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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS IN TURKEY AND ARGENTINA
DURING THE 1970S AND 1980S

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
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ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

**A Comparative Analysis of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and Argentina
during the 1970s and 1980s**

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Department of International Relations

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Both Turkey and Argentina had gone through a series of military coups until the late 1970s and early 1980s. While Argentina had experienced five (1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966), Turkey had lived through two (1960 and 1971) military coups. The factors that caused the 1976 coup in Argentina and 1980 coup in Turkey were quite similar: Political polarization and fragmentation, weak governments, violence on the streets, high mobilization of the labor class, and significant economic crises. However, in the post transition period while Argentina managed to establish a full civilian control over the military by removing the armed forces out of politics, in Turkey the military's dominant role in politics continued until the mid-2000s. This thesis is trying to find an answer to this question.

In an attempt to answer this question and analyze the different outcomes, this study as tools of civil-military relations approaches will refer to the modes of transition examined by Samuel Huntington and internal and external threats arguments brought by Michael Desch. It will argue that 'transformation' mode of transition in which the authoritarian rulers initiate the transition enabled the dominant role for the Turkish military in the aftermath of the 1980 coup. For Argentina 'replacement' in which the opposition overthrows the authoritarian rulers by force enabled the Argentinean civilian rulers to establish their control over the military. It will also argue that throughout the 1980s, the high internal

threat environment due to PKK attacks in Turkey and low external environment as a result of end of Cold War disabled the civilian control of the military. However, in Argentina during the same period low internal threat environment vis-à-vis the high external threat due to Malvinas/Falkland war promoted the establishment of the civilian control over the military.

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations, Modes of Transition, External and Internal Threats, Argentinean Politics, and Turkish Politics.

ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

**A Comparative Analysis of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and Argentina
during the 1970s and 1980s**

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1970'lerin sonu ve 1980'lerin başına kadar Arjantin'de beş (1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966), Türkiye'de ise iki (1960 ve 1971) darbe gerçekleşmiştir. Benzer faktörler Arjantin'de 1976 darbesine ve Türkiye'de 1980 darbesine yol açmıştır. Bu faktörler siyasi kutuplaşma ve bölünme, zayıf hükümetler, sokaktaki şiddet, işçi sınıfının hareketlenmesi ve ciddi ekonomik krizlerden oluşmaktadır. Ancak darbe sonrası demokratikleşmeye geçildiği dönemde Arjantin, ordusu üzerinde tam bir sivil kontrol oluşturup, silahlı kuvvetleri siyasetin dışına çıkarılabilmesine rağmen, Türkiye'de askerin siyasetteki etkisi 2000'li yılların ortasına kadar sürmüştür. Bu tez iki ülke arasındaki bu farkı incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Bu soruyu cevaplayabilmek ve farkı inceleyebilmek için, tez Samuel Huntington'ın ortaya koyduğu otoriter rejimden demokrasiye geçiş modellerinden ve de Michael Desch'in öne sürdüğü iç ve dış tehdit argümanlarından yararlanacaktır. Tez, otoriter yönetimden demokrasiye geçişte 'dönüşüm' model geçişin, yani geçişin otoriter liderlerin eliyle gerçekleştirilmesinin Türkiye'de 1980 darbesinden sonraki dönemde de askerin siyasette etkili rolünün devam etmesini sağladığını ileri sürmektedir. Arjantin için de otoriter yönetimden demokrasiye geçişte 'değiştirme' model geçişin, yani geçişin muhalefetin otoriter yönetimi güç kazanarak değiştirmesinin,

Arjantin’de sivillerin orduyu kontrol etmesini sağladığını ileri sürecektir. Ayrıca tez Türkiye’de 1980’ler boyunca PKK saldırıları sonucunda iç tehdidin artması ve Soğuk Savaşın sonu dolayısıyla da dış tehdidin azalması iddiası ile sivillerin askeri kontrol etmede zorlandıklarını iddia etmiştir. Arjantin için de aynı dönemde iç tehdit düşük iken, Malvinas/Falkland Savaşları dolayısıyla dış tehdidin artmasının sivillerin asker üzerinde kontrol kurmalarına yardımcı olduğu ileri sürülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil-Asker İlişkileri, Demokrasiye Geçiş Modelleri, Dış Ve İç Tehditler, Arjantin Siyaseti Ve Türk Siyaseti.

**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN
TURKEY AND ARGENTINA DURING THE 1970S AND 1980S**

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANAP	Motherland Party (<i>Anavatan Partisi</i>)
AP	Justice Party (<i>Adalet Partisi</i>)
CGT	General Confederation of Labor (<i>Confederación General del Trabajo</i>)
CHP	Republican People's Party (<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i>)
CKMP	Republican Peasants' Nation Party (<i>Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi</i>)
CONADEP	National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (<i>Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas</i>)
Dev Genç	Turkey's Federation of Revolutionary Youth (<i>Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu</i>)
Dev-Sol	Revolutionary Left (<i>Devrimci Sol</i>)
Dev-Yol	Revolutionary Path (<i>Devrimci Yol</i>)
DDKO	Revolutionary Culture Clubs of the East (<i>Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları</i>)
DGM	State Security Courts (<i>Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri</i>)
DİSK	Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (<i>Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu</i>)
DP	Democrat Party (<i>Demokrat Parti</i>)
DPT	State Planning Organization (<i>Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı</i>)
DSP	Democratic Left Party (<i>Demokratik Sol Parti</i>)
DYP	True Path Party (<i>Doğru Yol Partisi</i>)
ERP	Revolutionary Army of the People (<i>Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo</i>)
FAR	Revolutionary Armed Forces (<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias</i>)
FKF	Federation of Idea Clubs (<i>Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu</i>)
FREJULI	Justicialist Front for Liberation (<i>Frente Justicialista de Liberación</i>)
GAP	Southeastern Anatolia Project (<i>Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi</i>)

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GP	Reliance Party (<i>Güven Partisi</i>)
HEP	People's Labor Party (<i>Halkın Emek Partisi</i>)
HP	Populist Party (<i>Halkçı Parti</i>)
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import-Substitution Industrialization
İTC	Party of Union and Progress (<i>İttihat ve Terakki Partisi</i>)
MBK	National Unity Committee (<i>Milli Birlik Komitesi</i>)
MC	Nationalist Front (<i>Milliyetçi Cephe</i>)
MDD	National Democratic Revolution (<i>Milli Demokratik Devrim</i>)
MDP	Nationalist Democracy Party (<i>Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi</i>)
MGK	National Security Council (<i>Milli Güvenlik Kurulu</i>)
MGSB	National Security Policy Document (<i>Milli Güvenlik Siyaset Belgesi</i>)
MHP	Nationalist Action Party (<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i>)
MNP	National Order Party (<i>Milli Nizam Partisi</i>)
MP	Nation Party (<i>Millet Partisi</i>)
MSP	National Salvation Party (<i>Milli Selamet Partisi</i>)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organizations of American States
OHAL	Regional State of Emergency Governorate (<i>Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği</i>)
OYAK	Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Fund (<i>Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu</i>)
PAN	National Autonomist Party (<i>Partido Autonomista Nacional</i>)
PDP	Democratic Progressive Party (<i>Partido Demócrata Progresista</i>)
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party (<i>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan</i>)
PS	Socialist Party (<i>Partido Socialista</i>)
RP	Welfare Party (<i>Refah Partisi</i>)
SD	Socialist Revolution (<i>Sosyalist Devrim</i>)

SHP	Social Democratic Populist Party (<i>Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti</i>)
TİİKP	Revolutionary Workers Peasants Party of Turkey (<i>Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi</i>)
TİP	Workers' Party of Turkey (<i>Türkiye İşçi Partisi</i>)
THKO	People's Liberation Army of Turkey (<i>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu</i>)
THKP-C	People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (<i>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Parti-Cephesi</i>)
Triple A	Anti-Communist Argentine Alliance (<i>Allianza Anticomunista Argentina</i>)
TÜRK-İŞ	Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (<i>Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu</i>)
UCR	Radical Civic Union (<i>Unión Cívica Radical</i>)
UCRI	Intransigent Radical Civic Union (<i>Union Cívica Radical Intranssigentes</i>)
UCRP	Radical Civic Union of the People (<i>Union Cívica Radical del Pueblo</i>)
UIA	Argentina Industrial Union (<i>Unión Industrial Argentina</i>)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
YÖK	Higher Educational Council (<i>Yükseköğretim Kurulu</i>)
YPF	Treasury Petroleum Fields (<i>Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales</i>)
YSK	Supreme Election Board (<i>Yüksek Seçim Kurulu</i>)
YTP	New Turkey Party (<i>Yeni Türkiye Partisi</i>)

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INTRODUCTION

Throughout their history both Turkey and Argentina had gone through a series of military interventions. Since its establishment until the late 1970s while Argentina has experienced five military coups (1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966), until the late 1980s, Turkey has gone through two (1960 and 1971) interventions. The military interventions both countries had experienced in late 1970s and early 1980s, the September 12, 1980 coup in Turkey and March 24, 1976 coup in Argentina had had serious impacts on the political life of both countries. Prior to the military intervention of 1980 and 1976, both countries had experienced similar problems such as political polarization and fragmentation, weak and incompetent governments, high level of violence on the streets, high mobilization of the labor class, and very serious economic crises. However, although both countries accomplished their transition to democracy in the same year, in 1983, while the Turkish military had kept its dominant role in politics until the mid-2000s, the Argentinean military had gradually lost its power and eventually it was totally subordinated to the civilian rule by the 1990s. This thesis concentrates on this different outcome. Although both countries have gone through similar experiences (with minor differences) in the periods prior to the coups of late 1970s and early 1980s, why Argentina managed to curtail the power of the military in the post-transition period of 1976 coup and force the military to subordinate itself totally to the civilian rule and Turkey could not—is the research question of this thesis. Moreover, until the mid-2000s, Turkish military's interference into politics continued in full speed through institutional mechanisms (prerogatives including the MGK, the presidential powers, its dominance in the defense budget etc) and non-institutional mechanisms (military's informal impact on the society). In an attempt to find an answer to this question this study will analyze both cases through the civil-military approaches in the context of civilian control of the military by concentrating on modes of transition and the internal-external threat arguments.

Concerning the mode of transition the thesis will refer to Samuel Huntington's modes of transitions including transformation, replacement, and transplacement. The thesis argues that since the transition to civilian rule in Turkey in 1983 had taken place under the control of the military, the armed forces managed

to continue dominating the politics in the aftermath of the coup. Since the first day Turkish military came to power in 1980, they kept announcing that the country will turn back to civilian rule as soon as law and order is restored. Consequently, Turkish military took over the transition process and once they supervised the writing of a new constitution that would work in their favor and made sure the coup leader, Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren took the post of the presidency and ensured certain exit guarantees (that included tutelary powers, reserved domains, manipulation of the electoral process, irreversibility of actions of the military regimes and amnesty laws) for themselves, they accomplished the transition to civilian rule. They even decided the name of the parties and the leaders that would participate in 1983 general elections. Such a smooth transition under the control of the military leaders which is called as 'transformation' by Huntington permitted the authoritarian leaders to dominate the post-transition period.

However, in Argentina transition to civilian rule following the 1976 coup had taken the form of replacement in which the rise of civilian opposition managed to prevail over the decreasing power of the authoritarian regime. In contrast with Turkish military rulers, Argentinean junta members had not mentioned any intentions for returning to civilian rule or democracy. The Argentinean military banned all political activity, closed the senate, and fired almost all bureaucrats. Moreover, besides their military duties, they handled the day-to-day functions of the state. The military junta suspended the Argentinean Constitution and continued to rule the country through the decrees they arbitrarily issued. However, in time the military rule had been weakened due to their brutal human rights violations and economic failure. Consequently the Argentinean military decided to launch a diversionary war and invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982. Yet, the massive defeat of the Argentinean army against the United Kingdom in the Falklands War led to the total collapse of the military rule. These three failures led to the fall of the Argentinean junta in 1983 with the civilian opposition taking the lead for transition to democracy. Consequently, when the civilian opposition managed to bring civilian rule under its control by overthrowing the military regime, the military did not have much of a chance to keep its exit guarantees. In fact, in this context, the military members could easily go through trials that would put them in prison. Therefore, this thesis argues

that while the ‘transformation’ mode of transition enabled the Turkish military to keep its control over politics, the ‘replacement’ mode of transition in Argentina allowed the civilians to establish an absolute control in politics taking the military out of politics.

Regarding the internal and external threat approaches, the study will refer to Michael Desch’s arguments on the strength of the civilian control in politics by taking the combinations of low versus high internal versus external threat argument.¹ Desch argues that various threat environments have different effects on the civil-military relations of countries and examines the civilian control of military with internal and external threat variables. According to Desch, the high internal threat and low external threat lead to the worst civilian control of military. In other words, the civilians cannot control the military. Therefore, military dominates the civilian politics. In this context, the military that is not involved in external threats will concentrate on internal threats. The low internal threat and high external threat is the best environment for a well-established civilian control of military because both civilian and military elites conjointly focus on dealing with the outside enemy.

The rise of PKK terror in 1984, just a year after transition to democracy, as an internal threat provided a leverage for Turkish Armed Forces to intervene into the civilian politics. Although PKK attacks can be considered as an internal threat in which the security forces are responsible from handling. However, since such attacks involved a danger to the territorial integrity of the country, the military found the issue to be too sensitive to leave to the security forces and the civilian politicians. Meanwhile, the external threats against Turkey compared to Cold War Era relatively decreased during the 1980s. The Cold War tension had been defused starting in mid-1980s onwards. Two neighbors that have always threatened Turkey, Iran and Iraq had been at war with each other between 1980 and 1988. The only threats could have come from Greece and Bulgaria. However, the end of the Cold War overshadowed the conflicts with these two countries. Consequently, the high internal threat and low

¹ Michael C. Desch, **Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment**, Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1999.

external threat in Turkey had provided a suitable environment for military to dominate the civilian politics.²

In contrast with Turkey, in Argentina since 1979 the internal threat decreased. However, inception of Falklands War in 1982 increased the external threat. The Argentinean military's defeat in Falkland Islands to the United Kingdom proved that they were not in a capacity to protect the state and Argentines. The high internal threat continued in the aftermath of military rule due to the region-wide authoritarianism which was perceived as a national security threat for Argentina. As a result in Argentina the low internal threat and high external threat had provided a better environment for a well-established civilian control of military.

Consequently, this thesis argues that in Turkey the high internal threat level due to the PKK terror and the low external threat as a result of the end of the Cold War did not give the chance to Turkish civilian leaders to take control of the security issues from the military. Conversely, the study also argues that the low internal threat environment and the high external threat environment in Argentina as a result of Falklands War gave the Argentinean civilians the chance to establish a civilian control over the military.

This thesis as its case studies chooses to compare and contrast the military coups in Argentina and Turkey. The main reason for choosing these case studies was the similar institutional backgrounds as well as historical characteristics of both countries. First of all, predecessors of Turkey and Argentina, which are the Ottoman Empire and Spanish Kingdom, respectively, were the patrimonial states in Weberian terms. There had been no clear separation between the state apparatus and the household of the Sultans and Kings. The structure of society was constructed as top down and was defined for strengthening the authority of rulers. There were no right to inheritance and no private property, and the sovereignty was not divided into the hands of small classes like suzerains. The most privileged and most powerful class had always been the military in both empires. When the central authority had been

² The Law on MGK defined National Security as "the protection of the constitutional order of the state, its national existence, and its integrity; of all of its interests in the international field, including political social, cultural, and economic interests; and of interests derived from international treaties against all external and internal threats". The Article 35 of the Internal Service Code stated the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces as "protecting and safeguarding the Turkish motherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the constitution".

weakened during the 18th and 19th centuries the first reformed class was also military. The same military classes were the founders of modern Turkey and Argentina who preserved their privileged positions for decades.

Secondly, the rapid modernization of both Turkey and Argentina caused the weak institutionalization in both countries and eventually created defections in political structures. Samuel Huntington calls these kinds of polities as praetorian polities in which political systems that have low levels of institutionalization and high levels of participation. Both in Turkey and Argentina the political institutionalization was too weak to channel the high political mobilization thus leading to military interventions into politics.

The reasons that caused military interventions in Turkey and Argentina were quite similar. In Turkey, there had been three military interventions from transition to multiparty politics until 1980s. They have taken place in 1960, 1971, and 1980. The reasons of May 27, 1960 military intervention was the economic crisis, the authoritarian tendencies of the government, the humiliation of army officers by the governing party, and the street clashes. Eventually the Turkish military toppled the government, restructured the state institutions, and adopted a new constitution. The clashes between the rightists and leftists on the street, polarization of the society, the rule of incompetent, fragile and fragmented governments and serious economic crises led to both March 12, 1971 and 12 September 1980 coups.

In Argentina, after transition to multiparty politics in 1916 until 1980s, six military interventions had taken place (1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, and 1976). All of these military coups had similar reasons including widespread corruption, serious economic crisis, patron-client relations, incompetent civilian leaders, armed clashes between leftists and rightists and the factions of Peronism, and labor and student mobilization. These reasons that led to the coups in Argentina were quite similar to their counterparts in Turkey. In spite of all these similar institutional, historical, and contextual characteristics, while Argentina managed to accomplish its transition to civilian rule in late 1979s, Turkey could not. This thesis is trying to find an answer to this difference.

Literature Review:

The main concern of civil-military relations theory is the direct capture of political power by the military. Therefore, the civil-military relations literature generally studies military interference into civilian affairs and tries to find answers to the causes of military interventions by mainly looking at the military side of the relationship and from time to time to the civilian side of the relations. Concerning the civil-military relations in Turkey and Argentina there is a tremendous amount of literature. Majority of the civil-military literature on Turkey examines the key role played by the armed forces in the establishment of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey as well as its modernizing efforts and its role as guardian of Kemalist reforms and principles aimed at westernizing and modernizing the country.³ There are also articles and books that analyze the factors that lead to the military interventions in Turkey.⁴ Similarly, concerning Argentinean civil-military relations

³ William Hale, **Turkish Politics and the Military**, Routledge, London and New York, (Turkish), 1994. Feroz Ahmad, **The Making of Modern Turkey**, Routledge, London and New York, 1993. Eric C. Zürcher, **Turkey: A Modern History**, 7th Edition, I. B. Tauris, London and New York, 2005. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, **History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1977. John H. McFadden, "Civil-Military Relations in the Third Turkish Republic", **The Middle East Journal**, Vol: 39, No: 1, 1985, pp. 69-85. James Brown, "The Politics of Disengagement in Turkey: The Kemalist Tradition", **The Decline of Civilian Regimes, The Civilian Influence**, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1988, pp. 131-146. Stanford Shaw, **History of The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey**, Volume 1: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976. Donald Quataert, **Ottoman Empire 1700-1922**, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005. Roderic H. Davison, **Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West**, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1990. Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, **A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk**, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, California, 2009. George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey: Guardians or Decision- Makers?", **State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s**, (Eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin), Berlin - New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1988, pp. 177-200. Ümit Cizre, "The Turkish Military", **The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World**, Vol. IV, (Ed. Reşat Kasaba), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 301-332.

⁴ Some of these include Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", **Comparative Politics**, Vol: 29, No: 2, 1997, pp. 151-166. Gareth Jenkins, "Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics", The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 337, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001. Nasser Momayezi, "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey", **International Journal on World Peace**, Vol: 15, No: 3, 1998, pp. 3-28. Özgür Mutlu Ulus, **The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey: Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism**, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2011. Ümit Özdağ, **Menderes Döneminde Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri, 27 Mayıs İhtilali**, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1997. Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar, Bülent Çaplı, **12 Mart, İhtilalın Peçesinde Demokrasi**, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 1994. Mehmet Ali Birand, **The General's Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980**, Brassey's Defence Publishers, London and Washington, 1987. Hasan Cemal, **Tank Sesiyle Uyanmak: 12 Eylül Günlüğü**, 9th edition, Doğan Kitapçılık, İstanbul, 2000. Emre Kongar, **28 Şubat**

there is a wide range of literature analyzing the dynamics that cause the coups in the country.⁵ Moreover, it is quite common to run into the comparative analysis of the coups among the Latin American countries and also between the Latin America as a region and Eastern/South-eastern Europe.⁶

Rarely, it is possible to see the analysis of Turkish coups as a chapter in a book where the coups of other countries are examined.⁷ However, it is not very common to see the comparison of Turkish coups with the coups of other countries. There are some exceptions. For example in his “Turkish Civil-Military Relations: A Latin American Comparison” article David Pion-Berlin compared the civil military

ve Demokrasi, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2000. Cüneyt Arcayürek, **Derin Devlet 1950-2007: Darbeler ve Gizli Servisler**, Detay Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007.

⁵ Guillermo O'Donnell, **Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics**, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973. David Pion-Berlin, **Through the Corridors of Power, Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina**, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, (Through), 1997. Jonathan C. Brown, **A Brief History of Argentina**, 2nd Edition, Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group, York, 2010. Juan Carlos Torre and Liliana De Riz, “Argentina Since 1946”, **Argentina Since Independence**, (Ed. Leslie Bethell), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 243-364. Luis Alberto Romero, **A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century**, Translated by James P. Brennan, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 2002. Carina Perelli, “From Counterrevolutionary Warfare to Political Awakening: The Uruguayan and Argentine Armed Forces in the 1970s”, **Armed Forces and Society**, Vol: 20, No: 1, 1993, pp. 25-49. Kathryn Sikking, “From Pariah State to Global Protagonist: Argentina and the Struggle for International Human Rights”, **Latin American Politics and Society**, Vol: 50, No: 1, 2008, pp. 1-29. Herbert C. Huser, **Argentine Civil-Military Relations from Alfonsín to Menem**, National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 2002. Jill Hedges, **Argentina A Modern History**, I.B. Tauris, London-New York, 2011. Alain Rouquié, **Latin Amerika’da Askeri Devlet**, Translated by Şirin Tekeli, Alan Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1986. Aldo C. Vacs, “Argentina”, **Politics of Latin America: The Power Game**, (Eds. Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost), Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 2002, pp. 399-436. Alejandro Grimson and Gabriel Kessler, **On Argentina and the Southern Cone: Neoliberalism and National Imaginations**, Routledge, New York and London, 2003. David Rock, “Argentina, 1930-1946”, **Argentina Since Independence**, (Ed. Leslie Bethell), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, (1930), pp. 173-242.

⁶ (Ed. Diane Ethier), **Democratic Transitions and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia**, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1990. (Ed. Enrique A. Baloyra), **Comparing new Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone**, Boulder, Westview Press, 1987. (Ed. David Pion-Berlin), **Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives**, Chapel Hill and London, The University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Paul Chambers and Siegfried O. Wolf, “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies”, **Democratization**, Vol: 17, No: 5, 2010, pp. 950-975.

⁷ Aylin Güney, “The Military, Politics and Post-Cold War Dilemmas in Turkey”, **Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy**, (Eds. Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt), Zed Books, London and New York, 2002, pp 162-178. Nilüfer Narlı, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”, **The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe: Continuing Democratic Reform and Adapting to the Needs of Fighting Terrorism**, (Eds. Philipp H. Fluri, Gustav E. Gustenau, and Plamen I. Pantev), Physica-Verlag, New York, 2005, pp. 229-258. Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, “Civil-Military Relations, Political Islam and Security: The Turkish Case”, **Civil-military Relations, Nation Building, and National Identity: Comparative Perspectives**, (Eds. Constantine P. Danopoulos, Dharendra K. Vajpeyi and Amir Bar-Or), Praeger, Westport, 2004, 183-198.

relations in Turkey with other Latin American countries from an historical institutionalist perspective.⁸ In her PhD dissertation, Aslı Tohumcu compared Turkey and Argentina by applying Rebecca Schiff's "concordance theory" in order to understand the reasons of 1980 military intervention in Turkey and 1976 coup d'état in Argentina. In conclusion, although both Turkey and Argentina seemed different in the first instance, there are many common institutional, historical, and contextual features of both countries led to the military interventions.⁹ In addition, in his master dissertation, İnan Akdağ evaluated the "Civilian-Military Relations in the Argentinean Democratization" between the years of 1983 and 1995. Although the thesis of Akdağ is a single-case study, it explains the political environment during the post-transition period of Argentina until the end of President Carlos Menem's first term by examining the new democratic environment, economic structure, and the positions of civilian and military elites.¹⁰

Consequently, this thesis is attempting to fill the gap in the literature since there are not many studies that compare the military coups between Argentina and Turkey.

Methodology:

This thesis will use cross-case analysis while examining Turkey and Argentina with a retrospective method. Both Turkey and Argentina have similar structural and cultural variables but in the end the outcomes are different. Mostly secondary sources are used in the thesis. In the analysis of post-transition periods, this research shows the significance of the modes of transition in the democratic transition period and the internal and external threats a country is facing with. The data in the thesis shows how mode of transitions and the level of internal and external threats shape whether the civilians will control the military or military will

⁸ David Pion-Berlin, "Turkish Civil-Military Relations: A Latin American Comparison", **Turkish Studies**, Vol: 12, No: 2, 2011, (Turkish), pp. 293-304.

⁹ Aslı Postacı, **The Military Interventions of 1976 in Argentina and 1980 in Turkey: An Analysis and Comparison of the Civil-Military Relations**, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Yeditepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences, 2012.

¹⁰ İnan Akdağ, **Civilian-Military Relations in the Argentinean Democratization (1983-1995)**, Unpublished Master Thesis, Middle East Technical University Graduate School of Social Sciences, 2006.

dominate the civilians through an analysis of secondary sources that include books and journal articles.

Structure of the thesis:

The first chapter lays out the theoretical framework for the empirical discussions that will follow. It discusses the indicators of democratic consolidation which are political institutions and institutional design, civil society, socio-economic development, international factors, and civil-military relations. From these five indicators, this thesis concerns with the civil-military relations, more specifically, the civilian control of military. In order to explain why Turkey has weak civilian control of military and while Argentina has a strong one after 1983, this thesis uses refers to two approaches of civil-military relations literature, which are the modes of transition and internal-external threat environments. After explaining the various approaches of civil-military relations, this thesis includes a literature review about modes of transition which is followed by the security, theory of omnibalancing, threat, and internal-external threat variables.

The second chapter aims to provide a historical background of civil-military relations, particularly the military coups that had taken place both in Turkey and Argentina. The chapter begins with the examination of the roots of military interventions in both countries by giving a historical background from the Ottoman period for Turkey and Colonial period for Argentina. After explaining the historical roots, the chapter examines the military interventions one by one which are 1960 and 1971 in Turkey, 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, and 1966 in Argentina.

The third chapter particularly concentrates on the 1976 and 1980 coups in Argentina and Turkey, respectively. The chapter first analyzes the historical events and factors that led to the 1980 military intervention in Turkey, later focuses on the military rule and the events that occurred during the post-transition period. The chapter continues with the similar path for explaining the 1976 coup in Argentina, the military rule, and the aftermath of the military period.

The fourth and the most significant chapter of the thesis aims at analyzing the research question of the thesis. It attempts to give an answer to why Argentina

succeeded to establish civilian control over its military while Turkey was not able to through an analysis of the question with the help of modes of transition and internal versus external threat arguments. The chapter begins with re-evaluating the factors that led to the military intervention traditions in both Turkey and Argentina. In the following sections, the chapter analyzes the similarities and differences of both countries that led to the differentiation in the aftermath of military rules. The chapter continues with how different modes of transitions led to the creation of different levels of civilian control of military during the post-transition periods in Turkey and Argentina. More specifically, how the regime-led transition had provided privileges and exit guarantees for the military in Turkey, whereas the opposition-led transition in Argentina paved the way for curbing the powers and privileges of armed forces. Finally, the chapter examines the effects of different threat environments on the civilian control of military by explaining the high internal threat (PKK) and low external threat (e.g. the end of the Cold War) in Turkey whereas the low internal threat (e.g. end of political terror) and high external threat (the Falklands War, the Beagle Channel issue, and region-wide authoritarianism) in Argentina.

Finally, the conclusion summarizes the analysis of the 1976 and 1980 coups and the post-transition periods in Argentina and Turkey respectively by highlighting the modes of transition and internal and external threats arguments. The conclusion will elaborate on the reason how Argentinean civilians managed to get the military out of politics and how Turkish civilians could not do so by briefly examining the continuation of the military's dominance in Turkish politics throughout the 1990s. The conclusion also points out the weaknesses of the thesis and the future research that should be elaborated on this subject.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Both in Turkey and Argentina military coups have been a common scene in politics. While in Argentina until the 1976 military there have been five former coups, in Turkey until the 1980 coup, two other coups have taken place. However, in Argentina in the aftermath of the transition to democracy following the 1976 coup, military was completely subordinated to the civilians, in Turkey this only happened in mid-2000s. The Turkish military's dominant role in politics continued after the transition to civilian rule following the 1980 coup. Through institutional and non-institutional mechanisms Turkish military had continued to intervene into politics. In fact throughout the 1970s both countries have gone through similar crises such as weak governments, economic crisis and strong mobilization movements. During the 1976 coup and 1980 coup both militaries violated human rights and ruled their respective countries brutally. However, Argentines managed to take military out of politics, while the Turks could not. This study in its attempt to find an answer to this question as conceptual tools will concentrate on categorizations of Samuel Huntington's modes of transition and Michael Desch's internal and external threat variables.¹¹ In other words, the thesis will explain these different outcomes in two countries in the aftermath of the coups through transformation, replacement, and transplacement modes of transitions brought up by Samuel Huntington and other scholars and different internal and external threat environments presented by Michael Desch.

Civil-military relations, particularly civilian control of the military, is an important factor that can contribute to the consolidation of democracy in a country. Transition to democracy can take place in one night as it had happened in Eastern Europe; however, accomplishment of the consolidation of democracy at least takes a generation. Certain factors play a significant role in the realization of a consolidated democracy. Among these factors existence of state and its institutions, a vibrant civil society, socio-economic developments and external actors that promote democracy

¹¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "How Countries Democratize", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol: 106, No: 4, 1991-1992, pp. 579-616. Michael C. Desch, **Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment**, Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1999.

can be mentioned. Besides other indicators, civilian control of military is a condition *sine qua non* for a well-consolidated democracy. In order to evaluate the factors that affect the civilian control of military, this chapter will concentrate on civil-military relations approaches. In an attempt to analyze the different outcomes in Turkey and Argentina the chapter will focus on the modes of transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy. Besides the modes of transition to democracy, it will also examine the internal threat and external threat environments that have a significant impact on the civilian control of the military.

I. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Making a proper and inclusively definition of democracy is difficult because, as Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl argue, democracy is not composed of “a single unique set of institutions”. There are many different types of democracy as a result of the different practices exercised in various countries. In other words, the specific form of democracy is dependent on the socio-economic conditions, state structures, and policy exercises of a specific country. Nevertheless, Schmitter and Karl define democracy “as a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives”.¹²

Schmitter and Karl broadly explain each pillar of this definition. First of all “a regime or system of governance” represents a group of institutionalized patterns which are the methods of access to the public offices, who are allowed or excluded from such access, the paths of the actors can use for gaining access, and the rules that are ensued in creating publicly binding decisions. Similar to nondemocratic ones, democracies need rulers who can give legitimate orders to other people. The main difference between democratic and nondemocratic state is the way the rulers come to power and their accountability for their actions.¹³

The “public realm” covers the creation of collective norms and choices which have binding effect on the society. These norms are also supported by state coercion.

¹² Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not”, **Journal of Democracy**, Vol: 2, No: 3, 1991, p. 76.

¹³ Schmitter and Karl, p. 76.

“Citizens” in democracies make the difference from nondemocratic ones because democracies create the eligibility to vote and run for the office. In contemporary world, all native born adults are eligible to vote and to run for the office. The only difference can be the age limits. “Competition” can be accepted as long as its boundaries are defined. The degree and the way of limiting competition differ from democracy to democracy.¹⁴

“Elections” must be fairly conducted and honestly counted. Although they managed to channel the political demands into a peaceful competition, they are not by themselves enough for democracy. “Majority rule” is significant for democracy since it shows that more than half of those eligible for voting makes the decisions. However, “majority rule” should also have limits to protect minorities. “Cooperation” shows that the political actors voluntarily act collectively with parties, associations, and movements for determining candidates, articulating preferences, and influencing policies.¹⁵

“Representatives” are the people who “do the real work in modern democracies”. Therefore, democracies may not survive without directly or indirectly participation of these representatives. The question in democracies is how these representatives are elected and whether they are accountable for their actions or not. Besides electoral representation, there are also representations via agencies, interest groups, and associations.¹⁶ However, there are still countries do not include those pillars pointed out by Schmitter and Karl, creating problems in their democratic structure.

According to Robert Dahl, there are eight criteria for democracy, which are “freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, institutions for making government policies dependent on votes and other expressions of

¹⁴ Schmitter and Karl, pp. 77-78.

¹⁵ Schmitter and Karl, pp. 89-80.

¹⁶ Schmitter and Karl, p. 80.

preference”.¹⁷ Along the same line, Juan Linz broadly indicates that a political system is only then democratic

when it allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competitions between leaders to validate at regular intervals by non violent means their claim to rule, ... without excluding and effective political office from that competition or prohibiting any members of political community from expressing their preference.¹⁸

Transitions are “the first battle” for democracy,¹⁹ basically, according to Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, “is the interval between one political regime and another ... Transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative”.²⁰ Democratic transitions simply occurs when the political capacity of power holders decline and the oppositions’ increase. The ruling elites either tend to preserve the status quo or accept the change and negotiations.²¹ The transitions accomplish when the authoritarian regime falls. However, it is important to emphasize that democratic transition is different than democratic consolidation. While the transition can be accomplished with the fall of an authoritarian regime and transformation to multi-party system, democratic consolidation is a much more complicated process. In consolidation all the institutions of democracy must be established and moreover, adopted by the people.

¹⁷ Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, in Wolfgang Merkel, “The Consolidation of Post-autocratic Democracies: A multi-level Model”, **Democratization**, Vol: 5, No: 3, 1998, (Model), p. 62.

¹⁸ Juan J. Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes”, in Merkel, Model, p. 34.

¹⁹ Jeff Haynes, “Democratic Consolidation in the Third World: Many Questions, Any Answers?”, **Contemporary Politics**, Vol: 6, No: 2, 2000, p. 128.

²⁰ Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, “Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies”, **Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy**, (Eds. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead), Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 6.

²¹ Carl J. Saxer, “Democratic Transition and Institutional Crafting: The South Korean Case”, **Democratization**, Vol: 10, No: 2, 2003, p. 46. Jacek Kugler and Yi Feng, “Explaining and Modeling Democratic Transitions”, **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol: 43, No: 2, 1999, p. 141. Siddharth Swaminathan, “Time, Power, and Democratic Transitions”, **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol: 43, No: 2, 1999, p. 179.

People should not think of any other kind of regime besides democracy to rule the country.

Wolfgang Merkel distinguishes the minimalist and maximalist concepts of democratic consolidation. He argues that “it will be helpful to introduce a comprehensive and distinctive concept of consolidation” but not in normative-democratic aspects, instead, in understanding of the consolidation.²² The minimalist consolidation of democracy represents Schumpeterian understanding, “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will”.²³ Along the same line, Samuel Huntington argues that “democracies became consolidated when people learn that democracy is a solution to the problem of tyranny, but not necessarily to anything else”.²⁴

However, in maximalist understanding, democratic consolidation “is a much more lengthy and difficult process than the transition itself”. It begins with the end of transition period and inauguration of the new government elected with the free and fair elections, but “not all who make the transition will be able to sustain it”.²⁵ According to Adam Przeworski, “democracy is consolidated when it becomes self-enforcing ... when compliance - acting within the institutional framework - constitutes the equilibrium of the decentralized strategies of all the relevant political forces”.²⁶ Democratic consolidation is, according to Larry Diamond, “a discernible process by which the rules, institutions, and constraints of democracy come to constitute ‘the only game in the town’, the one legitimate framework for seeking and exercising political power”.²⁷

²² Merkel, Model, p. 38.

²³ Joseph A. Schumpeter, **Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy**, London and New York, Routledge, 2003, p. 250.

²⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, **The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century**, Norman and London, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, (Third), p. 263.

²⁵ David Beetham, “Conditions for Democratic Consolidation”, **Review of African Political Economy**, Vol: 21, No: 60, 1994, pp. 159-160.

²⁶ Adam Przeworski, **Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Europe and Latin America**, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.26.

²⁷ Larry Diamond, “Introduction: In Search of Consolidation”, **Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges**, (Eds. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien”, Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1997, pp. xvi-xvii. Also see: Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies”, **Journal of Democracy**, Vol: 7, No: 2, 1996, p. 15.

From time to time, there have been improvements and reversals in the global democratization process. Huntington points out three waves of democratization. While the first one had taken place with American and French revolutions in the 19th century and the second one had started towards the end of Second World War with the downfall of fascist regimes and the independence of colonies. The third wave had started in 1974 with the democratization in Portugal, continued with Spain, Greece and many military dominated Latin American countries, Asian countries, and Eastern European countries following the collapse of Soviet Union in the 1990s.²⁸ However, although third wave countries experienced a shift from authoritarianism to democracy, their scope of democratic progress was problematic. According to Freedom House, the number of countries that are considered ‘free’ had been increasing since 1974. Now the majority of the countries is “free” and has effectively-working democratic structure as defined by Freedom House. The chart below shows the rise of democratic countries in numbers:

Table 1: Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” Country Ratings²⁹

Year	Total Countries	Free Countries		Partly Free Countries		Not Free Countries	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
2013	195	88	45	59	30	48	24
2000	192	86	45	58	30	48	25
1991 ^a	183	76	42	65	35	42	23
1990	165	65	40	50	30	50	30
1980	162	51	31	51	31	60	37
1975 ^b	158	40	25	53	34	65	41
1974	152	41	27	48	32	63	41

(a): The collapse of the Soviet Union and democratization in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union territory

(b): The beginning of the Third Wave Democratization

²⁸ Huntington, Third, p. 21.

²⁹ “Freedom in the World Country Ratings”, **Freedom House**, 2014, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Status%2026%20Ratings%20Overview%2C%201973-2014.pdf>, (02.08.2014).

As already mentioned in the introduction, transition to democracy can take place in a very short time once the authoritarian leader is thrown and new parties are established. However, consolidation of democracy can take generations. One can easily observe this in the developments in the current post-Arab Spring countries. They all have managed to overthrow their authoritarian leaders in a short time and have gone through so-called free and fair elections. However, by electing the conservative Islamist groups to power they are still far from consolidated democracies. Holding free and fair elections is only a minimal definition of democracy.³⁰ A more comprehensive democracy presents a range of “competitive processes and channels for the expression of interests and values associational - as well as partisan, functional as well as territorial, collective as well as individual.” All of these are central to its implementation.³¹

In order to understand whether the democracy becomes “the only game in the town” Diamond sets five indicators which are political institutions and institutional design, civil society, socio-economic development, international factors, and civil-military relations.³² Consolidated democracy needs legitimate, strong and well-designed political institutions but above all, there has to be a “state”. The rulers of the state are supposed to govern the state democratically. If the elected rulers violate constitution, fundamental rights and freedoms, judicial independence and impose legislature, this kind of regimes are not democracies. A state of law is crucial for transparency and accountability of political institutions as well as individuals for democratic consolidation. In addition, a usable bureaucracy is required to carry out the main functions of government. Moreover, effective party systems are also necessary for democratic consolidation because political parties are essential tools for channeling the democratic participation, representing demands, preferences, and interests, and forming effective governments. In general, the durability, adaptability, interdependence, and coherence of institutions are essential for democratic consolidation.³³

³⁰ Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies”, **Democratization**, Vol: 11, No: 5, 2004, p. 34. Linz, pp. 157-158.

³¹ Schmitter and Karl, p. 79.

³² Diamond, pp. xiv-xv.

³³ Diamond, pp. xxii-xxvii. Linz and Stepan, p. 14.

Another important indicator for democratic consolidation is civil society. Civil society movements may play a crucial role during the transition periods, but their power and unity can be diminished after transitions. A well-established, rich, dense, vibrant, and “civic” civil society is a necessary instrument for consolidation of democracy. However, besides their benefits, civil society organizations can also be obstacle for democratic consolidation in certain conditions. If civil society organizations hinder establishing political majorities, intensifying clientelism as well as ethnic tensions, they become barriers for consolidation of democracy.³⁴

Socioeconomic development is influential on democratic consolidation. Economic performance, economic development, and the wealth of a country matter in democratic consolidation and democratic persistence. The more economic development leads the high quality democracy. Moreover, class structure is also important. A well-developed middle-class and an organized working class are vital for democratic consolidation. The middle-class includes the professional and intellectual elements that eventually affect civil society positively. A developed economic structure also leads to more flexible, moderate, conciliatory, and tolerant individuals and masses.³⁵

International factors or external actors are important for both democratic transition and consolidation. International and especially regional shifts towards democracy plays a stimulating role and provides models for democratic transitions. Democratization process taking place in the neighboring countries can have significant snowballing effect. International pressures and incentives, growth of democratic assistance by governmental and non-governmental organizations, rising emphasis on human rights, and democracy promotion of liberal states can all be effective on democratization.³⁶

Lastly, the structure of civil-military relations is a very significant indicator for consolidation of democracy. The military’s subordination to civilians is a condition *sine qua non* for a democratic constitutional order.³⁷ According to Felipe

³⁴ Diamond, pp. xxx-xxxii.

³⁵ Diamond, pp. xxxii-xxxiv.

³⁶ Diamond, p. xxxiv. Huntington, Third, p. 33.

³⁷ Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Paul Chambers and Siegfried O. Wolf, “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies”, **Democratization**, Vol: 17, No: 5, 2010, p. 960.

Agüero, “[c]ivilian control, or supremacy, assumes that the military does not occupy leading positions in spheres deemed civilian and presupposes an active presence of civilians in military and defense spheres”.³⁸ For Richard Kohn, “[a]ll decisions of government, including national security, are to be made or approved by officials outside the professional armed forces, in democracy, by popularly elected officeholders and their appointees”.³⁹ As clearly understood from the two definitions, civilian control of military infers the ultimate authority of civilians over the issues delegated to civilians by general elections, and military issues such as defense and security.

The officials or rulers that are elected popularly must have the ability to implement their constitutional powers without depending on the opposition from the unelected ones. Civilian control of military provides democratically elected governments an ultimate authority over the policies such as defining goals and threats, implementation of national defense, and supervising military organization. The more military missions are limited to external defense and international security and the more military is alienated from internal security, and as a result, the civilians enjoy more oversight and control of the military. Giving the responsibility of internal security to the military should be the last resort, since it poses the danger of reducing civilian control as well as alienating civilians and military from each other. In addition, the armed forces itself eschew from intervening into the politics. If the military resists on continuing its dominance in politics, there would be no civilian control left. Therefore, effective civilian control needs a neutral military establishment. In all circumstances the armed forces should preserve this neutrality and not side with any particular party, agenda, or ideology.⁴⁰

However, civilian control of military is a hard task to implement due to various reasons. First of all, the prior military rule may be effective over the post-transition period. Secondly, if there is a tradition of military interventions, changing this attitude could be difficult. Thirdly, the military may not be happy with leaving

³⁸ Felipe Agüero, “Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America”, **Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives**, Vol: 1, (Ed. Larry Diamond), Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1997, (South), p. 177.

³⁹ Richard H. Kohn, How Democracies Control the Military, **Journal of Democracy**, Vol: 8, No: 4, 1997, p. 142.

⁴⁰ Diamond, p. xxviii. Linz and Stepan, p. 15. Kohn, pp. 144-146.

its economical and political prerogatives. Thus, many factors have to be convened for civilian control such as experienced leadership, unity among civilian political actors, and long term policy vision. The legitimacy and strength of political actors and institutions also matter for establishing civilian control.⁴¹ In addition, newly established democracies should “integrate the military and business elites into a stable framework of effective democratic institutions which do not threaten their interests”.⁴² Last but not least, the military has to be removed fully from the issues about domestic policies. If military officers, deep-seated civil servants, or state administrators maintain to act independently from elected civilians or even veto their decisions, democracy is in danger.⁴³

There are some fundamental pre-requests and control mechanisms for establishing an effective civilian control of military. These pre-requests and control mechanisms can be enlarged. However these mechanisms are the minimum ones. First of all, there should be a clearly defined chain of command for all circumstances and an effective executive authority for the usage of armed forces. Secondly, the authority for the declaration of war and making peace should be in the hands of civilians. Thirdly, the military policy related to size, shape, organization, character, weaponry, and internal operating procedures should be determined by the civilians.⁴⁴

Besides these pre-requisites, there should be some control mechanisms for democratic civil-military relations. First of all, a civilian should be authorized as Minister of Defense for all issues relating to the military. Civilian control requires an experienced and flexible staff in Ministry of Defense for conducting the issues on behalf of citizens and parliament with the military. Secondly, the legislature should approve and oversee the military actions as well as its budget independent from the executive. Thirdly, commissioning, education, promotion, assignment, and retirement of the officers should be controlled by executive and legislature, as well as open to judicial review. Lastly, individual members of the armed forces should be accountable to the law for their actions. Even if there is a separated law system, such

⁴¹ Diamond, pp. xxix-xxx. Kohn, pp. 141-142.

⁴² Merkel, Model, p. 56.

⁴³ Schmitter and Karl, p. 81.

⁴⁴ Kohn, p. 147.

as military courts and civilian courts, it should be under the jurisdiction of civilian judiciary.⁴⁵

But how do we understand civilian control, measure its existence and evaluate its effectiveness? According to Richard Kohn, “the best way ... is to weight the relative influence of military officers and civilian officials in decisions of state concerning war, internal security, external defense, and military policy (that is, the shape, size, and operating procedures of the military establishment)”.⁴⁶ However, a student of civil-military relations needs more comprehensive and elaborative approaches to understand the civilian control of military in a specific country. These approaches will be evaluated in the next section.

II. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

Civilian control over the military has been a long-lasting debate since the period of ancient Greek and the philosophers commented a lot about the balance in civil-military relations. From the first establishment of a political community, both individuals and states needed protection from the outsiders. Either permanent or temporary armed groups (later militaries) provided this protection but the dilemma had arisen from the mission of the militaries. The military has to be strong enough to protect the state and individuals against aggression with its coercive force. But, because the military has strong coercive power, there is a chance that it may impose its will to the state and individuals. Thus, it is important to ask the question who will guard the individuals or states from the guardians.⁴⁷ In order to find an answer to this question, many scholars developed many approaches and this section will attempt to evaluate them in order to contribute to finding of an answer to the research question of the thesis.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Kohn, pp. 149-152.

⁴⁶ Kohn, p. 143.

⁴⁷ Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control”, **Armed Forces and Society**, Vol: 23, No: 2, 1996, pp. 150-152.

