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MASTER'S THESIS

THE DIVERGENCE IN THE PATHS OF MODERNIZATION OF JAPAN AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE 19TH CENTURY

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ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

19. Yüzyılda Japonya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Modernleşme Yolundaki Farklılaşma

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Modernleşme çalışmaları, modernleşmiş devletlerin nasıl modernleştiğini açıklamaya ve diğer ulusların kendi modernleşme çabalarında kullanmaları için bir reçete bulmaya çalışmaktadır. İlk modernleşmiş ulusların deneyimleri 19. yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Japonya tarafından Batıdan ithal edilmiş ve kullanılmıştır. Japonya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan geç başlasa da, modernleşme girişiminde çok başarılı olmuştur ve 1902'de Büyük Britanya ve ABD gibi devletlerle eşit hale gelmiştir. Öte yandan Osmanlılar uzun modernleşme sürecinde başarısız olmuş ve 1922'de dağılmıştır.

Modernleşmeyi ilk modernleşen devletler tarafından eşit görülmek olarak tanımladıktan sonra; Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Japonya'nın modernleşme sürecini Uluslararası Bağlam ve Siyasi Durum, Ekonomik Yapı ve Büyüme, Sosyal Yapı ve Eğitim olarak üç alt kategoriye ayırabiliriz. Bu alt kategoriler de dönemlere bölünür ve dört döneme ayrılır: Modernite Öncesi Dönem, Modernleşmenin Şafağı, Modernleşme Süreci ve Netice.

Modernite öncesi dönemde, Japonya daha eğitimli bir nüfusa ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda bulunmayan bir üst sınıfa sahipti, Japonya yavaş yavaş merkezileşirken, Osmanlılar daha sonraki dönemlerde modernleşme sürecini engelleyen disentralizasyon sürecindeydi. Takip eden dönemde, her iki ülke de

reform ihtiyacının farkındaydı ve bu dönemde Japonya'nın modernleşmiş ulusların diplomasi methodlarını ve teknolojisini hızlı bir şekilde öğrenerek diğer uluslara yetişme konusundaki yeteneğini görüyoruz. Osmanlılar, modernleşme çabalarının ilerlemesini engelleyen iç çatışmalar içindeydi. Osmanlıların süreci bütün bir devlet aygıtı olarak herhangi bir engelle karşılaşmadan başlatması uzun zaman aldı.

Modernleşme Süreci bölümünde, tüm devlet aygıtı olarak Japonya, modernleşmiş Batı ile imzaladıkları kapitülasyonları kaldırmak için devleti mümkün olan en kısa sürede modernize etmek istemiştir. Japonya, 40 yıllık mücadeleden sonra bu konuda başarılı olmuştur. Öte yandan, II.Mahmud'dan sonra Osmanlılar gelişmeye konsantre olma yeteneğini kaybetmiştir. Birçok kez taht ve bürokrasi, modernleşme sürecini yavaşlatan, bazen onu durduran ve hatta gerileten bir güç mücadelesine girmiştir. Japonya, modernleşme yanlısı devlet adamlarının muhafazakarlara karşı kazandığı zafer sayesinde sadece tek bir sorun yaşamıştır. Süreç hiç durmamıştır, ancak dönem boyunca hükümetin ihtiyaçlarına göre şekil değiştirmiştir. Bu dönemde Osmanlı ekonomisi temerrüde düşmüştür, bu da modern ulusların gözünde sahip olduğu tüm güvenilirliği yok etmiştir. Japonya ekonomisi ise Merkez Bankası sistemi ile daha büyük ve daha güçlü hale gelmiştir. Japonya'nın ilk emperyalist eğilimleri de bu dönemde ortaya çıkar.

Netice Bölümünde, Japonya, 1902'de Büyük Britanya ile yaptığı ittifak Anlaşması ile modern bir ulus olarak kabul edilmiştir ve 1905'te bir Batı ülkesi olan Rusya'yı yendikten sonra gücünü sağlamlaştırmıştır. Altın standardını benimsemek, Japon ekonomisinin güvenilirliğini artırmış ve Japonya, Güneydoğu Asya'yı istila etmek için ağır sanayisini geliştirirken yatırımlar Japonya'ya yağmıştır. Osmanlılar, tahtın gücünü sonsuza kadar deviren bir devrim geçirmiş ve bürokrasi kendi içinde iç çatışmalar yaşarken İmparatorluğu kurtarmak için devleti modernize etmeye çalışmıştır. İç çatışmalar çözümlendiğinde, İmparatorluk, kendini hiç bitmeyen savaşların içinde bulmuş; bu da modernleşmeye odaklanma çabalarını engellemiş ve sonunda İmparatorluğun çöküşüne neden olmuştur.

Japonya'nın modernleşme süreci, kendi modernleşme çabaları için yararlı olan yeni kurum oluşturan ve eski kurumu yok eden yıkıcı bir süreçti. Bununla birlikte, Osmanlılar 19.yüzyıl boyunca böyle bir yıkıcı sürece girmeyerek, modernleşme sürecini büyük ölçüde engelleyen eski kurumların yanı sıra yeni kurumlar kurarak iki başlılık yarattılar. Avrupa'ya coğrafi yakınlık, farklı din ve dilleri kullanan heterojen etnik gruplara sahip olmak Osmanlılar için bir engel haline geldi. Japonya, sosyal dönüşüm sürecinde bir engel haline gelen bu konulardan hiçbirine sahip değildi.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Meiji, Japonya, Tanzimat, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Batılılaşma, modernleşme, siyasi dönüşüm, sosyal dönüşüm, ekonomik dönüşüm.

ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

The Divergence in the Paths of Modernization of Japan and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century

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Modernization studies try to explain how modernized states modernized and to find recipe for other nations to use their own modernization efforts. The first modernized nations' experiences were initially used and imported in 19th century by The Ottoman Empire and Japan. Japan although starting late than the Ottoman Empire, was very successful in its modernization attempt, and became an equal state to the likes the Great Britain and the US in 1902. The Ottomans on the other hand failed their long modernization process and dissolved in 1922.

After defining modernization as being regarded an equal by the first modernized states, the Ottoman Empire and Japan's modernization process is divided into three sub categories as International Context and Political Situation, Economic Structure and Growth, Social Structure and Education. These sub categories are also periodized and divided into four periods called: Pre-modern period, Dawn of Modernization, Process of Modernization, and Aftermath.

In pre-modern period, Japan had more educated population and upper class which was nonexisted in the Ottoman Empire, Japan was gradually getting centralized but the Ottomans were in the process of decentralization which hindered the modernization process in the later periods. In the consequent period, both nations were aware for the need for reforms and in this period we see Japan's ability to catch up to the other nations by learning the ways of diplomacy and technology of the modernized nations quickly. The Ottomans were

having internal conflicts hindering the progression of modernization efforts. It took a long time for the Ottomans to start the process unhindered as a whole state apparatus.

In the Process of modernization, Japan as the whole state apparatus wanted to modernize the state as soon as possible to overturn unequal treaties they signed with the modernized West. Japan was successful at this after 40 years of struggle. On the other hand, after Mahmud II, the Ottomans lost its ability to concentrate on the progression. There were many times the throne and bureaucracy went into power struggle which slowed down the modernization process, and sometimes halted it and even regressed it. Japan only had one such struggle thanks to modernizers' victory over the conservatives. The process never stopped, however it changed shape according to the government's needs throughout the period. The Ottoman's economy defaulted in this period which destroyed any credibility it had in the eyes of the modernized nations, while Japan's economy was getting bigger and stronger with the central banking system. Japan's initial imperialistic tendencies also surfaced in this period.

In the Aftermath, Japan accomplished becoming a modern nation by the alliance treaty with the Great Britain in 1902 and cemented its power after defeating a western nation, Russia in 1905. Adopting the gold standard raised the credibility of Japanese economy, and investments poured into Japan while Japan developing their heavy industry to invade Southeast Asia. The Ottomans had a revolution which toppled the throne's power for good and bureaucracy hastily tried to modernize the state to save the empire while having internal conflicts themselves. When the internal conflicts were resolved, the empire found itself in never ending wars which crippled the effort focusing on modernization and eventually caused the downfall of the Empire.

The modernization process of Japan was a destructive one, destroying the old establishment to create a new establishment, useful for their own modernization efforts. However, the Ottomans never accomplished such a task and even created dualities by establishing new institutions besides the old ones that mostly hindered the modernization process throughout the 19th century. Geographical proximity to Europe, having heterogeneous ethnic groups with

different religions and languages turned into a roadblock for the Ottomans. Japan had none of these issues that became an obstacle in the social transformation process.

Keywords: Meiji, Japan, Tanzimat, The Ottoman Empire, westernization, modernization, political transformation, social transformation, economic transformation.

THE DIVERGENCE IN THE PATHS OF MODERNIZATION OF JAPAN AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE 19TH CENTURY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER TWO

COMPARISON OF THE DAWN OF MODERNIZATION PERIOD OF JAPAN AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

CHAPTER THREE

COMPARISON OF THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION PERIOD OF JAPAN AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

CHAPTER FOUR

COMPARISON OF JAPAN AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE AFTERMATH PERIOD

LIST OF TABLES

INTRODUCTION

I. PURPOSE AND MOTIVATION

The essence and successful / unsuccessful aspects of Turkish modernization have been debated for decades and comparative studies are carried out on this subject. In particular, it will be enlightening to understand the differentiating aspects of Turkey's modernization adventure from other countries that began their modernization at similar times.

Japan’s modernization process and its success was a phenomenon to be reckoned with; thus, to understand how it happened, many scholars from various fields flocked over its story. According to Arthur Koestler, “the Japanese burst like a pressure cooker and disrupted everything in those times. With an immense velocity, they hit the world, everything that the West reached and thought of, was absorbed by them and in a very short amount of time, Japan had overcome the Renaissance, Enlightenment and industrial revolution which took the West hundreds of years.” (Turgut, 1985: 352-353). The Ottoman Empire, although starting nearly half a century earlier of its modernization process from Japan, had minimal to no success in its endeavors and eventually collapsed.

The study is concerned with Japan and Ottoman Empire’s industrial development and integration to the international economy. The method that Gilbert Rozman has used in his book “*The Modernization of China*” will be used to scrutinize the developments. The method uses three categories to investigate a modernization process; these are international context and political situation, economic structure and growth, social structure and education. These categories will lay out the objective side of the modernization process with presenting hard data. The subjective sides of the modernization such as leaders’ and elites’ approach to modernization in their respective countries will also be examined. Historical experiences are important tools to learn from mistakes and find answers to contemporary problems for countries who strive to be rich and strong. Thus, a comparative study underlying the differences between the two modernization processes would be useful to contribute to the field.

To understand both the subjective and objective sides of the modernization process, the study will be based on the following research questions that attempt to cover the subjective and objective dimensions of modernization. To explain objective sides of modernization; such as international context and political situation, economic structure and growth, social structure and education;

1) How did Japan's and the Ottoman Empire's paths of modernization become diverted respective to each other?

2) In what ways did the elements of historical context such as their economic, social and political structures in the 19th century effect the outcome?

In addition, to explain subjective sides such as leaders' and elites' approach to modernization;

3) How did Japan and the Ottoman Empire approach the modernization in the 19th century? Were these different approaches the main cause of divergence of the two modernization paths?

II. THE DEFINITION OF MODERNIZATION

To avoid controversy, I need to define the term "modernization" properly to build my thesis upon it. If we understand modernization as any one country that is trying to reach or be like this other particular country, we can say that modernization existed since the dawn of civilizations (Heper, 1973: 17).

I find Gilbert Rozman's definition that he used in his book, *The Modernization of China*, very useful as a starting point. He says, "We view modernization as the process by which societies have been and are being transformed under the impact of the scientific and technological revolution." (Rozman, 1981: 3). However, this statement would be insufficient to explain the modernization of Japan and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. Neither state had any economic or social changes that would enable them to make a breakthrough in science or technology that could be regarded as revolutionary.

If we dub England, France and the United States the first comers as in first modernized states (Eisenstadt, 2014: 11), Japan and the Ottoman Empire would be the late comers. Just as any other late comers would have done, they pitched the first comers as role models, which happened to be the western countries (Western Europe and Northern America) (Sinai, 1964: 215), and started to borrow military science from them. Thus, modernization in late comers were also seen as westernization, due to the borrowing from the West. Especially the Ottoman Empire, unlike Japan, having constant and various relations with the West, got coerced into describing any reform that would make them strong and able again as westernization. In this sense, modernization is described as borrowing the West's superstructure and implementing it to another country (Heper, 1973: 19). What I mean by being a modernized country when non-western nations are concerned is to be regarded as an equal by the "first comer" states. Japan achieved this with Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, crumbled with the Great War.

Modernization process covers how to become a nation, a gesellschaft, and to develop in socio-economic sense that includes political and bureaucratic modernization gradually in time (Heper, 1973: 27). Therefore, I prefer to use the term "modernization" rather than "westernization" in my thesis.

III. THE REASON FOR COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MODERNIZATIONS

This study will be a comparative study; therefore, it is necessary to mention about comparative studies first. Comparative study is a research approach in which two or more cases are explicitly contrasted to each other regards to a specific phenomenon or along a certain dimension, in order to explore parallels and differences among the cases (Azarian, 2011: 113).

As a planned and coordinated initiative, the Ottoman modernization starts with Selim III (1789-1807) (Turhan, 1969: 192-193) and his letter to France asking for instructors and technicians in autumn of 1793 (Lewis, 1969: 39). The Japanese modernization starts with the shock that Commodore Perry of the US and his diplomatic and military expedition created in Japan in 1853. The Ottomans increased their efforts after the Auspicious Incident in 1826 under Mahmud II and Japan with Meiji Restoration in 1868.

There are many similarities and differences between the two. At the time, both were feudal states. Agriculture was the foundation of their economies. The population of both countries were around the same. In 19^{th} century, the Ottomans were struggling to hold on to their very life against an ever-growing Russian threat and effects of French Revolution on its non-Muslim subjects. Japan was getting out of a two hundred and fifty years of isolation with economic capitulations given to the West which were taken by threat of using lethal weapons which the Japanese never seen before. The reforms of modernization for both of the countries were born out life threatening actions of the West; Japan was on the verge of being colonized and the Ottomans dismantled. Both countries first tried to reform the military as it constitutes the outer and the most basic reform of any modernization attempt.

