massacre (1971), Malisbong Massacre (1974), Estrada’s “All Out War” Policy (2000)

Source: Al Jazeera, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; Yale Law School, 2015; Amnesty International, 2017; Chambers, 2011; Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, 2018; Satha-Anand, 2009; Lee, 2020; Zarni and Cowley, 2014.

**Common Pattern;** The study has found a common pattern of the state’s use of violence in three cases. There are two steps in using state violence against religious minorities in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines. First, states come up with legal permission to use violence or to pave the way for using violence. This step can be called a setup of the de jure state violence or securitization process. In the case of Rohingya in Myanmar, the military junta used the citizenship law to strip their status of citizenship before launching its military operations against them. In all cases, the state introduces extraordinary measures such as martial law, security acts, and executive orders to open up the way for militarization. However, securitization can be short-term and temporary, and it may not automatically lead to militarization.

Second, after the securitization process is in place, the states enforce the de facto violence or militarization of the area, which leads to the persistence of state violence against religious minorities. This step includes the mobilization of army troops and security forces into the targeted areas, setting up security checkpoints on the public roads, and launching military operations. In most cases, military operations include intelligence works, unwarranted searches, detention without charges, tortures, kidnapping, forced disappearance, extrajudicial killing, mass

killing, assassination, surveillance, and military operations. Often, the security forces use the phrase 'law enforcement' to implement all extraordinary measures.

The state's use of law enforcement discourse is problematic because the special law is not a normal legal instrument but an exceptional one that provides extraordinary power for security forces. These legal mechanisms allow all security forces to transgress all basic human rights and set aside existing ordinary laws. In this sense, state security forces can use violence against religious minorities without any legal accountability because state use of violence is a law-binding *per se*. As a consequence, this practice reinforces a culture of impunity and, in turn, maintains a cycle of state violence.

Key Condition; This thesis argued that the common sufferings and patterns of state violence mentioned above persist because of the effect of military control and influence. In other words, the persistence of military control reinforces and reproduces the common pattern of state violence, and it can hardly be diluted. In the cases of the Tatmadaw in Myanmar, the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) in Thailand, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the Philippines, military institutions are successful in intervening in national politics. The Myanmar case is the clearest example. Since the 1962 coup, Tatmadaw has directly been ruling the country until the present time, except for a short period of democratization in 2015-2020, and maintains its position as the strongest and leading state institution in carrying out internal security issues. The 2021 military coup in Myanmar reaffirmed the tradition of military rules. Because of the effect of military rule, Rohingya heavily and persistently suffered from state militarization.

The Thailand case also supports the argument of military control as a key condition contributing to state militarization against Muslim minorities. In 2006 and 2014, military coups in Thailand re-established military dominance in national politics. In effect, the monarchized military has successfully controlled the decision-making power in key policy domains and remained in leadership positions, including the commander-in-chief, senators, ministers, and the prime minister. With regard to internal security, the military and the ISOC possess the authority to establish policies and guidelines that govern its operations and dominate non-military security forces, law enforcement agencies, and the national intelligence apparatus. By this token, the

military government institutionalized militarization in the deep south, which was backed up by the implementation of special laws and extraordinary measures. In effect, the commission of all sorts of human rights violations and military operations in the areas has reinforced violent engagement between the state and Malay-Muslims' armed groups.

Military influence in national politics and internal security issues is also found in the Philippine case. The military developed its political power gradually from a weak position, which was once dependent on the civilian government, to a position of veto power, which the survival of the civilian governments has had to rely on. For example, the military's withdrawal of political support to a civilian government led to the collapse of the government. Though the AFP did not prefer direct military intervention, it maintained a symbiotic relationship with the civilian governments. Similar to other violent cases, after the AFP received a green light through legal mechanisms to carry out the military operation, militarization in Mindanao started to institutionalize. As a result, the military not only expanded its role to cover non-security issues but also reinforced extrajudicial killings, military operations, and human rights violations. By this token, the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2018 reaffirmed the maintenance of impunity practice.

Thus, state violence against Muslim minorities persists because militarization is paid off. Once violent repression has been institutionalized as a military's mode of operation against Muslim insurgents, it reduces transaction costs of information sharing and starts to embed as a routine implementation. Once militarization is routinized, it is difficult to change. It is because "[t]he costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchment of certain institutional arrangements obstructs an easy reversal of the initial choice" (Levi, 1997: 28). As happened in the Rakhine state of Myanmar, southern Thailand, and the southern Philippines, when the institutionalization of militarization of the area takes root after some periods, the opposite trajectory is costly and dubious. It is because militarization becomes the only feasible way for the state to maintain order in Muslim-concentrated areas. On the one hand, this violent condition reproduced a necessity of maintaining militarization. On the other hand, it reinforces Muslim

minorities to take up arms as the only way to react to state violence. In the end, violence becomes the equilibrium of their engagement.

Overall taken, military control tends to reinforce and upholds a hardline policy, repressive actions, military operations, and a commission of human rights violations as a mainstream approach toward resolving the violence between the state and Muslim minorities. This pattern consequently becomes self-reinforcing. From the outcome-based analysis, the thesis showed that the outcome of violent relations started from securitization and militarization as a common pattern in all cases. The persistence of such relations continues because of the common pattern's activation, but such a pattern is established and prolonged because of the enduring condition of military dominance in national politics in the first place. Thus, military control is the structural condition that lays the strong foundation of militarization as the main approach to countering Muslim minorities.

The Breakaway Path; The Singapore case demonstrates a breakaway path in this thesis. It shows that breaking with the common pattern of state violence against Muslim minorities is possible. The persistence of peaceful relations between the state and Malay-Muslim minorities in Singapore has been possible because of the legacy of civilian control in national politics. Unlike the other cases examined in this thesis, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) did not emerge from a liberation army during the independence war and decolonization movement, and thus it was not privileged with the status of being a guardian of the nation. Instead, the civilian government uses military institutions as a gateway, such as soldier-scholar programs, to recruit talents into bureaucracy and political careers. The Singapore model of 'civil-military fusion' guarantees the dominant position of civilian control and the professional military's advancement. By this token, the civilian governments not only define but also direct policies of racial harmony and social cohesion toward Malay-Muslim minorities, while the military maintains what Huntington (1957) calls 'military professionalism.' Even in the fight against the JI's network in Singapore, the state refrained from using physical violence and militarization against Malay-Muslims. On the contrary, it introduced the re-habitation and reintegration approach towards the former terrorists. Thus, the Singapore case demonstrates that civilian governments are prone to using

the non-military approach in establishing peaceful relations between the state and Malay-Muslim minorities.

In comparison, while the Singapore case showed the effect of objective civilian control in Huntington's term (1957), the cases of Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines demonstrate that the military's role expansion as a result of military control or the 'new military professionalism' in Stepan's term (1973) is the prominent feature of civil-military relations. In other words, the civilian government in Singapore has been able to control five key policy domains in elite recruitment, public policymaking, internal security, national defense, and military organization, while the rest of the countries have failed to do so. In effect, the case of civilian control has paved the way for the persistence of peaceful relations between the state and Muslim minorities, while the case of military control has reinforced the violent engagement between them. These different paths have meaningfully been shaped by the structural condition of military control, which was not a product of the current political crisis in the region.