⁴⁸ See Samuel P. Huntington, **The Soldier and The State**, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964, (Soldier), pp. 80-97. Claude E. Welch, Jr., “Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality”, **Civilian Control of the Military**, (Ed. Claude E. Welch), Albany, State University of New York, 1976, pp. 1-37. Samuel E. Finer, **The Man on Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics**, Boulder, Westview Press, 1988, pp. 14-19. Kohn, pp. 140-153. J. Samuel Fitch, **The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America**, Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press,

Samuel Huntington explains civilian control by taking the “relative power of civilian and military groups” into consideration and argues that “civilian control is achieved to the extent to which the power of military groups is reduced”. There are two kinds of civilian control that are classified as subjective and objective civilian control by Huntington. Subjective civilian control aims to maximize the power of civilian groups in relation to military. However, in turn, this becomes a power struggle among the civilian groups and one civilian group enhances its power at the expense of other civilian groups. Objective civilian control briefly aims to maximize military professionalism. In contrast with subjective control’s “civilianizing military” aim, objective control supports “militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state”. Objective control makes the military “politically sterile and neutral”, eventually downgrades “the lowest possible level of military political power with respect to all civilian groups”.⁴⁹

While Huntington’s liberal theory of civil-military relations concerns with preserving “the military’s ability to protect democratic values by defeating external threats”, Morris Janowitz’s civic-republican theory of civil-military relations concerns with sustaining “democratic values – especially the value of civic virtue – by bolstering civic participation through the citizen-soldier’s role”. According to Janowitz, military service is a positive duty because it expresses and improves “one’s citizenship and fulfilling the obligation improved democratic life”. Janowitz deeply supports “a national service program – including a military component – to provide youth with opportunities to work for a common good”. Moreover, instead of mercenaries or another political pressure group, professional soldiers have to continue to perceive themselves as citizen-soldiers. For this aim an explicit program

1998, pp. 36-43. Michael C. Desch, **Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment**, Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 6-12. Harold A. Trinkunas, “Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies: Argentina and Venezuela”, **Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs**, Vol: 42, No: 3, 2000, p. 79. Wendy Hunter, “Reason, Culture, or Structure? Assessing Civil-Military Dynamics in Brazil”, **Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives**, (Ed. David Pion-Berlin), Chapel Hill and London, The University of North Carolina Press, 2001, (Reason), p. 36. David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, “Democratization, Social Crisis and the Impact of Military Domestic Roles in Latin America”, **Journal of Political and Military Sociology**, Vol: 33, No: 1, 2005, (Democratization), pp. 11-13. Paul Staniland, “Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective”, **Security Studies**, Vol: 17, No: 2, 2008, pp. 322-343. Croissant, et. al., p. 956. Rebecca L. Schiff, “Concordance Theory, Targeted Partnership, and Counterinsurgency Strategy”, **Armed Forces and Society**, Vol: 38, No: 2, 2012, p. 319.

⁴⁹ Huntington, *Soldier*, pp. 80-84.

in political education is necessary to unite “professional military training to national and transnational purposes”.⁵⁰

Samuel Finer argues that the type of military intervention in politics differs from society to society depending on the political culture and institutionalization of this society. If there is a strong public attachment to civilian institutions in where civilian associations and political parties are powerful and numerous, the procedures for transfer of power are properly working and the location of supreme authority would not be confronted, the military intervention in politics would be weak. However, if there is a weak or non-existence of public attachment to the civilian institutions in which the parties and unions are few, the procedure for transferring power would be irregular or would not be available, the location of supreme authority would be challenged, the possibility of military intervention in politics would be constant and strong. Finer argues that while the former type of countries had mature or advanced political culture whereas the latter ones had low political culture.⁵¹

Samuel Fitch sets three preconditions for civilian control. According to Fitch first of all, “the military must be politically subordinate to the democratic regime”. In other words, the military should not take roles such as “national guardians”. Secondly, the policy control of the military should be conducted by constitutionally assigned civilian authorities. The military should not have “reserved domains of authority and policy-making”. Lastly, military personnel are supposed to be subjected to the rule of law. Special legal privileges can distort the civilian control over military. If the military is given the task to deal with counterinsurgency or similar duties, they should perform this in line with the national and international laws. Fitch sets four types of civil-military relations, which are military control (direct political control of military), military tutelage (direct and indirect influence of military as well as low policy control of civilians over the military), conditional subordination (limited policy control of civilians over the military as well as indirect

⁵⁰ James Burk, “Theories of Civil Military Relations”, **Armed Forces and Society**, Vol: 29, No: 7, 2002, pp. 11-12.

⁵¹ Finer, pp. 18-19.

influence and limited scope of military), and democratic control (policy control of civilians).⁵²

Claude Welch argues that civilian control of military is related to more of a set of relationships rather than an individual event. The changing balance between the strengths of civilian political institutions and the political strengths of military institutions displays the nature and extent of civilian control. The main point is the military acceptance of civilian government's "definition of appropriate areas of responsibility". However, for Welch there has always been a military influence in politics for some degree via "regularized and accepted channels". Thus, there are four types of civil-military relations which are military influence (civilian control), military participation, military control (with partners), and military control (without partners).⁵³

David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas claim that "[military political] intervention does not occur because armies serve domestic roles. Rather it is the consequence of inadequate civilian control in the context of severe crisis that prompts the military to fill the power vacuum left by weakened civilians". In other words, military penetration in politics is the dependent variable changes due to civilian control which is the independent variable. If internal crisis high and civilian control is low the military may penetrate the civilian politics. However, even if both internal crisis and civilian control is high, the military cannot intervene in domestic politics, because effective civilian authority and oversight do not give permission to do this.⁵⁴

Rebecca Schiff takes both institutional and cultural factors into consideration and presents a "concordance theory". This theory concentrates on "partnerships among institutions and culture and relies on agreement between the military, political elites, and citizenry". While focusing on, she sets four key indicators which are social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style. If there is an agreement on these four indicators, "domestic military intervention is less likely to occur".⁵⁵

⁵² Fitch, pp. 36-41.

⁵³ Welch, pp. 1-3.

⁵⁴ Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, *Democratization*, pp. 11-13.

⁵⁵ R. Schiff, p. 323.

Civilian control of military is the condition *sine qua non* for consolidation of democracy. Without an effective civilian oversight over the military, the armed forces as an unelected and unaccountable organization may impose its will and interests to the politics and society. Although many countries accomplished their transition to democracy from military rule, they have not reached to the level of a consolidated democracy. There are many reasons why these countries failed to establish a consolidated democracy. One of them is the preservation of militaries' dominant role over the politics even after the democratic transition. At this point, the modes of transition matter for the continuum or the end of the military domination. Different kinds of modes of transition may create diverse levels of civilian control of military and in the end may lead to different types of democracies. Thus, it is important to evaluate the modes of transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy.

III. MODES OF TRANSITION

Transition to democracy is an important process for the establishment of the democratic structures of the countries. Different conditions that emerge during the transitions may lead to the continuum of military domination over the politics or diminishing military's power. In other words, transitions to democracy may emerge in different modes and this difference may cause different levels of civilian control of military and eventually different kinds of democracy.

Various types of regime transitions directly cause different types of civil-military relations following the transitions. The conditions that emerge during transitions "may either restrict or enhance the options available to different political actors attempting to construct democracy". The choices that were made during transition cause structural changes in political institutions and rules, in turn, can shape the preferences and capabilities of actors during and after regime changes. However, the transition periods include very uncertain moments that may affect rational choice of actors negatively. Actors struggle to determine their interests and realize their allies or opponents. The only apparent moment can be "the founding

elections” (the first general elections from authoritarianism to democracy).⁵⁶ For many scholars type of transition matters and affects the post-transition periods.⁵⁷ This section in an attempt to answer the research question of this thesis will concentrate on the modes of transition and their impact on the role of the military in the aftermath of the transitions.

Stepan presents at least ten different modes of transition. These are internal restoration after external re-conquest, internal reformulation, externally monitored installation, transformation led from within the authoritarian regime, transition initiated by the military as government, extrication led by the military as an institution, transitions caused by social upheavals, party-pact induced transitions, an organized violent revolt coordinated by democratic parties, and a Marxist-led revolution. However, Stepan points out that most empirical cases play a part more than one path of democratization.⁵⁸

Similar to Stepan, Gerardo Munck and Carol Skalnik Leff set complicated variations for explaining the modes of transition. First they divide the variables into two main groups which are “identity of the agent of change” and “agent of change’s

⁵⁶ Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America”, **Comparative Politics**, Vol: 23, No: 1, 1990, pp. 1-7.

⁵⁷ Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”, **Comparative Politics**, Vol: 2, No: 3, 1970, p. 343. Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues”, **The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies**, Working Paper No: 130, 1989, pp. 21-28. J. Samuel Valenzuela, “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion Process, and Facilitating Conditions”, **The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies**, Working Paper No: 150, 1990, pp. 19-23. Juan J. Linz, “Transitions to Democracy”, **The Washington Quarterly**, Vol: 13, No: 13, 1990, pp. 150-152. Karl, p. 1. Samuel P. Huntington, “How Countries Democratize”, **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol: 106, No: 4, 1991-1992, (How), pp. 579-580. Gerardo L. Munck and Carol Skalnik Leff, “Modes of Transition and Democratization: Southern America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective”, **Comparative Politics**, Vol: 29, No: 3, 1997, p. 345. Felipe Agüero, “Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America”, **Mershon International Studies Review**, Vol: 42, No: 2, 1998, (Legacies), p. 399. Anthony W. Pereira, “Virtual Legality: Authoritarian Legacies and the Reform of Military Justice in Brazil, the Southern Cone, and Mexico”, **Comparative Political Studies**, Vol: 34, No: 5, 2001, p. 557. Charles T. Call, “War Transitions and the New Civilian Security in Latin America”, **Comparative Politics**, Vol: 35, No: 1, 2002, p. 1. Kathryn Sikking, “From Pariah State to Global Protagonist: Argentina and the Struggle for International Human Rights”, **Latin American Politics and Society**, Vol: 50, No: 1, 2008, p. 18. Joseph L. Derdzinski, **Internal Security Services in Liberalizing States: Transitions, Turmoil, and (In)Security**, Surrey and Burlington, Ashgate, 2009, p. 25. Gary A. Stradiotto and Sujian Guo, “Transitional Modes of Democratization and Democratic Outcomes”, **International Journal on World Peace**, Vol: 22, No: 4, 2010, p. 6.

⁵⁸ Mainwaring, p. 23. Linz, pp. 148-149. Alfred Stepan, “Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations”, **Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy**, (Eds. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead), Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp. 65-84.

strategy”. Then they set three different variables for each group. The former is divided as incumbent elite, counter-elite, and both incumbent elite and counter-elite. The latter is also divided into three which are confrontation, accommodation, and combination of confrontation and accommodation. As a result of these variables, seven different modes of transition are emerged as revolution from above, social revolution, conservative reform, reform from below, reform through rupture, reform through extrication, and reform through transaction.⁵⁹

J. Samuel Valenzuela introduces three different modes of transition which are collapse, defeat, or withdrawal, extrication, and reform. In collapse, defeat, or withdrawal “rules of the authoritarian regime are abandoned” and “rulers cannot or opt not to negotiate conditions for leaving power”. In extrication “rules of the authoritarian regime are abandoned, but rulers negotiate leaving power”. In reform “transition occurs without breaking the rules of the old regime”. However, he also set three different attitudes of authoritarian elites towards democracy which favor full democratization, prefer liberalized authoritarian regime but will accept democratization, and opposed to democratization.⁶⁰

Terry Lynn Karl presents two main variables of modes of transition. These are strategies of transition and relative actor strength. There are two kinds of strategies of transition which are compromise and force. Relative actor strength also has two different types which are elite ascendant and mass ascendant. In putting these variables, she sets four different modes of transition. These are pact, imposition, reform, and revolution. Karl also explains the outcomes of these transitions. Imposition leads a conservative democracy with restrictive rules. Pact transition mostly causes corporatist or consociational democracies with regulated democratic competition. Reforms produce competitive democracies but if the post-transition system would be weakened the system may return to authoritarianism. Lastly, revolution leads one-party dominant democracies in which the political competition is regulated.⁶¹ Although both Valenzuela and Karl evaluated modes of transition in all kinds, they did not make clear-cut definitions of these modes.

⁵⁹ Munck and Leff, p. 346.

⁶⁰ Valenzuela, p. 22.

⁶¹ Karl, pp. 8-9, 15.

According to Gary Stradiotto and Sujian Guo, there are two major dimensions for classifying the modes of transitions. These are “the relative balance of power among incumbent and opposition elites during the transition” and “the smoothness of the transition”. Yet, the former dimension has a deep effect on the latter. According to these dynamics the scholars categorize four different modes of transitions which are conversion, cooperative, collapse, and foreign intervention.⁶²

Juan Linz presents two different kinds of transitions which are *ruptura* and *reforma*. During the *ruptura* type of transitions, the opposition favors “a break with the existing institutional arrangements, a change not controlled and even without any participation by those who, to one or another extent, had a share in the previous regime”. This opposition gains power either from the dissident factions of the military or from the mobilization of people. Different than *ruptura*, *reforma* is “a transformation led by those in power without participation of the opposition”. In this kind of transitions, reformers of the regime promote the change rather than forced by events and dynamics of an explosive situation. According to Linz, the attitudes of “reformist wing of the government and the moderates of the opposition”, as well as the radical parts of the opposition are important determinants for the success or failure of the transition periods.⁶³

Samuel Huntington sets forth three types of transitions which are transformation, replacement, and transplacement. Transformations are regime-led transitions, in which the ruling authoritarian elites take the initiative for the transition. Replacements are completely different from transformations in which the opposition leads the transition and in the end authoritarian regime totally collapses. Transplacements are the middle ground in which the ruling elites and opposition act in a joint action.⁶⁴

⁶² Stradiotto and Guo, pp. 10, 17.

⁶³ Linz, pp. 150-152.

⁶⁴ Huntington also takes approaches of Juan Linz as well as Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring into account. Transformation is equal to Linz’s *reforma* and Share/Mainwaring’s transaction. Replacement is same with Linz’s *ruptura* and Share/Mainwaring’s breakdown/collapse. Transplacement is similar with Share/Mainwaring’s extrication but Linz does not evaluate such transition. Huntington, “How”, p. 583. Mainwaring, p. 26. Also see: Juan J. Linz, “Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration”, **The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes**, (Eds. Juan. J. Linz and Alfred Stepan), Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 35. Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain”, **Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects**, (Ed. Wayne A. Selcher), Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1986, pp. 177-179.

Transformations happen in such circumstances that the authoritarian elites, who are in power, promote transition and play a part in replacing authoritarian regime with democracy. In transformations, the authoritarian government is well-established and stronger than the opposition groups. There is almost no considerable political opposition, no economic crisis, and no breakdown of coercive system. Thus, authoritarian elites dominate the transition and post-transition period. Five factors may lead the delegation of power from military to civilians. Firstly, the costs of staying in power can be much more than leaving power. Secondly, the military aims to reduce the risk of strengthening opposition. Thirdly, the military leaders are sure that they will dominate the post-transition period. Fourthly, transition to democracy may provide economic aid and remove existed international pressures. Lastly, in some cases military leaders believe that democracy is the right form of government.⁶⁵

Replacements are very different from transformations. In replacements, authoritarian hard-liners are more dominant than moderates. Democratization process takes place with the rise of civilian opposition and the decreasing power of authoritarian regime. A triggering event leads to the corrosion of military regime, such as a defeat in war. The more opposition gains strength, the more authoritarian leaders become weaker and eventually the regime collapses. This civilian opposition is usually consisted of students, middle class workers, labors, religious groups, bourgeoisie, and ex-political organizations. Mass demonstrations, protests, and strikes become widespread.⁶⁶

Transplacements emerge in the joint actions of authoritarian regime and civilian opposition. In these kinds of transitions, there is no dominance between hard-liners and moderates of authoritarian elites, but there has to be a dominance of moderates in the civilian opposition rather than radical factions. These groups have formal or informal negotiations for transition to democracy. Both sides test their strengths and weaknesses and eventually realize that they are not strong enough to destroy one another.⁶⁷

In contrast with replacements, particularly in transformations military elites promote the regime change as a response to the possible opposition and popular

⁶⁵ Huntington, How, pp. 590-593.

⁶⁶ Huntington, How, pp. 602-604.

⁶⁷ Huntington, How, pp. 608-615.

pressure. The military leaders have never named themselves as the permanent rulers of the country. Instead once the military crashes the dissidents and maintains law and order, they exit from power and return their “military” duties. However, except from replacements, the timing and the negotiations on post-transition period are determined by the military. The military generally puts forward two “exit guarantees” for leaving the office. Firstly, there would be no punishments or retaliations for their actions during the military rule. In transformations, former authoritarian leaders almost are never be punished but in replacements they are likely to be sent in trial. In transplacements this situation is also negotiated. Secondly, the military domination in the governmental institutions, security missions, economic concessions, control of arms industries, and military autonomy would be continued. However, domination and autonomy of the military may last in transformations but curbed in replacements, while all of these negotiated in transplacements.⁶⁸

During the transition periods, a broad range of groups emerge as pro- or anti-democracy. The interactions of these groups play important role during transitions. The table below summarizes these groups and their attitudes:

Table 2: Political Groups Involved in Democratization⁶⁹

	Attitudes Toward Democracy			
	Against	For		Against
		Reformers Democratizers	Liberals	Standpatters
Government				
Opposition	Radical Extremists	Democratic Moderates		

According to Huntington, transformation occurs if reformers are stronger than standpatters, if the government is stronger than the opposition, and if the moderates are stronger than the extremists. However, in contrast, replacements take place when the opposition is stronger than the government and the moderates are stronger than the extremists. Possible weakness of moderates than extremists leads the downfall of regime and democratic system. The interactions of these groups are much more

⁶⁸ Huntington, How, p. 584.

⁶⁹ Huntington, How, p. 589.

complicated in transplacements. There is a power struggle among moderates and extremists in both government and opposition.⁷⁰

Although transition to democracy necessitates the reform of the repressive security forces, contrasting the replacements such a move does not take place in transformations. In transformations, the armed forces inherently “tend to resist strongly to the loss of any internal security prerogatives during democratization”. If the ruling militaries are not weakened during the transition, they eventually insist preservation of their prerogatives and, most importantly, their “internal security responsibilities, as a *quid pro quo* relinquishing the reins of government”.⁷¹

Joseph Derdzinski states that most of the internal security services in transitions were repressive and had operated outside the rule of the law. This situation may continue after the transition by formal and informal methods. The internal security services are “agencies of repression” during the authoritarian period “with their tools of surveillance, intimidation, interrogation, internment and torture”. If the power of security services were not curbed during the transition period, usage of these tools would be continued.⁷²

In sum, all the scholars mentioned above evaluate the transitions basically in three cases. All of them as a conclusion argue that there have been three different modes of transition (although some point out more types) which are mainly regime-led transition, opposition led transition, and the transition realized by a negotiation between the regime and the opposition. The table below summarizes the modes of transition pointed out by various scholars. However, this thesis in its attempt to compare the different outcomes between Turkey and Argentina during the transition periods will mainly use Huntington’s modes of transition, i.e. transformation, replacement, and transplacement as a conceptual tool of analysis. Huntington’s classification evaluates the powers and attitudes of both actors and institutions more broadly than the others.

⁷⁰ Huntington, How, p. 590.

⁷¹ Call, p. 4.

⁷² Derdzinski, pp. 18, 38.

Table 3: Modes of Transitions (Compiled by the author from the book chapters and articles written by the scholars mentioned in the chart)

<u>Scholars</u>	<u>Modes of Transition</u>		
	Regime-led	Opposition-led	Negotiation between Regime and Opposition
Huntington	Transformation	Replacement	Transplacement
Share and Mainwaring	Transaction	Breakdown/Collapse	Extrication
Linz	<i>Reforma</i>	<i>Ruptura</i>	- ^a
Stradiotto and Guo	Conversion	Collapse	Cooperative
Valenzuela	Reform	Collapse, Defeat, or Withdrawal	Extrication
Karl	Imposition	Reform	Pact
Munck and Leff	Reform through extrication/Revolution from above	Reform through rupture	Reform from below/Reform through transaction

(a): Although Linz accepts there are some transitions can be both classified as *reforma* and *ruptura*, he did not term such transitions. But Samuel Huntington names this kind of transitions as “*ruptforma*”. (Huntington, How, p. 583.)

IV. IMPACT OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS ON CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

Threat, or threat perceptions, is closely linked to the national security and can be defined as potential adversaries against a state.⁷³ The definition as “potential” differs “threat” from the concept of “enemy”. The enemy is more apparent and certain than threat. In addition, enemy is generally considered equal to the external aggression. According to Nils Orvik, “analyzing the threat meant making as accurate predictions as possible about how and when the enemy might initiate hostile action”.⁷⁴

⁷³ **The Encyclopedia of Political Science**, (Ed. George Thomas Kurian), Washington D.C., CQ Press, 2011, p. 1667.

⁷⁴ Nils Orvik, “The Threat: Problems of Analysis”, **International Journal**, Vol: 26, No: 4, 1971, p. 676.

The predictions against the hostile actions are closely related to the security. In this context, national security is an important concept that should first be analyzed. According to John Baylis, security is a “contested concept” but basically means “freedom from threats to core values (for both individuals and groups)”.⁷⁵ For a more broad definition, national security is “a state's ability to defend itself from enemies who, by external attack and/or internal subversion, would threaten the integrity of its borders or its very existence”.⁷⁶ During the Cold War era, national security was mostly defined in militarized terms. The main focus of Cold War scholars and statesmen was the military capabilities of their own countries against the potential threats.⁷⁷

However, this trend has theoretically been challenged since the end of the Cold War. According to Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, states are embedded in the security environments which are consisted from cultural and institutional elements rather than just material. Besides the effect of culture on state identity, formal institutions, norms, and ideational factors also matters. Additionally, states interact with environments either by limited cultural and institutional content or with more thickly structured by cultural and institutional elements. There is a mutually constitutive relationship between actors and environments. These environments may affect the behavior of actors as well as their identities, interests, and capabilities and the existence of actors.⁷⁸

Since the end of the Cold War the scope and definition of security and threat perceptions have been broadened. According to Kieran Williams, contemporary definitions of (national) security cover many other things in contrast with the Cold War era definitions. Now, threats are not only against the viability of the state but also against the quality or way of life of its citizens. The defense of liberal values,

⁷⁵ John Baylis, “International and Global Security in the Post-Cold War Era”, **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations**, (Eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith), New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 254-255.

⁷⁶ Lenore Martin, Turkey's National Security in the Middle East, **Turkish Studies**, Vol: 1, No: 1, 2000, p. 83.

⁷⁷ Baylis, p. 255. Martin, p. 83. Orvik, pp. 681-682.

⁷⁸ Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security”, **The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics**, (Ed. Peter J. Katzenstein), New York, Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 8-11.

democracy and civil rights is as important as defense of law and order.⁷⁹ For Merkel, the democratic stability of the neighboring states is also important,⁸⁰ because “diminished state security is associated with less democracy cross-nationally, and with the overthrow of democracy in favor of autocratic government”.⁸¹

According to Barry Buzan, security embraces political, economic, societal and environmental features along with the military ones thus has to be defined broadly.⁸² More largely, the post-Cold War security definition comprises economic and social conditions, regime type, environmental damage, ethnic and religious conflicts, wars of secession, terrorism, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, organized crime and drugs trafficking.⁸³ Moreover, for a citizen of a post-communist country security includes the protection of economy, political system and ecology or for a South African national security can be “defined as threats to the people rather than threats to the state”.⁸⁴ But, for a Turkish person security still can be defined as “the indivisibility of the nation and its territory”.⁸⁵

Many scholars from classical or neo- realist school of international relations have dealt with the influence of threats to the policies of countries.⁸⁶ They have emphasized the importance of threats and how states act against the threats such as balancing and bandwagoning.⁸⁷ However, according to Steven David, these theories

⁷⁹ Kieran Williams, “Introduction”, **Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania**, (Eds. Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant), New York, Palgrave, 2001, p. 2.

⁸⁰ Merkel, Model, p. 36.

⁸¹ Manus I. Mildlarsky, “The Impact of External Threat on States and Domestic Societies”, **International Studies Review**, Vol: 5, No: 4, p. 13.

⁸² Barry Buzan, **People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations**, Sussex, Wheatsheaf Books, 1983, pp. 10-11.

⁸³ Sevgi Drorian, “Turkey: Security, State and Society in Troubled Times”, **European Security**, Vol: 14, No: 2, 2005, pp. 255-256. Ümit Cizre, “Demythologizing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey”, **Middle East Journal**, Vol: 57, No: 2, 2003, p. 217.

⁸⁴ Williams, p. 2.

⁸⁵ Eric Rouleau, “Turkey's Dream of Democracy”, **Foreign Affairs**, Vol: 79, No: 6, 2000, p. 103.

⁸⁶ Some of the most important scholars and their pieces are: Hans Morgenthau, **Scientific Man versus Power Politics**, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1946. Hans Morgenthau, **Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace**, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. Edward H. Carr, **The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919–1939**, New York, Perennial, 2001. Kenneth N. Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, Reading, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979. Stephen M. Walt, **The Origins of Alliances**, New York, Cornell University Press, 1987. John J. Mearsheimer, **The Tragedy of Great Power Politics**, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2001.

⁸⁷ Stephen Walt explains these terms as “alliances are most commonly viewed as a response to threats ... When entering an alliance, states may either balance (ally in opposition to the principal source of danger) or bandwagon (ally with the state that poses the major threat)”. See Stephen M. Walt,

are not capable enough to explain the different attitudes of Third World states when they come to deal with especially internal threats.⁸⁸

According to David, balance of power theory does not take typical characteristics of the Third World countries into consideration. Above all, this article was published before the end of the Cold War and David explained the Third World within the context of the bipolar international environment. For example India and Brazil, which are the strong regional powers in contemporary international relations, were defined as Third World countries in his article. Anyway, David's theory called "theory of omnibalancing" is a useful approach that helps to the explanations concerning different attitudes of some countries in various threat environments.

Above all, theory of omnibalancing accepts the core realist assumptions on power, interests, and rationality. The structure of international relations is anarchic in which the states seek their interest in a self-help environment. Moreover, the objective laws that rooted in the human nature are also valid for the interactions of states, thus, in this self-help and unhierarchical structure conflict is inevitable. Therefore, the states pursue their survival in the first place.⁸⁹

However, theory of omnibalancing differs from the classical and neo- realism in the threat perceptions and level of analysis. While realism only deals with the external threats, theory of omnibalancing focuses on both external and internal threats. And while realism focusing on state as an actor, theory of omnibalancing takes individuals (rulers of states) into the consideration. As a result, theory of omnibalancing becomes less parsimonious than balance of power in explaining the different attitudes of the Third World countries.⁹⁰ David explains the difference of Third World countries as

“central governments in the Third World often lack the power to resolve disputes within their borders. Thus, there is often no ‘strong consensus’ or ‘integrated society’ to inhibit conflict ... as a result,

“Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power”, **International Security**, Vol: 9, No: 4, 1985, p. 4.

⁸⁸ Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment”, **World Politics**, Vol: 43, No: 2, 1991, p. 233.

⁸⁹ David, pp. 236-237.

⁹⁰ David, pp. 237-238.

balancing to ensure survival is as critical for groups within states as it is between states.”⁹¹

The problems of the Third World states that stem from the difficulties in their hierarchical structures and the interests of their leaders might be different from the interest of their states. Thus, one cannot ignore internal threats “the most likely source of challenge to the leadership” of these countries.⁹²

Eric Miller and Arkady Toritsyn develop David’s theory of omnibalancing and apply the attitudes of Ukraine and Uzbekistan during the post-Soviet period. First of all, rather than classifying those countries as “Third World” states, they define the characteristics of this kind of countries with a weak political legitimacy and a strong state apparatus that holds the total power. Internal conflicts are more likely to emerge compared to an invasion by a foreign power. The rules of succession are usually problematic. Secondly, Miller and Toritsyn define the possible internal threats for those countries as assassination attempts, coups, civil wars, and secessionist movements. Thirdly, they argue that “faced with such domestic threats, leaders find it necessary to focus on these more pressing internal challenges in contrast to the external threats to the state”. As a result, the leaders of those countries may align with the states that can be perceived as external security challenges under normal circumstances.⁹³

Along the same line, Robert Olson summarizes theory of omnibalancing as when external threat is high and internal threat is convenient, the priorities push the country towards coping with the external threat. However, when internal threat is high and external threat is less hostile, the priorities that shape foreign policy prefer to deal with internal politics.⁹⁴ Theory of omnibalancing that challenges classical and neo- realism’s external oriented approach is valid for all kinds of countries. Moreover, it presents the hypothesis that different threat environments affect countries in different ways. However, this theory is not useful for evaluating the relationship between civilian and military elites. It only takes foreign policy choices

⁹¹ David, pp. 242-243.

⁹² David, pp. 243-244.

⁹³ Eric A. Miller and Arkady Toritsyn, “Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States”, **Security Studies**, Vol: 14, No: 2, 2005, pp. 330-334.

⁹⁴ Robert Olson, “Turkey-Iran Relations, 1997 to 2000: The Kurdish and Islamist Questions”, **Third World Quarterly**, Vol: 21, No: 5, 2000, p. 872.

of political leaders into consideration and does not evaluate the different outcomes of internal and external threats.

According to Nils Orvik “if internal threat demand more attention, external threats are likely to get less”. The duty of governments is reducing the threat if not removing it and increasing the feeling of security among its citizens. The perception of threat varies from individual to individual, group to group, and region to region. The concerns on threats of different actors differ from one to another.⁹⁵

Michael Desch explains the significance of threat environments by applying “threat” as a variable that has an impact on the civil-military relations. According to Desch, most of the scholars focus on threats either by looking at domestic influences on civil-military relations or by concentrating on the international environment. However, it is important to ask “how threats can influence the civil-military relations of a country”. Desch simply argues that “it is easiest for civilians to control the military when they face primarily international (external) threats and it is hardest for them to control the military when they face primarily domestic (internal) threats”.⁹⁶

According to Desch, threats can influence “individual leaders, the military organization, the state, and society”. However, external and internal threats have different influences on those structures and individuals. On the one hand, external threats intimidate the whole state, both civilian and military parts, increase unity within the state, and lead everyone to concentrate on the outward problem. Internal threats, on the other hand, have more compound effects upon the various actors within a state.⁹⁷

However, type of internal threats depends on whether it has an impact on state, military, or society. The most crucial point here is how actors perceive threats. When there is a state of war, there is an obvious and objective threat. However, threats may be subjective at peace and military doctrines may be determinative about what is considered as threat.⁹⁸

More broadly, Desch claims that there are four types of different threat environments that are explained in the figure below:

⁹⁵ Orvik, pp. 677, 679.

⁹⁶ Desch, pp. 1-6.

⁹⁷ Desch, pp. 8-12.

⁹⁸ Desch, p. 13.

Table 4: Civilian Control of the Military as a Function of Location and Intensity of Threats⁹⁹

EXTERNAL THREATS			
INTERNAL THREATS		High	Low
	High	Poor (Q3)	Worst (Q4)
	Low	Good (Q1)	Mixed (Q2)

In the threat environments like (Q2) and (Q3) experiment of leaders, civilian control of military, threat orientation, and ideas of civilians and military officers are vague and too difficult to estimate. Thus, these kinds of threat environments are the most difficult cases for a structural theory. In countries where both low external and internal threats, civilian elites are either inexperienced or have no concentration on military affairs, thus may have subjective control of military. Both civilian institutions and armed forces may have low internal cohesion, thus the harmony between them can be lost. As a result, civilian control of military in this kind of uncertain environments can vary from good to mixed. There can also be both high external and internal threats. This kind of threat environments also has uncertain elements. In addition, simultaneous high internal and external threats may cause splits while dealing with the different threats. The harmony between civilian elites and armed forces may be lost or civilians and military come closer.¹⁰⁰

According to Desch, the most stable civil-military relations occur when internal threats are low and external threats are high (Q1). The leaders in this kind of threat environments are experienced. The civilians have objective control of military. The civilians and the military are unified in itself and they share common ideas against an external threat.¹⁰¹ Prior to Desch, scholars from other branches of social sciences, such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology proposed the hypothesis that “involvement in external conflict increases internal cohesion”.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Desch, p. 14.

¹⁰⁰ Desch, pp. 16-17.

¹⁰¹ Desch, p. 14.

¹⁰² Arthur A. Stein, “Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol: 20, No: 1, 1976, p. 143.

According to George Liska, the existence of an external threat is essential for alliance cohesion. However, for a well-established cohesion, the threat must be convenient for the members of the alliance. Inconvenient threats or threats that do not aim all members of the alliance actually do not increase cohesion.¹⁰³ In addition, some of the external conflicts (such as diplomatic conflicts that ambassadors recalled) do not penetrate the whole nation and thus do not create internal cohesion.¹⁰⁴ However, as Desch argues the end of Cold War coincided with the deterioration of the civil-military relations in the US and the Soviet Union, which were both pointed as the best examples of civilian control. In other words, the end of the Cold War, that means the low external threat, was weakened the civilian control of military in both countries.¹⁰⁵

On the other side of the scale there is (Q4), the environments in which the external threats are low and internal threats are high. This kind of threat environments has the weakest civilian control of the military. The leaders are inexperienced for handling the internal threat and the unified military takes the control of counter-subversion. Moreover, the civilians are divided and have subjective control on military. The focus of state, society and military is internal.¹⁰⁶ The internal threat mostly arises from the opposition groups within a country. It does not mean that all of the opposition should be perceived as a threat against national security. If the opposition groups take extra-constitutional measures they may become threat to the nation. For Orvik, there are two indicators to understand whether an opposition group is a danger against the national security or not which are (1) if the opposition chose organized violence, and (2) if these groups perform their activities for the interests of foreign powers.¹⁰⁷ For the purpose of analyzing the research question of this thesis, in other words to analyze the different outcomes in Turkey and Argentina, the thesis will concentrate on the threat environments (Q1) and (Q4).

In such different threat environments military doctrines can be influential in threat perceptions of civilians and army officers. Military doctrines can affect the

¹⁰³ George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*, in Stein, p. 160.

¹⁰⁴ Stein, p. 161.

¹⁰⁵ Desch, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Desch, p. 15.

¹⁰⁷ Orvik, p. 682.

structure of military institutions, offers normative road maps for military attitudes, or acts as the center for agreement between civilian and military elites.¹⁰⁸ Both Geoffrey Sloan and Harald Hoiback start their articles concerning military doctrine with the NATO's definition of doctrine which is "fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives".¹⁰⁹ Sloan points out that the word doctrine exists in Latin as "*doctrina*" that means "teaching". Secondly, doctrine links theory and practice of the military. Lastly, doctrine is "a set of beliefs about the nature of war".¹¹⁰ For Hoiback, a doctrine has three pillars in a mutual relationship which are authority (subordination), rationality (theory), and a-rationality (culture). This mutual relationship of these three pillars makes doctrine as tool of command, tool of education, and tool of change.¹¹¹

Consequently, the military doctrine is related to the education of an army, its war preparation and practice, and culture. Military doctrine is related to the role of the military forces during peacetime and covers both external and internal actions. It is the military doctrine of a country that determines the technical aspects (size and structure of armed forces), the type of equipment, training, as well as procedures and practices during the operations.¹¹²

According to Desch, it is harder to control to internally oriented militaries than the external ones. Thus, while internally oriented military doctrines can be an obstacle for a well-established civilian control, externally oriented military doctrines pave the way for an effective military subordination. The normative and cultural elements in the military doctrines are also influential, if "subordination to civilian control" is well-embedded to the norms and culture of a military, there is more likely better civil-military relations. If operational or institutional disagreements occur between civilian and military elites, more liberal military doctrines provide a democratic environment for consensus.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Desch, pp. 17-18.

¹⁰⁹ Geoffrey Sloan, "Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy and the Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis and Theory", *International Affairs*, Vol: 88, No: 2, 2012, p. 243. Harald Hoiback, "What is Doctrine?", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol: 34, No: 6, 2011, p. 879.

¹¹⁰ Sloan, pp. 244-245.

¹¹¹ Hoiback, pp. 884, 888.

¹¹² Andreas Velthuisen, "Towards a Military Doctrine for Humanistic Intervention in African Conflicts", *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies*, Vol: 8, No: 2, 2013, p. 92.

¹¹³ Desch, pp. 18-19.

This chapter in an attempt to analyze the different outcomes in the civil-military relations of Turkey and Argentina, in other words in order to analyze why Argentinean military managed to subordinate to civilian control in the aftermath of 1976 coup and Turkish military did not following its 1980 coup went over the approaches of democracy, democratization and democratic consolidation. Moreover, it focused on the impact of civil-military relations on democratic consolidation. In order to answer the research question of the thesis the chapter mainly concentrated on two significant issues or theoretical frameworks. The first is the modes of transition from an authoritarian rule to democratic system and the second is the existence of internal threats. The study will resort to both approaches as conceptual tools in the fourth chapter to analyze the different outcomes.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY AND ARGENTINA UNTIL THE 1970s

Both Turkey and Argentina have a long historical experience of the military's dominance in politics. While the military has been powerful in Turkish political life since the days of Central Asia in the 7th and 8th centuries, impact of military on Argentine politics date back its colonial period under Spanish rule starting in the 16th century. Both David Pion-Berlin and Brian Loveman argue that events and arrangements in the past shape the interactions in the future and point out how the influence of customs, attitudes, values, institutional norms, professional standards and political culture encumber and shape present civil-military relations in all modern polities of the countries.¹¹⁴ Consequently, this chapter in an attempt to analyze current civil-military relations both in Turkey and Argentina in line with Pion-Berlin and Loveman will concentrate on historical background of civil-military relations in both countries.

The chapter also argues that both Ottoman Empire and Spanish Kingdom, which were the antecedents of Turkey and Argentina, respectively, were patrimonial states in Weberian terms.¹¹⁵ The institutions that amalgamated with patrimonialism caused defections in political structure of both countries and actually made it easier for the military to intervene into civilian politics. According to Weber,

¹¹⁴ David Pion-Berlin, "The Study of Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies", **Asian Journal of Political Science**, Vol: 19, No: 3, 2011, p. 224. Brian Loveman, "Historical Foundations of Civil-Military Relations in Spanish America", **Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives**, (Ed. David Pion-Berlin), The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 2001, pp. 246-247. Felipe Agüero also shares similar arguments. Felipe Agüero, "Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military and democracy in South America", **Mershon International Studies Review**, Vol: 42, No: 2, 1998, (Legacies), pp. 384-385.

¹¹⁵ See Max Weber, **Economy And Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology**, (Eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich), University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1978, pp. 231-232. Francis Fukuyama, **The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to French Revolution**, Profile Books, London, 2011, pp. 231, 372. Haldun Gülalp, "Enlightenment by Fiat: Secularization and Democracy in Turkey", **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol: 41, No: 3, 2005, p. 355. Şerif Mardin, "Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social Science", **Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey**, (Eds. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba), University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1997, p. 70. P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Democratization in the South-Eastern Europe", **Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans**, (Eds. Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher), Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p. 30. Gina Zabludovsky, "The Reception and Utility of Max Weber's Concept of Patrimonialism in Latin America", **International Sociology**, Vol: 4, No: 1, 1989, p. 56.

“patrimonialism and, in the extreme case sultanism, tend to arise whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master... The primary external support of patrimonial power is provided by slaves, *coloni* and conscripted subjects, but also by mercenary bodyguards and armies (patrimonial troops); the latter practice is designed to maximize the solidarity of interest between master and staff”.¹¹⁶ In addition, Diamandouros and Larrabee summarizes characteristics of patrimonialism as “highly personalized exercise of power; the lack of a clear distinction separating the state from the ruler’s household and the official from the private; the discretionary, unrestrained, and unmediated exercise of power; the personal subservience of officials to the ruler; the use of tradition as its major principle of legitimation; and, more generally, the tendency to regard the state as a source of provisioning for the ruler”.¹¹⁷ In contrast with the fragmented sovereignty in Western Europe by the system of feudalism, Ottoman Empire and Spanish Empire had strong centralized systems and the rulers “delegate the tasks of governing to his favourite officials”.¹¹⁸

This chapter is mainly divided into two sections in which the historical backgrounds of civil-military relations in Turkey and Argentina are examined. Concerning the Turkish case the chapter will first examine the civil-military relations during the Ottoman Empire and then Republic of Turkey by concentrating on the 1960 and 1971 coup. The section concerning Argentina case will concentrate on the colonial period, the foundation of Argentine Republic, and 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, and 1966 coups d’état, respectively.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The roots of impact of Turkish military on politics go all the way back to Central Asia when the Turks as nomads used to move from one place to another. These movements were the results of the Turkish warriors who aimed to occupy new

¹¹⁶ Weber, pp. 231-232.

¹¹⁷ Diamandouros and Larrabee, p. 30.

¹¹⁸ Gülalp, p. 355. Zabulodovsky, p. 51.

places. Turkish nation was originally established as an army as a result of their nomadic life. This militaristic tradition continued during the Ottoman Empire in which the economy was dependent on the occupation of new lands. In order to build such a huge empire a very strong army was necessary. This strong army did not only fight in the wars but also helped the Ottoman economy by collecting taxes. Republic of Turkey that was established from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire was also established by a general Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Mustafa Kemal fought against the Ally forces that occupied current Turkey in the aftermath of the First World War between 1919 and 1922. Therefore, historically in Turkish life and politics the military has always played a significant role.

This chapter in an attempt to analyze the historical background of civil-military relations in both countries will first start by analyzing the military's role in Turkish politics during the Ottoman Empire as well as the Republic of Turkey by focusing on the military interventions that had taken place prior to 1980 military coup.

A. Turkish Civil-Military Relations during the Ottoman Empire Period

The roots of the Ottoman civil-military relations can be traced back to Central Asia, during which Turks lived as nomadic tribes moving from one place to another. These tribes were established for the purpose of fighting and therefore, had no formal organs of government and laws. The founders of the Ottoman Empire were also Turks who emigrated from Central Asia in the 9th, 10th and 11th centuries. When the Turks met with Islamic tradition in the 8th century, they also adopted Islamic people's military tactics, weapons, and the way of life. Eventually, nomadic Turks preferred to do business with the Arab tribes rather than plundering Islamic traders and caravans. Following their conversion to Islam, Turks became the foremost defender of caliph and religion.¹¹⁹

Once the Turks started to settle in Anatolia starting with the Manzikert War, in 1071, they established a series of chiefdoms (*beyliks*) including the Seljuk Empire of Rum. Among these chiefdoms Osman Bey established a small one in 1299, which

¹¹⁹ Stanford Shaw, **History of The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey**, Volume 1: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, pp. 1-4.

turned into one of the biggest empires of the world that lasted until 1918. This chieftdom which became the Ottoman Empire by time survived for six hundred years on three continents as a result of its conquests.¹²⁰ Ottoman sultans by sending nomads to Balkans for Turkification and conquering new lands managed to collect more taxes.¹²¹ In the 15th to 17th centuries, Ottomans conquered Constantinople (Istanbul), all of Balkans, parts of Eastern Europe, holy places of Islam Mecca and Medina, and parts of North Africa.¹²² This was all made possible with the successes of strong armies.

In fact Ottoman government was nothing but an army since all of the ruling institutions were established and designed with the army logic. Moreover, the civilian and military functions of the state were combined making it a military state. The Empire was founded by the conquest and in order to survive it had no choice but to conquer. *Timar* (benefice-holding) system was the backbone of the empire. The whole provincial governing and military manpower were directly connected with this system. The *Timar* system was consisted of giving most of the land to benefice-holders, chosen by central government generally for a lifetime or success at wars, and expecting them to carry out local administrative and military duties in return. The state expected from benefice-holders, *sipahis*, to be ready to join the army in the war time along with the soldiers (*cebeli*), whose number was determined due to the size of the land. In the peace time, they had to practice their military arts to get ready for the war. In the war time, the *sipahis* were commanded by captains, and by colonels, who controlled a *zeamet*, middle size lands. There were also greater lands called as *has*. Together with their military duty, the benefice-holders had administrative duties such as collecting taxes and controlling the provinces. This kind of a sophisticated army gave advantage to Ottomans while conquering a vast land. Besides the *timarli siphais*, the sultan also had his own royal standing military called *Yeniçeris* (Janissaries) that was mainly consisted of soldiers who were

¹²⁰ Shaw, pp. 4-11.

¹²¹ Donald Quataert, **Ottoman Empire 1700-1922**, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, pp. 18-20.

¹²² Roderic H. Davison, **Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West**, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1990, pp. 16-17.

originally Devshirme (recruited from non-Muslim families) boys. These boys were trained to become soldiers.¹²³

The gradual collapse of the *timar* system that started in the 16th century affected both the military system and economy. While the power of the *timar* holders started to decline, power of the janissaries increased *vis-a-vis* the sultan leading them to challenge the authority of the sultan. Once the Ottoman Empire started losing wars as a result of the problems in the military, technological backwardness in the weapons, missing the renaissance, reform and the industrial revolution Europe has gone through, its economy started to decline. Since the economy was dependent on the conquests, once the military campaigns were over, new lands were not occupied and new taxes were not collected.¹²⁴

Once the sultan started losing power as a result of decrease in sultan's interest in administration, lack of industrialization, economic decline, and losing wars, the *ulema* class (class of religious men) and the *Ayans* (local notables), which could be defined as the semi-feudal aristocracy in the empire, started to take over the power. Ottoman sultan and the ruling elite in an attempt to find a solution to Ottomans' problem of lagging behind the development in Europe tried to reform the Empire through military and administrative reforms in the 18th and 19th centuries. Janissary system was abolished in 1826 and a new military was established. *Tanzimat Fermanı* (Imperial Edict of the Rose House) of 1839 guaranteed the life, honor and property of all subjects, regardless of their religion by the Sultan. A new taxing system was established and military became compulsory for both Muslims and non-Muslims for five years. *Islahat Fermanı* (The Imperial Reform Edict) abolished the *cizye* tax, which was a discriminatory tax against non-Muslim citizens and made the state lands private property for all citizens. 1876 Constitution led to the establishment of *Meclis-i Mebusan* (The Chamber of Deputies) in 1877, transforming the absolute monarchy into a parliamentary monarchy.¹²⁵

¹²³ William Hale, **Turkish Politics and the Military**, Routledge, London and New York, 1994, (Turkish), pp. 2-7. Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, **A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk**, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, California, 2009, pp. 2-16.

¹²⁴ Erik J. Zürcher, **Turkey A Modern History**, I. B. Tauris, London, 2003, p. 17. Halil İnalcık, **The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy**, Variorum Reprints, London, 1978, p. 47.

¹²⁵ Carter Vaughn Findley, "The Tanzimat", **The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World**, Vol. IV, (Ed. Reşat Kasaba), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 12, 18. İnalcık, pp. 45-48, 53. Zürcher, pp. 50-62. Hale, Turkish, pp. 25-27.

