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**GERMAN TURKS’ PERCEPTION OF ANIMOSITY AND
THE ROLE OF ANIMOSITY ON CONSUMPTION: A
COMPARISON OF GENERATIONS**

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this master's thesis term project titled as "GERMAN TURKS' PERCEPTION OF ANIMOSITY AND THE ROLE OF ANIMOSITY ON CONSUMPTION: A COMPARISON OF GENERATIONS" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honor.

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ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

German Turks' Perception of Animosity and the Role of Animosity on Consumption: A Comparison of Generations

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Since the consumer animosity concept firstly defined by Klein et al. (1998), the majority of research focused on the attitudes of the members of a country towards the products of another country; but a limited number of research examined the impact of consumer animosity among the ethnic groups within a country. With the purpose of filling the abovementioned gaps in the literature, the aim of this research is to explore the nature of animosity of a minority group living in a multi-cultural country towards native people of the country, in terms of consumption behavior. In this frame, this research explores the nature of animosity construct to German Turks consumers' attitudes towards German products in the context of generational comparison. To conduct this investigation, the data were collected in the form of the in-depth interviews with the 42 German Turks living in Berlin, the city with the highest ratio of Turkish immigrants. Research findings demonstrates that the generation is negatively associated with animosity and the third-generation of German Turks harbours cultural animosity towards Germans which has a low impact on consumption of German products.

Key words: Consumer animosity, Cultural animosity, German Turks, Generation, Germany

ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

Almanya’da Yaşayan Türklerin Husumet Algısı ve Husumetin Tüketim Üzerindeki Rolü: Kuşaklar Bazında Bir Karşılaştırma

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Dış Ticaret Tezli Yüksek Lisans Programı

Tüketici husumeti kavramı Klein et al. (1998) tarafından ilk kez ortaya atıldığından beri, araştırmaların çoğu bir ülke vatandaşlarının başka bir ülkenin ürünlerine yönelik tutumları üzerine odaklanırken, sınırlı sayıda araştırma bir ülkede bulunan etnik gruplar arasındaki tüketici düşmanlığının etkisini incelemiştir. Literatürdeki bu boşluğu doldurmak niyetiyle, bu araştırmanın amacı, çokuluslu bir ülkede yaşayan azınlık grubun o ülkenin yerli halkına karşı duyduğu husumeti tüketici davranışı açısından ele almaktır. Bu amaçla araştırmamız, kuşak bazında karşılaştırma yaparak, Almanya’da yaşayan Türk tüketicilerin Alman ürünlerine yönelik tutumlarında tüketici husumetinin etkisini incelemektedir. Araştırma verileri, Türk göçmenlerin en yoğunlukta olduğu şehir Berlin’de yaşayan 42 Türk ile gerçekleştirilen derinlemesine görüşmeler sonucu toplanmıştır. Araştırma sonuçlarına göre, kuşaklar ve husumet arasında ters orantı vardır ve Almanya’da yaşayan üçüncü kuşak Türkler Almanlara karşı, Alman ürünlerini tüketimlerine düşük etkisi olsa da, kültürel husumet duymaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Tüketici husumeti, Kültürel husumet, Almanya’da yaşayan Türkler, Kuşak, Almanya

GERMAN TURKS' PERCEPTION OF ANIMOSITY AND THE ROLE OF ANIMOSITY ON CONSUMPTION: A COMPARISON OF GENERATIONS

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ABBREVIATIONS

EU	European Union
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
TAVAK	Turkish-European Foundation for Education and Scientific Studies
HUGO	Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center
FRA	European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
PEGIDA	Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident

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INTRODUCTION

Today's consumers have a wide variety of domestic and imported products to choose from, whereas they had limited choice of products accessible to them in the past. As the consumers' decisions become more numerous, the consumer selection process becomes more complicated. In this context, the consumer animosity has gained appreciable attention in international marketing literature in order to better comprehend the complexity of consumer behavior towards specific country's products. As a determinant of final consumer purchase decision, the consumer animosity represents a negative emotional attitude arising from various sources, towards a country or a nation and negatively associates with the consumers' purchase attitude on products originating from the animosity targets.

Since first introduced by Klein, Ettensen and Morris (1998), a great deal of study was done related to various dimensions of animosity such as economic-based (Ang et al., 2004; Shin, 2001), war-based (Klein, 2002; Nijssen and Douglas, 2004), political-based and diplomatic-based (Bahae and Pisani, 2009; Nes, Rama and Silkoset, 2012) but there are still relatively neglected issues in consumer animosity literature. First, less effort has been observed researching the influence of culture on consumer animosity (Darrat, 2011; Kalliny and Hausman, 2004). Second, while a great deal of research has focused on the animosity between two countries (Bahae and Pisani, 2009; Little, Little and Cox, 2009; Nijssen and Douglas, 2004), animosity among different ethnic groups or between immigrants and native people is rarely focused by few scholars such as Little and Singh (2014). Especially, due to the migration problem related to Syrians faced by Europe, the animosity between immigrants and native people may have notable attention in near future. Last but not least, whereas demographics such as age, gender analyzed as antecedents of animosity (Hoffmann, Mai and Smirnova, 2011), the association between animosity and generational differences is unpacked issue (Little et al., 2009).

In this framework, this study aims to explore the nature of animosity of a minority group living in a multi-cultural country towards native people of the country, and to investigate the effect of animosity on consumer responses on the purpose of filling the abovementioned gaps in the literature. In this study, Turkish

immigrants living in Germany, which is also called as “German Turks”, have been taken into the account as the minority group. Although German Turks account for the largest immigrant group in Germany for more than 65 years, the cultural differences between Turkish and German cultures are still exist. Also, in this exploratory study, the generational differences were analyzed among three generations of German Turks in terms of animosity towards Germans and the possible effects on buying preferences. In the following sections, a review of the conceptual background on the consumer animosity is provided in Chapter I and this is followed by the review of German Turks historical background and social structure in Chapter II. Finally, a methodological approach and the research findings of exploratory study are presented and discussed in Chapter III.

CHAPTER I

CONSUMER ANIMOSITY

1.1 CONCEPT OF CONSUMER ANIMOSITY

The concept of consumer animosity is regarded as part of the general concept of animosity (Klein et al., 1998) and the development of the concept of consumer animosity has led to a stronger understanding of the complexity of consumer behavior towards specific country's products, in order to comprehend the final consumer purchase decision. Averill (1982) defined animosity as strong emotion based on beliefs arising from past or present military, political or economic aggression between nations and peoples that are perceived as hostile, unwarranted, or violating social norms. Klein et al. (1998) were the first researchers who related countries' conflicts to consumer behavior and marketing fields and introduced consumer animosity as “the remnants of antipathy related to previous or ongoing political, military, economic events” (p.90).

Klein et al. (1998) conducted first study on the effects of animosity on consumers' purchasing behavior in the context of the Nanjing massacre in which 300,000 of Chinese civilians were murdered by Japanese soldiers in 1937, during the Second World War. The relationship between animosity and consumer behavior was tested with a model known as the *Animosity Model of Foreign Product Purchase* by Klein et al. (1998). The results showed that consumers in Nanjing have relatively strong animosity against Japan (over 60% have strong and medium negative feelings against Japan), which led to the negative direct impact on the willingness to purchase Japanese products due to the past military events. The study demonstrated that Chinese consumers boycotted Japanese products even 60 years after the Nanjing massacre. That is to say that consumer animosity has long-term effect on consumer purchase behavior.

The study of Klein et al. (1998) has opened a significant and interesting dimension of international marketing related to consumer attitude against the foreign product. Then, the following studies demonstrated a strong negative relationship between consumers' feeling of animosity towards a country and their willingness to

purchase products made in that country, such as animosity of Asian consumers towards the United States and Japan (Ang et al., 2004; Leong et al., 2008), Chinese consumers towards Taiwan (Souiden, Ladhari and Chang, 2018), Dutch consumers towards Germany (Nijssen and Douglas, 2004), US consumers towards France (Russell, 2004), Greek consumers towards Turkey (Nakos and Hajidimitriou, 2007) and Iranian consumers towards the United States (Bahae and Pisani, 2009). Also such studies developed the scope of the concept to regional animosity, such as consumer animosity between eastern and western regions in Germany (Hinck, 2004) and between northern and southern regions in the United States (Shimp et al., 2004); as well as ethnic animosity between Jewish and Arab Israelis based on the second Intifada (Shoham et al., 2006). These studies on consumer animosity has contributed to the international business literature in shedding light to how purchase intentions are directly affected by negative country-of-origin effects.

Consumer animosity has negative and direct impact on willingness to purchase. Klein et al. (1998) have found that animosity can affect product purchases in both situations of high animosity and mild animosity. On the other hand, as the feeling of animosity leads to decrease willingness to purchase products of target country, these feelings also incline consumers to purchase national alternatives or from other countries. For example, the success of such brands as Mecca-Cola and Qibla-Cola in Muslim nations is derived from Islamic consumers' disapproval of American foreign policy following the invasion of Iraq. Middle Eastern consumers support products and brands that advertise a political and ethical alternative to American brands (Parmar, 2004). Also, Klein et al. (1998) and Klein (2002) have concluded that animosity influences willingness to buy regardless of the product quality judgment. In other words, feeling of animosity towards a specific country would affect consumers' willingness to purchase products of that country, rather than their judgment or evaluation of these products. Consumers who have high animosity feeling tend to separate their anger towards a country from their assessment of that country' products. For example, according to people living in Nanjing, Japanese products tend to be high quality, although they are never willing to think purchase. Unlike the previous findings that distinct product judgment and consumer animosity, Shoham et al. (2006) found that consumers' willingness to purchase and product

quality judgment are negatively impacted by consumer animosity, so animosity leads to product denigration. Also, Rose, Rose and Shoham (2009) suggest that strong levels of animosity can impact product quality judgments and contribute to an unwillingness to purchase products from a specific country or nation.

Since the concept of consumer animosity was first introduced, research interests have continued and many empirical papers were published. Riefler and Diamantopoulos (2007) have categorized these papers into two themes. The first group of papers consists of replication of the original animosity research (Klein et al., 1998) that aim to validate the behavioral impact of the consumer animosity (Witkowski, 2000; Shin, 2001; Nijssen and Douglas, 2004; Russell, 2004; Kesic, Piri and Vlastic, 2005). The other group of papers focuses on extending or refining the applicability of the consumer animosity construct. For example, Jung et al. (2002) and Ang et al. (2004) developed the taxonomy of four types of animosities between stable versus situational and national versus personal. Cicic et al. (2005) applied the animosity model to inter-ethnic animosities among national groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Shoham et al. (2006) examined the potential antecedents of consumer animosity. Amine (2008) described cultural animosity as a new source of consumer animosity. Guo et al. (2016) and Sanchez, Campo and Alvarez (2018) introduced that the consumer animosity effects not only the consumption of goods, but also the intention to visit the place.

It is well documented in markets all over the world that some consumers tend to buy domestic products and avoid purchasing foreign ones. Perhaps, consumer ethnocentrism is the most commonly used phenomenon to understand this consumer attitudes. Proposed by Shimp and Sharma (1987), the term consumer ethnocentrism is defined as “the beliefs held by consumers about the appropriateness, indeed morality, of purchasing foreign-made products”. With patriotic and nationalist emotions, consumers are loyal to local and domestic products and perceived foreign products to be less quality. They typically have not contempt towards specific countries, but have a general feeling of despise for all foreign countries. In addition to domestic products viewed as superior, products from other countries are objects of contempt for highly ethnocentric consumers. In addition to the quality view, purchasing foreign products is wrong and unpatriotic, because national well-being is

threatened by imports, resulting in job losses (Shimp and Sharma, 1987). This is supported by Balabanis et al. (2002), who note that ethnocentric consumers tend to believe strongly that purchasing foreign products harm both local economy and the unemployment. Therefore, consumers who are ethnocentric avoid foreign products due to the perceived economic threats they pose.

Although consumer animosity and consumer ethnocentrism are directly related to consumers' willingness to purchase and influencing the consumption decision, they are distinct constructs, and each has a different impact on the willingness to purchase of foreign products. Consumer animosity differs from consumer ethnocentrism in several ways. First, consumer ethnocentrism provokes the purchase intention and product judgments, while consumer animosity only provokes willingness to purchase (Shimp and Sharma, 1987; Klein et al., 1998). The ethnocentric consumers tend to hold negative views of the quality of foreign products and they believe that the best products are produced by their own country. In contrast, the consumer animosity shows direct effects of products' country-of-origin on purchasing decisions and independent of consumer evaluation of the quality of products. Consumers might be unwilling to purchase these products, but might still believe those foreign products are of high quality. Second, consumer ethnocentrism has a stronger impact on purchasing decisions than animosity does (Fernandez-Ferrín et al., 2015). Third, consumer ethnocentrism is associated with consumer attitudes towards all foreign countries and is related to the preference for domestic products over all imported ones in general, but consumer animosity stems from the feelings of hostility towards only a specific foreign country or nation. However, consumer avoidance of products from the specific country is independent of the fact that the products are foreign or imported (Klein, 2002). Consumers may agree to purchase products from a foreign country, but refuse to purchase products of the country which is the target of animosity feelings (Riefler and Diamantopoulos, 2007).