In sum, variations in civil-military relations have significantly affected the way in which the states define their relations with Muslim minorities. Military control constitutes a military operation, repressive policy, and violent means as the mainstream approach to engaging with Muslim minorities. In contrast, civilian control facilitates peaceful means and cooperative strategies as the main approach to engaging with Muslim minorities. In effect, the condition of military control maintains the persistence of state violence through the institutionalization of securitization and militarization. When the latter process is embedded in the policy implementation, it can hardly be altered because, on the one hand, successful militarization already overcomes the problem of transaction cost, and, on the other hand, it facilitates any coordination and cooperation efforts between the state institutions that are involved in policy enforcement. Possible change in the state-Muslim minority relations can take place substantially only if the change in civil-military relations has been made in favor of civilian control.

**Table 19: Summary of Key Conditions and the Outcomes**

<b>Key conditions</b>	<b>Key mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcomes</b>
Military control	Securitization and Militarization	Persistence of violent relations
Civilian control	Minority engagement, racial harmony, social cohesion, multiculturalism	Persistence of peaceful relations

Source: Author's Analysis.



## REFERENCES

Abinales, P. (2000). *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the Philippine nation-state*. Quezon City: Ateneo University Press.

Abuza, Z. (2003). *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Abuza, Z., and Clarke, C. (16.11.2019). ISIS Seeks New Outposts in Southeast Asia. *Foreign Affairs*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeast-asia/2019-09-16/islamic-state-meets-southeast-asia>, (11.10.2019).

Ahmed, I. (04.10.2017). The Historical Roots of the Rohingya Crisis. *Asia Dialogue*. <https://theasiadialogue.com/2017/10/04/the-historical-roots-of-the-rohingya-crisis/>, (10.11.2019).

Aknur, M. (2005). *Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Analysis of Civilian Leaders*. (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). Montreal: Department of Political Science of the McGill University.

Al Jazeera. (25.02.2017a). The Rakhine Crisis. *Al Jazeera*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/inthefield/2017/02/myanmar-rohingya-peace-170225092947661.html>, (11.10.2019)

Al Jazeera. (27.03.2017b). Myanmar army chief rules out Rohingya citizenship. *Al Jazeera*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/videos/2017/03/27/myanmar-army-chief-rules-out-rohingya-citizenship/>, (11.10.2019).

Al Jazeera. (28.03.2017c). Myanmar army chief rules out Rohingya citizenship. *Al Jazeera*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/video/news/2017/03/myanmar-army-chief-rules-rohingya-citizenship-170327141825350.html>, (11.10.2019).



Al Jazeera. (01.10.2017d). The Rohingya: The Latest Massacre in a Violence-Filled History. *Al Jazeera*. <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2017/10/rohingya-latest-massacre-violence-filled-history-171001105229956.html>, (11.10.2019).

Al Jazeera. (11.11.2019). Gambia files Rohingya genocide case against Myanmar at UN court. *Al Jazeera*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/11/gambia-files-rohingya-genocide-case-against-myanmar-at-un-court>, (11.11.2020).

Al Jazeera. (23.02.2022). Rohingya Genocide case legitimate, The Gambia tells UN top court. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/23/genocide-case-is-legitimate-gambia-tells-un-top-court>, (25.05.2022).

Alagappa, M. (Ed.). (2001). *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School. (2015). *Persecution of the Rohingya Muslims: Is Genocide Occurring in Myanmar's Rakhine State? A Legal Analysis*. Fortify Rights. <https://www.fortifyrights.org/mya-inv-rep-2015-10-29/>, (22.10.2020).

Almond, G., Powell, G., Strom, K., and Dalton, R. (2004). *Comparative Politics: A Theoretical Framework* (Fourth). New York: Pearson & Longman.

Amnesty International. (2017). *"My World Is Finished": Rohingya Targeted in Crimes Against Humanity in Myanmar* (No. ASA 16/7288/2017). London: Amnesty International.

Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition* (Revised edition). London; New York: Verso.

Andre, V. (2012). 'Neojihadism' and YouTube: Patani militant propaganda dissemination and radicalization. *Asian Security*. 8(1): 27–53.

Andre, V. (2016). Thai Cyber-Actors: Evidence of an Islamophobic Effect. *Boundaries of Religious Freedom: Regulating Religion in Diverse Societies. Fear of Muslims?* (pp. 111–130). Cham: Springer.

Ang, D. (30.03.2016). *Minister K Shanmugam: Islamophobia Poses 'Significant Risk' to Multi-Racial Singapore*. <http://www.mha.gov.sg/hometeamnews/our-community/ViewArticle/islamophobia-poses-significant-risk>, (14.02.2020).

Aphornsuvan, T. (2004). Origins of Malay Muslim “Separatism” in Southern Thailand. *Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 32*. [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1317156](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1317156), (11.10.2020).

Aphornsuvan, T. (2012). *History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand*. Bangkok: Thammasat University.

Appadurai, A. (2006). *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger*. Durham: Duke University Press Books.

Arendt, H. (2006). *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (1st edition). New York, N.Y: Penguin Classics.

Arugay, A. (18.02.2021). The Generals’ Gambit: The Military and Democratic Erosion in Duterte’s Philippines. *Heinrich Böll Stiftung*. <https://th.boell.org/en/2021/02/18/generals-gambit-military-and-democratic-erosion-dutertes-philippines>, (19.02.2021).

ASEAN Secretariat. (2012). Bridging the Development Gap among Members of ASEAN. *ASEAN*. [https://asean.org/?static\\_post=bridging-the-development-gap-among-members-of-asean](https://asean.org/?static_post=bridging-the-development-gap-among-members-of-asean), (11.10.2020).

Associated Press. (02.04.2014). Burma census is not counting Rohingya Muslims, says UN agency. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/02/burma-census-rohingya-muslims-un-agency>, (05.12.2020).

Awaeputeh, A. (2021). *Role and Findings from the Works of Muslim Attorney Center Foundation*. Pattani: Main Hall of Pattani Office of Islamic Provincial Committee. <https://www.facebook.com/macmuslimfoundation/videos/1154437405006217>, (10.12.2021).

Baharudin, H. (08.06.2018). PM joins 700 to break fast at mosque in Jurong West. *The Straits Times*. <https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/pm-joins-700-to-break-fast-at-mosque-in-jurong-west>, (10.10.2020).

Bajoria, J. and Zissis, C. (10.09.2008). *The Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand*. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/muslim-insurgency-southern-thailand>, (31.08.2017).

Bajunid, O. (1999). The Muslims in Thailand: A Review. *Southeast Asian Studies*. 37(2): 210–234.

Bajunid, O. (2005). Islam, Nationalism, and The Thai State. *Dynamic Diversity in Southern Thailand*. Editor S. Wattana. Bangkok: Silkworm Books.

Bajunid, O. (2008). The Re-organization of Islam in Cambodia and Laos. *Islam at the Margins: The Muslims of Indochina*. 3(1): 70–85.

Bank, T. (2015). *Philippines—Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Social Fund Project (No. ICR1065; pp. 1–77)*. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/463571468295845023/Philippines-Autonomous-Region-in-Muslim-Mindanao-ARMM-Social-Fund-Project>, (10.12.2020).

Bangkok Post. (12.07.2012). Myanmar moots camps or deportation for Rohingyas. *Bangkok Post*. <https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/302138/myanmar-moots-camps-or-deportation-for-rohingyas>, (10.02.2019).

Bayar, M. (2009). Reconsidering primordialism: An alternative approach to the study of ethnicity. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 32(9): 1639–1657.

Benbourenane, O. (2012). *Political integration policies and strategies of the Thai government toward the ethnic Malay-Muslims of southernmost Thailand (1973-2000)*. Bangkok, Thailand: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University.

Bin Hassan, M., and Pereire, K. (2006). An Ideological Response to Combating Terrorism – The Singapore Perspective. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. 17(4): 458–477.