The differences are also striking: Japan's territories were extended only over an archipelago whereas the Ottomans was ruling over a vast empire extended on three continents. Japan was de facto ruled by a warlord called Shogun and had also an Emperor who was spiritual leader and had symbolic political powers. The Japan was nearly a homogenous state. Buddhism, Shintoism and Confucianism as religious and ethical doctrines were practiced side by side. The Ottomans were consisted of many different communities such as a Muslim majority and Christian and Jewish minorities. The Sultan who was in charge was also a Muslim. In Japan, the lands belonged to the daimyos, minor warlords who answered only to the Shogun. The Ottoman Sultan was the owner of all the lands in the Empire however due to the great magnitude of the lands, lost the influence gradually over time, and ayans, local notables, began to assert their dominance over territories.

In addition, during the implementation and follow up of the reforms, the divergence of these two countries becomes much more apparent. Comprehending the reasons of this divergence is worth studying.

IV. LITERATURE REVIEW

Regarding the modernization of Japan and the Ottoman Empire, there are plethora of studies, both in English, Turkish and Japanese. There are also collaborations from scientists whose academic backgrounds are different from each other that tried to analyze certain aspects of both nations' modernizations in a comparative way.

I am going to divide this section into three. In the first part, I am going to review the authors that deals with Japan's history and modernization. In the second part, I am going to review the authors dealing with the Ottoman Empire's history and modernization. Lastly, in the third part, I am going to review the authors that compare these two countries in terms of modernization.

To begin with the studies on Japanese Modernization; *The Meiji Restoration* by W.G. Beasley (1972) is a meticulous inspection of how the Meiji restoration came to be. Beasley explains how the Tokugawa regime started to lose power, the Western impact on the disillusion of the power of Tokugawa, and dissolution of Tokugawa regime consequently in great detail. While inspecting that, he looks at both internal and external problems such as unequal treaties and subsequent samurai discontent against the Shogunate as the causes of dissolution. He inspects the restoration of power to the Emperor Meiji, and Meiji government's initial governmental problems and status of economy and society in early Meiji years. The book suggests that Imperial restoration was a response, which was kindled by nationalism against the expansion of the West over Asia.

The Cambridge History of Japan: Volume 5: The Nineteenth Century, The Making of Modern Japan edited by Marius B. Jansen (1989) is a part of the book series that narrates the complete history of Japan. This particular volume looks at the 19th century Japan. Jansen, as the editor, leans on every area of change in Japan, namely political structure, social change, economic change, the institutions, the attitudes of the elite, the international relations and becoming a part of the Western nations. The book explains the social stratification of Japan before the modernization, and how the social change fit into the modernization process. It looks at the Meiji Conservatism through the government’s attempts to stop liberal ideas and regain its dominance through a number of programs, after two decades of Western adoption and influence. This conservative reaction will be compared with the reaction against Tanzimat reforms to draw out the similarities and dissimilarities.

Japan: Tradition & Transformation the other book of Edwin O. Reischauer with Albert Craig (1989) is very detailed book about the transformation of Japan. The authors remark many areas, especially political and international history. He suggests that Japan, despite the modernization process, which included reformation of many political, economic and social institutions, had preserved its basic self-identity and a considerable part of its tradition and culture, by remolding it with some western additions, thus creating something unique for Japan only. This book explains how this remolding took place, and which parts of the Japanese state were affected from this.

In *The Roots of Modern Japan,* Jean-Pierre Lehmann (1982) dissects the Meiji period into spheres such as economy, elites, society, industry etc. rather than historical sequence. He advocates that the Japanese answer to modernization was a dialectic. He sees the modern history of Japan as a dialectical process between economic base and cultural superstructure. It could not be possible to keep the traditional culture constant while changing the other parts of the society and state. This process occurs as an action-reaction. This creates a dialectic and something new, different from the western culture, however still modern. The book suggests that Japan had the conditions for modern growth such as cohesive and homogeneous society, linguistic and geographic unity, unlike Ottoman Empire.

In *Modern Japan: A Social and Political History*, Elise Lipton (2008) tells the history of Japan from the early Tokugawa period in the 17^{th} century to the early years of the 21^{st} century. She covers political, economic and military developments of Japan and how they affected the lives of the ordinary people, especially giving insights about the women's conditions. In *Peasants, Rebels, Women and Outcasts: The Underside of Modern Japan,* Mikiso Hane (1982) states that the modernization made little change in the quality of life for the rural people and the poor who came out of the villages and worked in the mines, the factories, and the brothels. Any changes were mostly for the worse, and even when improvements occurred, the rural areas lagged behind the urban areas in their pace of change.

In his articles *Religious Freedom Under the Meiji Constitution I and II,* Abe Yoshiya (1968, 1969) suggests that even though the liberal ideas of the West were adopted with modernization in the early Meiji period; religious freedoms were limited and only adopted by the Meiji government with a bad grace after the protest of the West for Christianity and popular protests for Buddhism.

In *Negotiating with Imperialism*, Michael R. Auslin (2004) shed light to the Japanese leader's understanding of the modern world that the Japanese started to experience after 1858. It looks at the Tokugawa and Meiji government's attitude and how it adapted to the international environment, and used the negotiations as resistance against the West.

Sydney Crawcour (1997) in his article *Industrialization and Technological Change, 1885-1920,* suggests that the situation of Japan as a late comer to modernization was an advantage to Japanese state to involve and coordinate the economic activities in contrast of Western countries. The experience of Western countries was in front of the Japanese state, and it used this experience to develop its industries in a short time but not without a trial and error.

In *Japanese Economic Development: Theory and Practice*, Penelop Francks (1999) suggests that the Japanese economic progress during the Meiji period has differed profoundly from Western models regards to the importance of the free market. Japan's development policy in Meiji period was not one of the pursuit of a predetermined state target or product of dominant state leadership, but rather a consensus between private sector and the state over the national goals. She also mentions that Tokugawa period’s economic life was the reason that facilitated Japanese people’s transition to Meiji period’s industrialization effort.

In *Japonya'da Toprak Düzeni ve Kapitülasyonlar,* Selçuk Esenbel (2012)*;* claims Tokugawa land regime with its land tax and domestic capital accumulation, sustained the development of 19th century Japanese capitalism. She points out that the Japan's modernization history followed the “classical” model, sustaining a resource flow from agricultural economy to industry via state channel, which was in parallel with England, Germany and Russia.

In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey edited by* Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (1964), R. P. Dore suggests that Tokugawa period’s Confucian education made solid foundations for modernization efforts, which would be coming in the later years. The elementary education of Meiji period was used to indoctrinate nationalism and heal social divisions of Tokugawa.

When we come to the Ottoman Empire, In *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Niyazi Berkes (1998) tries to explain the modernization process of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey went through in respect of the endeavor of separation of state and church. Essentially, he sees modernization is somewhat equal to secularization, which the Empire, and the Republic afterwards, struggled to institutionalize. He depicts this struggle as “getting rid of the forces of tradition, which tend to promote the domination of religion and sacred law”. This domination makes societies static due to impossibility of modification of tradition and sacred law it dominates. The state and society cannot change or modify itself for the crisis they come up against and eventually crumble under it. He shows this situation in many periods the Empire went through during the modernization process. In *Türk Düşününde Batı Sorunu*, Berkes (2018) mentions three elements that resisted change in the Ottoman Empire. The first of these was the reactionary elements that exist in the Ottoman's internal structure. Another factor was the conditions of the world politics of the times (imperialism) when the modernization movement was initiated, which brought the inability to implement any policy in a stable way. The third factor is the inadequacy of the elites who would carry out reforms both at the intellectual and at the economic level. On the other hand, In *Tanzimat'tan Sonra Aşırı Batılılaşma,* Şerif Mardin (1991) claims that the factors that hinder modernization and were called "religious", sometimes not entirely religious, and structural factors were hidden behind religion. The values of the warrior groups in the Ottoman social structure, the neighborhood as the center of society, redistributive morality and the partial monopoly of the political class on wealth, in this case, are the source of conservatism.

In *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Bernard Lewis (1969) firstly looks at history of Ottomans and Turkey, in chronological order, to find out turning points of change. Secondly, it deals with the aspects of change, namely: the sense of identity, transformation of government, religion, economic and social order. He claims that the most important stimulus for a change came not from the diplomatic pressure of the western powers, but from the former subjects of the Empire that rioted and humiliated the traditional institutions of the Empire at the beginning of the 19th century. His insights about the clash of Islam and Christianity causing subsequent cultural isolation of the Empire which made the Empire oblivious about the social change in Europe was in support of Berkes' views.

History of The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 by Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw (1977) gives a detailed analysis of the Ottoman Empire's reform period. The Authors claim that main problems that the Ottomans had stemmed from external forces such as capitulations and external borrowing, military pressures of the

West and Russia, and Russia's meddling of millet system. The government's inability to reform the millet system accelerated the disintegration under this pressure.

In *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, İlber Ortaylı (1987) claims that the Tanzimat era was the resistance of a struggling society that had been in contact with the West since the 11th century to resist economically strong, industrial Western civilization. The Tanzimat rulers combined conservatism and utilitarian reformism in their characters and became the only representatives or pioneers of the new man in the 19th century Ottoman society with their worldviews, ways of behavior and policies. Nevertheless, it was obvious that this new Ottoman type willfully maintained the way of life and worldview of the old society. The Tanzimat intellectual had realized that it was necessary to change and direct events in order to exist in the modern world, from the conservative manager to the opposition writer. In the middle of the 19th century, the Ottoman intellectuals was approaching Western life style and Western culture with a clear comfort. However, the fact that social and cultural change created a pronounced xenophobic reaction was undeniable. Tanzimat period was not a revolution in the history of Turkey, but was a movement that brought out the results that prepared the revolution. He also suggests that there is a western civilization, but western civilization is not a solid union. Ortaylı criticizes the concept of “westernization” as to how modernization could not be contained by this term alone, but also it cannot be thought separate from it. In *Batılılaşma Yolunda*, İlber Ortaylı (2007) explains Tanzimat and Constitutional era from different perspectives. According to him, the elites’ and the society's mindsets, religious conversions after the Declaration of Tanzimat, and the press were the important parts of Tanzimat era. The first Ottoman parliament, administrative modernization and Mithad Pasha's example, the industrialization attempts from the Ottoman bureaucracy, religion and secularism of the Empire, the minorities and their attitudes in the Empire were the important parts of the Constitutional era. In *Modernleşme ve Doğululuk-Batılılık Çekişmesi*, Ortaylı (2009) claims that political and social pressure which the government and institutions such as schools, mosques, medreses and family suffocated political and intellectual life in the Ottoman Empire. He suggests that the millet system was the instigator of the pressure, which made the communities in it disinterested and secluded from outside world.

Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876 by Roderic H. Davison (1963) reviews a 20-year period, expanding from late Tanzimat to the Constitutional Era. He tries to look at the problems that the Ottomans have, and how these problems were met in the process of modernization. He suggests that even though the Tanzimat period had its failures, it also made some aspects of the Empire better, for example administration became efficient, justice system bettered itself and western legal codes were partly enforced. He also states that the elites of the Empire, particularly Ali, Fuad and Mithad Pashas were very much cautious in their reforms, and not reckless westernizers. He claims that the biggest failure of the Tanzimat elites was the attempt of holding the Empire together through Ottomanism. In *Azgelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye*, Stefanos Yerasimos (1975) argues that the Ottoman Empire's transformation into a dependent state that occurred in the 19th century started long before the 19th century, and its economic colonization was realized due to the attitude of the ruling elites that were in alliance with the colonial powers in Tanzimat period. In *Türkiye'de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi*, İsmail Cem (2007) claims that the westernization had been adopted by rich groups in the Ottoman Empire as a natural consequence of the socio-economic features it brought to the Empire, and it created more earning opportunities for these groups. However, this liberalization had led to a more convenient exploitation of the people. The economic characteristics that were the basis of westernization were not visible to the public. The public who were getting poorer due to this exploitation noticed only the attire change, men-women relations and lifestyle change that were on the outer surface of modernization. The public could not understand the economic function of these changes and reacted to them as reacting to westernization.

In *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Millet Sistemi ve Tanzimat* Cevdet Küçük (2006) criticizes the idea of Ottomanism just as Davison does. He claims that Tanzimat Charter and Reform Edict turned the Ottoman state into a state that had no basis of sovereignty. The Muslim-Turkish subjects instead of reacting this situation with nationalistic rising, turned to constitutionalism and parliamentarism under Ottomanism. Non-Muslims' nationalistic tendencies fed the religious reactions instead of nationalistic reactions which hammered the emergence of Turkish nationalism until the end of the Empire which was one of the necessary ingredient of modernization effort to reach fruition. In *War and Society under the Young Turks, 1908-1918*, Ahmad

Feroz (1988) claims that although the Young Turks' modernization efforts created classes that have commitment to the survival of the Turkish Nation, much of the peasantry in Anatolia remained untouched by the reforms.

In *The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire*, Roderic H. Davison (1990) states that the progress the Empire made towards establishing democratic institutions was one the important aspects of the Empire's modernization attempt. He claims that 1877 and 1878 meetings of the parliament were so successful in projecting the representatives' ideals and constructive criticisms for the Empire, the Sultan Abdülhamid who had different ideas about ruling the state had to close down the parliament.

In *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*, Şevket Pamuk (2000) claims that the sharp increase of the inflation and debasement occurred in the early decades of the 19th century, just before the Tanzimat, not in the 18th century. Due to this conclusion, he suggests the real economic decline of the Empire occurred in the 19th century, during the era of Selim III and Mahmud II. In *Uneven Centuries Economic Development of Turkey since 1820*, Şevket Pamuk (2018) states that the reforms were useful for non-Muslim merchants and agricultural producers in the coastal regions of the Empire. The urban notables and other elites in the provinces who had gained power by the tax revenues in the earlier centuries experienced a decline in their wealth and political power, and this situation caused a great resentment among the Muslims who lost their wealth but also faced the same tax regime of the state. The centralizing reforms and the opening of the economy to globalization were accompanied by the rise of identity cleavages throughout the Empire.