As consumer animosity and consumer ethnocentrism are distinct conceptually, the profile of the consumer holding animosity towards a specific nation is different from the ethnocentric consumer. Aiming to support the differences between consumer animosity and ethnocentrism, Klein and Ettensen (1999) examined US consumers' purchasing behavior towards Japanese products and they found that these

two concepts have unique antecedents. Three antecedents including education, occupation and income are collaborated with consumer ethnocentrism but not with consumer animosity. In the manner of alternatives, three additional antecedents including prejudice, age and race are related to consumer animosity, but not consumer ethnocentrism. Also, men are predicted to hold greater animosity towards Japan than females, but they are more ethnocentric than males. However, Fernandez-Ferrín et al. (2015) found that education and age are associated with ethnocentrism but not with animosity, while gender is associated with animosity and not with ethnocentrism. As another antecedent, the patriotism is a common predictor of both construct.

1. 2. TYPOLOGIES OF CONSUMER ANIMOSITY

While many studies have shed light on the concept and impact of consumer animosity, less progress has been made towards how it is formed and internalized. First, Jung et al. (2002) and Ang et al. (2004) have developed a typology that categorizes animosity depending on two dimensions, the constructs' sources of manifestation (situational vs. stable) and the locus of manifestation (national vs. personal), and they have proposed a taxonomy of four types of animosity: stable animosity, situational animosity, national animosity and personal animosity (see Table 1). However, each type of animosity is associated with each other.

Table 1: The Taxonomy of Four Types of Animosity

	Stable Animosity	Situational Animosity
National Animosity	Arises from general historical background and persist for a very long time.	Arises temporarily caused by specific circumstance at the national level.
Personal Animosity	Arises from personal negative feeling and becomes deeply rooted.	Arises from personal negative sentiments caused by a short-live circumstance.

Source: Jung et al., 2002.

1.2.1 Stable Animosity

Since animosity is based on beliefs arising from previous or ongoing hostility, the feelings can evolve over time through a series of occurrence (Jung et al., 2002). *Stable animosity* refers to negative feelings arising from general historical background and becomes a value that is passed from generation to generation (Ang et al., 2004), via formal (e.g. history texts) or informal (e.g. word-of-mouth) channels (Jung et al., 2002). Animosity can persist for a very long time in determining the consumers' purchase choice, if the hostility towards a country or nation is so intense. The findings of Klein et al. (1998) show that the citizens of Nanjing still avoid purchasing Japanese products, even 60 years after the Japanese occupation during the Second World War. Also, the accumulation of other events may keep the feeling of animosity alive and make it more enduring (Jung et al., 2002). For instance, in Murray and Meyer's (1999) study, American consumers' old fears of the Soviet Union are a stable animosity. It first arose from the Cold War but becomes deeply rooted over time due to unfavorable news or events about Soviet Union.

1.2.2 Situational Animosity

Situational animosity refers to the negative feelings associated with a short-live circumstance at hand. Whereas stable animosity is long lasting and deep rooted, situational animosity refers to a specific and current circumstance. Negative feelings towards a specific country may be formed because of actual or perceived provocations leading to or inflicted during a crisis (Jung et al., 2002). For instance, the 1997 Asian economic crisis may have prompted situational animosity towards countries perceived to have contributed to the crisis. Also, Ettensen and Klein (2005) demonstrated that the situational animosity exists, by measuring the animosity level of Australian consumers towards French products. The consumer animosity level was high during France's nuclear testing in the South Pacific, but has been decreased one year later after the nuclear crisis and relations between two countries had partially recovered.

Edwards and Moss (2000) found that consumer anger that had not existed before but was suddenly generated, can also affect the purchase of product, even if

only temporarily. On the other hand, the situational animosity may turn into the stable animosity over time. Licsandru et al. (2013) argue that the stable animosity has an impact only if it is mediated by the situational one. War between two countries, for example, stimulates situational animosity at the time of occurrence, but can evolve into the stable animosity in the process of time, though not necessarily personally experienced (Leong et al., 2008). It is possible that animosity can be transmitted from one generation to another through stories told by those who have suffered from the conflict. Although one has never been provoked personally, the negative word-of-mouth arise from others' past behavior about countries may arouse consumer animosity (Jung et al., 2002). For example, the incidents such as the partition of India in 1947 may initially lead to temporary animosities between India and Pakistan; however, may trigger a permanent animosity for decades and may pass from one generation to other (Tian, 2010).

1.2.3 National Animosity

National animosity is feeling from macro perspective that is established on perceptions of how well that a nation display a hostile attitude to a foreign country and this attitude is rooted in the evaluation of whether the home country's national superiority, sovereignty or competitiveness (Ang et al., 2004; Hoffmann et al., 2011). Increased unemployment, for instance, is a national consequence as it mitigates the nation's economic well-being and may lead to the feeling of animosity at the national level towards another country accused by the cause of unemployment (Jung et al., 2002). During the stages of Asian economic crisis, national animosity in five Asian countries refers to the negative purchasing effects towards American and Japanese products.

1.2.4 Personal Animosity

Personal animosity at micro level results from negative personal experiences with the foreign country or people from that country (Jung et al., 2002). When a current or historical situation creates injury and hardship at a personal level, the consumer animosity may arise as personal animosity. For example, Korean

consumers may have hostile feelings towards Japanese products because of hardships they or their family members may have experienced with the Japanese cruelty during the World War II. This is personal, because they have personal experiences about the cause of hostility and negative personal experiences have strong effect on consumer animosity towards a certain country or nation (Hoffmann et al., 2011). Another example, the study of Podoshen and Hunt (2009) revealed that American Jews who survived the Holocaust still have personal animosity feelings towards Germany. On the other hand, Shoham et al. (2006) argue that if countries and populations have close contact with each other, the feelings of animosity become more personal.

Even though personal animosity relates negative personal experiences, is influenced from individual factors such as personal characteristics, demographic factors and generation-based factors as well.

1.2.4.1 Personal Characteristic

Consumer animosity is a dynamic concept that can operate independently in each society and country. Feelings of animosity may not be universally present among the population of a nation, because the degree of consumer animosity is shaped through the personal characteristic and differs among individual consumers. Personal characteristics are one of the main factors that influence how consumers evaluate foreign countries and nations.

The openness and awareness of consumers to other countries and cultures are negatively correlated with consumer animosity. These cosmopolitan consumers who travel outside their own country and communicate with other people from other countries in various places may have less negative attitudes towards foreign products in general or from specific country (Nijssen and Douglas, 2004). Additionally, consumers who speak foreign language exhibit weaker animosity attitudes towards products of target country, because they tend to interact with foreigners, read foreign books and newspaper and travel abroad (Nakos and Hajidimitriou, 2007).

Consumers, who have prejudice based on negative stereotypes towards specific country, are more likely to have feelings of animosity towards this country's products. The study Klein and Ettensen (1999) have demonstrated that prejudice towards Asians is positively related to consumer animosity towards Japan. The same

study also proved that patriotism is positively associated with consumer animosity. Patriotic consumers who love their country are more likely to be opposed to Japanese products. In contrary, Hoffmann et al. (2011) assume that there is no relationship between consumer animosity and patriotism, because patriotic consumers love their country but they do not claim that their homeland is superior to other countries.

Nationalism is another personal characteristic that is positively related to consumer animosity (Shoham et al, 2006). Nationalism is different than patriotism in that is not only a country love, but the belief that one's country is better than others and should be dominant over other countries (Balabanis et al., 2002). Also, collectivism has been shown to affect animosity. Klein and Ettensen (1999) demonstrated that the members of a union have probably much more animosity feelings and use their animosity to determine their behavioral intention.

1.2.4.2 Demographic Factors

Most of the prior research on the consumer animosity does not investigate typical demographic factors as predictor variables. First, Klein and Etterson (1999) have used a data set to identify demographic variables that serve as antecedents of consumer animosity such as age, gender, education, income and occupation. Klein (2002), in her subsequent research, concentrated to the potential impact of *age* on consumer animosity and found a significant relation between age and animosity. Older Japanese consumers are more likely to hold animosity towards the United States than younger consumers, because older consumers have had the direct experience of war with the United States. Also, younger people have more opportunities to travel other countries and rely to a greater extent on personal experiences (Hoffmann et al., 2011). In contrast, Bahaee and Pisani (2009) found that the older population has a lower level of animosity towards the United States than younger Iranians who have been exposed to more intense and radically different governmental socialization process.

The studies of Klein and Ettensen (1999) and Bahaee and Pisani (2009) investigated the impact of *gender* variable on consumer animosity. First study shows a greater presence of consumer animosity in males than females, on account of the fact that females are more educated and conscious in the perception of foreign

products. The second support that females are more likely to hold higher animosity levels than males, because females are more generally subjected to a greater percentage of government propaganda. Also Matic and Puh (2011) indicated the difference in the animosity feelings of Croatian people according to gender towards ex-Yugoslavia countries. On the other hand, Nakos and Hajidimitriou (2007) did not find a significant influence of gender on the feeling of animosity. As the result of their study, they found that Greek consumers both males and females do not hold significant different views on Turkish products.

Klein and Ettensen (1999) found that there is no significant relation between consumer animosity and such demographic factors including *education*, *income* and *occupation*. In contrary, Nakos and Hajidimitriou (2007) found that better-educated consumers have stronger animosity feelings in comparison with less-educated consumers. Educated consumers are more likely to follow actual political developments and that may strongly affect their consumer animosity levels. Also, the sample of Bahae and Pisani (2009) exposed that Iranian consumers' income and education are related to their animosity feelings. The middle class possess less animosity feelings than the lowest income group, due to their higher education and willingness to purchase foreign products.

1.2.4.3. Generation-Based Factors

The term of generation is defined by Strauss and Howe (1991) as “a peer personality recognized and determined by common age location, common beliefs and behavior and perceived membership in a common generation”. While new generations bring new attitudes, beliefs and perceptions, they are cyclical and each generation type is repeated in sequence.

The generations have been socialized in different times with different political, economic or cultural environments (Hoffmann et al., 2011) and each generation is described in terms of the times in which the generation grew up. The differences between generations are based on and used as a proxy for values, preferences, behaviors and individuals' formative experiences (Smith and Clurman, 1997). For that reason, individuals from different generations may have significant differences in their attitude about foreign countries and their own cultural beliefs that

influence their purchasing behavior.

Consumer animosity researches focus on behavioral traits of different age cohorts, but hardly discuss this in generational terms. Generation effect on consumer animosity has been examined by a few researches (Little et al., 2009; Abraham and Reitman, 2014) in comparison with researches concentrate to age factor. Little et al. (2009) found that American consumers' animosity towards Vietnam has been passed down from generation to generation. The Depression generation has showed the highest level of animosity due to the effect of communism, and then the level of animosity increased since the Generation Y. The Generation Y that has born after the Vietnam conflict had ended showed more animosity towards Vietnam than the previous generation. According to researchers, Generation Y was educated on the violent history between the United States and Vietnam, and they developed animosity towards Vietnam.

1.3 SOURCES OF CONSUMER ANIMOSITY

Consumer animosity arises from various sources and is a dynamic concept that is constantly updated by various events and experiences. Different consumer feelings are manifested through different dimensions of animosity depending on the cause of formation. The existing literature on consumer animosity suggests that the sources of animosity can be many and diverse. The founders of concept, Klein et al. (1998) distinguished only between general, war and economic related animosity. Then, subsequent studies investigated *war-based animosity* (Shin, 2001; Klein, 2002; Nijssen and Douglas, 2004; Shimp et al., 2004; Little et al., 2009) and *economic-based animosity* (Klein and Ettensen, 1999; Witkowski, 2000; Shin, 2001; Jung et al., 2002; Ang et al., 2004; Hinck, 2004; Leong et al., 2008). However the reasons of animosity do not only stem from war and economic events; consumer animosity was later extended to other sources such as *political and diplomatic-based animosity* (Witkowski, 2000; Russell, 2004; Ettensen and Klein, 2005; Nes et al., 2012) and *cultural animosity* (Kalliny and Lemaster, 2005; Maher and Mady, 2010; Russell et al., 2011; Darrat, 2011).

1.3.1 War-Based Animosity

War-based animosity is mostly connected with historical warlike events and current military conflicts and is result of actions of aggression or warlike behavior by a country or nation. For example, the American Civil War has affected purchase intentions of Southerners and Northerners in the United States (Shimp et al., 2004). While Southerners tend to prefer products from the south and avoid products from the north, Northerners prefer products from the north to those from the south.

Many researchers focus on stable animosity feelings while examining war-based animosity, because most of war-related issues are examined in the category of stable animosities as they arise from the historical war related occurrences such as The American Civil War in the late nineteenth century (Shimp et al., 2004), Vietnam War (Little et al., 2009), World War II (Klein et al., 1998; Klein, 2002; Nijssen and Douglas, 2004) or Internal war in old Yugoslavia (Cicic et al., 2005). For example, Nijssen and Douglas (2004) have reported that Dutch consumers are still reluctant to purchase German products due to the German occupation to the Netherlands in World War II. On the other hand, situational animosities have only been considered recently in context of war-based animosity (Riefler and Diamantopoulos, 2007). For instance, in the context of the ex-Yugoslavia civil war, Kesic et al. (2005) focused on consumers' actual purchasing behavior in newly formed countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

Many researchers proved a strong direct impact of war-based animosity on the consumer purchasing behavior, whereas economic-based animosity affects consumers' purchasing intentions via consumer ethnocentrism (Ang et al., 2004; Nijssen and Douglas, 2004).

