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CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROGRAM  
MASTER’S THESIS**

**RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS  
THROUGH NON-DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS: TURKEY-  
ARMENIA CASE**

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## DECLARATION

I here by declare that this master's thesis titled as "Resolution of International Conflicts through Non-Diplomatic Channels: Turkey-Armenia Case" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honour.



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## **ABSTRACT**

**Master's Thesis**

**Resolution of International Conflicts through Non-Diplomatic Channels:**

**Turkey-Armenia Case**

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**Dokuz Eylül University**

**Social Sciences Institute**

**Department of Business Administration**

**Conflict Resolution Program**

The relocation policy of the Ottoman government in 1915 towards the Armenian population has been at the center of an ongoing conflict between Armenians and Turks for more than a century. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the involvement of Armenian diaspora in the conflict have made the problem even more complicated. A sustainable conflict resolution perspective to improve Turkey-Armenia relationship could not be developed through diplomatic channels up to the present. Therefore, alternative channels and activities have been flourishing for a decade.

In this study, civil society-based Track Two efforts for the resolution of Armenian-Turkish conflict resolution were examined and their effectiveness was discussed. For this purpose, the limits of diplomatic methods have been examined within a theoretical and historical framework in the first place. Then, the activities of major non-governmental organizations working in this field were introduced and evaluated in the light of six hypotheses suggested. Information was gathered through interviews with the representatives of some of these NGOs.

It is concluded that Track Two Diplomacy methods can be effective in solving the Armenian-Turkish conflict. Focusing on some special groups such as young people, journalists and artists, receiving the help of specialists and academicians, the synergy that can be generated by the cooperation of similar institutions, seem to have positive effects on the reduction of mutual prejudices among the two peoples. However, it has also been observed that the works carried out were not enough to reach the public agenda of both communities and were insufficient to influence politicians.

**Keywords: Conflict Resolution, Armenia-Turkey Relations, Track Two Diplomacy, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)**



**ÖZET**  
**Yüksek Lisans Tezi**  
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**Anlaşmazlık Çözümü Programı**

Osmanlı devletinin 1915'te Ermeni nüfusa yönelik yürüttüğü yer değiştirme politikası Ermeniler ve Türkler arasında yüzyılı aşkın zamandır devam eden bir anlaşmazlığa neden olmuştur. Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan arasında yaşanan Yukarı Karabağ sorununun yanı sıra, Ermeni Diasporasının da anlaşmazlığa dâhil olması ile bu anlaşmazlık daha da karmaşık hale gelmiştir. Günümüze kadar Türk-Ermeni ilişkilerinin geliştirilmesinde diplomatik kanallar yoluyla sürdürülebilir bir çatışma çözümü perspektifi geliştirilememiştir. Bu nedenle, son on yılda alternatif kanallar ve aktiviteler zenginleşmektedir.

Bu çalışmada Ermeni-Türk anlaşmazlığının çözümü için yürütülen sivil toplum merkezli gayri resmi diplomasi çabaları ele alınmış ve bunların etkinliği tartışılmıştır. Bu amaçla öncelikle diplomatik yöntemlerin sınırları teorik ve tarihsel bir çerçevede ortaya konmuştur. Ardından Ermenistan-Türkiye anlaşmazlığının çözümüne yönelik çalışmalar yürüten başlıca hükümet dışı organizasyonların pratikleri tanıtılmış ve öne sürülen altı hipotez ışığında bu çalışmalar değerlendirilmiştir. Söz konusu organizasyonların bazılarının temsilcileri ile mülakatlar yapılarak bilgi toplanmıştır.

Çalışmada gayri resmi diplomasi yöntemlerinin Ermeni-Türk anlaşmazlığını çözmede etkili olabileceği sonucuna varılmıştır. Gençler, gazeteciler ve sanatçılar gibi bazı özel gruplara odaklanmanın, uzman ve akademisyen yardımı almanın, benzer faaliyet yürüten kuruluşların işbirliği içinde çalışmasının oluşturabileceği sinerjinin iki toplum arasında karşılıklı önyargıların azaltılmasında olumlu sonuçlar yarattığı görülmüştür. Bununla birlikte yürütülen çalışmaların her iki toplumun kamuoyu gündemine yeteri

kadar getirilemediđi ve politikacıları etkilemekte yetersiz kaldıđı da görölmüşür.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Anlaşmazlık Çözümü, Ermenistan-Türkiye İlişkileri, Gayri resmi Diplomasi, Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları.



# **RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS THROUGH NON-DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS: TURKEY-ARMENIA CASE**

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## **ABBREVIATION**

<b>AAA</b>	Armenian Assembly of America
<b>AGMI</b>	National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
<b>AMIDEAST</b>	America-Mideast Educational and Training Services
<b>ANCA</b>	Armenian National Committee of America
<b>ASALA</b>	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
<b>ATCP</b>	Armenia-Turkey Cinema Platform
<b>BSEC</b>	Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council
<b>CD</b>	Compact disc
<b>CF</b>	Civilitas Foundation
<b>CHP</b>	Republican People's Party
<b>CPPCG</b>	Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
<b>CSMHI</b>	Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction
<b>DC</b>	District of Columbia
<b>EPF</b>	Eurasia Partnership Foundation
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GPOT</b>	Global Political Trends Center
<b>HYD</b>	Citizens' Assembly
<b>ICHD</b>	International Center for Human Development
<b>ICT</b>	Information Communications Technologies
<b>ICTJ</b>	International Center for Transitional Justice
<b>IMTD</b>	Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy
<b>IPC</b>	Istanbul Policy Center
<b>IR</b>	International Relations
<b>ISIS</b>	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
<b>MANEC</b>	Marketing Network of Caucasasia
<b>MHP</b>	Nationalist Movement Party's
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organization
<b>NKAO</b>	Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast

<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
<b>PJC</b>	Public Journalism Club
<b>PKK</b>	Kurdistan Workers Party
<b>PLO</b>	Palestine Liberation Organization
<b>PODEM</b>	Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies
<b>RSC</b>	Regional Studies Center
<b>SATR</b>	Support to Armenia-Turkey Rapprochement
<b>SIDA</b>	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
<b>SIDU</b>	Summer School for Inter dialogue and Understanding
<b>TABDC</b>	Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council
<b>TARC</b>	Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission
<b>TEPAV</b>	Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
<b>TESEV</b>	Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
<b>TOBB</b>	Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
<b>TOG</b>	Toplum Gönüllüleri
<b>UMBA</b>	Union of Manufacturers and Businesspeople of Armenia
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>U.S.</b>	United States or America
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USD</b>	United States dollar(s)
<b>USIS</b>	United States Information Service
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>VAWM</b>	Regional Agricultural Wholesale Market
<b>YPC</b>	Yerevan Press Club

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## INTRODUCTION

Armenians and Turks have lived together and entered into various social, economic and cultural relations for a long time in history. However, rise of nationalisms and nation-states in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, and the dynamics of the World War I have affected these two peoples tragically. The Ottoman government ceased to regard the Armenians as “the most loyal subject”, as they founded nationalist organizations that sought independence in cooperation with some imperial states. The tension finally culminated in the government’s decision to relocate Armenians in 1915. This forced immigration, which ended up with the death of many Armenians, has caused a great disagreement between the Armenians and the Turks ever since. Armenians consider this event as a deliberate act of genocide while Turks speak of mutual violence and consider the relocation policy as a necessary wartime measure. The disagreement was frozen until 1991, as the relationship between the two states that emerged after the war, Turkish Republic and Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, has been embedded in the broader Cold War context. In 1991 and 1992 there were political and economic contacts between the two states, with the further aim of developing good neighborly relations. However, the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia and Turkey’s taking side with Azerbaijan in this conflict, have made the past wounds resurface. The recognition of the claims of genocide by the influence of the Armenian Diaspora in various countries of the world has made the problem even more complicated.

While Turkey puts the termination of the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh as a prerequisite for normalization and solution, Armenia regards the recognition of the genocide as a precondition. Nevertheless, there have been conflict resolution attempts in the last twenty years. In 1997, the Turkish Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) was established to develop trade relations between the two countries as an important milestone for resolving the Armenian-Turkish conflict. The Council has had positive effects on trade as well as on politics. Then, in 2001, Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) was established with non-governmental civil society participants to strengthen relations between Armenia and Turkey and to resolve the conflict. Although the efforts of this commission did



not yield a positive result, they set a background for the rapprochement in the 2000s. The new Turkish governments' adoption of a zero problem policy with its neighbors and following gestures such as launching air traffic with Armenia and opening of Van Akdamar church; Armenia's growing political isolation and economic problems aggravated by the crisis between Georgia and Russia in 2008; and finally the interest of both the USA and the EU in mediating a solution, have resulted in top level reciprocal visits ("football diplomacy") and the signing of two protocols between Turkey and Armenia in October 14, 2009. However, about three months after the signing of the protocols, Armenian constitutional court decided that the protocols would be valid when the mutual diplomatic relations was initiated and the closed border was opened. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey stated that the decision of the Constitutional Court of Armenia concerning the protocols contained prerequisite provisions and was unacceptable. At this stage, the protocols have been put on the shelf and rapprochement has stopped. It would not be wrong to say that official relations have been shaped according to the principles of realist approach to international relations. Yet there is another current and active channel between the two peoples, which is shaped by liberal approach: the unofficial diplomacy carried out by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This study attempts to identify these channels and evaluate their effectiveness.

The actual and potential role of NGOs in the resolution of Turkey-Armenia conflict is a relatively understudied academic topic. When the literature is reviewed, one may easily see that the vast majority of the studies on Armenian-Turkish conflict concern whether the 1915 events were genocide or not, and the causes and consequences of these events. There are also studies on the reasons and mechanisms of the rapprochement between the two countries in the 2000s, which mostly focus on official relations. Fewer studies <sup>1</sup> directly focus on the role of non-diplomatic/unofficial conflict resolution activities. They make an inventory of the NGO activities, and discuss the perceptions, concerns, and suggestions of civil

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<sup>1</sup> Diba Nigar Goksel, "Reconciliation Initiatives: Emerging Patterns in Turkey", Tigran Mkrtchyan and Nigar Goksel, "The Role of NGOs in Turkey-Armenia Rapprochement", Sven Behrendt, "Getting to Yes: Prospects for the Armenian-Turkish Dialogue", Aybars Görgülü, "Turkey-Armenia Relations: A Vicious Circle", Esra Çuhadar and Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, "Reflecting on the Two Decades of Bridging the Divide: Taking Stock of Turkish-Armenian Civil Society Activities". The contribution of these studies to the field is elaborated in Chapter 3.

society practitioners. This study aims to contribute to this growing academic literature through providing updated information about the efforts and ideas of practitioners, based on new hypotheses. In this study, we aim to respond to the question “Is unofficial diplomacy an effective way of influencing states and societies in Armenia-Turkey conflict, and what kinds of strategies and instruments have been developed to this aim?” Research is designed in order to test the effectiveness of current non-diplomatic channels between Armenia and Turkey. Six hypotheses focusing on six different aspects of non-diplomatic activities have been developed.

**Hypothesis 1:** In non-diplomatic conflict resolution activities regarding Turkey-Armenia conflict, young people, journalists, artists and businessmen are specifically addressed because they have a multiplier effect on the results.

**Hypothesis 2:** Mutual interaction and collaborative works reduce feelings of victimization on both sides. They make possible for people to be understood by the other side. It is effective in breaking prejudices and relieving wounds.

**Hypothesis 3:** Public awareness is increased through non-diplomatic activities. It is possible to change feelings and thoughts about the conflict that the society is experiencing.

**Hypothesis 4:** The help of experts (academicians and practitioners) on conflict resolution provides positive contributions to conflict resolution activities that are carried out.

**Hypothesis 5:** Non-diplomatic activities provide positive contributions to resolution when conducted in cooperation with other institutions and third countries.

**Hypothesis 6:** Non-diplomatic activities contribute to a positive change in the attitudes of the politicians of both countries.

The hypotheses stated above have been formulated based on certain theoretical foundations. This theoretical framework will be depicted in the first part of the study. Elements of the theoretical framework are derived from various scholars. First of them is Nimet Beriker, whose studies provide insights into the dynamics of a shift from strategic-competitive to cooperative foreign policy tools. Secondly, new approaches to diplomacy will be discussed with a focus on the actors of diplomacy at various levels and their mutual relations. Introduction of diplomacy “tracks” is particularly important for this study. The concept of “Track Two” diplomacy, which

refers to unofficial exchanges between two peoples, was introduced by Joseph V. Montville and William D. Davidson in 1982 for the first time. Later in 1992, it was expanded as “multi-track diplomacy” by Louise Diamond and John W. McDonald. Strengths and weaknesses of each track will be discussed, to understand the effectiveness of NGOs. Then, tools and stages of reconciliation will be clarified because in the Turkish-Armenian case a deep-rooted trauma seems to be the major cause of the problems between the two states. Paul Lederach’s contribution will be discussed, as he provided a comprehensive and practical model to build a bridge between official and unofficial levels, which also takes psychological dynamics such as stereotypes and prejudices into consideration. Finally, the work of Vamik Volkan will be discussed. His concept of “chosen trauma”, his call for addressing chosen traumas in conflict resolution, and his “tree model” as a method of unofficial diplomacy will be examined.

Second chapter will provide a summary of the roots of the Turkish-Armenian conflict, and a discussion of the various efforts to re-establish relations between the two states and societies since the late 1990s. Firstly, the history of Armenian-Turkish conflict, dating back to late 19<sup>th</sup> century, and the attitudes of Armenians in the historical process to Turks and Turks against Armenians will be examined. Secondly, the Armenian Diaspora, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and their impact on the relations between Turkey and Armenia will be evaluated. Finally, efforts of the Turkish Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) that started in 1997, political developments since the early 2000s and the ensuing gestures of rapprochement, “football diplomacy” and process of protocols will be discussed. In the light of this historical analysis, the vital role and potential instruments of unofficial diplomacy will become more clear.

Third chapter depicts how our case study is designed and carried out, and presents the findings. In the first place, various civil society efforts, which increased with the signing of the protocols between Armenia and Turkey in 2009, will be introduced. Those efforts include such “Track Two” diplomacy practices as seminars, meetings, workshops, mutual scholarship programs, travel funds, summer schools, journalism programs, and film and art studies. 4 NGOs from Turkey and 4 NGOs from Armenia under the Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process Support

Program of the European Union constitute the focus of our study. The NGOs from Turkey are Anadolu Kultur, Hrant Dink Foundation, The Economic Policy Research Foundation (TEPAV), Citizens' Assembly (HYD). The NGOs from Armenia are Civiltas Foundation (CF), Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), Public Journalism Club (PJC) and Regional Studies Center (RSC). In addition, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), the Global Political Trends Center (GPOT) of Istanbul Kultur University, the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), the Non-diplomatic Activities of the Turkish–Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) which have valuable projects for developing Armenia-Turkey relations have been included in the scope of the study.

In the second part of the third chapter we will try to identify the impact of unofficial diplomacy on conflict resolution, based on data collected through semi-structured interviews with representatives of 8 NGOs from Armenia and Turkey, from among these 12 NGOs. The findings will be analyzed under six categories that reflect the hypotheses: a) The contributions of “Track Two” diplomacy practitioners’ focus on specific target groups, specific working areas and activities when conducting their operations. b) The contributions of “Track Two” diplomacy to the establishment of interpersonal relationships, eradication of prejudice, and healing of past wounds and trauma. c) The contributions of “Track Two” diplomacy to the creation of awareness and changes in public opinion. d) The contributions of conflict resolution experts and academicians to NGO activities e) The contributions of regional and international non-governmental organizations’ cooperation f) The contributions of conflict resolution activities to changes in the policies of the country or in the attitudes of politicians. In conclusion, the present situation of the role of NGOs in improving the relations between Armenia and Turkey and prospects for future will be assessed based on the abovementioned theoretical, historical and empirical data.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: BASIC CONCEPTS AND LITERATURE REVIEW**

This chapter will focus on certain sections of the conflict resolution literature that are relevant to and inspiring for the case to be examined. After a glance at the sources of traditional and new approaches to diplomacy in the longstanding and broad debate between realist and liberal schools of international relations, a brief introduction to conflict resolution studies that emerged in the 1950s upon a liberal search for lasting peace will be presented. Then, two major topics in the conflict resolution literature –reconciliation and diplomacy tracks– will be examined in order to understand the limits of traditional diplomacy in Armenian-Turkish conflict and to offer an insight into a non-traditional workable reconciliation.

#### **1.1. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND MACRO-THEORIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

##### **1.1.1 Fundamental IR concepts referred throughout the study**

Before exploring the relevant theoretical studies, it is necessary to clarify for the non-specialized reader some basic terms referred throughout the study. To begin with “international relations” traditionally refers to political, economic and cultural interactions between states and to the broad scientific discipline that studies those interactions. “International politics” is another term sometimes used interchangeably. It focuses on the political side of international relations, and it is used to refer to both political interactions among states and all non-state activities with political goals and results. There is not one definition accepted by all because each actor, goal and instrument in international politics has a dynamic and complex structure. How different theoretical schools conceptualized the state, whether they included informal/non-state actors or not, which type of interactions they focused on, all

produce different and even contradicting definitions of international relations and international politics.<sup>2</sup>

Another term to be clarified is “power” since some define international politics as a continuing effort to maintain, increase and demonstrate the power of one’s own nation and to keep in check or reduce the power of other nations.<sup>3</sup> Power is explained as a control or influence over the others’ behaviors or minds intentionally.<sup>4</sup> In international politics a distinction is made between “hard” and “soft” power, according to the instruments used to keep and increase power. The world community is familiar with hard power. Everyone knows that military and economic might often get others to change their position. Hard power is based on calculable costs and benefits; it can rest on inducements ("carrots") or threats ("sticks").<sup>5</sup>

On the other side, soft power includes persuasive ideas that foreigners find attractive.<sup>6</sup> Joseph Nye has coined the term "soft power" to describe a nation's ability to attract and persuade. According to Nye, attractiveness of one’s culture, political ideals, and policies are the tools of soft power, while military or economic persuasion tools are hard power instruments used by the parties to influence the other side.<sup>7</sup> Soft power arises out of an attraction of the culture, values, and a foreign policy based on moral and legal norms.<sup>8</sup> When a country has soft power that means some other countries are admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness.<sup>9</sup> The power level of the adversary parties determines what

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<sup>2</sup> Joseph S. Nye, **Understanding International Conflicts An introduction to Theory and History**, Sixth Edition, Pearson Longman Printed, USA, 2007, (Understanding International Conflicts) pp. 8-9; Nezir AKYEŞİLMEN, “Uluslararası Politikanın Demokratikleşmesi”, **Uluslararası Politika-II**, (Ed. Murat ÇEMREK), Anadolu Üniversitesi, Eskişehir, 2013, p. 112; Tayyar Arı, Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Dış Politika, 5. Baskı, Alfa Yayın., İstanbul, 2004, p. 48-49.

<sup>3</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, **Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace**, First edition, published by Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, p. 175.

<sup>4</sup> Morgenthau, p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> Joseph S. Nye, **The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone**, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, (The Paradox of American Power), p. 8

<sup>6</sup> Joseph S. Nye, **SOFT POWER The Means to Success in World Politics**, Published in the United States by PublicAffairs, 2004, (**Soft Power**), p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Nye, **Soft Power**, pp.6-8.

<sup>8</sup> Nye, **Soft Power**, p. x.

<sup>8</sup> Nye, **Soft Power**, p. 11.

<sup>9</sup> Nye, **The Paradox of American Power**, pp. 8-9.

is considered to be important, fair, and just in most settings and thus shape and control many methods of resolution.<sup>10</sup>

A final related set of terms to be clarified focuses on “diplomacy”, a term that will be numerous referred in the rest of this chapter. “Foreign policy” is the activities of one state regarding its interactions with other states. The term “diplomacy” is used instead of “foreign policy” by some, while many others consider it as the whole non-violent foreign policy tools based on dialogue and carried out by officials.<sup>11</sup> Quality of diplomacy is one of the major elements that make the national power.<sup>12</sup> No matter how advantageous a nation is in terms of the other components of power compared to other nations, it wouldn’t succeed in the long run if it does not have a good diplomacy. Since diplomacy brings the ends of foreign policy into harmony with the available resources of national power.<sup>13</sup> The states attempt to achieve their aims through the diplomatic representatives of the foreign offices. The traditional instruments of diplomacy are the techniques of persuasion, negotiation, and pressure. There are many cases in which diplomacy has succeeded in preserving peace but there are many cases of failure as well.<sup>14</sup>

In the traditional realist view of international politics that we will discuss in the next section, states are the only significant actors and, so, classical diplomacy is the main instrument of foreign policy of the states. However, in today’s world, diplomacy is very different from the last century.<sup>15</sup> Non state actors are on the rise in terms of number and level of influence. Large multinational corporations’ power goes beyond the borders, sometimes they have more economic resources than many states do.<sup>16</sup> Nongovernmental organizations and networks are particularly effective in penetrating to the states. They are able to focus the attention of the media and governments on their preferred issues.<sup>17</sup> Diplomacy is not the only task of diplomats

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<sup>10</sup> Peter T. Coleman, “Power and Conflict”, **The Handbook of Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice**, (Ed. Morton Deutsch, Peter T. Coleman and, Eric C. Marcus), Jossey-Bass A Wiley Imprint USA, 2006, pp. 120-121.

<sup>11</sup> G. R. Berridge and Alan James, “**A Dictionary of Diplomacy**”, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, p. 70.

<sup>12</sup> Morgenthau, p. 105.

<sup>13</sup> Morgenthau, p. 107.

<sup>14</sup> Morgenthau, p. 444.

<sup>15</sup> See Morgenthau for the reasons of the decline of diplomacy that started in the second quarter of the 20th cc., pp. 425-430.

<sup>16</sup> Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>17</sup> Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, p. 60.

anymore. Every citizen may be diplomacy player thanks to developments in technology and increased cross-border mobility.<sup>18</sup> International conflict resolution tasks and means attached to diplomacy also vary in time and space, and according to one's approach. In the next section, the debate between realist and liberal schools in international relations will be briefly examined in order to comprehend the theoretical sources of the rise of a conflict resolution literature, and the rise of new diplomatic actors and tools in resolving international conflicts.

### 1.1.2. Realist and Liberal Approaches to International Relations

There are two basic paradigms which explain the global system and the behavior of states in this system. One of them is idealism or liberalism, and the other is realism. While realists regard international politics as a competitive arena of power-seeking states, liberals seek for opportunities for cooperation and peace, and they pay attention to non-state actors as well as states.<sup>19</sup> Today's statesmen and the decision makers find themselves at ease in strategizing foreign policies according to realist principles because the liberal paradigm provides "abstract frameworks" such as multilateralism, interdependence and commitment to democracy, rather than operational tools for managing the day-to-day business of diplomacy such as ultimatums, sanctions and strategic alliances.<sup>20</sup> However, since it is almost impossible to resolve a conflict in the long-term without any binding moral obligations, liberal principles are increasingly being applied in conflict resolution. For instance, Turkish foreign policy toward Armenia has maintained realist principles such as the sealed border, economic blockade and sanctions against Armenia which aim to weaken it and force it to make concessions.<sup>21</sup> However, this policy is proven to be ineffective in resolving the dispute. So, it is vital to understand realist and liberal approaches for the purpose of this study.

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<sup>18</sup> Firat PURTAŞ, "Rising Value of Turkish Foreign Policy: Cultural Diplomacy", **Akademik Bakış**, Cilt 7, Sayı 13, 2013, p. 13.

<sup>19</sup> Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, p. 5.

<sup>20</sup> Nimet Beriker, "Conflict Resolution: The Missing Link Between Liberal IR Theory and Realistic Practice", **The Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution**, (Ed. Dennis J. D. Sandole, Sean Bryne, Ingrid Sandole-Staroste and Jessica Senehi), First published, Routledge, 2009, (Conflict Resolution: The Missing Link), p. 257.

<sup>21</sup> Sergey Minasyan, "Prospects for Normalization between Armenia and Turkey: A View from Yerevan", **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2010, pp. 22-23.



### 1.1.2.1. Realism against Idealism in International Relations

The most important aim of the liberal/idealist approach to world politics is to reach a fair and peaceful system. It is a deep rooted tradition that dates back to the Enlightenment philosophy and internationalism of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. The First World War (1914-1918), however, destroyed many millions of lives and also the expectations of international proletarian solidarity, of global harmony which would come from growing economic interdependence, and of rational political leadership.<sup>22</sup>

After the war, US president Woodrow Wilson claimed that it might be possible to avoid war through institutional cooperation. International institutions were expected to provide a sense of continuity, an opportunity for reciprocity, flow of information, and ways to resolve conflicts.<sup>23</sup> On these grounds, The League of Nations was established in 1920 "to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security."<sup>24</sup>

This approach has been criticized by the realists, who argued that the idealists had utopian thoughts.<sup>25</sup> The concept of idealism was used by the realist for the first time to qualify their opponents.<sup>26</sup> Idealism gradually lost its influence in the international arena during the period of twenty years crisis between 1919 and 1939, while realism became dominant.<sup>27</sup> Realism was advocated in the name of "objective" and "scientific" thought; it was supposedly based on the observation of facts and the analysis of causes and effects.<sup>28</sup> According to Edward Hallett Carr, Niccolo Machiavelli, an early 16th century philosopher, is the first important political realist. Machiavelli's revolt against the utopianism of his contemporaries had three essential

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<sup>22</sup> Louis Kriesberg, "The Evolution of Conflict Resolution", **The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution**, (Ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, I William Zartman), Sage Publication, 2009, (The Evolution of Conflict), p. 17.

<sup>23</sup> Nye, "Understanding International Conflicts", p. 47.

<sup>24</sup> United Nations, History of the United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/index.html>, (13.12.2015).

<sup>25</sup> Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, "Uluslararası Politikada Alternatif Yaklaşımlar liberalizm" **Uluslararası Politika-I**, (Ed. Doç. Dr. Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu), Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayınları, Eskişehir, 2012, p. 60.

<sup>26</sup> Arı, p. 88.

<sup>27</sup> Atilla Eralp (Ed.), "Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar", İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004, pp. 70-71.

<sup>28</sup> Edward Hallett Carr, **The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939 An Introduction To The Study Of International Relations**, London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1946, p. 10.

tenets that constituted the cornerstones of realist philosophy. In the first place, historical facts can be revealed not through imagination but through an analysis of cause and effect relations. Secondly, theory does not create practice, but the other way around. Thirdly, politics is not a function of ethics, but ethics is a product of politics. Machiavelli did not deny the importance of morality, but he believed that if there was no authority there could be no effective morality.<sup>29</sup>

Hans J. Morgenthau is accepted as the father of the realist paradigm within the field of international relations.<sup>30</sup> According to this paradigm, first, the states are the basic actors of the international system.<sup>31</sup> Second, the nature of international politics is anarchic; i.e., there is lack of an authority that would regulate inter-state relations.<sup>32</sup> Third, in this anarchic environment all states are working to have the greatest power that they can achieve.<sup>33</sup> The relations between states may be harmonious to this aim but not for an ethical standard or obligation.<sup>34</sup> Realism, which emerged to be the dominant approach in international relations, started to be challenged strongly in the 1960s.

### **1.1.2.2 Revival of Liberalism and the Emergence of Conflict Resolution Field**

According to some scholars, the idealist-realist struggle ended definitely in favor of realism after the Second World War and in Cold War period<sup>35</sup> because the world community and the states thought that the idealist approach couldn't prevent the war. However, a revival of interest in liberal theories has been witnessed in the 1960s when global economic interdependence increased and the relation between superpowers softened. This revival has also involved the gradual rise of a new field – “conflict resolution studies”.

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<sup>29</sup> Carr, pp. 63-64.

<sup>30</sup> Brian A. Keaney, **The Realism of Hans Morgenthau**, University of South Florida, 2006, p. ii.

<sup>31</sup> Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, p. 8.

<sup>32</sup> Paul D'Anieri, **International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs**, Third Edition, Suzanne Jeans, Canada, 2014, p. 88.

<sup>33</sup> Morgenthau, p. 13.

<sup>34</sup> Carr, p. 153.

<sup>35</sup> Vamık D. Volkan, “Uluslararası İlişkilerde Psikanaliz”, <http://www.vamikvolkan.com/UluslararasıFD-%DDli%FEkilerde-Psikanaliz.php>, (09.11.2015), (Uluslararası İlişkiler).

Liberal thinking includes economic, social, and political dimensions. The political dimension also includes two parts, one relating to international institutions and the other to democracy. Firstly, liberalism focuses on economical ties, particularly on commercial ties. Liberal thought assumes that free trade will prevent wars. States can change their position through economic cooperation rather than through military victory. Secondly, liberalism underlines social contacts between non-state actors. Liberals argue that person-to-person contacts reduce conflict by promoting understanding. Such personal contacts occur at many levels such as between students, businesspeople, and tourists. These contacts make each party seem less foreign and less hateful. In other words social contact reduces the possibility of conflict. Finally, many liberals emphasize the role of institutions. According to Robert O. Keohane, institutions provide information and a framework that shapes expectations. They allow people to believe that conflict is avoidable. It means that people can be hopeful about peace when anarchy is limited and stabilized by international institutions.<sup>36</sup> Others highlight the role of common commitment to democracy in avoiding war. Oneal states,

*Today, liberal rather than realist theories dominate research on the causes of war in political science. Social scientific studies show that democracies are unlikely to fight one another; and economic interdependence, too, increases the prospects for peace. Importantly, democracy and trade have effects at least as great as those of power and alliances, and they are more amenable to manipulation.<sup>37</sup>*

Upon this theoretical background conflict resolution studies started in the 1950s and 1960s. A group of pioneers from different disciplines saw the value of studying conflict when the development of nuclear weapons and the conflict between the superpowers seemed to threaten human survival in the Cold War period. Initially the issue of conflict resolution was dealt with as a general phenomenon developing in industrial relations. Later it was extended from community mediation settings to conflicts in general, including civil and international conflicts.<sup>38</sup> In the international relations setting of the 1950s, the conflict resolution studies emerged out of needs.

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<sup>36</sup> Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, pp. 45-47.

<sup>37</sup> John R. Oneal, "From Realism to the Liberal Peace Twenty Years of Research on the Causes of War", **International Relations since the End of the Cold War**, (Ed. Geir Lundestad), Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 42-43.

<sup>38</sup> Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution The Prevention, management, and transformation of deadly conflicts**, First Edition, USA, 2011, p. 3.

First, there was the need of preventing devastating global war and also nuclear war. Second, to this aim, there was the search to make the study of the international relations an interdisciplinary enterprise so that the social, economic and psychological dimensions of politics could be illuminated.<sup>39</sup>

Traditional “realist” approach was far from providing a solution to the problems of the day because, by depicting politics as a zero-sum game, it offered little possible mutual gains for the opponents. This approach was proving to be increasingly maladapted to contemporary global developments.<sup>40</sup> So, the conflict resolution literature was to be developed upon liberal premises and arguments. The key aspect of the conflict resolution field was that it offered mutual gains for the adversary parties. It can be said that the attractiveness of the field came from this point. The foundational period of the conflict resolution is in the 1950s and 1960s. Further construction and expansion of the field occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. In the early 1980s, John Burton and colleagues reestablished conflict resolution field as an alternative to realist theory. Since then, conflict resolution field have produced its own intellectual and interdisciplinary concepts, hybrid methods and applications.<sup>41</sup>

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War created a favorable environment for the conflict resolution field.<sup>42</sup> Main reason is the growing concern about human security in addition to state security.<sup>43</sup> While foreign policy officials tended to perceive the conflict resolution field as a “new age” movement irrelevant to the real world issues<sup>44</sup>, this has changed in recent years. It is because contemporary conflicts are very difficult to control through traditional mechanisms which rely solely on statist diplomacy and real politics. Contemporary conflicts demand innovative approaches that can cope with accumulated perceptions, deep-rooted hatreds and fears transferred from generation to generation.<sup>45</sup> This can be explained by the intra-state or domestic character of most current conflicts. Upon the

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<sup>39</sup> Kriesberg, *The Evolution of Conflict*, p. 19.

<sup>40</sup> Kriesberg, *The Evolution of Conflict*, pp. 19, 30.

<sup>41</sup> Nimet Beriker, “Uyuşmazlıkların Barışçıl Çözümü ve Liberal Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramı: Dış Siyaset Araçlarına Bütüncül Bir Yaklaşım”, **Çatışmadan Uzlaşmaya Kuramlar, Süreçler ve Uygulamalar** (Ed. Nimet Beriker), İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009, p. 28.

<sup>42</sup> Kriesberg, *The Evolution of Conflict*, pp. 16-21.

<sup>43</sup> Eileen F. Babbitt, **The Evolution of International Conflict Resolution: From Cold War to Peacebuilding**, *Negotiation Journal*, October 2009, p. 540.

<sup>44</sup> Beriker, *Conflict resolution: the missing link*, p. 256.

<sup>45</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*, p. 25.

dissolution of the Soviet Union and of the bipolar world order, potential internal conflicts previously prevented or suppressed resurfaced.<sup>46</sup> While the 20th century wars were mostly ideological in character<sup>47</sup>, increasingly embedded in a broader ideological war between the USA and the USSR, ideological differences are no longer the major cause of the conflict according to the Lederach. The main source of today's violence is the redistribution of resources along ethnic identity.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, in the absence of a hegemonic power (or two powers, in the condition of bipolarity) that imposes "discipline" over the follower states, reconciliation between peoples becomes more and more important.<sup>49</sup>

Today, we witness more attention to unofficial diplomacy than ever seen before in world politics. Diplomacy tracks, the basic theoretical framework that will be appealed to in this study, is a product of this tendency. The concept of "Track Two" Diplomacy was created by Joseph Montville in 1981 to refer to unofficial interaction<sup>50</sup>, and has attracted a theoretical and practical interest ever since. The idea of Track Two diplomacy evolved over a period of years for the solution of the conflicts in the conflict resolution field. In 1991, John W. McDonald and Dr. Louise Diamond published the book "Multi-Track Diplomacy", a systems approach to peace.<sup>51</sup> In 1992, John W. McDonald pointed to the very little attention given to the concept of citizen diplomacy, claiming that Track Two diplomacy would be the informal mechanism for the peaceful resolution of national conflicts in the next 20

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<sup>46</sup> John W. McDonald and Noa Zanolli, **"The Shifting Grounds Of Conflict and Peacebuilding Stories and Lessons"**, Lexington Books, 2008, USA, p. 306.

<sup>47</sup> Morgenthau, p. 182.

<sup>48</sup> John Bosco Nizeimana and Alfred G. Nhema, "The Malian Crisis: Multiple Actors with Diverse Interests and Values", **Journal of Public Administration and Governance**, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2015, p. 126 cited from (Lederach, John Paul. 1995. *Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*. New York, NY: Syracuse University Press. p. 23).

<sup>49</sup> McDonald, Zanolli, p. 306.

<sup>50</sup> Joseph Montville defined the track two diplomacy as "unofficial, non-structured interaction. It is always open-minded, often altruistic...strategically optimistic, based on best case analysis. Its underlying assumption is that actual or potential conflict can be resolved or eased by appealing to common human capabilities to respond to good will and reasonableness"., William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville, "Foreign Policy According to Freud," **Foreign Policy Magazine** 45, 1981-1982, (Foreign Policy According to Freud), p. 155.

<sup>51</sup> John W. McDonald, "The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy", **Universitat Oberta de Catalunya**, <http://journals.uoc.edu/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/viewFile/vol3iss2-mcdonald/vol3iss2-mcdonald>, (21.12.2015), p. 67.

years.<sup>52</sup> In 1997, John Paul Lederach introduced his “pyramid model” which involved three tracks named “Track One”, “Track Two”, and “Track Three” diplomacy.<sup>53</sup> It is clear even from this brief scan that conflict resolution field offers some useful insights and updated strategies for diplomacy. In the next section we will selectively elaborate into new approaches to diplomacy to the aim of framing the theoretical foundations of the study.

## 1.2. COMPONENTS OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

According to Lederach, International Relations and Conflict Resolution fields are like siblings in dispute. The big brother, International Relations, trained with current political science and sees himself as a warrior to be managing the hard governmental issues of the real world. He sees his younger sister as a romantic who is away from reality. On the other side, younger sister has tended to see her big brother as obsessed with a power paradigm which is not interested in discovering root causes of issues in a creative way. Her training in social psychology and her devotion to the task of conflict resolution distinguishes her from her big brother. This metaphor refers to a real distinction between traditional and new practices. During the Cold War period the practices of world diplomacy were based on the traditional conflict resolution methods because national interests were defined as stationary and mutually exclusive elements, rooted in geopolitics, natural resources, and other enduring features of countries. They were often perceived by the states as zero sums. In other words, one of the conflicting states could gain more while the other state lost.<sup>54</sup> Today’s conflict resolution concept differs from the traditional one. New concept includes innovative practices through which conflicting parties are able to achieve mutual gains unlike the past. The term “conflict transformation” is even

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<sup>52</sup> John W. McDonald, “Citizen Diplomacy”, **Modern Science and Vedic Science**, Volume 5, Numbers 1–2, 1992, Special Issue Proceedings of Approaches to Creating a Stable World Peace, April 5–7, 1991, (Citizen Diplomacy ), p. 120.


<sup>53</sup> “Pyramid Model” is one of the peacebuilding approaches explained in the book of John Paul Lederach, **Building Peace Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies** United States Institute of Peace Press, Third Edition, USA, 1999, pp. 37-62.

<sup>54</sup> Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman “Conflict Resolution in a Changing World” **International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War**, (Ed. Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman), National Academy Press, Washington, 2000, (Conflict Resolution in a Changing World), p. 3.

preferred to refer to the effort to reach an agreement between parties in the conflict resolution processes by redefining interests.<sup>55</sup>

At this point it is worth examining a study by Beriker, which attempts to integrate the international relations and conflict resolution fields. Her basic assumption is that “the lack of operational coherence in liberal approaches often causes a ‘default’ use of realist tools in the making and execution of day-to-day foreign policies, even in situations in which joint interests can be increased through cooperation.” Beriker aims to render a liberal foreign policy possible, by providing the concrete instruments it required. To this aim, she proposes the “Foreign policy circumplex” model in figure 1.<sup>56</sup>

**Figure 1:** Foreign Policy Circumplex.



<sup>55</sup> Stern and Druckman Conflict Resolution in a Changing World, p. 5.

<sup>56</sup> Beriker, Conflict resolution: the missing link, pp. 256-257.

Source: Nimet Beriker, "Conflict Resolution: The Missing Link between Liberal IR Theory and Realistic Practice", *The Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*, (Edit. Dennis Sandole, Jessica Senehi, Ingrid Sandole-Staroste Sean Bryne), First published, Routledge, 2009, p. 263.

This model has positioned the functional capacities of the fields of conflict resolution, peace, security and diplomacy studies, along the axes of cooperative-competitive orientation and partisan-third party involvement in conflict resolution.<sup>57</sup> Various conflict resolution instruments are listed and categorized. The four fields shed light on four dimensions of international relations: relational, procedural, structural and strategic. A comprehensive and enduring conflict resolution framework in a particular case can be constructed upon a historical and normative evaluation of elements of success and failure.

Beriker's arguments have been inspirational for my search to understand the actual and potential shifts in Turkish foreign policy regarding the Armenian question. As it will be discussed in Chapter 2, traditional diplomacy that involves strategic-competitive foreign policy tools has been predominant in Armenian-Turkish relations since 1915. Nevertheless, there have been short-lived attempts in the 2000s to set aside such a win-lose perspective and to introduce cooperative (even if not totally relational) diplomacy tools such as unilateral gestures and exchanging visits. The successes and failures of both traditional and new approaches and tools will be examined and evaluated regarding their potential as a remedy for the Armenian-Turkish conflict in the future. To this aim, the rest of the chapter falls into two major parts; first, new approaches to diplomacy will be discussed with a focus on the actors of diplomacy at various levels and their mutual relations. Then, tools and stages of reconciliation will be clarified because in the Turkish-Armenian case a deep-rooted trauma seems to be the major cause of the problems between the two states. Why unofficial diplomacy is selected as the focus of this study would then make sense.

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<sup>57</sup> Beriker, *Conflict resolution: the missing link*, p. 269.



### 1.2.1. New Approaches to Diplomacy: Tracks and Actors

The problem of the agent of problem-solving diplomacy; i.e. whether it will be government officials, non-official leaders, grassroots organizations or else, is a major topic of discussion in international conflict resolution field. The first major attempt was made by Joseph Montville in 1981, who distinguished between official and unofficial diplomacy by introducing the concepts of “Track One” and “Track Two”. They are further developed by the introduction of other concepts and models such as “One and a Half Diplomacy”, “Multi-Track Diplomacy”, and “Pyramid Model”. This subsection will examine those new approaches to diplomacy.

#### 1.2.2.1 Track One Diplomacy

Track One diplomacy refers to the official relations between two or several governments. Track One practitioners may be the president of a state, the officials of the foreign affairs ministry, and the other governmental institutions. Track One diplomacy is also named as "first track" or "first tier" diplomacy.<sup>58</sup> Some major official diplomacy activities are negotiating treaties, trade policies, and other international agreements. Track One diplomacy relies on bargaining strategies, and aims to maintain power over the weaker nations.<sup>59</sup>

Some of the negative instruments of Track One diplomacy are sanctions, which range from travel bans and arms embargoes to complete trade bans,<sup>60</sup> ultimatums, and threat.<sup>61</sup> Track One diplomacy has also some positive instruments such as humanitarian aid, weapons sales, and trade relations. When diplomatic representation shifts from a lower-level official to a higher-level official, this may usefully signal a growing confidence in the negotiation process.<sup>62</sup> Strengths and weaknesses of Track One will be presented in the next subsections.

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<sup>58</sup> Susan Allen Nan, “Track I Diplomacy”, June 2003, **The Beyond Intractability**, <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track1-diplomacy>, (07.12.2015), (Track I Diplomacy).

<sup>59</sup> Conflict Research Consortium, “Official (Track One) Diplomacy”, University of Colorado, USA, <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/track1.htm>, (10.07.2016), (Track I Diplomacy).

<sup>60</sup> M. Shane Smith, “Sanctions: Diplomatic Tool, or Warfare by Other Means?”, April 2004, **The Beyond Intractability**, <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/sanctions> (07.12.2015).

<sup>61</sup> Nan, Track I Diplomacy.

<sup>62</sup> Nan, Track I Diplomacy.

#### **1.2.1.1.1. Strengths of Track One Diplomacy**

According to Susan Allen Nan some of the advantages of official diplomacy are as such: Official diplomatic efforts have more economic power than unofficial efforts, may reach information resources easily, have adequate security, and have adequate logistical resources. In other words, officials have better access to knowledge and concrete resources. For instance, Track One diplomacy may use positive incentives ("carrots") by offering humanitarian aid, weapons sales, and improved trade relations. These advantages give Track-One negotiators plenty of influence over the negotiations.<sup>63</sup>

Leadership element is very important for Track One diplomacy. Their duties, skills, authority and legitimacy provide political leaders an influential position in conflict resolution. They might make brave decisions and lead the ordinary people in crisis situations. However, peacemaking or peace building<sup>64</sup> is a very difficult and discouraging work. Most of the politicians can fail even when they want to reach it. They might misperceive the other party, or may be restricted by their constituents' interests or psychology. At this point, Track Two diplomacy can be supportive. It will provide a support to the official diplomacy to understand the opposite side's perspective and overcome the shortcomings of official relations, especially in times of tension.<sup>65</sup>

#### **1.2.1.1.2. Weaknesses of Track One Diplomacy**

Traditionally, Track One diplomacy is the main instrument of foreign policy. However, it has some of the disadvantages. Track One diplomacy, the official government-to-government interaction, is formal, structured, and often rigid in nature. There is no flexibility, it has rigid rules. All of the issues which are negotiated

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<sup>63</sup> Nan, Track I Diplomacy.

<sup>64</sup> Peace is defined as the freedom from war and violence, and especially living and working together without disagreements. At first glance, we can think that peace is stable or passive in nature. But, in reality peace is hard to achieve and it is defined in the conflict resolution literature as a continuous process such as peacemaking or peace building. Cambridge Dictionary, "Peace", <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/peace>, (13.12.2015).