In the comparative works, we see *Japonya ve Türkiye Çağdaşlaşma Tarihinin Karşılaştırması*, Selçuk Esenbel (1999) in which she states that the economic mentality of the Ottomans and Japan were different. Japan saw exporting as a fatal part of its state due to its needs for capital; on the other hand, the Ottomans were cold to exporting and very open to importing, and followed an anti-mercantilist policy due to its trust in itself for being an autarky, seeing its subjects' welfare as the most delicate issue. In *Alacakaranlık Diplomasisi: Japonların Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na İlgisi*, Esenbel (2012) states that the Asianism movement which rose in Meiji Japan after the earlier decades of the restoration made Japan sought an identity in the Ottomans to build against the West. This movement, eventually, affected the Young Turks for the revolution of 1908. After the Japanese-Russian War of 1905, Japan transformed and saw itself as a Great Power, and lost its romantic interest in the Ottomans and looked the Ottoman lands as an economic source to be used. In *Japon-Rus Savaşı'nın Osmanlı Türkiye'si Üzerindeki Etkisi*, Esenbel (2012) claims that Russia's defeat at the hands of Japan made Russia to turn its attention to the Balkans and accelerated the downfall the Ottoman Empire just in a decade. In *18. ve 19. Yüzyılda Türkiye ve Japonya Modernleşmesi Üzerine Düşünceler,* Esenbel (2012) suggests that the divergence of the Ottomans and Japan about technological and science transfer from West based upon early Meiji leaders' radical attitude of adopting the Western civilization in full in the early Meiji period. Their daredevil attitude accelerated the embracement of the Western civilization and created the Modern Japan. In *Medeni Davranışın Aczi: Türk ve Japon Modernleşmesinin "Uygarlık Süreci" Kavramı Açısından Mukayesesi*, Esenbel (2012) states that the 19th century Meiji Japanese and Ottoman Turkish elite incorporated the western culture into their lives as part of a "civilization process" necessary for the reform environment of the age, and created their own eclectic culture models. The Japanese incorporated the Western and Japanese elements separately for the same contemporary society. This created a sharp duality and prevented the synthesis of the two cultures (Western/Japanese). The Ottoman Turkish approach, on the other hand, was based on abandoning of old elements altogether and adopting the Western elements. However, in reality, these two structures were mixed and balanced themselves as the years went on.

In *Türk ve Japon Çağdaşlaşmasında Laiklik Sorunsalı*, Kihara Yumiko (1999) claims that Meiji Japan gave importance to reconciliation of its traditions and new elements rather seeking "the ideal religion", which facilitated Meiji government's religious reforms. She also adds the term "Tenno", the myth saying that the Japanese Emperor is the descendant of the gods was a traditional element of Japan which was promoted by the Meiji government and it did not have a similarity with the idea of "Caliph" which was promoted by Hamidian Ottomans, rather it was similar with the idea of returning to Turkic origins promoted in the Republican era.

These writers, both in English and Turkish, try to give an explanation to why Japan was relatively successful and the Ottoman Empire was not in their endeavors in the paths of modernization.

There are also journal articles and books that give statistical data in various areas, which will be used in the thesis.

V. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMPARISON

Geography, culture, social classes, education, international relations, economy and industrialization, and integration of these two countries to the international economic system will be looked at. While explaining these categories, they will be divided into historical periods such as pre-modern period, the dawn of modernization, the process of modernization, and the aftermath of modernization. A table related to this is below.

Table 1. Historical Periods of Modernization of Japan and the Ottoman Empire

	Japan	**Ottoman Empire**
Pre-modern period	Until Commodore Perry's arrival in 1853	Until the Letter of Selim III to France asking for personnel in 1793
Dawn of modernization	From Perry's arrival in 1853 until Imperial Restoration of 1868	From the beginning of Selim III's initiatives until the Auspicious Event in 1826
Process of modernization	From Meiji's ascension in 1868 until Sino-Japanese War of 1895	From Auspicious Event in 1826 until 1908 Revolution
The Aftermath	From Sino-Japanese War of 1895 until Emperor Meiji's Death in 1912	From 1908 revolution until the Dissolution of the Empire in 1918

Sources: (Berkes, 1998; Lewis, 1969; Liao, 2006: 6)

These divisions are necessary to compare the periods of modernization between two states more thoroughly. Why these dates are chosen to divide the timeline will be explained.

The Ottoman Empire, unlike Japan, had plethora of contacts with the West; actually, it was never out of contact (Berkes, 1998: 24). The constant wars and trade always sustained a degree of relation. Before the Tulip Era (1718-1730), Ottomans' superiority complex as the banner man state of Islam against the Christian states of the West stood its ground even after Karlowitz Treaty (1699). At last, with Passarowitz Treaty (1718) the Empire understood it became inferior relative to the West (Berkes, 1998: 30). There were unsystematic borrowing and imitating throughout 18th century (Turgut, 1985: 357), but systematic reforms started with Selim III.

Japan on the other hand was an isolated state during pre-modern period. After 1637 revolt, it had little contact with the West, only through the Dutch resided in secluded Dejima in Nagasaki. Same systematic approach of the Ottomans can be seen in Japan after Commodore Perry's arrival to Japan in 1853. The Tokugawa government accepted the West's superiority very early on and conceded the Unequal Treaties in 1858 (Gordon, 2003: 50) which Turkish readers also know this term as "capitulations". The Ottomans had a very violent period over the military reforms due to the opposition of the traditional army, but Japan was much calmer. This is called "the dawn", because at last both of the states admitted that they needed to change in dates given.

After the acceptance of the West's superiority, the changes started systematically, especially in the military. I call this period "the process" due to the excess amount of reforms initiated throughout the decades. For Japan, it was shorter, around 30 years, For the Ottoman Empire, it was a lot longer, around 80 years and very much turbulent. Western science and technology was at the helm of the modernization efforts for both of these countries during this period.

In the aftermath, Japan's military prowess against China in the war of 1895 was the milestone. With this victory, Japan entered among the imperialist states and rose as the new power in Asia. Japan built onto this; it signed Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, becoming an equal with modern states of the time, defeated Russia in 1905 and became an ally of Britain. The Ottomans on the other hand, was on the verge of defeat in the hands of its ex-vassal states in the Balkan Wars that started in 1913, and its eventual dissolution came after the defeat in the Great War.

VI. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

Following the introduction, in Chapter One, the situation in pre-modern times of Japan and the Ottoman Empire prior to the acknowledgement of the need for reform is examined. The chapter covers the matters over three categories; international context and political situation, economic structure and growth, social structure and education of Ottoman Empire and Japan in pre-modern times and compares them.

In Chapter Two, the first unsystematic reform initiatives after the acknowledgement of the need for reform is examined. Via checking three categories for both states given above, we could deduce the positive and negative outcomes of the unsystematic modernization process.

In Chapter Three, the systematic modernization process of both states are described and compared; for Japan, three decades of 1868-1895 period, and for the Ottoman Empire an enormous eight decades spanning from 1826 to 1908. The chapter includes political figures who affected the decision making process, and depicts internal and external challenges of the reforms adopted in the areas over three categories given above. The basic principles and strategies for the path of modernization could be reached via these comparisons. It also may help to show the diversion of these two states in the path of modernization.

In Chapter Four, the after effects of the systematic modernization process that both states went through are examined and consequences of these effects for both states are compared over the categories of international context and political situation, economic structure and growth, social structure and education. This will be important to explain the lessons the Ottomans learned from the previous era and the implementation new reforms according to those lessons. It will also help to understand the transformation of the Meiji government and society, and the emergence of Imperialistic Japan. This chapter will also include the budding relations of Japan and the Ottoman Empire in this period.

The Conclusion chapter will be the fifth and final chapter of the thesis. It will be looking why and how the Ottoman Empire and Japan’s paths became so diverted in the path of modernization. The key factors that caused this divergence will be drawn from the analyses that was laid out in the previous chapters. A review and arguments will conclude this chapter.

VII. PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS

Modernization is a vast and controversial topic, and yet it still draws many researchers to itself. There are lots of papers, articles and books about the issue in many different languages. Many scholars from different fields came together to find answers to particular phenomenon through analyzing history with different methods. Therefore, this vastness would be a hard limit for me; it would be beyond my capabilities as a Masters student to consume them all and present them in a concentrated state. My scope will be narrower and my content will be shorter. In addition, English sources will be used strictly for the Japanese case due to the language barrier. All It can be done is to draw from these vast sources to write and answer my own questions.

CHAPTER ONE

COMPARISON OF THE PRE-MODERN PERIOD OF JAPAN AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

I. THE SITUATION AT THE END OF THE PRE-MODERN PERIOD

This chapter will focus on the kind of experiences of Japan and the Ottoman Empire at the through out of their respective pre-modern periods. It is a necessity to understand how these experiences affected the initial reaction against the West and the modernization paths. This chapter will look at how the pre-modernization eras of the respective countries affected their modernization paths. There will be a comparison and analysis at the end of the chapter to deduce which one was the most apt for better transition to modernization process.

II. THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF PRE-MODERN EXPERIENCES ON MODERNIZATION PROCESS

All of the countries that started the modernization process had long pre-modern experiences. These experiences certainly affect the way the modernization process would go under. The Ottoman Empire and its predecessors clashed with the West for nearly a thousand years, and were always in contact with the western countries. Japan on the other hand had relations with China and Korea for thousands of years, and only in the 16th century, it came face to face with the Western powers. However, this contact ended abruptly, Japan went into isolation starting from 1633, excluding the Dutch in the island of Dejima, Nagasaki.

Western powers added the technological development to their culture in the process of modernization in the 18th century. Therefore, they had a century of experience until the turn of the 19th century, the era that Japan and the Ottoman Empire started their own processes. Both of them had a culture of their own, and the question would be how their pre-modern experiences affected their transition.

III. THE PRE-MODERN EXPERIENCES OF JAPAN AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

A. Japan

1. International Context and Political Situation

Japan is located at the edge of the Asia, in the Pacific Ocean. It is an archipelago with a very rough terrain. For a long time, the head of the state was the Emperor, albeit its power became a symbolic one starting from 12th century, when shoguns started to dominate the political scene of Japan.

There were periods of different Shogunates ruled Japan, and the last one was the Tokugawa Shogunate, which took the reins after the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600. It ruled the country until the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Tokugawa had a government system consisted of itself as an overseer and daimyos who governed the domains in Tokugawa Shogun's name. There were around 250 domains; and daimyos had autonomy in their regions in which they were allowed to have armies, administrative structures and fiscal systems but still seek a shogunal favor to rule over their domains (Jansen, 2002: 33).

Between 1633 and 1639, with several number of edicts, Japan went into isolation, excluding the Dutch in Dejima, China and Korea. Japan was still vigilant of its borders until the defeat of China by the hands of the Great Britain in 1842. The Opium Wars was the first time Japan was made aware about the force of the West when the Dutch gave consultation to the Shogunate about the war (Beasley, 1972: 78). Japan knew about the western countries thanks to the annual reports of the Dutch in Dejima (Beasley, 1972: 76); however, this was the first time the Dutch warned the Shogunate about the threats.

Just as the Dutch said, Commodore Matthew Perry entered the Tokyo Bay with four ships in 1853. In Uraga, he demanded Japan to open up its ports. A year later, Japan gave capitulations and signed Kanagawa Treaty[1] with the US. In 1856, the new American consul Townsend Harris arrived in Japan and forced the Tokugawa to sign new agreements (Beasley, 1999: 193-194). In 1858, the Ansei Treaties, also known as

[1] The full name of it was the Treaty of Peace and Amity between the US and Japan

unequal treaties, signed with five Western Powers (The Great Britain, France, The Netherlands, Russia and the US). The Ansei Treaties opened some ports of Japan to trade, brought extraterritoriality, and fixed the import and export duties to a low margin, bringing them out of Japan's control into International control, and most-favored-nation clause was forced upon Japan (Auslin, 2004: 44). The Shogunate crumbled under the overwhelming pressure of the Western powers. The Daimyo and the Samurai did not expect this outcome, and subsequent riots and revolts, both against the Western powers and the Shogunate itself, started after this sign of weakness of the Shogunate.

Under this premise, the rebel domains, Tosa, Satsuma and Choushuu tried to affect the national policy, and even went as far to deal with Western powers themselves, without the consent of the Shogunate (Henshall, 2004: 68). The Alliance of Satsuma and Choushuu even challenged the establishment about who should be the next shogun.

If we look at the military aspect; after Tokugawa took power, the shogun wanted to rule in peace. That is why the Shogunate made some changes in the military to assert its dominance over daimyos. These were "Laws for the Military Houses" which created the shogun-daimyo government style of the Tokugawa Shogunate and "Alternate Attendance" that obliged daimyos and their retainers to live in Edo for alternating years, under the Shogun's observation (Sansom, 1974: 20). These two developments effectively killed the potential domain revolts, thus making samurai not to practice war, but theorize it. From here on, the samurai turned into bureaucrats who oversaw the peasants while still holding to their swords.

After Shinto's rise, some of the samurai started to shift their allegiance from the Shogun to the Emperor in an increasing rate in the 19th century. This was one of the catalyst of the Shogunate's fall in the later years, after the West came.

2. Economic Structure and Growth

Japan was a typical feudal country. 85% of the people were living in the rural areas (Jansen, 1989: 571). The Shogunate was in control of the economy through daimyos and their domains. To get a better control over its domains, the Shogunate created the "Alternate Attendance" that coerced the daimyos to live in Edo (now Tokyo) in alternating years. This development made Edo grow and economy take a centralized shape unlike what feudalism suggests. In the ideal world of the Shogunate, the lords would rule, the samurai would preserve peace and order, and the farmers would cultivate the rice and pay the taxes (Francks, 1999: 21).