Biswas, N. (2020). Myanmar's military and the garrison state: State-military relations in Myanmar and their influence in the [re]production of violence against minorities. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*. 5(2): 158–173.

Blanchetti-Revelli, L. (2003). Moro, Muslim, or Filipino?. *Cultural Citizenship in Island Southeast Asia: Nation and Belonging in the Hinterlands*. Editor R. Rosaldo. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Blengsli, B. (2009). Muslim Metamorphosis: Islamic Education and Politics in Contemporary Cambodia. *Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic education in Southeast Asia*. Editor Robert Hefner. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

British Foreign Office. (1952). *The Mujahid Revolt in Arakan in 1952 (and a SOAS report on the Rohingyas)*. <https://www.brownpundits.com/2017/10/09/the-mujahid-revolt-in-arakan-in-1952-and-some-good-background-details/>, (10.12.2009).

Buaban, J. (2020). Islamophobia as Represented by Thai Buddhist Organizations. *Journal of Social Sciences*. 50(2): 23.

Buchanan, C. (Ed.). (2011). *Armed Violence in Mindanao: Militia and private armies*. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. <https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/17MilitiaInMindanaoReportFromIBSandHDCentreJuly2011-July-2011.pdf>, (15.01.2020).

Buendia, R. (2015). *The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law*. Manila: Yuchengo Center.

Burma Task Force. (28.03.2017). *Burma Military Chief Min Aung Hlaing Rules Out Rohingya Citizenship*. <https://www.burmataskforce.org/content/burma-military-chief-min-aung-hlaing-rules-out-rohingya-citizenship>, (20.12.2020).

Buzan, B., Wæver, O., and Wilde, J. de. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Callahan, M. (2005). *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Capotorti, F. (1979). *Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities*. Geneva: UN Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.

Central Intelligence Agency. (2018). *East Asia/Southeast Asia: Thailand*. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/th.html>, (20.12.2019).

Central Intelligence Agency. (2019). *The World Factbook*. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/th.html>, (10.12.2020).

Central Intelligence Agency. (2021a). *Burma—CIA*. <https://www.cia.gov/resources/map/burma/>, (12.12.2021).

Central Intelligence Agency. (2021b). *The World Factbook*. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/thailand/map>, (12.12.2021).

Central Intelligence Agency. (2021c). *Singapore—CIA*. <https://www.cia.gov/resources/map/singapore/>, (12.12.2022).

Central Intelligence Agency. (2022a). *Burma*. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/burma/#people-and-society>, (14.05.2022).

Central Intelligence Agency. (2022b). *Philippines*. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/philippines/#people-and-society>, (15.04.2022).

Chalerm-Pinyorat, R. (2013). *Deciphering the Ideologies of Independent Movements in Patani*. Pattani: Deep South Watch.

Chalk, P. (2008). *The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand-Understanding the Conflict (No. Paper 5)*. California: RAND Corporation.

Chambers, P. (2011). Understanding Civil-Military Relations Today: The Case of Thailand with Implications for Emerging Democracies in Asia. *Asia-Pacific Social Science Review*. 10(2): 1–24.

Chambers, P. (2012). A Precarious Path: The Evolution of Civil–Military Relations in the Philippines. *Asian Security*. 8(1): 138–163.

Chambers, P. (2013a). Introduction. *Knights of the Realm: Thailand's Military and Police, Then and Now*. Editor P. W. Chambers. Bangkok: White Lotus Co. Ltd.

Chambers, P. (Ed.). (2013b). *Knights of the Realm: Thailand's Military and Police, Then and Now*. Bangkok: White Lotus Co. Ltd.

Chambers, P. (2014). Constitutional Change and Security Forces in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Thailand and Myanmar. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 36(1): 101–127.

Chambers, P. (2020). Militarization and Securitization in Thailand's Deep South. *Southern Thailand/Patani: Understanding the Dimensions of Conflict and Peace* (pp. 87–148). Editors A. Engvall, S. Jitpiromsri, E. Potchapornkul, and N. Ropers. Bangkok: Peace Resource Collaborative.

Chambers, P., and Waitookiat, N. (2017). *Khaki Capital: The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia*. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

Chambers, P., and Waitookiat, N. (2016). The Resilience of Monarchised Military in Thailand. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*. 46(3): 425–444.

Chambers, P., and Waitookiat, N. (2019). The Role of Security Forces in Thailand's Deep South Counter-Insurgency. *International Studies Review*. 20(1): 53–77.

Chambers, P., Waitookiat, N., and Jitpiromsri, S. (2019). Introduction: Conflict in the Deep South of Thailand: Never-ending Stalemate? *Asian International Studies Review*. 20(1): 1–23.

Che Man, W. (1985). The Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand. *Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs. Journal*. 6(1): 98–112.

Che Man, W. (1987). *Muslim separatism: The Moros of southern Philippines and the Malays of southern Thailand*. (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis). Canberra: Australian National University.

Che Man, W. (1990). *Muslim separatism: The Moros of southern Philippines and the Malays of southern Thailand*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Che Man, W. (2008). The Problem of Patani Malays in Southern Thailand: Neither Assimilation nor Separation. *Outside the Definition of Thainess: Neither Assimilation nor Separation* (pp. 19-27). Editor Parinya Nuanpian. Songkhla: Institute of Peace Studies, Prince of Songkhla University and Centre for Lagoon Studies.

Colletta, N. (2006). Citizen Security – The Role of NGOs and Broader Civil Society in Ceasefire Monitoring: Lessons from Mindanao. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*. 2(3): 21–34.

Commission of Experts. (1993). *Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)*. New York: United Nations.

Congress of the Philippines. (1998). *Republic Act No. 8551*. [https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1998/ra\\_8551\\_1998.html](https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1998/ra_8551_1998.html), (12.10.2020).

ConstitutionNet. (2011). *Constitutional history of the Philippines*. <http://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-philippines>, (15.12.2020).

Conteh-Morgan, E. (2019). Militarization and Securitization in Africa. *Insight Turkey*. 21(1): 77–94.

Croissant, A. (2018). *Civil–Military Relations in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Croissant, A., and Kuehn, D. (2009). Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia's New Democracies. *Journal of East Asian Studies*. 9(2): 187–217.



Croissant, A., and Kuehn, D. (2011). Introduction: New Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations. *European Political Science*. 10(2): 131–136.

Croissant, A., Kuehn, D., Chambers, P., and Wolf, S. (2011). Conceptualising Civil-Military Relations in Emerging Democracies. *European Political Science*. 10(2): 137–145.

Croissant, A., Kuehn, D., Chambers, P., and Wolf, S. (2010). Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: Conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies. *Democratization*. 17(5): 950–975.

Croissant, A., Kuehn, D., and Lorenz, P. (2012). *Breaking With the Past? Civil-Military Relations in the Emerging Democracies of East Asia*. Honolulu: East-West Center.

Croissant, A., Kühn, D., Chambers, P., Völkel, P., and Wolf, S. (2011). Theorizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies: Agency, structure and institutional change. *Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*. 5(1): 75.