<sup>65</sup> Davidson and Montville, Foreign Policy According To Freud, pp. 156-157.

should be recorded in Track One diplomacy process.<sup>66</sup> The Track One actors are subject to hierarchy; they are either instructed or legally restricted.<sup>67</sup> Susan Allen Nan states that official diplomatic efforts may be restricted in their flexibility by the states policies; official diplomacy may not put new ideas on the negotiation table if they aren't previously authorized.<sup>68</sup> All these factors prevent dynamism and creativity.

Because of these limitations new foreign policy tools have emerged. An experienced ambassador John W. McDonald compares Track One and Track Two diplomacy as below:

*Track One is government to government, what I did for 40 years as a diplomat. It is basically under instructions, it's fairly rigid, it's not risk-taking, and it's not very imaginative. It tries to get things done in its own way. Track Two Diplomacy" or "Citizen Diplomacy" is person to person, small group to small group, it's dynamic, it's risk-taking, it's imaginative, it gets things done that governments are either afraid to do or don't want to have to do.*<sup>69</sup>

#### 1.2.1.2. Track Two diplomacy

Track Two diplomacy emerged as a response to the need for an informal and flexible structure in foreign policy. It refers to a broad range of unofficial contacts and interaction between groups and individuals from adversary communities, through the medium of business groups, religious institutions, academics, conflict resolution specialists, former government officials, non-governmental organizations, humanitarian organizations, and think tanks etc.<sup>70</sup> It is also expressed as "citizen diplomacy" because it is the informal and unofficial citizen-to-citizen interaction free from governmental guidance and instruction.<sup>71</sup> Montville defined it as such:

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<sup>66</sup> C. Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak, Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective: Comparing the Perceptions of Turkish And American Diplomats, **International Negotiation**, Volume 12, Martinus Nithoff Publishers, 2007, (Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective), p.63.

<sup>67</sup> McDonald, Citizen Diplomacy, p. 119.

<sup>68</sup> Nan, Track I Diplomacy.

<sup>69</sup> John W. McDonald, "Citizen Diplomacy in a Changing World", Extraterrestrial Civilizations and World Peace Conference, Kailua-Kona Hawaii, 10 June, 2006, <http://exopoliticsjournal.com/vol-2/vol-2-1-McDonald.pdf>, (12.12.2015), p. 4.

<sup>70</sup> James Notter and John McDonald, "Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Strategies for Peace", **American Perspectives on Conflict Resolution**, (Ed. Patricia H. Kushlis), US. Foreign Policy Agenda, Volume 1 Number 19, December 1996, (Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Strategies For Peace), p. 32; Diana Chigas, "Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy", August 2003, <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2-diplomacy> (07.12.2015).

<sup>71</sup> McDonald, Citizen Diplomacy, pp. 118-119.

*Track two diplomacy is an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict.*<sup>72</sup>

Track Two diplomacy aims to reach to two objectives. First objective of Track Two is to improve communication and understanding between adversary groups and nations for ending the conflict. It tries to eliminate stereotypes which blocks the relations between adversaries and tries to humanize the enemy. Track Two diplomacy also aims to reduce anger, tension, and fear. So, it is highly concerned with reconciliation. Second objective of Track Two diplomacy is to affect and change the thinking of Track One. Track One is the ultimate platform of both unofficial and official diplomacies, for the fact that treaties and agreements can only take place between governments.<sup>73</sup>

Track Two activities are categorized into three set of activities: consultation, dialogue, and training. Consultation brings the people together from conflicting groups. These participants facilitate discussion and generate creative ideas for problem solving. The most common consultation form is “problem solving workshop.”<sup>74</sup> One of the most important examples of Track Two consultation work was done unofficially by Israeli and Palestinian academics in Oslo, which was terminated by the historic agreement between Israel Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat.<sup>75</sup>

Dialogue refers to the connection or bridge between adversary parties. Dialogues can be more productive with influential people who have a positive impact on Track One negotiations. When there is no official communication between parties the dialogue processes will focus on the task of building trust between adversary groups, especially at the grass-roots level. One example is the Track Two dialogue

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<sup>72</sup> Joseph V. Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy”, Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy, eds. J. W. McDonald, Jr., and D. B. Bendahmane Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987, <http://abrahamfamilyreunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/the-arrow-and-the-olive-branch-a-case-for-track-two-diplomacy-joseph-montville.pdf>, (06.03.2016), (The Arrow and the Olive Branch), p. 162.

<sup>73</sup> McDonald, Citizen Diplomacy, p. 119.

<sup>74</sup> Notter and McDonald, Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Strategies for Peace, p. 33.

<sup>75</sup> Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “107 Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition, Letters and Speeches”, 10 September 1993, 10.09.1993,

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook9/pages/107%20israel-plo%20mutual%20recognition-%20letters%20and%20spe.aspx>, (25.05.2016).

process between Indians and Pakistanis with the help of The United States Information Service (USIS.). Many participant from different tracks participated in this process, including former diplomats, generals and representative from business and education. Seminars, which give the participants a chance to contact with people from the other country, and encourage the participants to continue conflict resolution process in their towns or institutions, are also useful.<sup>76</sup>

Training can include participants from all level of society, from high level political figures to grass-roots private citizens. Training focuses on conflict analysis, communication, reconciliation, cooperation, and negotiation skills. The training program for over 500 Turkish and Greek Cypriots since 1991 is an example. This program, sponsored by America-Mideast Educational and Training Services (AMIDEAST) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), included a range of participants such as policy leaders, educators, and journalists. A number of other bi-communal conflict resolution projects followed. Consultation, dialogue, and training can be used simultaneously. All of these three interventions provide the practitioners communication skills, more productive dialogue ability, and analytical problem solving skills.<sup>77</sup> More importantly, participants of those activities communicate with each other not only during sessions but also in break times. Face-to-face interaction and closer relationships might yield significant results.<sup>78</sup> It is clear that Track Two diplomacy is indispensable for diplomatic relations among the states. However, it has both advantages and disadvantages.

#### **1.2.1.2.1. Strengths of Track Two Diplomacy**

Unofficial diplomacy can make contributions to conflict resolution that official diplomacy is not equipped to achieve.<sup>79</sup> Track Two diplomacy provides interactive relational opportunities to the parties. Communication channels between adversary groups may be opened by Track Two diplomacy. The flexible nature of the

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<sup>76</sup> Notter and McDonald, *Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Strategies for Peace*, pp. 33-34.

<sup>77</sup> Notter and McDonald, *Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Strategies for Peace*, p. 34.

<sup>78</sup> Montville, *The Arrow and the Olive Branch*, p. 165.

<sup>79</sup> Nadim N. Rouhana, "Unofficial Intervention: Potential Contributions to Resolving Ethno-national Conflicts", *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, (Ed.Jan Melissen), Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 116.

Track Two diplomacy makes it possible to generate new ideas for solutions to the conflict all the time.<sup>80</sup>

While psychological level is not inserted into the formal level, Track Two work explores people's deepest psychological concerns and experiences with deep historical roots. Track Two diplomacy can be effective to overcome such deep barriers to conflict resolution process.<sup>81</sup> The individuals can tell their complaints directly.<sup>82</sup> Track Two diplomacy not only keep communication channels open but also prevents the problems from becoming unsolvable in other ways.<sup>83</sup> Track Two practitioners do not have any concerns about the elections because they are not the politicians.<sup>84</sup> This gives them a certain degree of freedom and creativity. Track Two practitioners may also offer a broader representation of the different social, economical and political segments of the country. By having contacts with both top leaders and the people living at the grassroots level, they can reflect the view point of their own communities or nations.<sup>85</sup> Finally, Track Two diplomacy increases the political awareness and participation of the society as the community becomes more sensitive to social and international issues.<sup>86</sup>

The Track Two diplomacy can be the driving force of diplomacy in today's world. Track Two diplomacy activities are familiar to all of us but the potentials of Track Two are not known by most political leaders accurately. As it provides a wider perspective and deeper legitimacy, the appeal to Track Two will provide enormous gains for the official diplomacy.<sup>87</sup> This is why the Western community is increasingly providing significant financial and human resources support to Track Two dialogues.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Çuhadar Gürkaynak, Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective, p. 63.

<sup>81</sup> Cynthia J. Chataway, "Track II Diplomacy: From a Track I Perspective" **Negotiation Journal**, Volume 14, Issue 3, July 1998, p. 279.

<sup>82</sup> Chataway, p. 278.

<sup>83</sup> Çuhadar Gürkaynak, Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective, p. 64.

<sup>84</sup> Jeffrey Mapendere, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks", **Culture of Peace Online Journal**, 2(1), p. 68.

<sup>85</sup> John Paul Lederach, **Building Peace Sustainable Reconciliation In Divided Societies**, United States Institute of Peace Press, Third printing, Washington D.C., 1999 (Building Peace), p. 42.

<sup>86</sup> Çuhadar Gürkaynak, Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective, p. 65.

<sup>87</sup> Davidson and Montville, Foreign Policy According To Freud, p. 162.

<sup>88</sup> Dalia Dassa Kaye, **"Talking to the Enemy Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia"**, RAND Corporation, 2007, p. xi.

#### 1.2.1.2.2. Weaknesses of Track Two Diplomacy

Track Two diplomacy has a number of limitations at the domestic and regional levels, according to Kaye. Ideology may be one of the reasons for some the participants' opposition to any cooperation with an adversary. Security cultures may be another reason; participants may not approach the Track Two efforts without regional security concerns. For example, if conflict resolution activities are interpreted by certain domestic opposition groups, particularly in the vulnerable regimes, as a threat to national security, the idea of cooperation would not be popular among the community. Another interrelated reason for the possible limits of the Track Two efforts is the deficiencies in the relations between the participants and the leaders, and between participants and grassroots. Some of the participants may have little relation to the diplomats, or to their own community which they supposedly represent. For example, if the participants who come from academia, think tanks, and NGOs have limited influence over official policymakers and are disconnected from grassroots groups or other broadly based societal movements, they will not make any difference. It may be thus concluded that the participants of Track Two should necessarily represent the mainstream views of their societies.<sup>89</sup>

According to Susan Allen Nan unofficial diplomacy has some disadvantages: Unofficial diplomacy is not funded as much as the official diplomacy, unofficial diplomacy may not reach information resources easily, unofficial diplomacy can face security problems, and unofficial diplomacy may not reach logistical resources.<sup>90</sup> Rouhana also explained some of the disadvantages of the unofficial diplomacy. In the first place, these disadvantages arise from the lack of governmental power. Unofficial intervention is non-coercive; it has no power to force the participants to reach an agreement through carrots or sticks. Secondly, unofficial diplomacy doesn't have a map to be followed by the practitioners; its goals are not necessarily defined. Goals may change in the process. Since unofficial diplomacy aims to reach long-term transformation in the minds and feelings of the parties, testing or correcting the results of unofficial diplomacy is a long term task. Thirdly, unofficial agreements are not binding to the government or societies of the parties to the conflict. Since the

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<sup>89</sup> Kaye, p. 26.

<sup>90</sup> Nan, Track I Diplomacy.

unofficial practitioners are not the representatives of their governments. Most of the unofficial intervention efforts are dismissed by the officials because official diplomacy sees the unofficial efforts doubtful.<sup>91</sup>

Track Two diplomacy is not the substitute for official diplomacy. As mentioned above, government-to-government relationship is the ultimate platform for reaching an agreement. Track Two diplomacy is the auxiliary of Track One diplomacy. However, when the official leaders are in great tension they can refrain from taking certain steps willingly or unwillingly. In this condition Track Two diplomacy complements official diplomacy by exploring possible solutions out of the public view. When the focus is not on gaining the upper hand, to find a middle way that will satisfy both sides is easier. Track Two diplomacy may also prepare a suitable environment for the politicians who may take risks for peace, through the education of public opinion.<sup>92</sup> Out of the search for integrating the strengths of the two tracks emerged the concept of “Track One and a Half Diplomacy”.

#### **1.2.1.3. Track One and a Half Diplomacy**

In some cases Track One diplomacy (conflict resolution through official representatives and facilitators) or Track Two diplomacy (conflict resolution through unofficial representatives and facilitators) may be inadequate for resolving conflicts. The states may need to appeal to both of the tracks together. Jeffrey Mapendere states that it is not known exactly who coined the term Track One and a Half Diplomacy. However, he refers to Susan Allen Nan as a leading figure. Inspired by her, Mapendere operationalized the term for practical use by The Carter Center Conflict Resolution Program, and introduced it as a solution with both official and unofficial aspects.<sup>93</sup>

Track One and a Half Diplomacy is the diplomacy that the parties come from government representatives, but the facilitators from ordinary citizens. It means that the representative parties have an official role. However, the facilitators do not have any official role. Therefore, Track One and a Half Diplomacy can also be called

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<sup>91</sup> Rouhana, *Unofficial Intervention*, pp. 115-116.

<sup>92</sup> Montville, *The Arrow and the Olive Branch*, p. 162.

<sup>93</sup> Mapendere, “Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks”.



“hybrid diplomacy” because it is a cross-fertilization of Track One and Track Two diplomacy. The Track One and a Half Diplomacy brings flexibility, using both of the diplomacy techniques during the conflict resolution process.<sup>94</sup>

The practitioners of Track One and a Half Diplomacy might be senior officials or other influential unofficial individuals who share their experiments, analyzing ability, and negotiation skills with the representatives of the parties. So, this contribution helps the parties to explore the core issues of the conflict which caused the problem.<sup>95</sup> As an illustration of this phenomenon, the Georgian and the South Ossetian met together with the help of Track One and a Half Diplomacy from in January 1996 to in June 1997, the workshops included participants ranging from presidential advisers to unofficial but respected opinion leaders on each side. They proved useful as they facilitated a real exchange of views between two sides, and a clarification of their approaches without any official concern. New ideas could be presented and tested much more openly, thus revealing products useful to the official negotiations.<sup>96</sup> Coordination and cooperation between official peace efforts (Track One) and unofficial engagement (Track Two) are vital for Track One and a Half Diplomacy. Track One and a Half Diplomacy might not work as expected when the facilitator is seen as representative of the official diplomacy. Another disadvantage is that Track One and a Half mediators have limited political power to command resources needed to encourage an agreement.<sup>97</sup> That is why the academic and practical search for a less mechanical relationship between official and unofficial instruments and actors continues.

#### **1.2.1.4. The Pyramid Model of John Paul Lederach**

A more comprehensive and practical model to build a bridge between official and unofficial levels has been introduced by Paul Lederach in 1997 in his book

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<sup>94</sup> Mapendere, “Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks”.

<sup>95</sup> Susan Allen Nan, “Track One and a Half Diplomacy: Contribution to Georgian-South Ossetian Peacemaking”, *Paving the Way: Contributions of Interactive Conflict Resolution to Peacemaking*, (Ed. Ronald J. Fisher) Lexington Books, USA, 2005, p. 161.

<sup>96</sup> Susan Allen Nan, “Track One and a Half Diplomacy: Searching for Political Agreement in the Caucasus”, *NGOs at the Table: Strategies for Influencing Policies in Areas of Conflict*, (Ed. Mari Fitzduff and Cheyanne Church), Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, USA, 2004, pp. 64-67.

<sup>97</sup> Mapendere, “Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks”, p. 5.

“Building Peace Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies”. Lederach’s model is particularly useful for this study as it is more concerned with reconciliation processes rather than official third party-involved peacemaking processes. Lederach is both an academician and a second track diplomacy practitioner, who has had direct experiences for 15 years when he explained his model. He has worked in more than twenty countries across five continents, and taken part in various tasks from conflict transformation training to a variety of services related to the design and support of peace building initiatives.<sup>98</sup> Upon this background, he argues that his approach emerged from the standpoint of a practitioner rather than a theorist.<sup>99</sup>

The Lederach pyramid in Figure 2 aims to integrate various approaches to conflict resolution. The pyramid consists of three major levels, each with a different approach to conflict resolution: top level, middle range, and the grassroots. The top-level leadership represents the fewest people, in other words, only a handful of key actors. In the middle range there are the actors who have built a suitable network between elites and the grassroots. The grassroots base of the pyramid encompasses the largest number of people, those who represent the population at large.<sup>100</sup> Before examining the approaches at these levels, it should be added that the pyramid model does not only involve a vertical dimension from bottom to top but also a horizontal dimension at the middle. The center where vertical and horizontal ways meet is the solution point; that is the point at which conflict resolution will be achieved. Lederach likened all of the conflict resolution activities to a spider web.<sup>101</sup> All of the top, middle, and grassroots level nongovernmental and unofficial efforts between two states will be connected to each other like a spider web, as shown in Figure 3.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*, pp. xvi-xvii.


<sup>99</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*, p. xvi.

<sup>100</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>101</sup> John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination The Art and Soul of Building Peace*, Oxford University Press., New York, 2005, (The Moral Imagination) pp. 80-84.


<sup>102</sup> Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, pp. 80-84.

**Figure 2:** Pyramid of approaches to peace building.



Source: John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination The Art and Soul of Building Peace*, Oxford University Press., New York, 2005, p. 79.

**Figure 3:** Doodle three the web process.



Source: Lederach, *the Moral Imagination*, p. 82.

In the pyramidal model of peace building, there are 3 approaches at 3 levels. The top of the pyramid is “*Track One*”, which includes most visible leadership and

the fewest people. "Top-down" approach to peace building at this level has the following characteristics: First, this level includes generally visible peacemakers known by the whole society such as key political and military leaders. Some of these top level leaders even have a worldwide reputation. Second, these leaders are generally locked into a rigid position because of their highly visible profile. They are subjected to close media scrutiny. Therefore, their freedom of maneuver is restricted under tremendous pressure which comes from their adversaries and their own society. Finally, top leaders have more influence and power than other individuals, which is recognized internally and externally. So, they possess the authority required to finish the hostilities.<sup>103</sup>

According to this model the leaders at this level have great importance because they translate the other group. When the top level political and military leaders reach an agreement it will move down through the rest of the population. Their ability to make concrete deals and to initiate the early steps for peace such as cease fire gives them a critical role. In many recent peace processes a phased approach has been followed and short term achievements of top level leaders have constituted a first and indispensable phase.<sup>104</sup>

The middle point of the pyramid is "*Track Two*", which includes academics, intellectuals, and so on. This is the connection point between the top leadership and grassroots levels. Lederach initially offered the name "middle out approach" to refer to the approach at this level in his book "Building peace: sustainable reconciliation in divided societies" in 1997. However he later changed it as "the web approach" in his book "The Moral Imagination". He explained that "Calling this the middle out approach is a misnomer. This approach is about explicit strategic networking, one that creates web of relationships and activities that cover setting".<sup>105</sup> In other words, they are not in a vertical and outward movement but move like a spider as explained above. Track Two actors have a determinant location in the conflict. They have key functions to creating an infrastructure for achieving and sustaining peace.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, pp. 44-45.

<sup>104</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, pp. 45-46.

<sup>105</sup> Lederach, The Moral Imagination, p. 80.

<sup>106</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, p. 51.

The middle range approach focused on three different groups of leaders. First group of leaders is the ones that occupy formal positions of leadership in such sectors as education, business, agriculture, or health. Second group of leaders are linked to religious groups, academic institutions or humanitarian organizations. Third group of leaders consists of well-known and respected leaders of the identity groups in conflict. They might be well known out of their region as well for being rewarded with Nobel prize etc.<sup>107</sup> The middle level leaders make a connection between top and the grassroots level. Their aim is to restore the relationship which is broken by the conflict.<sup>108</sup>

Three middle range instruments to peace are problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training, and the development of peace commissions. Lederach particularly pays attention to problem-solving workshops. Quoting Christopher Mitchell, problem-solving workshops are defined as

*Informal, week-long meetings of the representatives of parties in protracted, deep-rooted, and frequently violent conflict in an informal, often academic, setting that permits the re-analysis of their conflict as a shared problem and the generation of some alternative courses of action to continued coercion, together with new options for a generally acceptable and self-sustaining resolution.*<sup>109</sup>

Lederach lists some traits and advantages of this instrument. First, participants are invited according to their knowledge and proximity to key decision makers of the conflict, but top leader are not invited. Second, the workshops are the informal and off-the-record structures. All of the participants have a politically safe space. Participants have an interactive relation with their adversaries. They can share their problems and solutions openly. They are not there to solidify their position; they can have flexibility. Finally, these workshops provide participants an opportunity for an effective interaction. And offer them a chance to look at the conflict through analytical rather than only coercive lenses. These problem solving workshops also provide support to the official negotiators and feed new ideas into the bargaining process. Such successful workshops have been held in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)-Israeli treaty signed in 1993, developments in

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<sup>107</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, p. 41.

<sup>108</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, pp. 41-42.

<sup>109</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, p. 46 cited from Christopher Mitchell, "External Peace-Making Initiatives and Intranational Conflict," **The Internationalization of Communal Strife**, (Ed. Manus I. Midlarsky), New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 75.

Northern Ireland in the mid-1990s, and the agreement in Guatemala signed in 1996.<sup>110</sup>

The bottom point of the pyramid is “Track Three”, which includes grassroots leaders such as leaders of local NGO’s, leaders of local communities, relief organizers, health officials, and refugee camp leaders. Grassroots approaches face different challenges which are not confronted on the top and middle-range levels. First, at this level there are massive numbers of people. Grassroots leaders definitely provide a point of access to these people, but not necessarily a comprehensive program to reach them. Second, many of the people at this level are in a struggle for daily needs such as food, shelter, and safety. So, they can see peace and conflict resolution efforts as a trivial luxury. Nonetheless, important ideas and practical efforts do emerge at this level.<sup>111</sup> They are in perpetual contact with the grassroots level local community members. So, they can witness firsthand the deep-rooted hatred and animosity on daily basis.<sup>112</sup>

#### **1.2.1.5. “Multi-Track Diplomacy” of L. Diamond and J. W. McDonald**

Another theory that contributed to the diversification of diplomacy actors and instruments belongs to Diamond and McDonald. In the early years of the Track Two diplomacy, the term was being used for all of the unofficial conflict resolution activities. When these activities expanded to a broad range, Track Two diplomacy couldn’t represent them all adequately. So, the phrase “Multi-Track Diplomacy” in figure 4 was coined by Louise Diamond and John W. McDonald in 1991.<sup>113</sup> They initially mentioned four tracks: “conflict resolution professionals”, “business”, “private citizens”, and the “media”. They were soon expanded from four to nine tracks.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*, pp. 46-47.


<sup>111</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*, pp. 51-52.

<sup>112</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*, pp. 42-43.

<sup>113</sup> Louise Diamond and John McDonald, **Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace**, Kumarian Press, 1996, <http://www.imtd.org/index.php/about/84-about/131-what-is-multi-track-diplomacy>, (25.11.2015).

<sup>114</sup> James Nottter and Louise Diamond, “Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice”, **Occasional Paper Number 7**, The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, October 1996, (*Building Peace and Transforming Conflict*), pp. 6-7.

**Figure 4:** The Nine Tracks of Multi-Track Diplomacy



Source: Diamond and McDonald, The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/multi-track-diplomacy>, (15.11.2015)

Track One is the official government-to-government diplomacy. Track Two diplomacy includes the efforts to analyze, prevent, resolve, and manage international conflicts by non-governmental and professional conflict resolution actors. “Track Three” refers to the unofficial activities which aim to solve the conflict through strengthening business or commercial ties. “Track Four” is the citizen-to-citizen diplomacy, which includes a variety of activities such as exchange programs, private voluntary organizations’ and special-interest groups’ activities. “Track Five” refers to research, training, and education activities offered by universities, think tanks, and special-interest research centers on such topics as negotiation, mediation, conflict resolution, and third-party facilitation. “Track Six” includes activists’ work in various fields such as disarmament, human rights, social and economic justice, and so on. Activities regarding spiritual and religious communities constitute “Track Seven.” “Track Eight” activities concern providing funding to support “Multi-Track Diplomacy” activities such as workshops. Finally, public opinion is the core element of “Multi-Track Diplomacy”. “Track Nine” refers to the activities that transfer public opinion and the voice of people to the adversary or international community, through

communication channels like print/broadcasting/electronic media and arts.<sup>115</sup> Each of these tracks has its own "resources, values, and approaches". No one track, by itself, can build a peace process that will last. It is only possible when functioning together. It produces a synergy to approaching conflict.<sup>116</sup>

The Institute for "Multi-Track Diplomacy" was established by Diamond and McDonald in 1992 to facilitate conflict transformation. In its toolbox the IMTD had three important instruments that can be used alternatively or simultaneously while solving the problems through "Multi-Track Diplomacy": "bridge building", "capacity building", and "institution building". "Bridge building" refers to bringing members of two hostile communities together in a safe environment for training in conflict resolution skills, and giving them a shared experience and a purpose, which results in some advancement in bi-communal relationships. "Capacity building" is a key component of the social peace building process. Building a human infrastructure capable of carrying out effective projects is the core of capacity building.<sup>117</sup> To this aim, training programs to develop project writing and implementation skills, especially of local NGOs, must be introduced.<sup>118</sup> "Institution building" is to develop a system which has conflict transformation capacity. It aims to provide a suitable environment for the local peace builders to create sustainable organizations and working groups which are needed for the peace building practices in conflict resolution system.<sup>119</sup> A wide and persistent institutional societal dialogue can affect the conflict resolution process positively. The more contact means the more transformation of the conflicting parties. In other words, institutional interaction is the essence of the transformation of the disputants.<sup>120</sup>

In section 1. 2. traditional and new approaches to the scale and actors of problem-solving diplomacy have been introduced. This theoretical background is expected to shed light on the evaluation of recent official and non-official attempts to

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<sup>115</sup> Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), "Ambassador John W. McDonald", <http://www.imtd.org/index.php/about/84-about>, (12.12.2015).

<sup>116</sup> John W. McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy, September 2003, **The Beyond Intractability**, <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/multi-track-diplomacy>, (05.04.2016).

<sup>117</sup> Notter and Diamond, *Building Peace and Transforming Conflict*, p. 15.

<sup>118</sup> Esra Çuhadar, Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, **Reflecting on the Two Decades of Bridging the Divide: Taking Stock of Turkish-Armenian Civil Society Activities**, TEPAV Yayınları, Ankara, Ocak 2012, p. 27.

<sup>119</sup> Notter and Diamond, *Building Peace and Transforming Conflict*, pp. 16-17.

<sup>120</sup> Nathalie Tocci, **The EU and Conflict Resolution**, Routledge, USA, 2007, pp. 15-16.



resolve Turkish-Armenian conflict. However, not only the actors but the content of these attempts also needs to be conceptually clarified because it is the aim and content of conflict resolution that determine the proper tracks to follow. Therefore, in the next section, some theories on reconciliation those are relevant for the analysis of Turkish-Armenian conflict and for its resolution are presented.

### 1.3. PSYCHO-POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF RECONCILIATION

Reconciliation is a situation in which two people or groups of people become friendly again after they have argued.<sup>121</sup> In the context of our study, it concerns the bilateral relations of two past adversary parties living in two separate or different states.<sup>122</sup> So it aims to make one side understand the feelings, sufferings, and intentions of the other side. Communication and dialogue promote mutual confirmation, which would end up with reconciliation.<sup>123</sup> However it is a dynamic situation as stated by David L. Phillips who was the head of Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission: *“Reconciliation is a lot like riding a bicycle: Stop pedaling and you fall over. Contact and cooperation can advance to the goal of rapprochement.”*<sup>124</sup> In other words it is a long-term process that continues for years, and even decades.<sup>125</sup>

In intractable conflicts such as the Turkish-Armenian conflict, many complex factors like ethnic identity, violent history, and international obstacles affect the dispute and make it harder to reach a resolution. So, reaching reconciliation may be very difficult for the parties. In this condition reconciliation requires not only official

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<sup>121</sup> Cambridge Dictionary, Meaning of “Reconciliation” in the English Dictionary, <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/reconciliation>, (08.07.2016).

<sup>122</sup> Daniel Bar-Tal, “From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis”, **International Society of Political Psychology**, Vol. 21, No. 2, Blackwell Publishers, USA, 2000, pp. 355-356.

<sup>123</sup> Joseph V. Montville, “The healing function in political conflict resolution”, Conflict resolution theory and practice: Integration and Application, Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (ed.) Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993, <http://legacy.earlham.edu/~chris/CConflictRes/pdf%20files/conflict%20resolution%20theory%20and%20practice%20p112-1271.pdf>, (11.12.2017), (The healing function in political conflict), p. 115.

<sup>124</sup> David L. Phillips, “Centennial of the Armenian Genocide: Recognition and Reconciliation”, 20.04.2015, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/centennial-of-the-armenia\\_b\\_7103004.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/centennial-of-the-armenia_b_7103004.html), (05.07.2016).

<sup>125</sup> Bar-Tal, p. 356.

efforts but also unofficial efforts such as that of human rights activists, trauma-healing practitioners, humanitarian relief workers, and conflict resolution experts.<sup>126</sup> Further, the reconciliation process needs to be based on clear and well-defined policies that are carried out in a top-down and bottom-up fashion, simultaneously. The top-down efforts aim to influence the psychological perceptions and dynamics of the community with the help of leaders. The bottom-up efforts initiate the movements that influence the policies of the government with the help of the civil society members.<sup>127</sup> The aforementioned features of reconciliation imply that it is an important meeting point between realism and innovation in dealing with contemporary conflict challenges.<sup>128</sup>

### 1.3.1. Reconciliation: Basic Assumptions and Elements

Conflict is never a static phenomenon. It is relational, expressive, dynamic, and dialectical in nature. Conflict is born in the world of human meaning and perception. It is continuously changed by ongoing human interaction.<sup>129</sup> So, rather than resolution, the term “transformation” is increasingly preferred. In a dialogue process, a transformation of perceptions is the ultimate aim.<sup>130</sup> Especially in deep-rooted or intractable conflicts the term “resolution” may not be suitable because there has to be systemic change or transformation from conflict-habituated systems to peace systems.<sup>131</sup> In other words, if the psychological dynamics of the conflict are not fully addressed reconciliation cannot be ended with the real peace.<sup>132</sup>

Lederach makes it clear that reconciliation is not simply the last stage of conflict resolution:

*"Peace building' is more than post accord reconstruction. Here, peace building is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and*

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<sup>126</sup> Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess, **Conducting Track II PEACEMAKING**, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, 2010, p. 5.

<sup>127</sup> Rafi Nets-Zehngut and Daniel Bar-Tal, “The Intractable Israeli-Palestinian Conflict And Possible Pathways To Peace”, **Beyond bullets and bombs: grassroots peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians**, (Edited by Judy Kuriansky), Praeger Publishers, USA., 2007, (The Intractable Israeli-Palestinian Conflict), p. 9.

<sup>128</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, p. 25.

<sup>129</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, p. 63.

<sup>130</sup> Notter and Diamond, Building Peace and Transforming Conflict, pp. 12-13.

<sup>131</sup> Notter and Diamond, Building Peace and Transforming Conflict, p. 4.

<sup>132</sup> Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal, p. 10.

*sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords.*<sup>133</sup>

Lederach made three basic assumptions regarding reconciliation. First and foremost is the perhaps self-evident but most-neglected notion that relationship is the basis of both the conflict and its long-term solution.<sup>134</sup> Reconciliation cannot be possible without the two groups engaging with each other; talking together about the problems, sharing goals, taking mutual responsibility for the solution etc.<sup>135</sup> Second, coming together of the conflicting groups is not adequate. The conflicting parties need to express their pain, trauma, and anger and also the memory of injustices experienced. In this point acknowledgment will be first step toward restoration of the relationship.<sup>136</sup> It gives people hope so that they can act to advance peace, justice, freedom, and many other important values, and also they avoid severe destructive consequences.<sup>137</sup> Third, reconciliation requires innovation. It means that the traditional methods of international politics may be inadequate and thinking out-of-the-box may be necessary.<sup>138</sup>

Lederach also identified four major set of concepts vital for conflict resolution: Truth, Mercy, Justice, and Peace (Figure 5). Recognition of the truths related to the conflict, will be needed at every stage of the conflict transformation. If not, further conflicts may emerge. Truth should be supported by the other related concepts such as accepted honesty, revelation, clarity, openness and accountability. Truth Commissions serve that purpose; they bring people together for them to hear each other's stories and try to understand each other's experiences.<sup>139</sup> Mercy is related with emotions and thoughts like kindness, forgiveness, acceptance, and a new start. Without mercy healthy relationships would not be possible. Justice is about

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<sup>133</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, p. 20.

<sup>134</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, p. 26.

<sup>135</sup> Rubina Perroomian "New Directions in Literary Responses to the Armenian Genocide", **Looking backward, moving forward : confronting the Armenian Genocide** (edited by Richard G. Hovannisian) p. 271.

<sup>136</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, p. 26.


<sup>137</sup> Louis Kriesberg, **"Realizing Peace a Constructive Conflict Approach"**, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015, p. 290.

<sup>138</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, p. 27.

<sup>139</sup> Bernard Mayer, **The dynamics of conflict resolution: a practitioner's guide**, Jossey-Bass A Wiley Imprint, USA, 2000, p. 10.

creating equal opportunity and rectifying the wrongs.<sup>140</sup> The sense of injustice among one or both parties may fuel the conflict and even start new disputes between adversaries.<sup>141</sup> Peace is the feeling of respect and security. If there is a peace, there will be harmony, unity, and happiness. It is important to note that peace is not just for a few; it must be secured for everyone.<sup>142</sup> As a conclusion, reconciliation must include all of the four major concepts (Truth, Mercy, Justice, and Peace), and official and unofficial efforts must be brought together to create and maintain relationship, expression, and innovation elements. The most important obstacles to the task of reconciliation are psychological, the roots and remedies of which will be discussed in the next two sections.

**Figure 5:** The Place Called Reconciliation.



Source: Lederach, John Paul. *Building Peace Sustainable Reconciliation In Divided Societies*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Third printing, Washington D.C., 1999, p. 30

<sup>140</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*, pp. 28-29.

<sup>141</sup> Louis Kriesberg, "Comparing Reconciliation Actions within and between Countries", **From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation**, (Edited by Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov), Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, pp. 83-84.

<sup>142</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*, p. 29.

### 1.3.2. Stereotyping and Poor Communication as Psychological Barriers to Reconciliation

From the most primitive stone-age tribes to the contemporary nuclear family, individuals have some basic needs for survival, which are explained by Abraham Maslow's needs hierarchy. Some of these are "physiological" as they are about "safety", "belongingness", "love", "esteem", "self-actualization", and "self-transcendence". Conflict resolution practitioners should pay attention to such psychological needs at the level of community.<sup>143</sup> All of the parties to the conflict must be guided and facilitated in finding an adequate way of dealing with their collective feelings.<sup>144</sup> Social psychologist Herbert C. Kelman claims that international conflicts result from interest and ideological differences, but psychological factors have an adverse effect as they create barriers to resolution. Psychological barriers should be isolated and removed, otherwise the conflict resolution process will continue for a long time.<sup>145</sup>

Political and ethnic conflicts have been part of human experience throughout history, and social psychology has always been the primary driving force. Although we think that conflicts are related to concrete issues such as disagreements about territories or resources, psychological components also play an important role. The adversary group's image, or the ideas and feelings about the adversary group constitute the psychological component, which affect the past, present, and future of the conflict process. Stereotypes and prejudices are the most known psychological components. They develop and spread when the group members transfer their concerns and fears to the other group.<sup>146</sup> Most of the deep rooted intractable conflicts between ethnic and religious groups involve stereotypes. The parties may have dehumanized the image of the other side. Stereotypes make the situation more difficult. Many negative features can be associated with the adversary, such as "deceitful", "aggressive", "heartless", "sexually licentious", "with unclean personal habits", and "incapable of change for the better". One of the remedies of stereotyping

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<sup>143</sup> Davidson and Montville, *Foreign Policy According To Freud*, p. 148.

<sup>144</sup> Mayer, p. 11.

<sup>145</sup> Davidson and Montville, *Foreign Policy According To Freud*, p. 153.

<sup>146</sup> Daniel Bar-Tal and Yona Teichman, **Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, p. 1.

is communication. Some positive information about the other side will be provided by communication.<sup>147</sup>

Poor communication, miscommunication, and the stereotyping of adversaries leads to differences in perceived interests, values, and needs, therefore, they are among the basic reasons behind protracted social conflicts.<sup>148</sup> On the contrary, many conflicts can be eliminated by through effective communication. A suitable condition is the solution of an effective communication where the conflicting parties express and release emotions.<sup>149</sup> So, good communication and sharing experiences facilitate peace building. Widely shared experiences validate and back up the communities' memory. These shared experiences are stored in the community repertoire. This repertoire is reinforced by communication through mass media and cultural products such as books, movies, theater etc. They may validate and spread negative feelings, stereotypes and prejudice, or reverse.<sup>150</sup> So, the mass media and cultural products transfer ideas, attitudes, and feelings about another group. Yet, some argue that mass media channels are effective in creating knowledge of new ideas, but they are less effective persuading the people to adopt them. Interpersonal communications networks are more effective than the mass media. Especially respected opinion leaders and peers are very effective in accepting new information and changing attitudes.<sup>151</sup>

Track Two efforts are very important in this context. Track Two efforts attempt to explore the deepest psychological concerns and experiences, with an understanding of the deep historical roots of the conflict.<sup>152</sup> Direct communication is possible between conflicting parties. The complaints directly can be expressed by the individuals.<sup>153</sup> This new approach not only keeps communication channels open but also prevents problems from becoming unresolved.<sup>154</sup> While Track Two diplomacy pays attention to scientific and cultural exchanges, Track One diplomacy, with its

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<sup>147</sup> Montville, The healing function in political conflict resolution, p. 113.

<sup>148</sup> Ho-wong Jeong, **Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis**, SAGE Publication, 2008, p. 9.

<sup>149</sup> Mayer, p. 10.

<sup>150</sup> Bar-Tal and Teichman, pp. 10-11.

<sup>151</sup> Montville, The healing function in political conflict resolution, pp. 123-124.

<sup>152</sup> Chataway, p. 278.

<sup>153</sup> Chataway, p. 279.

<sup>154</sup> Çuhadar Gürkaynak, Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective, p. 64.

focus on official relations and its underlying threat of the use of force, generally fails to take psychological factors into consideration.<sup>155</sup>

We will examine the work of Vamık Volkan in the next section, who has made great theoretical and practical contributions to the field, regarding the importance of unofficial diplomacy in overcoming psychological barriers in international relations.

### **1.3.3. Vamık Volkan's Contributions to the Study of Collective Psychology in Conflicts and Conflict Resolution**

In 1977, Anwar Sadat, the president of Egypt made a speech in Israel Parliament Knesset. President Sadat said that approximately 70 percent of the whole problem between Arabs and Israel was rooted in a psychological barrier, which included a barrier of suspicion, a barrier of rejection, a barrier of fear of deception, a barrier of hallucinations around any action.<sup>156</sup> His speech had a great impact. After this event the American Psychiatric Association Committee on Psychiatry and Foreign Affairs initiated a study to examine the relation between Arabs and Israelis. One of the members of this study was Professor Vamık D. Volkan who, as the head of the team for three years, realized that 70 percent was not enough to explain the psychological barrier between Arabs and Israelis, rather, ninety percent<sup>157</sup> was the right figure. Ever since, Volkan has devoted his work to the analysis of psychological factors in political conflicts, with the aim of offering roads to reconciliation. In the next subsection, his relevant theoretical views on how group identity is formed will be introduced, with a special emphasis on the concept of “chosen trauma”.

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<sup>155</sup> Davidson and Montville, *Foreign Policy According To Freud*, p. 155.

<sup>156</sup> Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “73 Statement to the Knesset by President Sadat, 20 November 1977”, 20.10.1977, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook3/pages/73%20statement%20to%20the%20knesset%20by%20president%20sadat-%2020.aspx>, (06.12.2015).

<sup>157</sup> Volkan, “Uluslararası İlişkiler”.

### 1.3.3.1. “Chosen Trauma” As an Element of Large Group Identity

The identity of the human being is formed, starting from childhood, and has two layers similar to clothes. The first layer is the identity of a person, the core of our individual personality. The second layer is the “*large group identity*”.<sup>158</sup> Volkan explains the large group identity as a large canvas that connects so many people. The tent includes sections such as clans, profession groups, and religious groups and so on. People wear this canvas as a large group cloth. At times, the large group identity might become more important than individual identity. If the tent is torn or stained, or the leaders of this group become ill or die because of the other groups’ threat, people will begin to pay more attention to their large group identity. The large group identity connects many people together with very strict ties, and creates a sense of belonging to the group. Group identity might then dominate their individual psychological processes.<sup>159</sup>

The psychological roots of ethnic conflict thus rely on large group identity. An ethnic group is a large group most of whom will never meet one another, who share a sense of national, religious, or ethnic sameness in spite of their differences in terms of family, professional sub groupings, societal status, and gender divisions.<sup>160</sup> The canvas which composes the large group identity has two essential instruments. One of them is “*chosen glory*” and the other is “*chosen trauma*”. Chosen glory refers to past victories that are of vital importance to a group; e.g. the victory of Çanakkale is a chosen glory for the Turks. These victories are transferred from generation to generation. Chosen trauma is particularly significant for the purpose of our study.

Trauma means severe emotional mental distress that arises due to natural or man-made disasters.<sup>161</sup> Collective defeats or tragedies from the past, is particularly

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<sup>158</sup> John Rhead, “Interview with Vamik Volkan”, **From: Voices-The Art and Science of Psychotherapy**, Vol. 47, Winter, 2011, <http://www.vamikvolkan.com/Interview-with-Vam%FDK-Volkan.php>, (02.07.2015).

<sup>159</sup> Volkan, “Uluslararası İlişkiler”.

<sup>160</sup> Vamik D. Volkan, Traumatized Societies and Psychological Care: Expanding the Concept of Preventive Medicine, [http://www.freudconference.com.au/online\\_papers/Traumatized\\_Societies\\_And\\_Psychological\\_Care.pdf](http://www.freudconference.com.au/online_papers/Traumatized_Societies_And_Psychological_Care.pdf) (06.12.2015), p. 2.

<sup>161</sup> Oxford Dictionaries, “Trauma”, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/trauma> (05.12.2015).



important for the purpose of this study because the events of 1915 has been transferred from generation to generation in the Armenian collective memory as a “chosen trauma” since 1915. Volkan shares a personal experience regarding the consequences of chosen trauma. Early in his career, in 1957, he attended to a professional meeting where he sat next to another psychiatrist who was about Volkan’s age. This person was an Armenian-American who met a Turk for the first time. When he learned about Volkan’s Turkish Cypriot identity, he turned pale and began trembling. He was shocked and frightened to have seen the “monster”. Volkan says that he would never forget his fear.<sup>162</sup>

The Chosen trauma refers to the transfer of the memories of those events that cause a large group to feel helpless and victimized by another group.<sup>163</sup> When a large group is deliberately injured by the enemy and exposed to suffering as victims, their extreme losses, shame, and humiliation can make them restricted. This group needs to experience their pain like mourning. If they cannot successfully go through a mourning process they cannot assert themselves in social and political life. Briefly, if these groups and their members could not successfully complete these psychological processes, the traumatic feelings are passed on to the new generations consciously or unconsciously.<sup>164</sup>

The chosen trauma may have different appearances and functions according to new external factors. The trauma, which is rooted in victimization, may appear in different ways ranging from an exaggerated victimhood psychology to the feelings of revenge.<sup>165</sup> Moreover, since the chosen trauma becomes a significant marker for the large-group identity, it may be manipulated by the politicians to justify political actions. A good example of it is the reintroduction of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo,

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<sup>162</sup> Vamik Volkan, **Killing in the Name of Identity: A Study of Bloody Conflicts** A study of Bloody Conflicts, Pitchstone Publishing, USA, 2006, (Killing in the Name of Identity), p. 151.

<sup>163</sup> Vamik D. Volkan, “Ethnicity And Nationalism: A Psychoanalytic Perspective”, <http://www.vamikvolkan.com/Ethnicity-and-Nationalism:-A-Psychoanalytic-Perspective.php>, (06.12.2015) cited from **Applied Psychology: An International Review**, 1998, 47 (1), 45-57, Manuscript received October 1993, Revised manuscript received April 1997.

<sup>164</sup> Yaprak Özer, Hayatın İçeriği, “Seçilmiş Travmalar ve biz”, 09.04.2013, <http://www.yaprakozer.com/secilmis-travmalar-ve-biz/>, (29.10.2015).