1.3.2 Economic-Based Animosity

Economic environment can affect the perceptions, attitudes, and behavior of consumers towards other countries. Hence, the economic-based animosity is the result of feelings of economic dominance and aggression or trade disagreements between countries (Klein et al., 1998) and also trading practices perceived as unfair to the home country or unreliability of trading partners to each other (Riefler and

Diamantopoulos, 2007). This may lead to overall animosity and, in turn, to reluctance from the country in question to purchase products.

Economic-based animosity particularly appears in small nations or economies, because whose people may be apprehensive about other dominant economies that are threat for their domestic economies (Nijssen and Douglas, 2004). Countries which are more self-sufficient need less international trade cooperation and express higher tendencies towards animosity, because the level of import volume and foreign trade determines the consumer animosity impact. However, Riefler and Diamantopoulos (2007) assert that economic issues are encountered more often than other sources of consumer animosity, because these are very frequent reasons for tensions between countries.

Consumers may have negative feelings towards a specific country due to an economic crisis. According to Ang et al. (2004), in the case of the economic crisis, national animosity relates to the impact on a country's economic progress and personal animosity relates to hostility arising from personal suffering such as job loss or worsening living standards. They demonstrated that consumers in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand which were injured countries due to the Asian crisis have economic-based animosity towards USA attributed as the blame of the crisis.

According to Riefler and Diamantopoulos (2007), most of the economic-based animosity issues examined can be classified as situational. For instance, the intention of Hinck (2004) and Hinck et al. (2004) was to examine the effect on present economic events on present purchasing behavior. After German reunification, they took economic conflicts as a reason for consumer animosity and examined the consumer purchasing behaviors in Eastern Germany and Western Germany. Also, the unfairness economic dominance of Germany towards the Netherlands has been investigated by Nijssen and Douglas (2004).

1.3.3 Political and Diplomatic-Based Animosity

Consumer animosity is not something only originates in a situation of war or economic conflicts, but can be created when an adversarial relationship emerges due to political and diplomatic developments (Nakos and Hajidimitriou, 2007). It is also

connected to political and diplomatic risks as it has been emerged from unfavorable governmental actions (Klein et al., 1998) and these political and diplomatic actions in the international arena may create consumer animosity towards products affiliated with that nation.

Political and diplomatic issues were investigated for customers from many countries or nations as a source of consumer animosity. For instance, Witkowski (2000) investigated the animosity of Americans towards China due to the payment of Chinese to American politicians as corruption and due to China's foreign policy towards Taiwan and Tibet. Other political and diplomatic events which have been encompassed to consumer animosity researches are France's opposition to American foreign policies (Russell and Russell, 2006) and strained relations between Iran and the United States (Bahae and Pisani, 2009; Funk et al., 2010).

1.3.4 Cultural Animosity

Culture is the society's essential character which distinguishes it from other cultural groups. "It is always a collective phenomenon, but it can be connected to different collectives", Geert Hofstede said. In this respect, culture determines the identity of a human group. The fundamental components of every culture are the values, languages, customs, religions, myths, laws and the artifacts, or products transmitted from one generation to the next (Lamb et al., 2011). Furthermore, culture is an extremely important concept to understand consumers' purchasing behavior and marketers have to be very careful in analyzing the culture of different groups, regions or even countries, as well as interactions among cultures.

Cultural resemblance between a foreign product's country-of-origin and the home country of consumer impacts the willingness to purchase foreign products in a positive manner. Consumers are more likely to assess positively and more willing to purchase foreign products from a country that is culturally similar (Ma et al., 2012). In contrary, cultural dissimilarity including religious differences, mentality differences and cultural imperialism may be the key reason why consumers express hostility to a foreign country and may lead to the consumer animosity (Riefler and Diamantopoulos, 2007).

Cultural animosity is defined as one's intolerance and antipathy towards

another country, person or nation because of cultural differences (Kalliny and Hausman, 2004). This animosity influences willingness to purchase products from hostile country or nation, combining with cultural beliefs and attitudes. Consumers may avoid purchasing products of a specific country when they feel their own culture is threatened by that country's culture. For instance, French people are extremely proud of their culture and have anti-Americanism feeling due to the United States' cultural imperialism and mentality differences between two countries (Amine et al., 2005), and therefore French people mostly avoid to purchase American products. On the contrary, communication among cultures and exchange of ideas and information reduces the gap between in-group (own culture) and out-group (other culture) (LeVine and Campbell, 1972). Bahae and Pisani (2009) argue that exposure to foreign cultures offers a more comprehensive global perspective and reduces the culture-based consumer animosity; even if the individuals have never visited the specific target country.

Many researches has been devoted to war and economic-based animosity and it has been seen that other sources of consumer animosity such as cultural animosity have less impact (Huntington, 1993). However, the culture is the main aspect that generates conflicts and diversification among nations that will be present and may be deeper and longer lasting than war and economic-based animosity. Also, many war conflicts are based on cultural differences. As Huntington (1993) said “the fundamental source of conflict in this world will not be primarily ideological or economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural”.

All individuals of societies do not share a single culture, but consist of different subcultures identified as a separate cultural group that exists as an identifiable segment within a larger and more complex society. When a group of people emigrate from one country to another, they bring their cultural aspects to the host country and may create a minority group within society as a subculture (Schiffman and Kanuk, 2010). However, the diversities between subculture and dominant culture in the same country may result the animosity towards each other's. Subcultural difference in attitudes towards dominant culture is an important factor in consumer animosity researches. In many modern nations, these diversities are

increasing due to growing immigration and increase of emphasis among immigrants on maintaining their original culture while adapting the new culture rather than assimilating it (Swaidan et al., 2006). On the other hand, people of dominant cultures may also have animosity feeling towards subcultures. For example, Little and Singh (2014) found that Anglo-Americans have negative feeling towards the use of Spanish as the first language and the growing Hispanic-American culture within the United States borders. This situation creates a backlash of Anglo-American animosity towards Hispanic culture and products, based on the perceived threat of a change in American culture.

As an aspect of cultural animosity, religion-based animosity firstly introduced by Kalliny and Hausman (2004) has been seen. They identified religion-based animosity as one's intolerance and antipathy towards another country, nation or individual owing to the religious differences and emphasized how religion could be a factor that initiates consumer animosity and effects consumers' purchase intentions. Not only might individuals hold religion-based animosity towards products of hostile country, a more global reaction is possible (Kalliny et al., 2011). Religion splits the world into groups of people, sharing the same beliefs and members of groups show an enormous commitment to their own groups (Seul, 1999). Therefore, religion-based animosity is concerned with uniting people from several nations and countries, while war-based animosity is mostly linked to hostility in only one country. For example, recent crisis concerning the Prophet Muhammad cartoons controversy by a Danish journalist in 2005 triggered a massive protest against Denmark and boycott of Danish products, not only in the Middle East, but in the entire Muslim world. Additionally, domestic and international companies such as Carrefour also participated in the boycotts against Danish products (Darrat, 2011).

CHAPTER II

GERMAN TURKS: FROM GUEST-WORKER TO CITIZEN

The year 2019 is the 68th anniversary of Turkish migration to Germany, in other words, of the story of Turks in Germany. Starting with the labor migration from Turkey to Germany in early 1960s, Turks became an ignorable part of the German society. Today, about 3 million people with Turkish origin are living in Germany, representing 2.4 percent of the total population. The largest minority group in Germany, the population of Turks in Germany still continues growing. As many are German citizens or have permanent resident status, Turkish people in Germany no longer wish to be called immigrants. Therefore, the term of ‘German Turks’ is more suitable to call all people who has Turkish background living in Germany, irrespective of which citizenship they hold.

2.1 RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND GERMANY

Comparing to Turkey's relation with other European Union (EU) member states, the ties with Germany are unique in their intensity. For decades, Turkey and Germany have had relatively long-standing close relations in different realms, such as the economic, political, military and social; although there was no boundary neighborhood between two countries. This relation has started in political means during the years when the Ottoman Empire has been wide spread over Europe in the 18th century. In 1761, the first alliance agreement that Ottoman signed with a European-Cristian state “Peace and Amity Treaty” has been presented between Prussia Kingdom and Ottoman Empire. It is known that Germany has taken its position with caution in the unification of Europe against Ottoman and has presented an amicable approach (Aghayev, 2014). The main reason for this approach was the common perception against Russian threat and the strategic position of Ottoman territories. Also Germany did not have a colonial past that directly affected the Ottoman Empire and not have a political interest in the Ottoman territory compared to the other European great powers (Yeneroğlu, 2016).

With the 19th century, German-Ottoman relations became closer and reached to peak during Abdulhamit II and Bismarck period. The two sided political and

economic relations were transformed into the military and technical cooperation, spreading to commercial and cultural areas with the great powers that continued until the First World War (WWI) (Taşdemir, 2018). After the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russia War, the German military advisors gave assistance to the training and development of the Ottoman armed forces, and the import of German military equipment and goods started. The Ottoman Empire has induced the public of Germany to make an investment by giving the Baghdad project to the German Deutsche Bank which opened a branch in Istanbul. Abdulhamid II applied primarily to the German banks for foreign loans and this financial approach has been followed by the first German investors in Ottoman Empire (Atun and Aya, 2013).

The long-standing relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Germany conducted to a potential alliance during the WWI. Just as Germans needed the Ottoman Empire's manpower and strategic location against any possible future armed conflict with Russia, the Ottomans needed an alliance for the WWI, because their approach to Britain was rejected earlier and those to France and Russia, was likewise refused right before the war started (Atun and Aya, 2013). As the result of a concrete policy based on the mutual interests, the Ottoman Empire joined the Triple Alliance and formally entered the WWI by signing the secret alliance with Germany in 1914, the day after Germany has declared war on Russia. According to the alliance, German guaranteed Ottoman territory and promised not to make a separate peace until territory lost in the war was recovered (Penix, 2013). However, at the end of war with heavy losses, the political and diplomatic relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire were reduced to a minimum level due to the fact that both countries were dealing with the determination of national and foreign policy objectives. Following the Peace Treaty of Lausanne and the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the official diplomatic relations restored with the German-Turkish Non-Aggression Pact signed in 1924. In the subsequent years, the economic relations rekindled with Turkey benefiting from the German industry for its economic improvement and during the 1930's Turkish economy became highly dependent on Germany (Yeneroğlu, 2016).

Despite the German-Ottoman alliance in WWI, the Ottoman Empire stayed neutral because of many factors such as poor economy, technologically insufficient

army, and destructive effect of recent wars and shortage of manpower during the Second World War (WWII), but kept the good relations with Germany during that period. In 1941, Turkey signed an agreement of friendship and non-aggression with Germany to feel secure against any possible attack by Germany and continued exporting chromium to Germany, which was vital for its war industry (Altınörs, 2017). However, Turkey declared war against Germany in February 1945 following the change of conditions of the war, but this declaration was political and had not come armed against the German soldiers.

Following the WWII, the Turkish and German relations have gained a human dimension by filling the gap of manpower in Germany with the skilled and unskilled manpower supplied from Turkey, in the frame of the “Turkish Labor Force Agreement” in 1961. There started to emerge cultural resemblance and developments between two countries as the result of increasingly settling of Turkish population in Germany (Aghayev, 2014). Today, the presence of nearly 3 million people of Turkish origin residing in Germany gives an exceptional dimension to the relationship between Turkey and Germany. It is controvertible that Turks living in Germany play a significant role in building a bridge between Turkey and Germany that contributes to the development of relationships as well as the relations between Turkey and European Union. At the same time, this situation allowed the German public and its politicians to view Turkey's EU membership mostly through the lens of the Turkish immigration experience in Germany (Humphrey, 2009).

During the Cold War period, the official political, commercial, economic and cultural ties were reinforced by the presence of Turkey and Germany in the anti-Soviet bloc and being the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies. Germany had the role of coordinator of the international financial aid and military support for Turkey. However, this generally positive condition changed with the end of the Cold War by virtue of the fact that Turkey's strategic significance had diminished. Since the end of Cold War, there have been numerous ups and downs in the Germany-Turkey bilateral relations, combining both domestic and foreign policy components. German policymaking on Turkey involves various players including businesses, NGOs, the media, and the civil society, but especially takes shape in German party politics (Szabo, 2018). Due to its dominant position in the European

Union, Germany has a crucial position in shaping EU's perception of Turkey's membership and has a major impact on Turkey's relation with the EU. Until the late 1990s, the German governments were not very sympathetic regarding Turkish accession for EU membership, have always questioned Turkish membership aspirations and tried to prevent substantial commitments by the EU (Hauge, 2017). In 1998, the change of German government brought with an active support of Turkey's EU accession. The SPD-Greens government under the Presidency of Schröder represented the political constellation most favorable to the interests of the Turkish minority in Germany and of Turkey (Aktürk, 2010). This government supported Turkey to enter EU if it fulfills the Copenhagen Criteria and had an important influence for the official recognition of Turkey as a candidate to participate in EU, at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. According to the Schröder, the EU needs another powerful member country in order to survive and sees Turkey as an opportunity and a benefit to the Union owing to its strategic location in the Middle East area and its fast growing economy (Yeneroğlu, 2016). During that years, the efforts of German government to integrate the German Turks to the society and the sincere aid to Turkey after the earthquake disasters occurred in 1999, have had a positive influence on the bilateral relations (Aghayev, 2014). This period was considered as the golden age of Germany-Turkey relations, until the era of the Chancellor Angela Merkel (Yeneroğlu, 2016).