During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, the German influence on the Ottoman army was quite strong. German General von der Goltz started to train Ottoman army and German military doctrines became major school among the Ottoman elites. A German military mission of 70 officers (which increased to 700 soldiers during the First World War), under the command of General Liman von Sanders were charged for reforming the army. In addition, student exchanges between two countries increased.¹²⁶

In the 19th century, the military officers who were trained in Europe (in an attempt to modernize the military) came back home with ideas to modernize education and administration. Their aim was to create a modern, westernized state.¹²⁷ Therefore, when Ottoman Empire came out of the First World War as a failed state and Republic of Turkey was established, these officers under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk aimed at modernizing the country. Although Party of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Partisi*-İTC) as the pioneer of modernization and westernization was closed, its middle-ranking members carried its principles to the new Turkish Republic.

The military and İTC played a significant role in the reestablishment of the Ottoman constitution and the initiation of the second constitutional era in 1908. During the rebellion of anti-İTC soldiers, with the help of the *ulema* and religious extremists against the constitution in 1909 (31 Mart Event) the pro-İTC military members launched a counterattack, suppressed the rebellion and removed the Sultan Abdülhamid II from power. However, the military and ITC were not successful enough to take the control of the state. On July 25, 1912, a group of military officers called the Saviour Officers (*Halaskar Zabitan*) issued an ultimatum ordering the dismissal of the chamber of deputies and resignation of the government. Their orders were accepted and from August 1912 to January 1913, the İTC was removed from power. But, after the failure of government during the First Balkan War, İTC

¹²⁶ Zürcher, pp. 82, 121.

¹²⁷ See Gareth Jenkins, "Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics", **The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 337**, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 10. Hale, Turkish, pp. 2-3. Dankward Rustow, "Turkish Democracy in Historical and Comparative Perspective", **Politics in the Third Turkish Republic**, (Eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin), Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, p. 3.

launched a counter-coup and took the control of whole state structure on January 23, 1913, which is also known as *Bab-ı Ali Baskını* (Bab-ı Ali Raid).¹²⁸

In short, the military was highly involved in daily politics during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. The same military forces and members that attempted to modernize and westernize the Empire also played significant roles in the establishment of the Republic of Turkey.

B. Turkish Civil-Military Relations during the Republic of Turkey

In the aftermath of the First World War when Greek forces under the command of the British occupied Izmir and its hinterland and Italians and French occupied south-west Anatolia and southern Anatolia respectively, a War of Independence under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, one of the generals of the Ottoman Empire, started. The victory of Turks against the Ally powers led to the Lausanne Treaty that was signed in July 1923. This treaty enabled the establishment of Republic of Turkey that was recognized by the world.¹²⁹

Mustafa Kemal, as the pioneer of modernization and westernization, with the help of the military started a massive reform process by banning the sultanate and caliphate and establishing a secular parliamentary system. Among his westernization reforms included the closing of *türbes* and *tekkes* (religious shrines and dervish convents) in 1925, banning of Ottoman style dressing, fez and chador, adoption of European calendar as well as metric and weight system. More significantly, civil code from Switzerland, penal code from Italy, and the commercial law from Germany were adopted. Arab alphabet was replaced by Latin alphabet in 1928. Women received the right to vote and qualify as a candidate in local and general elections in the 1930s.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Hale, Turkish, pp. 35, 53-54. Zürcher, pp. 96-98, 106-110. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, "The Second Constitutional Period, 1908-1918", **The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World**, Vol. IV, (Ed. Reşat Kasaba), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 72-73.

¹²⁹ Hasan Kayalı, "The Struggle for Independence", **The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World**, Vol. IV, (Ed. Reşat Kasaba), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 141-143.

¹³⁰ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, **History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1977, p. 385. Andrew Mango, "Atatürk", **The Cambridge**

Besides these modernization and westernization reforms Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established his quasi-ideology called Kemalism or Atatürkism in the early 1930s. The main principles of Kemalism that were written down in the program of CHP in 1931 were named as republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, nationalism, revolutionism, and statism. Eventually, Kemalism became the state ideology.¹³¹

In 1923 in order to keep the military members away from politics, a law required military members to resign from the armed forces to join politics.¹³² However, the former military officers had still formed 20 per cent of the assembly. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself and his right hand man İsmet İnönü were once senior members of the Ottoman Army. Therefore, in an indirect way the military had a significant impact on politics during this period. The duty of spreading ideas of Kemalism and nation-building was given to the Turkish military. In particular, the military saw itself as the guardians of Atatürk's reforms and principles. They gave the message that they were not interested in intervening into politics as long as these reforms and principles were kept intact. In addition, the Chief of the General Staff was not subject to ministerial control. Generals also served as provincial governors in some places and the civilian authority was subordinated to the military commander during the martial law periods.¹³³ The Army Internal Service Law of 1935 specified the "duty of armed forces as to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the Turkish republic," as determined in the Constitution.¹³⁴

During the Second World War the country was under the control of President İsmet İnönü, the successor of Atatürk. Throughout the war İnönü tried hard to remain

History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World, Vol. IV, (Ed. Reşat Kasaba), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, (Atatürk), p. 165. Zürcher, pp. 188-190.

¹³¹ Zürcher, pp. 181-182. Republicanism represents the new regime of Turkey, abolishment of Sultanate and Caliphate. Secularism means the removal of religious aspects from the state institutions and the modernization of the state and society free from Islamic traditions and ways. Nationalism represents creating a new Turkish nation consciousness and establishment of a nation state. . Populism is the equality of all Turkish citizens regardless of class, rank, religion, or occupation. Revolutionism is the reform of traditional state and society into a new and modern structure. Statism is mixture of private enterprise as well as governmental supervision and participation in economy. See Shaw and Shaw, pp. 375-395.

¹³² This was actually a move against some former senior military members such as Ali Fuad (Cebesoy), Rauf (Orbay), Kazım (Karabekir) who were opposing Atatürk's reforms. Feroz Ahmad, **The Making of Modern Turkey**, Routledge, London and New York, 1993, p. 57.

¹³³ Özgür Mutlu Ulus, **The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey: Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism**, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2011, p. 11.

¹³⁴ Hale, Turkish, p. 80.

neutral and avoid the war or any kind of invasion. Finally, he was forced to join the war on paper in the last three months of the war. However, the economic crisis experienced in the country during the war led to a strong opposition against İnönü and his party Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* – CHP). Moreover, the end of the war brought fundamental changes to international system leading to the establishment of two blocs consisted of the two great powers: capitalist US and communist Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the war, Turkey found itself facing the Soviet threat with Stalin planning to control the Straits. In this context, Turkey had no choice but to ally with the Western bloc under the domination of the USA. As a result of Truman doctrine in 1947 and later Marshall Plan in 1948 and finally its membership to NATO in 1952, Turkey became a member of the western bloc.¹³⁵ This membership to Western bloc also accelerated Turkish transition to multi-party system. In this new multi-party system period, Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*-DP) under the leadership of Adnan Menderes lost the elections in 1946, but managed to come to power in 1950 elections, opening a new era in Turkish politics.

1. Establishment of Multiparty Politics

Starting from the beginning of the 1950s, Turkey moved closer to democratic system. Besides Democrat Party, during this period, Turkish Socialist Workers and Peasants' Party (*Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi Köylü Partisi*) was founded. Later more hardliner deputies of DP resigned from the party and established Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*-MP), which had supported more religious and more capitalist policy.¹³⁶

In the 1950 elections after gaining 53.3 per cent of the votes, DP under the premiership of Menderes came to power. Celal Bayar replaced İnönü for presidency. In this political context, while CHP represented the center (the military, civilian bureaucrats and some large landowners), the DP represented the periphery (urban poor, commercial middle classes, religious conservatives and the rural population).¹³⁷

¹³⁵ Shaw and Shaw, pp. 399-400.

¹³⁶ Zürcher, pp. 213-215.

¹³⁷ Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations", **Politics in Developing Countries, Comparing Experiences with Democracy**, (Eds. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset), Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1995, (Crises), p. 230.

The success of the DP governments in the first five years boosted the prestige and confidence of the party in the eyes of the public and among the ruling cadre of the party.

DP's economic success with the help of economic aid from the USA increased the standards of living, creating a new middle class that began to emerge during that period. These newly developing groups who were previously excluded from politics got involved in politics and eventually these developing commercial entrepreneurs and businessmen decreased the power and significance of the military and the civilian bureaucracy. As a result of rising inflation, both military and civilian bureaucracy experienced a loss of social status as well as political influence under the DP rule. The economic policies followed by DP such as rapid import-substitution based industrialization and modernization of agriculture as well as external borrowing led to the rise of inflation. Civil and military bureaucrats experienced material losses as their salaries failed to keep up with rapidly rising costs. In addition to these economic problems, Prime Minister Menderes alienated the military members by interfering into appointments and promotions in the armed forces. The use of religion as a political tool by the DP members was met with concern by the secular circles and the military. During DP period, religious education was expanded, the Turkish call to prayer was again translated to Arabic, and the appearance of religious leaders in public increased.¹³⁸

One of the hostile foreign policies DP followed towards the military (which it identified with CHP rule) once it came to power was to force the Chief of General Staff, the commanders of the land, navy and air force to resign. Although Turkish membership to NATO in 1952 increased the power of civilians over the military, in practice, it led to the political radicalization of the military. The poorly equipped and educated Turkish military started to modernize after the NATO membership, thanks to the US aids. In addition, DP members particularly, Menderes had often insulted the military officers. For example, once he said that "he could run the army with reserve officers if he wanted to do so".¹³⁹

¹³⁸ Özbudun, *Crises*, p. 230. James Brown, "The Politics of Disengagement in Turkey: The Kemalist Tradition", **The Decline of Military Regimes, The Civilian Influence**, (Ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos), Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1988, p. 134.

¹³⁹ Hale, *Turkish*, pp. 93-99.

DP government failed to establish a planned liberal economic policy. Although they achieved an outstanding economic growth in the short run, their unplanned economy turned into crisis in the long run. Eventually, as already stated huge debt and high inflation rates especially hit the wage earners such as professors, civil servants and military officers. The more DP started to lose its power, the more authoritarian acts they implemented by following harsh policies against the opposition. It had confiscated CHP's assets, suspended its publication *Ulus* (the Nation), and restricted freedom of press.¹⁴⁰ Most importantly, there was no checking mechanism such as an upper house or a constitutional court for the governmental acts violating the constitution. Moreover, the failure in the foreign policy, specifically on Cyprus issue, frustrated the DP government and turned into a pogrom against Greeks in Istanbul, also known as 6-7 September Events.¹⁴¹

Starting in mid 1950s, the increasing authoritarianism, economic failure, and rise of political Islam were perceived as threats to Kemalist revolution by the military staff. DP's increasing repressive politics such as establishment of the Fatherland Front (*Vatan Cephesi*) for consolidating and mobilizing its supporters and formation of Investigation Committee (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*) to investigate CHP's alleged illegal activities and forcing the military into politics were the last straws to mobilize the military for an intervention. The military was also frustrated with the attacks of DP supporters to İnönü. The student demonstrations that started against the massive repressive policies of DP caused chaos in big cities.¹⁴²

2. 1960 Coup D'état

Finally on May 27, 1960, the military launched its first coup d'état in the Turkish history. President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, and all of the ministers as well as the Chief of General Staff Rüştü Elderhun were arrested. Martial law was declared. General Cemal Gürsel was installed as the leader of military regime. National Unity Committee (*Milli Birlik Komitesi-MBK*) which was consisted of 38 officers was formed to execute the decisions of military regime. As a result of the

¹⁴⁰ Shaw and Shaw, pp. 408-411.

¹⁴¹ Zürcher, p. 231.

¹⁴² Zürcher, pp. 234, 239. Hale, Turkish, pp. 106-107.

pressure from the hardliners in the MBK, in August 1960, 235 generals and 5000 colonels and majors were forced into a compulsory retirement. Moreover, 147 university professors were fired in October 1960. These hardliners that were consisted of junior officers under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş supported the continuation of the military rule for a long time while the more moderates wanted to return to civilian rule as soon as possible. These disagreements led Chief of General Staff Gürsel to dissolve the MBK and establish a new one by excluding the 14 hardliner officers who were known as “fourteens”. The Constituent Assembly that was established in January 1961 finished writing a new more liberal constitution in July 1961. The new constitution was accepted by 61 percent of the votes through a referendum. 1961 Constitution as one of the most liberal and democratic constitutions of Turkey, established a bicameral system, with lower chamber and a senate in which MBK members became ex-officio members. Supreme Election Board (*Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*-YSK) was founded as a judicial body in order to prevent the electoral frauds. Constitutional Court was founded in order to prevent unconstitutional legislations.¹⁴³ In sum, the constitution makers aimed to establish a weak executive for both preventing the emergence of a strong man like Menderes once again.

Moreover, National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*-MGK) that was assigned “to assist the cabinet in the making of decisions related to national security and co-ordination” was established. It was consisted of the President, the Prime Minister, the ministers, the Chief of the General Staff, and army commanders was established. However, the military always dominated the decision-making process. Eventually MGK had become one of the strongest institutions through which the military exerted its power in politics. Moreover, the Chief of the General Staff became responsible to the prime minister rather than the Minister of Defense making the position more powerful than the Ministry.¹⁴⁴

The military government also made some economic reforms. State Planning Organization (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*-DPT) was founded for planning the economy and social policies of the state. Until the 1980s Turkey adopted industrialization through import substitution. During this period, in order to improve

¹⁴³ Hale, Turkish, pp. 108-110, 136-137. Shaw and Shaw, pp. 414-417. Zürcher, pp. 241-243.

¹⁴⁴ Ahmad, pp. 129-130.

the income of the military and retired officers Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Fund (*Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu-OYAK*) was founded. Ten per cent of the salaries of active military personnel and servants of the Ministry of Defense were collected for OYAK. In addition, OYAK became one of the most important economic corporations in a short time. By 1972, total assets of OYAK were \$300 million with a food company, insurance company, cement plant, truck and tractor factory. Meanwhile, thanks to its partnership with Renault, OYAK had shares in various factories, along with hotels and real estate investments.¹⁴⁵

In September 1960, DP was closed and its property was confiscated. 592 members of DP, including president Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, foreign minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, finance minister Hasan Polatkan and ex-foreign minister Fuat Köprülü were put on trial. They were charged with corruption, provoking events on September 6-7, 1955, imposing the rule of one class on another, and treason of the 1924 Constitution by violating its guarantees. As a result of these trials Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan were executed and many politicians were forced to serve life in prison.¹⁴⁶

Following the ban on DP, new political parties including New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi-YTP*) and Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi-AP*) were established by Ekrem Alican and Ragıp Gümüşpala, respectively. The free and liberal environment created by the 1961 Constitution led to the formation of a socialist workers' party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi-TİP*). In the 1961 general elections while CHP became the first party by gaining 36.7 per cent of the votes and 173 seats in the parliament, AP came second by gaining 34.8 per cent of the votes and 158 seats. In the senate elections, AP became the first party with 71 seats and CHP came second with 36 seats.¹⁴⁷ After one and a half years of military rule finally, Turkey was able to return to its parliamentary democracy.

3. Return to Democracy: 1961-1971

The military was quite unhappy with the results of the 1961 elections when CHP did not receive the expected percentage of the votes. Such a result made the

¹⁴⁵ Hale, Turkish, pp. 138, 174. Karpat, p. 359.

¹⁴⁶ Shaw and Shaw, p. 416.

¹⁴⁷ Shaw and Shaw, pp. 406, 421.

military members to question the success of the coup. The frustration of the military embodied a group in the military to launch a coup against the newly elected assembly. On October 21, 1961, seven generals, four admirals and twenty seven colonels met in Istanbul to plan an intervention. The Chief of General Staff Cevdet Sunay mediated the situation and forced the military group to sign the Çankaya Protocol on October 24, 1961. According to this protocol, while Cemal Gürsel would serve as the president, İnönü would get to the position of prime ministry by forming a coalition with AP.¹⁴⁸

CHP-AP coalition only lasted for six months and was dissolved as a result of a disagreement on the implementation of an amnesty for former DP members in prisons. Consequently, İnönü formed another coalition government with YTP and Republican Peasants' Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi-CKMP*), this coalition also ended in November 1963. Gümüşpala, the AP leader's attempts to establish a new government also failed. In December 1963, eventually İnönü formed a minority government with independents but resigned in February 1965 when his budget was not approved in the parliament. Finally, a caretaker government was founded by Suat Hayri Ürgüplü. This government managed to rule the country until October 1965.¹⁴⁹

During the 1961-1965 period, civil-military relations were very fluctuant since the military did not reach its purpose of getting rid of DP from politics. Now a new party AP as the successor of DP was supported by good percentage of the population. On February 22, 1962, Colonel Talat Aydemir launched a coup d'état but thanks to the efforts of İnönü, failed. Aydemir was arrested later and he was imprisoned for a short time and dismissed from the military. In December 1962, eleven air force officers were fired because of their plans for new coup attempts. On May 21, 1963, Talat Aydemir launched a second coup attempt but again failed. All officers who joined this coup attempt including 1,459 Military College students as well as Alpaslan Türkeş and other fourteens were arrested. The students were expelled from college. Seven of the arrested officers were sentenced to death, twenty

¹⁴⁸ Hale, Turkish, pp. 146-147.

¹⁴⁹ Zürcher, pp. 249-250.

nine to life imprisonment and seventy to different prison sentences. Yet, only Aydemir and his right hand man Fethi Gürcan were executed.¹⁵⁰

AP won the 1965 elections with its new leader, a career technocrat Süleyman Demirel, gaining 52.9 per cent of the votes and 240 seats in the assembly. CHP came second with 28.7 per cent of the votes and gaining 134 seats. Demirel and his party dominated Turkish politics for the next four years. He achieved an economic success and enjoyed AP's majority in the assembly, despite the blockings of CHP and vetoes of the Constitutional Court. To ease the relations with the military, Demirel and AP parliamentarians accepted military's candidate Chief of General Staff Cevdet Sunay to be elected as the new president.¹⁵¹

During this period, CHP had gone through a leadership change when the, young charismatic Bülent Ecevit replaced old veteran İsmet İnönü. Ecevit in an attempt to leave its elitist heritage behind defined CHP as the left of the center. The group that opposed this change left the party and established Reliance Party (*Güven Partisi*-GP) under the leadership of Turhan Feyzioğlu.¹⁵² Moreover, Turkish Workers Party, TİP managed to gain 14 seats in the parliament. From a labor union party, it soon became a socialist party that gathered radical leftist movements, Kurdish democratic-socialists, students, intellectuals, and university professors. However, as a result of strong ideological debates both inside and outside of the party, TİP soon lost its power.¹⁵³

Along with the increase in the rightist and leftist movements in Turkey, the international events of 1968 also triggered the student activism in the country. Moreover, the student movements that merged with the working class activism supported worker's strikes and factory occupations. At the same time, students occupied university buildings with reform demands and better living conditions. The first organization *Dev-Genç* (gigantic youth) was at the beginning established under the name of Federation of Idea Clubs (*Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu*-FKF) and later changed its name into Turkey's Federation of Revolutionary Youth (*Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu*). The members of *Dev-Genç* who attended peasant

¹⁵⁰ Hale, Turkish, pp. 160, 164-169.

¹⁵¹ Shaw and Shaw, p. 406. Karpas, p. 360. Hale, Turkish, p. 173.

¹⁵² Zürcher, pp. 252-253.

¹⁵³ Ulus, pp. 89-90.

meetings, strikes and demonstrations of workers supported Marxism and Leninism. At the same time they were also eager to merge with leftist-Kemalist groups since Kemalism was perceived as a complementary ideology of socialism. Some of the leftist-Kemalist intellectuals, professors, and even the members of the military became the supporters of National Democratic Revolution¹⁵⁴ (*Milli Demokratik Devrim-MDD*) which simply had an anti-imperialist and anti-US rhetoric. In addition, interestingly enough during this period, the weak working class supported a revolution with the help of the military.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, the Kurds, who felt close to the socialist idea, founded Revolutionary Culture Clubs of the East (*Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları-DDKO*).¹⁵⁶

The ultra-rightists who also started to show their presence in politics mainly supported the (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP*). MHP actually came out of CKMP. Following Alparslan Türkeş' election as its chairman in 1965, in 1969, CKMP's name was changed to MHP. The party established a youth organization called *Ülkü Ocakları* (Hearths of the Ideal) whose members known as *Bozkurtlar* (the Grey Wolves), were trained in special camps to fight against "communist subversion". Another ultra-right religiously conservative party called National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP*) was founded by Necmettin Erbakan. MNP established Association to Combat Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*) as a youth organization. This association supported the idea of "Islam as the antidote to communism".¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ Basically there were two major factions in Turkish left which were National Democratic Revolution (*Milli Demokratik Devrim-MDD*) and TİP's Socialist Revolution (*Sosyalist Devrim-SD*). Supporters of MDD claim that Turkey first and foremost needs a nationalist capitalist revolution. The socialist revolution could be possible after the nationalist capitalist revolution. Until the nationalist capitalist revolution takes place, masses should omit the class difference. Likewise the War of Independence, military-civilian bureaucracy class should be the vanguards of revolution. The major difference between MDD and SD, the former was anti-imperialist but not anti-capitalist; the latter was both anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist. SD claimed that the nationalist revolution could only be possible if the Turkish working class became the vanguard force. (Gökhan Atılgan, "Sosyalist Milliyetçilik Söylemi (Türkiye, 1961-1968): Temeller, Ayrılıklar", **Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi**, Vol: 64, No: 3, 2009, pp. 22-23. Suavi Aydın, "'Millî Demokratik Devrim'den 'Ulusal Sol'a Türk Solunda Özgücü Eğilim", **Toplum ve Bilim**, Vol: 78, Fall, 1998, p. 59.)

¹⁵⁵ Ulus, pp. 101-112.

¹⁵⁶ Hamit Bozarslan, "Kurds and the Turkish State", **The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World**, Vol. IV, (Ed. Reşat Kasaba), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 347.

¹⁵⁷ Zürcher, pp. 256-257. Ahmad, p. 142.

In the 1969 General Elections AP once again received 46.5 percent of the votes and 256 seats in the parliament while CHP received 27.4 of the votes and 143 seats in the parliament.¹⁵⁸ As soon as Demirel formed the government, he found himself in a vulnerable position. First, the disagreement on the new tax law in his party led the hardliners to establish Democratic Party (*Demokratik Parti*) under the leadership of Ferruh Bozbeyli. Second, the violence between the leftist groups and rightist groups were leading the country into chaos.¹⁵⁹

The armed struggles on the streets were widespread. First, urban guerrilla organizations that were founded by university students aimed at making a socialist revolution through armed struggle. Second, many leftist organizations were established. Among these Revolutionary Workers Peasants Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi-TİİKP*) was founded by Doğu Perinçek, İbrahim Kaypakkaya and their acquaintances, People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Parti-Cephesi-THKP-C*) was established by Mahir Çayan, Yusuf Küpeli, Münir Ramazan Aktolga, Ulaş Bardakçı and their companions, and finally People's Liberation Army of Turkey (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu-THKO*) was formed by Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan, Yusuf Aslan, Sinan Cemgil and their friends. Those organizations in an attempt to make socialist revolution launched sabotages, bank robberies and kidnappings that put the security on the country in danger and frustrated the military. In addition, in the summer of 1970, the working class unrest that showed themselves as demonstrations and strikes increased tremendously. Thousands of workers attended the demonstrations, closed highways and got involved into armed clashes with the police and the military. On the rightist front, the Grey Wolves also took to the streets accelerating political polarization. In this atmosphere of chaos, the police was helpless and was not able to suppress the street unrest.¹⁶⁰

In sum, the major reasons for the 1971 military intervention were high labor mobilization, the armed clashes among the leftist guerrillas, rightist militias, and state security forces and Demirel government's failure to maintain law and order. On

¹⁵⁸ Shaw and Shaw, p. 406.

¹⁵⁹ Zürcher, p. 252.

¹⁶⁰ Ulus, pp. 16-17. "DİSK ve 15-16 Haziran", *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, Vol: 6, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1988, p. 2156.

top of all these factors a leftist coup attempt also contributed to military's decision to intervene on March 12, 1971 by issuing a memorandum and bringing military dominated governments for the following two years.

4. 1971 Coup by Memorandum

Rather than a direct intervention, this time the military preferred to intervene through a memorandum. A neutral government under the direct tutelage of military was established by Nihat Erim. This government was mostly consisted of technocrats who aimed to sustain law and order. On the extreme left while TİP was closed, on the religious right MNP was banned from politics. 44 articles of the constitution were amended. The autonomy of universities and public radio-television was removed. The freedom of press and the powers of the constitutional court were reduced. The powers of MGK were increased and State Security Courts (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri-DGM*) as semi-military courts were established. The semi-military rule declared martial law in eleven provinces and started mass arrests. They detained thousands of activists, mostly leftists, writers, journalists, unionists, party leaders and military officers. Most of them were put in prison and some were executed.¹⁶¹

It was actually a military intervention against the left, university movement, and working class mobilization. 12 March Memorandum can be defined as a counter-coup against a leftist junta. This leftist junta, led by Cemal Madanoğlu, was a supporter of MDD and had some links with THKP-C and THKO. They were also supported by the socialist writers and leftist-Kemalist journalists, such as Doğan Avcıoğlu, who wrote the manifest of MDD. Three days after the memorandum while Madanoğlu, Avcıoğlu and other members of the junta were arrested, three active generals and eight colonels were fired from the armed forces. The leftist student leaders, Mahir Çayan, Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan, Hüseyin İnan, Sinan Cemgil, Ulaş Bardakçı, and their colleagues were either killed in armed conflicts or imprisoned or executed.¹⁶²

However, the military government in a short time lost its support both in the assembly and outside of the parliament. March 12 junta's leader Faruk Gürler could

¹⁶¹ Ulus, pp. 16-18. Zürcher, pp. 259-260.

¹⁶² Zürcher, p. 258. Ulus, p. 59. Hale, Turkish, p. 186.

not be elected as president after President Sunay's term ended. Instead, a retired Admiral Fahri Korutürk was elected as president as a more moderate candidate that would please the military and the members of the parliament. It was obvious that after two and a half years of military regime, the junta could not continue its rule. A caretaker government was established by Naim Talu and governed Turkey until the 1973 elections.¹⁶³

In sum, the military played a significant role in politics starting from the days of Central Asia and continuing during the Ottoman period. Ottoman Empire managed to control vast lands on the three continents as a result of its sophisticated military system. Once the empire started to disintegrate, the administration first started to reform military by sending soldiers to Europe for education. These military officers returned home with the modernization and westernization ideologies establishing the most educated and most politicized stratum of the state. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, these military officers started the independence movement and established the new modern Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. They also started a vast modernization movement, declaring themselves as the guardians of Kemalist reforms and principles. During the multi-party periods DP's anti-secular policies and authoritarian tendencies led military to intervene into politics through the 1960 coup. The violence caused by the extreme leftist and rightists groups throughout the 1960s, this time led the military to intervene indirectly in March 1971. Therefore, during the 1950s, 60s and 70s Turkish military assigned itself the role of guaranteeing political stability in the country.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN ARGENTINA

As Turkey was established on the Ottoman heritage, modern Argentina was founded on the legacy of three centuries of Spanish Empire rule. As a result, Spanish patrimonialism has been embedded into the structure of the country. The roots of patriarchal and militaristic characteristics of Argentina go back to the colonial

¹⁶³ Hale, Turkish, pp. 207-208.

period. The founders of Argentina were the soldiers and *caudillos*, who were the landlords with military tasks and militia forces. The military and wars after the foundation of Argentina forged the nation and state building. The military that had always been dominant in politics was highly involved in internal security. In addition, the politicians also used military to penetrate into the society.

The following section will concentrate on analyzing the historical roots of militarism in Argentina that was constituted during the period of colonialism. The section will also give information about the military interventions prior to 1976 coup and how military highly got involved in civilian politics.

A. Civil-Military Relations during the Colonial Period in Argentina

Until the arrival of *conquistadors* (conquerors), the native inhabitants of the Americas were quite backward people living as different ethnic groups in small villages and speaking various languages.¹⁶⁴ The colonial period in the Americas started with the exploration of Caribbean Islands by Christopher Columbus in 1492. Buenos Aires was established after almost a century later, in 1580.¹⁶⁵

During the colonial rule the King, who designed the colonial institutions, had the absolute control over politics and economy. In different regions, rulers of the colonial America were the viceroys, the king's alter-ego, who were appointed by the king in order to represent king's interests. The viceroys had complete executive as well as legislative, military and ecclesiastical powers in the colonies. The cities were ruled by governors called *Corregidor*. The Catholic Church also played a significant role for spreading Christianity and European moral values.¹⁶⁶ The land in Latin America was given to *conquistadores*, usually for life, without right of inheritance. The *Conquistadores* who came from Spain during the conquest of the Americas were

¹⁶⁴ Jonathan C. Brown, **A Brief History of Argentina**, 2nd Edition, Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group, York, 2010, pp. 3-4.

¹⁶⁵ Jill Hedges, **Argentina A Modern History**, I.B. Tauris, London-New York, 2011, p. 2.

¹⁶⁶ Susan Elizabeth Ramirez, "Institutions of the Spanish American Empire in the Hapsburg Era", **A Companion to Latin American History**, (Ed. Thomas H. Holloway), West Sussex, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2011, pp. 103-114.

appointed by the central government to control labor and taxing. They had to protect the indigenous people, pay for the support of parish priest, and defend the colony.¹⁶⁷

Until the 17th century, the security forces of the Americas came from Iberian Peninsula to keep the central authority intact in the region. Later, local militias were recruited for the army and their job was to maintain law and order. In the 16th and 17th centuries, as a result of military reforms, a permanent, well-trained and organized standing army was established. During the colonial period, there were a few military bases in most of the regions of the Spanish America. The main exceptions were the strategic coasts, ports and frontier regions. For example, there were light cavalry and infantry units in the Rio de la Plata as a frontier region.¹⁶⁸

Spanish Kingdom, similar to Ottoman Empire, had experienced some tough times as the administrative authority was weakened. As a result of the economic crisis in Spain, the posts started to put up for sale and a *Corregidor* found himself in the position of buying his office. Due to the low state salaries, most of them had to find other ways to increase their incomes. This led them to establish close relations with other local elites like *encomenderos*, land owners, miners, and merchants. If a royal decree conflicted with the interests of locals, the local authorities used the phrase "*obedezco pero no cumplo*" (I obey, but not comply) for postponing or not executing these decrees. Some *haciendas* (lands) became heritable, and they were turned into private estates. *Creoles* (fully or partially descended from white European colonial settlers) or Spaniards and the local elite class started to own them.¹⁶⁹

The internal revolts of both indigenous population and post-1492 settlers weakened the royalist administration. Moreover, the intensification of imperial disputes both in Europe and in the Americas caused problems. Thus, reforms were launched both in the administrative and military sphere at the beginning of the 18th century. The old style army system was replaced by the new French-style. The most important reform was concerned with creating career officers in the army. Similar to the Ottoman rulers, the Spanish sovereigns decided that the creation of a strong

¹⁶⁷ Benjamin Keen and Keith Haynes, **A History of Latin America**, 8th edition, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, Boston and New York, 2009, p. 77.

¹⁶⁸ Alain Rouquié, **Latin Amerika'da Askeri Devlet**, Translated by Şirin Tekeli, Alan Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1986, p. 54. Geoffrey Parker, "The 'Military Revolution', 1560-1660 – a Myth?", **The Journal of Modern History**, Vol: 48, No: 2, 1976, p. 197. Christon I. Archer, "The Role of the Military in Colonial Latin America", **The History Teacher**, Vol: 14, No: 3, 1981, p. 413.

¹⁶⁹ Ramirez, pp. 118-119. Fukuyama, pp. 383-385.

military would strengthen the state. Thus, they started to strengthen the current military force against both the internal and external threats. External threats included attempts of British or Dutch invasion or clashes with Portuguese Brazil. Firstly, they increased the number of military men and reorganized local militia units. In addition, they made *Creoles* a member of this imperial army. The officers of these militia forces gained the same rights with the imperial army officers.¹⁷⁰

Furthermore, the intendancy system was established in which an intendant, who was appointed from Spain by the rulers, was responsible for collecting taxes, acting as the commissariat of the army, promoting public works and regulating other economic issues. This ultimately caused militarization of the administration, making military an essential tool for inserting the central power. The military officers being appointed in key civilian positions took military into politics and government. The impact of these military regulations of 1786 lasted for a very long time in the Spanish America.¹⁷¹

B. Civil-Military Relations during the Downfall of the Colonial System

Spanish rulers eventually started losing their power as a result of defeats in long wars in Europe and the Americas. The economic crisis led the Spanish kingdom to give permission to the locals to make free trade from the ports of Americas. As a result, the locals gained a self-confidence to govern themselves, enjoyed the free trade, and contacted with third persons. Moreover, the Spanish rulers were never able to restore their old monopoly in the region.¹⁷²

French revolution with the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity, independence of the United States, rise of nationalism, and enlightenment that brought up the works of prominent figures like Francisco de Miranda, Simon

¹⁷⁰ These reforms were also known as the “Bourbon Reforms”. D. A. Brading, “Bourbon Spain and Its American Empire”, **The Cambridge History of Latin America: Colonial Latin America**, Vol. I, (Ed. Leslie Bethell), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 400-401. Rouquié, p. 54.

¹⁷¹ John Fisher, “Imperial Rivalries and Reforms”, **A Companion to Latin American History**, (Ed. Thomas H. Holloway), Blackwell Publishing Ltd., West Sussex, 2011, pp. 180-183. Brading, p. 391-395. Jacques A. Barbier, “The Culmination of the Bourbon Reforms, 1787-1792”, **Hispanic American Historical Review**, Vol: 57, No: 1, 1977, pp. 53-54. Loveman, pp. 250-258.

¹⁷² Brading, pp. 434-436. John Lynch, “The Origins of Spanish American Independence”, **The Cambridge History of Latin America: From Independence to c. 1870**, Vol. I, (Ed. Leslie Bethell), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, (Origins), pp. 3-4, 10-17, 22-24.

Bolívar, and Manuel Belgrano all affected Latin America. Now, the *Creoles* were aware of the fact that they were Americans not Spaniards. The British invasion of Buenos Aires that led to flee of Spanish Viceroy and his Spaniard soldiers in 1806 was a milestone for independence movement in the Rio de la Plata. The *porteño* army with *mestizo* and *mulatto*¹⁷³ soldiers resisted against the British invasion twice under the command of a French-born officer Santiago Liniers. After the British invasion, *Creoles* reinforced their own administrative and military power with self confidence and prestige. Moreover, credibility and power of Spanish rulers totally declined. Although the Spaniards returned Buenos Aires, the *Creoles* did not let them to regain their strength.¹⁷⁴

The end of colonial system came in 1808 with Napoleon's invasion of Iberian Peninsula and termination of Bourbon dynasty in Madrid. Consequently, French rule under Joseph Bonaparte replaced the Spanish king. Towards the end of May 1808, while in Spain the provincial juntas organized resistance against the French invasion, in Latin America since there was no king to obey, *Creoles* started to rule themselves.¹⁷⁵

C. Civil-Military Relations during the Independence and Establishment of Argentina

The independence movements of Latin America were not a consequence of an anti-colonial struggle. It was simply an output of the great political changes all around the world. In other words, it was a culmination of transformation of the ancient regime into modern liberal nation states. However, those new states could not escape from their past. New political processes and liberal modern institutions were established on top of the ancient regime rules.¹⁷⁶

After the French invasion of Iberia, the provincial juntas were established to resist Napoleon forces in Spain. In September 1808, *Junta Suprema Central*

¹⁷³ *Porteño* means the residents of Buenos Aires. *Mestizo* is a person with European and Native American descent. *Mulatto* is a person with black and white parents.

¹⁷⁴ Lynch, *Origins*, pp. 40-46. Barbier, p. 68. Romero, pp. 82-83. Hedges, p. 4.

¹⁷⁵ Lynch, *Origins*, pp. 49-50.

¹⁷⁶ Jaime E. Rodríguez O., "The Process of Spanish American Independence", **A Companion to Latin American History**, (Ed. Thomas H. Holloway), Blackwell Publishing Ltd., West Sussex, 2011, pp. 195-196.

Gubernativa del Reino (Supreme Central Governing Board) was created for national defense and to govern the empire in the absence of the king. The members from colonies were joined this Junta for the first time enjoying the real equality with the peninsula.¹⁷⁷

Eventually, the independence movements started in the Americas. After two failed junta attempts the *porteños* founded *Junta Provisional Gubernativa de las Provincias del Rio de la Plata* (Provisional Governing Board of the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata) the first triumvirate, the ruling-board that was consisted from three people, to rule in the name of Fernando VII during his exile in May 1810. However, they were ready to return the sovereignty to King Fernando VII as soon as he came back to throne.¹⁷⁸

During this period, lives of the first triumvirate and the second triumvirate were short-lived as a result of coups and counter-coups. In 1812, with the efforts of Argentina's foremost national hero Jose de San Martin a national regular army was established for enforcing Junta's authority all over Rio de la Plata. Officials of this army's were not career soldiers instead they were selected from prominent people. In 1813, Grand Constituent Assembly was established. Despite it designated symbols of national sovereignty such as national flag, currency and anthem; it neither prepared a constitution, nor declared total independence.¹⁷⁹

Although Fernando VII came back to throne in 1814, Latin Americans refused to waive their right of self governance and resisted the King's absolutism, curbing the power of Buenos Aires and revolutionary attempts. In March 1816, a congress was gathered in Tucuman and declared the independence of United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata on July 9, 1816. They also elected Juan Martin de Pueyrredon as the Supreme Director. However, the law and order could not be sustained for a long time. The first two decades after the independence could be

¹⁷⁷ Rodriguez, pp. 197-200.

¹⁷⁸ David Bushnell, "The Independence of Spanish South America", **The Cambridge History of Latin America: From Independence to c. 1870**, Vol. I, (Ed. Leslie Bethell), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 97-98. Hedges, pp. 4-5.

¹⁷⁹ Bushnell, pp. 120-121. Moreover, the Assembly prepared some laws about free birth, elimination of slavery, abolition of legal torture, titles of nobility, prohibition of founding entails, etc. It was also an anti-clericalist assembly which also abolished the Inquisition.

defined as chaos and civil wars period in Argentina. Even between 1820 and 1826, there was no central authority among the provinces of the Rio de la Plata.¹⁸⁰

This period of conflicts ended in 1829 when Juan Manuel de Rosas, also known as Restorer of the Laws, became the governor of Buenos Aires. Patron-client relations dominated the Rosas period. The landowner, *estanciero*, needed labor loyalty and service during peace and war. The labor, on the other hand, needed subsistence and security. This primitive labor-landowner relationship, which was established on individual power, improved personal loyalties, and strengthened by the authority of *estanciero*. Moreover, labor depended on state and became the model of *caudillismo*. A pyramid of power was established. Less powerful became the client of more powerful *estanciero*, until they became clients of a super-patron (the *caudillo*). The *caudillo* first of all was a warrior, a leader who was qualified to defend, recruit troops, control resources, and eventually protect his people. The combination of military power and personal authority was intrinsic in the *caudillo*. He was often from a rich, prominent family of a region, who protected his family's and region's interest in the first place. Inevitably this system caused the continuation of patron-client tradition in the early years of Argentina, dominating the military appointments.¹⁸¹

In addition, Rosas and his royals controlled the state apparatus that included the military, Congress, administration, bureaucracy, police, and economy as well as the judicial power. The military power was the cornerstone of Rosas' power. The military gave power Rosas for both controlling the internal affairs and for expanding in the external affairs. The military budget during his period increased from 27 percent of the total budget in 1836 to 49 percent in 1840, and 71 percent in 1841. Moreover, Rosas used state terror in order to eliminate his enemies, regulate rebels, and control his supporters. The state terrorism was implemented by *Sociedad*

¹⁸⁰ Bushnell, pp. 120-126. Aldo C. Vacs, "Argentina", **Politics of Latin America: The Power Game**, (Eds. Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost), Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 2002, p. 401.

¹⁸¹ John Lynch, "The River Plate Republics from Independence to the Paraguayan War", **The Cambridge History of Latin America: From Independence to c. 1870**, Vol. I, (Ed. Leslie Bethell), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, (River), pp. 630-631.

Popular Restaurador (Society of People's Restoration) and its armed wing *Mazorca*.¹⁸²

The enemies of Rosas consisted of Entre Rios province, Brazil and Montevideo defeated the Rosas regime bringing Entre Rios Governor Justo José de Urquiza to power in 1852. Urquiza era was the first constitutional period in Argentina history on paper, but not in practice. It was the end of United Provinces of Argentina and the birth of the new Argentine Republic. In 1862, Bartolomé Mitre was elected as president of Argentina bringing national unity, liberal institutions and modernization.¹⁸³

The 1853 constitution of Argentina defined the mission of military as to guarantee the defense of the nation, maintain internal order, secure constitutional rights, and enforce the laws. Moreover, the national permanent army was created on January 26, 1864 with 6,000 men divided as artillery, infantry and cavalry. Military academies were established to train personnel for the army in 1869 and for navy in 1872. In September 1872, the military service became compulsory. Until the end of the century, the French style military dominated the Argentine army although its ammunition and weapons were exported from Germany.¹⁸⁴

Paraguayan War, or the War of Triple Alliance, (1865-1870) contributed to the consolidation of a national consciousness and a national army. This war brought the first awakening of the nationalist feelings of Argentines since it was perceived as an invasion of Argentina land by a foreign country.¹⁸⁵ Moreover, national conscription led the professionalization of the army creating new career opportunities for lower and middle classes. The army also became a tool for consolidation of the national unification.¹⁸⁶

Starting with General Roca's presidency in 1880, Argentina enjoyed a relatively tranquility and consolidation period until the 1930 coup d'état. Roca managed to bring stability and consolidate his power since he had the support and respect of the officials of National Army, League of Governors as well as the

¹⁸² Lynch, River, pp. 635-643.

¹⁸³ J. C. Brown, p. 127. Lynch, "River", pp. 645-648.

¹⁸⁴ Herbert C. Huser, **Argentine Civil-Military Relations from Alfonsín to Menem**, National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 2002, pp. 30-31. Lynch, "River", 656. Rouquie, p. 88.

¹⁸⁵ Alejandro Grimson and Gabriel Kessler, **On Argentina and the Southern Cone: Neoliberalism and National Imaginations**, Routledge, New York and London, 2003, p. 7.

¹⁸⁶ Hedges, p. 17. J. C. Brown, pp. 128-135.

caudillos.¹⁸⁷ Roca government resolved the major problem of the country such as under-population by accepting immigrants from Europe, particularly from Italy and Spain. This massive immigration brought the major political ideas of the era, such as socialism, anarchism and syndicalism. As a result, employers' unions and labor unions were established and the rights of workers were recognized.¹⁸⁸

The most important step taken towards consolidation and sustaining of central authority was the abolishing of the local militia forces in 1881. It was a step to reduce the power of *caudillos*. In 1884, the old military structure was reformed, the General Staff was organized. The first German training mission that was established in 1889 brought German effect in the Argentine army. When *Escuela Superior de Guerra* (Superior War School) was set up in 1900, the director and four instructors were German. In 1907 German officers were assigned in the Military Academy (*Colegio Militar*) and Ballistic School (*Escuela de Tiro*). From 1918 to 1930, half of the published military books were translated from German to Spanish. The German school created an army which was only loyal to state, nation and themselves, not to the democratically and popularly elected groups.¹⁸⁹

As the country modernized and rate of literacy increased, the political mobilization expanded. The opposition groups came forward against the National Autonomist Party (*Partido Autonomista Nacional-PAN*). The first opposition parties established during this period were the Radical Civic Union (*Unión Cívica Radical-UCR*), the Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista-PS*), and the Democratic Progressive Party (*Partido Demócrata Progresista-PDP*). During the period of President Roque Sáenz Peña, in 1912, a new electoral law that established universal, secret and compulsory right to vote for all male citizens over the age of eighteen was accepted. The control and security of elections were taken from provincial police forces and given to military. Argentina was getting ready for the elections.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Ezequiel Gallo, "Society and Politics, 1880-1916", **Argentina since Independence**, (Ed. Leslie Bethell), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 81.

¹⁸⁸ Gallo, pp. 83-90. Grimson and Kessler, p. 9.

¹⁸⁹ Gallo, p. 99. Huser, pp. 32-33. Rouquie, p. 89. George Pope Atkins and Larry V. Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina, 1921-1940", **Journal of Latin American Studies**, Vol: 4, No: 2, 1972, pp. 258-259.

¹⁹⁰ Gallo, pp. 106-108.

1. Establishment of Democracy and Multiparty Period

In 1916, the presidential elections were held and the candidate of Radical Civic Union, UCR, Hipólito Yrigoyen, was elected as the first president through free and fair elections for the first time. The PAN came second and PS became the third party in the elections.¹⁹¹ The weakness of Yrigoyen was the result of the PAN domination in the Senate. Thus, legal amendments as well as the annual budget were not approved by the Senate. Yrigoyen realized that he could not exert his power until gaining majority in the Senate. Thus, he turned to the old rule of Argentine politics and federal intervention¹⁹² twenty times, from election frauds to patronage on jobs and credits. Those efforts brought UCR a victory in the Chamber of Deputies but the party failed in Senate elections.¹⁹³

A group of senior army officers in 1921 founded a secret organization called *Logia de San Martin*. Their purpose was to fight with the politicization of the military by Yrigoyen himself and also stop his intervention into the promotions, salaries and military budget. Until 1926, the society became the major tool of the military participation to politics. The members of organization were ready to protect the national interest rather than political regime.¹⁹⁴

During this period, according to the Constitution of Argentina, a president could be elected back to back without giving a break for one term. Following the end of Yrigoyen's term, Marcelo T. de Alvear from UCR was elected as president in 1922. Although Alvear was from one of the oldest and wealthiest families of Argentina, he also was not a strong president. He was not able to resolve the post-war economic problems and control the internal division inside the UCR. Alvear's appointment of a military administrator General Enrique Mosconi as the head of

¹⁹¹ Gallo, p. 109.

¹⁹² "Federal intervention" is the right of the central government to intervene in the federal territories in extreme circumstances. According to the Constitution of Argentina Article 6, "The Federal Government may intervene in the territory of the provinces in order to guarantee the republican form of government or to repel foreign invasions; and at the request of their constituted authorities, it may intervene to support or reestablish them, should they have been deposed by sedition or invasion from another province." "República de Argentina Constitución de 1994 / Argentine Republic 1994 Constitution", 16.07.2008, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Argentina/argen94_e.html, (09.07.2014).

¹⁹³ David Rock, "From the First World War to 1920", **Argentina Since Independence**, (Ed. Leslie Bethell), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, (First), pp. 149-151.

¹⁹⁴ Huser, p. 33.