<sup>165</sup> Conflict Research Consortium Article Summary, "The Tree Model: Psychopolitical Dialogues and the Promotion of Coexistence", by Vamik D. Volkan, [http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/full\\_text\\_search/AllCRCDOcs/volkan.htm](http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/full_text_search/AllCRCDOcs/volkan.htm), (08.07.2016), cited from Vamik D. Volkan, M.D., "The Tree Model: Psychopolitical Dialogues and the Promotion of Coexistence," in *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, ed. Eugene Weiner, (New York: Continuum Publishing, 1998), p. 345.

where the Serbian king Lazzara was killed by Turks in the battle field, by nationalist politician Milosevic as a chosen trauma for Serbs. Before the 600<sup>th</sup> anniversary ceremonies Serbian people were not well aware of the "realities" of this war.<sup>166</sup> So, a chosen trauma was then injected to Serbian identity.

Based on this theoretical analysis, Volkan argues that reconciliation efforts must address chosen traumas as well as other psychological aspects of conflicts. According to him, psychology may be changed. For achieving this change, an interdisciplinary and durable team of psychoanalysts, historians, political scientists, diplomats etc. is needed.<sup>167</sup> To this aim he founded the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI)<sup>168</sup>, and developed a model for unofficial problem-solving diplomacy, known as the "Tree Model".

#### **1.3.3.2. The Tree Model**

The tree model was developed in 1999 by Vamık Volkan as a method of unofficial diplomacy. The tree model, which can be utilized to prevent bloody conflict and also to create peaceful coexistence between opposing groups, was tested during his and his team's work in Estonia and Republic of Georgia.<sup>169</sup>

In this model, the three phases of conflict resolution resemble the three parts of a tree. Volkan divides the tree into the three main parts. These are the "roots", "trunk", and "branches". The "roots" of the tree is the diagnosis stage of the conflict. The "trunk" is the psycho-political dialogues stage, which aims to improve the participants' mutual understanding and also to eliminate the psychological barriers or poisonous emotions between adversaries. The "branches" are the advanced dialogue stage of the conflict. These dialogues can provide mutual gains through implementing practical projects and building institutions. When the branches go upward, they reach the authorities, and when they go downward, they reach the community. Tree model requires neutral third party facilitators who come from many

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<sup>166</sup> Vamık D. Volkan, "Chosen Trauma, The Political Ideology Of Entitlement And Violence", Berlin Meeting, June 10, 2004, Germany, <http://www.vamikvolkan.com/Chosen-Trauma,-the-Political-Ideology-of-Entitlement-and-Violence.php>, (08.07.2016).

<sup>167</sup> Volkan, "Uluslararası İlişkiler".

<sup>168</sup> Vamık D. Volkan was the founder and the director of the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI) from 1988 to 2002, <http://www.vamikvolkan.com/CSMHI.php>, (22.11.2015).

<sup>169</sup> <http://www.vamikvolkan.com/About-Vam%FDk-D--Volkan.php>, (14.03.2016).

different disciplines of social and behavioral sciences. In other words, tree model includes an interdisciplinary facilitating team.<sup>170</sup>

According to Vamik Volkan the tree model has to develop as a long term process which endures for years, just like a tree that grows over time. In the first phase, the phase of psycho political assessment of the situation, interviews that many people from both sides attend will be done. The intentions behind people's minds will be thus examined, and the implicit and explicit concerns on both sides will be determined. Second phase is the phase of psycho political dialogues between the members of the opposing groups. Conflicting parties will compete with each other to express their victory or trauma. Friction is an inevitable part of the process. It allows the parties to protect their own identity and feel safe. In other words, the parties must be allowed to maintain their own identities which distinguish them from each other, and psychological border of the conflicting parties need to be protected, while the process continues. Personal stories are very important at the second phase. Personal stories encourage argument. The indirect questions which will be asked to the parties by the facilitator may trigger similar stories to tell. In this way, common stories facilitate mutual understanding and empathy. Telling the story also reveals how the parties perceive their personal identity within their large group. To notice the differences in their large group will bring the parties flexibility for solving the many other complex problems.<sup>171</sup>

Third phase of tree model is the phase of developing institutions, policy statements, or other actions, which will offer a stable and influential space for mutual dialog. Programs and institutions that would be beneficial in preventing further conflict, reducing tensions, and healing, will be developed. With each institutional program the Tree Model may be implemented initially on a micro-level, but later its effect reaches to whole community.<sup>172</sup> Local working and contact groups will be

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<sup>170</sup> Vamik D. Volkan, **Enemies on the Couch A Psychopolitical Journey Through War And Peace**, Pitchstone Publishing, Durham, North Carolina, 2013, pp. 196-197.

<sup>171</sup> Vamik Volkan, "The tree model: a comprehensive psycho political approach to unofficial diplomacy and the reduction of ethnic tension", [https://www.academia.edu/17809472/TREE\\_MODEL--Unofficial\\_Diplomacy](https://www.academia.edu/17809472/TREE_MODEL--Unofficial_Diplomacy), (08.07.2016), cited from Volkan, V. (1999). The tree model: a comprehensive psycho political approach to unofficial diplomacy and the reduction of ethnic tension. *Mind and Human Interaction*, 10: 142-206.

<sup>172</sup> Lisa Aronson, "The Tree Model in the Context of Unofficial Diplomacy", **Mind and Human Interaction**, Volume 14: 2005, pp. 10-11.

needed<sup>173</sup> to develop an institution with formal principles and informal expectations. This will create a new context for the conflict management. These norms may also define responsibilities for states to prevent violent conflict.<sup>174</sup>

Track Two Diplomacy practitioners try to reach from one person to whole community in their non-diplomatic activities. Conflict resolution efforts move across multiple levels of the community.<sup>175</sup> In other words, the conflict resolution practitioners need to build new links among different layers of society, states, and international organizations to multiply the opportunities for dialogue and exchange.<sup>176</sup> It is important to ensure that the different actors, states and international organizations have new relationships with each other, which will increase the chances of dialogue and shared norms among these actors.

Volkan's theoretical and practical contributions show us the significance of healing from trauma for a successful reconciliation. Olga Botcharova, a conflict resolution expert who has designed and conducted numerous workshops on reconciliation, conflict management and cross-cultural communications, confirms that a failure of healing from victimization would block peace efforts. Besides this, she suggests two more factors that block the successful peace building. First are the strategies which are imposed by the foreigners, in other words, foreign recipes for peace. Second are the strategies which come from top to down, that is to say, the methods that are exclusively dictated by decision-makers along the political hierarchy.<sup>177</sup> Elite level dialogue, especially when imposed or encouraged by powerful international actors such as the USA or the EU, is likely to fail unless it is nested in a broader interaction between two communities in conflict.

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<sup>173</sup> Vamık VOLKAN, Seminars, CCC Alumni Forum-Fontainebleau, France, 4 May, 2014, <http://specialised-degrees.insead.edu/executive-master-in-consulting-and-coaching-for-change/events/2014/CCC-alumni-forum/programme/documents/VamikDVolkanSession4.pdf>, (14.03.2016).

<sup>174</sup> Stern and Druckman, *Conflict Resolution in a Changing World*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>175</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*, p. 135.

<sup>176</sup> Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, "Transnational advocacy Networks in international and regional politics", p. 89, [http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic446176.files/Week\\_7/Keck\\_and\\_Sikkink\\_Transnational\\_Advocacy.pdf](http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic446176.files/Week_7/Keck_and_Sikkink_Transnational_Advocacy.pdf), (22.12.2016).

<sup>177</sup> Olga Botcharova, "Implementation of Track Two Diplomacy", **Forgiveness and reconciliation: religion, public policy, and conflict transformation**, (Ed. Raymond G. Helmick and Rodney L. Petersen) Templeton Foundation Press, USA, 2002, p. 280.

Based on the conceptual tools selectively introduced in this chapter, next chapter will provide a brief summary of the roots of the Turkish-Armenian conflict, and a discussion of the various efforts to re-establish relations between the two states and societies since the late 1990s. The significance of complementation and reinforcement of official diplomacy by business actors, academics, and opinion leaders; the critical role of citizen-to-citizen interaction, especially of young generations, in decreasing prejudices; the importance of sharing personal stories through workshops, mass media and arts, and reaching acknowledgement of truth in healing trauma are among the major points to be made through the case analysis.



## CHAPTER TWO

### ARMENIAN-TURKISH CONFLICT: PAST AND PRESENT

Before evaluating the current state of Armenian-Turkish non-diplomatic channels, this chapter will focus on the Armenian-Turkish relation which has been broken since the 1915 events. For this reason, we will examine first the history and determinants of the Armenian-Turkish Conflict, second the effects of the 1915 controversy on Armenian-Turkish Relations including Armenian and Turkish mutual perception, third the effects of Armenian Diaspora and Nagorno Karabakh issue over today's Armenian-Turkish conflict, and finally the rapprochement efforts of both sides in the 2000s. These topics will create a ground for the readers to understand the Armenian-Turkish conflict.

#### 2.1. THE HISTORY AND DETERMINANTS OF THE ARMENIAN-TURKISH CONFLICT

Armenian-Turkish relations have long historical basis. The two communities are amongst the oldest groups to inhabit the same geography in the world with a history of 800 years<sup>178</sup>. The Armenians and Turks have developed a great amount of similarity in their daily and social lives. The Armenians have been so involved with Turks and Turkish customs that they even used Turkish language for Church service<sup>179</sup>. The term Christian Turks<sup>180</sup> was coined because of the similarities between the Armenians and Turks.

The 19<sup>th</sup> century was an era in which the multinational empires have left their place to national governments. The Ottoman Empire was also one of these multinational empires. Therefore, the nationalist movements of the 19<sup>th</sup> century

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<sup>178</sup>Justin McCarthy, "The Reality of Armenian Issue", at the Turkish Grand National Assembly on Conference Presentation, on March 24, 2005, **Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs**, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/presentation-by-prof\\_-justin-mccarthy-at-the-tgna-on-\\_the-reality-of-armenian-issue\\_-conference-on-march-24\\_-2005\\_.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/presentation-by-prof_-justin-mccarthy-at-the-tgna-on-_the-reality-of-armenian-issue_-conference-on-march-24_-2005_.en.mfa), (03.04.2016), (The Reality of Armenian Issue).

<sup>179</sup> Mehmet Kutalmış, On Turkish in Armenian Script, *Journal of Economic and Social Research* 5 (2), <http://jesr.journal.fatih.edu.tr/jesr.kutalmis.ed.pdf>, (30.04.2016), p. 53.

<sup>180</sup> Hüseyin Çakıllıkoyak, **Diaspora'da Ermeni Kimliği Paris ve Halep Örnekleri**, YeditepeYayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 258.

affected these groups in the Ottoman Empire. The Christian communities of the Ottoman Empire rebelled with the support of Western states. Many Turks and Muslims were forced to immigrate from the Russian Empire, Egypt, Crete, Balkans, Caucasus, Black Sea and North Africa to Ottoman territory<sup>181</sup> including those regions where the Armenians lived. The newcomers changed the demographic condition of these regions and negatively impacted Muslim-Armenian relations. The Ottoman state authority was inadequate to cope with those challenges. Kurdish and Circassian tribes entered into rivalry with Armenians to control distant border regions.<sup>182</sup>

When the Balkan wars of 1912-13 resulted in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire<sup>183</sup> most of the Balkan nations such as; Serbians, Rumanians, Greeks, and Bulgars who had lived under the management of Ottoman Empire gained their independence. These developments bolstered nationalist movements and the idea of an independent state among the Armenians. They gained hope for achievement of political liberty and security within this radically transformed imperial state. Most Armenian nationalists regarded Russian and European intervention as the only road to reform.<sup>184</sup> They developed good relations with the American and English missionary schools and also the economic ties with Rome in this period.<sup>185</sup> These developments increased Ottoman Empire's fear of losing the last remaining lands.<sup>186</sup> Therefore, the authoritarian Ottoman regime immediately suppressed the Armenian nationalist movement.<sup>187</sup> This prepared the ground for the Ottoman Empire's relocation policy and the Armenian-Turkish conflict.

In the following subsections, the conflict of the Armenian and Turkish national perspectives on the relocation policy of the Ottoman Empire will be dealt

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<sup>181</sup> David L. Phillips, **Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation**, Berghahn Books, New York 2005, (Unsilencing the Past), p. 2.

<sup>182</sup> Aram Arkun, "Into The Modern Age, 1800–1913", **The Armenians**, (Edited by Edmund Herzig and Marina Kurkchian), Routledge Curzon, 2005, p. 68. (Into The Modern Age, 1800–1913)

<sup>183</sup> Yusuf SARINAY, "Rusya'nın Ermeni Sorununun Ortaya Çıkmasındaki Rolü (1878-1918)", **Hoşgöründen Yol Ayrımına Ermeniler** Cilt 2, Yayına Hazırlayanlar: M. Metin Hülalü, Şakir Batmaz, Gülbadi Alan, Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayını-163, Ocak 2009, pp. 395-396.

<sup>184</sup> Arkun, Into The Modern Age, 1800–1913, p. 65.

<sup>185</sup> Mary Kilbourne Matossian, **1914 Öncesi Ermeni Köy Hayatı**, Aras Yayıncılık 2006, [http://www.arasyayincilik.com/uploads/1914-Oncesi-Ermeni-Koy-Hayati\\_1394699598.pdf](http://www.arasyayincilik.com/uploads/1914-Oncesi-Ermeni-Koy-Hayati_1394699598.pdf), (19.04.2016), p.19.

<sup>186</sup> Matossian, p.19.

<sup>187</sup> Arkun, Into The Modern Age, 1800–1913, p. 88.

with and then other elements that complicate the relationship in the rest of the 20th century such as the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Nagorno Karabakh issue, Diaspora activities for the recognition of “genocide” will be addressed.

### **2.1.1. The Effects of the 1915 Controversy on Armenian-Turkish Relations**

Armenian-Turkish conflict dates back to more than a hundred years. This conflict has not been resolved, and it remained chronic since its inception. David L. Phillips who was the creator and the facilitator of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) argues that there is a deep distrust between Armenians and Turks towards each other.<sup>188</sup> According to Phillips, Armenian-Turkish conflict is one of the most intractable conflicts in the world.<sup>189</sup> This conflict is created in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and reached to peak in the World War I because of the relocation policy of the Ottoman government.

In the Armenian-Turkish conflict, two Armenian parties have an important place. These are the Hunchak Party and Dashnaktsutyun Revolutionary Party. The Hunchak Party was founded in 1887 in Geneva, Switzerland.<sup>190</sup> And the Dashnaktsutyun Revolutionary Party was founded by the efforts of Christopher Mikaelian and his friends Stepan Zorian and Simon Zavarian<sup>191</sup> in 1890 in Tiflis in the Caucasus for the aim of organizing rebels.<sup>192</sup> Hunchak and Dashnak Parties, both of whom had a Marxist understanding, regarded violence as a method of struggle. In order to attain their goals, they resorted to armed actions in the Ottoman Empire, killing both the Ottoman authorities and the Armenians against them.<sup>193</sup>

In the 1890s, Dashnak rebels had begun to infiltrate the Ottoman Empire. Especially Van, Erzurum, and Bitlis were the road of the separatists who were

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<sup>188</sup> Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, p. 1.

<sup>189</sup> Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, p. 5.

<sup>190</sup> McCarthy *The Reality of Armenian Issue*.

<sup>191</sup> Wikipedia, “Christapor Mikaelian”, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christapor\\_Mikaelian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christapor_Mikaelian), (17.04.2016).

<sup>192</sup> Mim Kemal Öke, “The Anatomy of the Armenian Question”, **The Armenian Question, 1914-1923**, Chapter II, **Assembly of Turkish American Associations**, <http://www.ataa.org/reference/question-oke.html>, (17.04.2016).

<sup>193</sup> McCarthy *The Reality of Armenian Issue*.



smuggling rifles. Before the events of 1915, a total of 180.000 Armenians were recruited voluntarily in the Russia's three Corps.<sup>194</sup> Apart from these direct soldiers, small, independent, heavily armed and well-trained quasi-military secret Dashnak and the Hunchak committees<sup>195</sup> served Russia as saboteurs and guides.<sup>196</sup> The Armenian revolutionary committees' activities reminded the Ottoman government of similar experiences that had been experienced in the Balkans before and worried them in the war environment. In 1915, most of the Armenians were forcefully transferred from Anatolia to Syria, which ended with the death of many Armenians. According to Armenians, approximately one and a half million Armenians perished between 1915 and 1923.<sup>197</sup> On the other hand, according to the report of the Talat Pasha (Minister for Home Affairs of the Ottoman Empire), the number of Armenian casualties in the events of 1915 is approximately 300.000 people.<sup>198</sup> There is a gap between Turkish and Armenian perceptions regarding the aims, nature and casualties of 1915 events. These conflicting perceptions will be discussed in the next two sections in order to understand prospects for reconciliation.

It is a fact that this relocation policy which cut the ties of Armenians from their lands,<sup>199</sup> made them suffer. The losses caused by the relocation policy had traumatic effects in Armenians' psychology. On the other hand, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish foreign policy continued to act with the influence of security sensitivity called the "Sevres syndrome". The "Sevres syndrome" symbolizes the feeling of fear and being besieged by enemies.<sup>200</sup> Sevres Syndrome and refusal of Armenians' sufferings in 1915 may have further pushed the Armenian

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<sup>194</sup> Yusuf Sarımay, "Rusya'nın Türkiye Siyasetinde Ermeni Kartı(1878-1918)", **Akademik Bakış**, Cilt 1, Sayı2 Yaz 2008, p. 94.

<sup>195</sup> Edward J. Erickson, "The Armenian Relocations and Ottoman National Security: Military Necessity or Excuse for Genocide?", **Middle East Critique**, Vol. 20, No. 3, Fall 2011, p. 292.

<sup>196</sup> Johannes Henrich Christian, "1914 ve 1923 Yılları Arasında Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri: Ermeni Sorunu'na Dışarıdan Bakış", **Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika** Cilt 3, No: 11, 2007, p. 47 cited from Guenter Lewy, *Dererste Genozid des 20. Jahrhunderts* American Jewish Committee (Hrsg.), Commentary, Aug. Dezember 2005, p. 3.

<sup>197</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, <http://www.mfa.am/en/what-is-genocide/>, (12.02.2017).

<sup>198</sup> Armenian Claims And Historical Facts Questions And Answers, Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, 2007, p. 40.

<sup>199</sup> Erol Göka, Murat Beyazyüz, "Türk Ermeni Sorununun Psikolojik Boyutu", **Ermeni Araştırmaları**, Dört Aylık, Tarih, Politika ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi, Sayı 44, 2013, p. 142.

<sup>200</sup> Fırat Purtaş, "Rising Value of Turkish Foreign Policy: Cultural Diplomacy", **Akademik Bakış**, Cilt 7, Sayı 13, 2013, p. 7.

side into a nationalist line.<sup>201</sup> It should be noted that feelings of nationalism among Armenians remained limited or contained for a long time under Soviet rule. Such feelings have been revived upon Russia's territorial claims from Turkey on behalf of Armenians. The 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the "genocide" is commemorated<sup>202</sup> with the permission of the Russians in 1965. It has been a turning point for the "genocide" recognition efforts.<sup>203</sup> Since then, Armenians have commemorated the April 24 annually as a memorial day.<sup>204</sup> "Genocide" issue has emerged as an obstacle in the way of dialogue between the Armenians and Turks for years. As mentioned by Hrant Dink, Armenian policies based on recognition of "Armenian "genocide" not only harm the Armenians' own identity by reproducing traumas but also push the conflict resolution efforts in a deadlock point.<sup>205</sup> Yet it is also impossible to resolve the conflict if the parties turn a blind eye on the other's perception of 1915.

#### 2.1.1.1. Armenian Perception

In this part Armenians' perception of 1915 and of Turks will be examined. The Armenians, who have suffered from a loss of identity, have struggled to live through demanding the truth about 1915. It has become the basic pillar of Armenian identity. Especially, the third and fourth generations have embraced the task of showing "the realities" to the world.<sup>206</sup> According to Armenians, the decision of "genocide" was taken by Young Turk (Union and Progress Party) government in 1911 long before World War I. For this purpose, Young Turks saw World War I as an opportunity. About one and a half million Armenians have disappeared between 1915 and 1923, and nearly a million Armenians either migrated to other countries or Islamized. According to the Armenian state, the Armenian "genocide" took place in four stages. At first, hundreds of intellectuals were arrested and killed in the capital

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<sup>201</sup> Hrant Dink, **İki Yakın Halk İki Uzak Komşu**, Uluslararası Hrant Dink Vakfı Yayınları, 4th edition, İstanbul, 2012, (İki Yakın Halk), p. 20.

<sup>202</sup> Merve Gülçin Güleç, "Ermeni Tehcirinin 100. Yılında Çözüm Arayışları", **Akademik Perspektif**, 14 Aralık 2014, <http://akademikperspektif.com/2014/12/14/ermeni-tehcirinin-100-yilinda-cozum-arayislari/>, (13.04.2016).

<sup>203</sup> Ömer Faruk An, Türkiye'nin Dış Politikasına Etkisi Bakımından 2015'e Doğru Ermeni Lobisi, Ermeni Araştırmaları Sayı 45, Ankara 2013, p. 196.

<sup>204</sup> Michael Gunter and Dirk Rohtus, "Special Report: The Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement", **Middle East Critique**, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2010, p. 158.

<sup>205</sup> Dink, *İki Yakın Halk*, p. 79.

<sup>206</sup> Dink, *İki Yakın Halk*, p. 20.

of Ottoman Empire. In the second stage, approximately 60,000 Armenians taken for the Turkish army were killed by their friends. In the third stage, Armenians were deported and left to die by the effects of starvation, famine and epidemics. In the fourth and last stage, denial and isolation policies have been followed by the Turkish government.<sup>207</sup> So, the Armenian “genocide” was practiced throughout the empire as an organized killing action.

When we look at the Armenians requests, the most important issue is to achieve the recognition of the “genocide” by the Republic of Turkey. We can clearly see this approach in the words expressed by Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan in an interview. According to Sargsyan “Without a doubt, the recognition of the “genocide” by the Turks is the shortest path to the reconciliation of our nations. And it is my strong conviction that, if it is done sincerely, I believe, in a short period of time, relations between Armenia and Turkey could reach a new and quite a high level.”<sup>208</sup>

For the Armenians, the recognition of the “genocide” is not important only for moral values, but also is needed for security needs. They think that the recognition of the “genocide” in Turkey and the various parts of the worlds will be useful in the prevention of a new “genocide” in the future.<sup>209</sup>

The words of H. Hoosep from the Aleppo Diaspora show us the central place of 24 April commemoration in Armenians’ lives:

*“We cannot forget this date. The date April 24th is important for us. Even though I would earn more money, such as 100 Syrian pounds, I cannot go to work on this date. I stay at home. My grandfather's sister, brothers, father, and mother died there. Very important. On that day I go to church. I burn candles to commemorate them. Even the television is not opened at home that day. Only members of the close family are visited.”*<sup>210</sup>

The painful events experienced by the Armenians in 1915 have become a trauma which passed on from generation to generation. These painful and traumatic experiences have led to the feeling of helplessness and victimization psychology in

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<sup>207</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, “Genocide”, <http://www.mfa.am/en/what-is-genocide/>, (03.06.2017).

<sup>208</sup> Euronews, “‘Relations with Turkey could improve’ Armenian president tells euronews”, 22.04.2015, <http://www.euronews.com/2015/04/22/relations-with-turkey-could-improve-armenian-president-tells-euronews>, (14.06.2017).

<sup>209</sup> Sergey Minasyan, “Prospects for Normalization between Armenia and Turkey: A View from Yerevan”, **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2010, (Prospects for Normalization), p. 23.

<sup>210</sup> Çakıllıkoyak, p. 220.

the Armenian identity.<sup>211</sup> They want to mention and remember “genocide” instinctively.<sup>212</sup> The “chosen trauma” became the most powerful element of Armenian identity.<sup>213</sup> The transfer of painful events to the new generations as trauma has also caused deep scars in the new generation. The “chosen trauma” has been living among the new generation as if it is being experienced currently.<sup>214</sup>

The Armenians generally blame Turks for the great sufferings they have experienced in 1915, and think negatively about them. However, not all Armenians have the same viewpoint regarding Turks. “Turkey’s Armenians”, “Armenia’s Armenians” and “Diaspora Armenians” perceive the Turks in many different ways. Historically, Armenians in Armenia and Turkey have experienced the same things. However, mutual dialogue and living together with the Turks eliminated Turkey’s Armenians’ trauma significantly. Armenians of Turkey have shown that living together and having good relations with the Turks is possible. Dink said *“Living with Turks has been a chance for me as Turks incite great anger among the rest of the Armenians. The anger is eliminated while living together and the process becomes a cure. Living with the Turks is the antidote for the poison and anger inside us.”*<sup>215</sup>

On January 19, 2007 Hrant Dink, a leading figure of Armenian community in Turkey and the chief editor of Agos newspaper, was assassinated by a 17-years-old Turkish ultranationalist. 5 days later, tens of thousands of people attended Dink's funeral in front of the Agos newspaper in Istanbul.<sup>216</sup> They carried the banners *“We are all Armenians”* and *“We are all Hrant Dink”*.<sup>217</sup> They attended the funeral to become one in the face of this crime against humanity. This event had a positive influence on many people. Their belief in peace increased because of this funeral. A

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<sup>211</sup> Çuhadar, Punsmann, p. 23.

<sup>212</sup> Etyen Mahçupyan, “Sonuç”, **“1915 and Beyond: Public Perception in Turkey”**, (Aybars Görgülü and Sabiha Şenyücel Gündoğar), PODEM Publication, 2016, p. 44.

<sup>213</sup> Göka, Beyazyüz, pp. 148-151.

<sup>214</sup> Vamık D. Volkan, “Chosen Trauma, The Political Ideology of Entitlement and Violence”, 10.06.2004, <http://vamikvolkan.com/Chosen-Trauma,-the-Political-Ideology-of-Entitlement-and-Violence.php>, (02.07.2015).

<sup>215</sup> YouTube, “Hrant Dink”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vt3xUXmnelg>, (03.04.2016).

<sup>216</sup> Milliyet, “Hrant Dink”, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/hrant-dink/>, (07.05.2016), and Hürriyet Sefa ÖZKAYA Mustafa ÖZDABAK Asım GÜNEŞ Ardiç AYTALAR Fatma AKSU Mustafa KÜÇÜK Serkan AKKOÇ Taner YENER Muharrem AYDIN Şefik DİNÇ Birsal SANCAR Aslı SÖZBİLİR Esma ÇAKIR Burak AKBULUT Selçuk YAŞAR Ömer ERDEM Yeliz ÖZ, “Türkiye’nin bağrında”, 24.01.2007, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkiye-nin-bagrinda-5827906>, (07.05.2016).

<sup>217</sup> Gündüz AKTAN, “Turkey since the Hrant Dink murder (I)”, **Hurriyet Daily News**, 2.3.2007, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-since-the-hrant-dink-murder-i.aspx?pageID=438&n=turkey-since-the-hrant-dink-murder-i--2007-02-03>, (07.05.2016).

research has shown that the opinion of young Armenians of Turkey changed positively seeing the support from Turks and the atmosphere of solidarity in the funeral.<sup>218</sup>

The Armenians who came to Turkey from Armenia for business and commerce may be seen in a similar way.<sup>219</sup> According to a survey which measures the sympathy of Armenians for Turks and other people, the lowest sympathy was measured towards the Turks with 24.4%. This rate is much higher (over 35%) among the people who have visited Turkey or have met some Turks than those who have not.<sup>220</sup> In other words, when they are friends with a Turk, study in Turkey, visit Turkey or use the Turkish products they have positive thoughts about Turks.<sup>221</sup> On the other hand for the “Diaspora Armenians”, Turk is the Turk whom they have left in 1915. The differences in attitudes among the Armenians are seen in the 24 April commemoration every year. While some Diaspora Armenians display aggressive attitudes in commemoration meetings such as burning the Turkish flag, the Armenia’s Armenians hold a silent ceremony.<sup>222</sup>

Armenians see Turkey as the source of all of their daily problems. Most of the negative thoughts of the Armenian public opinion come from the closed border and the embargo.<sup>223</sup> Almost 2/3 of the population of Armenia was forced to migrate to various parts of the world.<sup>224</sup> In a survey, the most important reason of migration from Armenia is stated as the negativity of economic conditions with a rate of 57%.<sup>225</sup> Although there are older and deeper reasons for the deterioration of Armenian economy since the 1980s<sup>226</sup>, the closed border is also one of the important reasons of economic difficulties of Armenia since Armenia is a landlocked country.

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<sup>218</sup> Arzum Kopsa, **The Assassination Of Hrant Dink From The Perspective Of Armenian Youth In Turkey: A Time Of Trauma Or Solidarity?**, Sabancı University, Spring 2008, 101-106.

<sup>219</sup> Dink, *İki Yakın Halk*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>220</sup> Salih Akyürek, M. Sadi Bilgiç, **Ermenistan’da Türkiye ve Türk algısı**, Rapor No:41 Bilgesam, Ankara, Ocak 2012, pp. 17-21.

<sup>221</sup> Akyürek, Bilgiç, pp. 24-55.

<sup>222</sup> Dink, *İki Yakın Halk*, p. 21.

<sup>223</sup> Burcu Gültekin, **The Stakes of the Opening of Turkish Armenian Border the cross-border contacts between Armenia and Turkey**, French Institute of Anatolian Studies, Research Program on Turkey Caucasus, Istanbul October, 2002, (Opening of Turkish Armenian Border), p. 11.

<sup>224</sup> Dink, *İki Yakın Halk*, p. 15.

<sup>225</sup> Migration and Skills in Armenia, results of the 2011/12 migration survey on the relationship between skills, migration and development, European Training Foundation and Caucasus Research Resource Centers (Armenia) 2012, P. 54.

<sup>226</sup> Armen Yeghiazaryan, Vahram Avanesian, Nelson Shahnazaryan, *How To Reverse Emigration?*, <http://www.amerialegal.am/pdf/d5c0447534321fa8e3db55f97def1070.pdf>, (03.06.2017), pp. 2-3.

That is why, despite the closed border and lack of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey, many Armenians come to Turkey to look for a better life and work illegally.<sup>227</sup>

In concluding this subsection, the following findings are important for conflict resolution: (1) Traumatic memory of 1915 for all Armenians cannot be skipped; every conflict resolution attempt must involve sharing of ideas and emotions in this topic (2) To have a relationship with a Turk definitely has a positive effect on Armenian's approach to Turks; forging individual connections between the civil societies is thus vital (3) Economic problems that arise from closed border negatively affect Armenian's approach to Turks; restoring diplomatic relations and economic development must be part of the reconciliation strategy.

#### **2.1.1.2. Turkish Perception**

The Turks have been also deeply affected by the events of 1915. Ottoman state had referred to the Armenians with the epithet 'Millet-i Sadıka,' which means "the loyal nation". As aforementioned, the Armenian rebellions and demands for independence have created a disappointment among the Turks. After these events Armenians evolved from the most loyal nation to traitors in the eyes of the Turks. This interpretation was reproduced throughout the republican era. Turks believe that the Armenians betrayed the Ottomans by separating from the Empire. According to Turks, while the Ottoman army was fighting in the Balkans the Armenians stabbed them in the back. In addition to the 1915 events, the Nagorno-Karabakh occupation has made the Armenian-Turkish conflict more complicated, which will be examined in the next section. Turkey has sided with Azerbaijan and officially declared that the

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<sup>227</sup> The exact numbers of Armenian immigrants in Turkey are not clear, because most of them do not have any documents. However, we can derive some information from the statements of Turkish politicians: Tansu Ciller, a former Turkish prime minister, said there were 30,000 undocumented Armenian citizens living in Turkey in 2000. Former Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul put the number at 40,000 in 2005, while Yasar Yakis, who held the foreign affairs post the following year, estimated there were 70,000...And last explanation came from Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the President of the Republic of Turkey said there were 100,000 undocumented Armenian citizens living in Turkey in 2015. Umut Uras, "Armenian immigrants look for a better life in Turkey", 20.04.2015, **Al Jazeera Media Network**, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/armenian-immigrants-life-turkey-150420070803126.html>, (04.06.2017).

Armenia-Turkey border would remain closed until the end of the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>228</sup>

According to a survey conducted by The Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), portraying the perceptions of Turkish society towards 1915 and Armenians in Turkey, most of the Turkish community does not see the 1915 events as “genocide”, and only small minorities, most of whom are Armenians, call the events of 1915 a “genocide”.<sup>229</sup> For Turks, each side gave casualties in 1915. So the Armenians were exposed to a relocation policy by the Ottoman government as a security precaution in the World War I. They put up defensive walls against the Armenian “genocide” claims.<sup>230</sup> Turkish side explains the events of 1915 as a forced displacement with some unintended consequences.<sup>231</sup>

In the minds of most Turks, Armenian-Turkish conflict is embedded in a broader “Sevres syndrome”; i.e. suspecting that the western states have the intention to divide and rule Turkey. That is why the attempts of the Armenian Diaspora to get the events of 1915 recognized as “genocide” cause distress in the Turkish community. For many Turks, the protracted Armenia-Turkey conflict has been influenced by a three phase plan. The plan, which includes the “Recognition” “Compensation” and “Earth” stages, starts firstly with the Armenian attempt to reach “Recognition” by registering the events of 1915 as “genocide”, secondly they want to take “Compensation”, and lastly they want to have “Earth” in return.<sup>232</sup> Each year, on April 24, the commemorations of the events of 1915 receive reaction from Turkish state. According to Turks it is the Armenians’ “genocide” allegations that damage mutual relations between Armenians and Turks.<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> Cory WELT, “Turkish-Armenian Normalisation and the Karabakh Conflict”, **Perceptions**, Volume XVIII, Number 1, Spring 2013, p. 209.

<sup>229</sup> Görgülü and Senyücel Gündoğar, p. 28.

<sup>230</sup> Aybars Görgülü and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, Alexander Iskandaryan, Sergey Minasyan, **Turkey-Armenia Dialogue Series: Breaking The Vicious Circle**, Tesev-Caucasus Institute Joint Report, Tesev Publications, 2009, p. 13.

<sup>231</sup> Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, Turkey-Armenia Relations After 2000, **Marmara University Turks and Armenians**, <http://turksandarmenians.marmara.edu.tr/en/turkey-armenia-relations-after-2000/>, (23.02.2017).

<sup>232</sup> Kemal Çiçek, “Osmanlı Ermenilerinin 1915’teki Tehciri: Bir Değerlendirme”, **Akademik Bakış**, Cilt 3 Sayı 6, Yaz 2010, p. 11., Marina Kurkchian and Edmund Herzig, “Introduction Armenia and the Armenians”, **The Armenians**, (Edited by Edmund Herzig and Marina Kurkchian), Routledge Curzon, 2005, (Introduction Armenia and the Armenians), p. 13.

<sup>233</sup> In April 2005, Turkish Prime Minister sent a letter to Armenian President Robert Kocharian. The letter was about a History Commission that would be composed of other experts including Turkish

Yet, most Turks now do not see the Armenian-Turkish conflict as a fundamental national issue. They see this conflict as a trivial matter among many other important issues they have to consider on a daily basis.<sup>234</sup> Turks also claim that they have accepted Turkish citizens of Armenian origins generally as friends, neighbors, and citizens. According to an interview which is about the perception of the Turkish people regarding Armenians in Istanbul, most of the Turks gave positive answers about Armenians and Armenian-Turkish relations.<sup>235</sup> However, many conflict resolution practitioners claim otherwise, referring to prejudices and lack of knowledge about Armenians.<sup>236</sup> Aybars Görgülü explains this situation as follows:

*Among the Turkish students, there were even those who did not see an Armenian in their lives and did not know that Armenians had lived in Adana before. We saw this at the meeting. The Turks do not know much about the livelihood of the Armenians in this land.*<sup>237</sup>

Furthermore, Turkish community is not homogeneous. There are different thoughts among the Turkish community. As stated in the last section, tens of thousands of people attended Dink's funeral carrying "we are all Armenians" banners in 2007. Next year, some intellectuals launched a campaign in December 2008, calling for apologizing to the Armenian people for the 1915 events. The apology statement, signed by over 30.000 people was as follows:

*"My conscience does not accept the denial and insensitivity of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians suffered in 1915. I refuse this injustice and share the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and sisters. I apologize to them."*<sup>238</sup>

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and Armenian historians. This Commission would investigate the developments and events of the year 1915 not only using Turkish and Armenian archives but also those of third-party countries. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, "No:62 - 15 Nisan 2005, Başbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Ermenistan Devlet Başkanı Robert Koçaryan'a Gönderdiği Mektup hk." [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no\\_62---15-nisan-2005\\_-basbakan-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdogan\\_in-ermenistan-devlet-baskani-robert-kocaryan\\_a-gonderdigi-mektup-hk\\_.tr.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_62---15-nisan-2005_-basbakan-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdogan_in-ermenistan-devlet-baskani-robert-kocaryan_a-gonderdigi-mektup-hk_.tr.mfa), (12.06.2017). In his return letter Robert Kocharian stressed that the normalization of the bilateral relations is the task not of the scientists of the two countries, but of the governments of Armenia and Turkey. And he offered to establish an intergovernmental commission on examination of the whole spectrum of issues worrying the two countries. See Emma Nadirian, "Answer of Ankara to Letter of Armenia's President May Be Positive", 27.04.2005, <http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/showthread.php?25005-Answer-of-Ankara-to-Letter-of-Armenia-s-President-May-Be-Positive>, (03.04.2016).

<sup>234</sup> Çuhadar, Punsmann, p. 51.

<sup>235</sup> YouTube, "What Does the Turkish community think about Armenians?", <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yuB2zXfZRxE>, (14.04.2016).

<sup>236</sup> Fulya Memişoğlu, Easing Mental Barriers in Turkey-Armenia Relations: The Role of Civil Society, TESEV, Foreign Policy Programme, p. 4.

<sup>237</sup> Interview 10.

<sup>238</sup> Özür Diliyorum, <http://www.ozurdiliyoruz.com/>, (13.07.2016).



In concluding this subsection, the following findings are important for conflict resolution: (1) Insistence on recognition of 1915 events as “genocide”, particularly Armenian diaspora’s activities in the third countries, reveals the Sevres syndrome among Turks and decreases prospects for reconciliation, (2) alternative approaches that criticize the official understanding of 1915 have appeared in the 2000s, which provided a space for diplomatic and non-diplomatic efforts for conflict resolution.

### **2.1.2. Other Factors That Complicate the Conflict**

#### **2.1.2.1. Nagorno Karabakh Issue**

The dispute over Nagorno Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan dates back to the brief period of independence between the collapse of imperial Russia and the rise of the Soviet Union. Armenians had constituted a slight majority by the early 19<sup>th</sup> cc. A demographic explosion from 1823 to 1832 took a more than fourfold increase in the percentage of the Armenian population in Karabakh province. This figure rose to 53.3 per cent by the end of the century with the support of the Tsarist authority.<sup>239</sup> And Nagorno-Karabakh was made an autonomous region in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. From 1923 to 1988 the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had been frozen for almost 70 years. When the Soviet authority was weakened, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict reemerged between Armenia and Azerbaijan. When Armenia and Azerbaijan declared independence in 1991 Nagorno Karabakh also declared its independence.<sup>240</sup>.. Almost two years later in 1992-1993, Nagorno-Karabakh was occupied by Armenia.<sup>241</sup> A large amount of the Azerbaijan territories were occupied by the Armenian forces. More than twenty thousand people died and one million were displaced.<sup>242</sup> This occupied territory is recognized as an

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<sup>239</sup> Turgut Demirtepe and Sedat Laciner, “The Role of the Karabakh Issue in Restoration of Azerbaijani Nationalism”, 23.11.2004, **Turkish Weekly**, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/2004/11/23/article/the-role-of-the-karabakh-issue-in-restoration-of-azerbaijani-nationalism/>, (23.04.2016).

<sup>240</sup> Akyürek, Bilgiç, p. 5.

<sup>241</sup> President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, “Karabakh”, <http://en.president.az/azerbaijan/karabakh>, (23.04.2016).

<sup>242</sup> Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, p. 2.

Azerbaijani land within the international community, through the resolutions of UN Security Council, General Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.<sup>243</sup> But no solutions have been found as to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict so far. In 2016, two states had an armed conflict one more time. According to official statements, there were nearly 100 losses from both sides in this conflict. Azerbaijani authorities declared that some of the strategic territories around Seisulan, Talish, Madagiz were have been seized<sup>244</sup> and a village of Nagorno-Karabakh were taken from Armenians by the Azerbaijanis forces.<sup>245</sup> After this conflict, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to negotiate to reach an agreement over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.<sup>246</sup> However, as of August 2016, both sides have returned to the pre-war status quo in terms of diplomatic deadlock in negotiations.<sup>247</sup> When it came to the end of 2017, there was no development in relations between the two countries.

Let us now see the effects of this problem on Turkish-Armenian relations. The relations between Turkey and Armenia began at a formal level almost five months before Armenia's declaration of independence on September 21, 1991. The first high-level visit to Armenia by the Turks was held in April 1991. During these official contacts, Turkey's Moscow Ambassador Volkan Vural and Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian prepared a draft agreement on establishing good neighborly relations in Yerevan.<sup>248</sup> When the Soviet Union collapsed Turkey became the first country to recognize Armenia after the United States on December 16, 1991. Turkey has reopened the railway between the Turkish city of Kars and the Armenian

<sup>243</sup> Justin Amler, "Azerbaijan and Armenia tangle over disputed territory", 05.04.2016, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/5/justin-amlar-azerbaijan-and-armenia-battle-for-dis/>, (23.04.2016), International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, "Türkiye Ve Ermenistan: Kalıpları Kırmak, Sınırları Açmak", **Avrupa Raporu**, No 199, 14.04.2009, (Türkiye Ve Ermenistan: Kalıpları Kırmak ), p. 2.

<sup>244</sup> South Front Analysis Intelligence, "International Military Review And Analysis Studying Escalation In Nagorno-Karabakh", 15.04.2016, <https://southfront.org/international-military-review-analysis-studying-escalation-in-nagorno-karabakh/>, (30.04.2016).

<sup>245</sup> BBC News, "Nagorno-Karabakh clash: Turkey backs Azeris 'to the end' against Armenia", 03.04.2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35953358>, (30.04.2016).

<sup>246</sup> Matthew Lee, "Armenia, Azerbaijan agree to June talks on territory dispute", **The Washington Post**, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/us-russia-push-armenia-azerbaijan-on-nagorno-karabakh/2016/05/16/7317965e-1b73-11e6-82c2-a7dcb313287d\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/us-russia-push-armenia-azerbaijan-on-nagorno-karabakh/2016/05/16/7317965e-1b73-11e6-82c2-a7dcb313287d_story.html), (19.05.2016).

<sup>247</sup> Zaur Shiriyev, "The "Four-Day War": Changing Paradigms in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", 14.03.2017, **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, <http://turkishpolicy.com/article/842/the-four-day-war-changing-paradigms-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict>, (04.06.2017).

<sup>248</sup> Aybars Görgülü, **Turkey-Armenia Relations: A Vicious Circle**, TESEV Publications, November 2008, p. 10 cited from Graham E. Fuller, 'Turkey's New Eastern Orientation', Fuller and Lesser (eds.), Turkey's new Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China (Boulder, CO, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), p. 77.

city of Gumru and accepted to provide the urgently needed electricity.<sup>249</sup> The DoğuKapı border gate, the official border and railway connection between the two countries, had facilitated commercial traffic of many goods such as wheat and animal products between the USSR and Turkey since 1927.<sup>250</sup> The next counter-visit to Turkey came from the Armenian high level delegation in December 1992.<sup>251</sup> The Armenian delegation attended to a ministerial meeting of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council (BSEC) in Antalya upon the invitation of Turkey. Armenia's acting foreign minister, Turkish foreign minister and Azerbaijan's foreign minister held a trilateral meeting in Antalya. During this period, constructive and sustained contacts were maintained between Armenian officials and Volkan Vural, Ambassador of Turkey in Russia. He functioned as Ankara's envoy on Armenian issues.<sup>252</sup>

When Armenia occupied the region of Nagorno Karabakh in 1993 Turkey froze its relations, closed its border gates with Armenia, and its air space in 1994, as an act of retaliation.<sup>253</sup> However the air corridor between Armenia and Turkey has been open since 1995.<sup>254</sup> Turgut Ozal president of the Turkish Republic stated that *"It is impossible to see the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan as limited to Karabakh any longer... It is perfectly clear that Armenia plans to create a 'greater Armenia' out of Azeri lands"*.<sup>255</sup> According to the explanation of President Ozal, Turkey saw the Armenia's occupation as a regional threat and declared that all communications and transport links between Armenia and Turkey would remain broken until the end of the Armenian occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>256</sup>

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<sup>249</sup> International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, Türkiye Ve Ermenistan: Kalıpları Kırarak, p. 1.