The approach towards both the Turkish minority in Germany and Turkey's membership in the EU has changed with the era of Christian Democratic Union government under Chancellor Angela Merkel after 2005 in a negative way. The government was negatively disposed towards both the Turkish minority in Germany and Turkey's membership in the EU (Aktürk, 2010). In this period, the negotiations were not blocked unilaterally but German did not take any proactive steps to support the EU accession of Turkey. The Merkel's government seemed to apply a tactic of discouraging Turkey by allowing the negotiations to be extended while some member states vetoed the opening of new chapters for political reasons. This led to significant resentment and disappointment in Ankara and from Turkish society (Paul and Schmidt, 2017). On the other hand, the German public was traditionally doubtful towards Turkish EU membership, compared with the party politics. Surveys by

Forsa and *Yougov* from 2014 and early 2016 showed that Germans were against a Turkish accession with the high rejection rate of about 80 percent (Hauge, 2017).

During the past years, the Germany-Turkey relations proved to be extremely unstable on several occasions. The topical incidents like Turkey's EU accession process slowed down, the terrorism problem and the rise of Islamophobia in Germany mostly impact the relation between Turkey and Germany, and shape them in a specific manner. Lastly, with the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015 when more than one million migrants entered Germany, the tensions have been changed positively between Berlin and Ankara with the refugee deal (Paul and Schmidt, 2017). To control the massive refugee influx to Germany, Merkel offered the financial aid to Ankara to support the housing of refugees, to accelerate Turkey's accession by reopening of a number of chapters and the visa liberalization processes on the condition that Ankara helps the refugee flow. However, the deterioration of relations between two countries because of following incidents has halted visa liberalization and the reopening of accession chapters (Szabo, 2018).

Since June 2016, the tensions started to increase with the recalling of Turkish ambassador in Berlin, in consequence of the declaration of Armenians genocide during the First World War, by the German parliament. Then the relations deteriorated due to the German government's rather cold reaction in the aftermath of the 15 July 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey. Although Turkey expects Germany to take concrete steps in the fight against the terrorism and the Fethullah Gülen movement, the sufficient support does not receive from Germany (Paul and Schmidt, 2017). The jailing of Turkish-German journalist Deniz Yücel in February 2017 have further worsened the atmosphere and resulted banning Turkish officials from campaigning in Germany for the approval of a constitutional referendum in the spring of 2017. These actions led Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to reprove Germany and Merkel for using "Nazi methods" (Szabo, 2018). The latest incidents have resulted that Germany would veto starting negotiations to revise the EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement and Turkey should not be allowed to become a member of the EU. These rupture not only impacts Germany-Turkey and EU-Turkey relations but also the Turkish community in Germany.

Although Germany has not supported Turkey's EU membership and many

periodical incidents between two countries for most of the time, Turkey has been seen as an important strategic partner that should be kept close and not isolated (Paul and Schmidt, 2017). Unlike the question of Turkey's EU membership, there is a consensus among German political authorities on the strategic importance of Turkey for Europe. As a country that geographically connects Europe and Asia, Turkey has a strategically strong position for Germany against Russia, in the Black Sea region and in the Middle East. In parallel, the two countries collaborate in various major international organizations such as NATO, G20, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Nowak, 2015). On the other hand, the economic cooperation remains to be one of the strongest areas in bilateral relations and both countries intend to promote economic cooperation, particularly with respect to Turkey's attempt to join the European Union. Germany is described as the leading trading partner for Turkey, with bilateral trade volume at 37.7 billion euros in 2017. With more than 7,000 German companies currently operating in Turkey, Germany is the most important foreign investor in Turkey; and more than 80,000 enterprises of Turkish origin with a 50 billion dollar turnover in Germany; they play an important role in German economy (Eliçik, 2018). Also Germans constitute the largest group of tourists visiting Turkey with 5.5 million visitors, or 15 percent of the total in 2017, and still have an important economic impact (Szabo, 2018).

2.2 TURKISH MIGRATION TO GERMANY

After the WWII, Germany entered a process of rapid development to rebuild the country which required a workforce larger than the country could provide for itself. The solution for the shortage of laborers was to invite guest-workers (*Gastarbeiter*) who would be temporarily contracted for specific jobs. As a result, the West German government signed recruitment agreements with several South European and North African countries such as Italy (1955), Greece (1960), Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968) (Stowasser, 2002).

Turkish migration to Western Europe started with the signing of the 'Recruitment Agreement for Labor' between Turkey and Federal Republic of Germany in 1961 and Turkey became one of the largest suppliers of workers. Turkish

workers were accepted on the basis of a rotation principle under which they had to return after the first or second year (Ovali et al., 2011) and they were given contracts with limited duration. Mostly, males were assigned to un- or semi-skilled jobs in heavy industry and females were recruited for electronics, textile and garment industry (Yip, 2011). In the first year, a total of 7,116 Turks had immigrated to Germany to become guest-workers and the number of workers going to Germany increased immediately in the following years. Migration was also supported by Turkish government due to its alleviating impact on unemployment in Turkey, improvement on the balance of payments through workers' remittances and the acquisition of skills by the returning migrants (Keyder and Koç, 1989). Parallel to this, Turkey also signed similar bilateral agreements, setting out the general conditions of recruitment, employment and salaries, with the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium in 1964, France in 1965 and Sweden in 1967 (Sen, 2003).

The recession period of 1966-1967 caused a rapid decline in number of immigrant workers all over Europe, including in West Germany. In 1967, only 9,000 were sent to host countries, while over 900,000 people were on the waiting list to work abroad (Icduygulu, 2012). However, the decline of the number of new entrances was temporary. After the recession, the mass migration period have started again and during those years more than 100,000 workers were leaving Turkey annually. Eventually, between 1961 and 1974, a total of nearly 800,000 workers went to Western Europe and of these workers 649,000 went to Germany (Akgündüz, 2006). The economic recession after the oil crisis slowed again the demand for labor migrants and the official recruitment of Turkish guest-workers was stopped on 23rd of November 1973 to overcome the high levels of unemployment. At that time, one in every eight workers was foreign and the 605,000 Turks made up the largest group of guest-workers in Germany (Göktürk et al., 2007). With the cessation of labor recruitment, the number of arrivals decreased, but the expected return of Turkish immigrant labors to Turkey did not occur. Although German government pursued many strategies, they were not effective in convincing the Turks to leave (Verdugo and Mueller, 2008). In early 1980s, the 'Return Acts and Bonuses' of German government encouraged the return migration to Turkey, by offering money and social security refunds. Between 1983 and 1985, there were more than 310,000 returnees

from Germany. However, in the following years, the number of returnees stabilized at around 40,000-50,000 annually (Ayhan et al., 2000). In other words, the guest-worker population did not decrease as had been hoped by the government.

After the end of labor recruitment, there were only two routes of legal entry to Germany: family reunification and asylum seekers. First, Turkish population in Germany exponentially peaked with the Family Reunification in 1973 which prevailed in a sizeable flow of Turkish spouses and non-adult children (Schnapper, 1994). This unexpected follow-on was many times larger than the initial guest workers' migration. Plus, many of the Turkish spouses arrived to Germany from rural areas in Turkey by way of marrying someone who had already immigrated, because Turkish females from local German communities are considered to be too Westernized (Mueller, 2006). In 1974, the percentage of Turkish female present in the country was of 35.7 %, and by 1985, the proportion of female had increased to 42.3 %. Likewise, the number of young Turkish people under the age of twenty-one increased from 29.6% in 1974 to 45.6% by 1985 (Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik, 1974 and 1985). In parallel to high level of family reunification, after the 1980 military coup in Turkey in particular, a massive asylum seeker who was mainly individuals affiliated with banned political organizations or implicated in unlawful activities, left Turkey and came to Germany which was a country with a very liberal asylum system. In 1980 alone, almost 60,000 seekers were accepted to Germany from 108,000 applicants. It has become increasingly clear that the migration movement was not any more a matter of 'guest-worker migration', but 'the immigration' (Pütz et al., 2006).

In the beginning, the process was planned by both Turkish and German governments as a short-term employment. After the Family Unification, the Turkish community realized that they are not guest workers anymore and they have decided a settled life in Germany. The arrival of the families was a major factor that affects the permanent settlement in Germany. Other factors were the adverse experiences of those who re-migrated to Turkey such as the difficulty of adaptation to the daily life in Turkey and cultural and social alienation from Turkey, the lack of experience in finding a job or starting a new business in Turkey and the ongoing education of children in Germany (Sen, 2002; Sen, 2003). For these reasons, the migration pattern

has changed from a temporary stay to an unintended settlement. Turkish migration has gained its own dynamics and mechanisms, which were quite independent from the bilateral recruitment agreements (Içduygulu, 2012). A survey made by the Centre for Turkish Studies in Germany have showed that in 1980, 60 percent of Turks express a clear intention to stay in Germany permanently, but in 1992, the number increased to 83 percent and only 17 percent of those intended to return to Turkey (Kucukcan, 2002).

In early years of 1990s, migration level from Turkey to Germany was not as high as it used to be, but still have had positive acceleration. Although about 40,000 to 45,000 people were returning back to Turkey from Germany every year in the 1990s, number of new arrivals was more than returns (Sen, 2003). However, the 2000s characterized a new era in which emigration and asylum flows from Turkey to Germany slowed down significantly (Içduygulu, 2012). The research results of Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) show that the number of Turks who moved from Germany to Turkey (27,000) exceeded the number of those who migrated from Turkey to Germany (23,000) in 2013. According to Içduygulu (2012), the other factor of the decline of migratory flow to Europe is the new migration trends to other labor markets such as Middle Eastern and North African countries and Australia. Despite the decline of migration flows, the Turkish population is still growing due to the large number of Turkish children was born in Germany (Içduygulu, 2012). Federal Statistical Office reported that around 54,000 Turkish children have born in Germany each year. By far, Turks in Germany represent the largest and most established foreign-born population in the country (Verdugo and Mueller, 2008).

2.3 SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF TURKS IN GERMANY

When Turkish people have emigrated from Turkey to Germany, they carried their cultural aspects, and then the decision to stay in Germany involved the structural changes in the life styles of Turkish immigrants. They created a minority ethnic group within a society as a subculture with distinct language, traditions, customs and institutions. Compared to the early 1960s when immigration began, today we do not find only immigrants in Germany but also find different generations

of immigrants, having become a highly active part with an evaluated social structure in the German population. Under this caption, we will handle the socio-demographic structure of Turkish population living in Germany, the characteristics of four different generations with Turkish origin and their socio-cultural integration question.

2.3.1 Socio-demographic Data

According to the 'Zensus 2011' research of the Federal Statistical Office, there are about 6.2 million foreigners living in Germany. Of these about 2.7 million are with Turkish origin (including those who are German citizen), making up 2.4 per cent of the total population of Germany, which lies over 80 million. They account for the largest immigrant group in Germany, followed by Italians with 490,000 people, Polish with 380,000, Greek with 250,000 and Croatian with 210,000. As of the 2017 micro census, nearly 1.5 million people with a Turkish migration background reside in Germany without German citizenship, and approximately 14 percent are dual citizens.

Turks in Germany are predominantly concentrated in industrial regions such as the states of North Rhine-Westphalia with 1,019,000 Turks, Baden-Württemberg with 508,000, Bavaria with 377,000 and Hessen with 283,000. The majority (about 60%) live in large cities with a population of more than 500,000 like Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, Düsseldorf, Mannheim, Stuttgart and Munich, and only two percent of them live in small cities with less than 5,000 populations (Destatis, 2012). The preference for city living can be explained by the appraisal that the degree of tolerance and acceptance of migrants is more distinctive in big cities than small ones (Valiente and Yetgin, 2006). Today, Berlin is the city where the highest number of residents of Turkish origin with up to 200,000 people is living, especially in Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain, Neukölln and Wedding districts (Das Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2013). That is why the city is called as 'the second Turkish capital' or 'the biggest Turkish city outside Turkey'.

The family form of German Turks is significantly different than German families. Turkish families are still male-orientated with a traditional family structure. The average number of household members among Turks in Germany is four or

more (Haug et al., 2009), while German families have a small form. Also, half of German Turks have relatives living near their own home, 38 percent meet them daily and 39 percent several times a week. This is due to the fact that the extended family is of great importance in Turkish culture and is the most common form of solidarity for immigrant families. On the other hand, the birth rate among Turkish immigrants in Germany is 2.4 children per woman; nearly double that of the native German population with 1.87 children per woman (Constant, Nottmeyer and Zimmermann, 2009). The increased young population and immigration that continue every year give the signals of these population will go on increasing much more.

According to statistics from *Turkish-European Foundation for Education and Scientific Studies (TAVAK)*, the unemployment rate among German Turks is 30 percent compared to the overall unemployment rate of 5.90 percent and 44 percent of the Turkish population lives below the national poverty line (372 euros per month) in Germany (Sen, 2003). Major problem is the immigrants' lack of education, because in Germany most jobs require a specific professional training. 40 percent of German Turks has no professional qualifications while the German average is 27 percent, which is important for successful participation in working life. In comparison to the German population, Turkish immigrants have a poor performance in education. At first, the children of Turkish immigrants mostly do not go to kindergartens which are the most important pre-school institutions in Germany. In parallel with this, while 23% of Turkish students attend *Hauptshcule* (lowest secondary school), German students are only 13% and situation is reverse in case of *Gymnasium* (highest secondary school) where Turkish students comprise only 6% compared to 23% of Germans.