Treasury Petroleum Fields (*Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales*-YPF) created problems. During Alvear period, when the rise of anti-American sentiments increased in public, UCR wanted to nationalize the petrol fields. However, the Congress did not accept this proposal.¹⁹⁵

After six years compulsory break, Yrigoyen was again elected as president in 1928. In an attempt to gain power he followed similar policies such as federal intervention and get involved in favoritism, and corruption. As a result of 1929 Great Depression, UCR's votes fell in the 1930 elections. Increase in the corruption rumors and student demonstrations caused anarchy on the streets. Moreover, the UCR members and a right-wing organization called Republican League started to battle on streets. Lastly, there were sharp divisions among the cabinet members.¹⁹⁶ As a result of the economic crisis, student mobilization, street clashes, and corrupt government, the military intervened in the civilian politics for the first time in the Argentine history.

2. 1930 Coup D'état

On September 6, 1930, Argentine army launched a coup d'état under the leadership of General Jose F. Uriburu who was not happy with Yrigoyen's interventions to military promotions and labor and oil policies. General Uriburu had an aim to establish an authoritarian and corporatist regime in Argentina similar to the Italian fascism. However, the landed oligarchy and other factions of military opposed him. Nevertheless, Uriburu banned UCR, and sent Yrigoyen to exile. Following the September 6, 1930 coup d'état, General Uriburu became the interim president.¹⁹⁷

Although the coup had taken place easily, there were methodological and ideological uncertainties among the junta. They agreed on firing Radicals from the bureaucracy and other state agencies. Then they started fighting against social movements such as labor unions and deported some anarchist or communist union leaders from the country. The military regime also banned UCR from November 1931 presidential elections. However, these events weakened the power of General

¹⁹⁵ Rock, First, pp. 157, 163-168.

¹⁹⁶ Rock, First, pp. 169-171. Hedges, 43-44.

¹⁹⁷ Rock, First, p. 171. Vaca, p. 404. Roiquie, p. 115.

Uriburu and he was replaced by General Agustín Pedro Justo who became the president in November 1931 elections.¹⁹⁸ After almost one and a half year of military rule, Argentina returned democracy.

3. Return to Democracy 1931-1943

Interestingly enough, following the 1930 coup same old elites came to power again under the rule of General Agustín Pedro Justo. The old National Autonomist Party, PAN conservatives, anti-Yrigoyen Radicals, some other leftist fractions, and the military supported Justo in the elections, under the name of *Concordancia* (Concordance).¹⁹⁹ As soon as President Justo came to power, he lifted the state of siege, granted amnesty to political prisoners, including Yrigoyen, and re-hired pro-Radical university professors.²⁰⁰

One of the main reasons for 1930 coup was the impact of Great Depression on Argentine economy. As a solution to economic crisis, Argentine governments followed protectionist economy policies with industrialization through import substitution. These policies contributed to the recovery of the economy.²⁰¹

During the 1930s, the nationalist ideology, *nacionalismo*, which was influenced from Franco authoritarianism in Spain, Italian fascism and German Nazism emerged and later peaked during Juan Peron's presidency in the 1940s. The *nacionalismo* rejected liberalism and its individualism as well as communism and its materialism.²⁰² The nationalist gathered under the image of ex-President Rosas, supported fascist-inspired nationalism, Catholicism, Hispanic traditional authoritarian society.²⁰³

In the elections held following the end of Justo's term in 1937, *Concordancia*'s candidate Roberto M. Ortiz was elected as president. Meanwhile, nationalists were increasing the tension in the Argentine politics by affecting daily

¹⁹⁸ Romero, pp. 59-63. David Rock, "Argentina, 1930-1946", **Argentina Since Independence**, (Ed. Leslie Bethell), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, (1930), pp. 179-181.

¹⁹⁹ J. C. Brown, p. 189.

²⁰⁰ Rock, 1930, p. 183.

²⁰¹ Romero, pp. 65-67. Rock, 1930, p. 194. Veronica Oelsner, "'Forging the Fatherland': Work and Vocational Education in Argentina during Peronism (1944-1955)", **Paedagogica Historica: International Journal of the History of Education**, Vol: 49, No: 3, 2013, p. 384.

²⁰² Rock, 1930, p. 203.

²⁰³ Romero, p. 73.

politics. As a result, President Ortiz used federal intervention card against the fascist-leaning Buenos Aires Governor Fresco and sacked him from his position. Moreover, the Radicals won the majority in the Chamber of Deputies in the 1940 elections. The Second World War affected Argentine economy, leading the government to prepare *Plan de Reactivacion Economica* (Economic Reactivation Plan). However, the plan was not approved.²⁰⁴

When Ortiz resigned as a result of his illness, Vice-president Castillo took over the presidency. However, his government in a short time was filled with nationalist ministers when the more moderate ones resigned. As a result, strong anti-US and anti-British tone of *nacionalistas* affected the foreign relations of Argentina. Although the trade with Britain continued, the 1933 Roca-Runciman Treaty and economic dependence to Britain had been frustrating *nacionalistas*. Yet, the major blow came from Europe. The Second World War affected Argentine economy worse than the Great Depression. In addition, because of Argentina's anti-US policy in the region and refusal to declare war against Axis powers after the Pearl Harbor attack, annoyed US government imposed arms embargo on Argentina, froze its credits and terminated the supplies of oil tankers and machinery.²⁰⁵

The nationalist ideology inevitably spread to the Argentine military. Above all, the colonel ranks were open to the influence of German-rooted ideas since they received a German-style military education. The conservative, anti-liberal, xenophobic, and authoritarian sentiments also found supporters in the military. Moreover, during the presidency of Castillo, *Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares* (Department of Military Factories) and Military Geographic Institute were founded. Following the US arms embargo as well as its support to Argentina's major regional rival, Brazil, Argentine military decided to establish its own defense industry. The military inevitably became a political actor in Argentine politics.²⁰⁶

The polarization inside the government (consisted of conservatives and *nacionalistas*) increased tremendously by 1942. The majority in Congress was formed of Radicals and this had been paralyzing the Government acts. The polarized

²⁰⁴ Rock, 1930, pp. 208-219.

²⁰⁵ Rock, 1930, pp. 208-219. Roca- Runciman Treaty was a bilateral trade agreement granting concessions to the Great Britain. For details see Colin M. Lewis, **Argentina: A Short History**, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, 2002, pp. 41, 47.

²⁰⁶ Romero, p. 87.

and immobilized government, ineffective rule of President Castillo, the economic crisis emerging with the Second World War and the US embargo all led to the frustration of Argentine army. On June 4, 1943, the military launched the second coup d'état and suspended the civilian politics.²⁰⁷

4. 1943 Coup D'état

Although the 1943 coup was executed under the control of General Arturo Rawson, in three days he was succeeded by the previous government's war minister General Pedro Pablo Ramirez. Similar to the 1930 junta, there was a division between the generals as hardliners and moderates and there were uncertainties about what would they do next. The military administration also suppressed the political protest, harassed unions and fired the pro-opposition university professors. Nevertheless, the most important policy 1943 coup makers followed was to make religious instruction compulsory in public schools.²⁰⁸

During this period, the 1943 coup d'état provided a political environment for Juan Domingo Peron who dominated Argentine politics for decades to become popular and prominent.²⁰⁹ Under military rule in 1943 Peron was first appointed as the head of Department of Labor (which later became a ministry). Later, Peron became Minister of War controlling the two most important groups in Argentina, the labor and the army. Then, he came to the position of vice presidency.²¹⁰ In short, Peron controlled the most mobilized and most effective strata of Argentine politics and society. Holding three posts provided him both power and fame during this period.

The liberation of Paris from Germans in August 1944 influenced the Argentines to demand for returning constitutional government and elections. During the last years of military period, the military government was divided into two

²⁰⁷ Rock, 1930, pp. 219-221.

²⁰⁸ Romero, pp. 91-92.

²⁰⁹ Juan Domingo Peron was born in 1895 and joined the military in his youth. Before 1943 coup, he was also an active soldier in politics during 1930 military intervention. He was one of the foremost figures of secret logia, United Officers Group (*Grupo de Oficiales Unidos*), which was a nationalist secret society and the major group behind the 1943 coup. Paul H. Lewis, **The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism**, Cape Hill and London, The University of North Carolina Press, 1992, pp. 129-132.

²¹⁰ Rock, 1930, pp. 226-232.

groups as Peronist and anti-Peronist. When the military administration found itself challenged by Peron, the generals sent him to prison and set a date for elections.²¹¹ However, the working class did not accept the imprisonment of their beloved Peron and took the streets of south Buenos Aires, Tucuman, Cordoba, Rosario and La Plata. They demanded Peron's release and demonstrated their hatred against elites by attacking the symbolic places of elites such as the Jockey Club, university buildings, banks, newspaper offices as well as the faculty members. Hundreds of thousands of workers and their families gathered in Plaza de Mayo to protest Peron's imprisonment and as a result the government released Peron on the night of October 17, 1945.²¹²

Besides the military, now the Argentine politics were divided into two factions: Peronistas and anti-Peronistas. Peronistas, under the leadership of Peron, joined the elections in 1946 with Labor Party (*Partido Laborista*) with the support of dissident Radicals (UCR-*Junta Renovadora* [Renewal]) and the Catholic Church. Anti-Peronistas, on the other hand, established a coalition which was named as Democratic Union (*Union Democratica*-UD) and was consisted of UCR, conservative National Democratic Party, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party. Peron gained 53.7 per cent of the votes and a massive majority in upper and lower houses.²¹³ After three years of military rule, once again military returned to their barracks and civilians started to rule Argentina.

5. Return to Democracy: 1946-1955

Juan Peron took the presidency on February, 24, 1946. The Peronism the new formal ideology of Argentina supported a top-down state structure which organized all strata of people by creating social organizations or unions in order to control masses and weaken communism or other leftist ideas to maintain order.²¹⁴ As a result of 1930 military administration's import substitution economic model, the migration

²¹¹ Rock, 1930, p. 237.

²¹² J. C. Brown, pp. 203-204.

²¹³ Rock, 1930, p. 239. Mark P. Jones, Martín Lauga, and Marta León-Roesch, "Argentina", **Elections in the Americas A Data Handbook Volume II South America**, (Ed. Dieter Nohlen), Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, p. 110.

²¹⁴ Grimson and Kessler, pp. 12-13.

from the rural areas to the urban created a new working class population. This urban working class consisted Peronism's social basis.²¹⁵

Soon after the elections Peron dealt with internal party problems and later internal conflicts by using federal intervention card. He removed the dissent labor leaders from power, started controlling labor unions and suppressed the opposition, the Supreme Court, universities, and media. He also started the modernization of the military by increasing the military budget. Overall, Peron actually set an authoritarian regime in which he controlled the upper and lower houses of Argentina.²¹⁶ The new 1949 Peronist constitution approved the re-election of the president. This was simply a plan of Peron for prolonging his presidency. After the promulgation of new constitution, Peron immediately demanded an election in which he received 63.5 per cent of the votes.²¹⁷

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Argentina managed to recover its economy from the damages of the war increasing the industrial production and employment. However, this state sponsored economic development finally came to an end with increasing budget deficit and massive inflation. As a result Peron government implemented austerity measures and froze the wages and prices for two years. They also accepted the foreign investments with the Law of Capital Investment foreign investments. Nevertheless, none of these measures were able to solve the economic problems.²¹⁸

During last three years of Peron, Argentine politics were highly polarized. Death of his wife Eva Peron (a prominent political figure) from cancer in 1952 was a massive blow to Juan Peron. Later, Juan Peron's power struggle with the Catholic Church turned into a chaos. Peron in an attempt to separate the state and the Church cut the subsidies of Catholic schools, arrested priests and closed churches. He made sure that the state-controlled media was not influenced by the church. As a result, the Catholic Church joined dissident university students who had been making

²¹⁵ Peronism in some ways was similar to Italian fascism and German National-Socialism, which Peron himself experienced during his mission as a military attaché in Italy and Germany between 1939 and 1941. However, he did not label himself as communist or capitalist but *justicialista*. The basic principles of Peronism were economic independence, political sovereignty, and social justice. Oelsner, p. 385.

²¹⁶ Juan Carlos Torre and Liliana De Riz, "Argentina Since 1946", **Argentina Since Independence**, (Ed. Leslie Bethell), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 245-247. Jones, et. al., p. 61.

²¹⁷ Jones, et. al., p. 110.

²¹⁸ Romero, pp. 103-104, 121. Torre and De Riz, pp. 257-258.

demonstrations since 1954. In June 1955, anti-Peronist navy and air forces bombed the demonstration of thousands of Peronist workers and killing of 156 people. When the workers resorted to arms, the military suppressed them even more violently.²¹⁹

This chaotic atmosphere led to the resignation of Peron. Although the working class tried to bring him back to power, the military did not permit this. The repressive and populist policies of Peron, the massive political polarization among the Peronist government, the Catholic Church, working class, and students, coincided with the economic crisis. As a result, on September 16, 1955 the military intervened into politics once again under the command of General Eduardo Lonardi. Peron took refuge in the Paraguayan Embassy and on September 23 and General Lonardi declared himself as the provisional president.²²⁰

6. 1955 Coup D'état

Similar to the previous coups, disagreements among hardliner and moderate officers showed themselves. Only two months after the coup the hardliners forced General Lonardi to resign and brought General Pedro Aramburu as the new president. Despite the disagreements, they shared one common goal: war against Peronism. The new junta intervened in the pro-Peronist unions in order control them, jailed some of the union leaders and workers and fired others. Pro-Peronist military members received early retirement. In order to discredit Peron and his family, the junta displayed their assets. The Peronist Party was closed and using Peronist symbols was banned. The Peronist 1949 constitution was abolished and 1853 constitution was reinstalled.²²¹

The new military junta had to deal with economic crisis inherited from Peronist government. In order to cope with the crisis the military government took austerity measures, joined the IMF and the World Bank. They executed opening policies without totally giving up the ISI model. During the new bipolar international environment the junta eventually sided with Western block. They opened Argentine

²¹⁹ Torre and De Riz, p. 261-262. J. C. Brown, p. 213. Romero, p. 129. For the influence and power of Eva Peron see John T. Deiner, "Eva Peron and the Roots of Political Instability in Argentina", **Civilisations**, Vol: 23, No: 3, 1973, pp. 195-212.

²²⁰ Torre and De Riz, p. 262. Romero, p. 130.

²²¹ Romero, pp. 131, 135. J. C. Brown, pp. 218-219. Torre and De Riz, p. 263.

economy to foreign investment and modernized its structure. In order to do this they attempted to curb the powers of labor unions. The pro-Peronist labor and former military members who were frequently rebelling were usually suppressed harshly by the military.²²²

Restoration of civilian rule in 1957, brought pro-Peronists and anti-Peronists struggle back to the political scene. Interestingly enough, the candidate for Peronist heritage Arturo Frondizi came from UCR, and the anti-Peronists met under the leadership of Ricardo Balbin. The UCR divided into two parties, Balbin's supporters joined together as Radical Civic Union of the People (*Union Civica Radical del Pueblo*-UCRP) and Frondizi's as Intransigent Radical Civic Union (*Union Civica Radical Intransigentes*-UCRI).²²³ Frondizi won the 1958 elections, gaining 49.3 per cent of the votes and Balbin came second with 31.7 per cent of the votes.²²⁴ After almost two years, the military once again returned their barracks.

7. Return to Democracy: 1957-1962

Although pro-Peronist Frondizi's victory disappointed the military, they did not directly intervene in the aftermath of the elections. Rather they tried to control the Frondizi's presidency by using their strong military tutelage. As soon as Frondizi came to power he removed the ban on Peronist activities and the junta's decree on unions, granted amnesty law and increased the general wage.²²⁵

Once the strong anti-Peronist General Toranzo Montero became commander-in-chief in June 1959, he forced the Minister of War to resign. Frondizi accepted army's demands in order to avoid another intervention. Moreover, 1959 Cuban Revolution brought the threat of Communism to Argentina. Military designed the Conintes Plan to fight Communism. This plan gave power to army for fighting against communists, subordinated the provincial police to military, and approved the trial of civilians by military courts. In addition, in October 1960, the Chief of General

²²² Romero, pp. 133-135. Torre and De Riz, p. 263.

²²³ Romero, p. 139. Torre and De Riz, pp. 269-270.

²²⁴ Jones et. al., p. 110.

²²⁵ Torre and De Riz, p. 272.

Staff issued a memorandum which accused the government for tolerating the Communism and Peronism.²²⁶

Frondizi government's borrowed votes from Peron and the military's strong tutelage on him made Frondizi weak *vis-à-vis* the military.²²⁷ When Frondizi tried to find the ways for political maneuvering he failed. President Frondizi secretly met Che Guevara to mediate the US-Cuba relationship in 1961. The military strongly opposed these initiatives and forced Frondizi to fire his foreign minister and condemn the communism in Cuba. During the Organizations of American States (OAS) meeting in January 1962 the new foreign minister abstained on the motion on the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS. The military was disappointed and ordered President Frondizi to break up the relations with Cuba. Frondizi desperately obeyed the military's order.²²⁸

Meanwhile, economy was in crisis undermining Frondizi's power. Frondizi's weak legitimacy, which was borrowed from Peron, as well as his relations with communist states and soft attitudes against communists, coupled the economic crisis frustrated the Argentine military. Frondizi's failure in the provincial elections of March 1962 gave the military the power to initiate the 1962 coup by removing Peronist governors and Frondizi from power.²²⁹

8. 1962 Coup D'état

The military junta installed the head of the Congress, Jose Maria Guido, as president, dissolved the Congress and used federal intervention in provinces and took austerity measures.²³⁰ However, the military itself also became politically too polarized that led to bloody clashes. On the one side there were the *Azules* (blues) a moderate faction, had been supporting the negotiations with labor unions and had been trying to find a solution like "Peronism without Peron". On the other side there were *Colorados* (reds), the hardliners that aimed to assume total control and total

²²⁶ Torre and De Riz, pp. 279-280.

²²⁷ Romero, p. 144.

²²⁸ Torre and De Riz, pp. 281-282.

²²⁹ Torre and De Riz, p. 283.

²³⁰ Torre and De Riz, pp. 285-286.

suppression of Peronism and labor movements.²³¹ After almost a year of tug-of-war between two factions, the moderate *Azules* prevailed over hardliners and they took the election decision. One and a half year of military period again ended.

The elections were held on July 7, 1963. Radical Civic Union of the People, UCRP candidate Arturo Illia won the elections with 31.9 per cent of the votes. However, the blank votes, which were a Peronist symbol to protest elections, were more than the votes of the other candidate, UCRI's Oscar Alende. 1955 coup's leader General Aramburu became third with 9.5 per cent of the votes.²³² Another civilian period started for Argentina.

9. Return to Democracy: 1963-1966

As soon as Illia came to office he started working on two tasks. First one was reconciliation with Peronism and Peronist labor unions and second one was terminating contracts of foreign oil companies in the name of national sovereignty. President Illia while achieving his second task, failed in the first one because the labor opposition was stronger than before.²³³

The response of workers and unions to President Illia and to the *Azules* for reconciliation was factory occupations that took place in May and June 1964. 11,000 factories were occupied and almost 4 million workers attended these occupations. By the end of 1964, Peronist unions organized "Operation Return" of Peron to bring him back to Argentina. Peron left Madrid but could not enter Argentina, went to Brazil. The idea of "Peronism without Peron" became popular. Peron sent his third wife Isabel Peron to Argentina to intervene the conflict.²³⁴

President Illia government continued ISI policy in economy. The National Development Council was established in 1963 for planned economy and development. However, despite the relative success in early years of Illia administration the endemic regular economic crisis of Argentina had continued with a rise in inflation, deficits in balance of payments and foreign debt.²³⁵

²³¹ J. C. Brown, p. 220.

²³² Jones et. al., p. 111.

²³³ Torre and De Riz, pp. 290-292.

²³⁴ Romero, pp. 150-152.

²³⁵ Romero, pp. 153-156.

In 1965 Chief of General Staff Onganía declared the Doctrine of National Security. According to the doctrine, army should act as the guarantor of the nation's supreme values, which were Western and Christian values, and take action when these were threatened. Moreover, according to General Onganía, the menace against the Argentine state and society was communism. For General Onganía, functions of the Argentine army were "to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation, preserve the moral and spiritual values of western and Christian civilization, and ensure public order and internal peace".²³⁶

The changing international environment and new trends both in politics and social life inevitably affected Argentina in that era. Argentina was also going through a social transformation during this period. A new middle class emerged as a result of new education systems. Argentine lifestyle had been changing by new trends in worldwide. The new debates emerged through university circles and universities became the field for new thoughts. The new left emerged in that period thanks to the worldwide debates on Marxism and Cuban revolutionary experiment very close to Argentina. All of these trends had been shaking Argentine traditional society's foundations.²³⁷

²³⁶ Romero, p. 152. Torre and De Riz, p. 294.

²³⁷ Romero, pp. 159-168. There are two specific examples of new trends peculiar to Latin America. First one is liberation theology. As Michael Löwy argued, it is hard to make a precise definition of liberation theology but we can emphasize some of its aspects. First of all, the liberation theology supports fighting against idolatry not atheism and the contemporary idolatries were "Mammon, Wealth, the Market, National Security, the State, Military Force", and so on. Secondly, liberation theology supports "new reading of the Bible" with using "Marxism as a social-analytical instrument in order to understand the causes of poverty, the contradictions of capitalism and the forms of class struggle". Thirdly, supporters of liberation theology are sided with poor and in solidarity with "their struggle for self-liberation". Lastly, liberation theology argues "the development of Christian base communities among the poor as a new form of Church and as an alternative to the individualist way of life imposed by the capitalist system". The institutional base of liberation theology took its roots from the Third World Bishops meeting in 1967 and Latin American Bishops' Council meeting in Medellín, Colombia in 1968. (Michael Löwy, **The War of Gods Religion and Politics in Latin America**, Verso, London and New York, 1996, pp. 32-35.) The other example is structuralism and dependency theories. Structuralism emerged as a response to the economic liberalism which borrowed its theoretical base from Marxism-Leninism. According to Raúl Prebisch, Argentine leading theorist of structuralism, the underdevelopment of Latin America is as a result of its peripheral status in the centre-periphery relations and the surplus labour problem. For Prebisch "the only way for Latin American countries to escape their disadvantaged position and hence underdevelopment was to reform the structure of their economies by creating industries and so relying less on the production of primary products". (Gavin O'Toole, **Politics in Latin America**, Pearson, Essex, 2007, pp. 423-425.) Dependency theorists argue that the underdevelopment of Latin America is a result of capitalist system and the only solution to underdevelopment is "radical and immediate transformation of the social structures toward socialism". (Ramon Grosfoguel, "Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America", **Nepantla: Views from South**, Vol: 1, No: 2, 2000, p. 358.)

In sum, President Illia and his government were too weak to stand against those changes, economic crisis, labor mobilization, and military power. During the congressional elections in March 1965, Illia lost his majority in congress showing his weakness. Economic crisis turned into political crisis leading to a new coup d'état.²³⁸

10. 1966 Coup D'état

On June 26, 1966, the Argentine army once again directly intervened in the civilian politics. On June 28, a revolutionary junta was formed, president, vice-president, the members of the Supreme Court, the governors and all elected persons were dismissed. Congress and other legislative branches were dissolved. All political parties were banned. The resigned General Onganía became the president of the new junta.²³⁹

The new junta first attempted to strengthen the economy security, and scientific research.²⁴⁰ According to the military the roots of all evil were the universities and therefore, they ended the university autonomy and placed the universities under the control of Ministry of Interior. Massive censorship and repression started against "free life" including miniskirt, long hair, free love, and pornography. In order to run state companies effectively some measures were taken first in port of Buenos Aires, later in railroads and sugar mills in Tucuman. The labor that reacted against these measures was repressed violently.²⁴¹

First crisis that emerged in the junta administration was President Onganía's dismissal of all the commanders in chief. General Alejandro Lanusse became the new Chief of General Staff.²⁴² Yet, the major blow came from the uprisings in the city of Cordoba in May 1969. The uprising of university students merging with labor activism in May 1969 led to the general strike of local unions. Later students and workers as well as ordinary citizens took the control of downtown of Cordoba. The local police was ineffective to suppress the *Cordobazo* riot. Finally the army intervened in the riot leading to the casualties of twenty and injury of hundreds of

²³⁸ Torre and De Riz, p. 296.

²³⁹ Torre and De Riz, pp. 296-299.

²⁴⁰ Romero, p. 174.

²⁴¹ Torre and De Riz, p. 300. Romero, p. 175.

²⁴² Torre and De Riz, p. 305.

people. Similar uprisings had also taken place in Rosario, Cipoletti, Neuquén, General Roca, Mendoza, Chaco, Misiones, and Formosa.²⁴³

Similar to Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s, first guerrilla organizations were organized in Argentina. Specific to Argentina, these organizations claimed that the only way to get rid of this authoritarian regime was armed struggle and they had a good example: Cuban Revolution. From extreme left to leftist Peronism, the guerrilla organizations was founded at that period such as Peronist Armed Forces (*Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas*), *Descamisados*, Revolutionary Armed Forces (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias-FAR*), Armed Forces of Liberty (*Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion*), *Montoneros*, Revolutionary Army of the People (*Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo-ERP*), Revolutionary Workers Party (*Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores*). They had a dramatic impact on Argentine politics. *Montoneros*, leftist Peronist armed organization, kidnapped and executed former president General Aramburu in May 1970. FAR occupied Garin town in Buenos Aires province and *Montoneros* occupied La Calera in Cordoba province. They also targeted famous people, businessmen, high-ranging generals, union leaders.²⁴⁴

The kidnapping and execution of Aramburu brought the end of Onganía's presidency and he was replaced with an unknown general Rodolfo Levingston. During his period, economic and political crisis continued. In November 1970 all of the factions of political parties in Argentina from Peronists to Radicals founded a coalition called "*Hora del Pueblo*" (Time of People) which had demanded returning democratic rule. In March 1971 another *Cordobazo* forced Levingston to end his term. General Alejandro Lanusse was appointed as president but now the military junta was aware that they could no longer hold against the democratic demands.²⁴⁵

The military now accepted that without excluding Peron and Peronism from political scene they would achieve nothing. For the first time since 1955, the military leaders were ready to negotiate with Peron. Moreover, most of the armed resistance and liberation theology had been identifying themselves with Peronism. In November 1972, Peron returned Argentina after 17 years and stayed in the country

²⁴³ Romero, pp. 180-183.

²⁴⁴ Romero, p. 189-190.

²⁴⁵ Torre and De Riz, pp. 308-311.

for several weeks. He established Peronist coalition for March 1973 elections and named Hector Campora as Peronist coalition's presidential candidate.²⁴⁶ After seven years of military regime Argentina was once again returned civilian rule.

In sum, Argentina that was established on the heritage of colonial rule of Spain in the South America received the patrimonialist spirit of Spanish Kingdom. Struggles against colonial rule led the establishment of Argentina by army and *caudillos*. This militaristic culture continued in the later periods and when a political crisis emerged the military did not hesitate to intervene into civilian politics. Following the transition to multiparty system at the beginning of 1900s, the military kept its privileged and dominant position. When economic and political and economic crisis became unbearable, the polarization increased, and civilians lost control on law and order, and Argentine army intervened in politics, as can be seen in the examples of 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, and 1966 coups.

The historical analysis of both Turkish and Argentinean civil military relations clearly shows the dominant and privileged positions of both Turkish and Argentine military. In both countries the administration and the military forces were used as personal instruments of the sultans and the kings. Both Ottoman Empire and Spanish Kingdom had their external support of patrimonial power as both slave or colony subjects and mercenary bodyguards. Both militaries took over from the German tradition of being loyal to the state and the nation more than to a specific government or administration. As a result both Turkish and Argentinean army became a tool of national unification and modernization.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁶ Torre and De Riz, pp. 311-314.

²⁴⁷ Frederick M. Nunn, "Effects of European Military Training in Latin America: The Origins and Nature of Professional Militarism in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, 1890-1940", **Military Affairs**, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1975, p. 1. Warren Schiff, "The Influence of the German Armed Forces and War Industry on Argentina, 1880, 1914", **The Hispanic American Historical Review**, Vol. 52, No. 3,

The historical role and dominant positions had provided a great leverage for Turkish and Argentine army to intervene into politics. They had always been actively involved in daily politics. When the time came to “protect the nation and state” they were ready to intervene. They were the founders of modern Turkey and modern Argentina and they did not have an intention to abandon their status. The military coups in both countries followed the same pattern. Both militaries intervened into politics when the fragile and incompetent governments could not stop the polarization (usually between the right and the left) in the country and resolve the economic crises. However, in the restorations of civilian rules both militaries were disappointed with the new results, i.e. new politicians that came to power and in a short time (in Turkey a little longer) intervened again. While these interventions continued in Turkey throughout the 1990s, in Argentina the dominant role of military was controlled in the restoration of elections in the aftermath of the 1976 coup.

1972, pp. 442-443. Nasser Momayezi, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”, **International Journal on World Peace**, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1998, p. 4.

CHAPTER THREE

1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN TURKEY AND 1976 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ARGENTINA AND ITS AFTERMATH

Both Turkey and Argentina had gone through a series of military interventions. However, among these coups 1980 coup in Turkey and 1976 coup in Argentina have been the most significant military interventions that established turning points in the political life of these countries. In Turkey, despite the return to civilian rule in 1983, following the 1980 coup, military expanded its power and tutelage over the civilian politics and has remained prominent in politics until the mid-2000s. Meanwhile in Argentina following the return to civilian politics in the aftermath of 1976 coup the military gradually lost its power and prestige and eventually stepped back from civilian politics.

This chapter in an attempt to examine the 1980 coup in Turkey and 1976 Coup in Argentina will concentrate on the issues such as political, economic and social factors including labor and student mobilization in both countries. Samuel Huntington's "praetorian society" concept can analyze the political developments of Turkey and Argentina comprehensively. Huntington argues that if there is lack of strong and adaptable political institutions, rise in participation demands and political mobilization may cause instability and violence.²⁴⁸ In both Turkey and Argentina, the political institutionalization was not able to absorb the political mobilization after they were established as modern states. Both countries were firstly ruled by authoritarian regimes and later entered into periods of crisis in which they experienced corruption, bribing, nepotism, patron-client relations, riots and strikes that led to violence and finally military coups. This chapter examines these political forces as well as the economic ups and downs and their affects to the political order

²⁴⁸ Huntington points out two kinds of polities which are "praetorian polities" and "civic polities". Praetorian polities take place in political systems that have low levels of institutionalization and high levels of participation in which social forces using their own methods act directly in the political sphere. Civic polities are the political systems with a high ratio of institutionalization to participation. As a result of the absence of enough political institutionalization for absorbing the political mobilization, the society finds its own ways to bring pressure on authority. This mainly appears when the corruption among the politicians, bribing among the wealthy become common and the workers strike, students riot, mobs' violence increase. All of these lead to military interventions into politics, in other words the coups. Samuel Huntington, **Political Order in Changing Societies**, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1973, (Order), pp. 47, 80, 196, 212.

that led to the military interventions. Moreover, it will also concentrate on the restrictions that were implemented on political rights and civil liberties as well as the violations of human rights both in Turkey and Argentina during the coup periods. The chapter will be concluded with an examination of the periods of transition to democracy in both countries by focusing on the institutional changes. It will mainly try to show how the military's impact on civilian politics continued in Turkey while the military was subordinated to the civilian rule through trials of the military.

I. 1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN TURKEY AND ITS AFTERMATH

The 12 September 1980 military intervention was the longest and the most brutal takeover of the armed forces in Turkish political life. During its three year tenure, 49 people were executed and thousands of people were arrested and tortured.²⁴⁹ Moreover, labor unions and political parties were closed and political leaders were imprisoned. Although Turkey had gone through two military interventions in 1960 and 1971, 1980 coup was different from the other two coups due to its length and the number of people that were punished. While some of the rightists were arrested and executed during the coup, the 1980 intervention actually mainly targeted the leftist ideology, parties, as well as illegal organizations.

A. The Chaos Years of 1970s

Throughout the 1970s, Turkish political life witnessed political unrest, strikes, student demonstrations, corruption allegations, and lastly the armed clashes between leftist guerrillas and rightist militants. On March 12, 1971, the Chief of General staff issued a memorandum and overthrew the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and replaced the government with a technocratic government under its domination. The military government declared martial law and started operations mainly against the leftist organizations as well as some rightist political groups. Finally, Turkey returned to civilian rule with the 1973 elections which actually led the country to a period of vulnerable coalition governments and chaos in the country.

²⁴⁹ Hüsnü Öndül, "12 Eylül ve Hak İhlalleri", **Bianet**, 13.09.2007, <http://bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/101757-12-eyul-ve-hak-ihlalleri>, (13.03.2014).

1. CHP-MSP Coalition: Strange Bed-fellows

During the period of 1973-1980, one of the most unstable periods of Turkish Republic, none of the parties were able to gain the majority of the seats in the government. Therefore, ten successive governments consisted of unstable coalition governments with the help of radical and extremist parties were established. Such vulnerable coalitions led Turkish politics into fragmentation. 1971 coup was not able to resolve the problems encountered by the parliamentary democracy in the late 1960s. In the first elections held in the aftermath of technocratic governments in October 1973 Republican Peoples Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*-CHP) under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit managed to establish a coalition government with a contrasting party, conservative Islamist National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*-MSP). A CHP-AP grand coalition that was expected by the President, the business community, and the army was not realized.²⁵⁰

During this period CHP had gone through a significant transformation. Its new young leader Ecevit, who replaced veteran İnönü, moved the party from an elitist party to center of left, bringing the votes of people in working class. CHP started receiving votes from less developed regions as well as the squatters (*gecekondu* in Turkish) which were heavily populated with people that moved from small villages to the big cities in order to have better living standards.²⁵¹

Such a vulnerable coalition between Atatürk's party CHP, that defended the Kemalist reforms particularly secularism, and MSP, supporting Islamist values from the beginning, had experienced tensions. Apart from following an anti-American foreign policy, these parties did not have much in common. The first two significant policies followed by the coalition government were the revoking of the poppy

²⁵⁰ William Hale, **Turkish Politics and the Military**, Routledge, London and New York, 1994, (Turkish), p. 215. In the 1973 general elections, Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*-CHP) gained 33.3 per cent of the ballot; Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*-AP) came second under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel by winning 29.8 per cent of the votes. Democratic Party (*Demokratik Parti*-DP) and the radical Islamist National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*-MSP) received 11.9 and 11.8 per cent of the votes respectively while the Republican Reliance Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi*-CGP) and Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*-MHP) received 5.3 and 3.4 percent of the votes. See Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, **History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1977, p. 406.

²⁵¹ Feroz Ahmad, **The Making of Modern Turkey**, Routledge, London and New York, 1993, p. 159.

cultivation ban²⁵² and granting of an amnesty to political prisoners who were put in prison during the 1960 and 1971 military interventions.²⁵³

The major disagreement between the coalition partners emerged during the Cyprus crisis. Cyprus crisis was the result of Greeks' *enosis* (unification) idea to annex the island to Greece without taking the Turkish population living on the island into consideration. The crisis reached to a peak point when the attacks from Greek militias to Turkish villagers increased under the rule of Nikos Samson in 1974. Moreover, the conferences and negotiations held in London and Washington did not reach to a conclusion. As a result, Turkish government under CHP-MSP coalition sent troops to Cyprus in July 1974. The continuation of the clashes between the two communities left the conference held in Geneva inconclusive and forced Turkish army to launch a second attack in August 1974. This second attack brought reactions from the international community, particularly the USA implementing an arms embargo in February 1975.²⁵⁴

Concerning the Cyprus crisis while Prime Minister Ecevit was only interested in rescuing the Turkish villages that were under the attack of Greek armed organizations, vice-Prime Minister Erbakan supported a hardliner policy and demanded the invasion of the whole island. In addition, the economic sanctions by

²⁵² Since 1969, Nixon government in the US launched a war against production of drugs. The US administration wanted Turkey to ban the poppy cultivation since 1969. Demirel led governments of the time resisted this pressure since the ban would harm the Turkish economy. However, military controlled government led by Nihat Erim accepted the US demand and banned the poppy cultivation in June 1971. (Çağrı Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Vol: 1, (Ed. Baskın Oran), 12th Edition, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, pp. 702-703.)

²⁵³ Ahmad, pp. 162-163.

²⁵⁴ Cyprus was occupied by Britain in 1878 and annexed to Turkey following the Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923. However, Greek governments during the 1940s and 1950s returned to their *Megali Idea*. (a nationalist utopia that included establishing a Greek state on the territories of Greek populated lands by including Cyprus). Thus, the political struggle started in the second half of 1940s and turned into an armed conflict between Greek and Turkish population. Diplomatic initiatives started in 1955 and an independent Republic of Cyprus was established following the signing of Treaties of Zürich and London in 1959 and 1960. Britain, Greece and Turkey were indicated as guarantor states of Cyprus in these agreements. Leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities, Archbishop Makarios and Fazıl Küçük were elected as president and vice-president, respectively. However, the struggle between two communities never ended and eventually turned back to armed conflict in 1964. In April 1967, a coup d'état was launched in Greece and a military junta came to power. Meanwhile the armed clashes between two communities peaked and Administration of Provisional Turkish Cyprus was founded at the end of 1967. For details see Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Vol: 1, (Ed. Baskın Oran), 12th Edition, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, (Yunan), pp. 594-610, 719-738, 741-747. Erhan, pp. 704-706.

the USA caused a significant economic crisis in the country. Prime Minister Ecevit enjoying his victory on the Cyprus crisis in the eyes of the Turkish public started to undermine Erbakan's position as the vice-prime minister. Such conflicts eventually led Ecevit to give an end to the coalition government in September 1974. Ecevit was hoping to come to power on his own. However, new elections were not accepted by the small parties who already had representatives in the parliament. When Ecevit's attempts to establish a coalition government with other parties failed, President Fahri Korutürk assigned the leader of the opposition party, Demirel, to form a new government.

As stated by Hale this was the longest governmental crisis in modern history of Turkey. It lasted for 241 days. Eventually AP leader Demirel managed to form a new coalition government that was consisted of all the shades of right including the nationalist National Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*-MHP), Islamist National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*-MSP) and more moderate right Republican Reliance Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi*-CGP). This coalition government which was called Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe*-MC) started a new chaotic period in the history of Turkey.²⁵⁵

2. Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe*) Governments

The first MC government that stayed in power for 27 months did not bring much political stability to the country since it resorted to nepotism, favoritism, corruption, and suppression of the opposition. Rather than ending the division between the extreme left and right, they actually accelerated the polarization. During this period nepotism could be observed in every level of the state apparatus including the Turkish Radio and Television, the main information agency, the Anatolian Agency, the main news agency, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Customs. Many government employees were replaced with party sympathizers. The nationalists under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş as the junior members of the

²⁵⁵ Ahmad, p. 176. Hale, Turkish, pp. 218-220. Eric C. Zürcher, **Turkey: A Modern History**, 7th Edition, I. B. Tauris, London and New York, 2005, p. 261.

coalition government integrated the Grey Wolves (*Bozkurtlar*), ultra-rightist militants of MHP, into the state apparatus. By doing so, MHP legitimized their attacks.²⁵⁶

This period witnessed a variety of crisis including State Security Courts (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri-DGM*)²⁵⁷ protests and strikes organized by Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (*Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-DİSK*), physical attacks by the right-wing paramilitary groups of MHP to the opposition leader Ecevit. As a result of these political crises Prime Demirel resigned and early elections were held in June 1977.²⁵⁸

However, two significant attacks had taken place just before the elections. The first one was an attack to the demonstrations in Taksim square on the 1st of May 1977 and the second one was an assassination attempt to Ecevit during his election campaign. In the 1977 elections although Ecevit's CHP received the highest number of votes (41.4 percent), while Demirel's AP came second (36.9 per cent), Ecevit needed 13 more representatives to establish a government on his own. As a result, Ecevit established a minority government that did not receive vote of confidence. Consequently, Demirel took over the job of establishing the government once again with the help of nationalist and religious rightist parties, MHP and MSP, respectively.

Establishment of the second MC government once again increased the instability in the country leading to the rise of violence between the rightist and leftists. In this context, while the right held the upper hand in politics having the chance to be represented in the parliament, the left was in a weaker position without receiving any kind of political protection. The government lost its control over the violence on the streets. The compromises given to the leader of Islamist party Erbakan and increased role of nationalist party Türkeş in the government annoyed members of the moderate-rightist AP. The resignation of eleven AP representatives from the parliament brought the end of the second MC government. This time Ecevit formed a new government by recruiting ten independent members of the parliament

²⁵⁶ Hale, Turkish, p. 220. Ahmad, p. 166. Zürcher, p. 261.

²⁵⁷ DGMs were special courts established during the 1971-1973 military period. The Constitutional Court of Turkey annulled the status of DGMs on October 11, 1975. However, the rightist MC government wanted to re-establish DGMs within a year and this caused a reaction from the Turkish working class. See: "1973-1980 Arasında İşçi Hareketleri", **Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi**, Vol: 7, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1988, p. 2289.

²⁵⁸ Hale, Turkish, p. 221.

who resigned from the governing parties. During this period the political instability and crisis led to economic instability forcing Turkey to receive Western aid including an agreement with the IMF.²⁵⁹

Towards the end of 1978, the political violence reached to its peak point with the attack of the ultra-rightists to *Alevi*s (a kind of Anatolian Shia sect who are considered as leftists) leading to the death of 150 people in the city of Maraş.²⁶⁰ Such atrocities forced the government to declare martial law in many cities including Istanbul and heavily Kurdish populated south-eastern part of the country. When Ecevit government failed in the 1979 senate elections, he resigned and once again Demirel took over the power. This time he established a minority government. In the atmosphere of significant political and economic crises a minority government was too vulnerable to rule the chaotic political life in the country.²⁶¹

As a result of governmental instability and the chaos on the streets, Chief of General Staff, Kenan Evren, held a meeting with his commanders on December 13, 1979, where he discussed the anarchy and economic crisis in the country. While the Generals rejected a full-scale military coup, they were sure that a March 12 formula that was consisted of sending a memorandum was not going to bring a solution to the disastrous situation of the country. Upon sending a warning letter to President Korutürk, the military wanted the political leaders to cooperate to restore order. One of the last crises that accelerated the military's decision to intervene was the presidential election crisis. Following the completion of the term of President Korutürk, after the 115 rounds of voting in the Assembly a president was not elected. In addition, the interpellation for the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hayrettin Erkmen and the anti-secular policies followed by Erbakan increased the concern of the military. Erbakan, who refused to attend the annual Victory Day parade on August 30, 1980, led a mass meeting in Konya on September 6. In this meeting his supporters called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Turkey. On the same day the Konya meeting were held, Ecevit called the petroleum workers to start a strike. This call was considered by the military as an invitation of the workers to start

²⁵⁹ Ahmad, pp. 169-170. Zürcher, p. 268.

²⁶⁰ Abdullah Kılıç and Ayça Örer, "Maraş Katliamı MİT Planıydı", **Radikal**, 22.12.2011, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/maras_katliami_mit_planiydi-1073231, (15.03.2014).

²⁶¹ Hale, Turkish, p. 231.

protests on the streets. These were the last straws for the military to start its intervention.²⁶²

Consequently, on the 12th of September 1980 Turkish Armed Forces under the leadership of Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren intervened into politics in order to bring stability to the country.

B. Economic and Political Factors Leading to 1980 Military Intervention

As already analyzed throughout the 1970s, Turkey found itself in serious economic and political crises. Neither 1973 nor 1977 general elections could bring stability and governability to Turkey. During this period both economic crisis and political instability led to the 1980 coup.

1. Economic Factors Leading to 1980 Military Intervention

While Turkey had a relatively stable economic structure between 1960 and 1970, starting in the 1970s, the country had gone through serious economic crises. Besides the failure of the unstable governments to deal with the economy, international factors such as the 1973-1974 oil crises also had a significant impact on this crisis. Although the First MC government under Demirel leadership was supposed to reduce the inflationary pressures by devaluating the Turkish Lira, restricting government expenditure, and increasing taxes, shortly, with the fear of losing votes, they moved the country into a disastrous economic situation.²⁶³

During the period of 1977-1980 these problems gradually got worse and fragile coalition or minority governments were incapable of resolving them. Hale summarizes this period as follows:

The inflation rate climbed to around 44 per cent in 1978, 68 per cent in 1979 and 107 per cent in 1980. On the foreign trade front, the balance-of-payments deficit rose to around \$1.4 billion in 1979 and \$3.4 billion in 1980. To cover these deficits, Turkey was forced to resort to massive foreign borrowing, often very high interest rates.

²⁶² Hale, Turkish, pp. 235-238.

²⁶³ Hale, Turkish, p. 223.

From a manageable \$1.9 billion in 1970, total outstanding foreign debts rose to \$11.4 billion in 1977 and \$14.6 billion in 1979. By 1979 debt interest payments plus amortization were equivalent to some 46 per cent of total foreign-currency earnings from exports and emigrants' remittances. ... The annual growth rate of GNP fell 2.9 per cent in 1978, ... 0.4 per cent in 1979, and 1.1 per cent in 1980.²⁶⁴

The chronic shortage of fuel, power cuts became a daily fact of life and interrupted the work in offices and factories. Fuel for generating power and heating and petrol for medicine did not exist. There were very frequent electricity cuts for many hours. Black marketing was common. People could not even find simple needs such as bulbs for electricity or margarine for cooking.²⁶⁵

The immigrant workers who went to Europe and particularly to Germany contributed to the Turkish economy for a while. A large number of people were employed in Germany during that period, 480.000 in 1970 and 800.000 in 1974.²⁶⁶ Their contribution helped Turkish economy in two ways. Firstly, the unemployment rate stayed in low levels and secondly the remittances of these immigrants injected wealth to Turkish economy. However, due to the recession in European economy and oil crisis, these countries stopped hiring Turkish workers.²⁶⁷

The most important economic event of this period was the January 24, 1980 decisions, a milestone not only for Turkish economy but also for the politics. The last Demirel government tried to find a way to end the economic crisis. Their solution was restructuring Turkish economy with the prevailing neoliberal rules. Demirel gave this task to Turgut Özal, a career technocrat who had close relationship with the business circles. Under Özal's guidance, the government took austerity measures and launched economic opening program. In short Demirel government abandoned the Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) economy and initiated the transition from a state-controlled economy to export oriented economy. However, implementation of these decisions was not possible in the chaotic political atmosphere of the period.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁴ Hale, Turkish, p. 223.

²⁶⁵ Hale, Turkish, p. 224.

²⁶⁶ Zürcher, p. 270.

²⁶⁷ Andrew Mango, **Turkey and the War on Terror For Forty Years We Fought Alone**, Routledge, London and New York, 2005, (War), p. 20.

²⁶⁸ Hale, Turkish, p. 234.