<sup>250</sup> Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, Looking Back on the Fall of the Eastern Iron Curtain: How Turkey Rediscovered her South Caucasus Neighborhood, TEPAV, p. 9.

<sup>251</sup> Punsmann, p. 7.

<sup>252</sup> David L. Phillips, **Diplomatic History: The Turkey-Armenia Protocols**, Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University, March 2012, p. 15.

<sup>253</sup> Hasan Kanbolat, Turkey-Armenia Border Gates, 01.06.2006, ASAM, <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=Makaleler&MakaleNo=353>, (26.02.2017).

<sup>254</sup> Cengiz Çandar, Türkiye Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan, **Hürriyet**, 25.04.2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkiye-azerbaycan-ve-ermenistan-11509764>, (26.02.2017).

<sup>255</sup> The New York Times, "Turk Says Russia Is Tangled in Caucasus War", 15.04.1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/15/world/turk-says-russia-is-tangled-in-caucasus-war.html>, (23.04.2016).

<sup>256</sup> Welt, p. 209.

Since then, Turkey holds Armenian-Turkish border closed to compel the Armenian side to an agreement with Azerbaijan. In other words, the solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the prerequisite of Turkey to open borders with Armenia. Turkey has strong ties with Azerbaijan culturally, religiously and historically. Azerbaijanis and Turks explain their mutual relation with the sentence “*one nation, two states*”. Therefore, Turkey pressures the Armenians to withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia is a land-locked country with limited opportunities for economic development.<sup>257</sup> It is similar to a sandwich,<sup>258</sup> pressured from the West by Turkey and from the East by Azerbaijan. It has territorial disputes with Georgia as well. The only neighbor that Armenia has good relations is Iran.<sup>259</sup> So, it seems that there are economic incentives for Armenia in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

We can conclude that Nagorno Karabakh problem has complicated the picture and negatively influenced Turkish-Armenian relations in many ways. It can even be argued that claims of “genocide” have mostly been brought to the international agenda after 1993. One cannot take back the dynamics of the conflict though; thus, the conflict resolution task of seeking a mutual understanding about the tragedy of 1915 cannot be skipped. Yet, an improvement in Nagorno-Karabakh issue and a restoration of broken diplomatic relations would be vital. So, multi-track diplomacy seems the proper strategy for resolving this complex conflict.

#### **2.1.2.2. Armenian Diaspora and the Involvement of Third Parties through “genocide” Resolutions**

The Armenian emigration started with the massacres of the Armenians between 1895 and 1905<sup>260</sup> and continued with the 1915 events. Another wave of migration started in the 1990s. In the ten years after Armenia's independence, almost one third of the population of independent Armenia emigrated abroad in search of a

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<sup>257</sup> Izabella Sargsyan, “Armenia-Turkey Dialogue: Against Many Odds?”, 23.04.2015, <https://ge.boell.org/en/2015/04/23/armenia-turkey-dialogue-against-many-odds>, (02.07.2016).

<sup>258</sup> Dink, İki Yakın Halk, p. 64.

<sup>259</sup> Senol Kantarcı, Türkiye-Ermenistan İlişkileri: Önce “Peynir Diplomasisi” Sonra “Futbol Diplomasisi”, 01.09.2008, <http://www.turksam.org/tr/makale-detay/752-turkiye-ermenistan-iliskileri-once-%EF%BF%BDpeynir-diplomasisi-sonra-%EF%BF%BDfutbol-diplomasisi>, (19.05.2016).

<sup>260</sup> Kurkchian and Herzig, Introduction Armenia and the Armenians, p. 7.

job and a new home.<sup>261</sup> Today this rate is much higher. According to UN data the total number of Armenians in Armenia is around 3 million.<sup>262</sup> However, Armenians have a large Diaspora with about 8 million people throughout the world. Armenians are one the largest minority communities in some states such as in Russia, Iran, France, the U.S., Canada, Syria, and Lebanon.<sup>263</sup> It means that approximately 2/3 of Armenians are living in the Diaspora.

The Armenian Diaspora is a like a powerful third party who balances the asymmetrical economic, demographic and political powers of Turkey and Armenia. The Armenian Diaspora can influence the policies of the states where it has powerful effect from Russia to America and Europe, regarding the Armenian-Turkish conflict. In America, the government has been influenced by the effective Armenian lobbies since the Armenian Diaspora has been well integrated into the American society and can be organized and mobilized rapidly. In some regions, Armenians even constitute more than 10% of the total voters. For example, the Diaspora had an impact in favor of George W. Bush in the presidential election in 2000.<sup>264</sup> So the American politicians cannot ignore the Armenian Diaspora easily. They may seek Armenian Diaspora's political and financial support for the local and federal elections.

The Armenian Diaspora in the US consists of almost 1,2 million Armenians who migrated in the late nineteenth century between 1894–1896 and after the events of the 1915. They have been represented politically by two lobbies.<sup>265</sup> One of them is the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) and the other is the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA). Both organizations aim to influence the U.S. government and Congress to recognize the “Armenian “genocide”” for years.<sup>266</sup> They have managed to have more than 40 states of the USA recognized the events as “genocide” and continue to press for a recognition at the federal level too. Yet the federal government and Congress refrain from using the term “genocide” as the US

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<sup>261</sup> Kurkchian and Herzig, Introduction Armenia and the Armenians, p. 21.

<sup>262</sup> UN data, “Armenia”, <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=ARMENIA>, (24.04.2016)

<sup>263</sup> World Population Review, “Armenia Population 2016”, <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/armenia-population/>, (21.04.2016).

<sup>264</sup> Julien Zarifian, “The Armenian-American Lobby and Its Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy”, **Social Science and Modern Society**, Volume 51, Number 5, Springer, New York 2014, p. 506.

<sup>265</sup> Phillips, pp. 5-6.

<sup>266</sup> Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, p. 6.

does not want to compromise its alliance with the Turks.<sup>267</sup> Another example of the Armenian lobbies' achievements in the USA concerns Nagorno-Karabakh:

*It is to note that the Armenian lobby has managed to get an annual aid to Karabakh from the Congress. The Self Proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is not recognized internationally, has received a sizeable financial assistance (usually between \$5 million and \$10 million per year) every year since the 1990s, even though a country that is not recognized is not supposed to receive such aid.*<sup>268</sup>

So, the Armenian government can rely on the Diaspora in order to reach its targets and to level the asymmetrical relations with the Republic of Turkey. Armenia succeeded in attaining recognition for the 1915 events as “genocide” in 30 countries with the help of Armenian Diaspora, including Russia, France, Canada, Italy and Sweden.<sup>269</sup> According to the Armenian “genocide” Museum and Institute (AGMI) (National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia), Uruguay was the first country to recognize the Armenian “genocide” in 1965, followed by Cyprus in 1982. However the tendency to officially recognize the Armenian “genocide” increased after the declaration of Armenia's independence in 1991. Most of the countries have formally recognized the “genocide” since then. The chronological order of the countries that recognize “genocide” is as listed: Argentina (1993), Russia (1995), Canada (1996), Greece (1996), Lebanon (1997), Belgium (1998), Sweden (2000), Italy (2000), Vatican (2000), France (2001), Switzerland (2003), Slovakia (2004), Netherlands (2004), Venezuela (2005), Lithuania (2005), Poland (2005), Chile (2007), Bolivia (2014), Austria (2015), Luxembourg (2015), Germany (2016).<sup>270</sup>

Many other powerful states who have not yet recognized “genocide” claims keep holding those claims as a trump card, which rubs salt in the wounds of Turkey; i.e. its “Sevres syndrome”. Asymmetrical relations between Turkey and Armenia, and those between Turkey and major powers, are a fact that cannot be changed in the short-run. These asymmetries do not help but deepen the mutual suspicions. Hence,

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<sup>267</sup> Deutsche Welle, “Genocide debate puts Germany in tough spot with Turkey”, <http://www.dw.com/en/genocide-debate-puts-germany-in-tough-spot-with-turkey/a-19210270>, (18.02.2017).

<sup>268</sup> Zarifian, p. 510.

<sup>269</sup> Armenianguenocide100, “States which recognized the Armenian Genocide”, <http://armenianguenocide100.org/en/states/>, (18.02.2017).

<sup>270</sup> The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, States Resolutions, Laws, and Declarations, <http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/states.php>, (04.06.2017).

sincere efforts of reconciliation at the level of civil society in Turkey and Armenia seem very important for conflict resolution.

## **2.2. ARMENIAN TURKISH RECONCILIATION EFFORTS SINCE THE LATE 1990S**

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, some developments in track one and track two diplomacy began. About four years after the invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) was established in 1997 as a precursor of “Track Two” diplomacy, for the creation of new trade links. Although TABDC aimed to foster trade, it achieved an influential line of political communication between the two governments as the TABDC played an important role after the earthquake that occurred in the Marmara region in 1999 and Van region in 2011. Aids from Armenia were sent to Turkey in August and October 1999 and also in October 2011.<sup>271</sup> The projects of TABDC will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. After that a new wave of reconciliation efforts was initiated, with the influence of USA and the EU. From 2001 to 2009, a significant amount of US funding was granted to support Armenian and Turkish civil society activities.<sup>272</sup> A favorable environment for diplomatic efforts also appeared as the Justice and Development Party, which pursued a policy of democratization in domestic policy and “zero-problems with neighbors” in foreign policy, came to power in Turkey in 2002. Those developments in the 2000s are analyzed in the next subsections.

### **2.2.1. An Early and Significant “Track Two” Diplomacy Effort: Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC)**

Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) was created by David L. Phillips, a member of the influential think tank, Council on Foreign Relations in July 2001<sup>273</sup> and was ended by the decision of the TARC members on 14 April

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<sup>271</sup> Çuhadar, Punsmann, pp. 16-17, 60.

<sup>272</sup> Çuhadar, Punsmann, p. 38.

<sup>273</sup> Nazif Mandacı, “Reconciliation Under The Shadow Of Diaspora Politics: Some Lessons From The Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC)”, *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Cilt: 16, Sayı: 2, Yıl: 2014, p. 247.

2004.<sup>274</sup> TARC was a kind of “Track Two” diplomacy effort with four members from the Armenian side and six members from the Turkish side. TARC members were chosen from among civil society representatives.<sup>275</sup> It aimed to promote mutual understanding between two nations and also intended to encourage improved relations.<sup>276</sup> For this purpose, TARC members have organized different meetings. Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) was welcomed with good intentions by Armenian and Turkish participants since both sides wanted to put an end to the ongoing conflict between two nations since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Although none of the members of the TARC had official linkage to their governments,<sup>277</sup> they could not behave independent from both states and the Armenian Diaspora.<sup>278</sup> Phillips tells that whenever the commission wanted to make a decision Gunduz Aktan and Ozdem Sanberk, who were the two members of the TARC from Turkish side, went outside to telephone as if taking some instructions from Turkish government.<sup>279</sup> On the other hand, some other restrictions which influenced the Armenian members of TARC negatively came from the Dashnaktsutyun party (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) during the process. For example, the Dashnaktsutyun party expressed its dissatisfaction by arguing that the reconciliation between Armenian and Turks will jeopardize the international recognition of “genocide”, and stated that *“there can be no reconciliation without the recognition of the historical truth.”*<sup>280</sup>

The TARC commission decided to set up working groups for building confidence between members on historical, psychological, and legal matters. They also set up a history group which worked on different periods; from 1878—the rise of nationalism—to 1980s and from 1973 to 1984 when 42 diplomats and Turkish

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<sup>274</sup> Tigran Mkrtchyan, “The role of NGOs in Turkey-Armenia Rapprochement”, <http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/Mkrtchyan,%20Goksel%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20NGOs%20in%20Turkey-Armenia%20Rapprochement%20-%20November%202009.pdf>, (12.06.2017).

<sup>275</sup> Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, p. 46.

<sup>276</sup> Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission(TARC), “Terms of Reference”, <http://www1.american.edu/cgp/TARC/tor.htm>, (07.05.2016).

<sup>277</sup> Haroutiun Khachatrian, “Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission Encounters Skepticism”, 09. 09.2001, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav091001.shtml>, (02.05.2016), (Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission).

<sup>278</sup> Mandacı, p. 254.

<sup>279</sup> Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, p. 40.

<sup>280</sup> Khachatrian, *Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission*.



citizens were killed by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) terrorists' attacks.<sup>281</sup> While the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), one of the representatives of the Armenian Diaspora in America criticized the TARC strictly, the other one named The Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) supported the commission openly.<sup>282</sup> TARC was criticized by Armenian nationalists for hampering the international recognition of the "Armenian "genocide".<sup>283</sup> The Armenian Diaspora generally restricted TARC's work by its long term demands from Turkey such as an official confession, apology, and compensation.<sup>284</sup> Prof. Dr. Vamık Volkan, one of the TARC members from Turkish side stated that

*I concluded that there might be unconscious and conscious efforts on the Armenians' part to keep the status quo of the problematic Turkish-Armenian relationship. All of the Turkish TARC commissioners openly accepted that there was a huge tragedy and victimization of Armenians in 1915, but any time they spontaneously attempted to express empathy for the Armenians' suffering, it seemed that they were quickly rebuffed/rejected. Even when Armenian commissioners demanded it openly and strongly, there was no room for them to accept the Turkish commissioners' empathy. I learned that hundreds of e-mail and telephone messages were forwarded from Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora to the Armenian commissioners, Armenian organizations, and Armenian media urging the Armenian commissioners not to weaken the international pressure on Turkey by creating a positive image of the Turkish participants, as well as Turks in general.*<sup>285</sup>

During the meeting TARC requested the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)<sup>286</sup> to decide the applicability of the 1948 "genocide" Convention to the events which occurred during the early twentieth century.<sup>287</sup> The ICTJ provided the report on February 4, 2003.<sup>288</sup> According to ICTJ report, The "genocide" Convention does not give any right to the make legal, financial, or territorial claims for events which occurred during the early twentieth century or at any time before January 12,

<sup>281</sup> Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, p. 24, 40, Çiçek, p. 11.

<sup>282</sup> Kamer Kasım, "III. Problems of Turkey and Azerbaijan with Armenia The Armenian Diaspora and Turkey-Armenia Relations", [http://www.eraren.org/bilgibankasi/en/index3\\_1\\_1.htm](http://www.eraren.org/bilgibankasi/en/index3_1_1.htm), (03.05.2016).

<sup>283</sup> Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, "Caucasus Report: April 15, 2004", 15.04.2004, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1341767.html>, (27.04.2016).

<sup>284</sup> Mandacı, pp. 253-254.

<sup>285</sup> Vamık, (Killing in the Name of Identity), p. 151.

<sup>286</sup> Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, p. 3.

<sup>287</sup> Tigran Mkrtchyan, "The role of NGOs in Turkey-Armenia Rapprochement", **Non-Traditional Security Threats and Regional Cooperation in the Southern Caucasus**, (Edit. Mustafa Aydın), The authors and IOS Press 2011, (The role of NGOs in Turkey-Armenia Rapprochement), p. 157.

<sup>288</sup> Armenian National Institute, "International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) Report Prepared for TARC", [http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.244/current\\_category.5/affirmation\\_detail.html](http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.244/current_category.5/affirmation_detail.html), (02.05.2016).

1951<sup>289</sup> because the legal definition of “genocide”<sup>290</sup> was established in the 1948 United Nations Convention.<sup>291</sup> On the other hand, the report also said that 1915 events included all of the four elements of the crime of “genocide” as defined in the Convention, and “legal scholars as well as historians, politicians, journalists and other people would be justified in continuing to so describe them”.<sup>292</sup> The ICTJ report did not satisfy the commission members of both sides.<sup>293</sup> On the contrary it made both parties more rigid about their stance. The Armenian members of the commission have declared their joint statement as a team early in August: *“There is no debate about the validity of the Armenian “genocide”; it is an internationally recognized fact. The Armenian “genocide” is not the only issue that divides Armenians and Turks. We intend to look at differences and areas of common ground.”*<sup>294</sup> Both sides protected their position strictly during the meetings. While the Armenians were insisting on the recognition of the events of 1915 as “genocide”, the Turkish side insistently accepted the events of 1915 painful and tragic events, not as “genocide”.<sup>295</sup>

TARC has started with good intentions, but it has failed. According to Mooradian, this was because the commission members of the TARC were chosen from the people who are trained to win such as lawyers, former ambassadors, and generals. However TARC needed impartial, skilled, and experienced practitioners in

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<sup>289</sup> The International Center For Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “The Applicability Of The United Nations Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of The Crime Of Genocide To Events Which Occurred During The Early Twentieth Century”, <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Turkey-Armenian-Reconciliation-2002-English.pdf>, (07.05.2016), (The Applicability Of The United Nations Convention), p. 8.

<sup>290</sup> According to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) article 2, the term “genocide” defines as: “...actions committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group..., including: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately” inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

<sup>291</sup> Dan Eshet, (Primary Writer), **Totally Unofficial: Raphael Lemkin and the Genocide Convention**, (Editors Adam Strom and the Facing History and Ourselves Staff), Facing History and Ourselves Foundation, USA, 2007, p. 1.

<sup>292</sup> The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), The Applicability Of The United Nations Convention, p. 17.

<sup>293</sup> Mandaci, p. 252.

<sup>294</sup> Khachatryan, Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission.

<sup>295</sup> Moorad Mooradian, “Reconciliation: A Case Study of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission”, **Working Paper**, No. 24, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution George Mason University, March 2004, p. 24.

the art of problem solving. So they did not find a solution because the members of the commission were far from being mediators.<sup>296</sup> Despite the prejudices of both sides and all the negativities<sup>297</sup>, TARC was the most successful icebreaking project in comparison with many other NGOs, such as The Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC).<sup>298</sup> Van Z. Krikorian, who participated in TARC from 2001 to 2004, also observed that TARC created a more positive atmosphere for the projects between Armenian and Turkish groups.<sup>299</sup> One official result of this atmosphere was that, in January 2002, Armenian citizens were allowed to obtain a visa at the airport while they were going to Turkey.<sup>300</sup>

The role played by international actors in the beginning and end of the TARC must be restated. According to Phillips, the administration of US wanted to pull the Turkish side to the American policies in the Middle East and the Caucasus. However, the attack of the September 11, 2001, and the Iraq war changed the priorities of the US. As the US has withdrawn its support as facilitator, the peace building efforts between Armenians and Turks failed.<sup>301</sup> To put it another way if the attack of the September 11, 2001, and the Iraq war had not happened, the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) could be continued by the insistence of the USA.

### 2.2.2. The Road to Football Diplomacy: Official Steps in the 2000s

Turkey under the Justice and Development Party pursued zero problems policy with the neighbors after 2003; adopting "*safety for all*" and "*freedom for all*" approaches.<sup>302</sup> In this context, on 3 June, Foreign Affairs Ministers Abdullah Gul and

<sup>296</sup> Mooradian, p. 24.

<sup>297</sup> Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, p. 1.

<sup>298</sup> Mkrtchyan, *The role of NGOs in Turkey-Armenia Rapprochement*, p. 156.

<sup>299</sup> Van Z. Krikorian, "Testimony", **Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe**, [http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewWitness&ContentRecord\\_id=1612&ContentRecordType=D&ContentRecordType=D&ParentType=H](http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewWitness&ContentRecord_id=1612&ContentRecordType=D&ContentRecordType=D&ParentType=H), (07.05.2016).

<sup>300</sup> European Stability Initiative, "Timeline: 1990-2007", [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story\\_ID=27&slide\\_ID=1](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story_ID=27&slide_ID=1), (12.06.2017), (Timeline: 1990-2007).

<sup>301</sup> Nicola Melloni, "Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation, The Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC)", Paris, December 2007, **Irenees**, [http://www.irenees.net/bdf\\_fiche-documentation-544\\_en.html](http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-documentation-544_en.html), (02.05.2016).

<sup>302</sup> Talha Köse, "Türk Dış Politikasının Ortadoğu'daki Yeni Kimliği ve Çatışma Çözümlerini Keşfi", **Türk Dış Politikası Yıllığı 2010**, SETA Yayınları, Ekim 2011, pp. 637-638.

Vardan Oskanian met in Madrid during a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) foreign ministers summit. Second meeting between the two foreign ministers took place on September 25, 2003 in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session. After the meeting Oskanian said that there were "*no practical results*" but he called the meeting an "*important circumstance*."<sup>303</sup> Although the initiatives of the foreign ministers of Turkey and Armenia did not end up with the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border, on October 16, 2003, air traffic of commercial flights between Istanbul and Yerevan started.<sup>304</sup>

On April 10, 2005, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan sent a letter to the Armenian President proposing that the two countries establish a commission of historians. After proposing the history commission, Erdogan expressed his condolences to the grandchildren of Armenians who lost their lives at the beginning of the 20th century.<sup>305</sup> Armenian President Robert Kocharian's replied the Turkish Prime Minister's letter, on April 26, 2005. Kocharian's letter put forward the proposal of "establishing an intergovernmental commission to discuss and resolve the problems with compromise".<sup>306</sup>

In March 2007, as a conflict-building gesture, the government of Turkey has opened Akhtamar Church in the Lake of Van in Turkey to serve as a memorial museum.<sup>307</sup> This gesture required a restoration work that costed 1.5 million

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<sup>303</sup> The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, "Armenian, Turkish Foreign Ministers Meet", 29.09.2003, <http://cacianalyst.org/publications/news-digest/item/8456-news-digest-caci-analyst-2003-9-29-art-8456.html>, (21.11.2017)

<sup>304</sup> Serpil Yılmaz, "Ermenistan sınırı havadan açıldı...", 18.10.2003, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2003/10/18/yazar/yilmaz.html>, (28.05.2016).

<sup>305</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkish Prime Minister Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan published a message on the events of 1915", [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-prime-minister-mr\\_-recep-tayyip-erdogan-published-a-message-on-the-events-of-1915.en.mfa#](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-prime-minister-mr_-recep-tayyip-erdogan-published-a-message-on-the-events-of-1915.en.mfa#), (12.06.2017), (Turkish Prime Minister Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan published a message).

<sup>306</sup> The Turkish Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC), "Koçaryan'ın Mektubu", <http://www.tabdc.org/kocaryanin-mektubu/>, (12.06.2017).

<sup>307</sup> Haberlercom, "Akdamar Kilisesi Açıldı", <http://www.haberler.com/akdamar-kilisesi-acildi-haberi/>, (28.05.2016), A large majority of the citizens of the Republic of Armenia and the western Armenian diaspora are originally from Anatolia. They are the descendants of Armenians who survived the massacres of 1915 by fleeing Anatolia. So, Anatolia is seen as a homeland for most of the Armenian people. Turkey is a land that is visited with the purpose of bringing back a handful of soil. It is hardly possible to think of the Armenian identity without Mount Ararat, the ancient ruins of Ani, and the Church of island Akhtamar in the Lake Van. Çuhadar, Punsmann, p. 68.

dollars.<sup>308</sup> In 2007, "Cheese Diplomacy" has also begun between Armenian and Turkish cheese producers for the aim of mutual exchange of cheese recipes.<sup>309</sup>

On June 25, 2007, Oskaryan and Gul met in Istanbul during The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 15th anniversary summit. Oskanian reiterated Armenia's stance: a normalization of relations without any preconditions. Gul underscored Turkey's interest in a quick resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.<sup>310</sup> In June 2008, flights between Yerevan and Antalya were initiated as part of the normalization attempts.<sup>311</sup>

Developments in Southern Caucasus in the summer of 2008 gave a fresh impetus to the dialogue between the two countries, mediated by Switzerland. In August 2008, the Poti Port of Ossetia was damaged because of the Ossetia crisis which has erupted between Russia and Georgia.<sup>312</sup> Armenia was cut out from contact with the rest of the world until the end of the armed conflict. This development affected the Armenian economy very deeply since almost 80 percent of Armenia's imported goods passed through Georgia.<sup>313</sup> At this point, lifting the restrictions and allowing the Armenia to use the airspace of Turkey contributed to Armenia-Turkey rapprochement efforts positively.<sup>314</sup> Previously, for all flights between the two countries, Ankara was asked for political approval and then the flight was allowed, which caused anomalies and commercial loss.<sup>315</sup>

While the "zero-problem policy" of the Turkish government and the other positive developments contributed to the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement efforts, the Ossetia crisis also pushed the Armenian government to this way as a negative

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<sup>308</sup> International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, *Türkiye Ve Ermenistan: Kalıpları Kırarak*, p. 32.

<sup>309</sup> Çuhadar, Punsmann, pp. 48-49.

<sup>310</sup> European Stability Initiative, *Timeline: 1990-2007*.

<sup>311</sup> Deniz Zeyrek, "Uçuşlar sessiz sedasız başladı...", **Radikal**, 30 06 2008, <http://www.airporthaber.com/atlasglobal-haberleri/ucuslar-sessiz-sedasiz-basladi-3631h.html>, (19.02.2017).

<sup>312</sup> Aslan Yavuz Şir, "Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri ve Think-Tank Etkisi: Düşünce Kuruluşu Raporlarında Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri Algısı", **Ermeni Araştırmaları**, 2009, Sayı33-34, p. 192.

<sup>313</sup> Bulent Aras "A New Era In Turkish-Armenian Relations", September 2009, [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/A\\_new\\_era\\_in\\_Turkish-Armenian\\_relations.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/A_new_era_in_Turkish-Armenian_relations.pdf), (19.05.2016).

<sup>314</sup> International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, *Türkiye Ve Ermenistan: Kalıpları Kırarak*, p. 1.

<sup>315</sup> Dünya Bülteni, "Türkiye Ermenistan'a hava sahasını açtı", 26.09.2008, <http://www.dunyabulteni.net/amerika/54006/turkiye-ermenistana-hava-sahasini-acti>, (06.06.2017)

incentive.<sup>316</sup> The Russian-Georgian crisis had a devastating impact on the already deteriorating Armenian economy.<sup>317</sup> As aforementioned before by the Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian on April 14, 2005, Armenia had lost \$ 1 billion due to closed border between Armenia and Turkey.<sup>318</sup>

Under these conditions, in July 2008, President of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, invited the president of Turkey, Abdullah Gul, to watch the World Cup qualifying match between Armenian and Turkish national teams. On September 6, 2008, Gul visited Armenia to watch the football match, as the first president of Turkey who visited Armenia.<sup>319</sup> While the visit was welcomed by the opposition leader and former president Ter-Petrosian, it was protested by the Armenian Dashnaksutiun Party.<sup>320</sup> There was a broader discontent regarding the visit among the opposition in Turkey. Deniz Baykal, the chairman of the main opposition party, Republican People's Party (CHP), asked president Gul *"Has Armenia recognized the boundaries of Turkey and gave up the "genocide" rhetoric? Are they withdrawing from the occupied Karabakh territory? If not, why did you go to Armenia?"* Representing the nationalist wing, the Nationalist Movement Party's (MHP) chairman Devlet Bahçeli, expressed that *"this visit was at the cost of Turkey's honor and an example of historical blindness".*<sup>321</sup> Rapprochement continued despite these objections. At the end of this visit, Gul also invited Armenia's President Sargsyan to Turkey for the aim of watching the next qualifying game of the two national teams.<sup>322</sup> On October 14, 2009 four days after signing of protocols between two countries, which will be analyzed in the next section, Armenia's President Sargsyan also visited Turkey. Both

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<sup>316</sup> Minasyan, Prospects for Normalization, p. 27.

<sup>317</sup> Bülent Aras, Fatih Özbay, "Turkish-Armenian Relations: Will Football Diplomacy Work?", **SETA Policy Brief**, No: 24, SETA Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research, September 2008, p. 3.

<sup>318</sup> Selçuk Ural, Güzin Çaykiran, "Robert Koçaryan Dönemi Ermenistan Dış Politikası", **Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi**, Sayı 8, Sonbahar 2011, p. 128.

<sup>319</sup> Hurriyet, "Turkey beats Armenia in a historic game attended by both leaders", 06 09 2008, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkey-beats-armenia-in-a-historic-game-attended-by-both-leaders-9834510>, (28.05.2016).

<sup>320</sup> Radio Free Europe, "Turkish, Armenian Presidents Express Hope after Historic Meeting in Yerevan", 06 09 2008, [https://www.rferl.org/a/Turkish\\_President\\_Arrives\\_Armenia/1196840.html](https://www.rferl.org/a/Turkish_President_Arrives_Armenia/1196840.html), (12.06.2017).

<sup>321</sup> European Stability Initiative (ESI), "Gerçeklerle Yüzleşmek. Ermenistan, Türkiye ve Soykırım Tartışması", 21.04.2009, Berlin, İstanbul, Erivan, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=tr&id=156&document\\_ID=110](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=tr&id=156&document_ID=110), (21.02.2017).

<sup>322</sup> President of the Republic of Armenia, "Visit Of President Of The Republic Of Turkey Abdullah Gul To The Republic Of Armenia", 06.09.2008, <http://www.president.am/en/foreign-visits/item/2008/09/06/news-21/>, (19.05.2016).

presidents watched the football match between Armenia and Turkey together in Bursa.<sup>323</sup> Although this process was supported by America, European Union and Russia, there were anti-process groups in Turkey and Armenia including opposition parties in Turkey.<sup>324</sup>

### 2.2.3. Protocols Signed in 2009

All of the developments noted above contributed to a process of negotiations initiated in 2007 by Switzerland, which ended with the signing of two protocols between the two countries in Zurich in October 10, 2009. After two years of secret negotiations in Switzerland, Armenia and Turkey announced that they prepared a road map for the normalization of the relations between the two countries on April 22, 2009:

*“Turkey and Armenia, together with Switzerland as mediator, have been working intensively with a view to normalizing their bilateral relations and developing them in a spirit of good-neighborliness, and mutual respect, and thus to promoting peace, security and stability in the whole region.*

*The two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road-map has been identified.”<sup>325</sup>*

Protocols were signed by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian<sup>326</sup> in the presence of Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton.<sup>327</sup> The first protocol was named as *“The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Turkey and The Republic of Armenia”*. As its name suggests, the first

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<sup>323</sup> European Stability Initiative (ESI), “Key dates in Armenia-Turkey relations 2008-2010”, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=322&debate\\_ID=5&slide\\_ID=2](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=322&debate_ID=5&slide_ID=2), (28.05.2016).

<sup>324</sup> Ivan Watson, “Armenian leader in Turkey for 'soccer diplomacy'”, CNN, 14.10.2009, <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/10/14/turkey.armenia.soccer.diplomacy/>, (21.02.2017), (Armenian leader in Turkey for 'soccer diplomacy').

<sup>325</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “No: 56, 22 April 2009, Joint Statement of The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Turkey, The Republic of Armenia and The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs”, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no\\_-56\\_-22-april-2009\\_-press-release-regarding-the-turkish-armenian-relations.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-56_-22-april-2009_-press-release-regarding-the-turkish-armenian-relations.en.mfa), (12.06.2017).

<sup>326</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Ermenistan Cumhuriyeti Arasında Diplomatik İlişkilerin Kurulmasına Dair Protokol”, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site\\_media/html/zurih-protokolleri-en.pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/zurih-protokolleri-en.pdf), (03.04.2016).

<sup>327</sup> Watson, Armenian leader in Turkey for 'soccer diplomacy'.

protocol aimed at establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. The parties were going to develop good neighborly relations for the benefit of the people of the two countries based on equality, and cooperate in political, economic and cultural spheres. It was stated that they will respect international agreements in bilateral relations and respect the principles of territorial integrity and immunity of borders. The first protocol also included issues such as establishing a trusting environment between the two countries, resolving problems peacefully, avoiding terrorism and violence, and protecting human rights and freedoms. It was stated that the border between the two countries will be opened, and diplomatic representations will be established in the two countries.

The second protocol was named as “*Development of relations between The Republic of Turkey and The Republic of Armenia.*” Both sides aimed to develop mutual relations on the basis of respect and trust. They decided to develop relations in political, economic, energy, transport, scientific, technical, cultural and other fields, in the common interests of the two countries. They also aimed to develop international co-operation within the framework of the UN, OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organizations. Peaceful resolution of regional and international conflicts on the basis of international legal principles and norms, was emphasized. They also stressed cooperation in fighting against terrorism, transnational organized crime, drug and weapons smuggling.

If the protocols were approved by the states, following steps would be taken.

1. The opening of the border between the two countries within two months of the entry into force of the Protocol,
2. Regular consultation of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries,
3. Formation of a working group under the chairmanship of the ministries of foreign affairs 2 months after the protocol has entered into force to carry out the above mentioned studies,
4. Establishment of some sub-commissions such as a sub-commission as to an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations, a sub-commission on legal



matters, a sub-commission on science and education, a sub-commission on trade, tourism and economic cooperation and etc.

For Turkey, the rapprochement was the chance to improve its image and its relations with the Western allies. Turkey would improve its image in Brussels and Washington.<sup>328</sup> Since the closed border and the absence of diplomatic ties had left Turkey vulnerable to external pressures from the US and the EU. On the other hand, Turkey would have an opportunity to pursue proactive foreign policy goals. It would have an opportunity to increase its regional competencies thanks to official ties with a neighboring country.<sup>329</sup> Protocols between Turkey and Armenia would not only improve relations between the two countries, but would also facilitate the elimination of the problems in the Caucasus and Black Sea basin on behalf of Ankara. Therefore, Turkey would strengthen the position in the Caucasus.<sup>330</sup>

For Armenia, rapprochement was important for security and economic needs.<sup>331</sup> Since Russia Georgia war demonstrated to Armenia how vulnerable its position was and served to speed up the rapprochement with Turkey.<sup>332</sup> As Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Caucasus Institute in Yerevan, noted, even though about 70 percent of Armenia's trade is with Europe, there is no rail link with the West.<sup>333</sup>

However, these protocols are not signed only with the request of Armenia and Turkey but also upon an active involvement of Russia, France, United States and Switzerland.<sup>334</sup> It is important to underline this external factor, to be able to understand the fragility and inconclusiveness of the protocols. It was a unique moment, in which all major global and regional actors had an interest in

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<sup>328</sup> Alexander Iskandaryan and Sergey Minasyan, **Pragmatic Policies vs. Historical Constraints: Analyzing Armenia-Turkey Relations**, Caucasus Institute Research Papers, 01.01.2010, Caucasus Institute, Yerevan, 2010, p.17.

<sup>329</sup> Aybars Görgülü, Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement? **Insight Turkey** Vol. 11, No. 2, 2009 (Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?), pp. 28-29.

<sup>330</sup> Fatih Özbay, **Türkiye-Ermenistan İlişkileri**, Bilgesam, Rapor No: 25, 2011, p. 7.

<sup>331</sup> Minasyan, Prospects for Normalization, pp. 28-29.

<sup>332</sup> Gunter and Rohtus, p. 159.

<sup>333</sup> Jeremy Bransten and Charles Rechnagel (2008) "The Outbreak of 'Football Diplomacy'", Radio Free Europe, 05.09.2008., [https://www.rferl.org/a/Outbreak\\_Football\\_Diplomacy/1196718.html](https://www.rferl.org/a/Outbreak_Football_Diplomacy/1196718.html), (05.06.2017).

<sup>334</sup> Roman Muzalevsky, "The Armenia-Turkey Protocols: Tactical Cooperation in the Shadow of Eurasian Strategic Competition", 11.11.2009, **The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute**, <https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/11942-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2009-11-11-art-11942.html>, (23.02.2017).

rapprochement at the same time. The Armenian “genocide” issue came to America’s political agenda due to the Obama’s election campaign which promised to the American-Armenian community the recognition of the “genocide” if he would be elected. However, US federal foreign policy has been traditionally against the recognition of “genocide” since this decision could push the Armenian-Turkish relations to a deadlock position. Yet, the US has always pursued an active foreign policy by supporting Caucasus region economically and technically. The EU also had desires as to Caucasus region as well, although with a less developed strategy.<sup>335</sup> In this period the “genocide” issue and Turkey Armenia sealed border was criticized by Brussels as part of a greater Caucasus policy.<sup>336</sup> Another important aspect was the inclusion of Armenia in the European Neighborhood Policy. This situation indicates that the EU puts great emphasis on good neighborhood relations in the South Caucasus.<sup>337</sup> Energy security, Euro-Atlantic integration, open borders, liberal economies, reducing security risks, smuggling, terrorism, and conflict resolution in the Caucasus region are vital for the EU.<sup>338</sup> With the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations, South Caucasus and Europe would be integrated more and peace and stability in the region would be provided.<sup>339</sup>

On the other hand, although Turkey and Russia had different perspective on issues related to the South Caucasus especially Nagorno-Karabakh issue and energy issues, their relations have improved remarkably in the 2000s. Russia has been the largest trading partner of Turkey. The volume of bilateral trade reached USD 38 billion in 2008 and number one provider of natural gas with more than 60 percent.<sup>340</sup> However, Turkey’s traditional commitment to the West is a problem for Russia. That is why in this period Armenian leaders made an attempt to convince Kremlin that rapprochement between Yerevan and Ankara would not cause any detriment to Russian-Armenian relations in the military and political spheres.<sup>341</sup> Turkish diplomacy was also aware that Russia could block the process or pressurize on the

<sup>335</sup> Aybars Görgülü, *Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?*, p. 26.

<sup>336</sup> Minasyan, *Prospects for Normalization*, p. 22.

<sup>337</sup> Görgülü, *Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?*, p. 28.

<sup>338</sup> Aybars Görgülü and Onnik Krikorian, “Türkiye’nin Güney Kafkasya Politikası: Devlet ve Sivil Toplum Aktörlerinin Rolü”, TESEV, Dış Politika Programı, Ekim 2012, p. 7.

<sup>339</sup> Görgülü and Krikorian, p. 4.

<sup>340</sup> Meliha Benli Altunisik, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century”, **CIDOB International Yearbook**, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2011, p. 199.

<sup>341</sup> Iskandaryan and Minasyan, p.10.

Armenian authorities. For this reason, Turkey was very cautious in the movements it made. Ankara was trying to persuade Moscow that the rapprochement would not weaken Russia's role or interests in the Caucasus. Moreover, the Turkish side was emphasizing that Turkey's Caucasian policies were independent of the West and the US. After signing the Turkish-Armenian protocols on 31 August, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement expressing a positive attitude to the normalization process.<sup>342</sup> Some researchers even claim that Russia did not intervene in the Armenian Turkish dialogue process, but rather encouraged it.<sup>343</sup>

So, the protocols signed between Armenia and Turkey was supported by the US, Russia and the European Union without any preconditions.<sup>344</sup> Iran kept its distance from the Armenia-Turkey developments. Azerbaijan was the only country which remained opposed to Armenian-Turkish normalization since Azerbaijan believed that the normalization of Armenia and Turkey would strengthen the hand of Armenia in Nagorno Karabakh conflict.<sup>345</sup>

The Armenian government sent the protocols to the Constitutional Court according to the Armenian law. After verification by the court they could be sent to the Armenian National Assembly to ratify them. On the other side, the Turkish government sent the protocols to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey immediately after signing.<sup>346</sup> In January 12, 2010, almost three months later, the Armenian Constitutional Court made a decision about protocols. According to the decision of the court, the protocols would be valid when the mutual diplomatic relations started and the close border was opened. And also the court decided that the international commission which would be established for the aim of historical examination of the events of 1915 was not needed because of the reality of the "genocide".<sup>347</sup> According to Turkey, the Armenian Constitutional Court decision was unfavorable and it aimed to put forward the recognition of Armenian claims as a

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<sup>342</sup> Maciej Falkowski, "Turkey's game for the Caucasus", **OSW Commentary**, Issue 29, The Centre for Eastern Studies (CES), 2009, p. 4.

<sup>343</sup> Iskandaryan and Minasyan, p.10.

<sup>344</sup> Ömer Engin Lütem, "Türkiye-Ermenistan İlişkilerinin Güncel Durumu", **Yeni Türkiye** 60, 2014, p. 39, <http://haypedia.com/makale/Osmanl%C4%B1%20Tarihi/15839b92-ab79-46c6-b386-a48f0d4f815e.pdf>, (11.06.2017).

<sup>345</sup> Minasyan, Prospects for Normalization, pp. 22-23.

<sup>346</sup> Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, "Türkiye-Ermenistan Siyasi İlişkileri", <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ermenistan-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>, (03.04.2016).

<sup>347</sup> Yelda Demirağ, "2015'e bir kala Türkiye-Ermenistan İlişkileri", **Ermeni Araştırmaları Dört Aylık, Tarih, Politika ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi** 2014, Sayı 47, p. 77.

precondition.<sup>348</sup> So, the Turkish Foreign Ministry made a statement about the decision of the protocols of Armenian Constitutional Court: *"It has been observed that this decision contains preconditions and restrictive provisions that impair the objective and spirit of the protocols.... this approach cannot be accepted on our part."*<sup>349</sup> While Armenia withdrew the Protocols from Parliament in February 2015, Turkey's Protocols are still on the agenda of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.<sup>350</sup>

In conclusion, the Armenian-Turkish protocols were initially perceived as a chance by many people from both sides. They believed that these protocols would initiate the economic relations which had been restricted by the close border for years.<sup>351</sup> However, this wasn't achieved because of the mutual objections from both sides. Perhaps the process was too much "enforced" and the political and popular environment was not prepared. The overlapping interest and determination of domestic and external actors also eroded in the 2010s, upon such developments as the Arab Spring, Syrian civil war, political crises in Turkey (Gezi protests, Gulen-Erdogan split and Gulenist coup attempt, rise of PKK and ISIS terror), and the deterioration in Turkey-West relations. Normalization of relations has been postponed to an unspecified date.<sup>352</sup> Yet, based on this experience, conflict resolution may be achieved by Armenia and Turkey's own will and "mediation" of third parties in the future. Despite everything the football diplomacy and protocol efforts have also been very valuable as they deepened and widened the dialogue channels between Armenian and Turkish civil society activist, journalists, academics, businessmen and so on.<sup>353</sup> Those channels will be described and evaluated in the third chapter.

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<sup>348</sup> Emine Akçadağ Alagöz, "24 Nisan Yaklaşırken Ermenistan Türkiye İlişkilerinde Son Durum", 10.02.2010, <http://www.bilgesam.org/incele/887/-24-nisan-yaklasirken-ermenistan---turkiye-iliskilerinde-son-durum/#.V0mrqjWLTIU>, (28.05.2016).

<sup>349</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "No: 14, 18 January 2010, Press Release Regarding the Recently Published Grounds of the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court on the Protocols Between Turkey and Armenia", [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no\\_-14\\_-18-january-2010\\_-press-release-regarding-the-recently-published-grounds-of-the-decision-of-the-armenian-constitutional-court-on-the-protocols-between-turkey-and-armenia.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-14_-18-january-2010_-press-release-regarding-the-recently-published-grounds-of-the-decision-of-the-armenian-constitutional-court-on-the-protocols-between-turkey-and-armenia.en.mfa), (28.05.2016).

<sup>350</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Relations between Turkey and Armenia", <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-armenia%20.en.mfa>, (06.06.2017).

<sup>351</sup> Minasyan, Prospects for Normalization, p. 22.

<sup>352</sup> Çiçek, p. 12.

<sup>353</sup> Memişoğlu, p. 2.