Three cities, Edo, Kyoto and Osaka grew rapidly under this gradually centralizing economy. 2 million people lived in these cities out of 33 million (Jansen, 1989: 571). Under the peace Tokugawa had brought to the land, peasants wanted to do much more to earn besides only cultivating rice. Since the middle of the 18th century, the peasants created a commodity economy thanks to this centralized shape that the economy was taken. Various products such as cotton-based cloths were produced nearly all over Japan, on the other hand, specialized products such as silk that was produced in the Kanto region, and the trade of these goods was taking place in big markets such as Osaka (Horie, 1961: 5). Osaka was at the center of commercial economy, because daimyos had to broker their rice into money in this market and the Shogunate was trying to control the economic system through Osaka Market (Jansen, 1989: 572). Osaka merchants were using professional management for their businesses to grow and prosper since the 18th century (Fukuyama, 1996: 166). Much of the economic growth was happening through this commercial activity and the Shogunate was trying to tax it with various ways, however, Shogunate failed to do so properly and instead raised taxes on rice (Francks, 1999: 22). The taxes were paid in rice, but the Shogunate also issued money as in gold or silver. At the start of the 19th century, the domains tried to delve into new industries such as shipyards for modern ships and reverberatory furnaces to process precious metals to turn them into guns (Francks, 1999: 23).

In the 17th century, the Dutch in Dejima Island was bringing all sorts of good to Japan, including many goods originated from South-East Asia and was selling them for gold and silver. The Chinese was also buying Japanese products to sell them in the South-East Asia and China (Buluş, 2002: 153). In theory, Japan was isolation, that premise included the economic isolation. However, the trade, albeit limited to certain countries, was making this isolation null and void in practice. Nevertheless, this process slowly died out in the 18th century due to the Shogunate's encouragement to substitute important imported products via investments such as raw silk and sugar (Buluş, 2002: 155). Around this time, the real isolation started.

Two incidents heavily influenced people to look for new opportunities and shook the Shogunate. The first was the famines. Tenmei (1782-1788) affected millions (Jansen, 2002: 225) and Tenpo (1833-1837) made people riot, revolt and protest the government never seen before (Jansen, 1989: 117). The other was the West's realization of exchange rate difference of gold and silver in Japan after the opening of the ports. This difference created inflation on goods, Tokugawa's assertion of control of this exchange and trade failed due to treaties, and people became poorer (Jansen, 1989: 286).

Nevertheless, these developments were happening under a certain peace, without any wars. Just before the start of the modernization process, diversified economy boosted commercialization, monetarization and efficiency (Henshall, 2004: 65).

3. Social Structure and Education

Pre-modern Japan had four social classes. From top to bottom, these were warrior class who ruled over everyone else that consisted of 6% of the population at the start of the 19th century (Jansen, 2002: 50); peasants whose primary job to cultivate rice; artisans who produced whatever the ruling class ordered them to produce to indulge their consumption other than food; and merchants who dealt with trade. There is one more class below merchants who were called outcasts. These class was consist of "*eta*", the ones that their presence evoked "death", such as executioners or butchers (Jansen, 2002: 122); and ethnic minorities such as Ainu in Hokkaido.

The Shogunate strictly controlled the separation of the classes; mobility amongst them was very hard. The warrior class never intermingled with other classes, they did not even live with the peasants they oversaw, but lived in castle towns with their daimyos. However, economy's gradual trend of centralization and Osaka Market's increasing importance made Shogunate care about the merchant class. At the beginning of the 19th century, merchants were much freer than a century earlier. This was due to merchants rising economic power over the samurai class who had fixed stipends. Commercialization of the economy made merchants powerful and over time, with the rising inflation, daimyos became indebted to them. Some merchants gained samurai privileges, and some samurai engaged in commerce (Henshall, 2004: 66). This situation was slowly corroding the Tokugawa's rigid class system.

The society was based on family as it was a feudal society and the family was patriarchic. Much of the ideals of the family and society was based on Confucianism. Samurai vigorously studied Chinese art and literature, thus Confucian ideals became the part of the Tokugawa society (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 93). Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintoism were practiced side by side. However, both Buddhism and Confucianism had more effect on society than Shintoism (Yumiko, 1999: 155). The adoption of children was also a common practice. Bright-minded people were adopted by the prominent families whose sons were incompetent (Fukuyama, 1996: 173). Japan developed a system of primogeniture that was used since 14th century, necessitating that the oldest son would acquire the family business and house, preventing the division of wealth among siblings (Fukuyama, 1996: 173-174).

This adoption of Confucian ideals was also effective in the education, because it encouraged merit and learning for the self; the children of samurai and nobles were educated at home or at special domain schools, and wealthy merchants also set up private schools. As a result of this widespread education, the literacy rate in the later part of the period is estimated to have been 45% for males and 15% for females, giving an overall rate of 30% (Henshall, 2004: 62). Beforehand, in 1590, a Jesuit missionary, Alessandro Valignano came to Nagasaki with a press from Europe. The press was shut down and its products scattered or destroyed during the persecution of Christians in the early Tokugawa period. However, Japan did undergo a profound printing revolution, but it was based on woodblocks. Reverting to the older technology in printing is not well understood. There were suggestions such as creating calligraphic fonts for printing machine for Chinese characters were too expensive. With the advent of commercial printing by private individuals in the 17th century, a wide range of texts, including classic Japanese literature and new works were made available to urban audiences for the first time. Merchants and artisans were the driving force for the demand (Kamei-Dyche, 2011: 274). The role of the state in the print revolution was complex. On the one hand, the Tokugawa government supported printing and encouraged the commercial printing sector. On the other hand, a severe censorship policy was imposed, although this was not uniformly carried out, and its enforcement has been overstated (Kamei-Dyche, 2011: 276). There were also restrictions on importing foreign texts for prevention of Christian texts, but thanks to the exclusion of the Dutch from the isolation, western science books was able to enter Japan via Dejima Island. The Japanese scholars realized "Dutch Learning", as it was also known as "*Rangaku*" in Japanese, as superior to the Chinese science, especially in the area of medicine. However, this realization and curiosity also spread to the other areas such as botany and modern gunnery (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 101). This wide interest to Dutch Learning proliferated to the schools, and at the start of the 19th century, Japan had considerable amount of scholarly men who understood Western science and languages, which helped them immensely when the modernization attempt started (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 102).

On the other hand, Shinto was on the rise just after Tokugawa claimed the power. It went head to head with Chinese ideals due to its uniqueness to Japan and being a national treasure. There were instances of rejection of Confucianism's rationalism, and promotion of mythic "the land of the gods" idea with strong nationalistic connotations (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 103). These attitudes created a national identity very similar to Europe at the start of the 19th century.

In summary, when we come to the middle of the 19th century we see a declined power of military due to a period of long peace, a changing ideology and function of the samurai class, and daimyos growing in power to counterweight the shogun. The economy, which became commercialized and diversified gradually in 18th century, undermined the class rigidity in the 19th century, and lower classes wanted to have more prestige via economic power and acted accordingly. Confucian ideals such as self-worth created an educated population, and woodblock printing facilitated to sustain newly emerging demands for books. Shinto's rise of prominence promoted nationalism throughout Japan, and Dutch Learning opened Western sciences to the scholars of Japan, which they adopted wholeheartedly.

B. The Ottoman Empire

1. International Context and Political Situation

The Ottoman Empire started as a Beylik, a vassal lordship under the Sultanate of Rum in 1299. It quickly grew both in size and population, and its borders reached to the gates of Vienna in the West, encapsulated most of southeastern Europe, including Hungary, the Balkans, Greece, and parts of Ukraine; most of the Middle East now occupied by Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Jordan; North Africa including today's Libya, Tunisia and Algeria; and large parts of the Arabian Peninsula in the 17th century.

At the start of 18th century, the empire was getting out of a devastating war period, called the Great Turkish War (1683-1697). The war ended with the Treaty of Karlowitz, and the Ottomans lost Ottoman Hungary and Transylvania to Austria. There was only one war with West in these hundred years, until Napoleon's invasion of Egypt. The West was not interested in dealing with the Ottomans (Berkes, 1998: 24). However, another power, Russia, rose to fill the gap left by the West.

Russian onslaught starting in the 18th century made the Ottomans realize its inferiority. After the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718, the Ottomans wanted to avoid war and looked for the ways to reclaim its greatness. To understand what the West possessed, the empire sent ambassadors, first to Vienna, then to France, the prominent power of the 18th century, during the Tulip Era that started in 1718; and ordered the ambassadors to report on useful applications (Lewis, 1969: 45). Relations with the France was the most ancient one, trailing back to the 16th century. The West for the Ottomans meant France. However, the dealings of Muslims with Europeans were carried out only at the levels of warfare, diplomacy, and trade. Religion stayed as the wall that blocked cultural interaction (Berkes, 1998: 29)

The Ottomans lost all the wars, excluding Pruth (1711), it had against Russia in the 18th century. The Enemy of the Ottomans in the East, Persia, also waged war against the empire. At the time, Persia and Russia went into an alliance against the Ottomans. After losing the war against Persia in 1730, the Ottomans regained Belgrad in 1739 and a long period of peace started. This peace lasted until 1768. Another war with Russia started in 1768, ended with Küçük Kaynarca Treaty and the loss of Crimea, which the Ottoman Empire legally accepted in 1792. All these Russian advances made the Ottomans realize the need of change.

Most of the provinces were in direct control of the central government, excluding some vassal states. The empire was divided into sections called "vilayet" (Faroqhi and Fleet, 2013: 212) and central government assigned a "vali" to each vilayet. The Sultan was a Muslim and the supreme ruler. The central government consisted of him and his court. The court on the other hand consisted of viziers, ulema (religious authority) and military officers. The decisions to rule the country came from the Sultan with the advisory role of the Divan, the council of ministers. Bureaucrats came from medrese and enderun. Medrese was for Muslims and enderun was for Christians. Outside of central government, the civil and judicial administration for ordinary people was carried out by kadı that was a member of the ulema (Faroqhi and Fleet, 2013: 213). They were directly responsible to the Sultan.

The Empire's military was divided into two as Janissaries and Sipahis. Janissaries were constituted as the Sultan's elite personal guards, specialized only in fighting which grew in number over the years. Janissaries self-confidence also rose with their numbers. Especially starting from the 17th century, they meddled with every aspect of the central government, even toppling the Sultan and killing him. They also lost their specialty and became tradesmen that destroyed their effectiveness. Sipahis however, lived in the rural areas as the overseers of the peasants. With tımar system's decline, their numbers also declined. In 1630, there were only eight thousand of them while a hundred years earlier, their numbers reached eighty thousand. They were substituted with sekban and sarıca in the 17th century (İnalcık, 2013: 40).

In the 18th century, there were major changes in the empire. After the Belgrade Treaty in 1739, a peace period started and in this period central control was lost, North African provinces gone into corsairs' hands, local strongman seized Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon and Anatolian and Rumelian provinces went under the control of the ayans (local notables) (Davison, 1990: 21). The struggle for recentralization only came back to life in early 19th century.

2. Economic Structure and Growth

The Ottoman Empire was an agrarian empire with a centralized government that showed feudal characteristics (Matuz, 1982: 283). The bulk of the population, usually 80–90%, lived on and drew sustenance from the land, almost always in family holdings rather than large estates (Quataert, 2000: 130) The backbone of the system in the classical period (1300-1600) was tımar system which provided the empire with both soldiers as in sipahis and income as in taxes. Sipahis were assigned by the central government as the holder of the land, and collected taxes from the peasants as their income. In return, when the Sultan called them to war they would serve in the army.

However, rising taxes caused peasants run away from cultivation. In the 18th century, the tımar system had been declined already, and iltizam system had already taken its place. In iltizam system, the person who had enough financial resources would pay the pre-calculated tax revenue for a particular region in advance, then that said person would go on and collect the taxes from that region while extracting much more from the pre-calculated revenue from the peasants by maximizing his profit. The rise of the ayans started with this practice.

The thirty-year peace (1739-1768) made way to decentralization due to the inherent features of the iltizam system that resembled feudalism. Although economy grew 50% under iltizam system until Küçük Kaynarca Treaty (Salzmann, 1993: 405), the wars starting from 1768 deprived the Empire’s economy. In other places, such as remote conquered lands or vassal states, the empire chose only to tax the region, and did not alter the existing traditions. Due to this vastness and inability to control, there was not a monetary union in the empire (Pamuk, 2007: 12).

Industry was faring a little better than agriculture. The guilds protected the order but their economic effects were restrictive and destructive, a person who wanted to enter to the industry was limited to his habit, inheritance; primitive techniques and transportation; his manner and work of speed fixed by guild rules (Lewis, 1969: 33). Until the later 18th century, goods made by hand in the Ottoman Empire were highly sought after in the surrounding empires and states. The fine textiles, hand-made yarns, and leathers of the 18th century, however, gradually lost their foreign markets. By the early 19th century, almost all of the high quality goods formerly characterizing the Ottoman export sector had vanished (Quataert, 2000: 135). The government started to confiscate the capital of military personnel to finance its fiscal crisis due to wars after 1770s, which greatly hindered the basis of economic growth. Because military personnel were assisting the state by investing in to its investments in various fields before; the confiscation eradicated this assist (Genç, 2000: 217-218).

In addition, for a time, the Empire was in control of the Silk Road’s passage to the West. The custom duties were good source of revenue and it created a motivation for the empire’s war of conquest. Taking control of the trade routes would mean easy money. However, Shah Abbas’ blockade of silk going into Ottoman territories in 17th century and moving the silk trade to Indian Sea, as well as Britain’s direct purchase of spices from India, rather than Cairo markets, hurt this tax revenue (İnalcık, 2013: 39-40).

3. Social Structure and Education

The Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire, which ruled over a vast area. The society was divided as Muslims and Non-Muslims. The Sultan was a Muslim who had a Turkic tribe background. Due to Islamic law, Muslims had a higher status than non-Muslims. The other religions, namely Judaism and Christianity, were treated with respect unlike Europe at the time. Each religious community was ruled according to the Millet system, which allowed these communities to be ruled by their own religious laws. The government rarely interfered with the millets and how they ruled themselves (Sugar, 1977: 5-7). Nevertheless, there are evidences that non-Muslim millets also practice Islamic inheritance laws (Çakır, 2016: 119). The Islamic inheritance laws divide the inheritance amongst the family members in regards to their genders to estimate the portion he or she would get. A man would get twice the portion a woman would get.