The collapse of the economic system affected the political structure and society leading to the 1980 military coup, but the effects of January 24 decisions should not be underestimated. As Ahmad argued, one of the aims of September 12 Junta was to provide a political environment to realize the January 24 decisions.²⁶⁹

2. Political Factors Leading to 1980 Military Intervention

Various political factors contributed to the initiation of 1980 military intervention. Among these the most significant one that brought political instability to the country throughout the 1970s was the establishment of the fragmented and vulnerable coalition governments. The second significant political factor that created chaos and violence in the country was the ideological, sectarian and ethnic polarization.²⁷⁰

The governments were fragmented and vulnerable since none of the parties were able to come to power as a single party. They were always forced to establish a coalition government as can be seen in the cases of CHP-MSP, AP-MSP-MHP-CGP and AP-MSP-MHP. The political parties in these coalition governments did not agree with each other concerning significant domestic and foreign policies. Therefore, there were always serious conflicts among them and making a decision was always difficult. The governments that did not come to power as coalition were the minority governments that usually had problem of receiving vote of confidence. As already analyzed, ten successive governments were formed in seven years and there were long periods which none of the governments were able to hold the majority support in the assembly. Moreover, the weak coalition governments did not last long. For example, while CHP-MSP coalition and Ecevit's minority governments lasted for ten months, the second MC government only lasted for five months. Changing ministers every five to ten months led the country to instability.

As a significant second political factor was the formation of polarized violence as a result of these unstable and fragile governments. Hale argues that there were three kinds of "political mainspring of the anarchical violence" in Turkey

²⁶⁹ Ahmad, p. 178.

²⁷⁰ The US policies towards the Middle East are also important in the Cold War context. However, this thesis mostly focused on internal factors that led to the 1980 military intervention in Turkey.

including ideological, sectarian and ethnic. Firstly, ideological violence was between the extreme left and ultra-right groups. Unlike the extreme left, ultra-rightist groups were supported by the rightist Turkish governments.²⁷¹ Moreover, the USA with the fear that Turkey would fall under the Soviet orbit was supporting the extreme rightists groups in Turkey.²⁷² Andrew Mango argues that extreme left was supported by the Soviet Union and its satellite states.²⁷³

As already analyzed, the 1971 military intervention suppressed leftist armed organizations, such as THKP-C, THKO, TİİKP, brutally. During the 1970s, numerous armed organizations were founded as successors of the earlier ones. Among these Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist*), People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey/Urgent Revolutionarists (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi Cephesi/Acilciler*), Organization for Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda (*Marksist-Leninist Silahlı Propaganda Birliği*), Revolutionary Path (*Devrimci Yol [Dev-Yol]*), and Revolutionary Left (*Devrimci Sol [Dev-Sol]*) were some of the organizations that were active during that period.²⁷⁴ On the rightist side, Grey Wolves (*Bozkurtlar*) and Association of Idealist Youth or Idealists in short (*Ülkücüler*) were the armed branch of the ultra-right that had connections with MHP. The struggle between the two groups was not only limited to the fights between each other. These extreme groups also assassinated the important public figures including Professors Orhan Yavuz, Bedrettin Cömert, Cavit Orhan Tütengil and Bedri Karafakioğlu, Public Prosecutor Doğan Öz, Mayor of Malatya Hamit Fendoğlu, journalist Abdi İpekçi, Police Chief of Adana Cevat Yurdakul, author Ümit Kafrancıoğlu, ex-leader of DİSK Kemal Türkler, ex-Prime Minister Nihat Erim and Vice Chairman of MHP Gün Sazak.²⁷⁵

All strata of Turkish people were hit by the political inspired terrorism executed by the extreme left and the ultra-right. In 1977, 231 people were killed and this number increased to 832 people just a year later. Between December 1978 and

²⁷¹ Hale, Turkish, pp. 224-225.

²⁷² Tim Jacoby, "Political Violence, the 'War on Terror' and the Turkish Military", **Critical Studies on Terrorism**, Vol: 3. No: 1, 2010, p. 101.

²⁷³ Mango, War, p 19.

²⁷⁴ Hüseyin Aykol, **Türkiye'de Sol Örgütler: Bölüne Bölüne Büyümek**, 2nd Edition, Phoenix, Ankara, 2010, pp. 61, 66-67, 71, 76-77,84-85.

²⁷⁵ Cengiz Erdiç, **Uğur Mumcu Suikastı ve Siyasal Cinayetler: Karanlığın Son Otuz Yılı**, Tempo, İstanbul, pp. 19-45.

September 1979, 898 people were killed. The political terror peaked between September 1979 and September 1980, in which 2812 people were killed. Moreover, the armed robbery and kidnapping became widespread political action.²⁷⁶

Secondly, there was a religious sectarian division in Turkey. There were serious clashes between Sunni (orthodox-Islam) and *Alevi*s. While these two groups had been living in peace until the 1970s (with the exception of some minor clashes), this had changed in the 1970s. The *Alevi*s mostly had supported the CHP and leftist parties and this made them a target to rightist-Sunni people who mainly supported MHP. The clashes started firstly in Malatya in April 1978, then in Sivas in September 1978, Bingöl in October 1978 and peaked in December 1978, when 109 people were killed and 170 were injured in a massacre in Kahramanmaraş. Another slaughter has taken place in Çorum in July 1980 in which 30 people were killed and a mass exodus of *Alevi*s had taken place.²⁷⁷

Thirdly, there was ethnic violence in Turkey. Kurdistan Workers Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*- PKK), which at the beginning was a Marxist Leninist organization but by time started supporting a separate socialist Kurdish state, was founded in 1978 under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan. As a result of clashes between the nationalist Turks and nationalist Kurds, 243 people were killed during the 1970s.²⁷⁸

Kemal Karpat argues that the political violence was the result of the social transformation, the immigration from the rural areas to the cities and establishment of the settlements of squatter houses in big cities. The rural people found it difficult to integrate themselves into city life and were alienated both from social and political system. As a result many of these young people from these poor shanty areas fell under the domination of both radical leftist and rightist groups. In this context, Doğu Ergil points out the high positive correlation between “violent political activism and both rural-urban migration and failure in the established educational cum socio-economic system”.²⁷⁹ Moreover, the armed organizations could easily find members in young population because youngsters did not have career prospects in economic

²⁷⁶ Hale, Turkish, p. 224.

²⁷⁷ Hale, Turkish, p. 225.

²⁷⁸ Hale, Turkish, p. 226.

²⁷⁹ Hale, Turkish, pp. 226-227.

crisis-stricken Turkey.²⁸⁰ Şerif Mardin argues that these clashes were the results of the cultural displacements experienced by the youth. The armed struggle was an output of traditional rural social behavior and modern extremist ideologies.²⁸¹

Another significant factor that accelerated the political violence was the irresponsible behaviors of the leaders of two major parties' Ecevit and Demirel. Instead of uniting against the chaotic environment, they always accused one another for the increasing violence. Rather than establishing a government together, they preferred to establish coalition governments with smaller extremist parties or form minority governments. As a result, they became depended on the support of extremist parties which had no concern of ending terrorism.²⁸²

Consequently, Turkey had experienced its most politically polarized period. Workers, students, teachers, academicians, even the police were polarized in the leftist-rightist conflict. Workers were divided and united, generally, in two major unions which are Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-TÜRK-İŞ*) and DİSK. Students, even the high school students, were highly politicized. While the leftist students were united mostly under the name of *Dev-Genç*, the rightist ones were gathered as *Ülkücüler*. Leftist teachers were in TÖB-DER and rightists were in ÜLKÜ-BİR. Moreover, in police forces, leftists were united under the name of POL-DER and rightists under POL-BİR. When a police that belonged to POL-DER arrested a leftist, he would release him quickly, while a police who is a member of rightists POL-BİR would keep him in custody.²⁸³ The polarization coupled with fragmentation led the country to violence.

The period between 1973 and 1980 was the most mobilized era for Turkish working class. Contrasting the period between 1963 and 1971 the number of strikes was doubled, the number of workers who attended to strikes rose three-fold and the number of days the strikes were held rose seven-fold. One could easily see that every worker from every business line were on strike. The most important strikes included the DGM strike in 1976 that influenced the parliament's decision to abolish the DGMs, Profilo workers' strike in 1976, Turkish Airlines workers' strike in 1978 (six

²⁸⁰ Zürcher, p. 263.

²⁸¹ Sabri Sayarı, "Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976-80: A Retrospective Analysis", **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol: 22, No: 2, 2010, p. 207.

²⁸² Hale, Turkish, p. 229.

²⁸³ Hale, Turkish, p. 228.

thousand workers attended), a “Warning to Fascism” strike in 1978 (almost a million workers stopped working on March 20), and Tarih (Figs, Raisins, Cotton and Oil Seeds Agricultural Sales Cooperatives Unions) workers’ strike in 1980. There was a lot of politicization among the labor unions. For example, DİSK supported CHP in every election including the general elections, senate elections, and local elections, between 1973 and 1980. However, DİSK was at odds with CHP in 1978, when Ecevit signed a Social Pact with TÜRK-İŞ about freezing the workers’ wage increase.²⁸⁴

To sum up, the period between 1973 and 1980 was the most unstable period of Turkey. The political structure, both inside and outside of the parliament, was fragmented. None of the political parties during this period gained the majority in the parliament causing the establishment of coalition governments. However, extreme fragmentation and polarization of the political parties made it impossible for any of the governments to rule the country properly. Coalition governments protecting their own interests and was not able to do much to defuse the polarization. Immobility of the governments and parliaments delegitimized the political regime. As a result, the governments lost control of the law and order. The heterogeneous coalition governments with narrow majorities in the assembly did not work effectively.

The military remained as neutral and passive as much as possible between 1973 and 1978 because of the increasing credibility of Ecevit in the eyes of the public as well as the military due to the Cyprus Peace Operation. However, Chief of General Staff General Kenan Evren was not happy with the weakness and incompetence of the government *vis-à-vis* the anarchy on the streets. According to Evren the martial law was not enough to stop the violence. He knew that a full military intervention was necessary for combating the anarchy and terrorism and establishing the law and order. As a result he started planning the intervention. According to Hale there were four reasons for him to wait so long for the intervention: First of all, General Evren had an extremely cautious nature. Secondly, the members of the General Staff were determined not to attempt an intervention until no alternative was left. Thirdly, the military did not want to remain in power for a long time. Last but not least, the

²⁸⁴ 1973-1980 Arasında..., pp. 2282-2298.

military members wanted to maintain full control over their subordinates.²⁸⁵ The final preparations of the intervention were made on September 11, 1980 and on September 12 the operation started. In a short time the mission was accomplished and the military ruled the country for the next three years.

C. Military Rule in Turkey: 1980-1983

On September 12, 1980, the Turkish army launched its third military intervention under the name of Operation Flag, which lasted for three years and three months. In contrast with the 1960 coup d'état, the 1980 intervention was executed in chain of command, and the military kept its discipline until the end of military rule. MGK was consisted from the Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren, commander of land forces Nurettin Ersin, commander of air force Tahsin Şahinkaya, commander of navy Nejat Tümer, and commander of gendarmerie Sedat Celasun. The top officers of the military that ruled the country were consisted as National Security Council.²⁸⁶

Following the coup, the military assumed full executive and legislative powers. The military ruled the country for 38 months and planned to restructure the political system by making changes in three significant areas: first, the military reorganized the legal structure of the government; second, it took precautions to ensure that the new legal framework would not be filled with old political actors; third, it put itself in a position to observe and influence the performance of the new governments.²⁸⁷

The military junta immediately dissolved the parliament and the government, removed the immunities of deputies, declared martial law and curfew throughout the country. Moreover, they suspended all political parties, associations and the labor unions, and banned all strikes and lock-outs. The leaders of the political parties were arrested. All mayors and municipal councils were removed from their positions.²⁸⁸ The military administration appointed a cabinet and selected the retired admiral

²⁸⁵ Hale, Turkish, pp. 232-233.

²⁸⁶ Hale, Turkish, pp. 247-250.

²⁸⁷ John H. McFadden, "Civil-Military Relations in the Third Turkish Republic", **The Middle East Journal**, Vol: 39, No: 1, 1985, p. 70.

²⁸⁸ Leftist DİSK and rightist MİSK were suspended. Only the moderate labor union Türk-İş survived during the military rule. Bülent Tanör, "Siyasi Tarih (1980-1995)", **Türkiye Tarihi: Bugünkü Türkiye 1980-2003**, Vol: 5, (Ed. Sina Akşin), Cem Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2007, pp. 30-36.

Bülend Ulusu as prime minister. Generals appointed Turgut Özal, who initiated January 24, 1980 economic measures to bring free market economy as deputy prime minister responsible for economy and gave full authority to him for stabilizing the economy and maintaining liberalization package.²⁸⁹

The military junta had always emphasized their intention to initiate transition to democracy as soon as a new constitution, laws on political parties and elections were adopted. Only three months following the coup, General Evren announced the “democratization schedule” of military government stating that the constitutional referendum would be held in the fall of 1982 and the general elections in the fall of 1983. A constituent assembly and a constitutional council were established in June and November 1981 respectively to design the new constitution.²⁹⁰

The public generally welcomed the coup d’état after the long years of economic crisis and absence of law and order. Besides the resistance by some leftist armed organizations, there were no major rebellions against the military rule. In a short time the military administration established its authority and started following its policies in politics and economy.²⁹¹

The military administration started a war against anybody who was involved in leftist and rightist organizations. In three months the generals arrested 30,000 people that included labor unionists, politicians, professors, teachers, journalists, and lawyers. Torture, sexual abuse, and arbitrary use of force became ordinary practices during that period.²⁹² Many people died during these tortures. Detention period was extended from 15 days to 30 days. In Martial Courts 3600 people were sentenced to death and 49 of them were executed. With the amendment on the Martial Law Act,

²⁸⁹ Ahmad, pp. 183-184. There were 27 members in the cabinet, 9 of them were also on duty during 1971 military intervention governments. Tanör, p. 34.

²⁹⁰ Constituent assembly was consisted of two bodies, which were MGK and advisory council but the former had a supremacy over the latter. Advisory council was consisted of 160 members; 120 members were elected by the MGK from the lists that sent by the governors from each provinces. The remains were appointed by MGK directly. An important detail was the members of advisory council had to be non-partisan in September 11, 1980. Tanör, pp. 41-43.

²⁹¹ Zürcher, pp. 278-279. “12 Eylül Diktatörlüğü”, **Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi**, Vol: 7, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1988, p. 2400.

²⁹² With the difference of 1971 military rule, 1980 coup also targeted the rightist legal and illegal organizations. The leaders and members of MHP and MSP were arrested and sent to prison. Especially the members of MHP were surprised when they arrested and vice-chairman of MHP, Agah Oktay Güner, declared their confusion as “we are the only political organization whose members are in prison but the ideas are in power”. In addition, 144 people from MHP and Grey Wolves said that they were tortured during their detainment. 12 Eylül Diktatörlüğü, pp. 2408-2412. Zürcher, p. 279.

the military commanders gained powers including right to ban strikes, public meetings, and demonstrations, suspend newspapers, and fire public employees without right of appeal.²⁹³

In order to depoliticize the youth, the military organization first banned all the political organizations, dissolved all of the existing political parties and confiscated their properties. Then they imposed a political ban for 10 years for former politicians, such as Bülent Ecevit, Süleyman Demirel, Alparslan Türkeş and Necmettin Erbakan. Moreover, the military junta aimed to fill the ideological vacuum left from the former period (since all the leftist and rightist organizations were banned) with the so-called Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.²⁹⁴

The economic measures of January 24, which aimed at bringing free market economy to Turkey, were implemented during the military coup. Otherwise, their implementation prior to coup in the atmosphere of extreme leftist and rightist polarization would not have been possible. January 24 decisions let the prices and interest rates free, cut state consumption to bring down the inflation and removed the protectionist economy policies to liberalize economy. Turkish lira was devalued and Turkish market was opened for foreign investments. State stopped intervening into production and privatization of the state enterprises had started.²⁹⁵ However, freeing the interest rates caused a financial bubble that created a crisis in June 1982. The stock and bond brokers, known as *banker* in Turkish offered very high interest rates but could not make money from their loans and eventually collapsed. This scandal led to the resignation of Turgut Özal as well as Minister of Finance Kaya Erdem and

²⁹³ Tanör, p. 40. Hale, Turkish, p. 251. Even the death penalties were arbitrary. 17 years old Erdal Eren was hanged just a month after the military intervention. Leftist Necdet Adalı and rightist Mustafa Pehlivanoglu were hanged on the same day which was justified by junta leader Evren as “in order to secure the justice, we hanged one from the left and one from the right”. (“‘Bir sağdan bir soldan astık’ açıklaması”, **Hürriyet**, 22 Kasım 2012, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/21978372.asp>, (26.03.2014).)

²⁹⁴ Ahmad, pp. 184-186; Hale, Turkish, p. 260; Turkish-Islamic Synthesis mindset had roots from the discussions of Hearth of Intellectuals (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) during 1970s. According to the supporters of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, Turkey was under the attack of imperialist cultures and in order to resist this attack, Turkish nationalism and Islam had to be merged and imposed as an ideology for youth. Without Islam, Turks could not protect their own identities and the best religion for Turks was Islam. Thus, Turkish nationalism and Islam was the essence of Turkish people and had always to be protected. This protection of the “national culture” had to be sustained by the state itself. For details see: İlhan Uzgel, “Türk-İslam Sentezi”, **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Vol: 2, (Ed. Baskın Oran), 9th Edition, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, (Türk), p. 22.

²⁹⁵ Ahmad, pp. 184, 203. Hale, Turkish, p. 254. 12 Eylül Diktatörlüğü, p. 2390.

Minister of Housing Şerif Tüten from the cabinet. Nevertheless, the liberalization policies continued.²⁹⁶

The constitutional assembly announced the draft constitution in July 1982. The MGK added some exit guarantees, privileges, and provisional articles to the constitution, and then finally submitted to the referendum on November 7, 1982. However, the 1982 Constitution was written and submitted to referendum in an illiberal political environment. The military administration allowed to make only the positive statements for the constitution but banned the negative critics. In addition, voting for the referendum was made compulsory and the ones who did not vote would be banned from right to elect and to be elected for five years. While voting for the constitution, the people also voted for the presidency of Kenan Evren. Saying “yes” to the constitution meant saying “yes” to Evren’s presidency. Moreover, although it was not stated clearly but, rejecting the constitution meant rejecting the transition to democracy. That meant that if people rejected the constitution, the military could give up the idea of leaving power and initiating elections.²⁹⁷

Consequently, the 1982 Constitution was accepted by 91.4 per cent of the votes. The new constitution by abolishing the Senate turned back to the unicameral system. While the powers of executive, particularly the presidential powers were increased, the powers of judiciary were decreased. According to the Provisional Article 2, a Presidential Council which was consisted of five members of the junta (besides Kenan Evren who became the president) was established for six years. The use of Kurdish was also banned by the constitution. Massive restrictions were set up against the freedom of expression, freedom of thought, demonstrations, public meetings, union activities, and associations. The reason for these restrictions was to protect the national interest, public order and national security. Establishment of the Higher Educational Council (*Yükseköğretim Kurulu-YÖK*) ended the autonomy of the universities. The courses on religion in high schools became compulsory. All of these measures were contributed the continuum of the military tutelage even after transition to democracy.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁶ Hale, Turkish, pp. 254-255.

²⁹⁷ Tanör, pp. 44-45. Hale, Turkish, p. 256.

²⁹⁸ Hale, Turkish, pp. 257-259. Zürcher, p. 281. Tanör, pp. 48-53.

1982 Constitution adopted a ten percent threshold for political parties in order to gain a seat in parliament to prevent smaller parties to get into the parliament and endanger political stability. During this period many other restrictive laws were issued. Unions were banned from political activities and the right to strike was curtailed. In addition, the press was controlled by legislation. For any activities that were seen as putting national security in danger, the press was assigned heavy fines, subject to closures and imprisonment.²⁹⁹

The provisional acts of laws on elections and political parties provided the military administration right to determine the founders of newly established political parties and their election candidates. The 1982 Constitution attempted to create a two-party political system. All of the political parties of pre-1980 period were outlawed. In an attempt to bring new political actors to the stage, provisional Article 4 of the new constitution banned all officials who had belonged to any political parties prior to the September 1980 coup from being active in politics for a period of ten years. This constitutional prohibition also disallowed all former deputies from being involved in creating and leading new parties. Consequently, the military administration permitted the establishment of Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi*-MDP) under former general Turgut Sunalp, Populist Party (*Halkçı Parti*-HP) under undersecretary of Prime Ministry during the military period Necdet Calp, Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*-ANAP) under the leadership of former deputy prime minister responsible from economy Turgut Özal. In November 1983 elections politically conservative economically liberal ANAP won 45.15 per cent of the votes with a majority in the parliament. Moderate leftist HP came second with 30.46 of the votes and rightist military-supported MDP came third. Transition to democracy or multi-party system was realized in Turkey once again.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁹ McFadden, pp. 71-72. James Brown, "The Politics of Disengagement in Turkey: The Kemalist Tradition", **The Decline of Military Regimes, The Civilian Influence**, (Ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos), Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1988, p. 139. Henri J. Barkey, "Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition," **Armed Forces and Society**, Vol: 16 No: 2 1990, p. 179. Hale, Turkish, p. 259.

³⁰⁰ Tanör, pp. 56-58, 61. Hale, Turkish, pp. 263-264.

D. Aftermath of 1980 Military Intervention: Transition to Democracy and the Post-Transition Period in Turkey

The Turkish armed forces reached their goals at the end of the military rule. They believed that the freedoms given by 1961 Constitution led to the chaos on the street. Therefore, they adopted a new constitution and new laws that restricted liberties and freedoms. These restrictions became obstacles for democratic consolidation in the post-transition period. The military elites designed the new political structure by banning the ex-political parties and their leaders from politics and allowed the new ones that were suitable for military's aims. However, most importantly, the military gained lots of prerogatives which it eventually took advantage of it.

During the period between 1983 and 1989 lasted the military kept its dominance in politics due to many factors. First of all, the ex-politicians particularly the party leaders were not allowed to participate in 1983 elections. Second, both as the President of the Republic and the president of the MGK, former Chief of General Staff and the coup leader Kenan Evren dominated the national security area. Third, the martial law that was implemented by the military rule remained been in effect until 1987.³⁰¹

Following the end of President Evren's tenure and Prime Minister Özal's election as the eighth president in 1989, the balance of power in civil-military relations have changed considerably. First of all, Özal became president in a more liberal political environment in contrast with the previous period and compared to Evren he also had no legitimacy problem. Secondly, he appointed Yıldırım Akbulut as Prime Minister, who was a passive political figure and therefore, Özal could easily dominate him in handling economic and foreign policy issues.³⁰² Although Özal had some attempts to find a way to lessen the military dominance, such as increasing the power of civilian intelligence agency MİT and appointing his candidate General Necip Torumtay as Chief of the General Staff instead General Necdet Öztörün, the military still had a considerable power in politics, mainly due to the increasing

³⁰¹ Tanör, p. 64.

³⁰² William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis", **International Affairs**, Vol: 68, No: 4, 1992, (Middle), p. 683.

terrorism of PKK.³⁰³ Özal actually gained dominance in the national security issues once he became the president in 1989 by using constitutional powers such as presiding at the MGK and, if required, at the cabinet.³⁰⁴ However, military tutelage still continued to be effective.

Özal followed a pro-US policy during the First Gulf War in 1991, but his hawkish policy frustrated the military as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense. As a reaction to his pro-US foreign policies and his habit of bypassing the cabinet and the military in his foreign policy decisions, the Chief of General Staff Torumtay as well as the heads of two ministries resigned from their posts.³⁰⁵ Despite the opposition to Özal's policies, Turkey took part on the side of the USA in the first Gulf War by ending its economic relations with Iraq and approving the use of İncirlik and other bases by the Americans for initiating the air strikes against Saddam's forces.³⁰⁶

Meanwhile, Turkey had experienced two major Kurdish immigrations during this period. The first influx came in 1988 after Saddam Hussein's chemical attacks in Northern Iraq to the Kurdish population of Iraq. 51,000 Kurds became refugee in Turkey. The second one took place in 1991 during the First Gulf War and 460,000 Kurds immigrated to Turkey. Following the UN Security Council Resolution 688 and initiation of Operation Provide Comfort, in April 1991 that attempted establish a safe haven for Kurds in Northern Iraq, only 13,000 Kurds stayed in Turkey.³⁰⁷ Operation Provide Comfort was restructured as Operation Poised Hammer (mistakenly known as *Çekiç Güç* in Turkish) in July 1991.³⁰⁸

The power vacuum in Northern Iraq created a free environment for PKK and eventually intensified its attacks to Turkish military and the villages between 1991 and 1993. Meanwhile, ANAP lost 1991 elections under the leadership of Mesut

³⁰³ Karabelias, p. 459.

³⁰⁴ Tanör, p. 86.

³⁰⁵ Ahmad, pp. 200-201.

³⁰⁶ Hale, Middle, pp. 684, 687.

³⁰⁷ Kemal Kirişçi, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices", **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol: 36, No: 3, 2000, pp. 12-13.

³⁰⁸ Hale, Middle, p. 688. Baskın Oran, "Uluslararası Ve İç Hukukta Çekiç Güç'ün Yasal Dayanakları Sorunu", **Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi**, Vol: 50, No: 3-4, 1995, pp. 257-259. Operation Poised Hammer became Operation Northern Watch in 1996 and lasted since 2003. İlhan Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Vol: 2, (Ed. Baskın Oran), 9th Edition, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, (ABD), p. 266.

Yılmaz, who succeeded Akbulut. True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*-DYP) and Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*-SHP) coalition was established under the leadership of veteran Süleyman Demirel. In other words, Özal's influence over the cabinet ended and the military became more influential on Demirel's policies.³⁰⁹ Moreover, in 1991 elections 22 Kurdish deputies were elected from the SHP lists. However, once they came to parliament, they established their own party group People's Labor Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*-HEP). However following the closure of HEP by the Constitutional Court in 1993, these deputies were put in prison with the accusation of their connections with outlawed PKK.³¹⁰ With the adoption of Law for the Suppression of Terrorism in April 1991 the ban on Kurdish as well as the Sections of 141, 142, and 163 articles of the Penal Code (that were related to Marxist subversion) were removed. However, the same law brought heavier punishments for those that resorted to terrorist acts.³¹¹

Following PKK's attack to a border post in Samanlı, Hakkari in August 4, 1991, and killing of nine soldiers, Turkish military launched a cross border operation in Northern Iraq between 5th and 16th of August.³¹² During the 1992 Newroz celebrations (Kurdish and Shia New Year) state security forces opened killed more than 90 civilians. In retaliation, PKK placed a bomb in a store in Istanbul and killed 11 civilians. Turkish armed forces launched another cross border operation to Iraq in October 1992 with the support of other Kurdish factions.³¹³

Although the hardliner policy of military and Prime Minister Demirel, President Özal supported non-military means to end PKK attacks and to find a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue. Özal resorted to some unconventional methods to end these clashes. For example, he secretly met Jalal Talabani, a prominent political figure among Kurds, to cut a deal, without informing the military.³¹⁴ In 1992, both Jalal Talabani (leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) and Masoud Barzani (leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party) visited Ankara and

³⁰⁹ Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities", *Middle East Journal*, Vol: 51, No: 1, 1997, pp. 68-69.

³¹⁰ "1990'dan Bugüne, HEP'ten DTP'ye Kürtlerin Zorlu Siyaset Mücadelesi", *Bianet*, 12.12.2009, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/117387-1990-dan-bugune-hep-ten-dtp-ye-kurtlerin-zorlu-siyaset-mucadelesi>, (14.08.2014).

³¹¹ Hale, Turkish, pp. 289-290.

³¹² Hale, Middle, p. 689.

³¹³ Barkey and Fuller, p. 70.

³¹⁴ Karabelias, p. 459.

received diplomatic passports from Turkey.³¹⁵ In March 1993, PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire but the Demirel-led government did not take this attempt into consideration. In midst of his attempts to find a peaceful solution to Kurdish question, President Özal passed away in May 1993. During this period, PKK attacked an unarmed Turkish army recruits and killing 33 officers. Following Özal's death in 1993, small attempts for a peaceful resolution faded away and the military had dominated Turkish politics in the following ten years.³¹⁶

1980 military intervention was the result of both economic and political instability in Turkey. The military managed to bring some political stability at the expense of tremendous human right violations. With the help of civilians the military also initiated the transition to market economy. A significant reason for the continuation of the military's dominance in Turkey was the mode of the transition. It was the military itself that planned the transition to democracy very carefully by reserving itself exit guarantees and prerogatives. Moreover, the increasing terrorist acts by the PKK again put the military in a strong position in politics.

II. 1976 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ARGENTINA

Transition to democracy both in Turkey and Argentina from 1971 coup by memorandum and 1966 coup respectively had taken place in 1973. However, in three years following the 1973 coup, in 1976 Argentina found itself experiencing another coup. As already analyzed in the previous chapter, the duration of military rules in Argentina got longer in each consecutive coups and the duration of civilian periods between each military rule got shorter. The 1976 coup compared to the previous ones (1930, 1943, 1955, 1962 and 1966) was the most brutal and violent one lasting for seven years with numerous human rights violations.

A. Second Peronist Period: Politics in Argentina throughout the 1970s

After long years of political struggle between Peron and Argentine military, 1966 junta finally realized that it was impossible to neglect Peron and to wipe

³¹⁵ Uzgel, ABD, p. 263.

³¹⁶ Barkey and Fuller, pp. 70-71.

Peronism out of the Argentine politics. As a result, following the negotiations with Peron, 1966 junta allowed Peronism to participate in the 1973 elections. Although all three presidents that ruled Argentina between 1973 and 1976 were Peronist, the presidents established three different governments in three years. Moreover, power struggle inside-Peronism among leftist-Peronists and rightist-Peronists, economic crisis, labor and student mobilization, armed clashes among the leftists, rightists, and state security forces brought Argentina at the brink of abyss.

1. A Caretaker before Peron: Hector Campora Period

Peronist political tradition joined the March 11, 1973 elections under the name of Justicialist Front for Liberation (*Frente Justicialista de Liberación* – FREJULI) with its presidential candidate Hector Campora and their major rival Radical Civic Union's (*Union Civica Radical*-UCR) candidate Ricardo Balbin. Campora, a left wing Peronist with his rightist-Peronist vice-president, won the 1973 elections by gaining 49.5 per cent of the votes and Balbin came second with 21.3 per cent.³¹⁷

The most important performance of the Campora rule that lasted for one and a half months was the implementation of amnesty for hundreds of political prisoners. However, people who had great expectations from the government were disappointed in a short time and restarted their strikes and occupation of public buildings forcing Campora to resign. Meanwhile Juan Peron and his new wife Isabel Peron receiving their political rights returned to Argentina in June 1973. On their arrival to Argentina, armed clashes between the rightist and leftist factions of Peronism started in Ezeiza Airport. In these clashes 16 people died and 433 were wounded. In 1973

³¹⁷ FREJULI was consisted of *Partido Justicialista*, *Partido Conservador* (Conservative Party), *Popular Cristiano* (Christian Democrats), other minor socialist parties, and some provincial parties. Other candidates of the election were Francisco Manrique from Federalist Popular Alliance (*Alianza Popular Federalista*), Oscar Alende from Popular Revolutionary Alliance (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria*), and Julio Chamizo from New Force (*Nueva Fuerza*). (Mark P. Jones, Martín Lauga, and Marta León-Roesch, "Argentina", **Elections in the Americas A Data Handbook Volume II South America**, (Ed. Dieter Nohlen), Oxford, New York, 2005, p. 111.)

elections Juan Peron by winning a massive victory by receiving 61.8 per cent of the votes became the new president and made his wife Isabel the vice president.³¹⁸

2. Second Peronist Period of Juan Peron and the Rule of Isabel Peron

Although the military coup of 1966 aimed at blocking Peron's existence in politics, Peron, who was regarded as the only leader with enough charisma to stop the extremist actions of the left, was expected to play an appeasing role in Argentinean politics. However, Peron's return to power in 1973 could neither create a favorable environment for establishing an effective opposition nor fix the law and order. Two days after the elections, one of Peron's loyal supporters, Jose Rucci, the Secretary-General of the General Confederation of Labor (*Confederación General del Trabajo*-CGT) was assassinated by leftist guerrillas.³¹⁹

In this midst of this chaotic political and economic atmosphere, old and sick Juan Peron died in July 1975. His wife, Isabel Peron replaced him as the first female president in the Americas. Isabel Peron actually did not have sufficient background, experience or character to manage the crisis and requirements of the presidency. During this period, the change in the executives of the CGT led to the inflexible negotiators coming to power. Moreover, Isabel Peron tried to establish her own political team placing her friends and unqualified supporters, headed by Minister of Social Welfare Jose Lopez Rega, in key positions. Moreover, she made attempts to make changes in the military. All these efforts did not work and transformation of political mobilization into massive political polarization led to the loss of the legitimacy of Isabel Peron government. In 1975, Peronist Party lost their majority in the Congress. The coup attempt of the air force failed since the other forces did not support them. The polarization on social sphere and unbearable economic crisis combined with the management problems reached to a peak point in 1976. Other

³¹⁸ Jonathan C. Brown, **A Brief History of Argentina**, 2nd Edition, Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group, York, 2010, p. 236. Juan Carlos Torre and Liliana De Riz, "Argentina Since 1946", **Argentina Since Independence**, (Ed. Leslie Bethell), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 314-315. Jones, et al., p. 112.

³¹⁹ Jennifer S. Holmes, "Political Violence and Regime Change in Argentina: 1965-1976", **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol: 13, No: 1, 2001, p. 145. Luis Alberto Romero, **A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century**, Translated by James P. Brennan, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 2002, p. 204. Torre and De Riz, p. 315.

political parties also had little ability to represent society's interests. Even the changes in the cabinet in late January 1976 did not help the ineffectiveness of the government. Neither the military nor the business people had any hope for the improvement of Isabel Peron's performance. The agreements and pacts ended, big business withdrew from CGE and moreover started to attack the government for its downfall. Some members of the congress and union leaders tried to replace Isabel Peron with Italo Luder, head of Senate, but they could not reach their aim. Replacement of the Minister of Economy with Antonio Cafiero, a respected economist close to unions, did not reverse the economic crisis. As a result, Isabel Peron lost all the support she possessed.³²⁰

In sum, the weak and fragmented government of Isabel Peron, high labor mobilization that converged with the student demonstrations, armed clashes among the leftist organizations, rightist militias, and state security forces, massive economic crisis were sufficient to frustrate the Argentine military to intervene in the civilian politics to sustain law and order. Isabel Peron totally lost control of her rule and Argentine military launched another coup d'état on March 24, 1976.

B. Factors Leading to 1976 Military Intervention in Argentina

The political tension inherited from the previous period had never diffused during the period of 1973-1976. Particularly, in the aftermath of Juan Peron's death the economic fluctuations coupled with political crisis weakened the law and order.

1. Economic Factors Leading to the 1976 Military Intervention

Prior to Peron's elections in May 1973, Jose Ber Gelbard, the Minister of Economy as well as the president of CGE created and declared the Program of Reconstruction and National Liberation which included state interventionism, and to a certain degree nationalist and distributionist policies. Nationally-owned companies were combined under Corporation of National Companies (*Corporacion de*

³²⁰ J. C. Brown, pp. 237-238. Romero, pp. 202, 208, 214. Holmes, p. 146. Elizabeth Jelin, "Labor Conflicts under the Second Peronist Regime, Argentina 1973-76", **Development and Change**, Vol: 10, 1979, p. 248.

Empresas Nacionales). As part of its new economy policies the state started to control other means of economic instruments such as credit and price controls. Moreover, it increased its spending on public works, public employees and state companies.³²¹

By doing so in the short-run it managed to revitalize the domestic economy and halting the rise of inflation. However, in the long run such policies caused the rise of fiscal deficit. Emergence of new export markets, such as Cuba and Soviet Union helped the stabilization of balance of payments and accumulation of surplus. Improvements in wages stimulated the domestic economic activity.³²² However, towards the end of 1973 as a result of the rise of oil prices and stagnation in world economy, souring of the consumption, rising inflation and fall in exports worsened the economic situation.³²³

The Social Pact (*Pacto Social*), signed by the CGE and CGT and the government in June 1973, was a major sign of interventionism. The Social Pact required a price freeze and the suspension of collective bargaining for two years and compensation of the unions by a 20 per cent increase in wages. But it did not work as much as Peron government hoped. First, the CGE was not representing the whole industrial sector. Moreover another organization, Argentine Industrial Union (*Unión Industrial Argentina*-UIA) that did not sign the Social Pact had a significant impact in its failure. Consequently, the CGT was worried about Peronist government's economic policy. Secondly, the union leaders lacked tradition, instruments, and objectives for co-governing. Thirdly, the working class was highly mobilized and impossible to compensate, thus, inevitably guerrilla organizations filled the vacuum. Following a dissatisfying price and wage increase, the government itself broke the Pact to renegotiate the wages in March 1974.³²⁴

When the first effective economic measures adopted by the Peronist government did not work, by 1975 the government started to resort to austerity measures that were against the Social Pact. During this period of economic recession,

³²¹ Romero, pp. 205-206.

³²² Romero, p. 206.

³²³ Torre and De Riz, p. 319.

³²⁴ Romero, pp. 205-207. Jonathan Marie, "Inflation in Argentina during the Second Peronist Period (1973-76): A Post-Keynesian Interpretation", **Review of Political Economy**, Vol: 22, No: 2, 2010, p. 290. Torre and De Riz, p. 320.

the price inflation rose from 40.1 per cent to 334.4 percent in a year. The CGT demanded negotiations for bargaining. By late March 1975, the majority of the unions agreed a wage increase of 40 per cent. However, on June 2, 1975, Minister of Economy Celestino Rodrigo devalued peso by 100 per cent and increased the price of fuel and public services. The cost of living rose 21 percent in June and 35 percent in July. Unions demanded another wage increase that went to the level of 200 per cent. As a result Isabel Peron was compelled to force Minister of Economy Rodrigo and the Minister of Social Welfare Rega for resignation. The government's rejection of the wage increases led to two massive general strikes at the end of June 1975 and led to demonstrations in the Plaza de Mayo. As a result, Isabel Peron stepped back, Rodrigo and Rega resigned and wage increases were approved.³²⁵

The statics clearly show the economic decline in Argentina: From 1973 to 1976 the consumer price index soared from 40.1 per cent to 347.5 per cent. The growth rate of GDP decreased from 6.1 per cent in 1973 to – 0.4 and – 0.5 in 1975 and 1976, respectively. The inflation increased from 43.8 per cent in 1973 to 347.5 per cent in 1976.³²⁶ The unbearable economic situation actually accelerated the political crisis that led to the 1976 coup d'état.

2. Political Factors Leading to 1976 Military Intervention

The presidents of 1973-1976 were not able to consolidate their power in politics since Peronist electoral alliance was consisted of different political groups. Although Hector Campora won the elections in March 1973, he was just a caretaker of Juan Peron and his presidency lasted only for 49 days. Despite the massive victory of Juan Peron in September 1973, the Peronist organization was divided inside and the leftist leaning group challenged Juan Peron's rule. Moreover, this coalition was further split up by his successor Isabel Peron. As a result, she totally lost control in the last years of her presidency. The measures that were taken especially during the

³²⁵ Marie, p. 288. Jelin, p. 245. Romero, p. 209. Agustin Santella, "Workers' Mobilization and Political Violence: Conflict in Villa Constitucion, Argentina, 1970-1975, **Latin American Perspectives**, Vol: 35, No: 5, 2008, p. 153.

³²⁶ Marie, pp. 281, 288.

presidency of Isabel Peron were quite ineffective. Her power was delegitimized leading her to lose control over law and order.

The struggle among the political powers started with the massive mobilization. Various social groups in an attempt to express their political will were consciously or unconsciously mobilized.³²⁷ This political mobilization caused an extreme social polarization which could be seen everywhere from the neighborhood organizations to classrooms and factories. However, after years of authoritarianism and democracy in façade, Argentines started to identify power with hostility and repression. As a result, the power vacuum was filled with guerrilla organizations. Particularly Montoneros, the leftist Peronists, infiltrated into every social group from factories to student movements and even into the state apparatus.³²⁸

Although, Juan Peron, and his successor Isabel Peron tried hard to curb the power of leftist Peronists, they did not succeed. Juan Peron accused Peronist Youth (a leftist-Peronist organization) to act as mercenaries paid by foreigners. He also told his followers to keep away from the leftist-Peronists. Both Juan and Isabel Peron removed all the bureaucrats and other public officials who were close to the leftist Peronists in order to calm down the opposition parties, industrialists and the military. The most specific examples were arbitrary firing of elected governors by Perons. Following an attack of People's Revolutionary Army (*Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* - ERP) to an important military garrison in Buenos Aires province in January 1974, Juan Peron demanded the resignation of the province's governor who was close to the Montoneros. Moreover, the Cordoba Governor was removed by Peron by a "palace coup". Numerous governors, union activists, professors, who were close to leftist-Peronism, lost their positions.³²⁹

The armed clashes among the leftist groups and the rightist groups as well as the security forces had increased. The ERP set up a rural *foco* (revolutionary cell) in Tucuman Mountain in northern Argentina in 1974. The Argentine army launched an operation to Tucuman guerrillas. In September 1974, the government passed an anti-subversive law called the Security Act (*Ley de Seguridad*) and banned any

³²⁷ "Argentina Today: A Reign of Terror", **Latin American Perspectives**, Vol: 3, No: 1, 1976, p. 157.

³²⁸ Romero, p. 203.

³²⁹ Romero, pp. 208-212.

demonstration against the government and restricted many civil rights. In November 1974, a martial law was declared.³³⁰

The Anti-Communist Argentine Alliance (*Allianza Anticomunista Argentina-Triple A*), which was funded by Jose Lopez Rega, also started a fight against these guerrillas. They killed guerrillas as well as the ecclesiastics, threatened leftist actors and folk-singers and moreover, left mutilated bodies along the roads and burned cars. In 1975, 723 guerrilla activities took place in Argentina in which 790 people including soldiers, policemen, businessmen, politicians, and bystanders were killed. As retaliation, Triple-A killed hundreds of people. In October 1975, the government authorized the military to fight against the guerrillas. Moreover, in order to restrain the actions of ERP, Isabel Peron banned leftist rallies and publications.³³¹

The political polarization increased particularly after Juan Peron's death in 1975. The power struggle between the orthodox Peronists, especially labor unions *vis-à-vis* Montoneros and Peronist Youth reached to a peak point.³³² The leftist Peronists who were removed from the political arena showed their frustration in two ways. First, they established Authentic Peronist Party (*Partido Peronista Autentico*) after Juan Peron's death, but, the party failed in a short time. Then, they started an armed struggle against military, rightist groups, even the rightist Peronists. Their struggle varied from street demonstrations, protests to kidnapping famous people, such as a businessman Jorge Born, Secretary-General of CGT Jose Rucci, journalist David Kraiselburd, ex-Minister of Interior Arturo Mor Roig, and so on. In 1974, they broke into General Aramburu's grave and took his body as a hostage to exchange with Evita Peron's body.³³³ Triple A targeted mostly Peronist syndicators and prominent figures including lawyer Silvio Frondizi (brother of ex-President Arturo Frondizi), journalists Pedro Leopoldo Barraza and Carlos Ernesto Laham, lawyer of

³³⁰ Gustavo Morello, "Catholicism(s), State Terrorism and Secularization in Argentina", **Bulletin of Latin American Research**, Vol: 31, No: 3, 2012, p. 367. Romero, p. 213.

³³¹ Holmes, p. 145. J. C. Brown, p. 238.

³³² Holmes, p. 145.

³³³ J. C. Brown, pp. 212-213, 238. "Se Cumplen 30 Años del Asesinato de David Kraiselburd", **El Dia**, 17.07.2004, <http://www.eldia.com.ar/ediciones/20040717/opinion1.asp>, (22.07.2014). Rogelio Alaniz, "El asesinato de Mor Roig", **El Litoral**, 27.09.2008, <http://www.ellitoral.com/index.php/diarios/2008/09/27/opinion/OPIN-03.html>, (22.07.2014).

political prisoners Alfredo Curutchet, and ex-vice director of the police Julio Troxler.³³⁴

According to a study in Argentine magazine “*Gente y Actualidad*”, from May 1973 to June 1975, there were 5079 acts of violence in Argentina. Only in 1975, the leftist and rightist armed organizations killed 1100 people. Moreover, by 1976, Argentine people lived in a condition in which there was a political assassination every five hours and a bombing every three hours.³³⁵ Moreover, the police did not perform their duty. They either set free the criminals, especially the rightist ones, or did not go to the scene despite the repeated calls.³³⁶

The labor strikes continued non-stop during this period. The strike of Buenos Aires Printers Federation (*Federacion Grafica Bonaerense*) on August 8, 1974 was followed by a street demonstration on September 27. Another strike started by Auto Workers Union of Cordoba (*Sindicato de Mecanicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor – Seccional Cordoba*) turned into an occupation of union’s local branch. In September 1974, 5000 workers held a demonstration. The following month several members of the union were arrested. Despite the court order for their release, these members stayed in jail by “Executive Order”. In April 1975, these union members started a hunger strike and later escaped from jail and went underground. Metal Workers of Villa Constitucion (*Seccional Villa Constitucion Union Obrera Metalurgica*) strike was one of the most remarkable resistances during that period. On March 20, 1975, the government launched an operation to the factories in Villa Constitucion in the province of Santa Fe. On March 26, 20.000 workers went on strike in order to protest this operation. The strike turned into a resistance of labors with the support from other working sectors. After almost three months, the resistance gradually weakened.³³⁷

After the strong labor mobilization as exemplified above, the government wanted to take harsh measures on workers activity. As a result of *Ley de Seguridad*, the factory occupations were prohibited and wage demanding strikes were banned, reducing the mobilization of the workers considerably. The devaluation implemented

³³⁴ Ignacio Gonzalez Janzen, **La Triple-A**, Buenos Aires, Editorial Contrapunto, 1987, pp. 128-129.

³³⁵ Holmes, p. 146.

³³⁶ Argentina Today..., p. 159.

³³⁷ Argentina Today..., pp. 162-164. Santella, p. 151.

in June 1975 led to the mobilization again and reached its peak point in the last quarter of 1975. Employees from car workers to coal sector, paramedical staffs in state hospitals, and railway workers were on strike. Moreover, 12 percent of work stoppages during that period were a reaction to the kidnappings, assassinations and other acts of political violence. The mobilization of the workers increased dramatically during this period.³³⁸

Catholic Church also had been influential in Argentinean politics by supporting the upper-class, landowning families and the military. Along with the Colombian Catholic Church, the Argentinean Catholic Church was one of the most conservative, strong, strict and undemocratic religious body in the continent. However, ironically, the most revolutionary religious ecclesiastics were also from Argentina and Colombia. As already stated Peronism had supporters from all factions of the political ideologies in Argentina. The Liberation Theologies from Argentina, labeled as “the Third World Priest Movement in Argentina”, also regarded Peronism as an Argentine revolutionary movement. However, the disintegration of Peronist bloc, leftist Peronists and orthodox Peronists in 1973, also affected the opinion of this group. They were also divided. While one group sided with the leftist Peronists, Montoneros and Peronist Youth, the other group allied with the orthodox Peronist movement. In early 1974, the former group established Christians for Socialism in Argentina (*Cristianos por el Socialismo: Argentina*) while the latter group continued its actions under the same name. However, the assassination of well-known Father Carlos Mugica by a government-employed gunman ended the Third World Priests movement.³³⁹ Carina Perelli summarizes the general political, social and economic environment of Argentina in that period as follows:

Confrontational politics, hostility, and polarization began to dominate the political arena, reducing the possibilities of dialogue and negotiation to nil ... The breakdown of consensus had immediate paralyzing effect on state bureaucracies ... [D]ivisions inside the

³³⁸ Jelin, pp. 243-248.