2.3.2 Four Turkish Generations in Germany

The Turkish population in Germany cannot be characterized as one group; their characteristics are changing from one generation to another due to different reasons. Turkish community in Germany includes four generation German residents of Turkish origin at present. According to Sahin (2010), the differences between the first-, second-, third- and lastly fourth-generation are significant in terms of maintaining the ethnic culture and adapting to German society.

The first-generation is comprised of first arrival from Turkey who is typical guest-workers. They were mainly less educated and unskilled workers without having a specific profession. Also, the spouses who emigrated from Turkey to Germany as a result of Family Reunification can be included into this generation group. The men, mostly had between 20 and 40 years of age, often only having finished primary school and the females only a few years of schooling. Hence they were recruited for elementary jobs in factories (Spangler, 2013). The majority was coming from the rural areas and has not seen before the big cities in Turkey. Their social contribution to the German society was limited, because their main goal was to save money as soon as possible and eventually return to Turkey. For that reason, they lacked interest in learning the German language and many still have poor German language knowledge. Also, as the first-generation were not feeling the need for integration due to the willingness to return home, they were ignorant about discrimination compared to next generations (Sen, 2003).

Ties of the first-generation to Turkey are much stronger than following generations and this influences their opinion of not wanting to take on German citizenship (Sen, 2003). The 2010 European Social Survey shows that only 29.3 percent of first-generation of Turkish origin gained German citizenship. After being retired, many of the first-generation migrants have started to live six months in Turkey and six months in Europe. They prefer to keep in contact with the social and health services and also with their relatives both in Germany and Turkey (İçduygulu, 2012).

The second-generation who are children of the first-generation, are divided into two groups by their birth places: who were born in Turkey and migrated as children, and who were born in Germany. However, both group experienced socialization in Germany. Besides influences from the Turkish family and community, they were also exposed to social contacts with Germans and other minority groups (Krapf and Wolf, 2014). This generation has been better educated and has a better professional status than the first-generation. They tend to speak German better than their parents; hence the level of social contribution is greater. They are more involved in public affairs and protect their rights, strengthening their conscience levels and political participation (Sen, 2003). On the other part, many

researches describe the second-generation as 'in-between' and 'lost' generation. They feel the dilemma between home culture, where traditional practices and memories are entwined and the host culture where they constantly renegotiate their hybrid identities (Kilinc, 2014). In brief, they are more willing to integrate and accept the German culture; however they still preserve Turkish culture passed from parents and families. For instance, only half of the second-generation are German citizen, despite being more likely to gain citizenship than the first-generation. According to Ovali et al. (2011), the attempts of integration started with the second-generation. They were affected by German culture, but still shape their living according to Turkish culture. Although there is a clear progress regarding to the previous generation, the second-generation is less integrated than other migrant groups (Becker, 2011).

The third-generation, children of the second-generation and grandchildren of guest workers, is defined as those having born and raised in Germany; and hardly know Turkey. This young generation of Turkish immigrants has more contact with Germans and higher rate of intermarriage. They are mostly fluent in German language; 78 per cent of the 19-26 years olds evaluate their German linguistic skills as being good or excellent (Erdem and Schmidt, 2008). On the other part, the competence of the third-generation in Turkish language is deteriorating day by day and their accent is not purely Turkish. However, Weidacher (2000) point out the continued importance of Turkish language among Turkish youth and young adults and indicate that 88 per cent of them still use Turkish when talking with their family members.

This young generation lives in their own bicultural world, where they still confront a dilemma to follow both Turkish and Islamic values but also they are willing to integrate into German society (Erdem and Schmidt, 2008). However the presence of xenophobia and Islamophobia in German society in recent years pushes majority of Turkish young population into the margins of society and as a reaction, they consider their religion to be superior and prefer traditional values. Although the majority of the younger age groups were born and raised in Germany and they are better integrated into German society and culture than the older generations, they attach less importance to adapting to German culture and they are extremely dependent on Turkish culture, social values and the impact of Islam on the

development of family identity (Özdemir, 2015). More than ninety per cent of the third-generation adhere to traditional values come from their families and share these values (Mueller, 2006). These attitudes may lead to radical and nationalist behavior among Turkish youth in Germany or push them to go back to Turkey, the homeland. According to TAVAK's research, 63,000 Turks, mostly in the 18-40 age range, have returned to Turkey from Germany and the number of returning will rise to 256,000 in six years. In Turkey they have more opportunities to find better job, because they speak multiple languages including at least German, Turkish and English, and receive better education in German universities.

The youngest generation, *the fourth*, was born in Germany and become German citizen automatically. This generation is currently very young, but it is increasingly growing and will need to be studied in the future to better assess the generations of German Turks.

2.3.3 Socio-cultural Integration

As mentioned by Manderson and Inglis (1985), “migration is a process which is frequently seen as having considerable potential for producing social change due to the disruption it produces into the established patterns of social life.” Especially, migration from developing countries to developed ones may have powerful effects on social change (Içduygu, 2012). From this point, migration from Turkey to Germany have deeply influenced migrants' social life and exposed them to modern economic, social and political environment.


Starting with Family Unification in 1970s, Turkish immigrants rejected their presence in Germany as only temporary and asserted their belonging in German society. However, while integration to the host country's society has been successful for some Turkish migrants, the majority still have integration problem. While social and cultural integration have become important to upscale Turkish immigrants, it is of secondary significance to most low-income Turks who are part of the underclass in Germany (Mueller, 2006). According to Danzer and Ulku (2011), the social integration of Turks is positively inked to their personal characteristics such as education, being female as head of household, years since migration and birth in Germany.

The integration phenomenon to German society is regarded as the assimilation by who contest to be assimilated and to shed their culture and identities. According to Henrike Hochmuth (2015) from the journal of Turkish Weekly, the feeling of strangeness due to the differences in religion and cultures and the general awareness of 'the other' in German society also makes German Turks opposed to the integration. Turkish people who feel rejected may react with defiance and they do not want 'to be accepted'. As a result, Turks who does not want to become 'integrated' are more connected to the ethnic networks constituted by extended family, ethnic neighborhood, community-based groups, self-help organizations and the mosque (Mueller, 2006). Therefore, their isolation, both structurally and socially, suggests that they are not fully integrated and led to create their own communities where traditional customs, values and norms predominate (Verdugo and Mueller, 2008). The living style of Turks in form of collection into certain neighborhood like Kreuzberg (dubbed "*Little Istanbul*") in Berlin is criticized as "ghettoization". However, the solidarity between them helped prevent big social problems, but it seriously hindered their adaption and integration to the German society (Ovali, 2011). Additionally, Turks have created their own Turkish way of living by using Turkish material and language. The study of Yilmaz (2013) which research the daily practices of Turks, display the Turks' high level of preferences on reading Turkish newspapers (74%), watching Turkish channels (78%), eating Turkish food (66%) and not visiting German neighbors (52%).

Compared to previous generations, the young generation Turks are more successful at integration and participation into German society because they have born in Germany, use German language fluently and thus they have much better educational opportunities. The study carried out in November 2013 by *Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center (HUGO)* and the Berlin based research institute *Data 4U*, shows that 90 percent of Turkish young aged between 14 and 29 feel at home in Germany. Even German Turks are getting more integrated day by day; they face larger cultural barriers than other labor migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. The report of the Berlin Institute for Population and Development (2009) based on results from education, assimilation into society and employment, shows that Turks are the least integrated group of immigrants in German society,

despite their presence for many decades in Germany. As seen on the figure 1, German Turks are poorly integrated with the rate 2.4 at bottom of the scale (See figure 1).

Figure 1: Integration Levels According to Place of Origin in Germany



Source: Berlin Institute for Population and Development (2009): *Untapped potential*

The social adaptation and integration problems that Turkish immigrants face are related to education, identity, language, employment, religion, mutual relations and conflicts between generations (Ovalı et al., 2011). For instance, 30 percent of students of Turkish origin do not have a school leaving certificate and only 14 percent can pass the *Abitur* (the final secondary school exam), while 50 percent of those in other migrant groups can. Two-thirds of Turkish children are sent to *Hauptschule*, the lowest educational track, which leads to the lowest employment opportunities. For this reason, Turks are found to be the least successful in the labor market. The unemployment rate is high (about 22 percent) as many are dependent on state benefits and this high rate contributes to being isolated from the German society and to withdrawal into the Turkish community. In terms of assimilation, 93 percent of Turks have married within the Turkish community and the divorces among the marriages of German Turks have the highest rate compared to German-other nationalities (Mueller, 2006). Cultural and religious differences are probable to cause high divorce rates; 64 percent of German women married to Turkish man and 32 percent of German women married to Turkish women get divorce (Verdugo and Mueller, 2008).


On the other part, the role of the German state in the slow integration of Turks is ignorable. The immigration, citizenship and educational policies did not aid the integration of non-German immigrant groups until the 1990s. Even immigrants reached 9 per cent of the population in the 1980s, Germany was still maintaining that it was not an 'immigration country' and was neglecting the need for an extensive integration strategy (Humphrey, 2009). The guest-workers were marked as 'temporary foreigners' who would return to their countries of origin and there were no need for social and cultural integration. More than thirty years after Germany signed the initial recruitment agreements with many countries for guest workers, at last, Germany have taken steps for its transformation to be a multicultural society. However, with years without necessary supports, substantial integration had not occurred. For instance, German government installed job and linguistic skill trainings which help second-generation immigrants to find employment, but only 1,800 young foreigners benefited from these trainings during the 1990s (Liebig, 2007).

As a first big step to the integration, in January 2000, German government modified the legal basis for citizenship of foreigners. Before the modification, children of Turkish parents born in Germany, were not allowed to become German citizens, while new regulations allowed children to become German citizens automatically at birth (*ius soli*) if at least one parent has lived in Germany legally for eight years (Mueller, 2006). The legislation also allowed the first- and second-generation immigrants to obtain German nationality after 8-years period of residence, which used to be 15 years. However, Germany were not allowing dual citizenship, thus Turks who has taken German citizenship had to give up their Turkish passports. The benefits of German citizenship include political and social privileges such as the vote right, civil rights like equal treatment and access to jobs for public institutions, on the other hand this cause loosing citizen rights in Turkey. Between 2000 and 2002, only 470,000 Turkish immigrants held German passport and abandoned their Turkish citizenship (Euwals et al., 2007).

Additional to the revision of Citizenship Law, in 2005, the 'Act Controlling and Restricting Immigration and the Integration of EU-citizens and Foreign Nationals' which define the integration of immigrants as a responsibility of the German state, came into effect. In line with the new immigration law, a new

procedure on granting residence and work permits in order to reduce the bureaucracy was established and a long-term integration plan was built. For instance, as a result of this plan, Germany offers integration courses focus on German language and basic facts about the country, to foreigners and people with migration background. Federal Office for Migration and Refugees reported that, 67,000 of immigrants have finished successfully these courses in 2007 and 13,500 of which were Turkish citizens. After this citizenship reform, the numbers of naturalized citizens with Turkish origin picked again (see figure 2) and made up the largest group with 32,661 acquisitions in 2005, 33,388 in 2006 and 28,861 in 2007; accounting respectively for 27.9 percent, 26.8 percent and 25.5 percent of the total. However, the acceptance of dual citizenship was still a high controversial issue in Germany, while the immigrants from EU member states could have both passports. As recently, in 2014, the new dual citizenship legislation allows children of immigrants born in Germany to have a German passport while keeping the one from their home nation and Only those born after 1990 are concerned with the legislation (Anadolu Agency, 22/12/2014).

Figure 2: Naturalization of Immigrants in Germany between 1997 and 2008



Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees

Although Turkish immigrants have complete legal citizenship rights, they still face racism and social discrimination in various segments of society. Their construction as 'culturally others' and the growing racism and discrimination are important obstacles to establishing social integration (Küçükcan, 2002). Especially after the unification of Germany in 1990, there was an increasing violence against immigrants. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, many of people from the East

side entered to West side. They posed a threat to the fragile position of immigrants and heightened their feelings of insecurity, with slogans such as “foreigners out” and “Germany for Germans”. Turks, the largest immigrant group in Germany, became the primary targets for racist attacks. In November 1992, three Turkish residents were killed in a firebombing by extreme groups in Mölln in western Germany and in May 1993, four German Neo-Nazi youths set fire to a house where Turkish immigrants live in the town of Solingen and killed five members of a Turkish family (Karapınar, 2007). Although the act of violence against German Turks is not very aggressive compared to the past, they still experience discrimination in daily life, mainly when looking for a job or a house. Especially, one of the main problems of Turkish community is within the residential situation. Although Turkish migrants are able to pay high rentals for apartments, they are still facing difficulties when seeking for domicile. Because of German landlords’ unwillingness to rent their houses and apartments to Turks, they have gradually begun buying their own domiciles in Germany (Sen, 2003). Also, according to the survey of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) EU Minorities and Discrimination, published in 2009, 28 percent of Turkish migrants in Germany had experienced discrimination while looking for job and 23 percent at the workplace.