The Empire, before the late 19th century, counted the wealth of its subjects, but not the people themselves. The total population may have equaled some 25–32 million in 1800. According to one estimate, there were 10–11 millions in the European provinces, 11 millions in the Asiatic areas, and another 3 million in the North African provinces (Quataert, 2000: 112). According to Kemal Karpat, the estimates for the early 19th century varied from 14 to 23 million according to the data and even the highest number underestimated the actual numbers about 10-12 millions (Karpat, 1985: 23). The 1831 census' estimated number of 8 million was so wrong that it nearly omitted 50% of the population (Karpat, 1985: 21).

Muslims practiced all the professions; trade, government, war, religion and agriculture. However, the non-Muslims, who were excluded from practicing war which is a very lucrative business, started to dominate the trade with the European countries, especially after the 18th century with using their religious ties and legal capitulations that the Empire had signed. The Muslim merchants were trading in Venice since 15th century (Faroqhi and Fleet, 2013: 7) however, the Europeans were creating hardships for Muslim merchants, and thereby Muslim merchants gradually stopped their efforts to trade with Europe. The non-Muslims would work for a foreign consul and benefit from European legal system, which no Muslim in the Empire could do at the time (Kuran, 2019: 60-61).

Only a tiny minority could read. Among females, extremely few could read, a far smaller proportion than males. Estimates suggest general Muslim literacy rates equaling about 2–3 % in the early 19th century (Quataert, 2000: 169). The primary education institutions were “sibyan mektebleri”. These primary schools were usually constituted by high ranked public officials, and located within mosque or adjacent to a mosque, in a separate structure. Sibyan mektebleri were religious schools, and taught students the basic worshipping ways of Islam. In the higher education however, there were some additions to the existing institutions. Under a French convert, called Humbaracı Ahmed Paşa, Hendesehane and Humbarahane were constituted to teach bombardier corps. Trigonometry and geometry education in the style of the West were given to the students (Berkes, 1998: 48). In this period, translation of European science books continued steadily.

There was a printing initiative by a Hungarian convert, now known as İbrahim Müteferrika. He gained Sadrazam’s support and started a printing press; even the head of the ulema, Şeyh-ül İslam supported the initiative (Berkes, 1998: 40). Due to opposition of the calligraphers, printing of the religious texts were forbidden, but science books were permitted. One of the books he printed, “Rational Bases for the Polities of Nations” in 1731, which was submitted to Mahmut I, suggested that the empire had to adopt and learn from Europe (Berkes, 1998: 42). İbrahim printed a limited amount of books and the books he pressed were very expensive. The printing activities ended in 1742.

Society was in a change. Traditional values were getting relaxed amongst ordinary people and higher ups was showing materialistic tendencies. There was a crisis in the moral life (Berkes, 1998: 27-29).

In summary, in the long 18th century, we see the Ottoman Empire struggle to get out of a devastating war period, and how the empire seeks to avoid war at all cost. The acknowledgement of the West’s superiority came in this era and first ambassadors were sent to get useful information from the West. There were superficial modernization attempts, especially in the military. Religious difference stayed as a roadblock for cultural interaction. Decentralization of the empire accelerated.

Although the economy grew, it was not sustainable after 1774. There was no change in the primary education, but there was an addition in the higher education. The western books were steadily translated, and even a printing house was established. Society was in a materialistic transformation, and the tradition was crumbling. The war of 1774 with Russia and subsequent Küçük Kaynarca Treaty showed the ineffectiveness of traditional army and the need of change. Crimea's lost to Russia in 1792 was the final straw.

C. Comparison of Japan and the Ottoman Empire in the pre-modernization period

It would be easier to compare this period subject by subject to see how much of an impact it had over these two countries' inheritances while they were going forward.

1. International Context and Political Situation

Japan and the Ottoman Empire were very different from each other. Japan was in isolation excluding Dejima Island; The Ottomans on the other hand were sending ambassadors and trying to know the West in Tulip Era (1718-1730). The Ottomans were aware they were lagging behind and looking for anything useful to use. Japan realized this only after Opium Wars in 1842 which China easily defeated by Britain. Japan knew they were next and tried to find a way to avoid armed conflict. The Ottomans were located on very important trade routes. Although changing spice and silk roads affected the Ottomans fiscal situation, one of the revenue sources of the empire was taxing the commodities passing through its customs and ports. In addition, Russia was interested to find an access to Mediterranean and the Ottomans was its prime target. The Ottomans did not encounter with colonization of the West until the end of the empire in the 20th century, however Japan got out of isolation at the height of the colonization. Despite this situation, due to lack of resources Japan was never colonized either. Religion constituted a wall hindering the cultural interaction between the Ottomans and West; that is why the interaction was mainly on military issues and had utilitarian approaches.

As for the political structure, the Ottoman Empire was a multinational empire consisted of people who believe in different religions. The Sultan was the absolute ruler and every religious community had their own law to govern themselves. Japan on the other hand had only one nation in its borders and had a dualistic system where the Emperor was a symbolic figurehead and the Shogun the absolute ruler. While the Ottomans were in decentralization process in the 18th century, Japan was in the way towards centralization. This centralization would serve greatly when the modernization attempt started. Both states had similar number of population (around 30 million) but Japan's population situated very densely contrary to sparsely populated Ottomans.

The military of Japan was stagnated due to long peace period. Samurai were no longer a fighting force; they were just bureaucrats. However, there were samurai who educated themselves and affected the Japan's path in the twilight years of the Shogunate. The Ottomans on the other hand, were coming out of a devastating war period while going into the 18th century. It had one clash with the West in the entire 18th century. The Ottomans were aware that they were lagging behind militarily, and looking ways to remedy it. Sipahis were no more existed; Janissaries were getting ineffective and harmful to the empire. There were some superficial attempts bearing no fruit, nevertheless these attempts, the engineering schools, shows the intention to change. The long piece period of 1739-1768 ended with a rude awakening, resulting in Küçük Kaynarca 1774 and lost of Crimea in 1792. Traditional army was not working anymore and something needed to be done.

2. Economic Structure and Growth

Thanks to political semi-centralization that led to economic centralization and peace, commodity economy and monetarization started in the 18th century Japan. Merchants got rich and became the basis of the future capitalistic endeavors. Shogunate had the monopoly on issuing the currency while the Ottoman Empire did not even have a monetary union. The Ottomans had been using the iltizam system to collect taxes in the 18th century. The industry was faring better, however, started to lose its edge in the late 18th century. Nevertheless, the Ottoman economy got bigger until the late 18th century. The wars emptied the treasury and the government started confiscation of the military personnel's wealth and hindered capital accumulation to be used for future economic growth.

3. Social Structure and Education

If we look at the similarities, we see both Japan and the Ottoman Empire had similar population numbers at the start of the 19th century. Both states were in state of change. Japan had four classes divided by profession while Ottoman Empire use religious differences to divide the society up. In Japan, Samurai class ruled supreme over all others; in Ottoman Empire, a Muslim had a higher status than a non-Muslim had. In both Japan and the Ottoman Empire, the western books were being translated. The Ottomans even built a printing house at the time.

While Japan's inheritance laws had been practicing primogeniture, the Ottoman Empire had been practicing Islamic inheritance law, which divided the inheritance according to the number of inheritors. The records show that even though the non-Muslims were exempted to practice Islamic law, they chose to practice Islamic inheritance law just as Muslims. Primogeniture helped the Japanese entrepreneur to keep the accumulation of wealth in one hand while Islamic law dividing it and hindering the potential accumulation.

Rising Confucian ideals such as self-worth drove the Japanese to educate themselves, and literacy rate reached 30%. Dutch learning also helped samurai classes to learn the science of the West, which proliferated to schools. In the Ottoman Empire however, sibyan mektepleri mostly gave religious education, and did not even teach the kids how to read and write. Literacy rate was very low. In the higher education, the Ottoman Empire was trying to open new schools to teach western science to the students. These schools were giving military oriented education. Although the printing machine came early to Japan, the proliferation of printed books began with woodblock printing with the demand of merchants and craftsmen. In the Ottomans, however, the printing press of İbrahim Müteferrika started printing in 18th century with science books, but both the supply and the demand were limited, thereby printing house did not last long.

Rediscovered Shintoism created an idea of nationalism, similar to that of Europe at the time. Ottoman Empire, due to being a multinational empire, was against the nationalistic tendencies, excluding the last years of the empire.

What we see from the pre-modern period of these two states are Japan had a much more educated population and dynamic upper class, which would be proved useful in the upcoming modernization period. Territorial integrity and gradually centralizing economy was nowhere to be found in the Ottoman Empire. These two attributes constituted a relatively easier path for the modernization of Japan.

CHAPTER TWO

COMPARISON OF THE DAWN OF MODERNIZATION PERIOD OF JAPAN AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

I. THE SITUATION

In this chapter, we will look at how the realization of the superiority of the West triggered a systematic modernization process. The dawn of modernization for Japan started in 1853 and ended in 1868. For the Ottoman Empire, it started in 1793 and ended in 1826. The experiences they would live throughout their respective periods would certainly affect their judgments about taking decisions. Their reactions against the threat of the Western powers and their adjustments accordingly would be the consideration of this chapter.

A. Japan

1. International Context and Political Situation

After the Opium Wars occurred in China in 1842, Japan became aware of the power of the West. Both daimyos and the Shogun started reforms after this incident. Nevertheless, Japan did not come face to face with its inferiority until Commodore Perry's ships entered the Edo Bay in 1853. After Perry's threats to use force, the notion of his demand staying unanswered made the Shogunate chose a kind of appeasement method. The Shogunate wanted to avoid war at all costs.

Perry's demands ended the long isolation. The Shogunate, amidst the protests of some of its daimyos, signed the Kanagawa Treaty (Treaty of Peace and Amity between the US and the Empire of Japan) in 1854 (Auslin, 2004: 17). Japan gave most favored nation clause to the US and opened the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate, and a Consulate in Japan (Jansen, 1989: 270). This treaty was very superficial in its content (Auslin, 2004: 17); however, it was a beginning. Townsend Harris as the consul general, started to negotiate a much more extensive treaty with Japan. In 1858, both sides came to an understanding. In addition to Shimoda and Hakodate ports, the ports of Kanagawa and Nagasaki from July 4, 1859, Niigata from January 1, 1860, and Hyogo from January 1, 1863 would be opened (Jansen, 1989: 280). The treaty also provided extraterritoriality and free trade and fixed tariffs (Auslin, 2004: 44). Similar treaties were also signed with other Western nations. These treaties were called Ansei Treaties.

There was a political discrepancy between Tokugawa Shogunate and daimyos such as Satsuma. The Shogunate was aware that it was very weak to handle the West, thereby was executing an appeasement policy towards them. Daimyos of Satsuma and Choushuu with lesser status samurai were against this decision. They advocated a policy called "*Sonno Joi*" (Honor the Emperor, Expel the Barbarian). These daimyos and their samurais attacked and assassinated western officials. The attack of 1862, which the samurai killed four British officials (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 121-122) was retaliated heavily by the British. They indemnified their financial losses from Tokugawa and bombarded the Kagoshima port, which belonged to Satsuma. One year later, combined western forces bombarded and destroyed Shimonoseki batteries, which belonged to Choushuu (Jansen, 1989: 23).

After these two incidents, lesser samurai and rebellious daimyos became aware that the policy "*Sonno Joi*" would not work while they were weak. Instead, they turned their attention to take down the Tokugawa government.

The Shogunate started to send diplomatic missions to the US in 1860, they also sent fifteen students to Europe in 1862, while Satsuma sent the same number of students to Britain in 1865 (Jansen, 1989: 22-23).

Political situation was in turmoil. Tokugawa government was clearly getting weaker, and Choushuu with Satsuma was trying to capitalize this weakness of the Tokugawa government. Two sides firstly clashed on who would be the 14th Shogun in 1858. The side who supported the opening policy of Japan, the Shogunate won that clash. Choushuu who advocated *sonno joi* did not stop there. It attacked Kyoto in 1864. Choushuu-Tokugawa clash went on for two years. At first, Shogunate won and Choushuu daimyo submitted, however, a coup happened in the Choushuu domain and anti-Tokugawa faction took charge. In 1866, after Choushuu daimyo refused the alternate attendance, the Shogunate sent its armies, albeit it was without the support of other domains. The other daimyos refused to obey the Shogunate. The war was a disaster for the Tokugawa government, and the Shogunate sued for peace (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 131-132). After this victory, Satsuma and Choushuu made an alliance. The last Shogun of Tokugawa, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, was well aware of the situation, and at the end of 1867, he gave his powers back to the Emperor. After losing the Boshin Wars in 1868, he lost his title too. The skirmishes of the Boshin War lasted well into 1869 (Jansen, 1989: 21)

There were two reforms in this era; the first one was Ansei Reform (1853-1857) consisting of a new defense policy and expansion of Western learning based on Dutch learning. The second was Bunkyu Reform (1862). In this reform, the imperial court coerced the Tokugawa government to loosen alternate attendance, to promote western studies, to start a reform for creating a western style military. Aside from the Tokugawa government, domains were also trying to make their own reforms. They were mainly importing weapons from the West and expanding Western learning.

2. Economic Structure and Growth

After the unequal treaties, Japan lost its power to control imports via taxing them. In 1860s, the government started to have balance of payment problems. This was due to diminishing gold and silver reserves (Francks, 1999: 27). The deficit stayed until 1880s, and Japan tried to increase its industrial capacity to compete with imported goods (Francks, 1999: 27). Both reactionary daimyos and Tokugawa government was seeking out new industries to increase Japan's capabilities against the West.

3. Social Structure and Education

Education effort was immense in both Tokugawa government and domains. To promote western learning, the Shogunate opened the Medicine School in 1858, Shouhei school which taught Confucian studies and Kaisei School which taught foreign languages in 1868 (Duke, 2009: 51). These three later merged and became the Tokyo Imperial University.

In addition, educated samurai class started to educate people about new western knowledge. Some students were sent to missions to Europe and came back with analyses of Europe and what Japan needed to do for modernization. Modernization ideals had a profound base in the elite of Japan so much that they propagated wholeheartedly to the masses.