### 2.3. CURRENT SITUATION IN BILATERAL RELATIONS

Currently Armenia and Turkey have still no diplomatic relations. Armenia accelerated its efforts to establish “genocide” in the world with the help of Diaspora. On occasion of the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of April 24, the Turkish side adopted a positive discourse about the 1915 events. Prime Minister Erdogan’s official message on the events of 1915 stated that

*“The 24th of April carries a particular significance for our Armenian citizens and for all Armenians around the world, and provides a valuable opportunity to share opinions freely on a historical matter...” “Any conscientious, fair and humanistic approach to these issues requires an understanding of all the sufferings endured in this period, without discriminating as to religion or ethnicity.” “The incidents of the First World War are our shared pain. To evaluate this painful period of history through a perspective of just memory is a humane and scholarly responsibility...” “It is our hope and belief that the peoples of an ancient and unique geography, who share similar customs and manners will be able to talk to each other about the past with maturity and to remember together their losses in a decent manner. And it is with this hope and belief that we wish that the Armenians who lost their lives in the context of the early twentieth century rest in peace, and we convey our condolences to their grandchildren.”<sup>354</sup>*

This message was not quite welcomed by Armenians. Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan said that from 1915-23 Armenians “were killed simply because they were Armenians”.

*“The crime [was] designed minutely and in advance [and] pursued a clear goal: to take possession of the home country, the property and the millennium-old heritage by exterminating the native people living there. By this they committed a monstrous crime seeking to once and forever annihilate Armenians as a political factor”.*

The President added, “We are convinced that the denial of a crime constitutes the direct continuation of that very crime. Only recognition and condemnation can prevent the repetition of such crimes in the future”.<sup>355</sup>

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<sup>354</sup> The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Prime Minister Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan published a message.

<sup>355</sup> Centenary News, “Turkish PM offers “condolences” for the “events of 1915”, while Armenia accuses Ankara of “genocide denial”, 07.05.2014, <http://www.centenarynews.com/article?id=1635>, (12.06.2017).

Aram Hamparian the executive director of Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) criticized Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's statement on the "events of 1915". For him, *"Increasingly isolated internationally, Ankara is repackaging its 'genocide' denials."*<sup>356</sup>

In 2016, some events negatively influenced the relations. The first event is the "Four Day War", which erupted unexpectedly between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh region in April 2-6, 2016. More than 30 soldiers from both sides were killed.<sup>357</sup> Turkey gave quickly its unconditional support for Azerbaijan against Armenia.<sup>358</sup> President Recep Tayyip stated in April 4, 2016 that *"We are today standing side-by-side with our brothers in Azerbaijan. But this persecution will not continue forever. Karabakh will one day return to its original owner. It will be Azerbaijan's"*.<sup>359</sup> One day later Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu made a similar declaration:

*"The whole world needs to know that Turkey will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Azerbaijan against Armenian aggression and occupation until the end of time." ... "Each soldier martyred in Azerbaijan is our martyr. We will stand by Azerbaijan until all of its land, including Karabakh, is liberated"*<sup>360</sup>

The second event that impeded Armenia-Turkey rapprochement is the recognition of 1915 events as "genocide" by the German Parliament on June 2, 2016.<sup>361</sup> In response Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım blamed a "racist Armenian

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<sup>356</sup> The Armenian Weekly, "ANCA: Erdogan Statement is Denial Repackaged", 23.04.2014, <http://armenianweekly.com/2014/04/23/anca-erdogan-statement-denial-repackaged/>, (12.06.2017).

<sup>357</sup> Guy Taylor, "Azerbaijan, Armenia fight over disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory", **The Washington Times**, 03.04.2016, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/3/azerbaijan-armenia-fight-over-disputed-nagorno-kar/>, (09.07.2016).

<sup>358</sup> Luke Coffey, "Nagorno-Karabakh is not a localised conflict", 06.04.2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/04/nagorno-karabakh-localised-conflict-armenia-azerbaijan-160406081258222.html>, (09.07.2016).

<sup>359</sup> Hürriyet Daily News, "Turkey backs Azerbaijan in conflict with Armenia", 05.04.2016, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-backs-azerbaijan-in-conflict-with-armenia.aspx?pageID=238&nID=97338&NewsCatID=510>, (09.07.2016), (Turkey backs Azerbaijan in conflict with Armenia).

<sup>360</sup> TRTWorld, "Davutoglu says Turkey stands by Azerbaijan in Karabakh conflict", 05.04.2016, <http://www.trtworld.com/europe/davutoglu-says-turkey-stands-by-azerbaijan-in-karabakh-conflict-82608>, (09.07.2016); Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey backs Azerbaijan in conflict with Armenia.

<sup>361</sup> Curt Mills, Staff Writer, "German Parliament Calls Armenian Deaths 'Genocide' The vote has wide-ranging implications, from Turkey's EU bid to fighting the Islamic State group.", 02.06.2016, <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-06-02/armenian-genocide-germanys-parliament-weighs-in-on-1915-events>, (09.07.2016).

lobby".<sup>362</sup> President Erdogan also strongly reacted to the diaspora and the German parliament:

*"The Armenian issue is being used all over the world as a convenient blackmail against Turkey. It has even started to be used as a stick, ... Here we see a problem of sincerity. You keep leveling the same accusation at Turkey again and again while also turning your back on our proposal that would shed light on the issue. I once again say we know very well that this issue has nothing to do with defending the rights of Armenians. This is just a tool of manipulation. I hope Armenians also notice this fact and stop letting themselves be abused,"*<sup>363</sup>

On the other side Edward Nalbandian the Foreign Minister of Armenia saw this issue as a "valuable contribution" to the "international recognition and condemnation of the Armenian genocide"<sup>364</sup> Each side now seems to have reverted to its traditional perspective. Armenians regard the recognition of "genocide" as a precondition, and they generally perceive Turkey as a powerful country that limits their movements and increases the fear or widespread feeling of insecurity in Armenia.<sup>365</sup> On the other hand, Turks regard the termination of occupation of Azerbaijani lands as a precondition for opening the border, and perceive "genocide" claims as blackmail. It may be said that both of them are waiting for each other's step.

In conclusion, today there is a combination of constructive and destructive elements in the relation between Armenians and Turks. Although the official diplomatic efforts of the 2000s provided an accumulation of cooperative behavior and constituted a valuable roadmap for normalization of relations, they remained inadequate. This inadequacy mostly stems from the fact that these efforts were largely a result of other strategic calculations by both parties as well as third parties. The result was fragile and inconclusive, as seen in the protocols. Civil society activities in both countries are very important as a factor that can change this situation and enable the two countries to establish a permanent relationship. Mutual recognition and understanding between the two communities can trivialize today's

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<sup>362</sup> BBC News, "German MPs recognise Armenian 'genocide' amid Turkish fury", 02.06.2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36433114>, (09.07.2016), (German MPs recognise Armenian 'genocide' amid Turkish fury).

<sup>363</sup> Presidency Of The Republic Of Turkey, "Armenian issue is being used as a convenient blackmail against Turkey", 04.06.2016, <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/44275/armenian-issue-is-being-used-as-a-convenient-blackmail-against-turkey.html>, (09.07.2016).

<sup>364</sup> BBC News, German MPs recognise Armenian 'genocide' amid Turkish fury.

<sup>365</sup> Gültekin, Opening Of Turkish Armenian Border, p. 11.

impenetrable obstacles. Indeed, both domestic actors and major powers like the United States and the European Union seem aware of the inadequacy of official diplomacy. Thus, in recent years, civil society projects and efforts to fund “Track Two” diplomacy have increased. The next chapter will provide an analysis of those civil society efforts in both countries.





## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **A STUDY ON NON-DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN TURKEY FOR THE TURKISH-ARMENIAN RECONCILIATION**

Despite the current setback in official diplomacy between Armenia and Turkey, many civil society projects are being conducted in a lot of different fields, mostly carried out with the support of the European Union. In this chapter, the work of eight organizations, four of which are from Armenia and four from Turkey, supported by the European Union under the "Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process Support Program" has been dealt with. Also the activities of four organizations which are not included in the European Union support program but carry out valuable work to improve the relations between Armenia and Turkey, have been examined. Firstly, the activities of each organization relevant to our topic will be briefly introduced. Then, based on interviews with representatives of these organizations, their activities' contribution to reconciliation will be evaluated.

#### **3.1. CURRENT NON-DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS**

Turkish-Armenian relations have been frozen for a long time. The 1915 events, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the closed border between Armenia and Turkey are the reasons of this situation. In addition to these reasons, a realist approach in foreign policy, which considers state as the only actor and achieving superiority as the most important goal, has restricted the mutual relations. However with the recent revival of liberalism, economic cooperation, rather than political supremacy, and person-to-person contacts that occur at many levels such as between students, businesspeople, and tourists have become more significant in international relations.

Despite the closed border and the diplomatic disconnection between the Armenian and Turkish states, the peoples of both countries have become inclined to get to know each other and get closer through civil society organizations. Cooperation and mutual interaction have also been effective for the solution of the Armenian-Turkish conflict. In 1997, the Armenian Business Development Council of

Turkey (TABDC) was established for the development of commercial relations and the resolution of the Armenian-Turkish conflict. TABDC aims to improve trade. However, it was also effective on politics. Then, in 2001, the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) was established under the leadership of the United States. In the years that followed, the US government financed the Non-diplomatic activities aimed at resolving the Armenian-Turkish conflict. Thanks to this support, Non-diplomatic works between the two countries have increased significantly.<sup>366</sup>

In addition to American support, the European Union (EU) also encouraged the Non-diplomatic projects of the civil societies. So, the EU funded “The Armenia Turkey Normalization Process Support Program” on January 2014.<sup>367</sup> Béla Szombati, chargé d'affaires<sup>368</sup> of the Delegation of the European Union explains the aim of the program as below:

*“Bilateral relations between Turkey and Armenia have been deadlocked since 1993. The signature of bilateral protocols in 2009 was an important step forward towards normalisation of relations between the two countries that was not followed through. With this programme, the EU aims to support, in an innovative and wide-ranging manner, the efforts civil society is making towards the normalisation of relations through enhancing people-to-people contacts, expanding economic and business links, promoting cultural and educational activities, and facilitating dissemination of balanced information.”<sup>369</sup>*

In this direction, “The Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process Support Program” includes some activities in the two countries for the young people, journalists, teachers, artists, architects and entrepreneurs of cross-border cooperation. Research on business and economic opportunities is also a major task of the program.<sup>370</sup> The most common activities are: “interactive workshops,” “exchange

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<sup>366</sup> Esra Çuhadar, Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, Reflecting on the Two Decades of Bridging the Divide: Taking Stock of Turkish-Armenian Civil Society Activities, TEPAV Yayınları, Ankara, Ocak 2012, p. 25.

<sup>367</sup> European Union Initiative, “EU-funded programme Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process presents its achievements”, 03.04.2015, <http://www.armenia-turkey.net/en/programme-achievements>, (03.07.2016).


<sup>368</sup> Chargé d'affaires: a diplomatic official who temporarily takes the place of an ambassador.

<sup>369</sup> European Union Initiative, “EU-funded programme 'Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process' was presented in Ankara”, 23.10.2014, <http://armenia-turkey.net/en/news-public-presentation-ankara>, (09.06.2017).

<sup>370</sup> European Union Initiative, “Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process Kicks Off”, 01.05.2014, <http://www.armenia-turkey.net/en/Support-to-the-Armenia-Turkey-Normalisation-Proces>, (15.12.2016).

programs,” “cultural projects,” and “academic seminars and conferences” (See Figure 6).<sup>371</sup>

**Figure 6:** Types of Projects.



Source: Esra Çuhadar, Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, Reflecting on the Two Decades of Bridging the Divide: Taking Stock of Turkish-Armenian Civil Society Activities, TEPAV Yayınları, Ankara, 2012, p. 29

Currently eight non-governmental organizations take part in “The Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process Support Program” that started in January 2014.<sup>372</sup> Anadolu Kultur, the Hrant Dink Foundation, The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), and Citizens’ Assembly are the consortium members from Turkey. On the other hand, the Civilitas Foundation (CF), the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), the Public Journalism Club (PJC), and the Regional Studies Center (RSC) are the Consortium members from Armenia. In the next subsections, their activities regarding the reconciliation between Turkish and Armenian peoples will be introduced.

In addition to the European Union (EU) support program, four other unaffiliated non-governmental organizations which work to develop Armenia-Turkey

<sup>371</sup> Çuhadar, Punsmann, p. 17.

<sup>372</sup> Avrupa Birliği Türkiye Delegasyonu, “Ermenistan-Türkiye Normalleşme Süreci Destek Programı”, <http://avrupa.info.tr/tr/etkinlik-takvimi/etkinlik-takvimi-single-view/article/-4afef29cde.html>, (03.07.2016).

relations are the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), the Global Political Trends Center (GPOT), Istanbul Kültür University, The Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), and the Turkish–Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC). Their relevant work will also be introduced.

### **3.1.1. The Non-diplomatic Activities of Anadolu Kultur Foundation**

Anadolu Kultur Foundation was established in 2002 with the aim of supporting art in cities outside Istanbul. Its works regarding Armenia-Turkey began in 2005 with the idea of developing relations between the two countries. Cultural and artistic cooperation initiated by The Anadolu Kultur Foundation with non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and independent artists from Armenia continue today. Anadolu Kultur believes that mutual understanding and inter-communal dialogue can develop through the sharing of art. With this belief, it organizes concerts, exhibitions, art workshops, cinema and literary meetings in Armenia and in Turkey.

One of the projects is “Arts and Cultural Dialogue with Armenia”. It was initiated in 2005 for the aim of increasing the neighborhood relations between Armenia and Turkey. Since the programme’s launch in 2005, people from various fields, ages and social backgrounds have come together and found an opportunity experience each other’s daily life. The Arts and Cultural Dialogue with Armenia Project aims to support concerts, exhibitions, film and literature events and art workshops organized in both countries. The ultimate purpose of this project is the improvement of inter-communal dialogue steps towards the rapprochement of the two societies.<sup>373</sup>

Another project is “Creative Action and Public Intervention Workshop” and was held within the framework of the programme “Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process” funded by the European Union in Istanbul on March 26-31 2015. The workshop asked the participants to share their experiences together in

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<sup>373</sup> Anadolu Kultur “General Information”, <http://www.anadolukultur.org/en/about/general-information/3232>, (02.07.2016).

roundtable discussions during the six day workshop.<sup>374</sup> The workshop aimed to create a space of discussion about the current grassroots movements of Turkish and Armenian communities. During the workshop, roundtable discussions, field trips, workshop practices and presentations were held. At the end of the workshop; the participants had a chance to evaluate the activities of this project.<sup>375</sup>

“Anadolu Kultur's Female Minstrels Project” is also funded by the European Union within the framework of the programme Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process. “Anadolu Kultur's Female Minstrels Project” had three phases: first, the participants attended a concert in Yerevan's National Center for Chamber Music on May 26th, 2014. The second phase of the project was held in August in Istanbul and the last phase took place in Van on September 7th, 2014 before the sacrament in the Armenian Church of the Holy Cross on the Akhtamar Island in the city of Van. During the “Female Minstrels Project”, minstrels performed their traditional folk music. This music is associated with an oral history passed down from generation to generation and is still preserved in both Turkey and Armenia.<sup>376</sup>

“Exchange of Painters Program” was organized by the Public Journalism Club and Anadolu Kultur in cooperation. The program brought together four artists from each country. In the first step of the program the painters visited the cultural landmarks and arts centers in Yerevan in September 2014 and in the second step of the program they visited Istanbul in October 2014. The artists held ten master classes and organized open air sessions for sketching and painting in public spaces.<sup>377</sup>

“Speaking to One Another” is a project organized by Anadolu Kultur and some non-governmental organizations from Germany and Armenia and financed by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany. This project was initiated in August 2009 and continued until February 2013. It aimed to bring together young people from

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<sup>374</sup> Anadolu Kultur, “Call for Participants from Armenia and Turkey”, [http://www.anadolukultur.org/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/CfP\\_Creative%20Action%20&%20Public%20Intervention.pdf](http://www.anadolukultur.org/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/CfP_Creative%20Action%20&%20Public%20Intervention.pdf), (03.07.2016), p. 1.

<sup>375</sup> Armenia-Turkey, “Creative Action and Public Intervention Workshop”, 07.04.2015, <http://armenia-turkey.net/en/Creative-Action-and-Public-Intervention-News>, (03.07.2016).

<sup>376</sup> Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Armenia, “From Van to Yerevan Concert”, 25.05.2014, [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/press\\_corner/all\\_news/news/2014/20140525\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/20140525_en.htm), (03.07.2016).

<sup>377</sup> Armenia-Turkey, “Press Release: “Exchange of Painters” Project Kicks Off in Armenia”, 29.08.2014, <http://armenia-turkey.net/en/Exchange-of-Painters-press-release>, (03.07.2016).

both countries for improving mutual relations. In the first stage of the project a camp was organized in Armenia. During the camp, the young people from Armenia and Turkey received training on oral history and actively contributed to a research, which was later published. The second stage of the project was a summer camp held in Antakya, Turkey. The young people received a training to use photography and video equipment, on project management, and also had an opportunity to organize their own oral history projects after the camp. The aim of the third stage of the project was international circulation. During this stage participants from both sides joined two local history workshops held in Turkey and Armenia, and they explored the history of cities through oral history.<sup>378</sup>

“Van Project” is an Armenia-France centered civil society institution project supported by Anadolu Kultur Foundation. It consists of some young people aged 16-20, who carried out interviews in Anatolia with elderly citizens and local musicians. With this project, the participants attempted to find traditions of Armenians who lived in Anatolia. They held workshops with young people, and also performed concerts. This project aimed to bring some young participants aged 16-20 from Armenia and Turkey to establish a mutual dialogue.<sup>379</sup>

“The Armenia Turkey Youth Symphony Orchestra Project” was organized by Anadolu Kultur in July 2010. Young conservatory students from Armenia and Turkey had an opportunity to know each other and also had a chance to make music together. At the end of the project, the young participants declared that the problem existed only at the state level while music and musicians could be positive instruments for peace.<sup>380</sup>

The “Armenia Turkey Cinema Platform (ATCP)” is a production and communication platform which has been organized with the cooperation of the Golden Apricot Yerevan International Film Festival from Armenia and Anadolu

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<sup>378</sup> Anadolu Kultur, “Speaking to One Another”, <http://www.anadolukultur.org/en/areas-of-work/arts-and-cultural-dialogue-with-armenia/speaking-to-one-another/127>, (03.07.2016).

<sup>379</sup> Anadolu Kultur, “Van Project”, <http://www.anadolukultur.org/en/areas-of-work/arts-and-cultural-dialogue-with-armenia/van-project/129>, (03.07.2016).

<sup>380</sup> Anadolu Kültür, “Armenia-Turkey Youth Symphony Orchestra”, <http://www.anadolukultur.org/en/areas-of-work/arts-and-cultural-dialogue-with-armenia/armenia-turkey-youth-symphony-orchestra/128>, (04.07.2016).

Kultur Foundation from Turkey since 2008.<sup>381</sup> ATCP has been holding two meetings, one in Istanbul and one in Yerevan, annually since its establishment. It organizes workshops and provides funding for documentaries and short films. The participants had an opportunity to produce films together thanks to the Platform.”<sup>382</sup> The Platform organized 14 workshops in Istanbul and Yerevan. Approximately 200 filmmakers, directors, producers, film critics and scholars, actors and actresses and journalists came together in these workshops.<sup>383</sup>

### **3.1.2. The Non-diplomatic Activities of the Hrant Dink Foundation**

The Hrant Dink Foundation, founded in 2007, works to support the creative endeavors of children and young people to develop cultural relations between Turkey, Armenia and European societies, to support the democratization process of Turkey, to make nationalism- and racism-free history studies, and to collect articles, photographs and documents about Hrant Dink. For this purpose, the Hrant Dink Foundation publishes books, creates an archive, holds a summer school, organizes film, music, visual arts, dance and literature festivals and gives rewards in Hrant Dink's memory.<sup>384</sup>

One of Hrant Dink Foundation's projects is “Turkey-Armenia Travel Grant” program. It was initiated with the support of “The Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process Support Program” of the European Union. It offers travel support and fellowship opportunities to people from Armenia and Turkey.<sup>385</sup> Since the programme's launch in January 2014, “Turkey-Armenia Travel Grant” has received more interest than initially estimated from different regions of both countries and in

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<sup>381</sup> Anadolu Kültür, Ermenistan Türkiye Sinema Platformu, “Meeting of 2008”, <http://www.cinemaplatform.org/sayfa.aspx?PageId=178>, (04.07.2016).

<sup>382</sup> Anadolu Kültür, “Ermenistan-Türkiye Sinema Platformu (ETSP), 2008, İstanbul, Erivan, <http://www.anadolukultur.org/tr/calisma-alanlari/ermenistanla-kultur-sanat-diyalogu/ermenistan-turkiye-sinema-plattformu-etsp/44>, (04.07.2016).

<sup>383</sup> Ermenistan Türkiye Sinema Platformu, “What did we do?”, <http://www.cinemaplatform.org/en/about-project/what-did-we-do/38>, (04.07.2016).

<sup>384</sup> Hrant Dink Foundation, “Vision Mision”, <http://hrantdink.org/en/about-us/vission-mission>, (13.06.2017).

<sup>385</sup> Hrant Dink Foundation, “Armenia-Turkey Travel Grant Regulation, [http://hrantdink.org/picture\\_library/ATNP/TravelGrantRegulation\\_ENGs.pdf](http://hrantdink.org/picture_library/ATNP/TravelGrantRegulation_ENGs.pdf), (02.07.2016), p. 1, (Hrant Dink Foundation, “Armenia-Turkey Travel Grant Regulation,).

particular from Turkey.<sup>386</sup> 210 individuals from Armenia and Turkey traveled to the neighboring country between April 2014 and May 2015 thanks to the European Union funding.<sup>387</sup>

“Turkey-Armenia Travel Grant” was designed for non-profit civic initiatives and individuals. It aims to increase the grassroots level direct contacts and cooperation between the peoples of the two neighboring countries including the youth, university and high school students, non-governmental and professional organizations, local youth initiatives, students and teachers, academics, researchers, journalists, artists, sportsmen and sportswomen, businesses, and local authorities.<sup>388</sup>

“Grant Scheme for New Actors in the Dialogue Process” is carried out by a consortium of eight civil society organizations from Armenia and Turkey funded by EU, in which Hrant Dink is involved, for the aim of engaging new actors from both countries.<sup>389</sup> The Grant Scheme accepted 130 applicants (70 from Turkey, 60 from Armenia) working in various fields ranging from environment to women, from development to art, from education to business. According to the Grant Scheme, the participants from Armenia and Turkey may propose and implement awareness-raising activities for improving information flow through exchange and networking between media, expert communities and institutions.<sup>390</sup>

“The Turkey-Armenia Fellowship Scheme” project aims to enable cross-border learning opportunities and cooperation of professionals from Turkey and Armenia. 63 organizations from Turkey, 25 from Armenia in different areas such as academia, civil society, media, culture and arts, translation and language-learning

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<sup>386</sup> Beyondborders, “Dördüncü Dönem Seçim Sonuçları”, <http://www.armtr-beyondborders.org/en/travel-grant/fourth-round-selection-results/>, (02.07.2016).

<sup>387</sup> Beyondborders, “Travel Grant”, <http://www.armtr-beyondborders.org/en/travel-grant/>, (02.07.2016).

<sup>388</sup> Hrant Dink Foundation, “Armenia-Turkey Travel Grant Regulation”, p. 1.

<sup>389</sup> Hrant Dink Foundation, “Guidelines for Grant Applicants”, [http://hrantdink.org/picture\\_library/ATNP/GuidelinesforGrantApplicants\\_GrantScheme\\_Armenia-TurkeyNormalisationProcess.pdf](http://hrantdink.org/picture_library/ATNP/GuidelinesforGrantApplicants_GrantScheme_Armenia-TurkeyNormalisationProcess.pdf), (02.07.2016), p. 1.

<sup>390</sup> Eurosia Partnership Foundation, “EU-funded programme Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process presents its achievements”, 04.03.2015, <http://www.epfarmeria.am/eu-funded-programme-support-to-the-armenia-turkey-normalisation-process-presents-its-achievements/>, (03.07.2016), and Delegation of the European Union to Peru, “A Call for Proposals for the Grant Scheme within the framework of the programme Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process: Stage Two”, 12.07.2016, [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/peru/10311/-a-call-for-proposals-for-the-grant-scheme-within-the-framework-of-the-programme-support-to-the-armenia-turkey-normalisation-process-stage-two\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/peru/10311/-a-call-for-proposals-for-the-grant-scheme-within-the-framework-of-the-programme-support-to-the-armenia-turkey-normalisation-process-stage-two_en), (13.06.2017).



and law launched this program. From October 2014 to May 2015, 18 professionals from both countries participated in this program.<sup>391</sup>

### **3.1.3. The Non-diplomatic Activities of the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV)**

The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) is an institution established in 2004 for the purpose of making policy analysis and contributing to the policy design process. Some of the important works of TEPAV include its contributions to the constitutional work through the Constitutional Platform in 2012, and its leadership of the T20 subgroup that brought together think tanks and worked as an idea-production laboratory during the G20 presidency of Turkey in 2015.<sup>392</sup>

One of TEPAV's projects regarding Turkey-Armenia rapprochement is "The Economic Opportunity Analysis" meeting held in January 13, 2015. The aim was to evaluate the opportunities that may arise for the Turkish and Armenian economy circles for the aim of the cooperation and the stabilization of the region.<sup>393</sup> TEPAV aims to build confidence between the Armenian and Turkish businesses in the Information Communications Technologies (ICT) and tourism sectors through some joint projects with the Public Journalism Club (PJC) from Armenia.<sup>394</sup>

"The Exchange of Entrepreneurs Project" is one of the joint civil society activities of TEPAV and PJC. "The Exchange of Entrepreneurs Project" was funded by the European Union within the framework the programme "Support to the Armenia Turkey Normalisation Process." 12 entrepreneurs and 12 financiers from

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<sup>391</sup> Hrant Dink Foundation, "Turkey-Armenia Fellowship Scheme", 20.06.2014, <http://www.hrantdink.org/?Detail=1080&Activities=5&Lang=en>, (02.07.2016).

<sup>392</sup> Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), "What is TEPAV?", <http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/html/249/About+us/>, (13.06.2016).

<sup>393</sup> TEPAV, Türkiye ile Ermenistan Arasındaki Ekonomik Fırsatlar TEPAV'da Değerlendirildi, 13.02.2015, <http://www.tepav.org.tr/tr/haberler/s/3817>, (06.07.2016).

<sup>394</sup> Esen Çağlar, Ussal Şahbaz, Ali Sökmen, Feride İnan, İpek Beril Benli and İrem Kızılca. **Strengthening Connections And Business Synergies Between Turkey And Armenia Towards a Roadmap for Confidence Building Through Economic Cooperation**, TEPAV, November 2014, [http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1420818799-5.Strengthening\\_Connections\\_and\\_Business\\_Synergies\\_Between\\_Turkey\\_and\\_Armenia.pdf](http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1420818799-5.Strengthening_Connections_and_Business_Synergies_Between_Turkey_and_Armenia.pdf), (06.07.2016), p. 3.

Turkey, and more than 30 entrepreneurs from Armenia<sup>395</sup> attended this project for the aim of creating new opportunities for cooperation between two nations. They first met in Yerevan-Gyumri, Armenia, in November 7-9, 2014.<sup>396</sup> The second Exchange of Entrepreneurs Project was held in Istanbul-Antalya, Turkey, between February 25 and March 1, 2015.<sup>397</sup> Throughout these programs, the participants had a various range of activities from business meetings to roundtable discussions in Armenia and Turkey, which offered the participants a chance to come together and share their ideas.<sup>398</sup>

### **3.1.4. The Non-diplomatic Activities of the Citizens' Assembly**

Citizens Assembly based in Turkey was founded in 1993 under the name of Helsinki Citizens Assembly, and later changed its name to Citizens Assembly. The Citizens Assembly conducts activities in the areas of peace, pluralism, fundamental rights and freedoms, citizenship and democratization. It aims to resolve conflicts and problems peacefully and through dialogue with similar non-governmental organizations and the academic communities in many regions such as the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean and the European Union. The main activities are symposiums, seminars, workshops, panels and meetings.<sup>399</sup>

“The Summer School for Interdialogue and Understanding” (SIDU), held under the subtitle "Religion, Culture and Citizenship", was an international summer school organized in Armenia on 8-13 September 2003. This project was co-operated by the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly's offices in Armenia and France and contributed by the Council of Europe. This project aims to discuss the place of religion in the

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<sup>395</sup> TEPAV, “Girişimciler Değişim Programı Erivan – Gümrü, Ermenistan 6-9 Kasım 2014”, [http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/haber/1415882509-8.Ermenistan\\_Girisimciler\\_Degisim\\_Programi.pdf](http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/haber/1415882509-8.Ermenistan_Girisimciler_Degisim_Programi.pdf), (06.07.2016), p. 1.

<sup>396</sup> ArmInfo, Armenia and Turkey to implement two joint projects - Exchange of Entrepreneurs and Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process, 07.11.2014, <http://www.arminfo.info/index.cfm?objectid=F4F84020-667E-11E4-8F310EB7C0D21663>, (06.07.2016).

<sup>397</sup> TEPAV, Girişimciler Değişim Programı İstanbul-Antalya, Türkiye 25 Şubat-1 Mart, [http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/haber/1425566160-9.Turkiye\\_Ermenistan\\_Girisimciler\\_Degisim\\_Programi\\_.pdf](http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/haber/1425566160-9.Turkiye_Ermenistan_Girisimciler_Degisim_Programi_.pdf), (06.07.2016), p. 1.

<sup>398</sup> TEPAV, “Girişimciler Değişim Programı Erivan – Gümrü, Ermenistan 6-9 Kasım 2014”, pp. 1-6

<sup>399</sup> Yurttaşlık Derneği, “Yurttaşlık Derneği Kuruluş Amaçları ve Kısa Tarihçe”, <http://www.hyd.org.tr/tr/hyd-nin-hikayesi/amaclar>, (12.06.2017).

social mechanism, religion and state relations, multiculturalism and peaceful coexistence. A part of the program that attracted a great deal of attention was the "Turkey Armenia Dialogue". It was emphasized that the only way to establish a dialogue based on friendship between the two communities was the peaceful efforts of the civil society.<sup>400</sup>

"The Yavas Gamats Summer Schools" have been organized by Citizens' Assembly in Istanbul, Turkey and Vanadzor, Armenia. It was funded by the EU within the framework of "Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process." "Gamats" and "Yavaş" mean "Slow" in Armenian and Turkish respectively. The first "Yavaş Gamats" was held in 2005, in Antakya/Turkey. This project addressed teachers and teacher candidates. Authors, journalists and film-makers from Armenia and Turkey lectured the participants about a various range of disciplines.<sup>401</sup> The workshops, roundtable discussions, and group-work sessions were part of this 7-day program, in which the participants had the opportunity to get to know each other.<sup>402</sup> Yavaş Gamats Summer school programs have been held since 2005. The ultimate aim of this program is to build mutual trust among teachers and teacher candidates from both countries, who are responsible for raising new generations. Helsinki Citizens' Assembly also held a working meeting on 7-10 February 2013 in Istanbul, titled "Teachers for Democratization and Peace Building in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia". This meeting addressed formal education systems in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Teachers also received training for peace building, conflict resolution and democratic classroom management skills.<sup>403</sup>

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<sup>400</sup> Yurttaşlık Derneği, "Uluslararası hCa yaz okulu / Ermenistan 2003 Din, Kültür ve Yurttaşlık", <http://www.hyd.org.tr/tr/toplumsal-catismalarda-sivil-yaklasimlar/24-uluslararasi-ve-yerel-yaz-okullari/133-uluslararasi-hca-yaz-okulu-ermenistan-2003-din-kultur-ve-yurttaslik>, (16.06.2017).

<sup>401</sup> Yavasgamats, "'Ongoing Yavas-Gamats School" Call For Applicants", <http://www.yavasgamats.org/en/58-ongoing-yavas-gamats-school-call-for-applicants>, (12.06.2017)

<sup>402</sup> Yavasgamats, "Call for Applicants Summer School "Yavaş-Gamats 2015"", <http://www.yavasgamats.org/en/42-call-for-applicants-summer-school-yavas-gamats-2015>, (12.06.2017).

<sup>403</sup> <http://www.hyd.org.tr/tr/toplumsal-catismalarda-sivil-yaklasimlar>, (26.07.2017).

### 3.1.5. The Non-diplomatic Activities of the Civilitas Foundation (CF)

The Civilitas Foundation is a non-profit organization, founded in 2008 in Armenia.<sup>404</sup> Civilitas Foundation focuses on Armenia-Turkey relations as well as Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. It aims to carry out research and activities to promote normalization and peace for regional understanding and stability. It aims to make today's quickly evolving Turkey more understandable, through reports, videos, interviews and analyses. Civilitas is the first Armenia-based organization to establish an office in Turkey for the aim of increasing mutual relations and communication between two nations.<sup>405</sup> At the same time, it carries out activities for dialogue, peace and stability in the Caucasus. CF implements its works with “the Council on International Relations” and “the Democracy and Development Initiative”.<sup>406</sup>

The “Understanding Turkey Project” includes a website called “CivilNet.am” and was established by the Civilitas Foundation in order to better understand Turkey and ensure that the issues in the Turkish press are monitored by the Armenian public. Through this site, news, videos, interviews and analyses about Turkey are brought to the attention of Armenian and international public opinions. It draws attention to the successes and difficulties experienced in Armenian and Turkish civil society relations and at the same time closely observe the developments in the world related to Armenian-Turkish relations and create awareness in the international society.<sup>407</sup>

“Climbing the Mountain: Sharing Personal Journeys” program places a pair of individuals, participants from each society, to engage in a moderated conversation about their “personal journeys” dealing with historic and political tensions and their own views on the way forward. One of the examples of Climbing the Mountain is the “Sharing Personal Journeys” program that was held on June 22th, 2015 in Brussels. Ted Bogosian is a documentary filmmaker from the Armenian diaspora in America and Cengiz Çandar is a Turkish journalist who has close ties to Armenians in Turkey

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<sup>404</sup> Civilitas Foundation, “Inside Civilitas”, 12.06.2012, <http://www.civilitasfoundation.org/cf/who-we-are/inside-civilitas.html?start=5>, (15.06.2017).

<sup>405</sup> Civilitas Foundation, “Towards a Neighborhood”, <http://civilitasfoundation.org/v3/towards-a-neighborhood/>, (15.06.2017).

<sup>406</sup> Civilitas Foundation, “Civilitas Foundation: Internship Program”, <http://civilitasfoundation.org/v3/civilitas-foundation-internship-program/>, (15.06.2017).

<sup>407</sup> Civilitas Foundation, “Increasing Understanding of Turkey” <http://www.armenia-turkey.net/en/Increasing-Understanding-of-Turkey>, (22.12.2016).

(e.g. a friend of Hrant Dink) and is familiar with the sentiments of the Armenian Diaspora in Lebanon.<sup>408</sup>

Also, the abovementioned “The Turkey-Armenia Travel Grant Program” was carried out with the support of The Civiltas Foundation from Armenia, together with the Hrant Dink Foundation from Turkey. This project supports trips to increase direct contacts between the two neighboring countries to encourage cooperation in all areas.

### **3.1.6. The Non-diplomatic Activities of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF)**

Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF) was established in 1992 in Washington District of Columbia (DC) as a non-profit organization. Later, it opened its Armenia office in 1995. EPF aims to support Armenia-Turkey normalization by developing and maintaining cross-border partnerships. EPF is leading the “Armenia Turkey Normalisation Process Support Program” within the framework of the Armenia-Turkey Cross-Border Dialogue and Cooperation Program launched in 2006. EPF is carrying out activities to strengthen the capacity of NGO, media and business sectors and to perform cross-border partnerships.<sup>409</sup> The Eurasia Partnership Foundation aimed to speed up the normalization process of relations between Armenia and its neighbors, supporting cross-border initiatives between Armenian and Turkish citizens.<sup>410</sup> EPF focused on three main areas: support for cultural projects; research; and visits of important journalists and intellectuals (retired officials, academics, etc.) to Armenia and Turkey.<sup>411</sup>

To start with support for cultural projects, under the “Musical Bridge across the Armenia-Turkey Border” project, musicians from Armenia and Turkey gave concerts mutually in Armenia and Turkey. “The Armenia Turkey Cinema Platform

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<sup>408</sup> “Climbing the Mountain: Cengiz Çandar and Ted Bogosian will share with us their personal journeys, 22.06.2015, <http://armenia-turkey.net/en/Cengiz-Candar-and-Ted-Bogosian>, (22.12.2016).

<sup>409</sup> Esiweb, “Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF)”, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=fr&id=322&debate\\_ID=5&slide\\_ID=8](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=fr&id=322&debate_ID=5&slide_ID=8), (15.06.2017), (Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF)).

<sup>410</sup> Eurasia Partnership Foundation, “Armenia-Turkey Cross-border Dialogue and Cooperation 2006-2009”, <http://www.epfarmenia.am/en/program-portfolio/armenia-turkey/armenia-turkey-cross-border-dialogue-and-cooperation/>, (15.06.2017).

<sup>411</sup> Esiweb, “Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF)”.

(ATCP)” is another cultural project, mentioned above, held by Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF) and Turkish Anadolu Kultur Foundation in 2008. This platform has organized film production workshops for film producers in Turkey and Armenia. Another cultural project is “Armenians in Turkey 100 Years Ago” held also by EPF and Turkish Anadolu Kultur Foundation in 2008, a photo exhibition by Osman Koker on Armenians in Turkey 100 years ago.<sup>412</sup>

Research projects of EPF are as follows. “Identifying the State of Armenian Migrants in Turkey” is a survey of the situation of illegal Armenian immigrants in Turkey in 2009 conducted with the support of the Norwegian government. “Reducing Media Bias in Armenia and Turkey” project, carried out by the EPF and Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) with the support of the Norwegian government and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), was on the processing of Armenia-Turkey relations in the Armenian and Turkish media.<sup>413</sup>

Visiting projects of EPF are also significant. Firstly, EPF and Hrant Dink Foundation organized a visit by Armenian journalists to Bursa for the second leg of the football world qualifying match between Armenia and Turkey in October 2009. Secondly, EPF organized a second round tour for the Turkish journalists to visit Armenia. The group met with the Armenian colleagues and also spoke with Armenian officials in December 2009. Thirdly, EPF and Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) organized an elite level visit to Armenia. Some former senior bureaucrats and important journalists from Turkey took part in this tour in March 2010.<sup>414</sup>

EPF also aims to increase mutual cooperation and support for the Armenia-Turkey rapprochement with some other specific projects as well. “Support to Armenia-Turkey Rapprochement 2010-2012 Project” was implemented from October 1, 2010 through October 1, 2012 by EPF in a consortium with three Armenian partners: Yerevan Press Club (YPC), International Center for Human

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<sup>412</sup> Esiweb, “Cultural projects”, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=fr&id=322&debate\\_ID=5&slide\\_ID=8](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=fr&id=322&debate_ID=5&slide_ID=8), (15.06.2017).

<sup>413</sup> Esiweb, “Research”, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=fr&id=322&debate\\_ID=5&slide\\_ID=8](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=fr&id=322&debate_ID=5&slide_ID=8), (15.06.2017).

<sup>414</sup> Esiweb, “Visits”, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=fr&id=322&debate\\_ID=5&slide\\_ID=8](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=fr&id=322&debate_ID=5&slide_ID=8), (15.06.2017).

Development (ICHD), and Union of Manufacturers and Businesspeople of Armenia (UMBA). This Project aimed to contribute to Armenia-Turkey normalization through development of new business partnerships, engagement of civil society and establishment a favorable environment for state-to-state dialogue and interaction.<sup>415</sup>

“Highlights and Prospects Project” was organized as a two-day conference on October 22-23, 2012 in Istanbul by EPF, Yerevan Press Club, International Center for Human Development, and Union of Manufacturers and Businessmen of Armenia. Key Turkish partners for the project include the Global Political Trends Center, the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council, Anadolu Kultur, the GAYA Research Institute, the Media and Communications Department of Izmir University of Economics, Toplum Gönüllüleri Vakfı, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, and the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey. The conference held under the assistance of Support to Armenia Turkey Rapprochement Project was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The conference aimed to create a chance to discuss the assessment of the Armenia-Turkey Rapprochement.<sup>416</sup>

“Getting to Yes: Prospects for the Armenian-Turkish Dialogue Project” was initiated in April 2011 and lasted until June 2011. It was initiated by EPF and funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).<sup>417</sup> A series of interviews were conducted by researcher Sven Behrendt in this research project. The research was completed in June 2011, with the research findings being presented to major stakeholders in Armenia and Turkey.<sup>418</sup>

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<sup>415</sup> Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), Support to Armenia-Turkey Rapprochement 2010-2012, <http://www.epfarmeria.am/en/program-portfolio/armenia-turkey/support-to-armenia-turkey-rapprochement/>, (07.07.2016).

<sup>416</sup> Eurasia Partnership Foundation, “Support to Armenia-Turkey Rapprochement” Project: Highlights and Prospects, [http://epfarmeria.am/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/satr\\_press\\_announcement\\_satr\\_conference\\_in\\_istanbul\\_10\\_22-23\\_2012\\_eng.pdf](http://epfarmeria.am/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/satr_press_announcement_satr_conference_in_istanbul_10_22-23_2012_eng.pdf), (07.07.2016).

<sup>417</sup> Sven Behrendt, Getting to Yes: Prospects for the Armenian-Turkish Dialogue Opportunities, Project Ideas, Advocacy Messages, The Eurasia Partnership Foundation, June 2011, [http://epfarmeria.am/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1getting\\_to\\_yes\\_-\\_eng.pdf](http://epfarmeria.am/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1getting_to_yes_-_eng.pdf), (07.07.2016), p. 1, (Getting to Yes).

<sup>418</sup> Eurasia Partnership Foundation, “Getting to Yes” Research paper, <http://www.epfarmeria.am/en/program-portfolio/armenia-turkey/support-to-armenia-turkey-rapprochement/>, (07.07.2016).

A discussion under the name “Increasing Cooperation between Armenian Civil Society Organizations while Addressing Armenia Turkey Relations” was organized by EPF on April 8, 2011 at Congress Hotel in Yerevan, funded by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). This program was the model of cooperation for the civil society organizations of Armenia while they work on Armenia-Turkey dialogue. 50 Armenian participants included civil society organizations, academia, representatives of the business community and the media, which were the practitioners of the Armenia-Turkey projects. A major issue was the assessment of the situation in Armenia-Turkey relations, challenges and assessment of the impact of civil society initiatives on Armenia-Turkey Relations.<sup>419</sup>

Finally, “Youth Bank Project” was implemented by the EPF from Armenia and the Community Volunteers Foundation from Turkey. The dialogue between the young people of the two countries, with the youth network project initiated in 2010-2012, has greatly improved in the period of 2012-2014. The aim was to make the youth of the two countries discover each other's cultures and became aware of the common aspects in both cultures.<sup>420</sup>

### **3.1.7. The Non-diplomatic Activities of the Public Journalism Club (PJC)**

Public Journalism Club (PJC) is one of the eight partners to “The Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process Support Program” funded by EU to develop Armenia-Turkey relations. Public Journalism Club (PJC) was established in March 2011, in Yerevan, Armenia. PJC aims to support freedom of expression, diversity and pluralism in Armenia. The institution also aims to set up a stronger civil society and establishment of dialogue, mutual understanding and peace.

“The Exchange of Entrepreneurs Project” was organized by the PJC of Armenia and the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) under “The Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process Support Program.” First phase of the

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<sup>419</sup> Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), Brief Overview, Increasing Cooperation between Armenian Civil Society Organizations while Addressing Armenia- Turkey Relations, [http://epfarmeria.am/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1brief\\_overview\\_-\\_partner\\_meeting\\_in\\_yerevan\\_on\\_april\\_8\\_2011.pdf](http://epfarmeria.am/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1brief_overview_-_partner_meeting_in_yerevan_on_april_8_2011.pdf), (07.07.2016), pp. 1-3.