As the largest Muslim group in Germany, Turkish population was also victims of the attacks on the USA on September 11th, because people often equate Islam with Islamist and Islamist with Terrorist. After the attacks, the immigration debate in Europe, including in Germany, has moved from cultural to a religious focus (Mudde, 2012). The religion is the key identity element of Turks in Germany, because majority comes from rural regions in Turkey and for these people Islam has remained one of the important aspects of daily life and formed part of collectivity (Küçükcan, 2002). However, in the recent years, Germany has seen growing Islamophobia and hatred of migrants triggered by propaganda from the extreme right groups, such as “PEGIDA” (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident) which has anti-Islam and anti-immigrant sentiment. The number of Anti-Muslim attacks and incidents in Germany has been climbing and remain a serious problem for Turkish minority in Germany. According to the official statistics of Islamophobic attacks announced by the German government for the first time, at

least 950 attacks on Muslims and their institutions, including 60 against mosques were registered in 2017 alone (The Local, 2019). This threat gradually increased the potential radicalization of the Turkish population in Germany as a function of Islam. German Turks are constantly described as 'Muslims' and 'traditional' and they are given a fixed identity that indicates their differences from the Germans. Thus, they are pushed to the periphery and to social marginality (Küçükcan, 2002). Especially Turkish youth of the third-generation turned to Islam because it met their psychological and social requirements as a group marginalized from the German society (Verdugo and Mueller, 2008).

2.4. CONSUMPTION AND BUSINESSES OF GERMAN TURKS IN GERMANY

The largest minority group in Germany with average monthly household income 3,980 euro, the German Turks is very consuming oriented. They have a total spending power of more than 16.6 billion euro per year which is extremely large for a minority population and about 69 per cent of the Turkish population is in the active consumer age group of 15-65 (Tavak, 2015).

As the generations have different characteristics, the generations with Turkish origin in Germany are also diverse on consumer purchasing behavior. The first-generation who came to Germany as workers, were planning to stay in Germany for a limited period. They aimed to save money for their family, to start a business in Turkey and to have a real-estate in Turkey; therefore they avoided spending money on unnecessary consumer products (Öztürk, Suğul and Timur, 2010). Much of the incoming money was going directly into the family or local community of the migrant, often to maintain dependents stayed in Turkey. The common consumption practices of this generation included purchase of property in Turkey, of gold coins and gold jewelry, and purchase of shares in Turkish companies (İçduygulu, 2012). In this regard, their mainstream German contemporaries had to survive without many consumer products being taken for granted. With the next generations who are more integrated to the local society, the trend of saving money turned into a consumer-oriented and free-spending attitude and the products that were once avoided by the first-generation are preferred by the younger generations. The saving rate of income

has decreased up to 14% in the years of 1990, while the rate was 45% between 1975 and 1978 (Tavak, 2015). Today, German Turks has a relatively low saving rate of 450 euro monthly (11% of income) and have more than 1500 euros for consumption (Szillat and Betov, 2015). The immigrants spend money on improving their living conditions, such as access to better nutrition, education, and home consumables, or as an investment in equipment, building, car and new business (Atalık and Beeley, 1993).

Although a change in the second- and third-generation of German Turks with respect to their consumption behavior cannot be disregarded, this target group still has its sensitive and discrete characteristics that German businesses need to consider. Both a large amount of capital combined with a low savings rate and a strong average household income, make German Turks a consumer group with high potential for companies operating in Germany, because immigrant consumers tend to display a distinctive consumption behavior that connects their home culture with the host country's culture (Penaloza, 1995; Jamal and Chapman, 2000). However the differences in culture, language and habits compared to German population, make the Turkish consumer difficult to appeal, though the Turkish population was seen as a niche market by German companies (Erdem and Schmidt, 2008). Nevertheless, it is very costly to set up marketing teams that focus only on one ethnic target group and is only an alternative for large companies (Szillat and Betov, 2015). The niche market argumentation and an ethnic marketing needed are forwarded to comprehend the causes of the first enterprises started-up by immigrants. The ethnic market for immigrants often occurs within their own immigrant communities, because a demand emerges for certain specific ethnic products, with the arrival of immigrants (Rusinovic, 2006). In this context, German Turks have developed a large market that highly demands special and traditional Turkish products and services in Germany and this demand were the core of the development of Turkish businesses which are appeared in nearly all German cities today.

The independent economic activities of Turks in Germany started in the early 1970s and expanded very quickly though the consumption potential of Turkish population. Turkish people, who have decided to stay on to become long-term residents, developed their own way of living as a foreign community. This collective


way of living resulted the creation of new business areas for Turkish immigrants. Also, the high unemployment and the socio-economic discrimination have pushed immigrants to have their own business. As a result of the economic crises and industrial restructuring in 1970's and the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, many Turkish immigrants have been put out of work, because they were employed as unskilled laborers and were the first ones to be affected by crisis (Pütz, 2008). After moving away from blue-collar work, they turned to self-employment especially in the retail and service sectors, where average earnings are approximately 30 per cent higher (Constant et al., 2009). Moreover, many Turkish immigrants of the first-generation were of rural origin and working on agricultural activities. They were self-sufficient on their work and also experienced on managing a small business. This culture of independence and experience has pushed them to become self-employment in Germany (Pécoud, 2001).

The first business activities of German Turks have relied on demand of ethnic products which the German stores could not provide. Many of German manufacturers and supermarkets were ignoring a huge untapped market of typical Turkish products and halal goods. At the end of 1968, the first Turkish butcher shop opened which sell halal meat, in Berlin. The research results of Abedin and Brettel (2011) show that religiosity level of Muslim Turkish is strongly related to shape their consumer behavior and positively associated with Islamic religious rules on consumption. For that reason, the Islamic orientation of many Turkish consumers is one of the main reasons to rely on Turkish stores which are called as “*halal business*”. They produce halal meat product, sell religiously approved clothes for women and conform to prohibitions relating to alcoholic beverages and the consumption of pork (Inglis et al., 2009). Today, German Turks have access to nearly all the products available in their home countries, including food products in particular. Many people with immigrant backgrounds rely on the 10,000 Turkish supermarkets in the country to get their groceries, in which up to 90 percent of all products are imported from Turkey, on travel agencies (negotiation of travels to Turkey), on undertakers/funeral parlors (transfers, Islamic burials), on import-export shops, on translation agencies etc.

In the first half of the 1990s, the increases of businesses of German Turks

were concentrated and the business start-up percentage for them is double that for Germans. According to TAVAK's report, while only 22,000 German Turks were the business owners in 1985, today in Germany, Turkish immigrants own around 82,400 enterprises that have a turnover of €46 billion and around 430,000 employees (See figure 3). Also, according to KFW's research (2014), more than one in four start-up entrepreneurs has a migrant background in the retail sector in Germany and among those, entrepreneurs having Turkish origin represent the greatest percentage reaching 21%. Turkish businesses are now an important part of the German economy and present in more than 120 sectors including highly successful and competitive ones. Some of these businesses are middle large-scale industries or services in the textile industry, the food sectors of milk and meat products or tourism agencies. However the majorities are small or even micro scale (about 92%), such as grocery stores, restaurants, doner kebab take-away shops, snack bars and fruit and vegetable markets (Inglis et al., 2009). Every seventh businesses are a one man business and the average number of employees is 2.4, mainly are family members (Pütz et al., 2006). In particular, family resources are utilized to raise capital and to reduce business risks by German Turks.

Figure 3: Number of Business of German Turks in Germany between 1985 and 2015



Source: TAVAK's report (2015)

First-generation entrepreneurs have usually targeted a consumer group of Turkish origin, serving products that were mostly of ethnic nature like grocery stores or restaurants offering Turkish food only. They were highly concentrated in wholesale food sector in which low capitalization, no advanced education and built-in reliance on local customers are sufficient (Yip, 2011), because the first-generation

has faced problems due to legal conditions, funding problems and lack of German-language skills (Balkir and Hove, 2017). While the first-generation German Turks entrepreneurs used to cater mostly to co-ethnic customers, the second- and third-generation entrepreneurs are involved in multiple fields, having clients of all origins (Schulte, 2008). Today, Turkish stores are not preferred by only Turkish consumers. Businesses cannot survive by relying on customers only coming from the same ethnic group; they need to be interested by other groups. Thus, Turkish stores have adapted their products and promotions to get German customers interested and today 86% of them are also preferred by German customers (Pécoud, 2001). As an example, Doner kebab, invented by German Turks in Berlin, is far away from being the kind of ethnic “dining”. Now it is competing with currywurst as Germany's favorite fast food today and three-fourths of customers of the Turkish Imbiss or Doner stands are Germans. In addition, German-Turkish businessmen are no longer comprised mostly of small shore owners in a limited number of sectors. There is a growing number of German-Turkish who expands their businesses to the international market. For instance, the Turkish food manufacturers in Germany such as Baktat, Namlı, and Ege Türk serve a wide range of products, not only in Turkish grocery stores, but also in other large chain stores.

Concerning to the consumption behavior of the youngest German Turks generation, the situation is different for two reasons according to Pécoud (2001). First, many German companies and stores adapted their products to customers from other ethnic groups who therefore do not need to go to special ethnic stores any more. For instance, the E-Plus, the German mobile phone provider, provides direct connections to its products and services in the Turkish language with its subsidiary Ay Yildiz for a more customer-friendly strategy when addressing its Turkish clients (Szillat and Betov, 2015). And second, the second- and third-generation German Turks have also adapted their needs, and now are inclined to use non-ethnic products. This is also supported by the finding of Sevim, Hall and Abu-Rayya (2016) which show that there is a greater tendency among older Turkish immigrants to prefer Turkish-made products. On the contrary, younger German Turks who fell more integrated are likely to have favorable attitudes towards non-Turkish made products.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

3.1 AIM OF THE RESEARCH

The minority groups living in a multi-cultural country show different consumption behavior and therefore constitute a large consumer population that have an important effect on both the economy of its own culture of origin and the host society (Sevim et al., 2015). In this context, the purchase intension of minority group towards host country's products can be significantly affected by the consumer animosity feeling, but the animosity between immigrants and native people are rarely focused in the previous researches. On the other hand, the consumer animosity researches focus on behavioral traits of different age cohorts, but generation effect on consumer animosity has been examined by a few researches. On the purpose of filling the mentioned gaps in the literature, the rationale behind this research is to explore the existence of animosity in a minority group, Turkish immigrants living in Germany, towards the native people of the country, Germans, and to explore the impact of generation-based animosity on the responses of German Turks consumer.

With the information derived from the literature, the research has been developed with the aim of responding the following research questions, in order to obtain the basic purpose of the research: (1) How do Turkish consumers living in Germany define the animosity? (2) What are the types of animosity which are generated by Turkish people living in Germany against Germany? (3) What are the factors which affect Turkish consumers' animosity against German products? (4) What is the attitude of Turkish consumers living in Germany towards German products? (5) How the consumer animosities towards German products vary among the German Turks generations?

3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

In the design of the applied research conducted in order to demonstrate the impact of animosity on German Turks consumers towards German products, an exploratory research has been used. Exploratory research is defined as a type of

research used to investigate a topic which is not clearly defined before or needs to be deeply understood. In the previous studies, less effort has been observed researching the generation factors on consumer animosity and the animosity among different ethnic groups or between immigrants and native people are rarely focused. From this point of view, this study is an exploratory study for the reason that it was considered to be the most appropriate to obtain in-depth information on the correlation between the consumer animosity feelings, the beliefs and the attitudes of Turkish consumer residing in Germany. This has attracted significant interest in research and the exploratory research was conducted to reinforce the understanding of this correlation, in order to address the gaps in the existing studies.

Robson (2002) classifies exploratory studies as a valuable approach in finding out what is happening, to ask questions and to assess phenomenon in a new light. In this regard, the exploratory study which is called also hypothesis-generating research, involves gathering qualitative data which generally provides various data compared to other types of studies. Mainly two data collection methods used in exploratory research: in-depth interviews and focus group interviews. Related to the exploratory nature of this study, the qualitative research technique “in-depth interview” which is an open-ended and discovery-oriented method has been chosen. The goal of the in-depth interview is to deeply explore the respondent's point of view, feelings and perspectives and the nature of questions define the topic under investigation but provides opportunities for both interviewer and respondent to discuss some topics with all the specifics. In order to explore the perception about animosity of German Turks in three different generations towards Germany and Germans; and to understand the perceptions, beliefs, feelings and cultural characteristics of the respondents, the possible associations with their buying preferences, the in-depth interview is the most appropriate method for this study.

The data for this research were collected by interviewing with a total of 42 German Turks from three different generations, between January and March 2015. The population of respondents is composed of the German Turks living in Berlin which is the site of the largest Turkish population outside of Turkey, by having the permanent residence or possessing German passport. The one major advantage of the location set would be that there are more than 200,000 Turkish people living in

Berlin and this population is continuously increasing. All of the interviews were done in different districts of Berlin, such as Kreuzberg, Tiergarten and Wedding where a higher percentage of inhabitants are the immigrants with Turkish origin and it is specifically the Turkish population has shaped the culture and the streets of these neighborhoods. All German Turks respondents who have an immigration background from Turkey directly or through family are included in the sample regardless of their subcultural ethnic identity.

The respondents were initially selected through convenience and this was developed by using snowball sampling method which is adopted for the qualitative data collection. Bryman and Bell (2011) describe snowball sampling as the approach where the researcher first makes contact with a restricted group of people relevant to the research topic and then utilizes the initial connections to establish contacts with others. This is an efficient sampling method when the study is on behaviors, perceptions, customs, for the description of typical incident which cannot be generalized for an entire population. In this frame, the data for this study were collected through snowball sampling, because this method have supported to access to the German Turks respondents in Berlin from different generations, especially from the first-generation older than 60 years old who are very seldom generation difficult to encounter. This non-random sampling method also provided to have control on the limitation of sampling and to access the respondents who has specific or various socio-demographic background. Our data were collected from 14 respondents of the first-; 13 respondents of the second-; and 15 respondents of the third-generation which are equally split in terms of gender and having different educational level, whose data are provided in Table 2.