All of these developments clearly shows us that Japan had an urge to modernize even before imperial restoration, albeit it was not managed by one single authority, but by rival factions on similar issues. All of the factions was aware a change was coming and they needed to catch it in order to survive.

B. The Ottoman Empire

1. International Context and Political Situation

After Treaty of Jassy in 1792, newly crowned Sultan Selim III found an opportunity to modernize the military. In the 18^{th} century, all of the reform movements came via France. Selim III started to build upon this experience. Ottoman statesmen came to realize that a governmental system previously guided by custom had to be reconsidered as the object of rational planning and systematization (Kasaba, 2008: 11). The consultants of Selim advised him that the old system is irredeemable; therefore, he needed to create a new order while not touching the old one due to their profound connections to the system, creating a duality. Thus, "Nizam-ı Cedid" that included new regulations on governorship, new taxations on grain trade, and most importantly, new infantry that trained according to European guidelines began (Lewis, 1969: 58). There is an important aspect we could see about these reforms. The problem was looked at beyond the military, and encapsulating a civil reform. A planning was needed for reforms to be realized; and economic problems were a major issue in the reform process (Berkes, 1998: 72). The plans and regulations that defined Selim's "Nizam-ı Cedid" mark the point at which the Enlightenment's systematizing spirit appeared in Ottoman policy (Kasaba, 2008: 12).

The Empire's window to the West was France. The French Revolution changed the ancient regime of France and it became a republic. The Ottomans was not concerned with it, as it saw the revolution and conflict as an internal affair of France. In 1793, the Sultan wanted assistance from France's new regime. In 1796, French ambassador came to the capital with military experts. There was a brief war period with France over Egypt between 1798 and 1801, which scared the Ottomans proving that any place of the Empire was vulnerable to attacks from the West, not just the Balkan regions. France's influence continued over the Empire after the peace, which the Ottomans took back Egypt in 1801.

During this time, permanent embassies were started to be seen as a necessity. The first embassy was opened in London in 1793. It was followed by several embassies in capitals of the European states (Lewis, 1969: 61). These embassies made way to young Ottoman Turks to live in Europe and learn the European ways of many things. Before this breakthrough, only the Christians of the empire had connections with the West (Lewis, 1969: 62). France's effect on the Empire had a backlash in 1807. The secular aspects of the French revolution were bothering some factions in the Ottoman bureaucracy and military. Janissaries rioted in the Balkan provinces and Nizam-ı Cedid's army was sent to suppress the riot. The new army was defeated and Selim III was pressured to reverse his reforms, then he was deposed altogether.

One of the Ayans and an ally of Selim III, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha marched his army to the capital after Selim III was deposed. However, Selim was assassinated by the order of his cousin and the new sultan Mustafa IV. The only other living male of the house of Osman was Mahmud, younger brother of Mustafa. Alemdar captured the palace, deposed Mustafa and made Mahmud the Sultan. Ayans were accumulating power all throughout the 18th century. The power they accumulated had showed itself in Alemdar's success to designate the Sultan. Ayans wanted to capitalize on that. The idea of a pact that would make the Ayans' and the state's roles and responsibilities codified on the paper in the Empire came out in this way. Although most of the Ayans did not even sign it (Berkes, 1998: 91), and the new Sultan Mahmud II reluctantly ratified it (Lewis, 1969: 76), on 7 October 1808, "Sened-i İttifak" became a milestone in legal-political area. Interestingly, by recognizing the authority of the Ayans, the Empire was going backwards rather than becoming a more centralized state.

Alemdar wanted to reform the Military in continuation of Selim III's the New Order, naming it as "Sekban-ı Cedid" in October 1808. Janissary corps was to be dissolved peacefully; the treasury would buy up circulating commissions, and the Janissaries who would enter the new forces would receive higher pay (Berkes, 1998: 91). However, just one month later, yet again the Janissaries rioted. Alemdar was killed during the riot and new army disbanded. Mahmud II had to accept the reactionary faction's demands, albeit he was safe due to being the sole survivor of male line of House of Osman, after executing his older brother Mustafa IV. Mahmud waited seventeen years to counterattack the reactionary forces. During this time, he extended his authority over his empire by shuffling the leaders in bureaucracy who did not want him at the throne and was largely successful in making the Empire more centralized.

He also created personal guards for himself, which proved very useful against the Janissaries.

During this period, the Greek revolt ensued in 1821. The revolt had the backing of the European states as they saw Greece as the cradle of European civilization. Janissaries failed to suppress the revolt and Mahmud asked the help one of the ayans, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. He was successful in suppressing the revolt with his newly created modern army. The fact that Sultan Mahmud's forces performed poorly against the Greek revolutionaries, while Mehmed Ali Pasha's Egyptian troops performed well, heightened the sense of urgency in İstanbul (Kasaba, 2008: 12).

In 1826, Mahmud II declared the creation of a new army alongside Janissary corps, instructed by Muslims, not Westerners, to return to the glorious days of Süleyman I (Lewis, 1969: 79). Although the Janissaries accepted it at first, they revolted two weeks later. Mahmud II was prepared for a revolt, and used this opportunity to destroy the Janissaries. Known as "Vaka-i Hayriye", the destruction of the Janissaries lifted the greatest obstacle for Mahmud II's upcoming reforms.

2. Economic Structure and Growth

The war with Russia in 1787 deprived the economy so much that the Empire was about go bankrupt. The Sultan Abdulhamid I looked for a foreign loan from the Netherlands for the first time in the history of the Empire but he gave up the idea due to ayans and iltizam system's financial power (Cem, 2007: 184). The Sultan was afraid of failing to collect the taxes from ayans to pay the debts. His successor Selim III however did ask for it. The Empire was turned down by Spain, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia; and it resorted to expropriate the precious metals, which the subjects of the Empire had (Cem, 2007: 185). The economy stabilized with the end of the war, until Selim III was deposed (Pamuk, 2000: 171).

Selim's advisors had two ideas about fiscal policy. The first one was a recurring one, reforming the tımar system. The idea was to collect the taxes directly from vacant lands previously occupied by peasants, rather than giving this task to ayans and make ayans collect the tax (Berkes, 1998: 73). The second one was to reform the currency. The advisors suggested revaluing the currency and restoring the value of coins; however, due to the war with Russia, Selim continued the old policy of issuing debased coins, hurting the economy in the long run (Berkes, 1998: 73). To keep prices from rising, the government tried to enforce a system of price ceilings for most goods, unfortunately, price ceilings on food exacerbated the shortages in urban areas, especially in the capital (Pamuk, 2000: 171). In addition, after 1780s, the government started to borrow massively from moneylenders of Istanbul, transforming them into financial bourgeoisie in the later years (Pamuk, 2000: 20).

One of the interesting features of the Empire was its attitude towards exports and imports. Most of the European countries were trying to protect their economies by suppressing the import via high custom walls in this period to help their growing industries. The Empire was doing the complete opposite for nearly 350 years, suppressing their export and making the import easier to create an abundance of goods and keep the prices of goods cheap (Genç, 2000: 50). Overcoming the custom walls of the Ottoman Empire was merely a 3% tax on goods imported (Cem, 2007: 191), but export had 12% tax on goods. This seemingly absurd policy that was called provisionism (Genç, 2000: 41-42) was for the benefit for the subject’s comfort to find any goods they sought after for relatively cheap prices. Nevertheless, the superiority of the domestic manufacturers continued until Baltalimanı Treaty of 1838 (Çeştepe and Güven, 2016: 2).

3. Social Structure and Education

Mühendishane that was opened in 1769 was expanded under Selim III in 1795. Teachers were Turks assisted by French instructors. The library had many books in French language, that were on mathematics and military science (Berkes, 1998: 76). Sending young Turkish students to Europe to learn their ways incepted in this school. The ambassadors were also studying and learning the country they were living in. Intellectuals of Selim’s reign was openly supporting innovation. The youth was getting interested in learning French (Berkes, 1998: 78). These aspirations came to a halt when Selim was deposed, until the Janissaries’ destruction in 1826.

The idea of a reform, which arrived in Tulip Era had proliferated with Selim III, the number of people who had a firm belief in European sciences was getting bigger. France was the center of new knowledge for the Empire. On the other hand, reactionary factions were showing themselves at every turn against the reformers.

Economic problems and new French Republic's attack on Egypt fermented the reactionary factions, which overcame the reform process and halted it for nearly 20 years.

C. Comparison of Japan and the Ottoman Empire in dawn of modernization period

This part consists of the situation of both states, subject by subject in their respective periods.

1. International Context and Political Situation

After Commodore Perry ended Japan's isolation, Shogunate was aware that it could not deal with the power of the West. An appeasement approach was taken by Japan, and capitulations were given which were called unequal treaties. Some daimyos and lesser samurais were against this. The motto of "*Sonno Joi*" came about this time. "Revere the Emperor" tells us that the Tokugawa Shogunate lost its power over their daimyos with their appeasement approach, on the other hand "Expel the barbarian" tells us if the Shogunate would not do anything, the reactionary daimyos and samurais would. The West repelled the reactionary factions' attacks and those factions too saw the power of the West. Reactionaries then turned their gaze to topple Tokugawa primarily. Diplomatic missions started after this defeat. Japan wanted to learn the knowledge of the West and utilize it as they deemed fit in Japan. Eventually reactionaries prevailed, Tokugawa was toppled, and under Emperor, the reactionaries came to power.

On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire was well aware the West's power. The Sultan Selim III was planning a reform since he became the heir to the throne, but he had to deal with the reactionary factions who had profound connections with the system. First permanent embassies opened up in his reign and many young Turks went to Europe to work in these embassies opened in his era and young bureaucrats who were Muslim Turks started to learn the ways of the West in these embassies. Nizam-ı Cedid reforms of Selim were based on French model, however the French were Christians and seculars. The war with France between 1798 and 1801 was the icing on the cake for the reactionaries. After a rebellion, Selim halted the reforms, and was deposed. His cousin Mahmud II had to wait to destroy the reactionaries to implement his reforms for 17 years after Alemdar's death. Mahmud's destruction of Janissaries in 1826 opened the new page for the Ottoman reforms.

2. Economic Structure and Growth

The unequal treaties created balance of payment problems in Japan, gold and silver were leaving the country. To fight against this, both the government and reactionary factions in Japan started to increase their industrial capacity to compete with the West.

The Ottoman Empire's financial status was abysmal. The first attempt to take foreign loan occurred in this period. Coin debasement were utilized again for short-term benefits, the government confiscated gold and silver of the common people to solve the budget issues. Price ceilings were implemented to protect the poor, however it created food shortages. The Ottomans' traditional policy of provisionism was intact, and in effect while hindering the development of manufacturing sector.

3. Social Structure and Education

In Japan, both the Tokugawa government and reactionary daimyos started a Western learning campaign. Science and technology, medicine, Confucian and foreign languages were in the curriculum of the schools that were built, namely Medical School, Shohei and Kaisei Schools. These schools were the foundation of Tokyo Imperial University. The samurai were aware of the importance of the western knowledge and education, and they were trying to educate the peasants for the upcoming years. Both the government and domains sent students abroad to bring back western knowledge to Japan. Many modernizers of the Imperial Japan rose from their ranks.

The Ottoman Empire had already higher education schools such as Mühendishane before Selim III's reign. This school was expanded, and retailored. To avoid any reactionary backlash, Selim made sure the teachers were Turks. The curriculum was mainly mathematics, military sciences and languages. The school's library was a haven for western knowledge and encouraged many students to go to the

West to study. However, Selim's deposition and Alemdar's death stopped all of the reform efforts for 17 years.

While coming to this period, we see that the Ottoman Empire had more experience with the West than Japan. However, Japan's internal competition (amongst the daimyos, and daimyos vs the Shogunate) accelerated the Western learning. Ottomans did not have a competition but had a struggle among governmental factions. Many factions (ulema and janissaries) wanted no change and competition against themselves.

Both countries' governments wanted a reform. We can easily see this with Selim III with the Ottoman Empire and Ii Naosuke with Japan. There was little to no discrepancy between them. The top elites wanted a modernization in both nations. Japan quickly learned the ways of the West, such as diplomacy and technology. Japan even caught the Ottoman Empire in this regard. However, while Japan's reforms and modernization effort was getting intense, the Ottoman Empire was going on a bumpy road due to reactionary forces. The Ottoman Empire did not have a linear line of progression. Both countries however, were at a turning point. Japan was on the verge of imperial restoration in 1868 due to crumbling Tokugawa Shogunate against the Western Pressure. The Restoration would create an opportunity to unite all modernization efforts under a single government. The Ottomans on the other hand, destroyed the reactionary forces and nothing was stopping them internally after 1826.

CHAPTER THREE

COMPARISON OF THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION PERIOD OF JAPAN AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

As indicated in previous chapters, both states' reaction and interest of modernization started to confront the West. However, their mindsets were different. Japan was struggling not to become a colony; the Ottoman Empire on the other hand was seeking its former glory. Both started reform movements, which would be the base for their respective modernization process period.

Japan restored Emperor Meiji's power in 1868, and united the management of all of the modernization efforts that were taking place in different domains under him. The Ottoman Empire strengthened its centralization under Mahmud II before 1826, and with the destruction of the reactionary Janissaries in 1826, he was unchained to start the process of modernization in every aspect of the Empire.

This chapter will consist of the characteristics of the modernization processes of both states and comparison of the reforms. The analysis of their achievements in this period would reveal the discrepancy and divergence of the paths in their respective modernization processes.

I. JAPAN

A. International Context and Political Situation

When the Imperial restoration took place, Emperor Meiji was a sixteen-year-old kid. The government was depended on daimyos and samurai who overthrew the Tokugawa Shogunate. Under the imperial rule, many talented people who studied the West or studied in the West held important positions and power. These people, or oligarchs, were the ones who were responsible for the reforms and implementation of the modernization process. They will also be mentioned in this section.

The new government's elite knew that they had to start with economic and social reforms. The Charter Oath, which was promulgated on the enthronement date of Emperor Meiji, set the scene for these reforms. It was constituted of five articles and although written vaguely, changed the Japanese society legally. Shortly, the Oath mentioned of constituting a parliament, abolished the domain system, emancipated people from the class hierarchy to pursue their own occupations, demonized the feudal era's laws and brought the rule of law, and finally, the dedication of bringing the knowledge anywhere from the World to Japan.