³³⁹ Andrew Graham-Yooll, “Speaking for the People: Argentina’s Church Now”, **Index on Censorship**, Vol: 4, 2004, pp. 37, 40. Michael Dodson, “Liberation Theology and Christian Radicalism in Contemporary, Latin America”, **Journal of Latin American Studies**, Vol: 11, No: 1, 1979, pp. 217-219.

political class, coupled with scandals over corruption and the difficult functioning of both state bureaucracies and the judicial system, produced an appalling tableau that seemed to substantiate the predictions of decline and fall...³⁴⁰

As a result of all of these events, the public opinion started to call for a military coup. The newspaper editors, leaders of opposition parties, even the workers were all sick of the chaotic environment. The Argentinean Generals waited for a strong consensus for a new coup d'état.³⁴¹ Finally, on March 24, 1976, the army, the "only saviors", intervened and the "*Proceso de Reorganización Nacional*" (National Reorganization Process) for military "dirty war" for people started.

C. Military Rule in Argentina: 1976-1983

The economic and political crises as well as Peron and his wife's failure to control the turmoil in the country throughout the 1970s led to the March 24, 1976 coup that was ruled by General Videla. 1976 coup that lasted for seven years was the most atrocious one in Argentina with massive number of human right violations. Moreover, during this period, Argentine army launched a war against the Great Britain over the Falkland Islands. Its failure in this war paved the way for the downfall of the military regime.

1. General Videla Period

Similar to Turkey as soon as coming to power the first policy the military regime followed was to close all the political parties, labor unions and employers' unions, ban strikes and lockouts, arrest guerrillas, politicians, union members and intellectuals and censor the press. Strikes and lockouts were declared as the crimes against national security.³⁴² Differing from Turkey, the Argentine military junta had never set a schedule for transition to democracy.³⁴³

³⁴⁰Carina Perelli, "From Counterrevolutionary Warfare to Political Awakening: The Uruguayan and Argentine Armed Forces in the 1970s", **Armed Forces and Society**, Vol: 20, No: 1, 1993, p. 31.

³⁴¹J. C. Brown, p. 240.

³⁴²Paul G. Buchanan, "The Varied Faces of Domination: State Terror, Economic Policy, and Social Rupture during the Argentine 'Proceso' 1976-1981", **American Journal of Political Science**, Vol:

Similar to Turkey, the military's main target was the organized labor and the political mobilization created by the Left. To bring political stability and disqualify all these groups from politics, military junta announced their three steps as roadmap. Firstly, the military decided to destroy the Marxist subversion. Secondly, the junta administration planned to restructure and stabilize the economy "in a way that would eliminate and prevent the future disruptions of the productive process". They also decided to integrate Argentine economy to the world capitalist system. Lastly, they intended to transform the society towards religious values and destroy Peronism. Similar to the Turkish-Islam Synthesis of Turkey's military administration, the Argentinean junta tried to spread the Roman Catholic values through education, censorship, bans and other tools.³⁴⁴

The period between 1976 and 1983 was marked with the massive human rights violations. The abduction, torture, arrests, and executions became ordinary exercises during that period. The state used systematic methods of torture both physically and psychologically. The allegedly guilty people were abducted, their homes were looted and their properties were confiscated. They were forced to sell their properties to military families.³⁴⁵ The abductions were operated by *la patota* (the gang), an organization that was set up for this aim. Detainees after going through a torture, the innocent ones were released and guilty ones were taken as "criminals" to one of the 340 detention centers. In these detention centers they were usually punished with death penalty by the Councils of War. Most of the killed ones had no graves and they were known as "disappeared". Either they were buried in unmarked graves, or burned in collective graves, or thrown into the ocean.³⁴⁶

Argentine military junta fired the civilians from the bureaucracy and state apparatus. With the exception of Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Education every single official at the high levels of bureaucracy were replaced by the military personnel. The three branches of army shared the tasks. The Land Forces took the control of Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Labor as well as federal police,

31, No: 2, 1987, p. 362. Juan Carlos Torre and Liliana De Riz, "Argentina Since 1946", **Argentina Since Independence**, (Ed. Leslie Bethell), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 330.

³⁴³ Romero, p. 215.

³⁴⁴ Buchanan, pp. 355-356, 365.

³⁴⁵ David Pion-Berlin, **Through Corridors of Power Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina**, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1997, (Through), pp. 58-59.

³⁴⁶ Romero, pp. 217-218. Buchanan, pp. 369-370. Torre and De Riz, p. 328.

customs, internal revenue, border control, and other intelligence units. In addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is considered as the most anti-Peronist branch of the military, the Navy took control of Ministry of Social Welfare to discipline the Peronist labor unions. The Air Forces controlled the Ministry of Transportation. Each military branch also shared the control of many other posts of ministries and provincial governments. The legislation was dispersed and the judiciary was held in check by military.³⁴⁷

In order to restructure the economy, Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz was appointed as the Minister Economy as the sole conductor of economic transformation. As soon he was assigned, de Hoz cut spending, started privatization, and liberalized exchange and finance. During the military rule between 1976 and 1983, the Argentine economy was transformed from a protectionist state economy to neo-liberal economy and the old ISI system was abandoned. The military junta and the new liberal bureaucrats of the economy thought that the problem of Argentinean society was the involvement of the state into economy and social life, and the collective participation to the politics. Therefore, they took precautions to remove the state's involvement into the economy and in order to do that they suppressed the organized labor.³⁴⁸

By getting involved into politics the armed forces avoided their military duties. The administrative responsibilities created duality, causing anarchy in the military. Moreover, in contrast with the solid structure of Turkish army, there were three major factions in the Argentinean military. The moderate group was led by General Videla and later General Viola, while the hardliners were under the control of Admiral Massera who opposed the Videla-Viola faction. The third faction was led by General Menendez, General Mason, and General Camps, who were the commanders of Third Corps, First Corps, and the chief police of Buenos Aires province, respectively.³⁴⁹

During the first five years of junta, economic transformation was realized. However, in contrast with the relative success in Turkish economy's transition to

³⁴⁷ Buchanan, pp. 351-352.

³⁴⁸ De Hoz was used to be the Minister of Economy, Secretary of Agriculture, an executive of the *Sociedad Rural Argentina* – a large landowners' association-, director of Business Council and academician. Romero, p. 221. Buchanan, pp. 353, 356-357.

³⁴⁹ Romero, pp. 233-235.

market economy, Argentine's transition was more problematic. The financial liberalization caused interest-rate disparities between Argentina and the rest of the world. According to Maria Victoria Murillo:

[H]igh interest rates and an exchange rate lagged behind inflation provoked an appreciation of the domestic currency, which with trade liberalization put pressure on manufacturing firms in the consumer-oriented import-competing sector and generated massive inflows of capital. Firms acquired dollar-denominated debt to keep their operations afloat or went bankrupt.³⁵⁰

In addition to the bankruptcies of the firms, four important private banks that were owned by three major holding companies had also gone through the same experience in March 1980.³⁵¹

Such a long military rule had eventually experienced governmental instability and economic crisis in 1981 and 1982 leading to a power struggle between moderates and hardliners among the military junta. Following the retirement of General Videla, General Viola from the moderate faction became the new president. However, in December 1981, hardliners took the advantage of General Viola's health problems and removed him; eventually hardliner General Leopoldo Galtieri became president. Galtieri also changed the lower ranking officials and appointed Roberto Aleman as Minister of Economy. However, Aleman also failed to control and to stabilize the economy, which led to agitation. In order to divert the attention of the unhappy people to a different issues Argentine military invaded Falkland Islands.³⁵²

2. General Viola and General Galtieri Periods

As a result of internal fractions in the military, economic failure, and massive human rights violations with a tremendous number of people who disappeared, the civil society movements began to mobilize by the end of 1970s. Firstly, the junta was not able to stop the activities of group of mothers whose children have disappeared.

³⁵⁰ Maria Victoria Murillo, **Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 131-132.

³⁵¹ Romero, p. 225.

³⁵² Romero, pp. 225-226. Buchanan, p. 375. Torre and De Riz, pp. 337-340.

These mothers established a group called the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo and started gathering in the square every Thursday starting in April 1977 on.³⁵³ From the first day of this demonstration until the last days of the military rule, the mothers became the symbol of humanity and their protests and pain undermined the credibility of the military rule.³⁵⁴

The economic crisis surfaced the political repression. Consequently, striking workers held a general protest in April 1979. Although they were harshly suppressed by the military, their opposition continued. The CGT was re-established in late 1981 and workers held another strike, which was again violently suppressed by the military. The small scale strikes and demonstrations continued during this period. On March 30, 1982, the CGT called a demonstration in the Plaza de Mayo. The military suppressed the demonstration and two thousand people were arrested and one person was killed in Mendoza. The political parties that were banned from politics by the military rule, Radicals, Peronists, Christian Democrats and other small parties-gathered for demanding their political rights and founded a platform called *Multipartidario*. Union leaders, businesspeople, students, church leaders, intellectuals, and human rights activists later joined this opposition and demanded transition to democracy.³⁵⁵

The beginning of the end for the military junta started in April 1982. The junta tried to regain its prestige and power by initiating the Falkland War. On April 2, 1982 Argentine military forces occupied the islands. Argentinean people who were very excited about the war, at the height of their nationalist feelings started supporting the military administration. However, this euphoria did not last long. Following British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's order to British troops for a counter attack, the Argentinean military lost the war in a short time. This brought a setback for the Argentine junta. On June 4, 1982, British troops regained the control of the islands. The defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas and the military spending caused another economic crisis in the last years of the military rule. The Galtieri rule ended and General Reynaldo Bignone became the new president.³⁵⁶

³⁵³ Jonathan C. Brown, **A Brief History of Argentina**, 2nd Edition, Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group, York, 2010, p. 246.

³⁵⁴ Romero, pp. 237-240.

³⁵⁵ Romero, pp. 237-240.

³⁵⁶ Torre and De Riz, pp. 338-339. Buchanan, p. 376.

3. General Bignone Period

The defeat of Argentinean military in Falklands War led to another economic crisis causing a total frustration against the military government. In January 1983, the junta signed the stand-by agreement with IMF and promised to take austerity measures. Moreover, the crisis concerning governing also emerged among the three military branches. Each branch accused one another for the defeat, and eventually following General Bignone's presidency, the navy and the air forces were withdrawn from the junta administration.³⁵⁷

People from all strata of Argentina started demonstrations against the military rule. The rise of civil society also contributed to the deterioration of the power of the military rule. In December 1982, a mass demonstration was held under the leadership of Nobel Peace Prize Winner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel in which 100,000 people protested the "Dirty War". Eventually, the junta had no chance but to announce the transition to democracy.³⁵⁸

During the first three years of the military rule the Catholic Church supported the junta. However, the brutal abuses of human rights forced the Church to reconsider their support and by 1981 they openly criticized the junta's repression. In the document called "The Catholic Church and the National Community", ecclesiastics declared their own and the people's demand for democracy and distanced themselves from the military rule.³⁵⁹

During the last days of military rule, junta leaders attempted to take no responsibility for their human rights violations. In the document the junta released in April 1983, they claimed that although there were some violations, "these were inevitable –indeed pardonable– under the 'nearly apocalyptic' battlefield conditions of the counter-subversive war".³⁶⁰ Moreover, the military junta had an abortive attempt to make an agreement with political parties that they would not be punished for the violation of human rights.³⁶¹

³⁵⁷ Torre and De Riz, p. 340.

³⁵⁸ Romero, pp. 247-250. J. C. Brown, p. 252.

³⁵⁹ Romero, p. 238.

³⁶⁰ Pion-Berlin, Through, p. 61.

³⁶¹ Torre and De Riz, p. 341.

The elections were held on October 30, 1983. The UCR's candidate human rights lawyer Ricardo Alfonsín was elected as president by gaining 48 per cent of the votes while Peronist candidate Italo A. Lúder came second with 39.1 per cent. In other words, Argentines voted for the candidate who was against any kind of amnesty for the military officers.³⁶²

D. Aftermath of 1976 Military Intervention: Transition to Democracy and Post-transition Period in Argentina

The elected civilians immediately set to work for crafting civilian control over the military and sending junta members to trial in Argentina. Civilians were not able to achieve their objectives in a short time. After the long years of military autonomy and cycle of military interventions since 1930s, the military's subordination to the civilians was not easy. The post-transition period can be analyzed in three phases. From 1983 to 1987, the civilians were strong enough to reduce military's jurisdiction boundaries. The members of *El Proceso* junta and other senior officials were sent to trial for their human rights abuses and were put in prison. During the second phase, from 1987 until the mid-1990s, the civilians stepped back and issued so-called amnesties and pardons for the military junta. Meanwhile, the military reforms continued and, during this period the military had not attempted to interfere into civilian politics. In the third phase after mid-1990s, especially at the beginning of 21st century, the trials started again, all of the amnesties were declared as unconstitutional and were removed.

1. Military Trials

Following his victory in the 1983 elections, Raul Alfonsín became the president. During his presidential campaigns he promised to people that he would send the junta members to the court. He held his promise as soon as he came to power. Although military attempted to engage into an amnesty agreements with

³⁶² Mark P. Jones, Martín Lauga, and Marta León-Roesch, "Argentina", **Elections in the Americas A Data Handbook Volume II South America**, (Ed. Dieter Nohlen), Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, p. 112. Torre and Riz, p. 342.

Peronists, they failed. Argentinean people were waiting for justice.³⁶³ No one, including Alfonsín himself, had been expecting a victory of UCR, thus felt free to promise a more radical roadmap for civilian control and justice.³⁶⁴ However, once he came to power, he found himself being obliged to seek reconciliation and balance to his commitments to establish the subordination of the military to the civilians. He actually aimed at preventing future military coups.³⁶⁵

In order to send the junta members and other senior officers to trials, first the Alfonsín government annulled the junta's last minute self-amnesty law. Through a presidential decree he also established the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (*Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas*-CONADEP). CONADEP was authorized for collecting evidence concerning the disappearances. The Commission also brought the guilty ones to the courts. Their job was to find the whereabouts of the disappeared, find out the kidnapped or adopted children, and protect the documents and evidences. After nine months of investigations, CONADEP presented its report *Nunca Mas* (Never Again) to President Alfonsín. According to the report 8,960 people disappeared during the military's seven year rule. CONADEP made further recommendations such as starting trials of suspected persons, establishing an under secretariat for human rights, and providing pensions for the families of the disappeared. All of these proposals were taken into consideration and realized step by step.³⁶⁶

Two other important initiatives that were launched during this period were: First, with the help of the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo (*Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo*) who were searching their kidnapped grandchildren, a National Genetic Data Bank with grand paternity blood banks and DNA banks were established. Secondly, Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (*Equipo Argentino de Antropología Forense*) was founded as the first human rights forensic organization in

³⁶³ Felipe Agüero, "Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America", **Mershon International Studies Review**, Vol: 42, No: 2, 1998, (Legacies), p. 390.

³⁶⁴ Harold A. Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies", **Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs**, Vol: 42, No: 3, 2008, p. 88.

³⁶⁵ Kathryn Sikking, "From Pariah State to Global Protagonist: Argentina and the Struggle for International Human Rights", **Latin American Politics and Society**, Vol: 50, No: 1, 2008, p. 6.

³⁶⁶ The number of disappeared was almost 30,000 according to the relatives of victims. Louise Mallinder, "The Ongoing Quest for Truth and Justice: Enacting and Annuling Argentina's Amnesty Laws", **Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation**, Working Paper No. 5, 2009, pp. 22-39.

the world to exhume the graves of disappeared with the cooperation of the civil society and the state.³⁶⁷

Actually, Alfonsín made a distinction between the people who were on duty during the *El Proceso* by separating them into three groups, “(1) those in command of the *Proceso*, (2) those who had strictly followed orders and were presumed to be mistaken about the legitimacy of the orders (unless evidence to the contrary could be produced), and (3) those who had clearly exceeded the orders given”. The main defendants were grouped in (1) and (3).³⁶⁸

President Alfonsín issued a decree and ordered nine ex-commanders to be sent to trial before the Military Supreme Council. Alfonsín simply gave the military a break for purifying itself. The junta members and other senior commanders of the Dirty War were charged with homicide, illegal imprisonment of people, and use of torture against detained people. However, there was a time limit of six months in case of an arbitrary delay of military trial. When the Military Supreme Council could not reach a verdict in June 1984, the civilian Federal Court of Appeals assumed the case and assigned prosecutor Julio Strassera in April 1985. This was the first trial in Latin America that was held for the human rights violations of the ex-junta members. In fact, following the World War II trials in Nuremberg and the Regime of Colonels trials in Greece, it was the third trial held in the world for the military officers violated human rights. In December 1985, two years after the transition to democracy, the verdicts were announced. General Videla and Admiral Massera were sentenced to life, General Viola was sentenced for 17 years, Admiral Lambruschini for 8 years, and Brigadier General Agosti for 4.5 years of imprisonment. Brigadier General Omar Graffigna was acquitted. General Galtieri, General Anaya, and General Dozo were also acquitted but sentenced for 12, 14 and 8 years of imprisonment, respectively, due to their failures during the Falklands War. The Supreme Court approved the sentences in general. Only Viola’s sentence was reduced for six months. Moreover, all of the military officers were “stripped of their

³⁶⁷ Sikking, pp. 10-11.

³⁶⁸ Pion-Berlin, Through, pp. 77-78.

rank and deprived of various rights, including those to a military pension, property ownership, and to vote or hold public office”.³⁶⁹

The group of (1), those in command of the *Proceso*, was sent to trial and sentenced to different periods of prison terms. However, the investigations started to include other junior and senior officers and this created a frustration in the military. In order to prevent the military unrest, Alfonsín government demanded a “due obedience” excuse for the offenders of ongoing investigations from the General Prosecutor of the Military Supreme Council. However, in turn the demands created unrest in the judiciary, even some of the judges resigned from their posts. Later, President Alfonsín took a step back and the Military Supreme Council continued to investigate the cases.³⁷⁰

For reconciliation and defusing the military unrest *Ley de Punto Final* (Full Stop Law) was issued in December 1986. According to the *Punto Final*, “only people who have been indicted within 60 days of the law enactment could be subject to prosecution”. It was different from classical amnesties because it did not cover specific offenders and affect the ongoing trials or pass sentences. It only brought a time limit, “the suspects would no longer were liable for prosecution unless they were fugitives or in contempt of court”. Moreover, “the law does not apply to criminal prosecutions for the crimes of change of civil status and kidnapping and hiding of minors”. In other words, the offenders of “kidnapping children” were excluded from *Punto Final*.³⁷¹

2. Military Counter-responses

The general political and economic environment started to worsen by the end of 1980s. In February 1987, inflation rate had gone up to 13.7 per cent just one month prior to the provincial elections. In the March 1987 provincial elections the

³⁶⁹ Pion-Berlin, Through, pp. 81-83. Mallinder, pp. 44-47. Sikking, p. 7. Herbert C. Huser, **Argentine Civil-Military Relations from Alfonsín to Menem**, National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 2002, pp. 101-102.

³⁷⁰ Mallinder, pp. 55-56. Due obedience excuse is simply a plea of “not guilty by reason of obedience to superior orders”. However, due obedience is questionable in some situations such as war crimes. James B. Insko, “Defense of Superior Orders Before Military Commissions”, **Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law**, Vol: 13, 2003, p. 389.

³⁷¹ Mallinder, pp. 57-59.

Peronists were the winners gaining 41 per cent of the votes and Radicals came second with 37 per cent of the votes. In September 1987 elections, Radicals lost their majority in the Chamber of Deputies leading to the erosion of Alfonsín administration's power.³⁷²

The first phase of military purge ended with the *Senta Samana* (Easter) uprising and 1987 elections. On April 15, 1987, Major Ernesto Guillermo Barreiro was taken refuge in the garrison of the 14th Infantry Regiment at Córdoba. He received the support of the junior officers from Córdoba. Two days later, Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico declared that he left his post in Misiones and took over the Army Infantry School at Campo de Mayo to support to Barreiro. They wanted government to stop so-called injustice and humiliation against the armed forces. Meanwhile, Barreiro and officers in Córdoba surrendered to the Argentinean Armed Forces.³⁷³

During and in the aftermath of the uprisings, the soldiers who joined the rebellions emphasized that their aim was not to overthrow the government. However, these uprisings triggered fear for another coup when they were accompanied with bombing attempts that targeted the judiciary members. These events led to the demonstrations in Plaza de Mayo. Thousands of people, political parties and civic organizations gathered in the plaza to show their support to democracy and the popularly elected government. Business organizations, labor unions, and all political parties signed the "Manifesto of Democratic Commitment" to demonstrate their support to the civilian regime, constitutional rule, and democracy. The demonstration lasted until the soldiers involved in the rebellion surrendered.³⁷⁴

On April 21, 1987 when it was clear that the army would not intervene into politics, President Alfonsín handled the crisis well and eventually the rebellion ended. The soldiers who were involved in the rebellions asked for the resignation of Chief of Staff Héctor Ríos Ereñú and asked for a rise in their salaries. Consequently,

³⁷² Torre and De Riz, p. 356. Romero, p. 279.

³⁷³ This uprising was also known as the *Carapintadas* (the painted faces); those who attended painted their faces for camouflage. Huser, pp. 106-107. J. C. Brown, p. 258.

³⁷⁴ Mallinder, pp. 62-63. Romero, p. 264.

Ereñú resigned and in addition, 24 high-ranking officers were fired or forced to resign. However, there had not been any increase in the military budget.³⁷⁵

Alfonsín administration issued the *Ley de Obediencia Debida* (Law of Due Obedience) in June 1987 for weaken the military frustration. The *Obediencia Debida* prohibited prosecutions of perpetrators who were lower-ranking officers and soldiers (below the position of Commander in Chief, Chief of Zone, Chief of Sub-zone, Chief of Security, Police, or Prison Forces). During this period, when the officers were committing crimes they were actually following orders. Yet, the law excluded the “crimes of rape, kidnapping, and hiding of minors, change civil status, and appropriation of immovables through extortion”.³⁷⁶ This law dropped the number of proceedings against the army officers from approximately 450 to 20.³⁷⁷

In the following two years of Alfonsín rule two more military uprisings and one guerrilla attack had taken place. In January 1988, General Rico launched another uprising at Monte Caseros when he resisted returning his imprisonment. He claimed that the demands of *Senta Samana* uprising had not been met. However, this time the Chief of Staff General Caridi managed to force the rebels to surrender. A third uprising in which Rico was supported by Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin started at Villa Martelli in December 1988. They demanded an amnesty for the officers that had attended the previous rebellions. Chief of Staff Caridi at the end of four days arrested the rebels. On January 23, 1989, this time ERP guerrillas attacked the barracks of the Third Infantry Regiment at La Tablada. Due to the new defense law, Buenos Aires Provincial Police attempted to suppress the attack but failed. Later, General Gassino deployed troops and defended the military base. At the end of the clashed with many injuries and casualties, the guerrillas surrendered.³⁷⁸

Three significant issues that should be mentioned here are: First, Alfonsín had always supported the exclusion of lower ranking officers for being charged for the Dirty War. He suggested holding the trials of officers as individuals rather than as the whole army. Second, the uprisings started when the investigations began to include

³⁷⁵ Mallinder, p. 63. David Pion-Berlin, “The limits to Military Power: Institutions and Defense Budgeting in Democratic Argentina”, **Studies in Comparative International Development**, Vol: 33, No: 1, 1998, (Budgeting), p. 111.

³⁷⁶ Mallinder, p. 67.

³⁷⁷ Wendy Hunter, “Negotiating Civil-Military Relations in Post-Authoritarian Argentina and Chile”, **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol: 42, No: 2, 1998, (Negotiating), p. 306.

³⁷⁸ Huser, pp. 72-73, 113-114. Mallinder, pp. 71-73.

low-ranking officers. Alfonsín administration successfully sent the prominent figures of the Dirty War to the court and eventually to the jail.³⁷⁹ Third, the leaders of *Senta Samana* uprising emphasized that they did not rebel against president's authority.³⁸⁰ In other words, it was not a coup d'état for overthrowing the elected civilian government. It was simply unrest with pragmatic demands. In sum, these uprisings "did virtually nothing to reverse the reduction of the military's institutional prerogatives or of defense expenditures".³⁸¹

The economic problems that showed themselves as bread riots, the electoral defeats and military unrests led to the defeat of UCR during the presidential elections in 1989. The Peronist candidate Carlos Menem became president on May 14, 1989. When Alfonsín failed to gain Menem's support for the joint economic plan, he resigned to accelerate the transition period of presidency to Menem.³⁸²

After President Menem came to office, in an attempt to reach reconciliation with military, he issued a series of amnesties during 1989 and 1990. Massive economic crisis leading to the political unrest showed Menem as an incapable leader to handle the worsening situation all at once. By the end of 1990, *carapintadas* launched a revolt once again but this time the leaders of dissident soldiers were sent to trial and received life imprisonment. Moreover, the Law of Internal Security ended the internal role of the military in 1992 and compulsory military service was abolished in 1994. After the civil-military relations in Argentina had gone through ups and downs, the military was finally subordinated to the civilian power. While the Menem administration continued to curb military's political, institutional, and economic power, they also showed that "further insubordination would not be tolerated". For example, the head of the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Emilio Osses was forced to resign in 1991 after he gave a public speech on how low the defense expenditures were.³⁸³

³⁷⁹ Sikking, p. 10.

³⁸⁰ Huser, p. 108.

³⁸¹ Hunter, *Negotiating*, p. 307.

³⁸² Torre and De Riz, p. 361.

³⁸³ Mallinder, pp. 74, 78. Huser, p. 155. David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, "Democratization, Social Crisis and the Impact of Military Domestic Roles in Latin America", **Journal of Political and Military Sociology**, Vol: 33, No: 1, 2005, (Democratization), p. 20. Hunter, "Negotiating", p. 308. Wendy Hunter, "Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol: 112, No: 3, 1997, (Continuity), p. 465.

As analyzed in details in this chapter, the factors that paved the way for the Turkish 1980 coup and Argentine 1976 coup were quite similar. Both Turkey and Argentina perfectly fit the “praetorian society” concept of Samuel Huntington. The weak political institutionalization both in Turkey and Argentina was not enough to channel the political mobilization. Both societies found different methods to exercise authority. In both countries corrupt politicians existed, wealthy classes were involved in bribing, workers were continuously on strike, student riots continued non-stop and when the civilian authorities completely lost the control of state and society, both militaries launched coups.

In both countries once the politicians came to power, they did not want to leave the power easily. In order to keep their power, they turned a blind eye on their coalition partners or cabinet members as Demirel governments did to ultra-violent branches of MHP in Turkey and as Lopez Rega supported the rightist militants in Argentina. The working class was very active in both countries such as Villa Constitucion in Argentina and “Warning to Fascism” protests in Turkey. Students of both countries were involved in riots either by themselves or by joining the working class movements. In both countries both leftist militants and rightists militants conducted an armed struggle with each other or sometimes with the state forces. Hundreds of people died and injured during these clashes both from the leftists and rightists. In Argentina, Montoneros killed Secretary-General of CGT Jose Rucci in retaliation of the Ezezia Airport Massacre from the rightist Peronists. In Turkey, ex-chairman of DİSK Kemal Türkler was killed by *Ülkücüs*, the rightist groups in order to take the revenge of the assassination of ex-Prime Minister Nihat Erim. Similar figures, neither rightist nor leftist but humanist journalists David Kraiselburd in Argentina and Abdi İpekçi in Turkey were murdered. Ex-Minister of Interior Roig in Argentina and Public Prosecutor Doğan Öz in Turkey were assassinated. In both countries, thousands of people had become the victims of politically-inspired terror. Moreover, these armed organizations in both Turkey and Argentina used same tactics such as kidnapping and bank robberies.

During the pre-coup periods, the political polarization was very high in both countries. This polarization was mainly between the right and the left in Turkey. In Argentina the leftist and rightist polarization was coupled with inside-Peronism conflict. The polarization of particularly the police and other groups worsened the situation. The political polarization combined with weak and fragile governments as well as the massive economic crisis led to the loss of the legitimacy of the governments. The weak and fragile structure of coalition governments in Turkey during both Demirel's and Ecevit's rules and Hector Campora and Isabel Peron governments in Argentina created a power vacuum that was filled with corruptions, favoritism, riots, demonstrations, and strikes. Eventually, both Turkish and Argentine militaries again with the aim of establishing law and order intervened into politics.

Above all, during the military rule of both countries massive human rights violations had taken place. Torture, abduction, arbitrary trials, and detainment had become widespread practices. Compared with Turkey, such practices and human rights violations were more common in Argentina. However, the Turkish military's repressive policies were not abandoned during the post-transition period and used during the war against PKK.

The political parties, labor unions, and other political organizations were closed as soon as the military came to power both in Turkey and Argentina. The assemblies were closed and the civilian politics were halted. While civilians were assigned with day-to-day works in Turkey, the military handled all of these works in Argentina. As a result, the day-to-day works and military duties created a duality in Argentina junta coupled with the internal fractions leading to a weakening of the military rule in 1981. The Turkish military rulers and the armed forces remained unified in contrast with the Argentinean military where the internal fractions had taken place. Moreover, while Turkish military relatively recovered from the economic crises and successfully restructured Turkish economy, Argentinean economic elites failed to pull through the economic crisis. All of these failures in Argentina coupled with the massive defeat in Falklands War led to the collapse of the junta in 1983, while Turkey had experienced a military-led transition to democracy.

Following the transition to democracy, while Turkish military had preserved its dominant role in politics Argentinean military was gradually subordinated to the civilian rule. The collapse of the junta provided an upper-hand for the civilians in Argentina and the military trials began just one and a half years after the inception of the transition to democracy. In Turkey, on the other hand, the unified and successful military succeeded to keep its privileged position thanks to the exit guarantees that they established during the military rule. This difference will be analyzed in depth in the following section.

CHAPTER FOUR
AN ANALYSIS OF END OF MILITARY POWER IN ARGENTINA AND
ITS CONTINUATION IN TURKEY:
MODES OF TRANSITIONS AND INTERNAL THREATS

Both Turkey and Argentina had experienced their most brutal military rule during the 1970s and 1980s. In Turkey the military assumed power on September 12, 1980 and in Argentina on March 24, 1976. Prior to the military intervention of 1980 and 1976, both countries had experienced similar problems such as political polarization, fragmented and weak governments, terror, high mobilization of the labor class, and serious economic crises. However, although both countries accomplished their transition to democracy in the same year, in 1983, while Turkish military kept its dominant role in politics until the mid-2000s, Argentinean military gradually lost its power and was totally subordinated to civilians. This thesis concentrates on this different outcome. The study asks the question why Argentina managed to curb the power of its military in the aftermath of the transition to democracy in 1983 and Turkey did not. In an attempt to find an answer to this question this study will analyze both cases through the civil-military approaches in the context of civilian control of the military by concentrating on modes of transition and internal-external threat variables.

In order to understand why Turkish and Argentinean civil-military relations followed completely different paths, this chapter in the first section will explain the similarities and differences both countries had experienced in their political and economic developments until 1983. In an attempt to analyze different outcomes each country had experienced during the post-transition period, in the second section, the chapter will examine the modes of transition each country had gone through by focusing on transformation in Turkey and replacement in Argentina. The third section of the chapter will analyze the threat environments by referring to Michael Desch's internal and external threat arguments. During the post-transition period, while Turkey had low external threat and high internal threat that caused the weak civilian control of military, in Argentina there was high external threat and low internal threat giving the civilian actors the chance to control politics.

İ. POST-TRANSITION PERIOD: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF TURKEY AND ARGENTINA

Turkey and Argentina are two countries that are located in different continents of the world, far from each other. They belong to different cultures and religions. Despite these differences both Turkey and Argentina had patrimonial background that was inherited from their antecedents, which were the Ottoman Empire and Spanish Kingdom, respectively. These patrimonial characteristics that are embedded to state and society in both countries caused military dominance over the politics. Both countries have gone through various military coups. Interestingly enough both countries shared similar experiences such as economic and political instabilities that forced them to a military rule. However, while Argentina in the transition period following the 1976 coup managed to take military out of its politics, Turkey was not able to do so in the aftermath of the transition to democracy following the 1980 coup. Such a different outcome brings out the differences that will be explained in this section.

A. Similarities between Turkey and Argentina

There are many similarities between Turkey and Argentina both historically and institutionally. Needless to say, historically similar does not mean two countries have same roots, but both Turkey and Argentina have alike features. First of all, their antecedents Ottoman Empire and Spanish Kingdom were patrimonial states in which a strong central authority that was established in a top-down command determined the state affairs as well as daily lives of their citizens in contrast with other Western kingdoms that had loose authority over the state and people. Secondly, when the central authority had been weakened in these two empires, the military class was the first group that had been reformed in order to strengthen the state power. Thirdly, the same military classes were the founders of modern Turkey and Argentina. Fourthly, the rapid modernization of Turkey and Argentina caused similar defections in their democratic structure which led to the creation of praetorian states in these countries. Fifthly, the rapid modernization created weak political institutions and weak political

institutionalization concurred with massive political mobilization in which the former was unable to channel the latter. Lastly, as a result of the development of the similar events and factors led to the military interventions in both countries. Both countries experienced weak and fragmented governments, in which the political elites were corrupt, pursued personalist policies, and acted irresponsibly, and experienced massive economic crisis. The societies of both countries were extremely polarized (either leftist or rightists or Peronist or anti-Peronist or fractions inside Peronism) and in the end this polarization turned into violent clashes among these political groups. The working classes of countries tremendously mobilized, strikes and demonstrations became widespread. The university students both joined the armed organizations and supported working class mobilization. As a result, when the governments became paralyzed and unable to govern, the militaries of both countries intervened into the politics and ruled Turkey and Argentina.

1. Patrimonial Inheritance of Turkey and Argentina

As the patrimonial states, both in Ottoman Empire and Spanish Kingdom the unrestricted, uncontrolled, and unmediated central power was highly personalized in the hands of rulers. The statecraft of both empires was similar to the households of sultans or kings. Military forces ultimately became simply the personal instruments of the rulers in both empires. The armed forces in both countries were responsible from both external threats and internal threats. Such a tradition of being responsible from internal threats gave the militaries more power to interfere into domestic politics. When the central authority was weakened in both empires, the rulers first launched military reform programs. As a result, militaries of both countries became the first and most modernized organs of the state and the military officers became the best educated and enlightened class of their empires. These officers were first educated by the French system. Later the German-style military education and training became dominant. This led to the birth of the tradition of the military loyalty to the state and nation instead to a specific government or administration.

During the establishment of modern Turkey and Argentina, the military became a tool of national unification and modernization. The same military class was

the conductors of independence movements in Turkey and Argentina. The founders of modern Turkey were the bureaucratic-military elites of the Ottoman Empire, who led the war against the Allied powers and established the Republic of Turkey in 1923. They also became the guardians of westernization and modernization and the reforms implemented by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to accomplish this process. In Argentina the *caudillos* and their militia forces cooperated with the regular army of time and managed to establish an independent Argentina that was under the dominance of the Spanish Empire. These *caudillos* directly ruled the country until the 20th century but later indirectly influenced politics. In Turkey military-led establishment and the War of Independence created a social cohesion. Similar to Turkey, the War of Triple Alliance and the conquest of Southern Argentina (Patagonia) provided a national unity.

However, after the establishment of modern Turkey and Argentina, the rapid social change and rapid mobilization combined with slow development of political institutions created power vacuum that were filled by corruption, patron-client relations, and enforcement of ideas instead of resorting to consensus. In other words, weak political institutions were not enough to channel the political mobilization, thus created corrupt politicians, launching of labors strikes, students riots, demonstrations by the mobs. All of these negative developments in both countries eventually led to the military interventions.

2. Political and Economic Factors Leading to Military Coups in Turkey and Argentina

Prior to 1970s both Turkey and Argentina had experienced a military intervention tradition in politics. While in Turkey the military mostly preferred to intervene indirectly, in Argentina the military used its coercive force more directly. Thus, while there had been three military interventions in Turkey between 1945 and 1980 (including 1980), there were six military interventions in Argentina between 1916 and 1976 (including 1976).

Table 5: Comparison of Military Interventions in Turkey and Argentina

	Multiparty rule until 1983	Number of military interventions until 1983	Frequency of military interventions	Total length of military periods
Turkey	(1945-1983) 38 Years	3	Per 12,6 years one military intervention	6 years
Argentina	(1916-1983) 67 Years	6	Per 11.16 years one military intervention	23 years

The elite struggle has been the most significant reason for the military interventions. As already stated, until the 1950s, the same military class had been in power in Turkey. Although this military class was forced to resign from their military posts to become politicians, they still kept a military mind-set. . At the end of the Second World War, Turkey's transition to multiparty politics when CHP, the old elite's party lost power and DP came to power, new classes (urban poor, commercial middle classes, religious conservatives, and the rural population) became dominant in politics. Similar to Turkey, the military class had always been influential in Argentina. The *caudillos*, who were also large landowners with their militia forces also had close relationship with the military, had ruled the country starting from 1916 on (transition to multiparty system). The Radical Civic Union (*Union Civica Radical-UCR*) defeated National Autonomist Party (*Partido Autonomista Nacional-PAN*), which was the party of old elites, in 1916 elections. As a result, a different group (urban and rural middle classes) came to power in Argentina. However, the caudillo influence over the politics had continued even after the 1916 elections due to their close relationship with new political elites and their existence in other political institutions (such as Senate).

One can easily claim that the reasons of first military interventions in Turkey (1960) and in Argentina (1930) were quite similar. In Turkey, the military-bureaucracy class had been downgraded by the DP rule by politically and economically. Similar to Turkey, the interests of *caudillos* and military had conflicted with UCR. Moreover, there had been serious economic crisis which caused the economic decline of military class in both countries. In addition, the undemocratic attitudes of Prime Minister Menderes in Turkey, such as Investigation Committee (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*), Fatherland Front (*Vatan Cephesi*) and attacks

against CHP, and President Yrigoyen in Argentina, such as federal intervention, that frustrated the armed forces. However, in the end, the main difference in Turkey was, the leaders of 1960 intervention were able to establish strong formal prerogatives for the military such as MGK before delegating power to the civilians.

Economic crises were the fundamental factors promoting the military interventions in both countries. The degree of the impact of the economic crises on the coups had changed from one intervention to another. However, economic crises provided basis for military interventions one way or another. In Turkey, the economic crises had a significant impact on both 1960 and 1980 military interventions. In Argentina, 1929 Great Depression disastrously affected the Argentinean economy. Following the 1930 intervention, cyclical economic crises paved the way for 1943, 1955, 1966, and 1976 coups d'état. Turkish economy was more stable in contrast with Argentina during the 1960s and 1970s. However, particularly following the Cyprus intervention in 1974, Turkish economy also showed the signs of stagnation. After Cyprus intervention the US imposed arms and economic embargo on Turkey. The immigration of Turkish workers to the European countries that kept the economy relatively stable in 1960s ended during 1970s. This resulted in an increase in unemployment and budget deficit in Turkey. Meanwhile, Argentinean economy had experienced cyclical economic crisis during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Economically ineffective governments were toppled by economically inexperienced military juntas. Particularly, until the 1970s there had been lots of economic crises. Although Juan Peron tried to recover the Argentinean economy when he came to power for the second time in 1973, he was not in power for a long time. Following his death, his inexperienced wife Isabel Peron took the power and failed to recover economy causing hyperinflation. Moreover, the oil crisis also hit both Turkish and Argentinean economy leading to three digits inflations in both countries.

The weak, fragmented, and ineffective governments were another factor led the military interventions in both Turkey and Argentina. In both countries economic crisis turned into political crisis and the governments got weaker. Weak, fragmented, and corrupt governments, rise of political violence, and extreme polarization of society led to the total collapse of law and order. In Turkey, Prime Minister

Menderes in 1960 and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in 1971 were unable to control the street clashes and political polarization among the society. Between 1973 and 1980, immobility of the governments was common since no party gained absolute majority in the assembly. Ten successive governments were established in seven years. Most of them were in power for less than a year. Some of them failed to receive the vote of confidence. There were coalition governments that were consisted of irrelevant parties (CHP-MSP), minority governments, and governments with extremist parties (MC cabinets). These coalitions were vulnerable because in order to stay in the Assembly or cabinet, small parties used political blackmails and rejected electoral resolutions, and instead supported polarization in politics. The Turkish Parliament even was not be able to elect a new president due to this extreme polarization.

The political situation was quite similar in Argentina. Especially after the ban on Peronism by 1955 coup administration, there had always been a political representation problem. Peronists generally boycotted the elections or voted for the presidential candidate who was implicitly supported by Juan Peron. This situation created a legitimacy problem for elected presidents. The low electoral turnout and one-time-given votes restricted the political maneuvering area of presidents. This situation gave armed forces an upper hand particularly in 1962 and 1966 military interventions and removal of Presidents Frondizi and Illia from power. The increase in the weakness, fragmentation, and ineffectivity of governments between 1973 and 1976 period paved the way for 1976 coup. Although all were Peronist, three consecutive presidents came to office in three years between 1973 and 1976. The first president Hector Campora was nothing but a caretaker thus had no political legitimacy, instead he took the orders directly from Juan Peron. The second president was Juan Peron, who passed away after one and a half year of presidency. The last one was Isabel Peron, wife and vice-president of Juan Peron, who did not have much legitimacy and was very inexperienced. Therefore, she was not able to control the state. Constant changes in presidency created instability in the governments. Moreover, the inside-Peronism polarization between the leftist-Peronists and rightist-Peronists caused immobility of governments. Leftist-Peronists were expelled from the Peronist coalition by Juan Peron just after he came to power in 1973. In return,

the leftist-Peronist organizations, especially Montoneros, launched armed struggle against the rightist-Peronists. Consequently, Argentina was dragged to total collapse after the death of Juan Peron. Prior to military intervention, the Peronist coalition was disbanded and the Peronist party lost majority in the Congress, paralyzing the Argentinean politics.

The immobility of governments and massive economic problems along with the changing global and regional political environment eventually affected both Turkey and Argentina. The rise of the leftist ideology globally and in regional scale, like Cuban Revolution, led the establishment of leftist organizations in Turkey and Argentina. However, the harsh measurements against leftists by the state and rightist organizations led to the armed clashes among those groups. Especially during the 1960s and 1970s, there had been tremendous amount of political terror among leftist guerrillas, rightist militias, and state security forces both in Turkey and Argentina. The weak civilian governments were unable to suppress the fight among leftists and rightists. As a result the power vacuum created by these governments was filled by the armed forces. The militaries intervened into politics to end the clashes in 1971 and 1980 in Turkey and in 1966 and 1976 in Argentina. Especially during the 1970s, political terrorism reached to its peak point in both countries. The *Ülkücüs* in Turkey and Triple-A in Argentina through governmental protection justified their illegal acts. Both leftist and rightist organizations committed illegal acts such as kidnapping of politicians and businessmen and bank robberies. Politically prominent figures, intellectuals, and professors were killed by these organizations. In addition to political terror, there were also religious and sectarian clashes in Turkey during the same period.

All of these factors led extreme political polarization of the society during 1960s and 1970s in Turkey and Argentina. However, the polarization of state and society reached to its peak point particularly during the 1970s. Workers, teachers, civil servants, university and high-school students, and even policemen were polarized in both Turkey and Argentina. While leftist policemen had protected leftist youth, rightist polices favored rightist militants. Thus, the state apparatus was in chaos and immobility. Moreover, working class was highly mobilized in Turkey and Argentina by launching many strikes and protests during this period. Besides the

strikes, factory occupations and absenteeism were very common at that time in Argentina.

As a consequence of similar factors including weak, vulnerable and fragmented governments, massive economic crisis, extreme polarization of society, irresponsible and corrupt politicians military interventions had taken place both in Turkey and Argentina. While Argentinean army launched its sixth military intervention on March 24, 1976, Turkish military intervened into the politics for the third time on September 12, 1980.

B. Differences between Turkey and Argentina

As broadly explained above Turkish and Argentinean political life had many similarities until the military coups of 1980 in Turkey and 1976 in Argentina and their post-transition periods. However, differences between the two countries showed themselves during the military rule, transition periods, and post-transition periods. These shifts that had taken place during these three periods help us to understand why Turkish military continued to exert its power following the transition to multi-party system and Argentinean military was gradually subordinated to civilians.

The differences between Turkey and Argentina can be summarized under four headlines. Firstly, whereas Turkey achieved relatively economic success during the military period, Argentina failed to restore its economy. Secondly, while Turkish military elites stayed in power for a relatively short time, preserved army's monolithic structure, and did not experience any conflict in the army itself or a defeat by an external power, Argentinean military was not unified and military rulers changed for four times during the military rule. In addition, the military failed to keep internal cohesion, and finally was defeated in the Malvinas/Falklands War.

Thirdly, these failures caused civilian frustration in Argentina and the mode of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy emerged as "replacement", whereas relatively success of Turkish military junta to bring law and order and improve the economy created an opportunity to shape the post-transition period. As a result, the mode of transition in Turkey had taken the shape of "transformation". Lastly, different threat environments during these periods created weakness or

strength in civilian control of military. In Argentina high external threat and low internal threat caused civilian prominence in 1982 following its defeat in Malvinas/Falklands War. However, in Turkey, the low external threat and high internal threat caused by the attacks of PKK in early 1980s led to a continuation of military's dominance in politics. This section only covers the first two differences but the remaining two will be analyzed in depth with the help of approaches of modes of transition and internal vs. external threat arguments.

1. Success and Failure: Comparison of economic reforms Turkey and Argentina

Both Turkey and Argentina had similar economic histories. The import-substitution industrialization (ISI)³⁸⁴ economic model was established in both countries after the 1929 Great Depression. This model lasted until the end of 1970s and both countries had experienced more or less similar economic problems that were derived from ISI. They were both inevitably affected by the same global economic crisis between 1920s and 1970s. The protectionist economic system created many troubles that led to many political and social crises during that period. In addition to these crises, black marketing and deficiency of vital products in the market were common in both countries. Prior to military interventions, economic crisis of both countries became unbearable, price-indexes increased and chronic inflation turned into hyperinflation.