Table 2: Generational Differences by Gender in Educational Level

	Primary	Lower Secondary	Upper Secondary	Advanced
1st Generation Turkish Origin (Male: n= 7 Female n= 7)	5	3	3	3
2nd Generation Turkish Origin (Male: n= 6 Female n= 7)	2	4	4	3
3rd Generation Turkish Origin (Male: n= 7 Female n= 8)	-	3	4	8

The respondents were mostly took place on the streets, in parks, in front of houses, and in workplaces, cafes, shops, clubs, community centers, and organizations. Before starting to the interview, a socio-demographic background form, presented in appendix 1, was completed by each respondent to get more details about him/her such on the date and place of birth, the gender, the educational status and the duration of residence in Germany. Then, they were interviewed face to face using pre-prepared questionnaire that included more than 15 detailed open-ended questions. Each interview lasted between 30-50 minutes and has been audio-recorded by getting permission of the respondents. The questions such as “What is animosity?”, “Do you have animosity towards Germany/Germans?”, “If yes, what are the reasons behind your animosity?” and “Do you think that your animosity has an effect on your purchasing decision? If yes, how?” were asked to the respondents through the purpose of the study and they were not inadvertently leaded to answer the questions in a particular way or in favor of a particular option. The interview questions regarding the attributed studied can be found in appendix 2. By following a semi-structured interview, a casual conversation in amiable atmosphere with the respondents was engaged in order to get more specific details about their animosity feelings and consumption experiences.

3.3 FINDINGS

The data collected by using qualitative methods including in-depth semi-structured interviews, were analyzed through content analysis. Krippendorff (2004) suggests that the content analysis is a widely used qualitative research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from a written document. Before starting the content analysis, the qualitative data of interviews were categorized by using the encoding method. Coding is defined as the process of classifying the research data into meaningful and relevant categories for the purpose of data analysis (Singh, 2007). After the encoding process, the findings are identified and articulated the patterns and relationship among them. The most significant findings of the research can be summarized under three main titles: Animosity towards Germans among Three Generations of German Turks, Cultural Animosity towards Germans from the

Perspective of Three Generations, and Animosity and Effects of Consumption Behavior of German Turks.

3.3.1 Animosity towards Germany and Germans among Three Generations of German Turks

In response to the request to explain what is the concept of animosity, answers of the German-Turk respondents major on emotional terms from conflict, resentment, anger, and grudge to hostility in different emotional intensity ranges. This is consistent with the assertion by Harmeling, Magnusson and Singh (2015) that animosity is associated with several distinct emotions and these emotions lead different consumer coping processes.

Additionally, the findings reveal a difference between first- and second-generation in the way of defining the animosity, as shown in Table 3. The respondents from first-generation avoid using very strong negative emotional terms, while the respondents from second-generation refer specifically to the grudge. For example, Ender (male, second-generation) defines the animosity as “bearing grudge against a people or a nation” and Hatice (female, second-generation) mentions the term of “blood feud” when she attempts to explain the animosity.

Table 3: Definition of Animosity

	1 st Generation	2 nd Generation	3 rd Generation
Grudge	1	7	-
Conflict	2	-	2
Anger	4	3	1
Resentment	2	3	-
Hostility	1	2	-
Others	3	2	2

Although among the first- and second-generation, some respondents use the term animosity interchangeably with hostility; respondents from third-generation describe the animosity and the hostility are completely different concepts (Table 4). Their common view is that the hostile feeling is more intense, negative and long

lasting than the animosity. Burcu from third-generation highlights the distinction between animosity and hostility by making following explicit comparison:

“The hostility and the animosity are not same emotions. I think the hostility is like feeling hate or bearing grudge for someone, the hostile is somebody who hurts me. But the animosity is like being disagreed with someone. You still talk to him even if you do not like him.” **(Burcu, female, third-generation)**

Table 4: Difference between Animosity and Hostility

	1 st Generation	2 nd Generation	3 rd Generation
Animosity and hostility are <i>same</i> emotions	5	5	-
Animosity and hostility are <i>not same</i> emotions	4	5	5

According to the interview findings, it is evident that respondents from third-generation have more animosity towards Germans than first- and second-generation respondents have. This result contradicts with the findings of Klein and Ettensen (1999) who found that older consumers would be more likely to hold animosity. Almost all respondents from first-generation mentioned that they do not harbour animosity towards Germans, as shown in Table 5. Germany is defined by them as their second home country and they mentioned that they live with Germans for more than 50 years. Even they used to have some troubles in the first years of immigration; the first-generation do not harbour animosity towards Germans today.

Most of these respondents who mentioned that they do not have animosity also believe that they should not have animosity feelings towards Germans and they perceive that living in Germany is their choice and as a result they should be respectful towards Germans. Some respondents, who have close dealings with Germans or who has German family relatives, emphasize their positive feelings towards Germans:

“I have been in Germany since 1970 and I do not harbour animosity towards all German people or Turkish people. I used to face discrimination for sure when I was working. For example, the journeyman was German and he was favoring German workers, but I was only getting angry at those people.” **(Gönül, female,**

first-generation)

Table 5: Animosity towards Germans

			1 st Generation	2 nd Generation	3 rd Generation
I	harbour	animosity	1	6	10
	towards	Germans			
I	do not	harbour	9	10	5
	animosity	towards			
	Germans				

The guest-worker generation of German Turks has had limited social contribution to the German society and they did not require for integration, because of their inadequate German language proficiency and the desire to return to the motherland, Turkey. Due to the aforementioned reasons, they were relatively ignorant about discrimination compared to next generations (Sen, 2003). It can be argued that the isolated life from mainstream German society is the reason why the first-generation has low level of animosity towards Germans. The findings show that for those who had direct social interactions with Germans in daily life, negative experiences and perceptions have an effect in the form of reinforcing their animosity feelings. Although the second- and third-generation have higher level of socialization within and integration into German society than the first-generation has, they claim that they face racism and social discrimination in various sections of society. For example, a male respondent from third-generation mentions that he has already experienced the discrimination when he is looking for a job:

“For two years, I harboured animosity towards Germans when I was looking for a job. I applied everywhere but no one called, because there was a foreign name on my CV. However, I was born here and I am a German citizen.” (Cenk, male, third-generation)

In addition, this dynamic is also reflected in the following quote of Sevgi (female) from second-generation that also has animosity feelings because of her children's negative experience at school:

“I feel animosity towards some Germans, not all. For instance, sometimes my daughters come to home crying, because they experience discrimination from their

teachers at school. This makes me and my husband angry with teachers.” (Sevgi, female, second-generation)

According to the interview findings, the animosity feelings of German Turks towards Germans are mostly originated from specific and current circumstances and arise from negative personal experiences at the time of occurrence instead of which is stemmed from historical relationships. Referring to the taxonomy of animosity types (Jung et al., 2002), it signifies that German Turks tend to have the personal and situational animosity towards Germans. Many respondents have the animosity which is not deeply rooted and are not transmitted from one generation to the next. For example, the following two statements illustrate the two generations approach from the same family related to animosity towards Germans. While Burcu (female) from third-generation has high level of animosity, her mother Hale (female) from second-generation never harbours animosity towards Germans:

“I harbour animosity towards some Germans, because they obviously don't like you and don't want you in Germany. I'm living in a small town and especially old people treat differently to you there, although I am always polite to them.” (Burcu, female, first-generation)

“Why I need to harbour animosity towards Germans? We are living in their homeland and we should be respectful.” (Hale, female, second-generation)

The findings of interviews revealed some remarkable insights about how generation is negatively associated with animosity. The youngest German Turks generation has a higher level of animosity towards Germans than first- and second-generation. This unexpected result contradicts the findings of past researchers (Klein & Ettensen, 1999; Hinck, 2004) who found the age as positively correlated with the animosity. It is believed that the young generation German Turks is more successful in terms of integration and participation in German society than the first- and second-generation, because they have born in Germany, uses German language fluently and has much better educational opportunities. However, the result demonstrates that the level of social integration of third-generation is positively correlated with their animosity. Today, the third-generation is more likely to follow current political developments from German media and they are more aware of and more responsive

to the raising presence of xenophobia and Islamophobia in German society in recent years. These circumstances may lead to radical and nationalist behavior among youths of German Turks and trigger their animosity feelings forward Germans. For example, the following respondent's verbatim sentences show his impression related to xenophobic discourses as the reason underlying behind his animosity:

"In general, I only have animosity towards Germans who are xenophobic. There are at least 3-5 million foreign people in Germany. However, Germans call only Turkish and Arabic immigrants as foreigners, because we are Muslim." **(Murat, male, third-generation)**

The result that the third-generation has higher level of animosity than first and second-generation is also verified by respondents. As shown in Table 6, respondents from first and second-generation frequently consider that each generation shows more animosity than the previous generation and the third-generation has the highest level of animosity. Most of the respondents also stated that young German Turks are becoming more nationalistic and radical and more reactive against the social problems they face. Gradually radicalization of young German Turks is explained as societal problem depending on Germany by respondents and it is encapsulated in the following excerpt:

"The radicalization of Turkish youth is the output of Germany, not just from their own families. The feeling of social exclusion makes them more radical." **(Ender, male, second-generation)**

Beside the respondents argue the increasing animosity towards Germans; other respondents consider that the level of animosity decrease since the first-generation and each generation has less animosity than the previous generation. The reasons stated are that the young generation is more integrated and adapted into German society and they feel more German than being Turkish. On the other hand, the relation between the animosity level and the generation is not endorsed by few respondents.

Table 6: Relation between the Animosity Level and the Generation

	1st Generation	2nd Generation	3rd Generation
Each generation shows more animosity than the previous generation.	5	10	5
Each generation shows less animosity than the previous generation.	3	4	6
No relation between the animosity level and the generation.	2	2	3

3.3.2 Cultural Animosity towards Germans from the Perspective of Three Generations

In the literature, the sources of animosity are classified under the war, economic, political and diplomatic and culture-based dimensions (Amine, 2008; Ettensen and Klein 2005; Kalliny et al., 2011; Klein et al., 1998; Russell 2004; Witkowski, 2000). In this study, the reasons are given to explain animosity towards Germans by respondents' highlighted culture-based dimension. These reasons can summarize through three themes: discrimination, socio-cultural differences and maltreatment. The common view of respondents is that the animosity arises from the attitudes and behaviors of Germans, not Turks.

As it is seen in Table 7, the discrimination is the most often mentioned reason by respondents from second-generation behind their animosity. As mentioned earlier, German Turks claim that they are subject to the rising racism, social discrimination and xenophobia in various section of society, mainly in educational and working life. This social atmosphere and the negative experiences push them onto the margins of society and increase their feeling of animosity towards Germans. On the other hand, some respondents, particularly from the second-generation, mention the maltreatment already they faced, as a core reason of their animosity. This finding is also consisting with the history. Especially after the unification of Germany in 1990, there was an increasing violence and racist attacks against immigrants in the country (Kucukcan 2002). Today, the act of outrage against German Turks is not very vicious compared to the past, but another reason mostly given by respondents from third-

generation, appears as the most often mentioned reason: The social and cultural differences.

Table 7: Reasons of Animosity

	1 st Generation	2 nd Generation	3 rd Generation
Discrimination	1	6	7
Social and cultural differences	1	2	8
Maltreatment	-	3	1

The problem of integration and social harmony between culturally different societies, German and Turkish, in a nation-state, Germany, becomes an undeniable issue day by day. It is consistent with literature on cultural animosity (Swaidan et al., 2006, Little and Singh, 2014) that the differences between Turkish and German cultures increasingly lead to German Turks' cultural animosity towards Germans. Especially, the regional differences between Turkish and German societies are frequently mentioned by respondents, as a reason of animosity. The religion was always the key identity element for many German Turks, because it met their psychological and social needs as part of a collectivity. However, in recent years, German Turks become more radical about religion by virtue of the rising Islamophobia in Germany. For example, Bilge (female, third-generation) harbours animosity due to the negative perception about Germans who have religious prejudice against Islam:

“Germans show negative reactions when they see a woman wearing the headscarf. This is not about being Turkish; they have a fear of Islam. Religion is a topic that we cannot keep quiet about. I may be more radical than my relatives about this.” **(Bilge, female, third-generation)**

German Turks respondents are grouped on the basis of their perception of Germans that they live together with in the same country. While Germans are positively considered as “hardworking”, “punctual”, “well-organized”, “disciplined”, “polite”, “open-minded” and “modern”, they have also negative image as being “cold”, “remote”, “fascist” and “xenophobic”. As can be seen in Table 8, respondents from first- and second-generation has not a deeply rooted negative

perception of Germans, moreover one respondent from second-generation utters that “Germans are more reliable than Turkish people”. On the other side, respondents form third-generation tend to have more negative perception of Germans than the other generations have.

Table 8: What Is The Perception About Germans?

	1 st Generation	2 nd Generation	3 rd Generation
Positive perception of German	5	8	3
Negative perception of German	1	1	5
Both positive and negative perception of German	4	7	7

Besides of German Turks' perception of Germans, the perception of German culture has been also observed in this research to understand the cultural animosity profoundly. The interview findings indicate that all respondents, irrespective of generational factor, frequently perceive Turkish culture superior (Table 9). The most mentioned characteristics of Turkish culture by respondents are “cultural diversity”, “hospitality”, “strong family ties” and “rich culinary culture” which make Turkish culture superior to German culture from the standpoint of respondents.