First and foremost, the new government wanted to centralize the nation and take the reins of the state. Following the Oath, The Grand Council was formed to tie all the bureaucracy together (Henshall, 2004: 76). The first act was to determine the capital. Edo, the Tokugawa government's center of power was chosen for this, and Kyoto, the ancient capital, was abandoned. Edo became Tokyo (meaning Eastern Capital) and Emperor Meiji moved to Tokyo in 1869.

For further control over national economy and political scene, former lands of the Tokugawa Shogunate were nationalized. Summoning of daimyos to the capital followed this development in 1869. They were asked to give their domains back to the Emperor (Henshall, 2004: 76). They complied, and the process of creation the prefecture system started. After the firm control of bureaucracy in the domains completed; in 1871, the domain system was abolished and prefectures were constituted. Bureaucrats were assigned from the central government to rule the prefectures. To appease the daimyos who lost their lands, the imperial government granted daimyos big salaries (Gordon, 2003: 63), took over their domains' debts and granted smaller stipends to the samurai of each domain.

The reform of the military, which started in the 1850s by the competing domains and the Shogunate, had been transformed into national scale effort thanks to imperial centralization. Earlier reforms were based on the French army model (Kublin, 1949: 25) and Imperial government continued from it due to it being familiar (Kublin, 1949: 29). After the imperial restoration, there were some proposals for the reform about the samurai and the future of the army. It envisioned that the samurai class had to go and conscription needed to start for a modern army (Gordon, 2003: 66).

In 1870, a mission returned from Europe, having studied the Western military powers. The Bureau of Naval and Military Affairs was constituted, headed by Yamagata Arimoto (Kublin, 1949: 28), one of the people who was on the mission. In 1871, the domains with their clans' armies were disbanded. The Imperial government was trying to strengthen the army to secure its authority. To provide soldier for the army, German conscription system was adopted in 1872 (Kublin, 1949: 31). All men age 20 and able bodied were responsible to fulfill their duty under this law (Gordon, 2003: 66). With class system disbanded in 1870, the samurai stipends were gradually reduced, first by taxing the stipends in 1873 (Gordon, 2003: 65), then by turning into government bonds after the conscription law was declared in 1876 (Henshall, 2004: 77).

A number of missions were sent to the US and Europe. One of them was called Iwakura Mission. The mission was aiming to see the West at first hand and overturn the unequal treaties the Shogunate had signed (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 142). It was planned in 1869 and started in 1871 and went on for two years (Jansen, 1989: 736). The mission was very educational but a failure in terms of overturning the unequal treaties (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 142). While Iwakura Mission were abroad, the remaining oligarchs wanted to declare war against Korea due to problems of trade relations and Korean refusal to negotiate (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 142). The remaining oligarchs in the country were traditional samurai minded people, and reacted to the situation in traditional way (Mayo, 1998: 164). However, Iwakura Mission returned just in time, and the oligarchs in the mission, who were much more rational, also having learned what the West was capable of during the mission, rejected their demand of war due to the weak state of Japanese military (Henshall, 2004: 78). The high-ranking samurai in the government had a discontent for the reforms, and resigned from the Grand Council in protest after losing the argument on declaring war against Korea in 1873. Thus, the samurai who had been casted aside by the conscription law became a danger for the Imperial government (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 143).

Nevertheless, to appease the domestic pressure coming from the samurai (Kublin, 1949: 34), an expedition force was sent to Formosa, the current Taiwan in 1874 (Norman, 2000: 88), to punish the natives who killed the shipwrecked Ryukyu islanders, today's Okinawa in 1871 (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 143). The expedition was a success, but the expedition to Formosa started a crisis with China. Britain arbitrated between the two countries due to Formosa expedition, and China paid indemnities for the Formosa's natives' actions in 1871 (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 143). This treaty made way for Japan to annex Okinawa in 1879 by the approval of the British. In 1875, Japan did what the Americans did to them twenty years earlier to

Korea. Japan sent its navy to show its power to Korea, and forced Koreans to sign an unequal treaty called Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876 with gunboat policy (Gordon, 2003: 115). The treaty gave Japan the right of extraterritoriality, three ports were opened to Japan, and Korea was seen by Japan as detached from China's suzerainty (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 143-144).

However, the discontent of the high-ranking samurai continued and eventually turned into rebellions, first in 1874 and after in 1877 (Kublin, 1949: 34). The Imperial army that was designed after the French army was successful against the resurgent samurai on both occasions. However, after the Satsuma rebellion of 1877, the army started to leave the French model for German model (Kublin, 1949: 33). The navy was still using the British model (Jansen, 1989: 397).

In 1881, the Imperial government announced that a constitution would be promulgated at the end of the decade. Consequently, the first political parties of Japan emerged at the same time (Lehmann, 1982: 251). A year later, a mission led by Ito Hirobumi went to Europe to study the constitutions, which lasted around fourteen months (Jansen, 1989: 390). In 1885, the cabinet system was established and Hirobumi became the first Prime Minister of Japan. In 1888, the newly formed Privy Council completed the draft for constitution, and discussions about the constitution started with the presence of the Emperor Meiji (Jansen, 1989: 394-395). The constitution was promulgated in 1889 and the parliament, which was called the Diet, opened a year later. The constitution was based on Prussian constitution of 1850 (Jansen, 2002: 391). Nevertheless, the constitution had a peculiar aspect. While using Prussian constitution as a model, Ito Hirobumi rejected some of the notions of Prussian constitution due to their connections with Christianity. He suggested that the sovereignty of Japan should reside within the Emperor as he is the divine descendant of the gods (Beasley, 1995: 80). This notion was openly named in the Imperial Rescript of 1890 as "*Kokutai*" or "National Polity", and casted a shadow over the budding democracy of Meiji Japan by making the Emperor sovereign, not the parliament (Kawamura, 2014: 30). Although the creation of the Diet had brought in the opposition leaders, the government continued to be run by the oligarchs from Satsuma and Choushuu because the constitution did not require the formation of cabinets from the majority party in the

Diet. The parties in the Diet were made up mostly of wealthy men from rural areas (Lipton, 2008: 79).

Japan's effort to modernize was taking its strength mostly from revoking the unequal treaties. Besides military system, legal system was also in need for modernization. In order to modernize the legal system, Japan had proclaimed certain number of laws in the early years of Emperor Meiji. Japan proclaimed Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure in 1882 (Lehmann, 1982: 256) and felt it was enough to revoke extraterritoriality. In 1886, an attempt to revoke unequal treaties was made, and the Imperial government gathered an international conference in Tokyo. The conference failed after the public backlash, due to the western powers' demand to review the legal code drafts for the upcoming years and proposal of foreign judges to sit in Japanese courts (Gordon, 2003: 93-94). In the following years, Japan proclaimed the Code of Civil Procedure (Jansen, 1989: 694), and revised the Criminal Procedure Act in 1890 (Lehmann, 1982: 256).

In 1891, however, the Western powers were aware that Japan had changed since Ansei Treaties. The fear of unilateral revoking of the treaties pushed the West to negotiate. The negotiations started in 1891 with the US and France, and with the signature of Britain in 1894; the Aoki–Kimberley Treaty ended extraterritoriality in 1899 and brought back tariff control in 1911 (Auslin, 2004: 200).

Japan's opening of Korea in 1876 was a problem for China. Japan was not recognizing China's influence over Korea. A riot in Korea in 1882 met with a military intervention by both Japan and China. In 1885, China and Japan agreed to withdraw from Korea, but China kept its sphere of influence over Korea. In 1894, a riot again ensued in Korea (Gordon, 2003: 117). Both China and Japan intervened it. After seizing the Korean government, Japan declared war on China. The declaration came just weeks after the Aoki–Kimberley Treaty.

Japan's modern army and navy seriously tested themselves in this war. Japan seized the whole Korea, and by using British naval tactics, decimated Chinese fleet and invaded Manchuria (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 185). The Treaty of Shimonoseki signed between a victorious Japan and defeated China in 1895. Japan took Taiwan, Liaotung and became part of the unequal treaties China signed with the

Western powers in 1840s (Jansen, 2002: 433); China recognized Korea's independence and paid indemnity (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 186).

This was the first time the Western powers became aware of the results of Japan's modernization. Russia became concerned; it also had plans over China and Korea (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 186); and with Germany and France, intervened diplomatically and made Japan give up Liaotung (Jansen, 2002: 433).

B. Economic Structure and Growth

As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, competing domains and Shogunate started their own modernization processes, mostly on military system. Nevertheless, they also invested in weaving mills and reverberatory furnaces (Francks, 1999: 23-24). The imperial government inherited all of these industries.
The tariffs were not under control due to unequal treaties; and starting from the 1860s, the balance of payment were always in deficit. Only way to fight against this was to develop the domestic industries and make them able to compete with imports (Francks, 1999: 27). The government was in need to define its revenue sources and distribute the tax burden (Nakamura, 1966: 429). First, they took all of the daimyos' lands, and assigned bureaucrats to those lands from the center. The daimyos and their retainer samurais were given stipends. Daimyos' stipends were high, but the samurai's were not so much. Imperial government bought its political power from the daimyos, which was a heavy burden on the finances. Half of the tax revenue was going to the daimyo and samurai stipends and their overtaken debt payments between 1868 and 1875 (Francks, 1999: 31). The Land Tax Reform of 1873 followed these developments.

The reform made the land sellable, bringing private ownership to Japan. Prior to the reform, the land taxes were paid in rice, but now it was paid with currency. The taxes started to be calculated over the potential of the land, not from the yield it gave. The owner of the land became responsible for the taxes, not the farmer-cultivator. The tax rate was set as 3%, then it was reduced to 2.5% in 1877 (Francks, 1999: 30). This constant rate of revenue eased the Imperial government's hands. Japanese agricultural sector was productive too. The land tax took up about 80% of the government's revenue until 1880s, then it fell off to 60% in 1890s (Gordon, 2003: 95). The land tax helped the Meiji regime to realize an independent development strategy by saving internal resources without going to external borrowing (Esenbel, 2012: 156).

With silk and tea exports, a considerable amount of currency was entering Japan. A blight in silkworms in Europe made Japan's silk increase in demand so much that Japan's silk totaled 42% of Japan's total exports until 1900s (Gordon, 2003: 95). Japan used this income to buy foreign machinery to increase its industrial capacity in cotton to decrease dependency to imported textile goods (Lehmann, 1982: 194). Increasing growth and foreign demand created a diversification in agricultural products, and in turn created higher revenues for government to use in industrialization (Lehmann, 1982: 192).

In 1872, the Imperial government started national banking system, which was based on American model, disregarding the central bank model of Europe (Allen, 1981: 45). According to the Regulations issued in 1872, a national bank was to deposit Government paper money equal to three fifths of its capital with the Treasury, and to hold gold equivalent to two fifths of its capital as a reserve. The Treasury handed to the banks "Paper Money Exchange Bonds" bearing 6% interest in return for the notes deposited with it, and the banks were then permitted to issue their own notes redeemable in gold up to the amount of the security, which they possessed (Allen, 1981: 45). In this way, it was expected that notes convertible into gold would replace part of the Government's inconvertible note issue, and that effective banking machinery to serve the needs of the new economic systems would be brought into being (Allen, 1981: 45). These expectations were not realized. Only four national banks were established under these regulations, two of them in 1873 and the others in 1874. Their actual note issue never exceeded 2,300,000 yen (Allen, 1981: 45). New implementations in banking were introduced in 1876. The conversion of banknotes into coins was prohibited. Stipends given to samurai and daimyo were encouraged to constitute capital for reorganized banks, which worked a little to appreciate the bank note (Esenbel, 2012: 144).

In the meantime, the government strictly opposed to foreign loans as the case of Egypt, which turned Egypt a colony haunted them (Jansen, 2002: 373). The Imperial government even banned their merchants from external borrowing between 1868 and 1872 (Esenbel, 2012: 142). Even at a loss, the Imperial government was trying to set up factories with the intention of making its people familiar with factory production (Jansen, 1989: 612). The unequal treaties was making nigh impossible to profit from, and develop domestic industries (Jansen, 2002: 375). The reason for the Imperial government to shoulder the investment of the infrastructure and industry projects was no one wanted to do it (Norman, 2000: 110). Money lending merchants was too cautious and found risky to invest in these new industries. All of the investments requiring technology, expertise and big finances were started by the government itself (Francks, 1999: 38), the land tax revenue was heavily used for this endeavor. Until 1881, an expenditure equivalent of 30% of the expenditure of the army was allocated for the development of roads and general infrastructure, capital investments and industrial projects (Francks, 1999: 31)

The Imperial government was in a constant deficit due to unequal treaties and industrial investments. Increased military spending due to suppressing the Satsuma rebellion also raised the deficit starting from 1878 (Gordon, 2003: 95). The government printed money to finance its deficit. Printing money caused inflation that in turn became a crisis in 1881 (Francks, 1999: 31). The Imperial government intervened with the plan of the Finance Minister, Matsukata Masayoshi, and started to take austerity measures (Jansen, 2002: 376) to stop the inflation.

It was decided to abandon the experiment in national banking, to establish a central banking system on the European model, to balance the budget and to restore parity between the silver yen and the notes (Allen, 1981: 49). Matsukata established the Bank of Japan as the central bank (Francks, 1999: 32), shut down printing houses that printed paper money and returned to silver backed currency (Gordon, 2003: 96). In addition, the banks were the first institutions in Japan to be organized on modern joint stock company lines and to use western business methods (Crawcour, 1997: 58). Measures to cut imports, promote exports, and a specialized financial institutions to deal with foreign exchange transactions followed (Francks, 1999: 32). The investments that were made until 1880 was sold at a loss to the private entrepreneurs that would be called zaibatsu to start “Meiji Capitalism” (Jansen, 1989: 612). This development was not intentional. The Imperial government’s only goal was to reduce costs, but instead it had profound impact on Japan’s development (Francks, 1999: 39).