Croissant, A., and Lorenz, P. (2018a). *Comparative Politics of Southeast Asia*. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Croissant, A., and Lorenz, P. (2018b). Singapore: Contradicting Conventional Wisdoms About Authoritarianism, State, and Development. *Comparative Politics of Southeast Asia: An Introduction to Governments and Political Regimes* (pp. 255–289). Editors Aurel Croissant and Philip Lorenz. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Crouch, M. (2016a). *Islam and the State in Myanmar: Muslim-Buddhist Relations and the Politics of Belonging*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Crouch, M. (2016b). Personal Law and Colonial Legacy: State-Religion Relations and Islamic Law in Myanmar. *Islam and the State in Myanmar: Muslim-Buddhist Relations and the Politics of Belonging* (pp. 69-98). Editor Melissa Crouch. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Deep South Watch. (2021a). Database. *Deep South Watch*. <https://deepsouthwatch.org/index.php/th>, (10.01.2022).

Deep South Watch. (2021b). Summary of Incidents in Southern Thailand, October 2021. *Deep South Watch*. <https://deepsouthwatch.org/en/node/12815>, (10.01.2022).

Deep South Watch. (21.09.2022). Conflict Incidents Database. *Deep South Watch*. <https://deepsouthwatch.org/th>, (10.01.2022).

Domingo, R. (1995). *The Muslim Secessionist Movement in the Philippines. Issues and Prospects*. (Unpublished Master's Thesis). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.

Duayjai Group, Cross Cultural Foundation, and Network for Patani Human Rights. (2016). *Torture and ill treatment in The Deep South Documented in 2014-2015*. Pattani: Duayjai Group, Cross Cultural Foundation, and Network for Patani Human Rights.

Duayjai Group. (2019). *Human rights situation in southernmost of Thailand*. Presented at the Transitional Politics for human rights and Peace in the Southernmost of Thailand. <https://voicefromthais.files.wordpress.com/2019/04/9.4.2019-human-rights-situation-in-southernmost-of-thailand-2018-1.pdf>, (12.12.2020).

Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project. (2007). Philippines/Moro National Liberation Front (1946-present). *University of Central Arkansas*. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/philippinesmoro-national-liberation-front-1968-present/>, (01.10.2020).

Eickelman, D., and Piscatori, J. (1996). *Muslim Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Eng, L., and Mathews, M. (2016). Navigating Disconnects and Divides in Singapore's Cultural Diversity. *Managing Diversity in Singapore*. London: Imperial College London.

Esman, M. (1994). *Ethnic Politics*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Esposito, J. (2004). *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Farrelly, N. (2016). Muslim Political Activity in Transitional Myanmar. *Islam and the State in Myanmar*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Ferrer, M. C. (2005). The Moro and the Cordillera Conflict in the Philippines and the Struggle for Autonomy. *Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia* (pp. 109–150). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Fortify Rights. (2018). “*They give them long swords*”: *Preparations for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity Against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, Myanmar*. <https://www.fortifyrights.org/mly-inv-rep-2018-07-19/>, (12.10.2020).

FORUM-ASIA. (15.02.2009). *PHILIPPINES: NGOs release a report on fact-finding mission in Mindanao*. <https://forum-asia.org/?p=6631>, (10.10.2022).

Fox, J. (2003). Ethnoreligious conflict in the Third World: The role of religion as a cause of conflict. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*. 9(1): 101–125.

Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in the World*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>, (10.10.2022).

Furnivall, S. (1956). *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India*. New York: New York University Press.

Geertz, C. (1963). The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Liberties in the New States. *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (pp. 105-157). New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

Gellner, E. (1994). Nationalism and High Culture. *Nationalism* (pp. 63–70). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Geneva Call. (17.12.2019). *Protecting Civilians in Mindanao through Islamic Principles and International Humanitarian Law*. <https://www.genevacall.org/protecting-civilians-in-mindanao-through-islamic-principles-and-international-humanitarian-law/>, (10.10.2022).

Global Security. (30.01.2019). *Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)*. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/philippines/government-armm.htm>, (10.01.2020).

Government of Singapore. (09.08.1965). *Constitution of the Republic of Singapore*. <https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CONS1963?ValidDate=20170401&ProvIds=P1XIII->, (06.01.2020).

Government of Singapore. (03.01.2017). *Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act 2016*. <https://sso.agc.gov.sg:5443/Acts-Supp/28-2016/Published/20170103?DocDate=20170103>, (20.09.2022).

Gowing, P. G. (1975). Moros and Khaek: The Position of Muslim Minorities in the Philippines and Thailand. *Southeast Asian Affairs*. 27–40.

Green, T. (2015). *The Fear of Islam: An Introduction to Islamophobia in the West*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Griffin, P. (1988). National Policy on Minority Cultural Communities: The Philippine Case. *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*. 16(2): 5-16.

Griffiths, J., and Olarn, K. (11.01.2018). Myanmar military admits role in killing Rohingya found in mass grave. <https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/11/asia/myanmar-mass-grave-intl/index.html>, (22.04.2019).

Gutierrez, B. J. (2019). *Fast facts on the Bangsamoro Organic Law*. <https://pia.gov.ph/features/articles/1018364>, (11.01.2020).

Habib, M., Jubb, C., Ahmad, S., Rahman, M., and Pallard, H. (2018). *Forced Migration of Rohingya: An Untold Experience*. Ontario: Ontario International Development Agency.

Haemindra, N. (1976). The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand (Part One). *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*. 7(02): 197–225.

Hafez, M. (2003). *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in The Islamic World*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub.

Hansler, J. (21.0.2022). *Blinken declares Myanmar's military committed genocide against Rohingya*. CNN. <https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/21/politics/blinden-myanmar-genocide-designation/index.html>, (25.10.2022).

Hara, S. (2019). The interpretation of Shahid in Patani. *Asian International Studies Review*. 20(1): 137–157.

Hedman, E. (2001). The Philippines: Not So Military, Not So Civil. *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (pp. 165–186). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Hefner, R. (Ed.). (2009). *Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic education in Southeast Asia*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Helbardt, S., Hellmann-Rajanayagam, D., and Korff, R. (2013). Religionisation of Politics in Sri Lanka, Thailand and Myanmar. *Politics, Religion & Ideology*. 14(1): 36–58.

Hernandez, C. (2007). The military in Philippines politics: Retrospect and prospects. *Whiter the Philippines in the 21st century?* (pp. 78–99). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Hernandez, C. (1985). The Philippine Military and Civilian Control: Under Marcos and Beyond. *Third World Quarterly*. 7(4): 907–923.

Hoadley, S. (2017). *Soldiers and politics in Southeast Asia: Civil-military relations in comparative perspective, 1933–1975*. New York: Routledge.

Holt, J. (2016). *Buddhist extremists and Muslim minorities: Religious conflict in contemporary Sri Lanka*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Horowitz, D. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.

House of Representatives. (19.02.2020). *Muslim Affairs*. <http://www.congress.gov.ph/committees/search.php?id=0523>, (16.01.2020).

Huiwen, N. (17.06.2017). *President joins iftar at Yusof Ishak Mosque [Text]*. <https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/president-joins-iftar-at-yusof-ishak-mosque>, (12.01.2020).

Human Rights Watch. (2013). *“All You Can Do is Pray”: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State*. Human Rights

Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/04/22/all-you-can-do-pray/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims>, (20.12.2019).

Human Rights Watch. (2017). *“All of My Body Was Pain”: Sexual Violence against Rohingya Women and Girls in Burma*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/11/16/all-my-body-was-pain/sexual-violence-against-rohingya-women-and-girls-burma>, (20.12.2019).

Huntington, S. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Huntington, S. (1998). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Huntington, S. (2006). *Political order in changing societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ibrahim, Y. (2017). *Singapore’s Strong Socio-religious Muslim Community*. Singapore: Singapore Government. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=38aIEAMG0\\_c](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=38aIEAMG0_c), (14.09.2022).

Ibrahim, Z. (1994). *Muslims in Singapore: A Shared Vision*. Singapore: Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura.

Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar. (2018). *Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar* (No. A/HRC/39/CRP.2). United Nations Human Rights Council. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/report-hr-c42th-session>, (10.12.2020).

International Crisis Group. (2016). *Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State*. Brussels: International Crisis Group. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south->

east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state,  
(15.10.2016).

International IDEA. (2017). *Freedom of Religion*. <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices/#/indices/compare-countries-regions>, (15.10.2018).

International IDEA. (2022). *South-Eastern Asia: Voter Turnout by Country*. <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/region-view/30/40>, (27.10.2022).

Islam, S. (1998). The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines. *Asian Survey*. 38(5): 441–456.

Islamic Religious Council of Singapore. (1968). *Roles & Functions*. MUIS: Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura. <https://www.muis.gov.sg/About-MUIS/Roles-Functions>, (12.01.2020).

Islamic Religious Council of Singapore. (2013). *Annual Report 2012*. Singapore: Islamic Religious Council of Singapore.

Islamic Religious Council of Singapore. (2014). *Annual Report 2013*. Singapore: Islamic Religious Council of Singapore.

Islamic Religious Council of Singapore. (2015). *Annual Report 2014*. Singapore: Islamic Religious Council of Singapore.

Islamic Religious Council of Singapore. (2016). *Annual Report 2015*. Singapore: Islamic Religious Council of Singapore.

Islamic Religious Council of Singapore. (2017). *Annual Report 2016*. Singapore: Islamic Religious Council of Singapore.



Islamic Religious Council of Singapore. (2018). *Annual Report 2017*. Singapore: Islamic Religious Council of Singapore.

Islamic Religious Council of Singapore. (2019). *Annual Report 2018*. Singapore: Islamic Religious Council of Singapore.

Islamic Religious Council of Singapore. (2020). *Vision & Mission*. MUIS: Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura. <https://www.muis.gov.sg/About-MUIS/Vision-Mission>, (12.01.2020).

Jakes, L. (21.03.2022). U.S. to Declare That Myanmar's Military Committed Genocide. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/20/us/politics/us-rohingya-genocide.html>, (21.04.2022).

Jesus, E. (10.11.2018). *Birthing the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region*. <https://mbc.com.ph/2019/03/05/birthing-the-bangsamoro-autonomous-region/>, (11.01.2020).

Jitpiromsri, S. (2013). The New Challenge of Thailand's Security Forces in the Southern Frontiers. *Knights of the Realm: Thailand's Military and Police, Then and Now* (pp. 541-582). Bangkok: White Lotus Co. Ltd.

Jitpiromsri, S., Haque, M., and Chambers, P. (2020). Peacebuilding in Thailand's Deep South and in Myanmar/Burma: The dynamic roles of Muslim minorities in conflict societies. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*. 48(1): 1–26.

Juliano, H., Ordoñez, M., and La Viña, E. (2019). Dealing with diversity: State strategies on ethnic minority management in Southeast Asia. *ASIAN REVIEW*. 32(1): 85–108.

Kadir, S. (2004). Islam, state and society in Singapore. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*. 5(3): 357–371.

Kaplan, R. (2014). *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*. New York: Picador.

Keyes, C. (2010). Muslim “Others” in Buddhist Thailand. *Thammasat Review*. 13(1): 19–42.

Khaliq, R. (26.08.2022). UK decision to intervene in Rohingya case before International Court of Justice hailed. *Anadolu Agency*. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/uk-decision-to-intervene-in-rohingya-case-before-international-court-of-justice-hailed/2669838>, (25.10.2022).

Koma, A., and Tuansiri, E. (2022a). Triangulated Conditions for State Violence against Muslim Minorities: Rohingya in Western Myanmar and Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand Compared. *Journal of Social Sciences*. 52(2): 150–177.

Koma, A., and Tuansiri, E. (2022b). Who are the Patani Peace Influencers? Exploring from Perspectives of Civil Society in Southern Thailand. *Asia Social Issues*. 15(1): 1-17.

Kosem, S., and Saleem, A. (2016). Religion, Nationalism, and the Rohingya’s Search for Citizenship in Myanmar. *Muslim Minority-State Relations: Violence, Integration, and Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kundnani, A. (2007). Integrationism: The politics of anti-Muslim racism. *Race & Class*. 48(4): 24–44.

Kurtoglu, G. (2003). *Toleration of The Intolerants?: Accommodation of Political Islam in the Muslim World*. (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). Chicago: The Faculty of the Social Sciences of University of Chicago.

Kwang, K. (02.10.2019). *Singapore’s Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act: What you need to know about the proposed changes*. <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/>

news/singapore/maintenance-of-religious-harmony-act-what-you-need-to-know-11864292, (11.01.2020).

Kwok, J. (2010). *Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Southeast Asia*. (Unpublished Master's thesis). Boston: Department of Political Science of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Kyaw, N. (2016). Islamophobia in Buddhist Myanmar: The 969 movement and anti-Muslim violence. *Islam and the State in Myanmar: Muslim-Buddhist Relations and the Politics of Belonging* (pp. 183–210). Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Kymlicka, W. (1996). *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kymlicka, W. (2004). Justice and security in the accommodation of minority nationalism. *Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Minority Rights* (pp. 144-175). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kymlicka, W. (2009). Categorizing Groups, Categorizing States: Theorizing Minority Rights in a World of Deep Diversity. *Ethics & International Affairs*. 23(4): 371–388.

Laksmana, E. (2017). Threats and civil–military relations: Explaining Singapore’s “trickle down” military innovation. *Defense & Security Analysis*. 33(4): 347–365.

Lean, N. (2012). *The Islamophobia Industry: How the Right Manufactures Fear of Muslims*. London: Pluto Press.

Leavitt, S. R. (2007). *Persuasion, coercion, and neglect: Understanding state policy and the mobilization of Muslim minorities in Asia* (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University.

Lee, T. (2020). The Philippines: Civil-Military Relations, from Marcos to Duterte. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Levi, M. (1997). A model, a method, and a map: Rational choice in comparative and historical analysis. *Comparative politics: Rationality, culture, and structure* (pp.19-41). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Liow, J. (2009). Islamic Education in Southern Thailand: Negotiating Islam, Identity, and Modernity. *Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic education in Southeast Asia*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Lwin, N. (2012). Making Rohingya statelessness. *New Mandala*. <https://www.newmandala.org/making-rohingya-statelessness/>, (10.04.2020).

Madrasah Irsyad Zuhri Al Islamiah. (2022). *Joint Madrasah System*. Madrasah Irsyad Zuhri Al Islamiah. <https://irsyad.sg/joint-madrasah-system/>, (10.10.2022).

Makenna, T., and Abdula, E. (2009). Islamic Education in the Philippines: Political Separatism and Religious Pragmatism. *Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic education in Southeast Asia*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Manager Online. (08.07.2020). *Open Budget for Solving Southern Fires from 2004-2020 Overall 300 thousand million baht*. <https://mgronline.com/south/detail/9630000069937>, (25.12.2021).

Mathews, M. (2016). *Managing Diversity in Singapore*. London: Imperial College London.

McCann, F. (1979). Origins of the “New Professionalism” of the Brazilian Military. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*. 21(4): 505–522.

McCargo, D. (2006). *Rethinking Thailand's southern violence*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.

McCargo, D. (2008). *Tearing apart the land: Islam and legitimacy in Southern Thailand*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

McCargo, D. (2009). The Politics of Buddhist identity in Thailand's deep south: The Demise of civil religion? *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*. 40(1): 11–32.