<sup>420</sup> Armenia-Turkey, “Youth Bank”, <http://armenia-turkey.net/en/Youth-Bank->, (16.06.2017).



program was carried out in Yerevan and Gyumri, Armenia in November 2014.<sup>421</sup> "Entrepreneurial Partnership for Technology Exchange" was held in Turkey in February 2016. Within the scope of the project, 12 young entrepreneurs from Armenia participated. Participants were accompanied by Turkish investors and students. This project aims to encourage the entrepreneurs from neighboring countries to build transnational partnership networks in the field of information and communication technologies (ICT) and encourage entrepreneurship through mutual influences.<sup>422</sup> Following the fifth phase of the Turkey-Armenia Entrepreneurship Program held on 6th October 2016,<sup>423</sup> finally, in October 2016, 10 representatives of ten successful Armenian startups (young innovative companies) had the opportunity to participate in Startup Istanbul of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB).<sup>424</sup>

"Exchange of Painters Project", mentioned in the section about Anadolu Kultur, was jointly organized by the PJC from Armenia and Anadolu Kultur from Turkey in September 1-8, 2014.<sup>425</sup> Another project by the PJC to the aim of contributing to the development of inter-communal dialogue is "Trilingual Website: Portal Mapping Activities between Armenia and Turkey". PJC attempts to produce various print and multimedia materials that would highlight specific projects and success stories. In this project, the users can access information first hand in three different languages in an interactive environment on the website.

### **3.1.8. The Non-diplomatic Activities of the Regional Studies Center (RSC)**

The Regional Studies Center (RSC) is an independent Armenia based think tank foundation that aims to support conflict resolution in the broader South Caucasus

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<sup>421</sup> TEPAV, "Armenian Entrepreneurs to Visit Turkey", 23.02.2015, <http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/haberler/s/3820>, (15.12.2016).

<sup>422</sup> TEPAV, "Turkish and Armenian Entrepreneurs Receive Joint Training", 04.02.2016, <http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/haberler/s/4025>, (15.12.2016).

<sup>423</sup> TEPAV, "10 Successful Armenian Startups Are Coming to Istanbul to Meet with Investors", 28.09.2016, <http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/haberler/s/4103>, (15.12.2016).

<sup>424</sup> TEPAV, "Turkey-Armenia Entrepreneurship Program Gets the Spotlight at TOBB Startup Istanbul" 11.10.2016, <http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/haberler/s/4110>, (15.12.2016).

<sup>425</sup> Public Journalism Club (PJC), "Join "Exchange of Painters" Project", <http://www.pjc.am/en/node/153>, (15.12.2016).

region, supported by “The Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process Support Program”. One of the longer-term goals of RSC is *“to serve as a catalyst for reform and sustainable development by contributing to the formulation of public policy through innovative research and objective analysis”*.<sup>426</sup>

“Youth as an Agent of Change Project” was organized by the RSC as two-phase training course named “Closed Borders, Open Minds”. This project was financed by the European Union. The first training course was held in Yerevan on May 12-19, 2014, and the second in Istanbul on October 13th-19th, 2014.<sup>427</sup> Adopting a non-formal education methodology, these meetings brought together almost 40 young people from both countries. Throughout the courses, the participants had many learning outcomes, from conflict transformation and advocacy skills to developing a common vision and tools for the Armenia-Turkey normalisation process.<sup>428</sup>

“Teachers and Young People: Learning from One Another Project” (YavasGamats Summer Schools) was jointly implemented by the RSC and Citizen’s Assembly in 2014 and 2015, as mentioned above. These one week summer schools, which brought together young teachers and senior students of education faculties from both countries, were marked by personal transformations and confidence-building.<sup>429</sup>

“Media Support: Quality Analysis Project” is another project of the RSC, which aims to cooperate with Turkish media. RSC provides some content to the Turkish media through interviews as to the developments in the region. In 2014, RSC contributed with more than 40 interviews and pieces to 13 newspapers, 8 TV channels and 2 analytical journals in Turkey.<sup>430</sup>

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<sup>426</sup> Regional Studies Center (RSC), “The Regional Studies Center”, <http://regional-studies.org/>, (15.12.2016).

<sup>427</sup> Regional Studies Center (RSC), Training Course “Closed Borders, Open Minds: Part Two” 13-19 October 2014, <http://regional-studies.org/hy/component/content/article/388-closed-borders-open-minds-2>, (03.07.2016).

<sup>428</sup> European Union Initiative, “EU-funded programme Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process presents its achievements”, 03.04.2015, <http://www.armenia-turkey.net/en/programme-achievements>, (02.07.2016).

<sup>429</sup> Eurasia Partnership Foundation, “EU-funded programme Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process presents its achievements”, “Teachers and Young People: Learning from One Another”, 04.03.2015, <http://www.epfarmenia.am/eu-funded-programme-support-to-the-armenia-turkey-normalisation-process-presents-its-achievements/>, (15.12.2016).

<sup>430</sup> Eurasia Partnership Foundation, “EU-funded programme Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process presents its achievements”, “Media Support: Quality Analysis”, 04.03.2015,

“Speakers’ Bureau Project” is a virtual platform established to facilitate contact and interaction between retired politicians and prominent figures from Armenia and Turkey. These exclusive figures share their personal and professional experience for Armenia-Turkey rapprochement.<sup>431</sup>

In the following subsections, the activities of four unaffiliated non-governmental organizations that have done valuable work to develop Armenia-Turkey relations, outside of the EU funded “The Armenia Turkey Normalisation Process Support Program”, will be described.

### 3.1.9. The Non-diplomatic Activities of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)

TESEV is a think tank founded in 1994 to offer scientifically based contributions to build a democratic society in Turkey. TESEV conducts academic research, socio-political analysis, conferences, seminars and workshops in three main areas: Democratization, Foreign Policy and Good Governance.<sup>432</sup>

TESEV Foreign Policy Program started its work on the Armenian problem for the first time in 2006. TESEV has produced many much-cited reports on the Turkey-Armenia conflict, such as “Türkiye-Ermenistan İlişkileri: Bir Kısır Döngü” (Turkey-Armenia Relations: A Vicious Circle)<sup>433</sup>, “Kısır Döngüyü Kırma” (Turkey-Armenia Relations: Breaking the Vicious Circle)<sup>434</sup>, “Yakınlaşma Sürecini İncelemek” (Turkey-Armenia Dialogue Series: Assessing the Rapprochement Process)<sup>435</sup>.

Another major activity of TESEV regarding Turkey-Armenia rapprochement was the “Turkish Partners Coordination Meeting”. It was organized as a half-day

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<http://www.epfarmenia.am/eu-funded-programme-support-to-the-armenia-turkey-normalisation-process-presents-its-achievements/>, (15.12.2016).

<sup>431</sup> European Union Initiative, “Speaker's Bureau”, <http://www.armenia-turkey.net/en/1405377312>, (15.12.2016).

<sup>432</sup> Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), “Main Projects / Activities”, <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/members/turkish-economic-and-social-studies-foundation-tesev>, (23.12.2016).

<sup>433</sup> Aybars Görgülü, **Türkiye-Ermenistan İlişkileri: Bir Kısır Döngü**, TESEV, 2008.

<sup>434</sup> Aybars Görgülü, Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, Alexander Iskandaryan, Sergey Minasyan, **Türkiye Ermenistan Diyalog Serisi: Kısır Döngüyü Kırma**, TESEV Kafkas Enstitüsü Ortak Raporu, 2010.

<sup>435</sup> Aybars Görgülü, Alexander Iskandaryan, Sergey Minasyan, **Türkiye-Ermenistan Diyalog Serisi: Yakınlaşma Sürecini İncelemek**, TESEV, 2010.

coordination meeting, part of the “Support to Armenia Turkey Rapprochement” (SATR) project on June 26, 2012 at the Swedish Consulate in Istanbul. The meeting brought together 25 participants from various civil society organizations, who were involved in the rapprochement process between Armenia and Turkey. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the current stage of Armenia-Turkey projects, their achievements and failures, possible future projects and ways to increase the efficacy of such activities. The participants had an opportunity to learn about past and ongoing projects in the first session of the meeting. In the second session of the meeting, they had a chance to discuss ideas of future projects and cooperation, achievements and failures, and a road map for a better coordination among civil society actors in Armenia-Turkey projects.<sup>436</sup>

### **3.1.10. The Non-diplomatic Activities of the Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)**

Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) is a research institution established under the auspices of Istanbul Kültür University in Turkey in 2009, offering projects to support reconciliation through dialogue for the solution of local and international issues. GPoT attempts to reach its aims through organizing multi-track diplomacy meetings that regularly bring together opinion leaders, government officials, policy makers, analysts, scholars, experts and members of the media from Turkey and abroad, and conducting innovative and independent research about international relations.<sup>437</sup> Some foreign partners of GPoT are Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), Yerevan Press Club (YPC), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).<sup>438</sup>

“The Mutual Bias and Objectivity in the Media of Armenia and Turkey Program” was implemented by GPoT in Turkey and Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF) in Armenia, supported by Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the

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<sup>436</sup> Eurasia Partnership Foundation, Overview “Support to Armenia-Turkey Rapprochement” (SATR) Project Turkish Partners Coordination Meeting, [http://epfarmenia.am/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/overview\\_partner-meeting-in-istanbul\\_june-26-2012.pdf](http://epfarmenia.am/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/overview_partner-meeting-in-istanbul_june-26-2012.pdf), (07.07.2016), p. 1-3.

<sup>437</sup> GPOT, “About GPOT”, <http://www.gpotcenter.org/about/>, (06.07.2016), pp. 1-2.

<sup>438</sup> GPOT, Support to Armenia–Turkey Rapprochement (SATR), Partners/Sponsors, <http://www.gpotcenter.org/projects/738>, (23.12.2016), (Support to Armenia–Turkey Rapprochement).

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), between February 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009. This research program aimed to increase awareness about how bilateral relations are affected by mutual media biases.<sup>439</sup> In this program the news that cover the Armenian-Turkish relations in selected mass-media institutions in Armenia and Turkey are examined in order to understand the level of bias and accuracy in media coverage.<sup>440</sup>

“Days Two and Three in Armenia Turkey Rapprochement” meeting was held by Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF) in Armenia and GPoT in Turkey, along with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which funded the event, at the Armenia Marriott Hotel in Yerevan on March 25-26, 2010. A number of distinguished opinion makers and media figures from Turkey and Armenia attended to this meeting. This meeting aimed to have a catalytic role to improve the Armenia-Turkey dialogue. 15 Armenian and 9 Turkish journalists had an opportunity to work together in the workshops.<sup>441</sup> U.S. Ambassador to Armenia Marie L. Yovanovitch stated in her opening remark that

*“Any activity, whether at the elite, middle-range, or grassroots level, aimed at transforming the cross-border relationship, contributes to progress and to an atmosphere more conducive to conflict resolution, and we hope that this initiative will bring us one step closer to improved dialogue and cooperation between Armenia and Turkey”*<sup>442</sup>

“Program in Dialogue-Building between Turkey and Armenia” was a project carried out by a consortium that includes GPoT from Turkey and Yerevan Press Club from Armenia, between September 1, 2010 and December 31, 2011. The project had three objectives: increasing the production of multi-sourced media content; increasing information collection and dissemination of media content; and developing opportunities for emerging media professionals. The four main activities of this project are an exchange of film students from Turkey and Armenia, a bus reporting tour for Turkish and Armenian journalists, exchanges between print and

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<sup>439</sup> GPOT, Mutual Bias and Objectivity in the Media of Armenia and Turkey, <http://www.gpotcenter.org/projects/237>, (06.07.2016).

<sup>440</sup> Eurasia Partnership Foundation, “A Survey on Turkish- Armenian Relations and Armenia in Turkish Media 2006- 2009”, October 2009, [http://epfarmeria.am/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/gpot\\_analysis.pdf](http://epfarmeria.am/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/gpot_analysis.pdf), (07.07.2016), p. 3.

<sup>441</sup> Eurasia Partnership Foundation, “Armenia-Turkey Dialogue”, Project Goal, <http://epfarmeria.am/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/armenia-turkey.pdf>, (07.07.2016), p. 1.

<sup>442</sup> Embassy of the United States Yerevan Armenia, “Armenia-Turkey policy discussions held in Yerevan”, March 25, 2010, <http://armenia.usembassy.gov/news032510.html>, (07.07.2016).

television journalists from both countries, and the production of television talk shows.<sup>443</sup>

“The Youth Exchange Program” was carried out by GPoT in Turkey in 2011. Six film students from Turkey and six film students from Armenia attended this program, with the aim of making short documentaries about Armenia and Turkey. On December 20, 2010, during the first day visit of the Armenian students, a roundtable discussion was organized and the participants were informed about the Turkish culture and society. In the following six days the students made a documentary in Istanbul. In February 21, 2011, six film students from Turkey attended to a similar version of this program in Armenia. After participating in lectures given by notable Armenian directors and academics the students had a trip to shoot their documentary films. At the end these films have been screened in different platforms. The participants did not only reach their film making dream thanks to this program but also they found the program beneficial to understand the neighboring country from a deeper perspective.<sup>444</sup>

“Journalism Exchange Activity” is a project where Armenian and Turkish journalists from different experience and age groups were brought together in 2011. Thirteen journalists from both countries, with no previous experience with the other country, participated in this project.<sup>445</sup> Journalist Müge Akgün, one of the participants of Journalist Exchange Program explained her experience as follows:

*“It was impressive to see how quickly we connected to each other and how the two cultures had so many similarities. It is so sad that the two communities are so disconnected from one another even though we have so many common points. But the turning point for me to understand them was the visit to ‘Genocide Museum’. ... I faced some facts about our past untold in history lessons, facts that we ignore. And I felt an inexpressible pain.”<sup>446</sup>*

“Media Reporting Bus Tour” project was also organized by GPoT for Armenian and Turkish journalists, between May 3<sup>rd</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup>, 2011. This program

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<sup>443</sup> GPOT, “Program in Dialogue-Building between Turkey and Armenia”, <http://www.gpotcenter.org/projects/720>, (16.06.2017).

<sup>444</sup> Susae Elanchenny, Narod Marashlyan, **Breaking the Ice: The Role of Civil Society and Media in Turkey-Armenia Relations** (An Evaluation of the “Dialogue-Building between Turkey and Armenia” Project), Istanbul Kültür University Publication, April 2012, pp. 18-20.

<sup>445</sup> Elanchenny, Marashlyan, p. 21.

<sup>446</sup> Müge Akgün, Ararat’a Erivan’dan Bakmak”, Radikal, 26.11.2011, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/muge-akgun/ararata-erivandan-bakmak-1070684/>, (14.12.2016).

aimed to prepare reports based on human stories in the neighboring country. And this project also aimed to form a network to facilitate future collaboration in Armenian-Turkish media-based normalization projects. Turkish newspapers published almost 15 articles between May and June in 2011, showing that Turkish media was willing to play a role in the normalization process given the opportunities to do so.<sup>447</sup> GPoT also supported the making of television programs as to the Turkey-Armenia relations. A total of 27 television programs were shot, 14 from Armenia and 13 from Turkey, including very different topics from the parliamentary elections to the Van earthquake in Turkey and from Akhtamar Island to the education of the children of Armenian immigrants in Turkey.<sup>448</sup>

“Support Armenia Turkey Rapprochement (SATR)” program was held by GPoT Center, the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), Yerevan Press Club (YPC) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), between October 1, 2010 and on October 1, 2012, aimed to develop business partnerships and regional professional networks, to engage civil society in alliance-building, and to establish a favorable environment for state-to-state dialogue and interaction. Within the scope of this project, GPoT Center held policy and media discussions with the participation of media figures, opinion-makers, experts and former officials from Turkey and Armenia.<sup>449</sup>

### **3.1.11. The Non-diplomatic Activities of the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM)**

The Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM) is an independent think tank foundation founded in February 2015 in Istanbul. PODEM seeks to contribute to efforts towards the creation of a Turkey where democracy is fully institutionalized, and where a democratic mindset, social peace and justice prevail. It further envisions a Turkey that is increasingly influential in the establishment of peace and justice at regional and global levels.<sup>450</sup> PODEM makes

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<sup>447</sup> Elanchenny, Maraşlıyan, p. 23.

<sup>448</sup> Elanchenny, Maraşlıyan, p. 26.

<sup>449</sup> GPOT, Support to Armenia–Turkey Rapprochement.

<sup>450</sup> Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), <http://podem.org.tr/en/>, (17.06.2017).

research and analysis to achieve this purpose, and shares the results with the public. It is expected to raise public awareness and facilitate decision making. In addition, PODEM struggles to produce synergy between government agencies and local NGOs.<sup>451</sup>

"1915 and Beyond: Public Perception in Turkey" is a research project that was implemented by the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM) to the aim of offering political suggestions as to Armenia-Turkey conflict. The research was published as the first report of PODEM on the Armenia-Turkey relations in the first year of its establishment. This report deals with the perceptions of Turkish society towards 1915 and towards Armenians in both Turkey and Armenia.<sup>452</sup> Although PODEM is still a new institution, it has highly experienced experts as to Armenia-Turkey relations.

#### **3.1.12. The Non-diplomatic Activities of the Turkish–Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC)**

The Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC), established in Turkey in 1997, is defined as “the first and only official link between the public and private sectors in each of the two countries' communities.”<sup>453</sup> TABDC is a pioneer of “Track Two” diplomacy. It was founded by a group of businessmen from İstanbul and Yerevan in order to create a favorable environment between the Armenian and Turkish business circles, which would pave the way for reconciliation. The main function of TABDC is to set up mutual relations between two countries for business plans and business strategies. TABDC organizes business trips and meetings every year. It brings together companies, officials, various research foundations and academic institutions from both countries. These meetings offer

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<sup>451</sup> Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), “Mission and Vision”, <http://podem.org.tr/en/mission-and-vision/>, (17.06.2017).

<sup>452</sup> Aybars Görgülü, Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, **1915 and Beyond: Public Perception in Turkey**, PODEM, 2016, p. 8.

<sup>453</sup> Esiweb, “Turkey Armenia Manual”, Supported by the Eurasia Partnership Foundation and the American People through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2011, [http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi\\_picture\\_story\\_-\\_turkey\\_armenia\\_manual.pdf](http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_picture_story_-_turkey_armenia_manual.pdf), (17.06.2017).



mutual information exchange opportunities.<sup>454</sup> Some of the activities and projects, of TABDC between 1997 and 2013 are listed below.

TABDC initiated the first contact on the restoration of Akhtamar Church in Van, with the purpose of protecting common cultural heritage.<sup>455</sup> The first contact between universities of Armenia and Turkey was also initiated by TABDC. Middle East Technical University and Yerevan State University signed a Memorandum of Agreement on February 17th, 1999 in Ankara. It also initiated and coordinated the efforts for the album (“Turar”) of Aydin Esen and Arto Tunc Boyaciyen in 1999, the first joint music album of Turkish and Armenian musicians.<sup>456</sup>

TABDC and International Center for Human Development (ICHD) organized the first cross border trade between Armenia and Turkey, named the Regional Agricultural Wholesale Market (VAWM), between December 1, 2001 and November 31, 2002. This project aimed to gather regional partners and to identify their needs. This project was funded by American University’s Center for Global Peace, within the framework of the Track II Public Diplomacy Programme. TABDC and American University’s Center for Global Peace also organized the “Women's Partnerships” for global peace on March 8th, 2002. A delegation of eight Turkish women including journalists, academics, business women and NGO members traveled to Yerevan to celebrate International Women's Day with their Armenian counterparts. A panel at Yerevan State University and some meetings with Armenian women parliamentarians, business leaders and academics were held, for the purpose of improving cooperation between Armenian and Turkish women.<sup>457</sup>

TABDC and “Diocese of the Armenian Church of America” organized a pilgrimage tour in Turkey for the members of the Armenian Diaspora in the USA. 150 Armenians from the United States visited Turkey for the first time on June 4-18th, 2001. This activity was followed by the “Discovering Common Grounds of

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<sup>454</sup> TABDC, “The Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council and Turkish-Armenian Economic Relations”, 27.05.2013, <http://www.tabdc.org/the-turkish-armenian-business-development-council-and-turkish-armenian-economic-relations/>, (17.06.2017).

<sup>455</sup> Aybars Görgülü, **Turkey-Armenia Relations: A Vicious Circle** TESEV, 2008, p. 27.

<sup>456</sup> TABDC, “Activities and Projects of Turkish Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) between 1997-2013”, <http://www.tabdc.org/wp-content/uploads/TABDC-Activities-1997-2013.pdf>, (17.06.2017), (Activities and Projects of Turkish Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) between 1997-2013).

<sup>457</sup> TABDC, (Activities and Projects of Turkish Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) between 1997-2013).

Economic Cooperation” meeting was, held by TABDC and Istanbul Policy Center (IPC), and funded by American University’s Center for Global Peace. A group of economists, businessmen, academics as well as representatives of the civil society from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey met together in Istanbul on June 21-23, 2002. “Marketing Network of Caucasasia (MANEC)” was jointly held by ICHD in Armenia and the TABDC in Turkey in June 2003, and funded by the American University’s Center for Global Peace. This project aimed to improve the opportunity of cooperation among the region local farmers and ranchers for marketing and selling their products to other areas of the region.<sup>458</sup>

Since October 2010, TABDC established partnerships with some Armenian think tanks and NGOs in the Support to Armenia-Turkey Rapprochement (SATR) Project to develop business relations between the two countries. From January to May 2011, the UMBA and TABDC conducted a survey in both Turkey and Armenia called Business Ideal Leaders Research. The intention of this study was that the local and international business community in Armenia and Turkey could use the results of this research to establish strategic cooperation.<sup>459</sup>

In September 2011, the UMBA, TABDC and the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) implemented a project to allow both Armenian trucks to transit from Turkey and to permit the loading and unloading of goods in Turkey. The joint efforts of UMBA and TABDC have encouraged the Turkish government to extend the validity of 200 pilot entry permits allowing 200 Armenian transit trucks to pass through Turkey territory until January 31, 2012. On November 22-23, 2011, TABDC organized a business conference with UMBA in Yerevan. 30 Turkish businesspeople participated this conference from different sectors such as light industry, construction, furniture production, mining industry, jewelry and trade.<sup>460</sup>

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<sup>458</sup> TABDC, (Activities and Projects of Turkish Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) between 1997-2013).

<sup>459</sup> TABDC, (Activities and Projects of Turkish Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) between 1997-2013).

<sup>460</sup> TABDC, (Activities and Projects of Turkish Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) between 1997-2013).

### **3.2. A QUALITATIVE RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT NON-DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS**

All these past and ongoing non-diplomatic efforts demonstrates that many contacts between Turkish and Armenian people at different levels have been established since the late 1990s and that NGO projects have continued despite the interruptions in official diplomacy. In order to move this cumulative experience forward, academic evaluation of non-diplomatic, or Track Two-diplomatic, channels and instruments must be carried out at regular intervals. In this section, findings of such an academic effort will be introduced and discussed. Before our contribution, other similar studies in the literature, upon which some of our assumptions and theses are constructed, will be introduced.

#### **3.2.1. Literature review**

The Armenian-Turkish conflict dates back to 1915. Since then, many researches have been conducted on the Armenian-Turkish conflict. The vast majority of these studies are historical studies that focus on whether the 1915 events were genocide or not, and the causes and consequences of these events. There are also international relations studies on the reasons and mechanisms of the rapprochement between the two countries in the 2000s, which mostly focus on official relations. Fewer studies directly focus on the role of non-diplomatic/unofficial conflict resolution activities. They make an inventory of the NGO activities, and discuss the perceptions, concerns, and suggestions of civil society practitioners.

One of these studies was conducted by Diba Nigar Goksel, named “Reconciliation Initiatives: Emerging Patterns in Turkey”. This study covered Turkey-Armenia conflict, the protocols signed in 2009, and non-diplomatic efforts such as newspaper interviews, book studies, panels, apology campaign, which were carried out by the Turkish side in the nature of self-criticism. The author states that in the 2000s there were three important elements that led to the interaction between Turks and Armenians: Turkey's EU membership process and democratization, the European Union-sponsored civil society projects, and the football diplomacy and

protocols. Briefly, this paper seeks to provide a perspective from the Turkish side about both what has been achieved and the weak links of the civilian component of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement over the course of the 2000s. In other words, this study examined the impact and value of the civilian reconciliation efforts of 2000s.

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Another study was conducted by Tigran Mkrtchyan and Nigar Goksel, named “The Role of NGOs in Turkey-Armenia Rapprochement”. The article discusses the nature of Armenian-Turkish Track Two Diplomacy efforts and their influence. The analysts evaluated whether the NGOs played a pivotal role in the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. Their conclusion was that Armenian Turkish NGO activities have gained much attention only when there was an interest for political normalization of relations by the governments of Armenia and Turkey. So, it is difficult to say that NGOs’ efforts played pivotal role in the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement. However it could be possible to say that those initiatives have supplemented the political rapprochement.<sup>462</sup>

Another study was conducted by Sven Behrendt, named “Getting to Yes: Prospects for the Armenian-Turkish Dialogue”. This paper is largely based on interviews held in Armenia and Turkey in the spring of 2011. The study reflects the opinions of civil society members supporting the dialogue between the two countries. This study aimed to develop input to create opportunities, projects and ideas that will increase dialogue between Armenia and Turkey. The outcomes and suggestions revealed by the author focus on the significance of developing trust and empathy despite historical prejudices, deepening and widening the dialogue, and developing linkages between two societies. According to the author, trust and empathy are

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<sup>461</sup> Diba Nigar Goksel, “Reconciliation Initiatives: Emerging Patterns in Turkey”, Publication forthcoming titled 'Prospects for Reconciliation: Theory and Practice Papers of the International Workshop.' Edited by Hranush KharatyanAraqelyan and Leyla Neyzi. Published by Institut für internationale Zusammenarbeit des Deutschen Volkshochschul-Verbandes (dvv-international, 2011), [https://www.academia.edu/1016212/Emerging\\_Patterns\\_in\\_Turkey-Armenia\\_Reconciliation\\_Initiatives](https://www.academia.edu/1016212/Emerging_Patterns_in_Turkey-Armenia_Reconciliation_Initiatives), (04.11.2017).

<sup>462</sup> Tigran MKRTCHYAN, The Role of NGOs in Turkey-Armenia Rapprochement, <http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/Mkrtchyan,%20Goksel%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20NGOs%20in%20Turkey-Armenia%20Rapprochement%20-%20November%202009.pdf>. (04.11.2017).

crucial to isolate the historical prejudices, and this can be succeeded with developing dialog and mutual relations between Armenian and Turkish societies<sup>463</sup>.

“Turkey-Armenia Relations: A Vicious Circle”, written by Aybars Görgülü and published by TESEV in 2008, is another major study on the topic. With the aim of drawing public’s attention to Armenia-Turkey relations and contributing to the solution of the regional and international problems of the Republic of Turkey, the work focused on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the question of border recognition, genocide allegations, and the question of closed border. In addition, some local attempts and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission’s (TARC) studies have been examined.<sup>464</sup>

Esra Çuhadar and Burcu Gültekin Punsmann also conducted a research, named “Reflecting on the Two Decades of Bridging the Divide: Taking Stock of Turkish-Armenian Civil Society Activities”, published by TEPAV in 2012. This study aimed to bring to the surface the perceptions, concerns, and suggestions of the civil society practitioners. For the ultimate aim of this study is to improve the practice in this area and contribute to the capacity building of civil society actors. This study has been particularly useful to my study in terms of understanding the general outlines of civil society work being carried out in Turkey and Armenia, and in understanding the areas in which these activities are concentrated<sup>465</sup>

Finally, Gamze Turgaylı wrote a master thesis named “Non Governmental Organizations’ Approach to Turkey’s Foreign Politics in the Context of Turkey and Armenia Relations Normalization Process” in 2013. This study aimed to illuminate the roles of non-governmental organizations working on the development of Armenia-Turkey relations in foreign policy making process. In the study, the relations of non-governmental organizations with the state were examined through a model of 3 kinds of relations (“complementarity”, “cooperation” and “competition”), and the author tried to determine how these relations affected the foreign policy.<sup>466</sup>

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<sup>463</sup> Behrendt, Getting to Yes.

<sup>464</sup> Aybars Görgülü, **Turkey-Armenia Relations: A Vicious Circle**, TESEV, 2008.

<sup>465</sup> Esra Çuhadar, Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, *Reflecting on the Two Decades of Bridging the Divide: Taking Stock of Turkish-Armenian Civil Society Activities*, TEPAV Yayınları, Ankara, Ocak 2012.

<sup>466</sup> Gamze Turgaylı, *Türkiye Ermenistan İlişkilerinin Normalleşme Süreci Bağlamında Türkiye’deki Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının Türk Dış Politikasına İlişkin Yaklaşımları*, (Unpublished Master’s Thesis), Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Kamu Yönetimi Anabilimdalı Kamu Yönetimi Programı, İzmir, 2013.

This study has been useful to my study in terms of understanding the civil society practitioners' relations with the Republic of Turkey while they are carrying out their activities.

This thesis aims to contribute to this growing academic literature through providing updated information about the efforts and ideas of practitioners, based on new hypotheses. These hypotheses are derived through an in-depth theoretical study of the resolution of international conflicts through non-diplomatic channels in general, as well as a detailed historical study regarding the current state and flaws of official channels in Armenian-Turkish relations. The effects of non-governmental organizations' works on Armenian-Turkish conflict resolution are attempted to be measured, based on six hypotheses, which will be introduced in the next section.

### **3.2.2. Hypotheses**

The basic aim of our research is to discuss the effectiveness of current non-diplomatic channels in Turkish-Armenian relations. To this aim, six hypotheses focusing on six different aspects of non-diplomatic activities have been developed.

**Hypothesis 1:** In non-diplomatic conflict resolution activities regarding Turkey-Armenia conflict, young people, journalists, artists and businessmen are specifically addressed because they have a multiplier effect on the results.

**Hypothesis 2:** Mutual interaction and collaborative works reduce feelings of victimization on both sides. They make possible for people to be understood by the other side. It is effective in breaking prejudices and relieving wounds.

**Hypothesis 3:** Public awareness is increased through non-diplomatic activities. It is possible to change feelings and thoughts about the conflict that the society is experiencing.

**Hypothesis 4:** The help of experts (academicians and practitioners) on conflict resolution provides positive contributions to conflict resolution activities that are carried out.

**Hypothesis 5:** Non-diplomatic activities provide positive contributions to resolution when conducted in cooperation with other institutions and third countries.

**Hypothesis 6:** Non-diplomatic activities contribute to a positive change in the attitudes of the politicians of both countries.

### 3.2.3. Methodology of the Study

The main research strategy was to collect data through semi-structured interviews with practitioners of unofficial civil society activities from Armenia and Turkey. Major organizations with multiple projects on the resolution of the conflict between Turkey and Armenia are the ones depicted in section 3.1. There are eight non-governmental organizations that take part in “The Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process Support Program”, which is funded by the EU and started in January 2014. And, four other organizations are also examined because they also have influential projects as to Armenia-Turkey rapprochement. 9 out of these 12 organizations replied to my interview request. I was not able to contact and interview with representatives of Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), the Turkish Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) and Regional Studies Center (RSC). Public Journalism Club (PJC) replied to my initial message; however, we couldn’t have an interview later with this organization.

A sophisticated sampling method was not required, as the sample is more or less equal to the research universe. I sent e-mails to some important figures from Armenia to make interviews, including Artush Mkrtchyan who was a practitioner of the “Cheese Diplomacy”, Turkologist Gevorg Petrosyan, and Turkologist Andranik Israyelyan. However, I couldn’t have the opportunity to make interviews with them. I had the chance to make only two interviews with institutions from Armenia. So, the limitation of the work is the interview with a limited audience. One limitation of the sample is that organizations based in Armenia are limited compared to Turkey-based NGOs. This stems largely from the fact that I cannot speak Armenian, and also that it would be quite hard for an independent researcher to contact from a distance and earn trust. This restriction was tried to be overcome with the purpose of interview travel to Armenia, but this travel was not possible due to the coup attempt made in Turkey in 2016. This work is limited in this respect.

I contacted with the Anadolu Kultur Foundation, the Hrant Dink Foundation, the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Citizens’ Assembly, Global Political Trends Center (GPOT), and The Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM) from Turkey and the Civilitas Foundation (CF), the

Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), the Public Journalism Club (PJC), and the Regional Studies Center (RSC) from Armenia. The Anadolu Kultur Foundation, the Hrant Dink Foundation, The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Citizens' Assembly, Global Political Trends Center (GPOT), The Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), Civilitas Foundation (CF), the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF) replied positively. I interviewed with one person from each NGO, between October 4th, 2016 and February 9th, 2017. Five of them were held face-to-face, one of them via skype, one of them on the telephone, and one of them via e-mail.

In an effort to address the research question, 6 questions were formed. The questions were designed to provide us with both prescriptive evaluations of the interviewees on their projects and organizations, and descriptive details on the experiences of the participants of the abovementioned civil society activities. So, the interviews were semi-structured. Following the interviews, the collected data was analyzed by using simple content analysis technique.

#### **3.2.4. Findings and Discussion**

In this study, which aims to explore the effects of non-diplomatic activities on the resolution of the conflict between Turkey and Armenia, data was gathered via interviews, as described above. Table 1 shows the names, and the distribution of NGOs according to country and EU partnership. The 4 NGOs from Turkey funded by EU under the Support to the Armenia Turkey Normalization Process are Anadolu Kultur Foundation, Hrant Dink Foundation, the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) and Citizens' Assembly. The 2 unaffiliated NGOs from Turkey are the non-diplomatic activities of the Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) and the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM). Finally, the 2 NGOs from Armenia, which are supported by the EU Program, and which agreed to respond to our questions are the Civilitas Foundation (CF) and the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF).



**Table 1:** Names and Distribution of Interviewed Non-Governmental Organizations according to country and EU partnership

Interviewed NGOs	NGOs Armenia	NGOs Turkey
NGOs funded by (EU) under the Support to the Armenia Turkey Normalization Process.	<u>1. Civiltas Foundation (CF)</u> <u>2. Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF)</u>	<u>3. Anadolu Kultur Foundation,</u> <u>4. Hrant Dink Foundation,</u> <u>5. Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV)</u> <u>6. Citizens' Assembly</u>
Other Unaffiliated NGOs	-	<u>7. Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)</u> <u>8. Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM)</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>

The distribution of interviewed NGOs according to country and EU partnership is given not because it is expected to affect the hypotheses but it simply provides additional data. In particular, some NGOs' being part of the EU consortium may have some relevance in terms of Hypothesis 5 on the effect of institutional cooperation.

The findings are analyzed under six categories that reflect the hypotheses: a) the contributions of "Track Two" diplomacy practitioners' focus on specific target groups, specific working areas and activities when conducting their operations. b) The contributions of "Track Two" diplomacy to the establishment of interpersonal relationships, eradication of prejudice, and healing of past wounds and trauma. c) The contributions of "Track Two" diplomacy to the creation of awareness and changes in public opinion. d) The contributions of conflict resolution experts and academicians to NGO activities. e) The contributions of regional and international

non-governmental organizations' cooperation. f) The contributions of conflict resolution activities to changes in the policies of the country or in the attitudes of politicians. Table 2 shows the outcomes of the research for each hypothesis.

No	Hypotheses	NGOs <sup>467</sup>		Outcomes		
				Favorable	Unfavorable	Suspicious
1	In non-diplomatic conflict resolution activities regarding Turkey-Armenia conflict, young people, journalists, artists and businessmen are specifically addressed because they have a multiplier effect on the results.	Participants from Turkey funded by EU	1	√		
			2	√		
			3	√		
			4	√		
		Participants from Armenia funded by EU	5			√
			6			√
		Participants with unaffiliated works From Turkey	7	√		
			8			√
2	Mutual interaction and collaborative works reduce feelings of victimization on both sides. They make possible for people to be understood by the other side. It is effective in breaking prejudices and relieving wounds..	Participants from Turkey funded by EU	1	√		
			2	√		
			3	√		
			4	√		
		Participants from Armenia funded by EU	5	√		
			6	√		
		Participants with unaffiliated works From Turkey	7			√
			8	√		
3	Public awareness is increased through non-diplomatic activities. It is possible to change feelings and thoughts about the conflict that the society is experiencing..	Participants from Turkey funded by EU	1	√		
			2			√
			3			√
			4			√
		Participants from Armenia funded by EU	5	√		
			6			√
		Participants with unaffiliated works From Turkey	7	√		
			8	√		

<sup>467</sup> The participants of the interviews from Turkey that take part in "The Armenia Turkey Normalisation Process Support Program" funded by European Union (EU) are listed in the table as **1. Anadolu Kultur**, **2. Hrant Dink Foundation**, **3. The Economic Policy Research Foundation (TEPAV)**, (personal experience shared by an expert) and **4. Citizens' Assembly**, The participants of the interviews from Armenia that take part in "The Armenia Turkey Normalisation Process Support Program" funded by European Union (EU) are listed in the table as **5. Civiltas Foundation (CF)**, **6. Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF)** and, The participants of the interviews with exclusive works from Turkey are listed in the table as **7. Global Political Trends Center (GPOT)** Istanbul Kultur University, **8. The Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM)**.

4	The help of experts (academicians and practitioners) on conflict resolution provides positive contributions to conflict resolution activities that are carried out.	Participants from Turkey funded by EU	1	√		
			2	√		
			3	√		
			4	√		
		Participants from Armenia funded by EU	5	√		
			6	√		
		Participants with unaffiliated works From Turkey	7	√		
			8	√		
5	Non-diplomatic activities provide positive contributions to resolution when conducted in cooperation with other institutions and third countries.	Participants from Turkey funded by EU	1	√		
			2	√		
			3	√		
			4	√		
		Participants from Armenia funded by EU	5	√		
			6	√		
		Participants with unaffiliated works From Turkey	7	√		
			8	√		
6	Non-diplomatic activities contribute to a positive change in the attitudes of the politicians of both countries.	Participants from Turkey funded by EU	1			√
			2		√	
			3		√	
			4			√
		Participants from Armenia funded by EU	5	√		
			6		√	
		Participants with unaffiliated works From Turkey	7	√		
			8	√		

**Table 2:** The hypotheses and outcomes of the research

#### 3.2.4.1. Focusing on specific target groups, specific working areas and activities

As mentioned in the first chapter, the “Track Two” Diplomacy practitioners are trying to reach from one person to the whole community in their activities. Conflict resolution practitioners aim to change the perspectives of whole community with their non-diplomatic efforts.<sup>468</sup> So, the conflict resolution practitioners need to

<sup>468</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, p. 135.

build new links among different layers of society, states, and international organizations, in order to multiply the opportunities for dialogue and exchange.<sup>469</sup>

In conflict resolution literature, John Paul Lederach explained that the conflict resolution activities could be more beneficial if the participants connected with each other in different layers.<sup>470</sup> Every layer of the community has different special groups who are affected from conflict in a different way. It means that every conflicting party needs to have special conflict resolution efforts for an effective transformation. It will not be enough to conduct conflict resolution effort for a group or a region. So, multiple interdependent activities need to offer constructive contributions to conflict resolution, regardless of "roles," "functions," "activities," or "strategies".<sup>471</sup>

As mentioned in the first chapter, “Track Four” of the multi-track diplomacy is the citizen-to-citizen diplomacy, which includes a variety of activities such as exchange programs, private voluntary organizations’ and special-interest groups’ activities. If the “Track Four” participants are active in the field of conflict resolution, they will have a big multiplying potential. These participants will be able to contribute more effectively to the solution because they are both active in the interaction and role models in the environment they are in. So, the selected participants of the conflict resolution programs are important. In other words, the participants’ activities and relations may have a positive effect over the people who they are working with.

Most of the non-governmental organizations’ (NGO) we examined thus have special target groups in different areas. It is possible to explain this in two ways. First, track two diplomacy practitioners prefer the areas where they conduct their best work, and second, they prefer the area and group they think they can get the best result from. The most common target groups of Armenia-Turkey non-governmental organizations are journalists, students, politicians, academicians, scholars, senior retired officials, businesses, historians, architects, ethnographers and artists.

When we look at the answers given in the interviews, five out of the eight participants indicated that they have certain target groups in the conflict resolution

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<sup>469</sup> Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “Transnational advocacy Networks in international and regional politics”, pp. 89-101, [http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic446176.files/Week\\_7/Keck\\_and\\_Sikkink\\_Transnational\\_Advocacy.pdf](http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic446176.files/Week_7/Keck_and_Sikkink_Transnational_Advocacy.pdf), (22.12.2016).

<sup>470</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*, pp. 45-46.

<sup>471</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*, p. 67.

works, which had a positive effect on the results. Some of the institutions do not have fixed target groups. They can identify new target groups according to the circumstances and their needs. In other words, they see the determination of the target group as a dynamic process.

One of the interviewees, who cited their projects that bring together young filmmakers from Turkey and Armenia, explained why they chose a particular area as follows:

*“As Anatolian Culture Foundation, our activities mainly focus on culture and arts. Because we believe that culture is a very powerful instrument. What we have seen from our work is that culture and arts create a space where people can come together and create things. In this space, positive contributions to conflict resolution can be made.”*<sup>472</sup>

Young people are also of particular importance for civil society activities.

One of the interviewees emphasized the “multiply effect” of the youth as such:

*Let’s think that a young Armenian and a young Turk, who have never been to the other country, who have been raised with a discourse of hatred that they had heard from their families, media, and their states constantly. They go to the other state. They see how they look like each other. They realize how they share the same culture and how they understand each other. They actually notice how insignificant and unnecessary the problem is. ... When they go back, they tell about this exchange to their families. This is a very big “multiply effect”. They tell their friends and persuade some of them. ... This effect is very likely.*

Another participant emphasized the importance of addressing young teachers and young teacher nominees who are in the last year of the university. She explained why they are selecting the young people as such: “Young people have a greater power to change themselves and to change others.” And she continued, “Young teachers believe that they can change a classroom full of students and change a whole society through them. They believe that they can contribute to change and demonstrate appropriate behavior in this direction..”<sup>473</sup>

When we consider the interviewees as a whole, we see that most of the participants have special target groups which they focus on, but they are also carrying out their activities in a flexible structure, diversifying them according to the conditions and needs of the time. For example, initially the Hrant Dink Foundation started working with journalists for the first time in Turkey Armenia conflict

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<sup>472</sup> Interview 1.

<sup>473</sup> Interview 4.

resolution program. It was because, until then, there has been almost nothing about Armenia and Armenians in the Turkish media. There was a neighbor, but it was never known<sup>474</sup>. Currently, the Hrant Dink Foundation is considering bringing together doctors from the two countries to talk about the "Mediterranean Anemia" disease that is common in both countries. The interviewee stated that Armenia has research centers and good experiences in this issue, and Armenia can help Turkey in this regard. On the other hand, he added, Armenia can learn much from Turkey in another field such as techno parks. So, they aim to identify such common areas of work and bring people together in those areas for mutual benefits, which can contribute to reconciliation.<sup>475</sup>

#### **3.2.4.2. Establishing interpersonal relationships, eradicating prejudice, healing past wounds and traumas**

It was explained in the first chapter that most of the deep rooted intractable conflicts between groups involve stereotypes. Communication is one of the remedies for these stereotypes.<sup>476</sup> The development of personal relations among conflicting communities will provide significant contributions both to the solution of the conflict and to the destruction of prejudices. In other words, the more contact means the more transformation of the conflicting parties.<sup>477</sup> According to the literature, while “Track One” diplomacy is not interested in the psychological level of conflict, “Track Two” diplomacy explores the feelings, concerns and experiences of the people with deep historical roots. Disputants can tell their complaints directly. So the conflict resolution efforts of the “Track Two” diplomacy can be remedy for the solution.<sup>478</sup>

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<sup>474</sup> Interview 2.

<sup>475</sup> Interview 2.

<sup>476</sup> Nathalie Tocci, **The EU and Conflict Resolution**, Routledge, USA, 2007, pp. 15-16.

<sup>477</sup> Montville, The healing function in political conflict resolution, p. 113.

<sup>478</sup> Cynthia J. Chataway, “Track II Diplomacy: From a Track I Perspective” [119](http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/11/art%253A10.1023%252FA%253A1024694827724.pdf?originUrl=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Farticle%2F10.1023%2FA%3A1024694827724&token2=exp=1458760995~acl=%2Fstatic%2Fpdf%2F11%2Fart%25253A10.1023%25252FA%25253A1024694827724.pdf%3ForiginUrl%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Flink.springer.com%252Farticle%252F10.1023%252FA%253A1024694827724*~hmac=6a52fec9603d787dc35a82d132b38dd3e969987d95e19c1af4d0d27c6777678c, (23.03.2016), pp. 278-279.</a></p>
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Since “Track Two” diplomacy both keeps the communication channel open and prevents the problems from becoming unsolvable.<sup>479</sup>

The interviewees were asked about the relationship between participation in their activities and reduction of the sense of victimhood of the parties and re-humanization of the image of the adversary. All participants, except one, had positive answers. It seems that personal communication has positive effects on the solution of the conflict. Some of the NGO practitioners said that initially participants were prejudiced against each other, but after the communication, the image of the enemy in their heads changed, and they became aware that the participants of the other side were also people like themselves. Two different stories are told as to the stereotypes. One of the stories is from a summer camp in Turkey.