“Many of the Germans that I know are atheist. In general, they have small families with one child. They are not as hospitable as Turkish people. These are negative things. I have grown up in both cultures and German culture seems to be much more negative.” (Duygu, female, third-generation)

Table 9: What Is The Perception About German Culture?

	1 st Generation	2 nd Generation	3 rd Generation
Who perceives German culture superior	3	3	2
Who perceives Turkish culture superior	5	7	11
Who cannot decide	2	6	2

The perception which is in contradiction with Sahin (2010) who concluded that the generation variable has a negative effect on continuing Turkish culture and

positive relation with internalizing German culture may be explained by the fact that people living in cultural dilemma often have a strong attachment to their original culture and national identifications (Kılınç, 2014). Although they were affected by German culture, the majority of German Turks still sculpts their living according to Turkish culture and preserves Turkish culture transferred from their parents and relatives. On the other hand, the presence of xenophobia and Islamophobia in German society in recent years pushes majority of Turkish young population onto the margins of society and as a reaction, they consider their culture to be superior and prefer traditional values (Mueller, 2006).

However, in a few cases, this process is reversed. Several respondents are of the opinion that the German culture is superior to Turkish culture. The most mentioned characteristics of German culture are modernism, liberal values and individualism. For instance, Mehmet states his appreciation of German culture:

“I respect German history, literature and culture. German culture is very precious for me. German language is a great literature and science language.” and adds “Turkish culture is a conservative culture. German children are more independent, for this reason they are more self-confident.” (Mehmet, male, first-generation)

In spite of the growing emphasis among German Turks sustaining their original culture while adjusting to the new culture rather than assimilating it, the assimilation is supported by some respondents: German culture is interpreted as a threat of a change in Turkish culture.

“In my opinion, there is a negative interaction between two cultures. While we are integrated to German culture, we destroy our own culture. We need to keep alive Turkish culture.” (Mustafa, male, second-generation)

3.3.3 Role of Animosity on Consumption of German Turks

According to the findings of interviews, the general view is that the animosity towards Germans does not influence their buying preferences. Purchasing German products is seen as a necessity of living in Germany and in spite of a great number of Turkish stores, it is not possible to quit purchasing these products while living in

Germany (Table 10). This is supported by following statements:

“I have to purchase German products because I do not find everything in Turkish stores.” (Hüseyin, male, first-generation),

“I may quit purchasing French or American products but not German, since I am living in Germany. I cannot imagine this!” (Mustafa, male, second-generation),

“Sometimes I harbour animosity towards Germans but not that much to avoid purchasing German products.” (Seda, female, third-generation)

Table 10: Influence of Animosity to the Consumption

	1 st Generation	2 nd Generation	3 rd Generation
I cannot avoid purchasing German products.	10	13	8
I may boycott German products for a while	-	3	7

However, the respondents from third-generation mention that they may boycott German products limited period of time depending on their animosity level. First, the respondents were asked their preferences on Turkish or German stores. As can be seen in Table 11, German Turks from second- and third-generation mostly prefer shopping from German stores in general, while first-generation is used to shop from both Turkish and German stores. At this point, the imperfect German language proficiency of first-generation may be associated with this finding.

Table 11: Preference on Place of Shopping

	1 st Generation	2 nd Generation	3 rd Generation
Shopping from Turkish stores in general	1	2	-
Shopping from German stores in general	3	10	11
Shopping from both Turkish and German stores	6	4	4

Considering the respondents' answers on their reasons of Turkish stores preference (Table 12), it could be seen that the fundamental reason is the familiar taste of Turkish food products. The products such as legumes, Turkish tea, spices,

sujuk and yoghurt are the specialties of Turkish cuisine and cannot be found in German groceries.

The second reason mainly given by second- and third-generation is based on the permissible (halal) and prohibited (haram) product choice, thus they always buy meat products from Turkish groceries or Turkish butchers and eat meat in Turkish restaurant.

“I go to German markets every other day for daily needs. For some special food products, I go to Turkish supermarkets once in two weeks. I can find some of these products in German groceries but the taste is not same. For example, meat products, tomato paste, halva...I do not care if the meat is halal or not, but I can find assorted cuts of meat in Turkish butchers.” (Ülkü, female, first-generation)

Table 12: Reason of Preference / Turkish Stores

	1 st Generation	2 nd Generation	3 rd Generation
Taste	9	15	12
Product diversity	4	4	5
Price	1	2	3
Halal & Haram choice	2	8	5
Convenience	0	1	1

Compared to the reasons lying behind German store preference, the price is the most mentioned reason by all generations (Table 13). The majority of German Turks has a significant lower income than native Germans as a result of their high unemployment rate. The price is a very important factor that influence low-income customers' consumption attitude. The respondents mostly report that German markets offer low prices to the consumers in comparison with Turkish stores. Finally, third-generation is also explained the reasons of shopping from German market as habit. They are used to use German stores.

Table 13: Reason of Preference / German Stores

	1st Generation	2nd Generation	3rd Generation
Quality	4	4	3
Product diversity	4	1	6
Price	5	8	10
Habitude	-	3	3
Taste	2	2	8



CONCLUSION

In this study, the nature of animosity of German Turks from different generations was analyzed by focusing on the cultural animosity and the impact of animosity on their buying preferences. The findings of interviews can be concluded under the three major headings. First, the generation is negatively associated with animosity. The third-generation has more animosity towards Germans than first- and second-generation have. Although the young generation is more integrated into German society, the animosity of the third-generation is relatively situational and triggered by direct social interactions with Germans and unfavorable attitudes of Germans towards German Turks. Second, the third-generation of German Turks harbours cultural animosity towards Germans. Each generation has their own dynamics on nature of animosity, because their characteristics and the social environment they live in are changing from one generation to another. While the reasons lying behind the animosity of the first- and second-generation are based on social discrimination and maltreatment, the third-generation tend to have cultural animosity arising from cultural and religion-based differences. As consistent with literature on cultural animosity (Bahae and Pisani, 2009; Little and Singh 2014; Swaidan et al. 2006), the differences between Turkish and German cultures and the raising presence of xenophobia and Islamophobia in German society increasingly trigger German Turks' cultural animosity. These circumstances also lead to radical and nationalist behavior among youths of German Turks which is associated with their animosity feelings towards Germans. Third, the animosity has a low impact on consumption of German products. In general, German Turks tend to have the personal and situational animosity towards Germans, which is not deeply rooted and the level of animosity towards Germans is not strong enough to influence their consumption attitude on German products. However, the third-generation has a possibility to boycott German brands for a limited period of time depending on their animosity levels.

Insights of this study provide also some managerial recommendations. Although it is observed that the animosity of German Turks does not create a severe threat for German brands now, if the tension depending on cultural animosity

increase, a risky and complex market conditions may exist. German Turks may avoid from German brands and they can switch their preferences through Turkish brands. Particularly, if the competitive pressure of Turkish stores and brands is exist in the German market; the subject of animosity should not be neglected by policy makers and marketers. In this light, the impact of cultural animosity feelings of the target consumer, even if they are from the minority ethnic group, should be investigated and proactively managed among German Turks consumers by the marketing managers. As they face varying degrees or types of animosity among consumers, the effective marketing campaigns should be developed in Germany. Ignoring the circumstance of cultural animosity is the worst option for marketing managers as it may cost a loss of sales and profits to their firm or brand.

There are number of limitations and futures lines of research to this study. As this research is exploratory in nature, the findings cannot be generalized to other minority groups. A limitation of this research is that the single town selection may have resulted in findings relevant only to the German Turks in Berlin. This may or may not be directly true for other Turkish immigrant in Germany where the level of animosity may be different and where the generations. The results also could differ when this research has applied in rural areas of Germany. An additional limitation is the consumption dependency of the young group of respondents, mostly from the 3rd generation. They are not fully independent while taking decisions relating to consumption and spending, as they still depend on resources from family. Finally, a future research may focus on the same subject from the perspective of native Germans.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

The Socio-demographic Background Form

Name-Surname				
Date of birth				
Education	Primary <input type="checkbox"/>	Lower Secondary <input type="checkbox"/>	Upper Secondary <input type="checkbox"/>	Advanced <input type="checkbox"/>
Working Condition	Student <input type="checkbox"/>	Part-time <input type="checkbox"/>	Full-time <input type="checkbox"/>	Retired <input type="checkbox"/>
Born in Germany?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>		
How long have you been in Germany?				
How many times a year do you visit Turkey?	Never <input type="checkbox"/>	Only one time <input type="checkbox"/>	More than one time <input type="checkbox"/>	

APPENDIX 2

Görüşme Soruları

1. Almanya'daki yaşamınız nasıl? Ne tür zorluklar yaşıyorsunuz?
2. Almanlar hakkındaki düşünceleriniz nedir?
3. Alman kültürünü nasıl tanımlarsınız?
4. Alman kültürü ve Türk kültürü arasında sizce ne gibi farklar var?
5. Sizce burada yaşayan Türklerin kültürü Alman kültüründen etkileniyor mu? Etkileniyor ise, olumlu mu olumsuz yönde mi?
6. Günlük alışverişinizi Türk marketlerinden mi, Alman marketlerinden mi yapıyorsunuz? Tercihinizin sebebi nedir? (fiyat, kalite, lokasyon, alışkanlıklar,...)
7. Ne tür ürünleri özellikle Türk/Alman marketlerinden alıyorsunuz? (gıda, temizlik, ev eşyası, kişisel bakım, teknoloji,...)
8. Alman ürünlerini kaliteli buluyor musunuz?
9. Vazgeçemediğiniz Alman ürünleri var mı? A) Evet B) Hayır
10. Cevabınız evet ise, aynı ürünün Türk menşelisini tercih eder miydiniz? Ne gibi durumlarda tercih edersiniz?
11. “Asla almam” dediğiniz Alman ürünleri var mı? Neden?
12. Husumet kelimesi size ne ifade ediyor?
13. Düşmanlık ve husumet sizce aynı şey mi?
14. Almanlara karşı husumet hissi duyuyor musunuz? A) Evet B) Hayır
15. Evet ise;
 - Neden husumet duyduğunuzu düşünüyorsunuz? Bu husumetin altında sizce ne gibi sebepler var?
 - Aileniz ve çevrenizdekilerin sizinle aynı fikri paylaştığını düşünüyor musunuz?
 - Bu husumetin kültürel benzerlikler ve farklılıklarla bir ilgisi olabilir mi? (7. Soruyu referans al)
 - Bu husumetin Alman ürünlerini tercihinize etkisi var mı? Var ise hangi ürün grubunu etkiliyor?

- Husumet duysanız da asla vazgeçmeyeceğiniz Alman ürünleri var mı? Var ise neden?

- Sizce husumet hissi nesilden nesile değişen bir olgu mudur? Değişiyor ise ne yönde?

16. Hayır ise;

- Almanlar ve Türkler arasında nasıl bir sorun yaşansa sizde husumet hissini uyandırır? (savaş, ekonomik sebepler, diplomatik sebepler, kültürel sebepler,...)

- Türk ve Alman kültüründeki farklılıklar husumete sebep olur mu? (7. Soruyu referans al) A) Evet B) Hayır

- Evet ise, bu durum Alman ürünlerine karşı tutumunuzu etkiler mi?

- Yıllardır kullandığınız ve memnun olduğunuz Alman ürünlerinden husumet nedeni ile vazgeçer misiniz? Bu ürünlerin yerine Türk mallarını tercih etmeye başlar mısınız?

- Sizce husumet hissi nesilden nesile değişen bir olgu mudur?

Interview Questions

1. How do you feel about living in Germany? What kind of difficulties do you face with?
2. What do you think about Germans?
3. How do you describe German culture?
4. What are the differences between German and Turkish cultures according to you?
5. Do you think Turkish people who are living in Germany are affected from German culture? If yes, do you think it is on positive or negative way?
6. Which shopping centers or markets do you prefer on a daily basis, Turkish stores or German stores? What is the reason of your choice? (Price, quality, location, habits...)
7. What kind of products do you buy from Turkish/German stores? (Food, cleaning, furniture, personal care...)
8. Do you think that German products are of good quality?
9. Are there any German products which are unreplaceable for you? A) Yes
B) No
10. If yes, would you prefer Turkish origin of the same product? In which conditions?
11. Is there any German product that you have never bought? Why?
12. What does the word animosity means to you?
13. Do you think that hostility and animosity have the same meaning?
14. Do you feel animosity against Germans? A) Yes B) No
15. If yes;
 - Why do you think that you have the animosity feelings? What are the reasons behind the animosity ?
 - Do you think that your family and people around you feel the same with you?
 - Do you think that this animosity feeling is caused by the cultural differences or similarities? (Please refer to question 7)
 - Is your animosity feelings affect your decision to prefer German products? If yes what kind of products are being affected?

- Are there any German products for you that you cannot give up even you feel animosity? If yes, why?

- Do you think that do animosity feelings change according to generations? If yes does it change in a good way or a bad way?

16. If no;

- What kind of a problem between Germans and Turks can make you feel animosity? (War, economic reasons, political reasons, cultural reasons,...)

- Do you think that cultural differences between Germans and Turks cause the animosity? (Please refer to question 7) A) Yes B) No

- If yes, does it effects your thoughts about German products?

- Do you stop using German products that you are using for years and be satisfied with because of Animosity?

- Do you think that animosity feelings change according to generations? If yes, does it change in good way or bad way?