McKenna, T. (1998). *Muslim rulers and rebels: Everyday politics and armed separatism in the southern Philippines*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

McKirdy, E. (28.08.2018). Myanmar military leaders should face genocide charges, UN says. *CNN*. <https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/27/asia/un-myanmar-genocide-investigation-intl/index.html>, (25.10.2022).

Médecins Sans Frontières. (2018). *"No One Was Left": Violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar*. Doctors Beyond Borders. <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/research/no-one-was-left-violence-against-rohingya-myanmar>, (20.12.2022).

Mehden, F. (2009). *Islam in Southeast Asia*. Obo in Islamic Studies. <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0080.xml>, (21.10.2022).

Miller, M. A. (2012). *Ethnic and Racial Minorities in Asia: Inclusion or Exclusion?*. *Ethnic and Racial Minorities in Asia: Inclusion or Exclusion?* London: Routledge.

Ministry of Home Affairs. (2003). *White Paper on the Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism*. Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs.

Minorities At Risk Project. (2021). *Minority Group Assessments for Asia*. Minorities At Risk Project. <http://www.mar.umd.edu/assessments.asp?regionId=3>, (30.05.2022).

Minority Rights Group International. (2019). *Burma/Myanmar*. Peoples Under Threat. <https://peoplesunderthreat.org/countries/myanmar/>, (30.05.2020).

Minority Rights Group International. (2018a). *People under Threat 2018*. London: Minority Rights Group International.

Minority Rights Group International. (2018b). *Peoples Under Threat Data*. Peoples Under Threat. <https://peoplesunderthreat.org/data/>, (20.04.2019).

Mizzima. (2012). Citizenship Issue Complicates Rohingyas' Plight - Myanmar. *ReliefWeb*. <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/citizenship-issue-complicates-rohingyas%E2%80%99-plight>, (25.12.2019).

Mohamad, B. (2018). Memories of collective victimhood and conflict in southern Thailand. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*. 49(2): 204–226.

Murdoch, G. (29.10.2007). TIMELINE: Recent coups and attempted coups in the Philippines. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-phillipines-unrest-idUSSP31116220071129>, (15.10.2021).

Musa, M., and Taib, M. (2015). Managing Religious Diversity in Singapore: Context and Challenges. *World Scientific Series on Singapore's 50 Years of Nation-Building. Perspectives on the Security of Singapore* (pp. 253–276). Singapore: World Scientific.

Mutalib, H. (2009). Authoritarian Democracy and the Minority Muslim Polity in Singapore. *Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia*. London: Routledge.

Myoe, M. (2009). *Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since 1948*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Myoe, M. (2014). The Soldier and the State: The Tatmadaw and Political Liberalization in Myanmar since 2011. *South East Asia Research*. 22(2): 233–249.

Nasir, K., Pereira, A., and Turner, B. (2010). *Muslims in Singapore: Piety, politics and policies*. London: Routledge.

Na-Thalang, C. (2017). *Malaysia: Southeast Asian Peacemaker?* Australian Institute of International Affairs. <http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/malaysia-peacemaker/>, (21.01.2020).

National Commission on Muslim Filipino. (2010). *Profile*. National Commission on Muslim Filipino. <http://ncmf.gov.ph/offices/who-we-are/>, (16.01.2020).

National Commission on Muslim Filipino. (2019). *Transparency Seal*. National Commission on Muslim Filipino. <http://ncmf.gov.ph/transparency/transparency-seal-2/>, (22.01.2020).

National Library Board. (2014). *Singapore Malay National Organisation is formed—Singapore History*. National Library Board. <http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/history/events/183c4002-a13d-4e58-9219-1a7bccd0ac41>, (11.01.2020).

Nations Online Project. (n.d.). *General Map of Philippines*. Nations Online Project. <https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/philippines-political-map.htm>, (12.10.2022).

Nebehay, S., and Lewis, S. (11.09.2017). U.N. brands Myanmar violence a “textbook” example of ethnic cleansing. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-idUSKCN1BM0QF>, (20.10.2019).

Nilsen, M., and Hara, S. (2018). Religious Motivation in Political Struggles: The Case of Thailand's Patani Conflict. *Prio*. <https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=11025>, (05.12.2018).

Nishikawa, Y. (2010). *Human Security in Southeast Asia*. New York: Routledge.

Noiwong, O. (2001). *Political integration policies and strategies of the Thai government toward the Malay -Muslims of southernmost Thailand (1973–2000)* (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). Illinois: Northern Illinois University.

Nordlinger, A. (1976). *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Pearson College Div.

Nuanpian, P. (2008). *Outside the Definition of Thainess: Neither Assimilation nor Separation*. Songkhla: Institute of Peace Studies, Prince of Songkhla University and Centre for Lagoon Studies.

Nyein, S. (2011). The armed forces of Burma. *The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia* (pp. 24–44). London: Routledge.

Ockey, J. (2020). Pattani or Patani: Memory, forgetting, history, and the conflict in Southern Thailand. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*. 62(2): 179-192.

Office of Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process. (2016). *Home*. Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process. <https://peace.gov.ph/>, (10.10.2020).

Oo, N. (2020). A New Tatmadaw with Old Characteristics. *Praetorians, Profiteers or Professionals?* (pp. 30–69). Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.

Osman, M. (2017). Understanding Islamophobia in Asia: The Cases of Myanmar and Malaysia. *Islamophobia Studies Journal*. 4(1): 17–36.



Panjo, R. (2013). Yala Hijab Protest: A Memory of Negotiation. *Rusamilea*. 33(1): 18–34.

Panjar, R. (2018). Dealing with Dangerous “Peace”: Politics of Words in the “Armed Conflict” of Pa(t)tani. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*. 45(2): 56–77.

Parliament Of Singapore. (2017, June 7). *List of Current MPs*. Parliament of Singapore. <https://www.parliament.gov.sg/mps/list-of-current-mps>, (13.01.2020).

Parnini, S. (2013). The Crisis of the Rohingya as a Muslim Minority in Myanmar and Bilateral Relations with Bangladesh. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*. 33(2): 281–297. (20.12.2019).

Pathan, D., Tuansiri, E., and Koma, A. (2018). *Understanding Anti-Islam Sentiment in Thailand*. Pattani: Patani Forum.

Pawakapan, P. (2021). *Infiltrating Society: The Thai Military’s Internal Security Affairs*. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

Pawakapan, P. (2021). The mobilization of state-sponsored mass organizations since the 2006 coup in Thailand. *Political Violence in Southeast Asia since 1945*. London: Routledge.

Perera, S. (2001). *The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka: A historical and sociopolitical outline*. Washington DC: The World Bank.

Pitsuwan, S. (1982). *Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand* (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). Massachusetts: Harvard University.

Pobre, C., and Quilop, R. (Eds.). (2008). *In Assertion of Sovereignty: The 2000 Campaign Against the MILF* (Vol. 1). Quezon City, Philippines: The Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of Strategic and Special Studies.

President of the Philippines. (2017). *Proclamation No. 216, s. 2017*. Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2017/05/23/proclamation-no-216-s-2017/>, (15.10.2020).

Public International Law and Policy Group. (2018). *Documenting Atrocity Crimes Committed Against the Rohingya in Myanmar's Rakhine State: Factual Findings Report*. Public International Law and Policy Group. <https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/rohingya-report>, (15.12.2020).

Rahim, L. (2009). *Singapore in the Malay World: Building and Breaching Regional Bridges*. London: Routledge.

Rahim, L. (2012). Governing Muslims in Singapore's secular authoritarian state. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. 66(2): 169–185.