*There was a young Armenian student in Turcology who joined the summer school in Kocaeli in 2014 from Armenia. This was the first time that this Armenian young man met with the Turks; he had never met them before. He was very angry with the Turks. During the first session of the summer school, he said to the Turkish participants, "I have an idea about Turks - watch your attitude. My emotions and my thoughts may change with your attitude, perhaps it will change, perhaps it will become rigid, watch your step." Later he established very good relationship with the Turks. Because people really want to be friends and make peace and they want to trust each other as two people. They are in desire of developing neighborly relations between the two countries.*<sup>480</sup>

This participant finally explained that “*the Armenians want to tell and be understood*”.

Another story was told by one of the Turkish civil society practitioners about her experience with a group of students in a private high school in Armenia.

*I went to Armenia in 2009 for the first time in my life. I went alone. I stayed two weeks without knowing anyone. I had a friend in Armenia. She said “Here we occasionally have talks with students in a private high school on the resolution of the conflicts between Turkey and Armenia, and Azerbaijan and Armenia. But they had not seen any Turkish people in their lives before. It would be nice if they meet you.” At first I hesitated, then I said okay and I went to that school. 20 high school students and me in Armenia. There was a great silence and a cold room at first. We could not speak for 5-10 minutes.*<sup>481</sup>

As the interviewee continued the communication, the Armenian youngsters advanced the conversation too, and started to make jokes. The interviewee

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<sup>479</sup> C. Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak, “Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective: Comparing the Perceptions of Turkish and American Diplomats”, **International Negotiation**, Volume 12, Martinus Nithoff Publishers, 2007, p. 64, (Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective).

<sup>480</sup> Interview 4.

<sup>481</sup> Interview 2.

emphasized: *“We need to talk about and discuss different subjects together - not only history.”*<sup>482</sup>

On the other side, one of the interviewees, who worked with senior retired officials such as retired military personals and diplomats, explained that demolishing prejudices with the help of non-diplomatic efforts may not always be possible. This situation may change according to the target group. According to this interviewee;

*“These studies may benefit the process in the long term. These grassroots activities which are part of the pyramid have long-term benefits. States and people know each other. A cumulative effect will surely follow. But it is difficult to say that it is similar to the activities we do. Since, we are doing business on a highly realistic level.”*<sup>483</sup>

It seems that this objection reflects the differences between the NGOs in terms of their focus either on grassroots level or elite level as the proper level of contacts. He further expressed doubts about “professionalization” of conflict resolution activities:

*“It is important to note that conflict resolution have become an industry. Conflict resolution work is useful if there is political support, if there is no contact between the conflicting parties. But when people already know each other and come and go, there is not much benefit in organizing congresses, concerts etc. Most particularly, the most dangerous is the professional, “learned” conflict resolution practitoners ... If you are going to do this, you must do it with an amateur spirit. ... Another thing is that if you want benefit you must definitely work with people who have access to state power. Otherwise it will not be useful. You should come down to earth.”*<sup>484</sup>

In support of these last statements, another participant compares the impact of policymakers with that of civil society activities in removing prejudices.

*I think civil society activities like scholarship programs are good. They matter. But their impact is limited. When these consortiums are being established, they must involve policymakers. Because the activity you are trying to do is quite a political one. You are trying to change an established perspective in Turkey. You are trying to make people conscious. But the institutions you choose to do this have a very narrow domain. I see this as a problem ... One step taken by decision-makers will have a multiplier effect on the society, 100 times the work you do as civil society activists. As an example, if the president comes out and says that we feel shame for what happened to Armenians, it will create more effect than granting 100,000 scholarships.”*<sup>485</sup>

We can conclude that people get a chance to know each other more closely through non-diplomatic activities. As a participant from Armenia remarked, “It is

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<sup>482</sup> Interview 2.

<sup>483</sup> Interview 7.

<sup>484</sup> Interview 7.

<sup>485</sup> Interview 8.



important for them to share their own perceptions about the process that takes place between the two countries rather than reading the works of historians or some analyses by less involved parties who may or may not represent their cases objectively.”<sup>486</sup> Yet, this impact would make sense if it is accompanied by similar efforts of policymakers.

### 3.2.4.3. Creating awareness and changes in public opinion

As another conflict resolution principle, “Track Two” practitioners may offer very different social, economic and political suggestions to their communities or nations. They can reach all society from the people at the grassroots level to the top leaders.<sup>487</sup> So, “Track Two” diplomacy is beneficial to increase the political awareness and participation of the society, and to make the community become more sensitive to social and international issues.<sup>488</sup>

When the interviewees' answers are examined, we see that half of the participants indicated that “Track Two” efforts increase the awareness of the public as to conflict resolution, while the other half of the participants came up with suspicion. Some of the interviewees stressed the importance of collaborative work between public authorities and civil society practitioners in raising public awareness. This collaboration is also useful in facilitating the activities. If such collaboration can be achieved, it may be possible to reach a wider audience.<sup>489</sup>

A participant from Turkey said that the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh or the increase in nationalism could affect the works negatively. At such times they only focus on making the project unproblematic. She explains this situation as “*Although we want to disseminate our projects to the larger public, we do not announce some of them; e.g. the summer school, to the public for the safety and continuity of the activity. Because at the time we only wish to complete the summer school without any*

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<sup>486</sup> Interview 6.

<sup>487</sup> John Paul Lederach, **Building Peace Sustainable Reconciliation In Divided Societies**, United States Institute Of Peace Press, Third printing, Washington D.C., 1999 (Building Peace), p. 42.

<sup>488</sup> Gürkaynak, Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective, p. 65.

<sup>489</sup> Interview 1, Interview 2, Interview 8, Interview 9.

*problems. We consider the task of transforming public opinion not as a momentary work but rather as a long-term work.*”<sup>490</sup>

Similarly, another participant stated that in principle they want to announce their activities and their conclusions to the community by sharing the participants’ impressions about the programs. However, they can find themselves in problematic situations that force them to act otherwise:

*At times nationalism in Turkey increases, which can affect the Armenians too. Or, when the conflict in Karabakh flares up again, there appears some news about Armenia in Turkey. This also affects our activities and participants. For example, teachers participate in our projects and, as public servants, they can be affected from this negative environment. We want teachers, soldiers, lawyers to be involved in our work. ... Sometimes those special groups need to be protected more. We of course want to come to the fore in Turkey and reach the public but we are aware of our limits; we must pay attention to the aforementioned issues*”<sup>491</sup>

Another participant from Turkey emphasized that the civil society efforts provide positive contributions to create a positive image of Armenia in Turkey. However this contribution and awareness may change from one region to the other. For example, the effect of the conflict resolution activities between Armenia and Turkey are more impressive near the Armenia-Turkey border. When we go further from the border to the west of the Turkey, this effect will be less impressive. People do not display the same degree of interest and awareness as to the conflict resolution efforts. So, there is no homogeneity within the Turkish community.<sup>492</sup>

Interviewees from Armenia also seem suspicious about public outcomes of these efforts. One interviewee explained his idea sincerely: “Yes, I think we try to do so. However, I am not sure that we achieve the impact that we would like to achieve.”<sup>493</sup> The other participant from Armenia expressed awareness of accomplishments and limits. She emphasized that “What we do is a drop of water: together with many other colleagues in Armenia and Turkey we do bring many issues

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<sup>490</sup> Interview 4.

<sup>491</sup> Interview 2.

<sup>492</sup> Interview 3.

<sup>493</sup> Interview 6.

*on the public agenda, to influence decisions in a bottom-up way. Although slowly, the public discourse in both societies is being changed.*"<sup>494</sup>

#### **3.2.4.4. The contributions of conflict resolution experts and academicians**

Conflict resolution workshops are usually informal and off-the-record events. Participants interact with their adversaries in a politically safe place. They can share their problems and solutions openly. They are not there to solidify their position; they can have flexibility. So, these workshops provide participants an opportunity for effective interaction. Furthermore, they offer them a chance to look at the conflict through analytical lenses and rethink their one-sided and highly emotional understanding. Christopher Mitchell describes such workshops as,

*"informal, week-long meetings of the representatives of parties in protracted, deep-rooted, and frequently violent conflict in an informal, often academic, setting that permits the re-analysis of their conflict as a shared problem and the generation of some alternative courses of action to continued coercion, together with new options for a generally acceptable and self-sustaining resolution."*<sup>495</sup>

Academics and experts who are trained in social psychology, effective communication, history etc. can prepare a suitable background and setting for interaction.

All of the eight participants of our interviews emphasized the importance of the academicians and conflict resolution experts' contributions on the results, and said that they received their help. One of the participants from Turkey explains the importance of the academicians for the workshops as below:

*In many projects we receive ideas and help from academia. As an example, academicians worked in an oral history project called "Speaking to One Another". Some scholars from Sabanci University and Yerevan State University worked in this project. They carried out the workshops and prepared the book. Previously, academics from Sabanci University and Kadir Has University have been involved in workshops. In these activities, which are*

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<sup>494</sup> Interview 5.

<sup>495</sup> Lederach, Building Peace, p. 46 cited from Christopher Mitchell, "External Peace-Making Initiatives and Intranational Conflict," **The Internationalization of Communal Strife**, (Ed. Manus I. Midlarsky), New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 75.

*bilateral or broader conversations, academicians provide direct benefits. They help people to understand each other.*<sup>496</sup>

One of the participants from Turkey emphasized the importance of the academicians for their summer schools: “*We have academicians and specialists among our trainers in our summer schools. Their contributions cannot be denied.*”<sup>497</sup>

One interviewee from Armenia underlined the help they receive from both local and international experts. “*Of course we also engage them in some workshops, in some trainings, and very much rely on the international best practices of bringing each side together and conflict resolution practices that can be used in our projects.*” According to him, another outcome of working with conflict resolution experts is their contribution to reaching a wider audience through media: “*It also has spilled over wider segments of society when this people do thanks to their own professional engagement produce some joint papers or studies or recommendation lists and then they publish it provide it to the media. And then publish all these. And we achieved larger segments of the society.*”<sup>498</sup>

These reports may also provide support to the official negotiators and feed new ideas into the conflict resolution process. One participant from Turkey emphasized the influence of conflict resolution activities on decision-makers via reports prepared by academicians or experts after the work was done. As he remarked:

*Studies that can influence politicians must be increased in the first place. Say, you have done a study on how Armenians perceive Turkey. Politicians must be aware of this work so that they take this sensitivity into account when producing policies in the future. Many people make political decisions by looking at the available materials. If you do not have any informative material about this topic, you cannot consider it. Obviously, it is difficult to influence politics. But it's also so easy.*<sup>499</sup>

#### **3.2.4.5. Regional and international non-governmental cooperation**

“Track Two” diplomacy develops strategies to influence public opinion, and to organize human and material resources in ways that might help conflict resolution.<sup>500</sup> Developing joint strategies is an important success factor for

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<sup>496</sup> Interview 1.

<sup>497</sup> Interview 4.

<sup>498</sup> Interview 6.

<sup>499</sup> Interview 8.

<sup>500</sup> Montville, *The Arrow and the Olive Branch*, p. 162.

reconciliation; therefore, it is a much referred topic in the conflict resolution literature. If contact between conflicting groups is institutionalized, they would be more effective in removing fear, anxiety and hostility among hostile groups.<sup>501</sup>

For such joint strategies and projects, powerful third parties can play a facilitating role. This is why the Western society supports track two dialogues by providing financial and human resources.<sup>502</sup> Especially the institutions that carry out projects with the support of the European Union produce joint projects which can offer positive contributions to the normalization process. So, it may be argued that third party interventions to facilitate cooperation of NGOs, such as those from European Union and United State America, have positive effects on the Armenian-Turkish conflict resolution efforts.

When we consider the interviewees, all of the eight participants emphasize the positive effect of international cooperation among similar organizations on the results. In other words, the importance of the regional and international non-governmental cooperation was highlighted by the participants of the interviews. One of the participants from Armenia emphasized the vital role played by the EU in this cooperative efforts: *“We do not include NGOs from Georgia or Azerbaijan in our projects. Only Turkey because it is supported by European Union. ... The international presence is there thanks to EU activities.”*<sup>503</sup>

As mentioned in Chapter II, Turkey officially declared that the Armenia Turkey border would remain closed until the end of the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh. So, the participation of Azerbaijan may be beneficial to the Armenia-Turkey conflict resolution. One of the participants from Turkey emphasized the importance of the cooperation between the Armenian, Azerbaijanian and Turkish civil societies. She explained that:

*From time to time we come together with civil society organizations from Armenia and Azerbaijan. These collaborations are synergistic. Because people from all three countries need it. There are many people in Armenia and Azerbaijan, who think “I want to make peace, I want to trust the neighbor”. It is very important for the Armenians to be able to say “there are people who think*

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<sup>501</sup> Ho-Won Jeong, **Conflict Management and Resolution: An Introduction**, Routledge, USA, 2010, p.54.

<sup>502</sup> Dalia Dassa Kaye, **“Talking to the Enemy Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia”**, RAND Corporation, 2007, p. xi.

<sup>503</sup> Interview 6.

*like me in Azerbaijan”. Knowing that there are peace-loving people everywhere strengthens your hand, it raises your morale..*<sup>504</sup>

Broader regional cooperation of NGOs was also emphasized by another interviewee. According to her explanation, besides the merits of regional projects that arise from the complicated international dimensions of the problem, multiple participations may also be more useful in some practical situations. She believes that

*Multiple participation sometimes makes the projects easier to implement, e.g. in a project in Kars or other border regions. This work may receive a lot of reaction from the nationalist groups in small settlements such as Kars and Gyumri. Conflict resolution activities and cooperation with Armenia can sometimes face reactions. In such cases, we include Georgia and say that the activity is a regional work rather than Turkey-Armenia cooperation.*<sup>505</sup>

However, she added that “one should not miss the focal point; if the issue is Armenia-Turkey conflict, it would be useful for the parties to negotiate alone without any external interventions”.<sup>506</sup>

In fact, according to most of the civil society practitioners, the basic pillars of any reconciliation effort should be the “insiders”. So, interviewees mostly stated that they received third-party support but that they carried out their activities without any intervention. One of the participants explained her personal idea as to the third party intervention as follows:

*“The degree of their involvement is very important. That there is too much international intervention is a major problem. Something is counterproductive when imposed from outside. It would really work if third parties do not say “face your past” or “solve your problem” but simply share their experiences. The people of these countries should be given the opportunity to be able to speak to the other, individually. You do not need a mediator at all times.”*<sup>507</sup>

#### **3.2.4.6. Changing the policies of the country or the attitudes of politicians**

It is important to understand the opposite side’s perspective especially in times of tension. At this point; a second track diplomacy is seen as a supporter to the official diplomacy to overcome its shortcomings.<sup>508</sup> There are many aforementioned

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<sup>504</sup> Interview 4.

<sup>505</sup> Interview 1.

<sup>506</sup> Interview 1.

<sup>507</sup> Interview 2.

<sup>508</sup> William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville, **Foreign Policy According To Freud**, [http://www.mediaten.org/webmediation/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/joe\\_montville\\_fpaccording\\_to\\_freud\\_1982.pdf](http://www.mediaten.org/webmediation/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/joe_montville_fpaccording_to_freud_1982.pdf), (11.12.2015), pp. 156-157, (Foreign Policy According To Freud).

examples of how the interactions between people from the two societies changed the image of “the enemy” in their heads. So, they started to think that “the others” were also people like themselves. In other words, the Armenian and Turkish civil society efforts mostly have become successful in lessening mutual prejudices.

Although, as discussed in the first chapter, “Track Two” diplomacy provides a wider perspective and deeper legitimacy, and the appeal to “Track Two” will provide enormous gains for official diplomacy<sup>509</sup>, “Track One” continues to be the ultimate platform of conflict resolution, for the fact that treaties and agreements can only take place between governments.<sup>510</sup> Therefore, compatibility and coherence between politicians and NGOs is very important.

When we examine the interviewees’ experiments and statements, we may conclude that most of the “Track Two” practices in Armenia and in Turkey alone have no positive effect on the official diplomacy. They explain that if the governments have an intention to improve the relations between the two societies, the civil society efforts may be beneficial, as was observed during the football diplomacy and protocol efforts between Armenia and Turkey. But if the official diplomacy is not eager to take any steps, the unofficial diplomacy efforts cannot change the policies of the governments.

As one of the interviewees told, when politicians want to take initiative for conflict resolution civil society work supports it.<sup>511</sup> To illustrate, a civil society practitioner from Turkey mentioned the positive effects of their efforts in a “One and Half Diplomacy” framework. He told about their initiatives to isolate a few small problems between Armenia and Turkey in the process of the protocols. They conveyed the Armenian side’s expectations to the Turkish side as a “Track Two” diplomacy practitioner. After that, the Turkish government made explanations at the top level that would meet those expectations. That is to say civil society activities have provided some positive contributions to the official diplomacy.<sup>512</sup> Similarly, another participant from Turkey emphasized that when there is an effort for interstate

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<sup>509</sup> Davidson, Montville, Foreign Policy According To Freud, p. 162.

<sup>510</sup> John W. McDonald, “Citizen Diplomacy”, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy Washington, D.C., U.S.A., **Modern Science and Vedic Science**, Volume 5, Numbers 1–2, Sponsored by the Institute of World Peace Maharishi International University, 1992, pp. 117-136, [https://www.mum.edu/pdf\\_msvs/v05/mcdonald.pdf](https://www.mum.edu/pdf_msvs/v05/mcdonald.pdf), (12.12.2015)

<sup>511</sup> Interview 2.

<sup>512</sup> Interview 8.

negotiations such as the football diplomacy in 2009, civil initiatives would strengthen these efforts.<sup>513</sup>

There are indirect ways of political influence too. Some Track Two activities, for example; seminars, which give local leaders or government officials a chance to contact with people from the other country, and encourage them to continue conflict resolution process in their towns or institutions, are also useful.<sup>514</sup> One such example is given by a civil society practitioner from Turkey. Saying that “*I guess that saying our activities change the states policies would not be right. ... Changing the state is a big word*”, she nevertheless added:

*In one-to-one conversations, many people with official duties say that they want to take part (in improving Armenia-Turkey relations) very much. For example, a mayor wants the relations to develop. But he has fears because of his position, because of political pressures and voter pressure. Therefore, he cannot participate very courageously. He says “I’m afraid. If I do something tomorrow the next day maybe the people will occupy the municipality. Or there is pressure from above.” Because of these, they are afraid and cannot do much. If there was a similar desire a little higher in the hierarchy, definitely more people would participate in these activities.*<sup>515</sup>

Another indirect effect is that, thanks to their persistent work, the NGOs are regarded legitimate by the state. One interviewee from Turkey stated that even when they cannot receive much support from the state they do not face hindering either:

*Even with a low profile, we get support from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries, of course. We receive support in emergency situations, permission processes for green passports, or the permits of our scholars. In other words, when there is a necessary bureaucratic procedure, we usually get help from the Foreign Ministries of the two countries. They do not see it as a threat now. This is important. Because even though they are not openly supportive, they do not at least hinder these activities between the two countries. They are informed about what we do, and can solve it when a problem arises.*<sup>516</sup>

To conclude, NGO representatives underline the role of the political conjuncture in the potential contributions of unofficial efforts; however, they do not refrain from trying even in times of crisis. One of the interviewees from Turkey expressed this as such: “*Depending on the conjuncture, it may have an influence on the politics and politicians of the country. If there is a more consensual approach*

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<sup>513</sup> Interview 4.

<sup>514</sup> Notter and McDonald, *American Perspectives* (Ed. Patricia H. Kushlis), pp. 33-34.

<sup>515</sup> Interview 1.

<sup>516</sup> Interview 2.



*between states, it is effective. If there is no such conjuncture, it is not effective.”*<sup>517</sup>

Yet, she continued, *“Even when the states are not open to negotiation, these activities must be carried out. Why? Since, the relations between the two societies must be sustained.”*<sup>518</sup>

One of the participants explained the importance of maintaining relations and civil society work as follows:

*I think we should make more efforts by spreading civil society activities and involving more people. Because there are no other channels. You do not get anything positive if you leave the task to the media. If you leave it to the state you do not get any positive result and even worse things happen. A greater hatred is being created. I think that this kind of work is very important in that respect. Because we do not have other channels. Since we do not have other channels, we need to continue these studies without stopping. And we have to attract new people into these activities.*<sup>519</sup>

The same participant shared a very interesting observation on the growing strong ties between Turkish and Armenian societies:

*“Azerbaijan and Turkish states have very close, brotherly relations. However, when it comes to people, it is not like that. There are less cultural activities connecting Azeri and Turks compared to the ones between Armenians and Turks. They have less civil society dialogue. Despite the hostility and lack of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia, there are much more activities. Civil society, the ordinary people have stronger ties. They try to do things. Therefore, bottom-up efforts are more effective. Politics can always change. What matters more is people’s attitude. If people really want it, if they really believe it, this is much more sustainable and lasting.”*<sup>520</sup>

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<sup>517</sup> Interview 4.

<sup>518</sup> Interview 4.

<sup>519</sup> Interview 1.

<sup>520</sup> Interview 1.

## CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to explore the effectiveness of current non-diplomatic channels in the resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Turkey. For this aim, the efforts of major organizations with multiple projects on the resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Turkey were introduced and evaluated. The main research strategy was to collect data through semi-structured interviews with practitioners of unofficial civil society activities from Armenia and Turkey. To this aim, the study involved a theoretical and historical analysis of the merits and flaws of non-diplomatic efforts.

The first chapter of the study attempted to focus on certain sections of the conflict resolution literature that are relevant to and inspiring for the case to be examined. After a glance at the sources of traditional and new approaches to diplomacy in the longstanding and broad debate between realist and liberal schools of international relations, the difference between official diplomacy and unofficial diplomacy, which is known as Track Two diplomacy, was discussed. Then, two major topics in the conflict resolution literature –reconciliation and diplomacy tracks– were examined in order to understand the limits of traditional diplomacy in Armenian-Turkish conflict and to offer an insight into a non-traditional workable reconciliation.

“Track two” diplomacy has been increasingly regarded as an innovative conflict resolution way in international relations. This study agrees with the idea that "Track Two" diplomacy contributes to opening communication channels between the parties, overcoming barriers between them, enhancing communication and resolving the conflict. Perhaps most importantly, "Track Two" helps preventing problems from becoming unsolvable even if it cannot fully resolve the conflict. The elaboration of the Pyramid Model of Lederach, the Multitrack Diplomacy of L. Diamond and J. W. McDonald, and the Tree Model of Vamik Volkan were particularly important for the aim of this study. Based on 15-years of practical experience in conflict resolution, Lederach identified three tracks/levels in conflict resolution efforts in a pyramid which aims to integrate various approaches to conflict resolution. His pyramid consists of three major levels, each with a different approach to conflict resolution:

top level, middle range, and the grassroots. Every level of the pyramid includes people from every level of the community from elites to the grassroots. In the middle range of the pyramid, there are the actors who would build a spiderweb-like network between elites and the grassroots. So, his model may be one of the most beneficial insights into conflict resolution. Coined by Louise Diamond and John W. McDonald, “Multi-Track Diplomacy” offers nine indispensable and integral tracks to build a peace process. Through this model they contributed to the diversification of unofficial conflict resolution activities. Finally, the tree model of Vamik Volkan identifies three phases of conflict resolution: The “roots” of the tree is the diagnosis stage of the conflict. The “trunk” is the psycho-political dialogues stage, which aims to improve the participants’ mutual understanding and also to eliminate the psychological barriers or poisonous emotions between adversaries. The “branches” are the advanced dialogue stage of the conflict. This model provides beneficial devices for practitioners of conflict resolution. Some of the basic assumptions and elements of reconciliation, such as stereotyping and poor communication as psychological barriers and “Chosen Trauma” as an element of large group identity, were also explained to better understand the Armenian Turkish conflict.

Second chapter dealt with the Armenian-Turkish relationship, which has been broken since the 1915 events. For this reason, we examined first the history and determinants of the Armenian-Turkish Conflict. Armenian and Turkish perceptions of the 1915 events and of each other were introduced and the effects of the 1915 controversy on Armenian-Turkish relations were discussed. The effects of Armenian Diaspora and Nagorno Karabakh issue on the conflict were also examined. In a nutshell, Armenian side regards the recognition of “genocide” essential for conflict resolution while Turkey rejects that claim and sees the termination of occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh as a precondition for opening the border between Armenia and Turkey.

The official rapprochement efforts of both sides in the 2000s were also evaluated in the second chapter. Thanks to concurrent international, regional and domestic reasons introduced in the study, reciprocal official visits known as “Football Diplomacy” were made and protocols between Yerevan and Ankara were signed in 2009 despite the objections of Azerbaijani state and the nationalists’

movements in Armenia and Turkey. Although the official diplomatic efforts of the 2000s provided an accumulation of cooperative behavior and constituted a valuable roadmap for normalization of relations, they remained inadequate. This inadequacy mostly stems from the fact that these efforts were largely a result of other strategic calculations by both parties as well as third parties. The result was fragile and inconclusive, as seen in the failure of protocols. Therefore, it is concluded that civil society activities in both countries are very important as a factor that can change this situation and enable the two countries to establish a permanent relationship. Mutual recognition and understanding between the two communities can trivialize today's impenetrable obstacles. Indeed, both domestic actors and major powers like the United States and the European Union seem aware of the inadequacy of official diplomacy. Thus, in recent years, civil society projects and global efforts to fund "Track Two" diplomacy have increased.

The third chapter of this thesis focused on the civil society efforts in both countries. Despite the current setback in official diplomacy between Armenia and Turkey, many civil society projects are being conducted in a lot of different fields, mostly carried out with the support of the European Union. In the third chapter, the activities of twelve non-governmental organizations from both countries carrying out valuable work to improve the relations between Armenia and Turkey eight of which are supported by the European Union under the "Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process Support Program", were briefly introduced. Then, based on interviews with representatives of eight of these organizations, their activities' contribution to reconciliation was evaluated.

When analyzing the data we classified the findings under six categories that reflect the hypotheses: a) The contributions of "Track Two" diplomacy practitioners' focus on specific target groups, specific working areas and activities when conducting their operations; b) The contributions of "Track Two" diplomacy to the establishment of interpersonal relationships, eradication of prejudice, and healing of past wounds and trauma; c) The contributions of "Track Two" diplomacy to the creation of awareness and changes in public opinion; d) The contributions of conflict resolution experts and academicians to NGO activities; e) The contributions of regional and international non-governmental organizations' cooperation; f) The

contributions of conflict resolution activities to changes in the policies of the country or in the attitudes of politicians.

When we address the effects of activities in a specific area or targeting a specific group, we have the following conclusions: most of the participants indicated that targeting certain groups in the conflict resolution works had a positive effect on the results. They focus on certain target groups they think they can get the best result from in their non-diplomatic efforts. The most common target groups of Armenian and Turkish non-governmental organizations are journalists, students, politicians, scholars, teachers, senior retired officials, businessmen, historians, architects, ethnographers and artists. As the conflict resolution literature implied, some of the conflict resolution practitioners we interviewed believe in the need to build new links among different layers of society, states, and international organizations, in order to multiply the opportunities for dialogue and exchange. These NGOs carry out their activities in a flexible structure; changing and diversifying focus of their attention according to the conditions and needs of the time,

When we focus on the contributions of “Track Two” diplomacy to the establishment of interpersonal relationships, eradication of prejudice, and healing of past wounds and trauma, all participants, except one, had positive answers. It seems that personal communication has positive effects on the solution of the conflict. Some of the NGO practitioners said that initially participants were prejudiced against each other, but after the communication, the image of the enemy in their heads changed, and they became aware that the participants of the other side were also people like themselves. In other words, people get a chance to know each other more closely through non-diplomatic activities. Yet, interviewees agreed that this impact would make more sense if it is accompanied by similar efforts of policymakers.

When the interviewees' answers are examined from the point of the contributions of “Track Two” diplomacy to the creation of awareness and changes in public opinion, half of the participants indicated that “Track Two” efforts increase the awareness of the public as to conflict resolution, while the other half came up with suspicion. Those with suspicion believe that positive effects of the conflict resolution efforts depend on the context. As an example, rise of nationalism following the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh affected the conflict resolution

efforts negatively. If the situation is suitable to carry out non diplomatic works openly, the conflict resolution practitioners can reach all members of the society from the people at the grassroots level to the top leaders. It means that “Track Two” diplomacy is beneficial to increase public awareness at such times. Apart from this, many interviewees stressed the importance of collaborative work between public authorities and civil society practitioners in raising public awareness.

Regarding the contributions of conflict resolution experts and academicians to NGO activities, all of the eight participants of our interviews emphasized the importance of the academicians and conflict resolution experts’ contributions on the results, and said that they received their help. Academicians and experts participated in some of the NGOs projects, and provided some contributions to the Track Two diplomacy efforts by carrying out workshops, preparing books and reports. Reports that constitute an important source for policymakers are among the major contributions of experts in the field. Expertise and vision facilitates these works’ access to media, which helps the NGOs reach larger segments of the society.

When the contributions of regional and international non-governmental organizations’ cooperation are examined, all of the participants emphasized the importance of the cooperation among similar organizations. When civil society organizations from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey come together these collaborations may become synergistic. From time to time, participation of multiple NGOs makes the projects easier to carry out since people see something from themselves and engage in the project more easily; at least they do not show a negative attitude about the project. So, international cooperation has a positive effect over the NGOs efforts that need to be maintained. However, the degree of their involvement is very important. That there is too much international intervention is a major problem. When we look at the interviewees' answers, most of the civil society practitioners explained that the basic pillars of any reconciliation effort should be the “insiders”. So, interviewees mostly stated that they received third-party support but that they carried out their activities without any intervention.

When we examined the contributions of conflict resolution activities to changes in the policies of the country or in the attitudes of politicians, most of the “Track Two” practices in Armenia and in Turkey alone have no direct positive effect

on the official diplomacy. The participants explained that only if the governments have an intention to improve the relations between the two societies, may the civil society efforts be beneficial, as seen during the football diplomacy and protocol efforts between Armenia and Turkey. However, if the official diplomacy is not eager to take any steps, the unofficial diplomacy efforts cannot change the policies of the governments.

These findings suggest that non-diplomatic methods may be effective in resolving the Armenian-Turkish conflict. Upon an analysis of NGO projects and evaluations of NGO representatives, we can conclude that thanks to these projects the prejudices of the Armenian and Turkish participants against each other can be removed, the pain of the past can be alleviated and both sides can understand each other better. To this aim, certain groups such as young people, journalists and artists are selected as the target of these projects. This practice seems to yield good results. The synergy that is created by civil society activities involving multiple international institutions and organizations also appears as a positive factor in resolving the conflict. The study also confirmed the positive results of the assistance of experts and academicians, especially in reaching broader masses through publications. However, the study revealed the fact that the Armenian-Turkish conflict resolution works have not been sufficiently brought to the agenda of the society and influenced politicians. Currently, the official diplomacy between Armenian and Turkish states cannot make any contribution to a policy change, which limits the unofficial diplomacy in its efforts to remove prejudices. The NGOs are aware of these limits but they seem undiscouraged and determined to continue their work despite setbacks.

This determination and dedication is not groundless. Track Two diplomacy efforts are vital for building networks between the two communities and accumulating experience in cooperation in the absence of official relations. Furthermore, they facilitate official diplomacy when the governments are eager to establish relations. The study revealed that the two countries have potential mutual economic and political gains in rapprochement, which once made them communicate in the late 2000s. Thus Track Two diplomacy efforts should continue even though they currently have a limited effect on government policies. When there is an intergovernmental rapprochement similar to the 2000s, it may be expected that these

civil society efforts will facilitate the governments' work and Armenian and Turkish societies will be able to develop relations faster through these activities. Academic studies on the Armenian-Turkish conflict are a growing field, as alternative channels based on civil society are becoming increasingly important. It is hoped that this study will contribute to the field by providing an up-to-date elaboration of the institutions and organizations that are active in this area. It is expected that new institutions to develop Armenia-Turkey relations will enter the field and increase the diversity of activities. Updated analyses will be needed in the future. Finally, one major deficiency of this study is that examination of and interviews with organizations based in Armenia are limited due to problems related with language and current political environment. Future studies may also be able overcome these limitations.



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## **APPENDICES**

## **APPENDIX 1: List of Interviews**

**Avetisyan, Armine**, Anadolu Kultur Foundation, on October 5th, 2016, Istanbul, (Face-to-face interview).

**Becermen, Burcu**, Hrant Dink Foundation, on November 17th, 2016, Istanbul, (Face -to-face interview).

**Itez, Can**, the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), on February 9th, 2017, (An interview via telephone).

**Uzpeder, Ebru**, Citizen's Assembly, on October 4th, 2016, Istanbul, (Face -to-face interview).

**Harutyunyan, Karen** Civilitas Foundation (CF), on November 7th, 2016, (An interview via an e-mail).

**Ayunts, Artak**, Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), on December 19th, 2016, (An interview via skype).

**Akgün, Mensur**, Global Political Trends Center (GPOT) on November 17th, 2016, Istanbul, (Face -to-face interview).

**Görgülü, Aybars**, the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), on November 16th, 2016, Istanbul, (Face -to-face interview).

## **APPENDIX 2: The Questions of Interview**

### **THE QUESTIONS OF INTERVIEW**

**Question 1:** Do you have a specific audience that you are focusing on, such as a certain age group, occupation or gender, while conducting your activities? If there is such a specific group, what are the factors that are effective in determining these areas?

**Question 2:** Do you think that your efforts are beneficial to establish interpersonal relationships, to reduce prejudice, to heal the past wounds and trauma? Do they help people to understand the perspective of the other side?

**Question 3:** Do you think that your activities can carry Armenia-Turkey conflict to the public agenda? Do they contribute to creating awareness and changes in public opinion?

**Question 4:** Do you receive any help from experts and academics while conducting your activities? (For example; working with an expert in the area of conflict resolution, personnel and activist trainings, academic cooperation, etc.) What are the contributions that these assistance and cooperation provide for your work?

**Question 5:** Do you get positive results from your cooperation with other non-governmental organizations, international organizations or third countries in your activities? If there are such positive results, what are they?

**Question 6:** Do you believe that the activities you are pursuing to develop Armenian-Turkish relations change the policies of the countries or the politicians' attitudes? If you believe that such changes are possible, can you give an example in this regard?



**APPENDIX 3: Anadolu Kultur Foundation Armine Avetisyan October 5<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Istanbul, (Face-to-face interview).**

**The interview of Anadolu Kultur Foundation with Armine Avetisyan on October 5<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Istanbul, (Face-to-face interview).**

**The Questions of Interview**

**Question 1:** Do you have a specific audience that you are focusing on, such as a certain age group, occupation or gender, while conducting your activities? If there is such a specific group, what are the factors that are effective in determining these areas?

*Our target audience is broad, actually. We are trying to adopt from each occupational group, each age group, and each social sectors. We are working more in the field of culture and art. There is a film project one of our big projects. We are setting up workshops to bring together young filmmakers from Turkey and Armenia. After these workshops, the applicants make a movie with together. This has been an ongoing project for several years. This project is held in conjunction with "Golden Apricot" festival in Yerevan. This is one of the projects currently ongoing. This project is a sample of the field of cinema. We have other activities in the field of music. We provide the young musicians from Yerevan and Istanbul to get together and work together for a while. Then they give concerts together.*

*Talk to each other is another project conducted. In this study, we bring together the young people from both side and we have established workshops on different topics. Then these young people go to different cities of Armenia and Turkey to make an oral history. After these studies, a documentary and a book appeared. Then another book.*

*We're opening exhibitions in the field of visual arts. As the Anatolian Culture Foundation, we are working mainly in the field of the culture and the arts. We do it. Because, we believe that culture is a very powerful instrument. Because, we see that the good results created by the culture and art. You can be gathered in this area and that something can be created because of the field. It means that culture and art can offer good contribution towards the conflict resolution.*

**Question 2:** Do you think that your efforts are beneficial to establish interpersonal relationships, to reduce prejudice, to heal the past wounds and trauma? Do they help people to understand the perspective of the other side?

*Let's think that an Armenian juvenile person has never been in Turkey or a Turkish juvenile person never been in Armenia in their life. They have been growing with the hate speech And they have been hearing this speech from their families, their medias, and their states constantly. These adolescents are going to the other state, They meet together with the others who seen as an enemy by them. They see how these people are. Then they realize the reality. In fact, how they share the same culture and they speak the same language. They understand each other. They actually notice that how insignificant and unnecessary the problem is. This is the "Conflict Resolution"*

*Let's people arrived joined. There has been a shift among them. They go to their family and explained it very effectively. This means that a "multiply effect". They told their friends and persuade a few of them. They will think that we are saying bad things towards Turks and Turkey. However, the people who met together with Turks in Turkey say different things. They say that Turks are not bad people. This is also possible result. This should be disseminated by including more people. Because there is no other channel. You can't get something positive in the media, and also can't from the states' policies. On the contrary, more bad things happen. Created a hatred worse. So, this kind of work is very important. Because there is no other channel.*

*We need to continue this work without stopping for lack of our other channels. We need new people to get involved. We took some challenges in front of us because of the four day war in the Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia on April and current political situation of Turkey. But despite this, we mustn't give up we need to continue constantly to do step by step.*

*When we look at Azerbaijan and Turkey states, they look very brotherly. But when it comes to people, we do not see it at all. For example, the cultural activities between Azerbaijan and Turkey are not as much as between Armenia and Turkey. Civil society dialogue is not so as between Armenia and Turkey. In spite of the*

*hostility between Turkey and Armenia and there is no diplomatic relationship between Turkey and Armenia, there are more activities. The relationship between civil society and ordinary people is stronger. And they're trying to do good things. Therefore, I think, from bottom to top (bottom-up) it may be more effective way to go. Because the politics of the states can always change. But the attitude of people is important. If the people really believe that they really want it, I think this is more sustainable. It's a more sustainable thing. That's the thing.*

**Question 3:** Do you think that your activities can carry Armenia-Turkey conflict to the public agenda? Do they contribute to creating awareness and changes in public opinion?

*We share our activities from social media. Our newsletters are also in place. Our activities are always on our website. We spread our work out many channels in many places. These are also reflected in the media. We do as far as we can. So, we're moving our work to the public agenda. We have not had really serious problems. Of course, sometimes getting a negative reaction. But I am not confronted with this problem that sabotaged it. We always do what we do. We are rolling out our work all the time.*

**Question 4:** Do you receive any help from experts and academics while conducting your activities? (For example; working with an expert in the area of conflict resolution, personnel and activist trainings, academic cooperation, etc.) What are the contributions that these assistance and cooperation provide for your work?

*In many projects we receive ideas and help from academia. For example, academicians worked on the oral history project. He worked as a teacher from Sabancı University and Yerevan State University. They conducted workshops and book activities. Previously, Sabancı and Kadir Has University have been involved in workshops. In these activities, the academicians provide directly some of the benefits to the people who participate in the work. Sometimes pairs, sometimes more wider activities are conducted. And, of course, in the mutual understanding of the parties are effective in these studies.*

**Question 5:** Do you get positive results from your cooperation with other non-governmental organizations, international organizations or third countries in your activities? If there are such positive results, what are they?

*Some of the projects can be regionally They include Georgia and Azerbaijan. If the goals of the project are to develop more regional cooperations, multiple participations can be more beneficial. But if the focus is only Turkey-Armenia relations, it would not be useful to include Georgia, Azerbaijan or Iran from the outside? I don't know Maybe it happens. But it's a bit dependent on the purpose of the project. There is a lot of participation in regional work. Multiple participation sometimes makes the project easier, for example in a project in Kars or in border regions. This work may be faced with a lot of reaction because of the nationalist groups in these small settlement places such as Kars and Gyumri. Conflict Resolution activities and cooperation with Armenia can be faced sometimes reactions. In such cases, we include Georgia and say that the activity is a regional work rather than Turkey's Armenia cooperation. From that perspective, it can provide some easiness in that respect.*

**Question 6:** Do you believe that the activities you are pursuing to develop Armenian-Turkish relations change the policies of the countries or the politicians' attitudes? If you believe that such changes are possible, can you give an example in this regard?

*I guess that saying our activities change the states policies would not be right. But some people from the government, for example, a mayor can be very positive sometimes. They are looking the matters very positive. They are very interested and want to be involved. From this perspective, It is effective. But changing the state is a big word. So, saying this is a little difficult.*

*When you meet with these people, mutual they say that I want to involve a lot of your activities. For example, a mayor wants to develop relations. But there are fears because of their position. He or she is under pressure due to the elections and the reaction of the voters. He or she can't be discouraged. Sometimes there is pressure from above. They are afraid to involve these activities and can't do much. If there is a desire a little higher, more people will be in these conflict resolution activities.*

**APPENDIX 4: The interview of Hrant Dink Foundation with Burcu Becermen on November 17<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Istanbul, (Face -to-face interview).**

**The interview of Hrant Dink Foundation with Burcu Becermen on November 17<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Istanbul, (Face -to-face interview).**

**Question 1:** Do you have a specific audience that you are focusing on, such as a certain age group, occupation or gender, while conducting your activities? If there is such a specific group, what are the factors that are effective in determining these areas?

*We have a target group. First we started with journalists. The first target group of Turkey Armenia program was the journalists. We identified some of the journalists from both countries. Because there was almost no Armenians and Armenia in the Turkish media. We have a neighbor but it is not known at all. The border is closed and and so forth. We have no idea. But there is a lot of news about Turkey in Armenia. In fact, there is a situation of carrying on with Turkey in the Armenian side. But these news are always processed from a historical or political perspective. They weren't interested in the current situation of Turkey. They had no idea what is going on in Turkey currently? At this point, we thought that why the Armenians and Armenia didn't come to the public agenda or we do not have very deep news as to this issue. We started with the journalists first because we thought journalists had a very important mission in community. In other words, we started to work on the Turkish media to explain Armenia and on the Armenian media to explain Turkey. At the same time, we started this program with the desire to establish a bond between colleagues. This program is still going on. In that study, our request was the fact that people from all layer of the Turkish media. In other words, we have chosen participants from the press and media sector both from the supporters and the critics of the government. We tried to create a mixed group of participants. Then, we thought that these kind of activities sould't be limited with the only journalists. And we said we could do something with academicians, young people and university students. We have identified them as a participants. But at the same time, we attempted to address all age groups to all professional groups. We had designed the*

*travel fund first. All ages from all areas, and we wanted to meet people from all professions go with each other. Because we think the most important thing is to meet and discuss mutually.*

*We also have a scholarship program. We aimed to go beyond meeting and dialogue and aiming to increase their cooperation.*

*There are many things to sit and learn together. We need to talk and discuss different subject and issues with together not only history.. We also aimed to reach especially at universities, research centers, museums, art centers and press organizations. So now we look at whether we can do something in the fields of technology, medicine, tourism, health and law. For example, doctors from two countries come together to talk about the "Mediterranean Anemia" disease, which is common in both countries. Armenia has good experiences on this issue. Because they have research centers and they can help the Turkey. Or there are technoparks in Turkey. Not in Armenia. We aim to identify special working areas where the people from both country work and bring together. We are targeting all of the people, but there are areas we focus on.*

**Question 2:** Do you think that your efforts are beneficial to establish interpersonal relationships, to reduce prejudice, to heal the past wounds and trauma? Do they help people to understand the perspective of the other side?