Consequently, both countries left ISI model and restructured their economies with export-oriented industrialization. Interestingly enough, it was obvious that this kind of massive transformations could only be applied under the extra-political environments. In other words, normal party politics and free civil society were the obstacles for economic transformations. While Turkish economic reform was launched just nine months (January 24 decisions) before the military intervention and continued during the military rule, Argentinean economic restructuring was also

³⁸⁴ The ISI-led political and social problems in the Latin America were largely evaluated by Guillermo O'Donnell in his masterpiece **Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics** (Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973).

initiated by the military. Although Argentinean military sacked everyone in their posts and appointed army officers, Ministry of Economy was one of the two ministries that permitted to rule by civilians during the coup period.

However, while Turkish transformation was relatively successful and economic crisis was diffused, Argentinean transformation failed and economic crisis continued during the military period. Moreover, Turgut Özal and his team that launched the Turkish transformation under the military control continued the same process once they came to power in the 1983 elections following the military rule period. In other words, same people handled the economic transition during and in the aftermath of the coup. In contrast with Turkey, Argentina's economic transformation was unsuccessful. Economic fluctuations not only had occurred during the military period but also continued after the transition. Even the appointment of a well-known economist Jose Martinez de Hoz as the Minister of Economy did not help to remedy the fiscal problems. In the following two years of military period four more economy ministers were appointed. In other words the economic staff was forced to change whenever a new junta leader came to power. Not only during the military rule, but also during the civilian rule of Presidency of Ricardo Alfonsín four different economy ministers were in charge. As a result, constant changes also led the failure of Argentinean economic recovery.

2. Strength and Weakness: Political Comparison of Turkish and Argentinean Coups

Turkish military rule was not only economically strong in contrast with Argentinean junta but also politically resilient. Especially following the 1976 coups, Argentinean military junta had gradually lost its power due to the leader changes, economic failure, and defeat in Malvinas/Falklands War. In contrast, Turkish military rule remained solid, economic restoration was relatively successful, and did not experience any defeat.

First of all, military as part of its nature is not an institution to govern a country. Thus, while Turkish military rulers delegated day-to-day works to civilians and established a civilian cabinet for this reason, Argentinean military was heavily

involved into daily politics. Rather than civilians, the military was in charge of day-to-day functions of the government. Moreover, the day-to-day works and military duties by creating duality in Argentinean military structure caused many problems.

Secondly, in contrast with a long military rule in Argentina that lasted for seven years, Turkish military remained in power only for three years. Turkish military delegated its power to civilians before his strength and credibility eroded. However, Argentinean junta handed over the power to civilians after they became weak and their credibility eroded.

Besides these institutional differences, there were two more differences between the post-transition periods in Turkey and Argentina. These were the modes of transition and internal-external threats. These two differences give an explanation to the continuation or discontinuation of the power of the military in the aftermath of the coups of late 1970s and early 1980s. The following sections will analyze the research question of the thesis by concentrating on the modes of transition and internal and external threat arguments.

II. ANALYZING THE DIFFERENT OUTCOMES: MODES OF TRANSITION

This thesis aims to find an answer to the difference between the civil-military relations of Turkey and Argentina. Although both countries had experienced similar political and economic backgrounds, in the aftermath of 1980 coup while Turkish military preserved its dominant position in politics, Argentinean military's privileged status was abolished following the transition period after the 1976 coup. In order to analyze this difference this thesis makes use of two approaches related to civil-military relations: the modes of transition and arguments concerning internal-external threats.

A. Mode of Transition

As indicated in the first Chapter, transitions are the first battles for democracy that starts with the dissolution of the authoritarian regime and ends with the

installation of some form of democracy. The “some form” of democracy is ultimately related to the modes of transition. The choices that are available during the transition periods led to structural modifications in political institutions and rules. Moreover, these choices can form the preferences and capabilities of actors during and in the aftermath of the regime changes.

Different modes of transition have different effects on the impact of the role of military on politics in the aftermath of the transitions. Many scholars classified these modes of transitions in various ways. However, as can be seen in the first chapter despite these numerous and various categorization of modes of transition, in sum they all end up in three types of means of transition. As broadly analyzed in the Chapter One on theoretical framework, there are three kinds of modes of transition from authoritarian rule to the democracy, which are regime-led transitions, opposition-led transitions, and transitions realized with the negotiation between regime and opposition. Huntington actually classifies these modes as transformation, replacement, and transplacement. Transformations take place when the ruling authoritarian elites lead the transitions to democracy. Replacements, in contrast, occur when opposition groups break through transformation from authoritarian rule to democracy. Transplacements represent the middle ground between transformation and replacement in which the transition to democracy happens by the joint action of regime and opposition groups. In this categorization while transition to civilian rule in Turkey can be classified as the regime-led type of transition, Argentinean transition can be identified as an opposition-led transition.

Turkish transition to civilian rule in the aftermath of 1980 coup can be acknowledged as Alfred Stepan’s “transition initiated by the military government” mode of transition among the ten different classifications of modes of transition he had categorized. Argentina rather suits to the “transitions caused by social upheavals” due to the dominance of the civil society dominance the transition period. Likewise Stepan, Gerardo Munck and Carol Leff set many different modes of transition according to the “identity of the agent of change” and “agent of change strategy”. In Turkey the incumbent elite was the identity of the agent of change and their strategy was accommodation. As a result, the mode of transition had taken place as a conservative reform. According to Munck and Leff, in Argentina the identity of

the agent of change was both incumbent and counter-elite and change strategy was confrontation, therefore the mode of transition emerged as reform through rupture.

J. Samuel Valenzuela set forth three different modes of transition, which are collapse, defeat, or withdrawal, extrication, and reform. While Argentina fits the collapse, defeat, or withdrawal, Turkey suits the reform modes of transition. However, Valenzuela makes a second classification according to the attitudes of military governments during the transition which are “full democratization”, “prefer liberalized authoritarian regime but will accept democratization”, and “opposed to democratization”. While Argentina perfectly fits the second attitude, (prefer liberalized authoritarian regime but will accept democratization) it is hard to define Turkey with one of these attitudes, thus, it will be better to place Turkey in the middle of second and third attitudes (prefer liberalized authoritarian regime but will accept democratization and opposed to democratization).

Terry Lynn Karl presents four different modes of transitions according to their strategies and relative actor strength. With elite ascendant and force characteristics Turkey fits the imposition mode of transition. However, with mass ascendant and compromise features Argentina suits reform mode of transition. Similar to Karl, Gary Stradiotto and Sujian Guo point out four different modes of transition by taking “the relative balance of power among incumbent and opposition elites during the transition” into consideration. This relative balance of power was in favor of military in Turkey whereas on the side of civilians in Argentina. Thus, while Turkey’s mode of transition was conversion, Argentina’s was collapse. Juan Linz presents two different modes of transitions which are *ruptura* and *reforma*. While the former represents a clean break with the past without authoritarian domination, the latter means the transition without the participation of the opposition. Therefore, while the mode of transition of Argentina was *ruptura*, Turkey with some concerns was *reforma*.

However, this thesis prefers to refer to Samuel Huntington’s categorization of modes of transition which are transformation, replacement, and transplacement in order to analyze the difference concerning the changes in civil-military relations in

Turkey and Argentina.³⁸⁵ More specifically, although both countries had similar civil-military relations backgrounds, in the aftermath of 1980 intervention in Turkey and 1976 coup in Argentina, Turkey had experienced “transformation” and Argentina had gone through “replacement”. Therefore, both countries had experienced different levels of civilian control of military in the aftermath of the coup periods.

1. Turkey’s Regime-led Transition: Transformation

The mode of transition of Turkey in 1983 as classified by Huntington was “transformation”. The military elites of Turkey promoted the transition and they played an important role in replacing the authoritarian regime with democracy. As evaluated broadly before, the military rule of Turkey was well-established; there had been no significant political opposition, no economic crisis, and no breakdown of coercive system during their rule. Therefore, the military elites had dominated the transition and post-transition period.

According to Huntington, transformation takes place if reformers are stronger than standpatters, if the government is stronger than the opposition on the regime side, and if the moderates are stronger than the extremists on the opposition side.³⁸⁶ In Turkey authoritarian reformers were stronger than standpatters.³⁸⁷ Indeed, there were no standpatters among Turkish military elites because from the beginning of the military rule, top staff of the army constantly declared their intention of transition to democracy. Most importantly in the 1980 coup, unlike 1960 coup there was no division in the military. There were no dissent voices and the absolute power was under the control of Chief of General Staff. Therefore, such a top down strong hierarchical situation did not permit the existence of standpatters. In 1983 the military administration acting as the government was stronger than the opposition (which actually hardly existed). Due to 1982 Constitution and the prerogatives and exit guarantees, the military administration gained tremendous amount of control

³⁸⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, “How Countries Democratize”, **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol: 106, No: 4, 1991-1992, (How), pp.579-616.

³⁸⁶ Huntington, How, p. 590.

³⁸⁷ Standpatters stand for the faction in authoritarian elites who are against democratic transition

making itself very powerful and hindering any kind of potential opposition. The Turkish military was mainly able to do this due to the power it gained through exit guarantees.

Huntington argues that militaries establish exit guarantees in order to manipulate the post-transition period, prevent possible human rights trials, and preserve economic privileges. Ergun Özbudun proposed five exit guarantees as tutelary powers, reserved domains, manipulation of the electoral process, irreversibility of actions of the military regime, and amnesty or indemnity laws and analyzed them by applying to the Turkish military.³⁸⁸

Özbudun's first exit guarantee, the tutelary powers are established by the military to enable itself to possess broad oversight over the government and its policy decisions. The first way to do this is through an insertion of "certain substantive values cherished by the military – such as the territorial integrity of the state, national sovereignty, law and order, ... and secularism" into the constitution. Accordingly, the 1982 constitution that was written by the military dominated constitutional assembly included these kinds of codifications concerning the protection of territorial and national integrity of the state as well as the principles of Kemalism. Moreover, the institutions that were dominated by the military were delegated with the constitutional duty of preserving such values.³⁸⁹

As the second tool of tutelary powers, the military increased the powers of the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Konseyi* –MGK) under the Article 118 of the 1982 constitution. On the one hand, Article 118 had determined the members of the council rigidly, on the other hand, it enhanced MGK's powers by changing the wording as "the Council of Ministers shall *give priority* consideration to the decisions of" MGK (italics were added). Thirdly, the Article 35 of the Military Internal Service Code entrusted guardianship role to Turkish Armed Forces written as "protecting and safeguarding the Turkish motherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the constitution". The military frequently used this article for justifying their direct or indirect interventions to the civilian politics.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁸ Ergun Özbudun, **Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation**, Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner, 2000, (Challenges), p. 106.

³⁸⁹ Özbudun, Challenges, pp. 106-110.

³⁹⁰ Özbudun, Challenges, pp. 106-110.

Lastly, the broad and vague concept of national security was broadened by the Law on the MGK. The Article 2 of the law defined national security as “the protection of the constitutional order of the state, its national existence, and its integrity; of all of its interests in the international field, including political social, cultural, and economic interests; and of interests derived from international treaties against all external and internal threats”. As analyzed in this study, Turkish military continued to get involved not only to the external, but also the internal threats.³⁹¹ In addition, the same law granted “unlimited access to any civilian agency and the authority to monitor the implementation of recommendations forwarded by the [MGK] to the Council of Ministers”.³⁹²

As his second exit guarantee, Özbudun explained reserved domains quoting from J. Samuel Valenzuela as “remove specific areas of governmental authority and substantive policy making from purview of elected officials”. The 1961 Constitution did not include such domains at the beginning but during the 1971-1973 military rule some articles were added to the constitution. The armed forces were exempted from the audition of the Court of Accounts (*Sayıştay*). The Supreme Military Administrative Court (*Askeri Yüksek İdare Mahkemesi*) was established and authorized with the judicial review of administrative acts and actions of the military personnel. In other words, the oversight of civilian administrative court was removed. The State Security Courts (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri*) was established and one of the three judges of these courts were appointed from military judges. The September 12 military rule further enhanced these domains. The military was exempted from the supervision of State Supervisory Council (*Devlet Denetleme Kurulu*). The Supreme Military Council (*Yüksek Askeri Şura*), which deals with the appointments, promotions, retirements, and disciplinary actions, became completely independent from civilian judicial control. With the Law on the State of Siege, appeals to the civilian courts against decisions of martial law commanders were exempted.³⁹³ Moreover, the military consistently meddled with the appointments in the Ministry of Defense. Until 2004, the undersecretary at Ministry of Defense was

³⁹¹ Özbudun, Challenges, pp. 106-110.

³⁹² Gareth Jenkins, “Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”, *International Affairs*, Vol: 83, No: 2, 2007, p.344.

³⁹³ Özbudun, Challenges, pp. 110-112.

always chosen from serving generals and the appointments of other staff were approved by the office of the Chief of General Staff. Thus, the Minister of Defense was perceived as the inferior of the Chief of General Staff. In addition, the military also interfered into the business of Ministry of Interior. Besides the direct control of gendarmerie and coastal guard units, some civil servants of the Ministry of Interior were actually educated in military schools.³⁹⁴

As the third exit guarantee, Özbudun refers to the manipulation of the electoral process. The militaries also manipulate the electoral process before delegating power to the civilian authority in order to preserve their dominant position in politics. These kinds of attempts may either limit the founding elections (first free election) or have more enduring effects. The first way for the military to preserve its domination in elections is done by guaranteeing the election of the leader of military regime as the president for the incoming civilian rule. In the Turkish case, election of coup leader and former Chief of General Staff Evren was an example of this method. Secondly, the military adopted provisional articles to ban the political activities of former politicians. Moreover, the first prime minister following the 1980 coup, Özal was against the removal of the political bans during the 1987 referendum period since such restrictions worked in his favor. Thirdly, as broadly evaluated in the previous chapter, the military regime arbitrarily determined which leaders and parties would participate to the elections. Lastly, by putting the formal MGK members of the military regime into a Presidential Council, the military guaranteed its dominance in politics for another six years period.³⁹⁵

As the fourth exit guarantee, Özbudun mentions the irreversibility of the military's actions. Most of the military regimes took measures to stop any attempt to reverse the policies they followed during the authoritarian military rule. The Provisional Article 15 of the 1982 constitution prevented anybody to challenge the laws passed by the ruling military council as unconstitutional before the Constitutional Court. In addition, the Provisional Article 9 of the 1982 constitution had provided "for a six-year period following the convening of the newly elected parliament, the presidential veto of constitutional amendments could be overridden

³⁹⁴ Gerassimos Karabelias, "Dictating the Uppertide: Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Özal Decade, 1993-2003", *Turkish Studies*, Vol: 9, No: 3, 2008, pp. 462-464.

³⁹⁵ Özbudun, *Challenges*, pp. 112-114.

only by a three-fourths (instead of the usual two-thirds) majority of the full membership of parliament”.³⁹⁶

Adopting amnesty laws on the crimes, such as human rights violations, that were committed by the military officers were very common in transformations. The Provisional Article 15 of the 1982 constitution had protected “members of the ruling military councils, members of the government, and all officials acting the orders against criminal and civil proceedings; no recourse in any court was allowed involving those officials’ criminal, financial, or civil responsibilities.”³⁹⁷ This provisional article provided a shield for the military regime for a long time and crimes of September 12 remained unpunished.

Moreover, as an exit guarantee, the Turkish Armed Forces preserved institutional strength in terms of economic power and number of personnel. The defense budget of Turkey boomed in 1981 during the military rule. While it was 1.876 million US dollars in 1980 then it rose to 2.316 million US dollars. The defense budget remained almost the same between 1981 and 1989. At the end of the decade defense budget of Turkey was 2.715 million US dollars.³⁹⁸ Turkey became extremely important for the US during that period after the Islamic revolution in Iran and invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979. Therefore despite the human rights abuses, the US continued its military assistance to Turkey. Legal arm sales and the annual US military assistance increased from 413.2 million US dollars in 1980 to 1.3205 billion US dollars in 1987. Much of this assistance was later used in the fight against PKK.³⁹⁹ The structure of Turkish military remained the same during the 1980s. The number of military personnel in Turkey also showed some increase between 1980 and 1990. During the military rule the number of military personnel, with active soldiers and conscripts, was almost 600,000. However, it rose

³⁹⁶ Özbudun, *Challenges*, pp. 114-115.

³⁹⁷ Özbudun, *Challenges*, pp. 115-116.

³⁹⁸ Feroz Ahmad, **The Making of Modern Turkey**, Routledge, London and New York, 1993, p. 206. Latif Wahid, **Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in the Middle East**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009, p. 83.

³⁹⁹ Tim Jacoby, “Political Violence, the ‘War on Terror’ and the Turkish Military”, **Critical Studies on Terrorism**, Vol: 3, No: 1, 2010, p 103.

almost to 700,000 in 1987. Although the conscripts were declined in 1986, the number of military personnel continued to increase during the same year.⁴⁰⁰

Besides the hardly existing opposition, Turkey was not experiencing an economic crisis during the military rule. The restrictions on daily politics as well as trade unions and working class provided a free environment for the economic restructuring. Despite suppression on politics, the economic restrictions were removed. Foreign investors were encouraged and an agreement was signed with the IMF. The inflation decreased from 107.2 per cent to 36.8 in 1981, 25.2 in 1982, and 30.5 in 1983. The export rates grew during the 1980s. The export rate in GDP which was 2.77 in 1979 rose to 6.4 in 1981, 8.7 in 1982, and 9.2 in 1983. As a result of the new economic policy the chronic vital product shortage ended with the removal of economic restrictions. Moreover, the investments in the infrastructure and utilities also rose. Despite a short term crisis in 1982, known as *Banker Crisis*, there were no major problems in the economy during the military rule.⁴⁰¹

Moreover, there was no strong opposition to military's coercive power or there was no breakdown of coercive system. This was mainly the result of the iron fist of the military during the coup period. As soon as the military launched the intervention, it declared martial law and state of siege. Later, the armed forces suspended the civilian politics, closed the assembly and banned the political parties. The leaders of the political parties were arrested, imprisoned or sent into exile. Around 10,000 political suspects fled from Turkey. Among the 30,000 people that were arrested, 3600 of them were sentenced to death and 49 of them were executed. In addition, all organizations –political or non-political- and labor unions (except moderate and rightist *Türk-iş*) were closed. Strikes, lockouts, and public demonstrations were banned. As a result of all these restrictions there was no opposition or attempt for a crackdown of coercive regime. Since there was hardly a

⁴⁰⁰ Evren Balta, **Military Success, State Capacity and Internal War-making in Russia and Turkey**, (Unpublished PhD Dissertation), The City University of New York the Graduate Faculty in Political Science, New York, 2007, p. 138.

⁴⁰¹ Eric C. Zürcher, **Turkey: A Modern History**, 7th Edition, I. B. Tauris, London and New York, 2005, pp. 306-310. Hikmet Uluğbay, “1981-90 Döneminde Türkiye’nin Temel Ekonomik Göstergeleri”, **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler Yorumlar**, Vol: 2, (Ed. Baskın Oran), 9th Edition, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p. 15. Hikmet Uluğbay, “1961-1980 Döneminde Türkiye’nin Temel Ekonomik Göstergeleri”, **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Vol: 1, (Ed. Baskın Oran), 12th Edition, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p. 662.

significant opposition, it was not possible to identify opposition as moderate or extremist in the Turkish case.

If so, why did the Turkish military aim to delegate power to civilians in a (relatively) short time? First of all, the military was aware that costs of staying in power would be much more than leaving power. Secondly, the military took the advantage of structuring the post-transition. By doing so they managed to weaken the potential opposition. Thirdly, the military leaders have already planned the post-transition period by holding the most important institutions including presidency, presidential council, the MGK under their control and by possessing other prerogatives and privileges. Fourthly, as a result of the human rights violations, especially European Community had put pressure on the military rule. As a result, the top staff in order not to deteriorate Turkey's relations with the European and other international organizations had planned the transition to civilian rule as soon as it came to power. Lastly, and similar to the previous factor the leader of the military rule Kenan Evren constantly declared the aim of military as returning the democracy, and defined democracy as the right form of government.⁴⁰² Turkish military elites never considered themselves as the permanent rulers of the country. Instead, they had always declared their intention as once they maintain law and order; they would leave the power and return back to their military duties. However, the timing for "returning military duties" and post-transition structure were also determined by the military.

To sum up, the political strength and economic successes of the Turkish army during the military rule provided a great leverage for it to dominate the transition and post-transition period. This domination of politics in the aftermath of the transition can be called as "transformation" in terms of Huntington in which the ruling military regime led the transition to democracy. Therefore, Turkish military granted many exit guarantees for itself such as tutelary powers, reserved domains, manipulation of the electoral process, irreversibility of actions of the military regime, and amnesty or indemnity laws as broadly explained above. As argued by Valenzuela, if mode of

⁴⁰² The degree of military elites', in particular Evren's, democracy aim is controversial. However, the best example of "minimal democracy" aim of military rule was emphasized in the preamble of 1982 Constitution: "This constitution ... is entrusted by the Turkish nation to the patriotism and nationalism of its democracy-loving sons and daughters".

transition is regime-led and even if the military seem to willingly return to its barracks, they may still influence civilian rule. Even worse, they may still hold the capacity to re-intervene in politics.⁴⁰³ The case of Turkey perfectly fits these assumptions.

2. Argentina's Opposition-led Transition: Replacement

In contrast with Turkey, following the 1976 coup Argentina's mode of transition in 1983 –as classified by Huntington— was replacement. Replacements occur when opposition groups take the lead to the transition to democracy. More specifically, replacement mode of transition takes place when the opposition is stronger than the government and when the moderates are stronger than the extremists (in both government and opposition side). Moreover, possible weakness of moderates compared to the extremists on the opposition side leads to the downfall of the regime and the democratic system.⁴⁰⁴

This mode of transition perfectly fits the Argentinean transition in 1982 and 1983. The authoritarian moderates (Videla-Viola faction) were removed in 1982 and hardliners (Galtieri faction) came to power in Argentina. In other words, prior to transition standpatters were in charge in Argentina. Later, the defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands War in 1982 had taken place as a triggering event for the erosion of military junta's strength. After the erosion of military's strength the standpatters were removed and the moderates (Bignone) came to power.

From the beginning of the military rule in 1976 until 1981, the military junta was led by General Videla who was considered as more moderate compared to General Galtieri faction. As a result, for the first five years of military period there had been no major fractions, at least, no disagreements came to surface as in contrast with the following period. After the retirement of General Videla the fractions among the military rulers became prominent. Although General Viola succeeded General Videla, who was in the same moderate faction, he was obliged to leave the office as a

⁴⁰³ J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion Process, and Facilitating Conditions", **The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies**, Working Paper No: 150, 1990, p. 23.

⁴⁰⁴ Huntington, How, p. 590.

result of a coup within a coup that was led by the hardliner faction, which used Viola's health problems as a pretext. As a result a hardliner, General Galtieri came to power. The political and economic decline of the junta accelerated with the beginning of Galtieri's term.

Above all, the main failure of the military junta was on the economic restructuring. The chart below summarizes the price inflation between 1976 and 1986 in Argentina.

Table 6: Price inflation in Argentina, 1976-1986.⁴⁰⁵

Year	Percent	Year	Percent
1976	444	1982	164
1977	176	1983	343
1978	175	1984	626
1979	159	1985	672
1980	108	1986	90
1981	104		

The numbers clearly show that the hyperinflation became chronic during the military rule and the situation worsened in 1982, eventually the Malvinas/Falklands disaster caused the total collapse. As a result of the arbitrary acts of the military junta, such as removing the Peronist civil servants for replacing pro-military ones, the economic restructuring failed. Even after the transition to democracy the new economy administration was not able to decrease the massive inflation quickly. In addition, while the growth of GDP (annual average) had been 2.1 per cent during 1973-1976 and 2.2 percent during 1977-1979, it fell to 1.8 per cent between 1980

⁴⁰⁵ J. C. Brown, pp. 223, 266.

and 1983. In sum, the efforts for restructuring Argentinean economy from ISI to export oriented one failed.⁴⁰⁶

The second failure of the military junta was its human rights record. Thousands of people were abducted, imprisoned, tortured, and disappeared during the seven years of military period. Although the official numbers reveal that 9,000 Argentines disappeared, in fact the real number was estimated to be 30,000 people. The concentration camps were established for killing the people. Many Argentines were buried in mass graves or dumped into the ocean. The babies of pregnant abductees were kidnapped and given to the military officers.

The third failure of the military rule was the factionalism inside the armed forces. First of all, three branches of the Argentinean Armed Forces had great disagreements about the policies that should be followed and implemented. While the land forces were more moderate the navy was more of a hardliner. These two branches showed their duality through the policies they followed. Moreover, the handling of the armed forces day-to-day functions of the government also created an administrative duality for the armed forces. It was not clear whether they were responsible from the governmental functions or from the security of the country. Lastly, the fragmented structure of the armed forces became prominent during the Malvinas/Falklands War.⁴⁰⁷ The collapse of the chain of command caused the defeat of the Argentinean military vis-à-vis the British.

The defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands War became a triggering event for the erosion of the popular support to the military rule. General Galtieri left the office and more moderate General Bignone became the leader of junta in the final days of military rule. The three failures, economic crisis, human rights record and Falklands disaster, led to the emergence of political mobilization that clearly fits Huntington's replacement mode of transition.

On the opposition side, the moderates were more powerful than the extremists. By time this opposition, which was consisted from ex-political organizations, labor unions, university students, relatives of the victims of the

⁴⁰⁶ Felipe A. M. de la Balze, **Remaking the Argentine Economy**, New York, Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1995, pp. 51,56.

⁴⁰⁷ Falklands War and the failure of military will broadly be explained under the internal threat vs. external threat subtitle.

military rule, human rights supporters, and the Catholic Church, gained more strength against the government, as a result of the failures. Mass demonstrations, protests, and strikes became widespread. As a result, the military elites had no chance to negotiate the post-transition period. Transition to civilian rule had taken place due to the rise of civilian opposition which was the result of the decreasing power of authoritarian regime. Lastly, the civilian moderates never lost their power against the extremists in the post-transition period. The political elites and civil society always demonstrated its support to democracy during the military rebellions and the extremist attacks like La Tablada was an exceptional one.

As a result, the military left the office with no exit guarantees in order to prevent the potential punishments and the retaliation they could get. After almost one and a half year, the trials of military top staff began with the charges of homicide, illegal imprisonment of people, and the use of torture against detained persons. On December 9, 1985, only two years after the transition to democracy, the verdicts were announced. General Videla and Admiral Massera was sentenced to life imprisonment, General Viola was sentenced for 17 years, Admiral Lambruschini for 8 years, and Brigadier General Agosti for 4.5 years of imprisonment. Brigadier General Omar Graffigna was acquitted. General Galtieri, General Anaya, and General Dozo were also acquitted but sentenced for 12, 14 and 8 years of imprisonment respectively, following their trial on Falklands War.⁴⁰⁸

Alfonsín administration also launched other important legal and structural reforms. His aim was a doctrinal reform for enhancing technical capabilities of the armed forces while redefining their role with external defense, a limited space in which the military would enjoy technical autonomy.⁴⁰⁹ On January 31, 1984, some of the president's authority was delegated to the Minister of Defense. The authority of nominations and changes in assignment of all officers of colonel's grade and above were given to the Minister of Defense. A new Chief of Joint Staff and three force commanders were appointed after a few days of Alfonsín's inauguration. In July

⁴⁰⁸ Herbert C. Huser, **Argentine Civil-Military Relations from Alfonsín to Menem**, National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 2002, pp. 101-102.

⁴⁰⁹ Paul W. Zagorski, "Civil-Military Relations and Argentine Democracy: The Armed Forces under the Menem Government", **Armed Forces and Society**, Vol: 20, No: 3, 1994, p. 424.

1984 Border Troops (*Gendarmeria Nacional*), in October 1984 Coast Guard (*Prefectura Naval*) was authorized by the Minister of Defense.⁴¹⁰

The number of officers was dramatically reduced from 96,000 in 1983 to 53,000 in 1987 and 57,500 in 1989 in the final year of Alfonsín administration. Between 1983 and 1989, among 264 highest-ranking officers 179 of them were forced to get retired. The number of conscripts was reduced from 64,640 in 1983 to 24,921 in 1987. Not only the number of military personnel was decreased also military's budget was reduced. In fact these budget reforms were not related to national security, but they were implemented for economic purposes in order to achieve the general fiscal and monetary objectives. In 1984, the military budget was cut almost 40 per cent in contrast with the 1983 military budget. As a result, the salary of the military members came to the same level of a civil servant. This budget cut coincided with the massive economic crisis and many military members in order to survive financially were forced to take second jobs. In addition, the arms imports were reduced from 975 million US dollars in 1983 to 435 million US dollars in 1984 and 95 million US dollars in 1986. Moreover, the authorization *Fabricaciones Militares* was transferred from military to the Ministry of Defense and a civilian manager was appointed.⁴¹¹

The most important adoption was the *Ley de Defensa Nacional* (Law of National Defense) which was promulgated on April 26, 1988 after long debates and challenges. With the approval of this law, the national security doctrine was not an official military policy any more.⁴¹² This law marked the primacy of the president over civil-military relations. It limited the "defense" with only external aggression and "stated that the internal security will be ruled by a special law". In other words, the law restricted the military's functions with external defense and withdrew its obligations from internal security. Moreover, it ended the military responsibility of national intelligence and anti-subversion.⁴¹³ Most importantly, the *Ley de Defensa Nacional* led to the establishment of National Defense Council, which was consisted

⁴¹⁰ Huser, pp. 54-55.

⁴¹¹ Huser, pp. 64-84. David Pion-Berlin, "Civil-Military Circumvention: How Argentine State Institutions Compensate for a Weakened Chain of Command", **Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives**, (Ed. David Pion-Berlin), The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 2001, (Circumvention), p. 148.

⁴¹² Zagorski, p. 433.

⁴¹³ Huser, p. 71.

of vice-president, cabinet ministers, and the head of intelligence for providing the president with advice on defense and security issues. By excluding the military from this council, this law provided the ultimate authority in setting defense priorities free from the military interference.⁴¹⁴ As part of these reforms the military education was also reformed. A civilian director was appointed to the National Defense School (*Escuela de Defensa Nacional*). Moreover, the curricula were changed and new courses concentrated on democratic government and keeping the military away from politics.⁴¹⁵

To sum up, the economic failure of Argentinean junta coincided with the political setbacks, such as the defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands War, as well as the rise of democratic opposition to the armed forces led to the collapse of military rule in 1982. In Huntington's classification this transition can be considered as a replacement since the military elites left power without any exit guarantees. As a result, the incoming civilian rule, Alfonsín administration, curbed the powers and privileges of the military, abolished its economical concessions, and sent junta members to the court for the human rights abuses. Therefore, in contrast to Turkey, diminishing of the power of the military in Argentina paved the way for effective civilian control of military in the following period.

III. ANALYZING THE DIFFERENT OUTCOMES: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS

Threats are potential adversaries against the states. As broadly evaluated in the first chapter on theoretical framework, this "potential" feature stems from the perceptions of civilian and military elites that have been shaped in the course of time. This thesis does not reject the material definitions of threats and security. However, it claims that the states are embedded into the security environments that have been established by cultural, institutional, and material dynamics. Moreover, there is a

⁴¹⁴ Wendy Hunter, "Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol: 112, No: 3, 1997, (Continuity), p. 464. Pion-Berlin, Circumvention, p.142.

⁴¹⁵ Huser, p. 88. Louise Mallinder, "The Ongoing Quest for Truth and Justice: Enacting and Annuling Argentina's Amnesty Laws", **Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation**, Working Paper No: 5, 2009, p. 53.

mutually constitutive relationship between actors and security environments. Therefore, both actors and environments reciprocally influence each other.

In this point, theory of omnibalancing is a useful concept for explaining the threat priorities though not the effects of threats to the civil-military relations. Despite accepting the general concepts of realist theory of international relations, such as anarchic and self-help nature of international politics, power, interests, and rationality, theory of omnibalancing challenges the single external threat focusing of realism. According to theory of omnibalancing, some states have weak political legitimacy and political structure as well as irregular rules of succession. Therefore compared to external threats, they are more open to internal threats, such as assassination attempts, coups, civil wars, and secessionist movements. As a result, if there are high internal threats and low external threats, the political leaders are more prone to deal with the more hostile threat which is the internal one. In contrast, when internal threats are low and external threats are high, dealing with external threats become high priority.

For that reason, another conceptual tool for analyzing the difference between Turkish and Argentinean civil-military relations in their post-transition periods throughout the 1980s, involves a closer examination of their threat environments. In order to explain this difference, this thesis as a conceptual tool of analysis will refer to Michael Desch's internal threat and external threat arguments.⁴¹⁶

As already explained in the theoretical chapter in depth, according to Desch, there are four kinds of threat environments that are determined by the degree of internal and external threats. If both internal and external threats are high or if they are both low, threat orientation, and the ideas of civilians and military officers are vague and too difficult to estimate. However, if the external threats are low and internal threats are high, the civilian control of the military is the weakest. The leaders are inexperienced for handling the internal threat and the unified military takes the control of counter-subversion. Moreover, the civilians are divided and have subjective control on military. When internal threats are low and external threats are high, the civilian leaders are usually experienced and have objective control of

⁴¹⁶ Michael C. Desch, **Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment**, Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 1-21.

military. The civilians and the military are often unified in itself and they share common ideas against an external threat.

In 1982, while Argentina was in a high external threat but low internal threat environment, Turkey had lived in a low external threat and high internal threat setting in 1984. According to Desch while it is easier for the civilians to control the military in a high external but a low internal threat environment, it is more difficult for them to control the armed forces in a low external but high internal threat situation. This argument explains why Turkish military managed to preserve its dominant position in politics. Turkish military continued to be effective in politics because of the increasing PKK attacks that created a serious high internal threat. In addition, in early 1980s, the softening of Cold War effects also decreased the external threat environment in Turkey. Desch's argument also explains how the civilians in Argentina managed to dominate the military in an environment of high threat in which the Argentinean army launched a war against the UK on Falkland Islands and low internal threat environment.

A. Turkey: High Internal Threat and Low External Threat Environment

Various threat environments have different impacts on individual leaders, the military elites, the state, and the society. However, internal threats are more ambiguous than the external threats since it is difficult to define what the internal threat is. Moreover, sometimes it is also difficult to make a distinction between the internal and external threats. The military doctrines may become determinative on internal threat perceptions. A closer examination Turkish military doctrine can identify the threat perceptions in Turkey.

Until the 2000s, threats against Turkey were determined by the military-prepared National Security Policy Document (*Milli Güvenlik Siyaset Belgesi-MGSB*), which is also known as "the Red Book". During the Cold War period according to the document the most significant threat against Turkey was determined as communism and its local supporters. After 1980 military intervention, as a result of increasing PKK attacks to the Turkish military, civilians, villages, and cities separatism was added to the document as a crucial internal threat. During the mid-

1990s, besides separatism, rise of political Islam was also included as an internal threat. The rise of political Islam was actually considered at the same significance level as separatism.⁴¹⁷

Since the mid-1960s, political terror had always been on the top priority list of the national security policy makers' agenda. The extreme polarization of leftists and rightists led to bloody clashes until the 1980 military intervention. Even 1971-1973 military rule was not able to suppress the political terror. In other words, the internal threat had always been high between mid-1960s and 1980. The level of external threat, on the other hand, changed from time to time. In the early stages of the Cold War throughout the 1960s, while Turkey was always concerned about the Soviet Union, in the later stages of the Cold War throughout the 1970s and 1980s Turkey's fear of Soviet Union got lesser and lesser due to the détente period (easing of the geo-political tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States). Turkey's deteriorating relations with the USA also made it easier for Turkish governments to establish more peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. In addition, concerning the crisis in Cyprus between Turkey and Greece, due to the Turkish intervention into Cyprus while there had been high external threat in the mid 1970s, the same threat slowly got weaker towards the 1980s. Following the 1980 military intervention political terror between the rightists and leftists also diminished as a result of military's war against these armed organizations.

The most important danger against Turkey is widely accepted by the policy makers and armed forces as the threat against its "indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation" (quoted from the Article 14 of the 1982 Constitution). Intrinsically, the rise of PKK has been perceived as a threat due to its Kurdish nationalist and separatist sentiments. As a result, the military started to deal with PKK at first hand by using its legal prerogatives.

Similar to other Third World countries "the Turkish military combines external defense with an internal security function".⁴¹⁸ The Internal Service Code of the Turkish Armed Forces proves this assumption. It gives the task of protecting

⁴¹⁷ "New Security Document Goes into Effect following Cabinet Approval", **Today's Zaman**, 24.11.2010, <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-227760-new-security-document-goes-into-effect-following-cabinet-approval.html>, (30.07.2014).

⁴¹⁸ Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", **Comparative Politics**, Vol: 29, No: 2, 1997, pp. 160-161.

Turkish homeland from external and internal enemies. As already analyzed, the Article 35 of Internal Service Code had stated that the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution. Moreover, the Article 85/1 of Armed Forces Internal Service Directive had stated that “it is the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces to protect the Turkish homeland and the republic, by arms when necessary against internal and external threats”.⁴¹⁹

Following the transition to democracy, starting with its armed attacks in 1984 where PKK killed Turkish soldiers in Eruh and Şemdinli, a new wave of terrorist attacks started in Turkey causing the death of more than 40,000 civilians and soldiers both Turkish and Kurdish until the 2010s. Consequently, with high internal threat and low external threat the Turkish military continued to dominate politics during this period.

1. High Internal Threat in Turkey: PKK

Since its foundation, the Turkish state that was established under the ideology of a nation-state had for a long time denied the existence of Kurds. In fact, Kurds were accepted as a threat, particularly to the territorial integrity of the country. For nationalist Turks the fear that the Kurds would harm the territorial integrity of the country led them to turn a blind eye to the rights of people of Kurdish origin. Kurdish populated provinces have always been the least developed regions of Turkey and their economic integration to the rest of the country has always been problematic. The Kurds populated in the south and south-east provinces of Turkey are mainly living in rural areas. They have strong tribal relationship that has been creating obstacles for development.⁴²⁰

The roots of Kurdish problem go back to the Ottoman period. From 1500s to the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, Kurds to a certain extent had always enjoyed autonomy in the southeastern parts of current Turkey. The Hamidian army, which

⁴¹⁹ Gareth Jenkins, “How the Turkish Military Influences Policy”, **The Adelphi Papers**, Vol: 41, No: 337, 2001, p. 45.

⁴²⁰ Hamit Bozarslan, “Kurds and the Turkish State”, **The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World**, Vol: IV, (Ed. Reşat Kasaba), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 333-335.

was established in the era of Abdülhamid II, was consisted of mostly Kurds. They fought against the Armenian armed organizations and protected Empire's southern borders. The twenty plus Kurdish rebellions that had taken place between 1806 and 1914 were mainly about economy rather than nationalist reasons. During the First World War and War of Independence, Kurds supported Unionists and Anatolian independence movement, respectively. Kurds actually wanted to keep their strong position in the eastern and southeastern part of the country. Anatolian movement gave promises for the liberation of southern Kurdish provinces, such as Mosul, from the British occupation and preservation of the caliphate.⁴²¹ However, these promises were not held.

The young Republic of Turkey was established as a nation-state. In the Ottoman Empire the main division in the society was classified according to religious lines, Muslims and non-Muslims or in other words, majorities and the minorities. However, in the Republic of Turkey this division was made according to the nationalist lines, Turks and non-Turks. Therefore, the Kurds who were identified as a member of majorities during the Ottoman Empire were now a member of a non-Turkish group. By accepting to be a Turk, they would be treated equally. But if they did not do so, that would create a problem. Turkish republic actually simply denied the existence of Kurds and such a policy led to the Kurdish rebellions including *Koçgiri* (1921), *Şeyh Sait* (Sheik Sait) (1925), *Ağrı Dağı* (Mount Ararat) (1926-1930), and Dersim (1937-1938). All of these revolts were suppressed by the military. Turkish government in 1934 issued *İskan Kanunu* (Law of Settlement) for displacement of Kurds, banned the use of Kurdish and Kurdish traditions, and imposed martial law between 1932 and 1946.⁴²²

From 1938 until the mid-1960s, Kurdish issue remained in silence. The Kurdish political mobilization was absorbed by the DP to some degree until the 1960s. Some of local Kurdish notables became deputies of DP. 1960 military junta continued the former Turkish governments' assimilation attempts by denying the existence of Kurds, exiling 55 Kurdish tribes to the western areas, and changing

⁴²¹ Bozarslan, pp. 336-338. H. Ayla Kılıç, "Democratization, Human Rights and Ethnic Policies in Turkey", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol: 18, No: 1, 1998, pp. 95-96. Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities", *Middle East Journal*, Vol: 51, No: 1, 1997, pp. 62-63.

⁴²² Bozarslan, pp. 338-342. Kılıç, pp. 96-97.

Kurdish names of villages into Turkish. The free political environment, which was sustained by 1961 constitution, created some space for Kurdish politics but not enough to absorb the Kurdish political mobilization. Most of the urban Kurds and Kurdish university students were articulated the leftist politics towards mid to late 1960s. Especially the Kurdish political activists were gathered in TİP (that was later banned by the 1971 coup), which was the sole party that accepted the existence of Kurds, recognized their problems, and their self-determination. Kurds managed to establish their own organizations such as DDKO that was closed by the 1971 junta. In mid-1970s Kurds established many organizations such as Liberation (*Rizgari*), the Flag of Liberation (*Ala Rizgari*), the Struggle (*Tekosin*), Kurdistan Workers Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan-PKK*), Kurdistan Socialist Party-Turkey (*Türkiye Kürdistan Sosyalist Partisi*), and Democratic Party of Kurdistan-Turkey (*Türkiye Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi*). Among these the PKK eventually turned out to be the most significant and notorious organization.⁴²³

PKK was founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978 in Fis village, Diyarbakır. Differing from previous Kurdish rebellions which did not aim for an establishment of an independent Kurdish state, founders of PKK and its leader Öcalan planned independence from Turkey. For him, the only path for emancipation (and independence) was armed struggle and socialism. Between 1975 and 1977, Öcalan and other members recruited about 300 people for PKK.⁴²⁴

The harsh suppression of the 1980 coup administration of the leftists had also been a disaster for the Kurds who were put in prison. The Diyarbakır Military Prison was known as the most notorious prison in which many Kurds suffered ill-treatment. As a result of such treatments once they got their freedom these prisoners became members of the outlawed PKK.⁴²⁵ During the coup Öcalan managed to flee to Syria and continue organizing PKK from Syria. Öcalan moreover, by negotiating with Masoud Barzani, Kurdish leader of the Northern Iraq established a base on the Iraq-Turkish border in 1982. On August 15, 1984, three years after the military rule, PKK attacked Turkish military barracks in Eruh and Şemdinli. These were the first bloody

⁴²³ Bozarslan, pp. 343-348. Kılıç, p. 98.

⁴²⁴ Aliza Marcus, **Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence**, New York University Press, New York and London, 2007, pp. 23-39.

⁴²⁵ Bozarslan, p. 350. Marcus, p. 67.

attacks of PKK attacks that would continue in the following 30 years.⁴²⁶ According to the official records, 1,954 people lost their lives between 1984 and 1993,⁴²⁷ among whom 2001 of them were soldiers, 3385 civilians and 5255 PKK members.⁴²⁸

As already stated the Kurdish issue and rebellions had been perceived as a threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey and therefore, it fell within the Turkish military's area of concern. The establishment of MGK gave power to military to influence the decisions of the Cabinet for fighting the Kurdish rebellions.⁴²⁹ Throughout the 1980s Turkish governments and the military perceived the Kurdish insurgency as a military threat and used simply military means to fight against PKK. Thus, first the number of military personnel in the region was increased.⁴³⁰ In 1985 the village guard (*korucu*) system was established.⁴³¹ However, the degree of the effectiveness of *korucu* system had always been questionable. The system that was established to end the violence in the region created further hostility between *korucus* and the PKK. The PKK simply aimed the *korucus* and their families who were defined as collaborator of Turkish state and killed them.⁴³²

In 1987, the State Emergency Law was issued. Nine years of state of emergency was replaced with the "Regional State of Emergency Governorate" (*Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği-OHAL*) and a "Super Governor" was installed with extraordinary powers in order to deal with the PKK more easily. The super governor could suspend civil rights and liberties, displace people, and restrict freedom of travelling across the region.⁴³³ In May 1990, the Super Governor was entrusted with more authority and became a "super commander".⁴³⁴ Although the super governorate system was adopted to increase civilian control since he was appointed by the Minister of Interior and was accountable to the Prime Minister, it established a

⁴²⁶ Marcus, pp. 49-80.

⁴²⁷ The year 1993 is the end of Turgut Özal's tenure as a result of his death.

⁴²⁸ Nedim Şener, "26 yılın kanlı bilançosu", *Milliyet*, 24.06.2010, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/26-yilin-kanli-bilancosu/guncel/gundemdeta/24.06.2010/1254711/default.htm>, (17.04.2014).

⁴²⁹ Özbudun, Challenges, p. 108.

⁴³⁰ Southeastern part of Turkey included ten provinces: Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Şırnak, Siirt, and Tunceli.

⁴³¹ *Korucus* were the people who had been living in the region and familiar with the local conditions

⁴³² Robins, p. 664.

⁴³³ Kılıç, p. 102, Marcus, p. 97.

⁴³⁴ See Decree 413 in the Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete) No: 19517, 14 July 1987 and see Philip Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue", *International Affairs*, Vol: 69, No: 4, 1993, p. 664.

restrictive environment for the flow of information from the region and created a free zone for the military to act on its own way.

As a consequence, while offering some economic assistance and developing the infrastructure in the region, Prime Minister Özal as the first civilian prime minister following the coup generally pursued military's policies in order to confront the separatist threat PKK.⁴³⁵ The attempts for increasing civilian control in the region did not work effectively and the power vacuum was filled by the Turkish Armed Forces.

2. Low External Threat in Turkey: End of Cold War

Besides high internal threat, Turkey had relatively low external threat during the 1980s. At least, if one would apply the theory of omnibalancing to the national security policy making in Turkey, it was obvious that internal threat had been so high that external threats were neglected by the policy makers. Starting from the transition to democracy in 1983 until the First Gulf War in 1991, there had been low external threat in the country. In fact, the PKK threat had been stronger than Turkey's disputes with Greece and Bulgaria during the period under examination.