Ramadan, T. (2015). *To Be a European Muslim*. Leicester: Islamic Foundation.

Rasmussen, M. (1999). *The military role in internal defense and security: Some problems* [Occasional Paper #6]. California: Naval Post-Graduate School. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36718266.pdf>, (15.11.2019).

Republic of the Philippines. (1990). *The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission: VII: Causes, Analysis, and Recommendations*. Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1990/10/03/the-final-report-of-the-fact-finding-commission-vii-causes-analysis-and-recommendations/>, (10.10.2022).

Reuters. (29.05.2015). Myanmar publishes census, but Rohingya minority not recognized. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-migrants-myanmar-census-idUSKBN0OE1S420150529>, (05.06.2019).

Ringuet, D. J. (2002). The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in Mindanao. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 24(1): 33–49.

Rogers, B. (21.06.2012). *A friend's appeal to Burma*. Partners Relief & Development. <https://blog.partners.ngo/post/25558370323/a-friends-appeal-to-burma>, (20.04.2020).

Rotberg, R. (2003). Failed states, collapsed, weak states: Causes and indicators. *State Failure and State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (pp. 337–363). Cambridge: The World Peace Foundation.

Saleem, A. (2016). Muslim-State Relations in Sri Lanka: A Challenge for Post-Conflict Reconstruction. *Muslim Minority-State Relations: Violence, Integration, and Policy* (pp. 173–209). Editor Robert Mason. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Samudavanija, C. (2002). *Thailand: State-Building, Democracy and Globalization*. Bangkok: Institute for public policy studies.

Samukkhethum, S. (2016). Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict Management. *Journal of Social Development*. 18. 157–173.

Sarosi, D., and Sombatpoonsiri, J. (2011). Arming civilians for self-defense: The impact of firearms proliferation on the conflict dynamics in Southern Thailand. *Global Change, Peace & Security*. 23(3): 387–403.

Satha-Anand, C. (1981). *The Nonviolent Prince* (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). Hawaii: The Graduate Division of the University of Hawaii.

Satha-Anand, C. (1992). Pattani in the 1980s: Academic literature and political stories. *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia*. 7(1): 1–38.

Satha-Anand, C. (1993). Kru-ze: A theatre for renegotiating Muslim identity. *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia*. 8(1): 195–218.

Satha-Anand, C. (2001). Defending community, strengthening civil society: A Muslim minority's contribution to Thai civil society. *Islam and civil society in Southeast Asia* (pp. 91–103). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Satha-Anand, C. (2004). Praying in the rain: The politics of engaged Muslims in anti-war protest in Thai society. *Global Change, Peace & Security*. 16(2): 151–167.

Satha-Anand, C. (2006). The silence of the bullet monument: Violence and “Truth” management, Dusun-nyor 1948, and Kru-Ze 2004. *Critical Asian Studies*. 38(1): 11–37.

Satha-Anand, C. (2009). Missing lawyer of Thailand: The fate of engaged Muslims in authoritarian democracy. *Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia*. London: Routledge.

Scupin, R. (1980a). Islamic Reform in Thailand. *Journal of Siam Society*, 68(2): 1–10.

Scupin, R. (1980b). The Politics of Islamic Reformism in Thailand. *Asian Survey*, 20(12). 1223–1235.

Scupin, R. (1998). Muslim Accommodation in Thai Society. *Journal of Islamic Studies*. 9(2): 229–258.

Selochan, V. (2004). The Military and the Fragile Democracy of the Philippines. *The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific* (pp. 59–68). Canberra: ANU E Press.

Shah, M., Razak, M., and Al-Fijawi, M. (2019). Transformation of Myanmar Muslim Community: Singapore as a Role Model. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*. 39(4).

Singapore Department of Statistics. (2020). *Census 2020*. Census of Population 2020. <http://www.singstat.gov.sg/modules/infographics/census-2020>, (10.10.2022).

Singapore Malay National Organisation. (2019). *About PKMS*. PKMS. <https://www.pkms.org.sg/about-pkms/>, (20.10.2022).

Sombatpoonsiri, J. (2022). Buddhist Majoritarian Nationalism in Thailand: Ideological Contestation, Narratives, and Activism. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*. 1–25.

Stanford University. (2018). *Jemaah Islamiyah*. Mapping Militant Organizations. <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/jemaah-islamiyah>, (22.10.2022).

Statista. (2022). *Singapore: Resident population by ethnic group 2022*. Statista <https://www.statista.com/statistics/622748/singapore-resident-population-by-ethnic-group/>, (10.10.2022).

Stecklow, S. (15.08.2018). Why Facebook is losing the war on hate speech in Myanmar. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/>, (10.05.2020).

Steinberg, D. (2010). *Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Stepan, A. (1973). The new professionalism of internal warfare and military role expansion. *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, policies, and future* (pp. 47-65). New Haven: Yale University Press.

Supreme Court of the Philippines. (2019). *Muslim Code Governs Marital Relations of Muslim Couples*. Supreme Court of the Philippines. <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/6452/>, (21.01.2020).

Tamthai, M., and Boonchu, S. (2008). National Security of the Southern Border Provinces: 30 Years Comparison. *Imagined Land* (pp. 53-107). Bangkok: Matichon Public Company Limited.

Tan, E. (2009). From Clampdown to Limited Empowerment: Soft Law in the Calibration and Regulation of Religious Conduct in Singapore. *Law and Policy*. 31(3): 703-731.

The Fund for Peace. (2018). *Fragile State Index: Comparative Analysis*. Fragile State Index. <https://fragilestatesindex.org/comparative-analysis/>, (27, 04.2019).

The Government of Singapore. (1968). *Administration of Muslim Law Act*. Singapore Statutes Online. <https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/AMLA1966>, (11.01.2020).

The Government of Singapore. (1992). *Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act*. Singapore Statutes Online. <https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/MRHA1990>, (11.01.2020).

The Institute for Economics and Peace. (2018). *Global Terrorism Index*. Vision of Humanity. <http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/terrorism-index/>, (16.04.2019).

The Straits Times. (2019a). How Singapore is battling three key security challenges: Vivian Balakrishnan. *The Straits Times*. <https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/how-singapore-is-battling-three-key-security-challenges-vivian-balakrishnan>, (13.01.2020).

The Straits Times. (26.05.2019b). Breaking fast together. *Straits Times*. <https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/breaking-fast-together>, (12.01.2020).

The World Bank. (2014). *GDP per Capital*. The World Bank. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>, (23.10.2015).

The World Bank. (2019). GDP per capita (current US\$). The World Bank. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>, (30.12.2015).

The World Bank. (2022a). *Population, total—Myanmar*. Data. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=MM>, (11.10.2022).

The World Bank. (2022b). *Population, total—Philippines*. Data. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=PH>, (12.11.2022).

Tilly, C. (1985). War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. *Bringing the State Back In* (pp. 121-139). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tin, A. (19.02.2009). *Myanmar: Who are the Rohingya? - Myanmar*. ReliefWeb. <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-who-are-rohingya>, (28.05.2022).

Tong, C. (2005). Chinese in Singapore. *Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World* (pp. 723–732). Boston, MA: Springer US.

Tuansiri, E., and Koma, A. (2021). *Muslim Minorities under Myanmar State and Thai State*. Pattani: Faculty of Political Science, Prince of Songkla University.

UN Security Council. (1994). *Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)* (No. S/1994/674). <https://undocs.org/S/1994/674>, (16.12.2020).