*It helps. While we are doing these projects, we are always focusing on the relations between the two countries when we say Turkey Armenia relations. And thanks to these studies, people come together and learn about each other's family stories. This is a very important thing. It's breaking point. For example, a journalist from Turkey may be concerned about how to be welcomed when he first goes to Armenia. But when you go there, the situation is different when you talk to people and listen to their stories. When they learn about their origins, they are impressed by the name of all restaurants or by the name of the towns. Because most of them are same as Anatolia. Seeing that there is no hostile attitude in general, this situation contributes to the healing the past injuries, getting them closer and facilitating to understand the other side. Prejudices are breaking down. Stories are getting closer.*

*This has an ice breaker effect. Then, they can say that we've lost so much time. And, how do we can make up for it?*

*I would like to give an example about this issue. I went to Armenia in 2009 for the first time in my life. I went alone. I stayed two weeks without knowing anyone. I had a friend. She said to me we had a private high school here. We had the conflict resolution discussions which are about to Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan Armenia conflicts. But they did not see any Turks in their lives. It would be nice if they meet you. I concerned first. Then I said okay and I went that school. 20 high school students and I are in a high school in Armenia. It was a great silence and a cold room before. Firstly, We could not speak through 5-10 min.. Then came a question why the Kurds are taking our tombs' stones and building houses for them. I do not know that. I do not think the Kurds did anything to destroy them in particular. They probably have a lot of trouble with them. And they're doing it for the house needs. But in this regard there are Armenian architects in Istanbul who also knows the region.*

*Maybe they are following. They know. Or you can get information from Armenian architects. Our meeting with Armenian high school students is at this level. High school students are against me. Second question is why Turkey does not recognize genocide. We started from there. What would you do if you were a Prime Minister? Would you apologize if you were Prime Minister? Or did you give us our land? But on the one hand, these are still unknown in Turkish society, they are not known, they are not understood. He will not solve the problem by apologizing for the meaning. And how realistic this situation.*

*You are a people displaced from your land. But there is another man living there. Is it right to take these people away? Finally, the ice broke. Then, one of the students said something laughing I understood, you will not give us our land. At least give us the Mount Ararat. You know it is very symbolic for us. Okay get yours. But I said, I have one prerequisite. You will also give me a residence permit here. Because the Mount Ararat does not look so good from our side as much as your side. The real scene is here. If you give me a residence permit, I will give it to you, so we finished. I think we need to talk.*

**Question 3:** Do you think that your activities can carry Armenia-Turkey conflict to the public agenda? Do they contribute to creating awareness and changes in public opinion?

*We do our every activities clearly as a principle. We want to announce everything. We do not announce only our activities but also share the impressions of the journalists, the academics and the students who have go to the Armenia. We are trying to keep the Armenian issue on the agenda as much as possible. We make this so that it will not be normalized closed border at this time. So, we want to keep it on the agenda. But sometimes there can be troubles in Turkey. As the nationalism increases, the Armenians can be affected. Or, when the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh restarts, there can be negative news as to Armenia in Turkey.*

*This kind of conditions also affect our activities and participants. We want teachers, soldiers, lawyers to be involved in our activities. They do not be limited to only 2-3 people. We want that institutions and people meet and understand each other. Sometimes those special groups need to be protected more. We pay attention to these issues and in principle we want to come to the agenda in Turkey and reach the public in a way. But we are aware of our limits.*

**Question 4:** Do you receive any help from experts and academics while conducting your activities? (For example; working with an expert in the area of conflict resolution, personnel and activist trainings, academic cooperation, etc.) What are the contributions that these assistance and cooperation provide for your work?

*We are benefiting. We take various forms of support. We want them to be more involved in the activities of the Turkey-Armenia relations. we are collaborating with some universities and academics such as peace research centers of Boğaziçi University, Assist. Prof. Dr. Esra Çuhadar Çerağ from Bilkent University, Assist. Prof. Dr. Talha Köse) from Istanbul City University.*

*We include them in our scholarship program as much as possible so that people will work together with the people working in this field from Armenia.*

*We are receiving support from Assist. Prof. Dr. Talha Köse how or what he international examples. We are consulting him.*



**Question 5:** Do you get positive results from your cooperation with other non-governmental organizations, international organizations or third countries in your activities? If there are such positive results, what are they?

*First of all, Turkey and Armenia need to be able to speak on their own in some way without the third countries intervention. I think it is very important that they can basically develop that confidence and continue together in pairs. If regional cooperation can be added then Azerbaijan and Georgia should participate. There is a requirement in this way. Unfortunately, the current political situation does not provide opportunities for Azerbaijan to be involved at the same time with Armenia.*

*If regional cooperation can be achieved among the Russia, Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, This cooperation will be very useful in many aspects.*

*We do not have any program that we do this way. We are very interested in perspectives We think very much about how we can contribute as a foundation for peace in the Caucasus. For example, there is Karabakh issue. The Turkey Armenia border has been closed for many years because of this issue. But we do not know very well Karabakh issue. We do not know exactly what the Karabakh issue is as the diplomats and academicians actually.*

*We have translated the book of Thomas De Wall's Karabakh (Black Garden) book into Turkish to make up for the lack of information on this subject. We know civil society organizations working for peace in that region. But it is very difficult to do something now because of political reasons. It is especially difficult for NGOs there.*

*In the past, a lot of work was being done between Azerbaijan and Armenia. But the last few years these Works have come to a halt. It would not be right to say it directly because of one special thing. But we can say that it originates from the environment of two countries. A lot of peace activists have been arrested in Azerbaijan for the last few years. Journalists, activists, and the people who working for peace are more closely monitored and controlled. Civil Society offices were closed in this period.*

*Although not as serious as in Azerbaijan, prejudices have also increased in Armenia. In general, increased conflict, strike, and fighting are effective in this case.*

*A complete ceasefire was not reached in Nagorno Karabakh. This negative situation has reflections on the media and public opinion. So you can not do anything. I wish that the other countries can support the process positively. And they can build a multi-platform. But we see that it is not possible at the moment.*

*I want to tell you about the third countries. The international community organizations may play a crucial role in bringing together countries like Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, rather than bringing together only Turkey and Armenia. For example, everyone can meet in Georgia now. Georgia is in a meeting point. Their experience is important for the regional peace. I think it is very important for the region to share experiences. But it is very important that they are involved. Because one of the problems is a lot of international intervention. Something is counterproductive when imposed. it will be really useful to face your past yourself without outside interference. But it is necessary to provide a speaking opportunity individually to these countries and the people of these countries. I always think that a mediator is not an obligation in this issue.*

**Question 6:** Do you believe that the activities you are pursuing to develop Armenian-Turkish relations change the policies of the countries or the politicians' attitudes? If you believe that such changes are possible, can you give an example in this regard?

*There is no such thing as a policy change in the government policy yet. But I would say; When the signatures of the protocols were signed in 2009, the state started it on her own. There was not a civil society movement before that. It was opening the border and signing the protocol with Armenia for the establishment of relations. Some of the people meet these protocols negatively Some of them positively. Again, the voice of the civil society was not heard. Later, when the protocols were abandoned, there was no civil society request or reaction again. So the government made this on its initiative.*

*But now we see that when the people meet each other, that social demand has increased more since 2009. In other words, those who go through travel funding or journalists. They started to ask why this border is closed. Even in the case of war, diplomatic relations continue and communication channels are always kept open. At*

*least we should do this. They started talking about them. Non-diplomatic civilian approaches and contacts are increasing in society. Despite the four-day war in Karabakh, despite the coup attempt, despite all the political uncertainties, civil society is still eager to do something with each other.*

*I think this is very important. This is something that also supports politicians. So it's something that politicians will be supported when they want to take any initiative. I do not know if this is a change of attitude, but we do all of this attempts at a time when there is no diplomatic relationship between the two countries. Even if it is a low profile, we are of course also receiving support from the Foreign Ministries of the two countries. That is, when there is an urgent situation or when the green passports permit process. Or on the official permission of our scholars. In other words, when there is a necessary bureaucratic procedure, we usually get help from the Foreign Ministries of the two countries. They do not see it as a threat now. This is important. Because at least they do not interfere with these activities between the two countries. They do not give it to the support very clearly. But they are aware of it and can solve it when something goes wrong.*

*There is an uncertainty here in Turkey. There is a disturbance it has developed, which affects things. No matter how much effort you spend, in the end, everything is looking at politicians and their decisions.*

*And sometimes, even if you think you're getting a lot of gainings, you can fall 5 points rear. But you have to start over again. I see this kind of work we have done in recent years as a chance. There is a suitable environment, there are people who want. When you want to start over there is a ready base we will put something on it. At least there is a network. I am happier because of that. But it is necessary to be realistic about this. It can also push politics back from where you started. I think you need to be prepared for this situation.*

*The Genie is out of the bottle. only get request. The problems can be solved, of course, but the important point is how the international environment will allow it. How will the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia have an impact on it? Will the climate in Turkey and the climate in Armenia allow this? There are elections*

*there next year. There are also elections in Turkey. All these situations affect all the initiatives and the activities in that country regardless of Turkey Armenia issue.*

*But if there is an intention and the two sides see it as an opportunity, the stage is recorded. Because these studies are for the benefit of both sides. They are also very beneficial for the regional peace. For example, I think that if the protocol was not missed, I would have a very positive effect on the Karabakh problem.*



**APPENDIX 5: The interview of The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) with Can Itez on February 9<sup>th</sup>, 2017, (An interview via telephone).**

**The interview of the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey with Can Itez (an expert who shared his personal experiences with us) on February 9<sup>th</sup>, 2017, (An interview via telephone).**

**The Questions of Interview**

**Question 1:** Do you have a specific audience that you are focusing on, such as a certain age group, occupation or gender, while conducting your activities? If there is such a specific group, what are the factors that are effective in determining these areas?

*We actually have a specific target group, since we usually move through economic affairs. We work either with representatives of the business dental world or with authorities regulating the business world (eventually because we offer a policy recommendation).*

*Whatever we are in our projects, for example, tourism and information communication technologies, we are trying to meet people working in these fields. Apart from that, we are working with public authorities and local authorities interested in these fields.*

*The issue of normalization with Armenia is not very popular. There is such a problem. It is not a priority issue for state and public institutions at the moment. We are thinking how we will do what we do in such an environment.*

*At such times, the work that non-governmental organizations do is more important. That is, when the will of the state is lost on the subject, civil society's task is to continue the work when the socialization of the subject decreases. But it's hard. There is no one outside of us working on the economy in the consortium.*

**Question 2:** Do you think that your efforts are beneficial to establish interpersonal relationships, to reduce prejudice, to heal the past wounds and trauma? Do they help people to understand the perspective of the other side?

*The reaction to this issue will be different from the reaction given in Ankara, such as Van, Kars, Ardahan, which are neighboring to Armenia. In other words, we are conducting interviews in Van specifically for Kars. Things are different. I think they find it more flexible than normal.*

*I think that there is a disturbance between the states rather than the distress among the people. The opening of the border in Kars with people when talking to*

*people is actually a desirable and pleasant situation. I do not think people will have any trouble with the Armenians.*

*As long as it is an economic and commercial relationship, I do not think it will be a political problem among people unless it is fanaticism. Trade is trade. Trade is one of the most important factors in the coexistence or interaction of cultures. It was so centuries ago, it is still so. There is always such an effect of trade. Trade is a means of mutual tolerance of cultural exchanges, a retreat to a certain point of commerce. I think that you could be like this for years to come.*

*The issues of improving trauma or causing conflict are related to prejudices. We can say that it is out of the scope because it is a matter that requires political ideological and political stance. But I do not think it will be a problem prejudiced by the continuing interaction through trade.*

**Question 3:** Do you think that your activities can carry Armenia-Turkey conflict to the public agenda? Do they contribute to creating awareness and changes in public opinion?

*I do not think there is much in public. There is a good thing about the people in the interviews and the public in that area. But is there a difference in terms of people in Yozgat, Çorum, Muğla or general Turkey? Well, he's a bit too ambitious. I also agree with the non-expert opinion. Regionally, this issue can be turned into a more aware campaign. But if it is required to be in the general public, it must be by the will of the state. It happens on this way.*

**Question 4:** Do you receive any help from experts and academics while conducting your activities? (For example; working with an expert in the area of conflict resolution, personnel and activist trainings, academic cooperation, etc.) What are the contributions that these assistance and cooperation provide for your work?

*Of course we get academic help. Moreover, since TEPAV is a semi-academic think-tank, there is such a characteristic.*

**Question 5:** Do you get positive results from your cooperation with other non-governmental organizations, international organizations or third countries in your activities? If there are such positive results, what are they?

*A form of interaction is civil society organizations. Armenia and Turkey are coming together and moving to a very different dimension is the issue. And I can say it's very useful. The work I have done is a different work from the work done by gathering everything together. Because data collection data analysis was done locally for Kars. It did not include those from Georgia or Azerbaijan or Armenia. I cannot give a very specific example but I can say that the consortium's co-existence is also very important.*

**Question 6:** Do you believe that the activities you are pursuing to develop Armenian-Turkish relations change the policies of the countries or the politicians'

attitudes? If you believe that such changes are possible, can you give an example in this regard?

*We did not have such an experience. we are a Think tank establishment. We have suggestions for what we should do at the end of our reports. We do not go directly to politics (for the last report), but they are usually launched, people can be called and the media can be informed. It can work. In today's conjuncture, what I see and do not really matter much. For example, when the Foreign Minister changes or when his staff changes, we need to reconsider this issue. So in the end management is a matter of change. So, in every change of management, the matter is reviewed and re-evaluated. New management or new people talk about how to handle the issue. This applies both to Turkey and to Armenia. You know, years ago, there was an opening process. Normalization steps were taken. (between Armenia and Turkey). That period was a brilliant period. As I said at the beginning of this period, it is a bit more challenging in terms of bringing up the issue nowadays. This is the case. It is hard to say that politicians changed hands. In my role there is no example I can give it. I have no experience.*

**APPENDIX 6: The interview of Citizens' Assembly (Helsinki Citizens' Assembly) with Ebru Uzpeder on October 4<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Istanbul, (Face -to-face interview).**

**The interview of Citizens' Assembly (Helsinki Citizens' Assembly) with Ebru Uzpeder on October 4<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Istanbul, (Face -to-face interview).**

**The Questions of Interview**

**Question 1:** Do you have a specific audience that you are focusing on, such as a certain age group, occupation or gender, while conducting your activities? If there is such a specific group, what are the factors that are effective in determining these areas?

*Our work with Turkey Armenia is usually summer schools called “Yavas Gamats”. Gamats means slow in Armenian. The purpose of this naming is a reference because these things are slow. The first “Yavas Gamats” was held in Antakya in 2005 as an international summer school. Later, in 2014 in Kocaeli and in 2015 in Yerevan. The 2016 “Yavas Gamats” international summer school will also be held in Istanbul on 1-7 August 2016. The Citizenship Association wanted to implement this program even though it was a coup attempt.*

*However, the friends of the Armenian side did not want to do because of exploding bombs in the airport and the reason of the coup attempt. They did not find Turkey safety. Because the families of the young participants who were going to participate were worried. In this case, Armenian side saw to come to Turkey as a risk and did not want to take this risk. Therefore, the “Yavas Gamats” international summer school planned to be built in 2016 is postponed to the summer of 2017.*

*Participants in the “Yavas Gamats” are selected from young people. The reason for this is that young people have the power to change themselves and to change others. The reason is that young people have a high power to change and change. A total of 24 university students from Turkey and Armenia were attended the summer school in 2005. This summer's school focused on topics such as nationalism, history reading, globalization and identities. The main goal of these schools is to*



*increase the mutual contact. Similar topics were discussed in the summer schools in 2014 and in 2015. However, teachers were invited for this summer school this time.*

**Question 2:** Do you think that your efforts are beneficial to establish interpersonal relationships, to reduce prejudice, to heal the past wounds and trauma? Do they help people to understand the perspective of the other side?

*There was an Armenian young student in Turcology who joined summer school from Armenia in Kocaeli in 2014. This was the first time that this Armenian young man met with the Turks in the summer school, He has never met before. He was very angry with the Turks. During the first session of the summer school, he said to the Turkish participants, "I have an idea about Turks / watch your attitude. My emotions and my thoughts may change with your attitude, perhaps it will change maybe it will become a rigid, watch your step." Later he had a very good relationship with the Turks.*

*Because people really want to be friends and make peace and they want to trust each other as two people. They are in the desire of the two nations to develop neighborhood relations. Participants want to change things through skills and training. They also thought that it would be possible for children to describe history in other ways. At the same time they were aware that through education they could reinforce historical hostilities. as a matter of the fact that in this summer schools, the teachers from Armenia and Turkey have made a good change in recognizing each other in such an environment.*

*We selected our programs from the young people who participated in the first 5 years of the teaching profession. This was due to the fact that they were young. Because young teachers believe that they can change a classroom full of students and change a whole society through them. They believe that they can contribute to change. They do not think that they can contribute to change and but also they can really behave in this way.*

*First of all, teachers will change their approach and then they try to give the students a different and critical look. They will take a critical look at it when evaluating the history.*

*These are not the things that will change from today to tomorrow. The benefit of these building-up activities may be seen after 5 years, and 10 years later. In other words, I think the teachers who train young people who evaluate their work by critically and examining them through their own logic, rather than the official theses presented to them, will be teachers who will be raised from this summer school.*

*In the end of Summer School, the participant teachers from both countries hoping that they can trust each other in a happy way by thinking that they can change things with together.*

*The Armenians want to tell and be understood.*

*Relations of mutual recognition, dialogue efforts must be continued so that when there is a reconciliation day, we must be ready on a community basis. We must do it to build infrastructure.*

**Question 3:** Do you think that your activities can carry Armenia-Turkey conflict to the public agenda? Do they contribute to creating awareness and changes in public opinion?

*We want to spread our work to the broader public. But we do not announce this to a large number of people because of the summer school safety. Because our desire to have that summer school can be done safely and well. We want to take the influence of public opinion not as instant but as longer term.*

*How we can be sure how the issues will be understood by the public such as Armenia, Turkey, peacemaking, confidence building. This situation is also acceptable to be carried out a program in Armenia. We have not announced in Armenia as well as in Turkey. we could not say that we came here as the Turks and we all talk about the way of getting together. This is not something welcomed in Armenia.*

**Question 4:** Do you receive any help from experts and academics while conducting your activities? (For example; working with an expert in the area of conflict resolution, personnel and activist trainings, academic cooperation, etc.) What are the contributions that these assistance and cooperation provide for your work?

*We have academicians and specialists as an instructor among our trainers in our summer schools. Their contributions can not be denied.*

**Question 5:** Do you get positive results from your cooperation with other non-governmental organizations, international organizations or third countries in your activities? If there are such positive results, what are they?

*We come together with non-governmental organizations from Armenia and Azerbaijan from time to time. These collaborations are synergistic. Because people from all three countries need it. I want to make peace. People who think that I want to trust the neighbors are also in Azerbaijan and in Armenia. It is very important to know that there are people who think like me in Azerbaijan in terms of Armenia. Something that strengthens one's hand and boosts morale. There are people who love peace.*

**Question 6:** Do you believe that the activities you are pursuing to develop Armenian-Turkish relations change the policies of the countries or the politicians' attitudes? If you believe that such changes are possible, can you give an example in this regard?

*Depending on the conjuncture, it may be an influence on the politics and politicians of the country. If there is a more consensual approach between states, it is effective. If there is no such conjuncture, it is not effective.*

*Non-Diplomatic Activities have effect of during such periods as football diplomacy.*

*If there is an inter-state agreement effort, the civil initiatives that are made make this effort very strong. Even when the States are not open to negotiation, these activities must be carried out. Why? Because these relations must be sustained.*

**APPENDIX 7: The interview of The Civilitas Foundation (CF) with Karen Harutyunyan on November 7<sup>th</sup>, 2016, (An interview via an e-mail).**

**The interview of The Civilitas Foundation (CF) with Karen Harutyunyan on November 7<sup>th</sup>, 2016, (An interview via an e-mail).**

**Question 1:** Do you have a specific audience that you are focusing on, such as a certain age group, occupation or gender, while conducting your activities? If there is such a specific group, what are the factors that are effective in determining these areas?

*As a media outlet we produce our reports for general public without any restriction. But this does not mean we don't focus on specific audiences. Judging from the feedback, the main consumers of our Turkey related topics are academicians, scholars and students, as well as some government experts and civil society organizations.*

*We try to elucidate Turkey related topics out of stereotypes, bringing new approach in understanding of the past and present.*

**Question 2:** Do you think that your efforts are beneficial to establish interpersonal relationships, to reduce prejudice, to heal the past wounds and trauma? Do they help people to understand the perspective of the other side?

*Yes, we think that our reports and coverage on Armenia-Turkey issues help to overcome prejudices and establish good interpersonal relationships at least on the level of NGO's and media. We also try as much as possible to introduce to our audience the constructive voices in Turkey.*

**Question 3:** Do you think that your activities can carry Armenia-Turkey conflict to the public agenda? Do they contribute to creating awareness and changes in public opinion?

*What we do is a drop of water: together with many other colleagues in Armenia and Turkey we do bring many issues on public agenda, to influence decisions in a bottom-up way. Although slowly but the public discourse in both societies is being changed. And it is changed due to such efforts.*

**Question 4:** Do you receive any help from experts and academics while conducting your activities? (For example; working with an expert in the area of conflict resolution, personnel and activist trainings, academic cooperation, etc.) What are the contributions that these assistance and cooperation provide for your work?

*We always use experts and specialists knowledge in our everyday production. In recent years we enlarged the pool of experts and speakers on Armenia-Turkey issues, and we are in constant mood to give more exposure to the newly found sound voices.*

**Question 5:** Do you get positive results from your cooperation with other non-governmental organizations, international organizations or third countries in your activities? If there are such positive results, what are they?

*Civiltas is a part of a consortium of 8 Armenia and Turkey based organizations implementing EU funded Support to Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process project. We believe that consistent reporting of the developments in and around the Armenia-Turkey relations will contribute to the better understanding of each other's issues and realities between the two societies, which itself will support the normalization process.*

**Question 6:** Do you believe that the activities you are pursuing to develop Armenian-Turkish relations change the policies of the countries or the politicians' attitudes? If you believe that such changes are possible, can you give an example in this regard?

*We think that the Armenia-Turkey relations need bottom-up endeavors, and our activities foster to two societies mutual understanding and better awareness of each other, as well as have gradual influence on political decision makers.*

**APPENDIX 8. The interview of Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF) with Artak Ayunts on December 19<sup>th</sup>, 2016, (An interview via skype).**

**The interview of Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF) with Artak Ayunts on December 19<sup>th</sup>, 2016, (An interview via skype).**

**Question 1:** Do you have a specific audience that you are focusing on, such as a certain age group, occupation or gender, while conducting your activities? If there is such a specific group, what are the factors that are effective in determining these areas?

*EPF is in collaboration in several Armenia and Turkey based organizations. Implementing Armenia Turkey normalization program. For the last three years. As to yours specific questions we do not have you know target group as such in terms of age limitation. We cover several sectors and areas including youth age from 18 to 30-35. But we don't limit our operations to this specific group of people. We also cover other areas such as businesses, media, professional groups, like historians, architects, ethnographers etc. And there is no age limitation to this activity. And we try to engage as many people as possible in the process of normalization. So that from different angles and different perspectives they important aspects of Armenia Turkey normalizations are addressed. There is why. Some organizations within the consortiums that were implementing this project focus on youth others focus on other segments of areas of society I just mentioned. If you are interested in EPF's activities I can talk about it later.*

**Question 2:** Do you think that your efforts are beneficial to establish interpersonal relationships, to reduce prejudice, to heal the past wounds and trauma? Do they help people to understand the perspective of the other side?

*Oh yes absolutely. This is a good question. One of the main focus of this project is to work exactly on this subject that you just raised which is breaking the stereotype trying to break image of enemy through dialog through interaction through getting to know each other through raising of awareness of about each other to providing for stand information to other side. So that people read and understand the other side beat Armenia or Turkey. You know first time declared. Rather than*

*media through which usually exaggerates topics and presents. Their approaches those are beneficial to their authorities and regimes rather than ordinary people. So, our aim is directly engage as many people as possible to get to know each other better on different levels and different layers. People to people contacts, civil society organizations media contact, professionals contacts. So, these will support the process of normalization and eventually the process of the reconciliation. When Armenian people visit to Turkey Istanbul or other parts of the Turkey they get to know you know better without any intermediary institutions. When Turkish people travel to Armenia they have the opportunity to visit different, important venues and places in Yerevan Armenia. For them to share them own perception about that process that take places between the two countries rather than read some pieces of historians, some analysis of other people who may or may not represent the objectivity. So, absolutely to answer your questions we think positively bring some changes in these interactions and dialogs between the two nations. And one of the aims of our projects is to break the stereotypes and break the prejudices towards the each other to get to know the each other better than we used to know and better than it is presented in the media.*

**Question 3:** Do you think that your activities can carry Armenia-Turkey conflict to the public agenda? Do they contribute to creating awareness and changes in public opinion?

*Yes, I think we try to do so. However, I am not sure that we achieve that impact that we would like for that matter. Because in Armenia in Turkey I think the regimes and the governmental level is not democratic and in such circumstances trying to influence their decision making processes from bottom up is very difficult. Because, ... they don't really care about public you know support public votes whereas they basically want to engage in any activity that will be popularistic (popularized) or nationalistic and not really welcoming Armenia Turkey normalization process from bottom up. Because, on the political level, on the top level of the process stuck because of the freezing of protocols that were signed in 2009. And the governments do not want to engage this stage the feel you know they feel it is not time for reengaging negotiations. Because, both sides blame each other for the stoppage of protocols process. And that is why in this atmosphere negative*

*political atmosphere it is difficult to achieve an impact from civil society on the decision making level. Because, there is no interest on political level. That is why our activities try to impact policy level but usually it is not as successful as we would like it to have.*

**Question 4:** Do you receive any help from experts and academics while conducting your activities? (For example; working with an expert in the area of conflict resolution, personnel and activist trainings, academic cooperation, etc.) What are the contributions that these assistance and cooperation provide for your work?

*Oh yes absolutely. For instance, our organization ... in conflict resolution. So, we do not necessarily invite them outside but we use our organizational capacity and staff for this reason for the conflict resolution approach. And other organizations in this consortium. They also have the capacity of providing conflict resolution expertise in circumstances when we see that we need at special interview from outside such as renowned conflict resolution experts or practitioners. Of course we also engage them in some workshops in some trainings and very much rely on the international best practices of bringing to conflict the each side together and conflict resolution practices that can be used in our projects. For instance, right now there is a training going on for the youth organized by one of our partner organizations in Armenia and there we have both young people from Armenia and Turkey in this training it is aiming developing conflict resolution skills of these people to build bridges together. And this organization has also invited conflict resolution specialists to deliver this training. So, we use both international expertise and our local organizational capacity in discussing conflict resolution issues.*

*It has two effects. You know first building capacity or building confidence between and among the professional groups like conflict resolution experts or academicians or practitioners. This is the first important outcome we achieve by building trust between professional groups but it also has spilled over wider segments of society when this people do you thanks to their own professional engagement produce some joint papers or studies or recommendation lists and then they publish it provide it to the media. And then publish all these. And we achieved larger segments of the society. For instance, recently we had an architecture exchange between Armenia and Turkey based architects and restoration specialists*



*to assess Armenian culture heritage in Turkey. These experts engage in joint efforts to build trust and confidence between them but also they will produce the reports based on their findings which will be provided to the society. At large then the ordinary people will get knowledge and information from the report that was carried out the efforts of the professional group of people. So, this is our efforts to have an impact on professional confidence building but also national overwhelming conflict between the two societies.*

**Question 5:** Do you get positive results from your cooperation with other non-governmental organizations, international organizations or third countries in your activities? If there are such positive results, what are they?

*Not really. We do not include Georgia or Azerbaijan NGO or civil society group in our projects. Only Turkey but it is supported by European Union. So, it is projected is supported by EU and they approach Armenia Turkey based organizations including our organization EPF asking to implemented projected 2014. So, the international presence is there thanks to EU activities. And then we only engage in Armenia Turkey related topics that engage Armenia Turkey civil society groups, NGOs, business man etc. Only Armenia Turkey. However with one reservation that we are planning the activity of an international conference next year. We may also invite other players of the region from Georgia from Iran from Russia maybe and also Armenia Turkey obviously to discuss the potential of regional cooperation and the process of regional development Armenia Turkey relation. So, we may use the component by inviting different experts and different countries to understand and identify the issues that may positively or negatively aspects of Armenia Turkey relations. But, this is only plan we haven't done such thing so far.*

**Question 6:** Do you believe that the activities you are pursuing to develop Armenian-Turkish relations change the policies of the countries or the politicians' attitudes? If you believe that such changes are possible, can you give an example in this regard?

*I think we talked about it. I don't think we do influence politicians' perceptions. I cannot be sure we do not have any data or we don't do this. You know feedback service asking whether it changes I am not sure about it. I am not really confident speaking about this. However, I think that publishing our material by going*

*public by letting a lot of people including policy makers know about project, about the outcome of the project, about number of people engages in this projects I think this somehow effect their mentality their perception. But, I cannot sure to whole extent how much influential are these sources of projects that they influence policy makers. If we are judging objective reality if we were able to make any changes than progress would be also a political level. If we don't witness any political changes in terms of normalization opening the border or establishing diplomatic relation between Armenia and Turkey than it seems that our such projects don't influence very much their perceptions. But, again it is the matter of you know perception at some point given the positive political environment even the policy makers may be interested in breaking the impact and starting the reengage in the normalization process. And this also will be because of such projects. Because we provide opportunity for many ordinary Armenians and Turks to engage in dialog where is in the political level process is just scale may be. We aim at the long term change rather than very short term political changes. We understand it may not be possible on the political level to open the border right now. But, eventually such projects will have contribution also on policy makers' attitudes and the prejudices toward the normalization process.*

**APPENDIX 9: The interview of Global Political Trends Center (GPOT) with Prof. Dr. Mensur Akgün on November 17<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Istanbul, (Face -to-face interview).**

**The interview of Global Political Trends Center (GPOT) with Prof. Dr. Mensur Akgün on November 17<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Istanbul, (Face -to-face interview).**

**Question 1:** Do you have a specific audience that you are focusing on, such as a certain age group, occupation or gender, while conducting your activities? If there is such a specific group, what are the factors that are effective in determining these areas?

*Our target is the older age group. Here we have a center called GPOT. It's a small place. When I was in TESEV I was in charge of management.*

*We started the projects to support the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia.*

*We started the activities to support the step that both presidents have taken.*

*We started our meetings with retired ambassadors, senior retired generals, journalists and academics who proved oneself as Mehmet Ali Birand. We took them from both sides. The thing we discussed was always the same. How can we overcome difficulties in? how we can develop relationships? What needs to be done? Or something else.*

*We never talked about genocide. Has it been done? or not it? We never entered them. We entered the projects. We have done with Diaspora. How do you see the explanation that the prime minister did it on April 24th. 2014 not by stating an attitude with them? What needs to be done to improve it? We've been working on things like that. We shared these views with the state both in TESEV and in the studies we made here. Especially with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We prepared the reports. These are not very long reports. There were certain expectations. We shared these expectations. Our target for Armenia Turkey relations was the upper age group from Armenia and Turkey.*

**Question 2:** Do you think that your efforts are beneficial to establish interpersonal relationships, to reduce prejudice, to heal the past wounds and trauma? Do they help people to understand the perspective of the other side?

*It may be said, but I can not share it openly. One of the features of this second track is the relationships of yours with the state. Our relationships with the state is "One And Half Diplomacy". We took the initiative to isolate a few small problem. We conveyed their expectations to our side and made statements that would meet those expectations. And those explanations were at the top level. Our expectation was the normalization of the Armenia Turk relations. We didn't achieve this expectation totally but some of the achievement could be accomplished.*

*Of course we did not, but we attempted to keep it at a certain level after this process began with Obama's coming to power. It started at the end of 2008 and continued at the beginning of 2009. This process contributed to the management of relations with America at least. We have supported it as very modest.*

*These studies may benefit in the long term. Those grassroots activities which are under the pyramid have long-term benefits as you have dealt with. States and people know each other. A cumulative effect will surely be. But not like us. We were doing business on a highly realistic level. There should be a requirement for this. At the same time, we need to have political desire and determination of a new initiative. Then Obama and the 2008 crisis of Georgia emerged. A football match opportunity was born. Then there was a political desire to evaluate the suitable situation In Turkey. Russia was not against it. The Foreign Minister and the undersecretary of Turkey personally told me that we were informing Azerbaijan. So, we try to do is to normalize the relationships without breaking anything. We wanted to keep the balance. So that we did not act freely for the relations with Armenia and Turkey would be normal, no matter whatever happens.*

**Question 3:** Do you think that your activities can carry Armenia-Turkey conflict to the public agenda? Do they contribute to creating awareness and changes in public opinion?

*It happens as follows; we have probably made some contribution to the creation of a positive image of Armenia in Turkey. I can not say the same thing for Armenia. But it's not entirely negative either. What I wanted was to make them more*

*positive aspects of Turkey. There were stickers. But unfortunately the majority is stuck in the past. We already started this process to overcome the 1915, and they stayed there.*

**Question 4:** Do you receive any help from experts and academics while conducting your activities? (For example; working with an expert in the area of conflict resolution, personnel and activist trainings, academic cooperation, etc.) What are the contributions that these assistance and cooperation provide for your work?

*Yes. We have friends who work professionally. A friend of ours is Palestine and Turkish at the same time. I have a friend in Ghana. There were Americans. There was a friend who was a Turkish Armenians. My friend I work with is from in Slovakia. This center we built together. TESEV is more Turkey based institution. But we had also a Turkish Armenian friend there. Our work is usually in such a multinational structure.*

**Question 5:** Do you get positive results from your cooperation with other non-governmental organizations, international organizations or third countries in your activities? If there are such positive results, what are they?

*I am not called the third group of countries. But there are those who sponsor. In other words, one of the projects was taken from the European Union. If I remember correctly, one of the projects was taken from the Norwegian government. But they did not give us money and they came to us indirectly from the Norwegians. I guess that we had a meeting in Georgia. We also held a meeting in Georgia in order to attend the meeting in Azeris. Third group countries didn't join the Georgia meeting. The government of the Turkey always had the news about this meeting. Everything that was done in consultation with them.*

**Question 6:** Do you believe that the activities you are pursuing to develop Armenian-Turkish relations change the policies of the countries or the politicians' attitudes? If you believe that such changes are possible, can you give an example in this regard?

*You are only looking at the Armenian issue, but we are leaning on the issue of Israel Turkey. Since 2003, we have been organizing meetings about the Cyprus issue, publishing reports, publishing books, talking in the European parliament. We are talking about the isolation of Cypriot Turks. From time to time we bring together the*

*Cypriot Turks and the Greeks. So we are doing them. In my opinion, Conflict Resolution theory is actually a very useful approach when there is no contact in between parties. These are very important when there is no contact. So when you are in touch or in Cyprus, conversation is beneficial, but not much. Because people are already seeing each other. Now here is the same thing about the Armenian issue. When we contacted and spoke with the Armenians before the first time the president of Turkey went to Armenia. Its effect was different. It will work if there is a political spark on both sides. Otherwise, as far as I can see, it is not beneficial.*

*Conflict Resolution theorists say but not happens. In Cyprus, 5000 people from both sides are trained on conflict resolution. In 2004, a referendum was held. The Turks said yes. The Greeks said no. Of these, 2500 were Greeks. If they were Greek at 500,000, they would still say no. This is the same in the Azerbaijani Armenia conflict. We were going to various meetings with Azeri and Armenians. Inside they are very civilized. You drink two glasses in the evening; my friend who is from Azerbaijan says negative things. I mean it says it metaphorically, but it's actually in the past. He does not really say he will, but he thinks about it. But when you're sitting together, they are colleagues. The same is true of Israel in Palestine. After a while they are adopting the pattern of behavior. And the people there are spoken there are not staying out. It is becoming a professional cooperation there.*

*So you do not want to break your dreams, but you have to consider how you turn into an industry. It is useful if there is no useful contact if there is no useful contact with the political desire, but when people are going to recognize each other while they are going to do it, it is not an exercise that is very useful. It's not a very useful exercise to me if people only get to know each other and only do congress concerts. The most dangerous of which is the conflict resolution that they have learned so professionally. You will do it with an amateur spirit. You will look at what the other party wants. You also have to do this with people who are absolutely influential on the state. Then it will benefit. Otherwise, it will not benefit. Your feet should also come down to earth.*

*Despite Azerbaijan or Russia, these things are not going to happen. We need to be realistic. If we are realistic, then we can contribute to it.*

**APPENDIX 10: The interview of The Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM) with Aybars Görgülü on November 16<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Istanbul, (Face -to-face interview).**

**The interview of The Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM) with Aybars Görgülü on November 16<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Istanbul, (Face -to-face interview).**

**Question 1:** Do you have a specific audience that you are focusing on, such as a certain age group, occupation or gender, while conducting your activities? If there is such a specific group, what are the factors that are effective in determining these areas?

*The Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM) is a one year organization. We are working directly on topics that are of interest to political producers. Domestic and foreign politics in general. We do not have a very big limit to our work. At the same time, we are doing what we do to appeal to the general public as well. PODEM has semi-academic structure. Whatever the problem areas inside or outside of the politics in Turkey, we tend to go there. It was the same in Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV). The PODEM looks like TESEV.*

*The main purpose of our study was a normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations. We are a new organization as a PODEM. We haven't done yet any project about the relationship between Turkey and Armenia. However, we worked on the Armenians living in Turkey. What do they feel about issues in Turkey? And how is Turkish society looking at Armenian and genocide issues?*

*As the focus here is methodology studies were performed. And individual interviews were held with some opinion leaders. In this study, we asked how do you define 1915? We were asked questions like what do you think about the Armenians. We were chatting with the people a few basic areas. It was an Armenian-focused work. The picture of what the participants think was drawn. Apart from that, we are also working on Diaspora. We started working at TESEV and we will publish its report here at PODEM.*

*In this study, who is in the Diaspora? How do they look at Turkey? Do you have any expectations from Turkey? If you have, what is it? How do they look at the genocide issue, the steps taken by Turkey, the issue of compensation?*

*In fact, the purpose of this study is to introduce the Armenian Diasporas in the world to the Turkish public. Although the diaspora is a very large group, it is not well known by Turkish society. They are very heterogeneous group that live in many different points of the world. All of them have a separate agenda. The connection between them is also very broken. For example, Armenians in Australia and Armenians in Canada have almost no connection with each other. So, the aim of this study is recognition, understanding and explaining of the Diaspora in Turkey.*

**Question 2:** *Do you think that your efforts are beneficial to establish interpersonal relationships, to reduce prejudice, to heal the past wounds and trauma? Do they help people to understand the perspective of the other side?*

*Our ultimate goal is to normalize the Turkey Armenia relations relationships. To break the stereotypes and the prejudices of both Turks and Armenians. The issue of Armenians in 1915 is very important. One of the most important elements of their identities. On the other hand, 1915 is not very well known in Turkey what happened in that section of history. The suffering and the trauma of the Armenians really is unknown. They are always accused of betraying the Turks.*

*I do not know if you helped to overthrow prejudices. Breaking prejudices is not so easy. But at least, the Armenians might have thought that they have such sensitivity in Turks. If we give an example of the issue of prejudice; At the end of the year 2000, we conducted a study on Turkey Armenia relations in TESEV. In Anatolian universities, we have made programs that Armenian experts have participated in, especially in cities such as Adana and Kayseri where Armenians have lived before.*

*In this context, we held a conference at the University of Cukurova. Former Mayor of Yerevan was talking. He is a liberal one. He described the events not from a nationalist point of view but from his point of view. Then one of the students mentioned that I do not think of 1915 incidents as genocide but now I understand why you say genocide. There is also an empathy for the opponent's position. It is not even known that the Armenians had lived in Adana before by the students. We saw*



*this. Actually, it's not just about genocide. The Turks do not know how the Armenians lived in this land.*

*When these issues are learned, prejudices are broken on both sides against each other. In this context, thanks to civil society projects, many people went to Armenia. A lot of people from Armenia came here. I think they are absolutely broken, prejudices.*

*I think civil society activities like the scholarship program are good. They're making an impact. But when you look at the effects that these studies have created, there is no big impact. So, while these consortiums are being established, they have to be involved in some of the institutions, which also include advocacy and policymakers. Because if the activity you are trying to do is a lot of political work. You are trying to change an existing perspective in Turkey. You are trying to make people conscious.*

*But the institutions you choose to do this have a very narrow domain. I see this as a problem. The same is not true in Armenia. Because Armenia is a small country. There are not many institutions there. The number of institutions that can carry out such studies is also clear.*

*A step of political decision-makers is 100 times more powerful than what you do in terms of multiplier effects in society. For example, if the president comes out and says that you are shameful to Armenian, if you want the effect that will make it, you will be more than 100.000 scholarships.*

**Question 3:** Do you think that your activities can carry Armenia-Turkey conflict to the public agenda? Do they contribute to creating awareness and changes in public opinion?

*Things you write affect the perception of your public opinion.*

**Question 4:** Do you receive any help from experts and academics while conducting your activities? (For example; working with an expert in the area of conflict resolution, personnel and activist trainings, academic cooperation, etc.) What are the contributions that these assistance and cooperation provide for your work?

*We are working with academicians at PODEM. We do not do all the work ourselves. We are a very small team here. We are taking part in some of the projects. But we work with the academicians from the outside in the field, or on projects or*

*writing reports. We have cooperation with the private academy, but PODEM is not just an academic institution. In this sense, I can say that we receive academic help from outside*

**Question 5:** Do you get positive results from your cooperation with other non-governmental organizations, international organizations or third countries in your activities? If there are such positive results, what are they?

*Previously, there were articles we wrote together with Armenians. It was not easy to produce a common text when we were writing those reports with the Armenians. Everyone has their own point of view. You have a public opinion. Things you write do not want to affect your public perception. So we had to keep a balance according to him. If you are working with an Armenian institution, you have to protect the balance.*

*For example, we are more objective and more equitable when they approach the very hard case of Karabakh and genocide. If you put a piece of paper in a one-sided perspective, it becomes a one-sided newsletter. So, you have to put something in front of him. We tried to be more objective because we did not want to put something like that. In these studies, we understood the Armenian priorities and approaches to the issues.*

**Question 6:** Do you believe that the activities you are pursuing to develop Armenian-Turkish relations change the policies of the countries or the politicians' attitudes? If you believe that such changes are possible, can you give an example in this regard?

*I think it is absolutely. But there is a need to increase state penetration studies. For example, you did a study in order that Armenians would look at Turkey like this. Somehow this should go to the hands of politicians. Then they take this sensitivity into account when they produce policies in the future. Many people make decisions by looking at the materials that come in front and they are dealing with politics.*

*If you do not come up with something about this topic in front of you, you act like it's gone. Obviously politics is difficult to influence. But I think it is not so. There are many advisors in the government of the state. You do not have to go and tell the politicians directly. You can reach it in one way.*

*This is our view as PODEM. Whatever the government is, whoever does politics, you should talk to them. We do not find it very meaningful that non-governmental organizations and think tanks are the opposition of the politicians. Whoever is ruling, who controls this country, you should speak to them. Otherwise, political parties will make the opposition. We must catch a common language.*

*If we are working to make Turkey go further, we will not do this without talking to people. People should take care of what you write, what you do. Otherwise, there is no point in what you do.*

*I think Grassroots is important. I think none of them are not more important than each other. But this kind of consortium's target groups should be led more politics. It is also difficult. I understand it too. The consortium established with America also had a political foot. we were taking part in that political foot As TESEV. What does the political foot mean. That means; For example one day a border will be opened Turkey Armenia relations will normalize. The Economy Ministry says are we ready for this? Start with such a question. What steps will be taken after opening the border? What does the Ministry of Customs do in this regard? Maybe bring the bureaucrats together rather than the upper side on both sides and talk about it. I mean that when I say politics foot.*

*For example, if you have started a project, it is very difficult to do so. Turkey has no relationship with Armenia. It is very difficult for civil society to bring together an official Turkish officer and an official Armenian officer. So, that area could not sustain. We attempted to do such a study with International Center for Human Development (ICHD) in David Hovhannisyan administration who is now a member of parliament. ICHD and TESEV partnered with*

*We would make political foot. In the consortium supported by USA. We would meet over skype.*

*We, as TESEV, will bring three officials from the ministry. They would bring it. And we would talk. From their point of view it might seem. But such a thing is very difficult in Turkey. This did not happen. So political foot fall down. The next consortium never had a political foot. They focused more on things like cultural exchange programs, scholarship programs. You should consider the facts of life in your project. But, this not easy.*