The decades-long high priority external threat of Turkey, which is international communism and communist subversion, began to decline during the second half of the 1980s. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev who came to power in Soviet Union immediately worked on resolving the conflict with the Western Block by halting the nuclear program of Soviet Union and then signing Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with the US. Gorbachev launched *Novoe myshlenie* (New Thinking), *Perestroika* (Restructuring), and *Glasnost* (Publicity) policies in the mid-1980s. Moreover, in 1988, Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan.⁴³⁶

⁴³⁵ Özal also identified the PKK activities as "small scale terror problem". Müge Aknur, **Civil-Military Relations and the Role of the Civilian Leaders: The Turkish Case**, Unpublished PhD Thesis, McGill University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science, Montreal, Canada, 2005, (Role), p. 92

⁴³⁶ Baskın Oran, "Dönemin Bilançosu", **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler Yorumlar**, Vol: 2, (Ed. Baskın Oran), 9th Edition, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, pp.12-13, 26-27. Eren Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler Yorumlar**, Vol: 2, (Ed. Baskın Oran), 9th Edition, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, pp. 158-161.

In addition to the calmness of the Cold War era towards mid 1980s, the two problematic neighbors of Turkey, Iraq and Iran, were at war between 1980 and 1988. As a result of their war these two neighbors did not create a threat for Turkey. In fact, rather than generating an external threat, this war actually accelerated the internal threat in Turkey by creating a power vacuum in the Northern Iraq and giving a free environment for the PKK attacks. In an attempt to fight against PKK, Turkey and Iraq signed a security protocol in October 1984. Although Turkey had problems with Iraq and Syria as a result of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (*Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi-GAP*), which is a regional development project with irrigation and hydraulic energy production on the Euphrates and Tigris,⁴³⁷ Turkish national security policy makers neglected those threats as theory of omnibalancing explains.⁴³⁸

Although Turkey had experienced some problems with Greece and Bulgaria throughout the 1980s, the end of Cold War diffused Turkey's tension with these countries. The most important event between Turkey and Greece during the 1980s stemmed from the decades-long Aegean Sea conflict which is consisted of delimitation of the maritime boundaries and continental shelf, breadth of territorial waters, control of the air space beyond the territorial waters and Greek militarization of eastern Aegean islands. The March 1987 crisis was about the territorial waters and continental shelf issue in which Greece claims 12 miles territorial waters in Aegean Sea, for both mainland and its islands, while Turkey rejects this claim and declares this attempt as *casus belli*. Turkey wants the territorial waters to be limited to 6 miles due to the unique features of Aegean Sea. Moreover, the extension of territorial waters also means the extension of continental shelf and the sovereignty over the minerals and other resources on this shelf. The March 1987 crisis was the result of the oil exploration attempts of Greece over the disputable areas of Aegean Sea. However, with the mediation of United Kingdom, the tension between the countries was diffused.⁴³⁹

⁴³⁷ For details about GAP see: "What is GAP", **GAP**, <http://www.gap.gov.tr/about-gap/what-is-gap>, (17.08.2014).

⁴³⁸ Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler: Arap Devletleriyle İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler Yorumlar**, Vol: 2, (Ed. Baskın Oran), 9th Edition, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, pp. 129-148.

⁴³⁹ Mustafa Aydın, "Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities", **Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean**, (Eds. Mustafa Aydın and Kostas Ifantis), London and New York, Routledge, 2005, pp. 27-29.

After the March 1987 crisis, Özal and Papandreou met twice in Davos and Brussels in 1988. Although the establishment of Turkish Republic of the Northern Cyprus in 1983 left Özal in a difficult situation, he had always supported the resolution of the decades-long Cyprus issue via diplomatic initiatives in contrast with the military.⁴⁴⁰

The problems with Bulgaria stemmed from the suppression of the Bulgarian government of the Turkish minority living in the country. Towards the end of 1984, Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov had launched an assimilation policy against Turks by changing their names with the Bulgarian ones, banning Turkish newspapers, and demolishing Turkish graves. During the clashes in Bulgaria between 800 and 2,500 Turks were killed. Moreover, Zhivkov forced Turks to immigrate. As a result, 300,000 Turks, who had been living in Bulgaria, left their homes and moved to Turkey. However, rather than use of force, to resolve the conflict with Bulgaria, Turkey launched many diplomatic initiatives.⁴⁴¹

Consequently, there were no major external threats against Turkey during this period. While the decades-long major threat communism and communist subversion began to decline during the mid-1980s, threats coming from Greece, Bulgaria, Iraq, Iran, and Syria had not been on the top priority of Turkish foreign policy. Actually some external threats actually advanced the internal threat, the PKK threat.

3. Results of High Internal Threat and Low External Threat in Turkey

Throughout the 1980s, there had been high internal threat (PKK) and low external threat (the end of the Cold War) in Turkey. This threat environment perfectly fits Desch's argument which points out that high internal threat and low external threat creates weak civilian control of military. The inexperienced civilian elites that are unable to control the insurgency (meaning the Özal's government that has just come to power for the first time) created a power vacuum which was filled by the unified, determinant, and experienced Turkish Armed Forces. In fact when

⁴⁴⁰ Fırat, Yunanistan, pp.114-122.

⁴⁴¹ İlhan Uzgel, "Balkanlarla İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler Yorumlar**, Vol: 2, (Ed. Baskın Oran), 9th Edition, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, pp. 176-181.

Özal came to power in 1983 as the prime minister, in his first years he was mainly engaged with economy policies of the country leaving the security issues in the domain of the former chief of general staff and coup leader and the then president Kenan Evren, In other words, any kind of security issue including the internal threats were under the control of the military.

The armed struggle of PKK against the state was simply the result of the weak political institutionalization of Turkey. Similar to Nils Orvik's domestic threat definition, the internal threat arose from a historical opposition that some parts of it was transformed and reflected itself with the organizational violence, therefore became a danger against the national security. The PKK had been a threat perceived as directly against "the indivisibility of the nation and its territory" of Turkey. This perception had roots in the Treaty of Sevres that created pathology in Turkish policy-making mechanisms called as Sevres Syndrome. The Treaty of Sevres was not only an agreement that divided Ottoman territory in many parts, but it was also a continuation of centuries-long losing land episode. Treaty of Sevres pledged an independent Kurdish state in the South-east Anatolia. In fact although the external support to PKK came from Iraq, Iran, and Syria, PKK terror was not perceived as an external threat but rather as a danger that was integrated into the internal threat perceptions. Thus, the Turkish military that perceives itself as the guardian of Kemalism and the Turkish state against external threats as well as the internal ones, started to deal with the PKK attacks at first hand.⁴⁴² These PKK attacks continued increasingly throughout the 1990s and until the beginning of 2000s. This situation led the Turkish military to preserve its dominance on civilian politics until the beginning of the 2000s.

Consequently, doctrine of Turkish Armed Forces became an obstacle for civilian control of military. In this point, it will be better to adopt Velthuisen's definition of doctrine that was explained in the first chapter on theoretical framework. The doctrine is driven by a set of normative beliefs of views (the

⁴⁴² Sevgi Drorian, "Turkey: Security, State and Society in Troubled Times", **European Security**, Vol: 14, No: 2, 2005, pp. 256-262. George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey: Guardians or Decision- Makers?", **State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s**, (Eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin), Berlin - New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1988, pp. 187-188. Ümit Cizre, "The Turkish Military", **The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World**, Vol: IV, (Ed. Reşat Kasaba), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 331.

indivisibility of the nation and its territory) founded on what happened in the past during wartime (gradual collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a result of the territorial losses and eventually the Treaty of Sevres), and current realities (PKK) and a vision or prediction on how military operations (counterinsurgency) should be conducted in the future. Therefore, the doctrine of Turkish Armed Forces remained as internally oriented and became an obstacle for a well established civilian control. The normative and cultural elements in the doctrine adversely affected the subordination to civilian rule since the Turkish military continued to perceive itself as the “guardians of the nation”. Lastly, the hardliner doctrine of Turkish military did not create a democratic environment for consensus when disagreements had occurred between civilian and military elites.

B. Argentina: Low Internal Threat and High External Threat

Argentina’s threat environment was quite different from Turkey during its post-transition period. However, similar to Turkey, since mid-1960s Argentina had been living through a high internal threat which was embodied as political terror in the country. Similar to Turkey, in Argentina too as already analyzed there had been serious bloody clashes between the leftist and rightist armed organizations. In addition, there had been a division among the Peronists during the 1970s. Leftist-Peronist armed organization Montoneros conducted an armed struggle not only against the Argentinean army but also against the Peronism. Eventually, in order to suppress the armed clashes the Argentinean Armed Forces intervened in the civilian politics in 1976 one more time.

Besides some historical conflicts with Brazil and Beagle Channel issue with Chile, there were not significant external threats for Argentina until the Malvinas/Falkland War. The major external threat against Argentina during this period started between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982 due to Argentina’s attempt to include the Malvinas/Falkland islands into its territories. This war provided a dramatic shift in the balance of power between civilians and military. As a result of its defeat to British forces, the Argentinean military lost its credit in the eyes of the Argentineans. Therefore, the Argentinean civilian opposition took the

advantage of this decreasing credibility and resolved the century-long Beagle Channel conflict with Chile. Moreover, the region-wide authoritarianism had been perceived as a national security threat against Argentina since transition to democracy. Therefore, there had been low internal threat and high external threat starting in 1982 on.

1. Low Internal Threat in Argentina: End of Political Terror

As broadly explained in the previous sections and chapters, clashes among the leftist militants, state-supported right-wing militias, and state security forces starting in the mid-1960s led to the 1976 coup d'état. Similar to 1971 coup in Turkey, 1966 coup was not able to suppress all dissidents, especially the Peronist ones. Eventually, the military elites accepted a middle ground for Peronism and allowed the participation of Peronist Party to the 1973 elections. However, Juan Peron, who had been perceived as the only savior to end the political conflict, died in 1974 and the country was dragged into a bloody civil war.

As already analyzed in the previous chapters Argentinean military determined the national security threats during these years. Similar to Turkey, communism and communist subversion had been determined as the foremost threat against Argentina by the Argentinean military elites. This security doctrine was cemented with Operation Condor during the 1970s. Operation Condor that was established among Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru with the contribution of the USA aimed at fighting with communism. It provided the Latin American militaries the opportunity "to share intelligence and to hunt down, seize, and execute political opponents in combined operations across borders".⁴⁴³ In these joint operations political refugees, leftists, union members, priests, intellectuals, professors, and students were tortured, killed, disappeared and assassinated.⁴⁴⁴

During the military coup regime in the late 1970s, the armed forces launched counterinsurgency operations against the leftists, killing more than 9000 people.

⁴⁴³ J. Patrice McSherry, "Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System", **Social Justice**, Vol: 26, No: 4, 1999, p. 144.

⁴⁴⁴ J. Patrice McSherry, "Tracking the Origins of a State Terror Network: Operation Condor", **Latin American Perspectives**, Vol: 29, No: 1, 2002, pp. 38-39. For broad information about the US involvement in the Operation Condor see McSherry's same articles.

However, this internal threat that existed between 1976 and 1979, during the transition to civilian rule and post-transition period got weaker and weaker and eventually got lost.

However, the power struggles among the military and the administration and the massive economic crisis weakened the military rule, thus the military elites designed a diversionary war in Falklands. Obviously, the major reason of the Falklands invasion was the growing discontent against the military junta. The opposition began to mobilize in 1981. Ex-political parties established *Multipartido* and the relatives of the people who disappeared took to the streets. The General Confederation of Labor (*Confederación General del Trabajo*-CGT) was re-established and launched demonstrations, and consequently, the demand for transition to democracy was increased. At the time of the Falklands War the inflation rate was 130 per cent (the world's worst) and unemployment was 13 per cent (highest level since the Second World War).⁴⁴⁵

To sum up, there had been a growing discontent against the military rule since 1981 as a result of economic failure, human rights abuses, and arbitrary implementations of the junta regime. Therefore, the junta designed a diversionary war in Falklands. However, the defeat against the UK led to the total collapse of the military rule. The discontent and demonstrations became widespread and the civilian opposition led to the military's departure with no prerogatives.

2. High External Threat in Argentina: Falklands War

The junta administration designed a *coup de théâtre* for distracting the public's attention from economic crisis and convincing the opposition movements to unite the people in support of the military government by inciting nationalist sentiments. In an attempt to launch a diversionary war, on 2 April 1982 Argentinean military forces occupied the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. However, the massive defeat

⁴⁴⁵ John Arquilla and Maria Moyano Rasmussen, "The Origins of the South Atlantic War", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol: 33, No: 4, 2001, p. 746.

of the Argentinean army vis-à-vis the United Kingdom in the Falklands War paved the way for the downfall of military rule.⁴⁴⁶

The problem between Argentina and the UK concerning the Falkland Islands goes back to the colonial struggle. The Islands represent Argentinean's national identity and their struggle against the great powers which had colonized and dominated their culture. For Argentineans, UK represents the threatening imperial power rather than Spain because British forces tried to invade Buenos Aires twice in 1806 and 1807. The Falkland Islands were first invaded by France in 1764. Three years later Spain bought the islands from France but British established a small colony on the islands by force in 1769. After independence from Spain, Argentinean forces took the control of the islands in 1816 and since then they considered them as integral part of Argentina. However, British forces invaded the islands in 1833 and the conflict began. During the 1940s and 1950s, Britain proposed taking the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) but Argentina refused since ICJ was dominated by stronger states rather than Third World countries. After the establishment of UN Decolonization Committee in 1960, Falklands were listed as colonial territory. In 1965, UN General Assembly demanded negotiations from Britain with Argentina but the issue had remained inconclusive. Britain offered freezing the negotiations in 1981 but Argentina refused this offer.⁴⁴⁷

On 2 April 1982, Argentinean forces landed on the Falklands after confronting little resistance from small British troops and took the control of whole islands. The leader of the junta General Galtieri went out to the balcony of *Casa Rosado* and announced the victory of Argentinean military to the people who were harshly dispersed by the military for gathering to protest the military rule a few days ago.⁴⁴⁸ However, the invasion began to turn into a fiasco just one day after the invasion. While most of the Argentinean troops had returned to the mainland on April 3, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ordered the British troops to counter this *fait accompli*. On the same day, the newly accepted UN Resolution 502

⁴⁴⁶ Taylor, p. 1. Amy Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands", **Security Studies**, Vol: 15, No: 3, 2006, pp. 433, 442, 445, 446.

⁴⁴⁷ J. M. Taylor, "Argentina and the 'Islas Malvinas': Symbolism and the Threat to Nationhood", **Royal Anthropological Institute News**, No: 52, 1982, pp. 1-3. "Colonialism and the Malvinas Conflict", **Economic and Political Weekly**, Vol: 17, No: 28/29, 1982, pp. 1139-1140.

⁴⁴⁸ Oakes, pp. 431-432.

demanding an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of Argentinean forces, and diplomatic resolution for the conflict. The European Economic Community accepted to oppose the invasion and to suspend all economic relations with Argentina on 9 April 1982. After the American President Ronald Reagan's attempt to initiate a shuttle diplomacy between Argentina and the UK failed, by the end of April 1982, American government declared their support to the UK and sanctions for Argentina.⁴⁴⁹

The real armed conflict began at the end of April, when the British forces took the control of South Georgia Island (nearby Falklands) on April 25 and bombed Port Stanley Airfield (capital of Falklands) on May 1. The following day British forces sank the Argentinean cruiser General Belgrano causing the death of 321 Argentinean marines which created panic among the Argentinean Armed Forces. As a counterattack, Argentinean commanders sunk the British destroyer HMS Sheffield on the 4th of May. After the days of fight on the sea finally British forces landed the islands on the 21st of May. On the 7th of June, the Argentinean Air Force successfully conducted an attack and sunk two British vessels in which 49 British marines died and 115 were injured. These losses created a setback in British plans. However, after days of clashes on the Falklands the British forces took the control of the mountains that surround Port Stanley, finally Argentinean forces surrendered on the 14th of June 1982.⁴⁵⁰

There were many reasons of the disastrous defeat of the Argentines in the Falklands War. First of all, the rivalry among the Argentinean military branches, especially among the air forces and navy caused collective action problems. The air forces first opposed to join the operation because they did not want to be under the command of Navy and Land forces. Different commanders refused to obey the orders from their seniors. As a result of these rivalry and disobedience in the armed forces, Argentinean military lost the war. Secondly, land forces were ill-prepared and inexperienced. Thirdly, the Argentinean military rulers did not expect such retaliation from the British and sanctions from the US. The Argentinean government was not legitimate in the eyes of international community because it was simply a

⁴⁴⁹ Francisco Fernando de Santibañes, "The Effectiveness of Military Governments during War: The Case of Argentina in the Malvinas", *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol: 33, No: 4, 2007, pp. 617-618. Michael P. Socarrast, "The Argentine Invasion of the Falklands and International Norms of Signalling", *Yale Journal of International Law*, Vol: 10, No: 356, 1985, pp. 359-360.

⁴⁵⁰ de Santibañes, p. 619. Socarrast, p. 360.

military rule that committed serious human rights crimes. Therefore, while the US seemed to be neutral at the beginning of the conflict, eventually they opposed the junta in Argentina. In addition, the military junta had not sought a support from the UN and other permanent members when the Security Council passed the resolution 502, condemning the invasion of Falklands. This showed the lack of foreign policy experience of the military elites.⁴⁵¹

The defeat broke the integration of Argentinean military by making obvious the “incompatibility between the military rule and the successful conduct of an external war”. In other words, Argentina would be in danger externally if the military had continued to rule the country.⁴⁵² The defeat of Argentinean military did not stem from the lack of enough military power; instead it was the result of the absence of an effective civilian control. The lack of expertise of the military elite in foreign affairs and its illegitimacy in the eyes of international community also contributed to their defeat in the war.⁴⁵³ In general, the civilian control of military both actualized the war-fighting potential of the armies and led the military to pursue the national interest of Argentina rather than its own interests. The miscalculations and ineffectiveness of the military top staff during the Falklands war proved these assumptions.⁴⁵⁴

3. High External Threat in Argentina: Region-wide Authoritarianism and The Beagle Channel Issue

The rise of civilian domination handling the external threats continued during the post-transition period. Alfonsín administration established a new foreign policy which had promoted democratization and cooperation in South America. For Alfonsín and his foreign policy team the major external threat was the region-wide authoritarian regimes and tendencies that might attract the retrogressive sections within the Argentinean military for justifying their actions during the Dirty War, re-

⁴⁵¹ Arquilla and Rasmussen, pp. 753-757, 763-766. Oakes, pp. 456-459. Joseph S. Tulchin, “The Malvinas War of 1982: An Inevitable Conflict That Never Should Have Occurred”, **Latin American Research Review**, Vol: 22, No: 3, 1987, p. 133. de Santibañes, pp. 623-630.

⁴⁵² Desch, p. 105.

⁴⁵³ Santibañes, pp. 631-632.

⁴⁵⁴ Arquilla and Rasmussen, pp. 768-769.

legitimizing their values and beliefs, and at worst returning to power. If these authoritarian neighbors would give support to these retrogressive sections, all democratization efforts could have been disrupted. For the foreign policy-makers of Argentina, the country was besieged with these authoritarian regimes.⁴⁵⁵

As a result, the foreign policy-makers almost reversed the previous foreign policy implementations of Argentinean governments, especially the military ones that used foreign policy as a tool for legitimizing their rules instead of establishing long-term relations. *Alfonsinista* foreign policy had two pillars which had sought alliances and cooperation with other states that are interested in democratization and aimed at defense and promotion of democratic values that would help Argentina's adhesion to constitutional politics and protection against potential coups. In order to realize these foreign policy goals, Alfonsin and his foreign policy team launched new foreign policy initiatives. Argentina signed cooperation agreements with her long term rivals Brazil and Uruguay, later strengthened relationships with Bolivia and Paraguay. In addition, Argentina supported democratic opposition groups in these countries and made contributions to their democratic transitions.⁴⁵⁶

However, the major achievement of Alfonsin was ending the centuries-old Beagle Channel dispute with Chile. The Beagle Channel is not only an important national pride for both Argentina and Chile, but also has strategic importance due to its location to Pacific and Atlantic Ocean as well as Antarctica, and rich in fish, minerals, and possibly petroleum. The Beagle Channel problem covers the sovereignty problem over the strait that links Pacific and Atlantic oceans as well as the small islands nearby. After almost two centuries of unsettlement, both Argentina and Chile came to the brink of a war in December 1978. Although, Papal mediation reduced the tension, the relations between two countries were not recovered. In December 1980, a Vatican-led proposal was presented to parties which Chile accepted and Argentine left unanswered.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵⁵ Dates of Argentina's neighbors transition to democracy: Bolivia 1982, Uruguay 1984, Brazil 1985, Paraguay 1988, Chile 1990.

⁴⁵⁶ Dominique Fournier, "The Alfonsin Administration and the Promotion of Democratic Values in the Southern Cone and the Andes", **Journal of Latin American Studies**, Vol: 31, No: 1, 1999, pp. 41-63.

⁴⁵⁷ James L. Garrett, "The Beagle Channel Dispute: Confrontation and Negotiation in the Southern Cone", **Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs**, Vol: 27, No: 3, 1985, pp. 81-85, 96-100.

In order to reduce the autonomy and popularity of military, Alfonsín pledged in his electoral campaign to solve the Beagle Channel problem. Eventually, one and a half months after his inauguration Argentina signed the Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation with Chile in which both parties agreed to resolve the problem through negotiations.⁴⁵⁸ Despite all efforts of the nationalist opposition, and lesser extent from the military, Alfonsín held a nonbinding plebiscite for bolstering his position before the ratification of the treaty in which 71 per cent of the population voted for the ratification. Both lower and upper houses of Argentina ratified the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Beagle Channel dispute was settled with the efforts of civilian rule. Finally on 2 May 1985, foreign ministers of both Argentina and Chile signed the treaty in Vatican and the centuries-old Beagle Channel dispute came to an end.⁴⁵⁹

4. Results of Low Internal Threat and High External Threat

Consequently, the civilian dominance concerning the external issues started with the Argentinean military's failure in the Falklands War and had continued during the Alfonsín period with resolving the century-long Beagle Channel issue. Starting in 1982, Argentina had low internal threats and high external threats which perfectly fit the most suitable environment for high level of civilian control of military. In addition to the Falkland War, the region-wide authoritarianism during the 1980s was the major threat against Argentina. *Alfonsinista* foreign policy perfectly fits the changing security perceptions during the last phase of the Cold War. While the Beagle Channel issue represents the classical threat perception from an external enemy, region-wide authoritarianism had stood for a more broad definition of external threat.

As mentioned in the first chapter on theoretical framework, the democratic stability and democratic structure of the neighboring countries are important factors. Decreasing state security coinciding with less democracy cross-nationally may lead

⁴⁵⁸ Fournier, pp. 64-65.

⁴⁵⁹ Randall R. Parish, Jr., "Democrats, Dictators, and Cooperation: The Transformation of Argentine-Chilean Relations", *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol: 48, No: 1, 2006, pp. 160-162. Garrett, pp. 99-101.

to the ousting of democratic regime in favor of autocratic government. Therefore, the past experiences, such as Operation Condor, triggered the fear of returning authoritarianism in the post-transition period since it created established cooperation among the military forces of Latin American states.

Consequently, while external threat remained high after 1982, internal threat continued in low levels. Such a combination led to dominance of civilians in policy-making. The negotiations with Chile were not conducted by the military but by the civilians. The degree of experience of the civilian leaders, as Desch claimed, may be questionable. However, Alfonsín administration perfectly gained the backing of the Argentines after the military failure in Falkland War and during the Beagle Channel negotiations. The advantageous position of civilians started in the 1982 Falklands War continued in the following period and created a better environment for establishing civilian control of military.

As a consequence, all of the historical records, events, structures of institutions, legal issues, and statistics clearly show us while Turkish army had continued to preserve its dominant role in the aftermath of military rule; the power and privileged status of Argentinean military had been gradually curbed. The different modes of transition and different threat environments led to different levels of civilian control of military in Turkey and Argentina.

CONCLUSION

This thesis asked the question of why Turkish military had preserved its dominant position in politics while the Argentinean military had gradually been subordinated to the civilian authority despite both countries accomplished their transition to democracy in the same year, in 1983 possessing similar historical, institutional, and contextual characteristics.

Both Turkey and Argentina had similar features which were inherited from their predecessor states Ottoman Empire and Spanish Kingdom, respectively. These great empires had comparable structures that can be defined as patrimonial states in Weberian terms. Both Ottoman and Spanish Empires had a strong central authority in which the lives of their citizens were determined from a top down structure. The military that had been the most privileged class in these empires later became the first reformers after they have gone through a reform process. They both managed to take the place of the declining central authority and led to the establishment of modern Turkey and Argentina.

However, the rapid modernization of both countries created deficiencies in their institutional structures. Thus, the weak political institutions were not able to channel the high political mobilization. As identified by Huntington both states have been patrimonial states as a result of their weak institutionalization. This weak institutionalization led to corruption in politics, non-stop strikes of the labor class, riots of university students, and demonstration of mobs. All of these events paved the way to military interventions.

Similar reasons led to the military interventions in both Turkey and Argentina. First of all, when the economic crisis reached to a peak point the militaries of both countries did not hesitate to intervene in politics as can be observed in 1960 and 1980 military interventions in Turkey as well as 1930, 1943, 1955, 1966, and 1976 coups d'état in Argentina. Secondly, the rise of political terror in both countries among the leftists and rightists brought an end to the law and order. This chaotic atmosphere led to the killing of many political figures, intellectuals, journalists, as well as ordinary people by either the extreme leftists or rightists. Thirdly, the weak, fragmented, and illegitimate governments failed to establish law

and order and control the economic crisis. Instead they followed irresponsible populist policies to maximize their own interests. Fourthly, the extreme polarization in the governmental level spread to the society and all strata of Turkish and Argentinean people, from labor unions to police organization classifying them as leftists and rightists. As a result, in both countries to give an end to anarchy and chaos militaries intervened into politics. .

Despite these similarities Turkey and Argentina had experienced different paths during their military rules, transition periods, and post-transition periods. First, the modes of transition in both countries were different. While Turkey had gone through transformation mode of transition, Argentina had experienced replacement. The success of Turkish military in restructuring the economy, keeping its institutional strength, and not facing any political defeat provided the armed forces a great leverage to determine the post-transition period. As a result, the Turkish military delegated the authority to civilians after adopting a new constitution and providing exit guarantees and privileges for themselves. Such an outcome led to the continuation of military domination until the mid-2000s. In contrast, Argentinean military failed in economic restructuring, did not succeed to preserve its institutional strength, and experienced a massive defeat in Falklands War. This outcome in Argentina led to the rise of civilian opposition curtailing the power of the military drastically.

Second, different threat environments Turkey and Argentina have gone through ultimately influenced the degree of civilian control of military. While there had been high internal threat (against its territorial integrity from PKK) and low external threat (the end of the Cold War) in Turkey, there were low internal threat (end of political terror) and high external threat (the Falklands War, the region-wide authoritarianism, and the Beagle Channel issue) in Argentina. According to Michael Desch, the worst civilian control of the military takes place in high internal threat-low external threat environments, which had been valid for Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s. He also argues that the best civilian control of the military takes place in a low internal threat-high external threat environment as it occurred in Argentina. Therefore, the different levels of threat from different environments led the

continuum of military domination in Turkey, whereas provided supremacy for civilians in Argentina.

These two approaches, modes of transition and internal-external threats, eventually examine the aspects of civilian control of military. However, it is significant to find answers to the following questions in order to understand the degree of civilian control of military in Turkey and Argentina: (1) does the ultimate authority of elected civilians being challenged, (2) who has the authority on defense and security issues, (3) are there any opposition from the unelected elites (military), (4) does military has some role beliefs such as “national guardians”, (5) does military have reserved domains of authority and policy-making, and (6) does the military personnel subject to the rule of law.⁴⁶⁰

Concerning whether the ultimate authority of elected civilians are being challenged or not, in Turkey the ultimate authority of civilians had always been challenged by the military. Military managed to do this as a result of its exit guarantees and reserved domains (which answer the fifth question) that had been established during the military periods and the high internal threat environment during the 1980s and 1990s. The economic strength and political success of Turkish military during the coup period led to a transformation mode of transition that provided five exit guarantees, tutelary powers, reserved domains, manipulation of the electoral process, irreversibility of actions of the military regime, and amnesty or indemnity laws. In addition to these exit guarantees, the high internal threat and low external threat in Turkey in the aftermath of military rule, that emerged as PKK terror also gave power to the Turkish Armed Forces to interfere into politics. However, the situation in Argentina was completely different. The collapse of military rule in 1982 after the Falklands War led to the replacement mode of transition that did not permit the military to possess any exit guarantees. Such an outcome helped the Alfonsín government to curb the power of military in politics by abolishing its political, institutional and economic privileges and imprisoning the junta leaders. The military rebellions that took place during the 1980s in Argentina were not against the ultimate authority of the civilian rule, but for demands to end the military trials and increase salaries of army officers.

⁴⁶⁰ The first three questions quoted from Diamond's requisites and the last three one are Fitch's indicators that broadly evaluated in the theoretical chapter.

Concerning the authority on defense and security issues Turkish military preserved its authority on defense and security issues by the tutelary powers and reserved domains in the state departments. Since 1960, Turkish military has been responsible to the prime minister. Moreover, the powers of MGK that had been strengthened in each military coup provided a legal ground to determine the defense and security issues. Turkish military had determined the internal and external threats, and the methods of dealing with these threats. However, these tutelary powers and reserved domains of Argentinean military were completely removed by the Alfonsín administration. The status of Argentinean Armed Forces was downgraded and the military became responsible to the Minister of Defense. With the adaptation of the Defense Law in 1988, the internal mission of Argentinean military ended.

Whether there is an opposition from unelected elites such as the military, in the Turkish case there has always been such an opposition. Moreover, answering the next question Turkish military has always seen itself as national guardians. Historically, Turkish military, as the founders of the Republic as well as the guardians of Kemalist reforms and principles, had a privileged position in Turkish politics. Therefore, Turkish military did not hesitate to intervene into politics directly and indirectly whenever it perceived threats to the reforms and principles of Atatürk. Such interventions continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s, particularly when the internal threats were high. Moreover, Turkish military's ideology of seeing itself as the national guardians, although diminished a little but is not totally over. Argentinean military also had similar historical privileged position and the military elites used this power quite often to intervene into politics until 1983. In addition, similar to Turkish military, they also saw themselves as national guardians as a result of their German training. Since 1983, Argentinean military had gradually stopped opposing the elected civilian rulers and seeing themselves as national guardians.

Concerning whether the military personnel is subject to rule of law or not, in both countries the military personnel obeyed the rule of law. However, the legal system related to the military jurisdiction was different. Turkish Armed Forces were exempted from the audition of the Court of Accounts and State Supervisory Council. Moreover, with the establishment of the Supreme Military Administrative Court the civilian oversight over the administrative acts and actions of the military personnel

was removed. Lastly, the decisions of the Supreme Military Council had been independent from the civilian judicial control. The legal system was different in Argentina. First of all, during the aftermath of military rule, Ministry of Defense was authorized about the fiscal and organizational issues of military. Secondly, the case of the military junta was heard in civilian courts.

As clearly examined above and in the previous chapter, while the dominant position of Turkish military had continued until 2000s, the Argentinean military had gradually been subordinated to the civilian authority. The next section will examine the civil-military relations in Argentina and Turkey during the 1990s and 2000s.

Argentina: The Very End of Military Tutelage

After the release of the junta leaders and many senior officers as well as ex-guerrilla leaders by the amnesties of President Carlos Menem, the relatives of disappeared and human rights organizations internationalized by taking the cases to the international courts such as Inter-American Court. Cases such as kidnapping babies were excluded from amnesties leading to the punishment of General Videla and Admiral Massera. More investigations continued by the end of 1990s and early 2000s putting more military people in prison. In addition, the relatives of disappeared launched a campaign of “truth trials” for receiving information on the whereabouts of the disappeared and the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo had sought justice about their kidnapped grandchildren. They managed to find the real relatives of 115 children that were kidnapped during the Dirty War.⁴⁶¹

Argentinean Congress tried to derogate the amnesties in late 1990s and succeeded in mid 2000s when the Senate approved that the pardons were null and void, and unaffected.⁴⁶² In mid 2012 General Videla and General Bingone received 50 years and 15 years imprisonment with the charges of kidnapping 35 babies from

⁴⁶¹ Louise Mallinder, “The Ongoing Quest for Truth and Justice: Enacting and Annuling Argentina’s Amnesty Laws”, **Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation**, Working Paper No: 5, 2009pp. 83, 96, 100. Kathryn Sikkink, “From Pariah State to Global Protagonist: Argentina and the Struggle for International Human Rights”, **Latin American Politics and Society**, Vol: 50, No: 1, 2008, pp. 12-13. “Ana Libertad Baratti es la nieta 115”, **Telesur TV**, 22.08.2014, <http://www.telesurtv.net/news/Recuperan-a-nieta-de-la-abuela-Alicia-Zubasnabar-en-Argentina-20140822-0078.html>, (27.08.2014).

⁴⁶² Jonathan C. Brown, **A Brief History of Argentina**, 2nd Edition, Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group, York, 2010, p. 282.

abductees.⁴⁶³ In July 2014, General Menendez and Commodore Luis Estrella received life imprisonment for the murder of Bishop Enrique Angelelli.⁴⁶⁴

Since then, the Argentine military has completely subordinated to the civilian rule and abided the supremacy of democracy and legal practices. The most significant example of this was the economic collapse that led violent riots between 2000 and 2003. Although President Fernando de la Rúa ordered military to suppress the revolt in 2001, the military refused to intervene and asked for a congress approval. Following the resignation of de la Rúa, although the presidency had changed for four times in a month, the military stayed in their barracks and the chaos period handled by Argentine lawmakers.⁴⁶⁵ In sum, Argentinean civil-military relations reached to a democratic structure contributing to the consolidation of democracy in the country.

Turkey: The Rise and Fall of Military Power in Politics: 1990s and 2000s

Although Prime Minister/President Turgut Özal challenged the military's power in politics towards the end of 1980s, following his death throughout the 1990s, Turkish military's power in politics dramatically increased. This was not only the result of the dramatic increase in PKK terror but also the weak and fragmented political parties. Once the civilian leaders were weak and incompetent such a gap was filled with the military. Particularly during the period of DYP-SHP coalitions in which leadership changed frequently, the military started to dominate the foreign policy too. During the period of incompetent and inexperienced Prime Minister Tansu Çiller (1993-1996), the military was in charge of both domestic and foreign

⁴⁶³ "Arjantin darbelerle nasıl yüzleşti?", **T24**, 22.07.2012, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/arjantin-darbelerle-nasil-yuzlesti,208992>, 17.07.2014.

⁴⁶⁴ "Arjantin darbelerle nasıl yüzleşti?", **T24**, 22.07.2012, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/arjantin-darbelerle-nasil-yuzlesti,208992>, 17.07.2014. "Argentinean retired officers sentenced to life over murder of Catholic bishop", **The Guardian**, 05.07.2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/05/argentinian-retired-officers-sentenced-life-murder-catholic-bishop>, 17.07.2014.

⁴⁶⁵ David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, "Democratization, Social Crisis and the Impact of Military Domestic Roles in Latin America", **Journal of Political and Military Sociology**, Vol: 33, No: 1, 2005, "Democratization", p. 15. Andres Malamud, "Social Revolution or Political Takeover?: The Argentine Collapse of 2001 Reassessed", **Latin American Perspectives**, Vol. 20, No. 10, 2013, p. 8. David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, "Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking During Constitutional Crisis in Latin America", **Comparative Politics**, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2010, (Civilian), pp. 403-404. J. C. Brown, p. 275.

policies.⁴⁶⁶ The military had overseen Turkey's relations with the US, Russia, European countries and particularly Middle Eastern countries. The PKK terror reaching to its peak point during this period also contributed tremendously to military's dominant role in politics.

During this period during its low-intensity civil war with PKK, the military resorted to many atrocities also occurred. As a result of the death squads that established by the cooperation of ultra-nationalist far-right militants and some pro-state tribal leaders with the state security and intelligence agencies thousands of people were killed. Meanwhile, PKK continued killing many public employees, teachers, *korucus*, and many other civilians.⁴⁶⁷ As a result of the war against PKK, between 1984 and 2010, 6653 soldiers, 5687 civilians, and 29,704 PKK members lost their lives. Total number of the deaths was 41,828, until 2010.⁴⁶⁸ More than 3000 villages were evacuated thus more than 307.000 people had been displaced from their places.⁴⁶⁹ Moreover, pro-Kurdish political parties were constantly banned and their deputies were imprisoned during the 1990s.⁴⁷⁰ Meanwhile, political assassinations of journalists, academics, and Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals continued during 1990s.⁴⁷¹

Meanwhile, the Turkish military during this period established departments and groups such as Greece-Cyprus Department, Human Rights Department, Western

⁴⁶⁶ For detailed analysis of civil-military relations during Prime Minister Çiller period see Aknur, (Role).

⁴⁶⁷ Hamit Bozarslan, "Kurds and the Turkish State", **The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World**, Vol: IV, (Ed. Reşat Kasaba), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 353. Interestingly enough, the atrocities in the Kurdish populated areas caused a reaction similar to the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, called as the Saturday Mothers of Turkey (*Cumartesi Anneleri*). Between May 1995 and March 1999, they staged weekly sit-in acts in Galatasaray Square, which is one of the most important places of Istanbul. After the massive suppression of governments they gave break their demonstrations but after ten years, they again started their sit-ins in the same place in 2009. (Umut Arifcan, "The Saturday Mothers of Turkey", **Peace Review**, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1997, p. 265. Gülsüm Baydar and Berfin İvegen, "Territories, Identities, and Thresholds: The Saturday Mothers Phenomenon in Istanbul", **Signs**, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2006, p. 689.)

⁴⁶⁸ Nedim Şener, "26 yılın kanlı bilançosu", **Milliyet**, 24.06.2010, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/26-yilin-kanli-bilancosu/guncel/gundemdetay/24.06.2010/1254711/default.htm>, (17.04.2014).

⁴⁶⁹ Ayşegül Kayaoğlu, "Socioeconomic Impact of Conflict: State of Emergency Ruling in Turkey", **Defence and Peace Economic**, 10.1080/10242694.2014.891354, 2014, pp.2-3.

⁴⁷⁰ Bülent Tanör, "Siyasi Tarih (1980-1995)", **Türkiye Tarihi: Bugünkü Türkiye 1980-2003**, Vol: 5, (Ed. Sina Akşin), Cem Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2007, p. 105.

⁴⁷¹ Journalists Uğur Mumcu, Çetin Emeç and Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, Professors Muammer Aksoy, Turan Dursun and Bahriye Üçok, ex-vice chairman of MİT Hıram Abas, retired soldiers Ata Burcu, Memduh Ünlütürk, Kurdish intellectuals Vedat Aydın, Musa Anter, General Eşref Bitlis, as well as many Kurdish mafia leaders were killed. Cengiz Erdiç, **Uğur Mumcu Suikastı ve Siyasal Cinayetler: Karanlığın Son Otuz Yılı**, Tempo, İstanbul, pp. 50-125.

Working Group, Eastern Working Group, European Union Working Group, Caucasus Research Group, Strategic Research and Study Group, and Prime-Ministerial Crisis Management Centre to control domestic and foreign policies.⁴⁷²

This dominant role of the military took the form of an indirect intervention on 28 February 1997 when the leadership of the senior partner of the coalition government, pro-Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*—RP) resorted to Islamist ways of ruling the country through its discourses. The military issued a memorandum during a MGK meeting, which led to the resignation of RP-DYP coalition government. The military indirectly forced the popularly elected government to leave the power. Again Turkish military was acting as the guardian of one the principles of Atatürk, the secularity principle.

Changes in military's power in politics started with the coalition government of (DSP-MHP-ANAP) in late 1990s, but mostly with AKP's coming to power in early 2000s with the EU reforms and AKP's desecuritization reforms. In order to qualify Turkey for the full membership of the EU and accomplish the requirements of the political criteria of Copenhagen criteria, AKP governments curtailed the power of the military through constitutional amendments and harmonization packages. Among the changes made included diminishing the power of MGK, terminating the EMASYA secret protocol and increasing the civilian and judicial oversight and control over the military budget.⁴⁷³ However, once the military lost its institutional mechanisms to have an impact on politics it then resorted to non-institutional mechanisms in which the senior members of the military affected policy-making through the speeches they gave in various occasions.⁴⁷⁴

By gaining the 47 percent and 49 percent of the votes in 2007 and 2011 elections, respectively, AKP governments consolidated their power. Moreover, the economic and political stability they provided gave them the power to curb the

⁴⁷² For details of military's dominant role in politics during this period see Gencer Özcan, "Türk Dış Politikasında Algılamalar. Karar Alma ve Oluşum Süreci", **Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi**, (Ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu), Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004, pp. 845, 854-856. İlhan Uzel, "TDP'nin Oluşturulması," **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Vol: 1, (Ed. Baskın Oran), 12th Edition, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, pp. 87-88.

⁴⁷³ Müge, Aknur, "Towards More Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Turkey", **L'Europe en Formation**, No: 367, 2013, (Towards), pp. 41-42.

⁴⁷⁴ For a detailed analysis of these noninstitutional mechanisms, see Uğur Burç Yıldız, **Avrupa Birliği Sürecinde Türkiye'de Sivil-Asker İlişkileri: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Dönemi**, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Dokuz Eylül University, Social Sciences Institute, European Studies Program, October 2010.

dominance of military in politics. In addition, by desecuritizing the issues that used to be security issues, AKP managed to narrow the political sphere of the military. By attempting to resolve the Kurdish question through diplomatic means starting in mid 2000s on and establishing harmonious relations with the neighbors, the military started to lose its power in security issues. Furthermore, the military started to lose its credibility in the eyes of the Turkish people with the *Ergenekon* and *Balyoz* (Sledgehammer) investigations in which they were charged with alleged coup plots against the AKP. As a result of these trials dozens of active or retired military officers, including one ex-Chief of General Staff, as well as journalists, professors, intellectuals, members of radical nationalist NGOs, and civil servants were put in prison for 18 to 20 years. However, these investigations and trials that aimed at eroding the deep state tradition in Turkey were not handled legally fairly and transparently. Although in 2014, most of the military members are released because of their long period of detention and unfair judgment, it is not clear what kind of trials is awaiting them.⁴⁷⁵

Finally, the Provisional Article 15 of the 1982 constitution, which grants immunity to military junta of 1980, was removed with the September 12, 2010 referendum and the trial of 1980 coup started in 2012. However, there were many differences of Turkish military trial from the Argentine one. First of all, the junta was charged with abolishing the Turkish constitution and the Turkish Grand National Assembly rather than human rights violations and crimes against humanity. Secondly, only the living top staff of junta, Kenan Evren and Tahsin Şahinkaya, were sent to trial. The public prosecutor did not include other senior and lower officers to the case. Thirdly, two ex-generals did not come to courthouse due to reasoning their health problems. After two years of trial, the court gave life imprisonment for Evren and Şahinkaya in June 2014.⁴⁷⁶ Meanwhile, 1650 state officials who committed human rights abuses during the military rule that were listed by the Federation of

⁴⁷⁵ “Ergenekon davasında tahliyeler”, **BBC Türkçe**, 10.03.2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2014/03/140310_ergenekon_tahliye.shtml, (18.07.2014). “Balyoz davasında sanıklara tahliye”, **BBC Türkçe**, 19.06.2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2014/06/140619_balyoz_update.shtml, (18.07.2014).

⁴⁷⁶ Aknur, “Towards”, p. 44. “12 Eylül iddianamesinin tam metni”, **Hürriyet**, 10.01.2012, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/19651524.asp>, (18.07.2014). “İngiliz basınında 12 Eylül Davası yorumu: Tarihi karar”, **BBC Türkçe**, 19.06.2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2014/06/140619_12eyul_disbasin.shtml, (18.07.2014).

Revolutionary 1978 Generation (*Devrimci 78'liler Federasyonu*) in August 2014 were not called for trials.⁴⁷⁷

This thesis concludes the democratization of Turkish civil-military relations compared to the Argentinean one still has a long way. Currently Turkish civil-military relations by firmly subordinating to the civilian control and committing to democratic constitutional order seem to contribute to the consolidation of democracy. However, there are two sides in this relation, while the military must obey the rules of democracy, the civilians are supposed to do the same. As can be observed in the following chart while Turkey is still considered as a partly free country by the Freedom House reports, Argentina is considered as free country.

Table 7: Freedom House's Freedom Ratings Comparison of Turkey and Argentina⁴⁷⁸ (1.0 the best - 7.0 the worst)

	Turkey				Argentina			
	Status	Freedom Rating	Civil Liberties	Political Rights	Status	Freedom Rating	Civil Liberties	Political Rights
1975	Free	-	3.0	2.0	Partly Free	-	4.0	2.0
1979	Free	-	3.0	2.0	Not Free	-	5.0	6.0
1983^a	Partly Free	-	5.0	4.0	Partly Free	-	3.0	3.0
1984^b	Partly Free	-	5.0	3.0	Free	-	2.0	2.0
1991	Partly Free	-	4.0	2.0	Free	-	3.0	1.0
2001	Partly Free	4.5	5.0	4.0	Free	1.5	2.0	1.0
2014	Partly Free	3.5	4.0	3.0	Free	2.0	2.0	2.0

(a): Transition periods of both countries

(b): A year after the transition of both countries

As can be observed from the chart Turkey is still going through serious human rights violations and problems with civil liberties and political rights.

⁴⁷⁷ "İşkencecilerin isimlerini açıkladılar", **Cumhuriyet**, 22.08.2014, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/108715/iskencecilerin_isimlerini_acikladilar.html, (28.08.2014).

⁴⁷⁸ "Freedom in the World", **Freedom House**, 2014, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.U90B9mO_CII, (02.08.2014).

Although the current judiciary's treatment of the military has not been fair, it still is not clear whether an effective objective or subjective control of military is achieved. For example, among many incidents caused by the military, the most significant one is the Uludere (Roboski) Event in which 34 Kurds were killed by the Turkish Air Forces in December 2011 while they were returning from smuggling in Northern Iraq. After almost three years from the event, both civilian and military judges gave the decision of *nolle prosequi*.⁴⁷⁹ As a result of the legal process of the event remains inconclusive. Therefore, it is not possible to reach a decision whether the Turkish Armed Forces are accountable on their acts to the legal proceedings or not. However, in Argentina there is not such a subordination problem of the Argentinean military to the civilian authority as had experienced during 1990s and 2000s.

As stated by the Freedom House statistics Turkey is still suffering from problematic civil liberties and political rights while Argentina is not. While Turkey is still trying to accomplish its democratic consolidation process particularly from the civil-military relations perspective, Argentina had already accomplished it.

⁴⁷⁹ "Sivil savcıdan Uludere için görevsizlik kararı", **Radikal**, 11.06.2013, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/uludere_dosyasi_askeri_savcilikta-1137176, (28.08.2014). Hıdır Tok, "Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Askeri Savcılığı'nın Uludere İçin Verdiği Takipsizlik Kararının Tam Metni", **Başka Haber**, 07.01.2014, <http://www.baskahaber.org/2014/01/iste-genelkurmay-baskanlg-askeri.html>, (28.08.2014).

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