United Nations. (2017). UN human rights chief points to ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ in Myanmar. *UN News*. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-points-textbook-example-ethnic-cleansing-myanmar>, (20.04.2019).

United Nations Peacemaker. (1998). General Framework of Agreement of Intent Between the Government of the Republic of Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). *UN Peacemaker*. <https://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-agreementofintent98>, (21.01.2020).

United Nations Population Division. (2022). *UN Population Division Data Portal*. <https://population.un.org/dataportal/data/indicators/53,41,67,52,71,47,46,70,50,54,51,72,49/locations/920/start/2020/end/2022/table/pivotbylocation>, (28.11.2022).

United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. (1998). *Burma [Myanmar]: State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)/ State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)/ National League for Democracy (NLD)/Burmese Dissidents*. United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3df097254.html>, (16.12.2019).

University of Maryland. (2017). *Global Terrorism Database*. <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>, (26.05.2019).

U.S. Department of State. (1997). *Foreign Terrorist Organizations*. Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>, (16.05.2019).

U.S. Department of State. (1998). *Country Reports: The Annual Report to Congress on International Religious Freedom*. U.S. Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/index.htm>, (21.05.2019).

U.S. Department of State. (2018). *Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 East Asia and Pacific*. Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282842.htm>, (26.05.2019).

Vartavarian, M. (11.10.2019). Praetorian Network Politics in the Philippines. *The Newsletters*. 84(Autumn): 14–15.



Wade, F. (2017). *Myanmar's Enemy Within: Buddhist Violence and the Making of a Muslim 'Other'*. London: Zed Books.

Walsh, S. (2007). The Roar of the Lion City: Ethnicity, Gender, and Culture in the Singapore Armed Forces. *Armed Forces & Society*. 33(2): 265–285.

Ware, A. (2015). Secessionist Aspects to the Buddhist-Muslim Conflict in Rakhine State, Myanmar. *Territorial Separatism and Global Politics* (pp. 165-180). London: Routledge.

Ware, A., and Laoutides, C. (2018). *Myanmar's "Rohingya" Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wattana, S. (2006). Islam, radicalism, and violence in Southern Thailand: Berjihad di Patani and the 28 April 2004 attacks. *Critical Asian Studies*. 38(1). 119-144.

Weber, M. (1958a). *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Translators H. Gerth and C. Wright. New York: Oxford University Press.

Weber, M. (1958b). Politics as a Vocation. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (pp.77-128). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Whittinghm-Jones, B. (30.10.1947). Patani-Malay State Outside Malaya. *The Straits Times*. [eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19471030-1.2.82.1](https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19471030-1.2.82.1), (17.10.2020).

Winichakul, T. (1994). *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press.

Winichakul, T. (2017). *Kon Thai/Kon Uen (Thai People/The Others)*. Bangkok: Same Sky.

World Justice Project. (2019). *Rule of Law Index: Current & Historical Data*. R World Justice Project. <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2019/current-historical-data>, (09.05.2019).

Yahprung, A. (2014). *Islamic Reform and Revivalism in Southern Thailand: A Critical Study of the Salafi Reform Movement of Shaykh Dr Ismail Lutfi Chapakia Al-Fatani (from 1986-2010)* (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University Malaysia.

Yee, Y. (17.05.2019). Breaking fast together, regardless of race and religion. *The Straits Times*. <https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/breaking-fast-together-regardless-of-race-and-religion>, (12.01.2020).

Yegar, M. (1972). *The Muslims of Burma: A Study of a Minority Group*. Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz.

Yegar, M. (2002). *Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Yegar, M. (2018). The Plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar. *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*. 12(2): 197–207.

Yong, C. (07.06.2017). PM joins 400 breaking fast at mosque. *The Straits Times*. <https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/pm-joins-400-breaking-fast-at-mosque>, (12.01.2020).

Yong, T. (2001). Singapore: Civil-Military Fusion? *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (pp. 276-293). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Yong, T. (2011). The armed forces and politics in Singapore: The persistence of civil-military fusion. *The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia* (pp. 162-180). New York: Routledge.

Yusuf, I. (2007). *Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand*. East-West Center Washington Working Papers. <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/faces-islam-southern-thailand>, (12.12.2017).

Yusuf, I. (2009). Ethnoreligious and Political Dimensions of the Southern Thailand Conflict. *Islam and Politics: Renewal and Resistance in the Muslim World* (pp. 43-55). Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center.

Yusuf, I. (2017a). Nationalist Ethnicities as Religious Identities: Islam, Buddhism and Citizenship in Myanmar. *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*. 34(4): 100–119.

Yusuf, I. (2017b). *Tracing the Exclusion of the Rohingya in Myanmar: Research Notes*. [https://www.academia.edu/34521361/Tracing\\_the\\_Exclusion\\_of\\_the\\_Rohingya\\_in\\_Myanmar\\_Research\\_Notes](https://www.academia.edu/34521361/Tracing_the_Exclusion_of_the_Rohingya_in_Myanmar_Research_Notes), (16.09.2019).

Yusuf, I. (2018). Three Faces of the Rohingya Crisis: Religious Nationalism, Asian Islamophobia, and Delegitimizing Citizenship. *Studia Islamika*. 25(3): 503–542.

Zarni, M., and Cowley, A. (2014). The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar's Rohingya. *Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal*. 23(3): 683–754.

Zin, M. (2015). Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now? *Social Research: An International Quarterly*. 82(2): 375–397.



## APPENDICES

**Appendix 1: An Overview of The States-Muslim Minorities in Southeast Asia**  
(2012-2019)

Countries	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII
Cambodia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				
Laos	✓	✓	n/a	✓	✓							
Myanmar	✓	✓	✓						✓		✓	✓
Philippine	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Singapore	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					
Thailand	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Timor-Leste	n/a	✓	n/a	✓	✓	✓						
Vietnam	✓	✓	n/a	✓	✓	n/a	✓	n/a				

*Notes:*

I	The state recognizes Islam as a legitimate organized religion in the country.
II	There are Muslims or Muslim associations that participate in politics/public employment/ not.
III	A state has allowed Muslims to apply/practice (partial) shariah rules/not since 2012.
IV	Muslim minorities have no problem with citizenship rights.
V	There exists a record of the state's accommodation/toleration of Muslim minorities since 2012/ not.
VI	There exists a record of a Muslim member of Parliament in the latest election/ not.
VII	There exists an official authority of Islamic affairs incorporated into the state institution/ not.
VIII	There exists a record of the impact of the Salafi movements in the countries since 2012/ not.
IX	There exist a Muslim militant/insurgent group since 2012/ not.
X	The active Muslim militant/insurgent groups since 2012 have an objective to secede/ not.
XI	There exist a record of state violence and violation of human rights on Muslim minorities since 2012/ not.
XII	There exists a record of ethnic cleansing since 2012/ not.

Source: Bajunid, 1999, 2008; Central Intelligence Agency, 2018, 2019, 2022b; Hefner, 2009; The University of Maryland, 2017; Esposito, 2004.

**Appendix 2: Voter Turnout in Muslim Minority Countries in SEA (2010-2019)**

Cambodia	2018	83.02%
	2013	68.49%
Laos	2016	97.94%
	2011	99.69%
Myanmar	2015	69.72%
	2010	77.26%
The Philippines*	2016	81.95%
	2010	74.98%
Singapore	2015	93.56%
	2011	93.18%
Thailand	2019	74.69%
	2014	46.79%
	2011	75.03%
Timor-Leste*	2017	71.16%
	2012	73.12%
Vietnam	2016	99.26%
	2011	99.51%

Source: International IDEA, 2022.

Note: \* denote presidential election.