Matsukata’s measures were harsh; prices went down nearly 50% by 1884, small-scale landowners went bankrupt and sold their lands to big landowners, nearly 10% of all arable lands switched hands, and tenancy on arable lands rose sharply

(Gordon, 2003: 96). The measures helped to stabilize the economy, and meet budgetary balance with an organized financial system even during the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 (Francks, 1999: 32).

It should be noted that the word “capitalism” does not mean pure free market economy in the case of Japan. The Imperial government, in the areas that they considered important, put more faith in manipulation than in free competition (Jansen, 1989: 617).

Starting from the 1880s, Japan started to build what a capitalist economy needed. Railways, telegraph lines, a new commercial law and specialized banks that gave long-term credits emerged in 1880s (Gordon, 2003: 96). Pioneer industrial sector was textile manufacturing. Coal and metal mining followed textile. In a twenty-year span, textile output quadrupled, and mining doubled (Gordon, 2003: 96). However, most of this increase occurred in the 1890s; most of the 1880s was the years of struggle for Japan due to economic crisis. The Imperial government’s investment to railways was also limited; it reached about 275 km in 1882 (Ericson, 1996: 9). It was costly; the government was dealing with the budget deficit, and not in favor of foreign loans to finance the railways. The private sector shouldered the further developments. At the end of the 1880s, Japan’s railways reached more than 2240 kilometers in total, in which the private sector’ portion was 1360 km (Ericson, 1996: 9). The government subsidized the private sector for their railway construction efforts during this period (Francks, 1999: 57). The railways helped the other industrial sectors to grow. It helped to reduce the cost of the raw materials and transport of the finished products, mostly in textiles and coal mining sectors (Gordon, 2003: 97).

The private sector mentioned here were called zaibatsu. These were consisted of a family owned holding company, which controlled large shares, which in turn controlled industrial and commercial firms, which in turn controlled small affiliates (Reischauer, 1970: 160-161). The zaibatsu bought the government’s enterprises, creating an oligopoly in Meiji period Japan (Jansen, 2002: 377). The zaibatsu’s sphere of activity encapsulated almost every sector in Japan’s industry. The government was always in support of private sector to take the necessary steps to develop the industry. This situation resulted in a relationship of trust between the state and business sector, a complete contrast of the West (Reischauer, 1970: 160).

Japan’s approach of modernization in this regard was seen before such as in Russia and Germany. To reach significant industrial capability, a “late comer” modernizing country would direct its resources to the industry via big capable companies. However in Japan’s case, this situation supported by cheap labor (Gordon, 2003: 98) and high technology, which made Japan unique in the world (Reischauer, 1970: 157). In 19th century, there was an emerging vast market of China and East Asia, demanding western products. Japan filled that gap by manufacturing cheap and useful goods by using its unique position. Buluş suggests that Japan's success in industrialization was based on this market's expansion (Buluş, 2002: 155).

In this period, Gross National Product was steadily growing, at a rate of 3.25% per year and manufacturing output 4.7% per year until 1900 (Francks, 1999: 41-42). The agricultural sector was growing around 2% per year until 1900 (Lehmann, 1982: 192). Although getting bigger, the industrial capability was still small relative to the agricultural sector. In 1895, the agricultural sector represented 37% of the Gross Domestic Product of Japan; however, industry was only at 9% (Francks, 1999: 42). Textile sector contributed to more than half of the industrial employment at the end of the 19th century. Heavy industries were developed for strategic reasons. Japan’s competitiveness in heavy industries only started in 1930s (Reischauer, 1970: 158). Japan was importing necessary technologies rather than making them domestically for light industries. This situation started to change only after 1895.

After defeating China in 1895, Japan made China to sign its own capitulations and pay indemnity worth of 366 million of yen. With this money, Japan started its heavy industry and built Yawata Steel Works. Britain, anticipating Japan's rise in the East, abandoned Russia and allied with Japan in the later years. The effective termination of unequal treaties in 1899 by Britain emancipated Japan of the fear of external borrowing and Japan started an immense external borrowing for its heavy industry investments and military defense against Russia (Esenbel, 2012: 157).

C. Social Structure and Education

The new government saw westernization as a key element in modernization. Westernization would make Japan stronger, better and be capable of competing with the western powers, and perhaps even match them or surpass them. One of the many slogans of the age was to be "*oitsuke, oikose*" – "catch up, overtake" (Henshall, 2004: 79).

Meiji leaders both outside and inside the government encouraged the adoption of Western social customs and cultural styles to reach the goal of "civilization and enlightenment" (*bunmei kaika*) (Lipton, 2008: 47). Westernization of outward appearances also included aspects of daily life such as dress and diet. Japanese leaders had learned from Western advice, such as Townsend Harris's, the importance of appearance in the judgements of other cultures (Lipton, 2008: 47) Aside from the introduction of Western-style military uniforms, the government passed an ordinance in 1872 requiring Western dress for government officials at formal occasions (Lipton, 2008: 47).

The government had encouraged unbound hair along with making the samurai topknot optional, but because unbound hair was associated with outcasts and "barbarians" like Ainu (in Hokkaido), it was resisted except by men wanting to make a strong statement in favor of reform. Soon, however, the emperor's example of a short western haircut and pressure from local officials, such as authorizing police to cut any long hair they encountered, led to a rapid take up of western haircuts (Lipton, 2008: 48). While western dress and social customs came to be seen as correct and up to date, at home even government officials typically reverted to kimonos, sitting on tatami floors and eating Japanese food. Most homes continued to be built and furnished in traditional Japanese style, making Western dress and shoes inconvenient and uncomfortable (Lipton, 2008: 50).

Moreover, with the Charter Oath's announcement, feudal class system was abolished, and people were emancipated to pursue their occupation. It should be noted that in many countries, industry broke up the peasant village and dispersed its population, or greatly weakened its solidarity by creating deep class divisions. Neither development occurred in Japan, at least not on a comparable scale. Family farming remained the almost invariable rule, preserving the pattern of compact settlements and blocking the growth of large capitalist farms. Land ownership did tend to concentrate, but large owners turned their land over to families of tenants or part-tenants rather than work it themselves (Smith, 1959: 209).

Although modernization generated in towns and cities new attitudes destructive of tradition and greatly affected some important aspects of agriculture, the countryside remained a vast and populous hinterland of conservatism. Nor did the demographic ratio between town and countryside alter with the growth of industry as rapidly as in some countries (Smith, 1959: 210). By 1893, Japan's population reached 41 million, of those 41 million, only 16% were living in the cities (Taeuber, 1958: 41-47-60).

Industry clearly can develop no faster than the quantity and the quality of the labor force allow, which in practice usually means no faster than the character of agriculture permits since workers must be recruited mainly from the farm population (Smith, 1959: 211-212). It is easy to overlook the significance of labor in Japanese industrialization because it posed no major problem. For upward of two hundred years the agricultural labor force had been unwittingly preparing for the transition to factory employment. This essential psychological preparation made it relatively easy to draw the peasant away from the village to the city (Smith, 1959: 212). White explains this as this "relative ease" was also due partly to the fact that: (1) in many cases and for a considerable period of time, industrial employment did not require migration; and that (2) internal migration in Japan between 1880 and 1940 followed that of the Edo period: it was primarily between villages, or from villages to nearby towns, from towns to small cities, or from small and medium-size cities to large cities. The transition was slower and more indirect than Smith suggests, since many individuals either were employed by industry without migrating or migrated without entering the industrial sector (White, 1978: 91).

In Japan in the 1880s and 1890s, when most of the industrial development was in textiles, many factories were also located in rural areas and most workers in these factories were from nearby villages (White, 1978: 92). More than four out of five textile workers were women. They typically were required to live in company-owned dormitories that were locked at night (Gordon, 2003: 100). Men's numbers were smaller than the number of women factory laborers.

Until Matsukata's policies, the peasants and landlords who work in agricultural sector thrived. Rising inflation and fixed land tax left them more money. After Matsukata's policies created a hard price crash and made the land tax valuable again, peasant riots who were supported by landlords started. Major disturbances occurred in

Fukushima (1882), Kabasan, Chichibu, and lida (all in 1884). In Chichibu, for example, the local rebels called for better terms for repaying debts, reduction of consumer taxes, closing of schools for three years (because they were not free of charge until at the end of the century) (Lipton, 2008: 57), revision of the conscription law, and reduction of village expenses. All these demands directly or indirectly reflected their straitened economic circumstances (Duus, 1976: 108). The Imperial government suppressed all of them.

From 1 January 1873, the western solar (Gregorian) calendar was adopted in place of the old lunar one. Modern-style newspapers proliferated from the early 1870s (Henshall, 2004: 79). The introduction of compulsory education in 1872, initially for sixteen months and extended to four years in 1886, proved most important for industrialization effort (Lipton, 2008: 50). By as early as 1879 almost two-thirds of all boys and one-quarter of all girls were receiving education at least elementary school level. The literacy rate of the total population on the eve of industrialization stood somewhere in the region of 40%, by the end of the Meiji period the literacy rate had doubled to about 80% (Lehmann, 1982: 259).

Ahead of many European countries, this not only gave access to education and new career prospects for children of all classes, but also provided new opportunities and ideas for girls as well as boys. The government regarded education for girls as important for training future mothers (Lipton, 2008: 50). In addition, missionary schools and other private schools provided the only opportunities for higher education to girls. The government did not establish girls' higher schools until 1899, and women remained barred from universities until after the World War II (Lipton, 2008: 52).

In the 1880s and 1890s, as protest against compulsory schooling decreased and attendance rose, the government also changed the curriculum (Gordon, 2003: 105). Initially, many school texts were translations of western texts, and students were therefore exposed to such ideas as egalitarianism and individual right. However, during a tour of central Honshu in 1878, the Emperor concluded that the adoption of things western had gone too far at the expense of values such as filial piety (Henshall, 2004: 84). It became clear that commoners were using their education to read newspapers and sign petitions that criticized the government. The Ministry of

Education responded with a more state-centered, moralistic curriculum (Gordon, 2003: 105).

In some ways, Japan was simply producing its own version of the sort of nationalistic expression that dominated classrooms in the Great Britain or other imperial nations. However, it went a step further in indoctrination, severely restricting the worldview of its students (Henshall, 2004: 84). The culminating statement of this conservative reform came in the Imperial Rescript on Education, promulgated in the name of the emperor on 30 October 1890. The document reflected the beliefs of high government officials and their advisors that the goal of education was learning to serve society and the state (Gordon, 2003: 105). The rescript turned the class virtues of the samurai into a national ethic for the commoners. At the same time, by associating these virtues with the emperor and with the "*kokutai*", national polity, it made them specifically Japanese virtues, not shared with the rest of the world (Duus, 1976: 118). The late 1880s and 1890s represented a period when the Meiji leaders continued to use Western institutions and practices as models, but, even more deliberately and selectively than earlier, adapted rather than merely copied them to suit Japan's particular conditions and needs as they perceived them (Lipton, 2008: 59). The Imperial Rescript on Education was closely related to the issue of religious freedom in spite of the fact that the document did not refer to religious matters at all. Once promulgated, it deified itself as the holy object of the civil religion in practice. The rescript became the source of coercion toward a national identity (Yoshiya, 1969: 181).

When the Imperial government was formed in 1868, new regime tried to build the legitimacy and bring together the people through the Imperial household. The reason for this was actually the lack of power the new government had at the time. The Tokugawa family was ousted from the newly constituted oligarchy of Satsuma and Choushuu. Emperor's image would give them legitimacy they would need to start their reforms (Yumiko, 1999: 162). The Imperial Rescript on the Unity of Government and Religion promulgated on the same day of Emperor Meiji's assertion of power. This rescript was intended to exhibit the new government's power and nationalism and also it developed the programs of prohibiting Christianity, while damaging Buddhism for the enhancement of Shinto doctrines (Yoshiya, 1968: 288).

In 1872, Ito Hirobumi explained to the Imperial government that Americans regarded Japan as a savage nation because the lack of freedom of religion and persecution of native Christians, and that the Americans made it a pretext for not signing an equal treaty with Japan (Yoshiya, 1968: 315). Hirobumi tried to persuade the government to adopt the freedom of religion principle. The Imperial government accepted to show toleration towards Christianity informally in 1873.

On the other hand, in 1868, when the restoration leaders pushed for the establishment of the authority of the Emperor, they attempted to extract essence of Shintoism from the eclectic institutions that had been mixed and fused together for centuries. The Grand Council of State and the Office of Shinto issued a number of orders for the separation of Shintoism and Buddhism, and for the promotion of Shinto (Yoshiya, 1968: 319). This haste to promote Shinto was government's only choice against danger of proliferation of Christianity which they had no power to ban it due to external pressures (Yumiko, 1999: 168). Meanwhile the state leaders realized that the Buddhist priests' ability to preach was much better than the Shinto priests. Hence, the leaders encouraged the Shintoists to enlarge the scope of the state cult and to mobilize Buddhist with all the other religious teachers in the Great Religion movement (Yoshiya, 1968: 329). According to Yumiko, Shigeyoshi Murakami added that the government also used district officials, fortune tellers, comedians and artists to indoctrinate the people (Yumiko, 1999: 168-169).

Most Buddhist priests willingly participated in this project. After suffering badly under the separation and the abolition movements, they found in this project an opportunity to recover their social function and position (Yoshiya, 1968: 331) Subsequently, during January 1873, a priest submitted a criticism of the Great Religion to the Minister of Religious Education. He mentioned that this project was in conflict with ideal of separation of church and state that the Westerners cared so much. He further recommended the dissolution of the Institute of the Great Religion and the adoption of the policy of religious freedom in October 1873. Correspondingly, the government reduced the promotion of the Great Religion (Yoshiya, 1968: 332-333).

In April 1875, the Grand Council of State instructed the Ministry of Religious Education to abolish the Institute of the Great Religion and to let each sect establish its own institution for religious teaching. The Ministry of Religious Education declared the abolition of the Institute of the Great Religion and the permission for the religious organizations autonomously to establish their own places of religious instruction. Consequently, having lost its function, the Ministry of Religious Education was abolished in 1877 (Yoshiya, 1968: 334-335).

The development of religious freedom in early era of Meiji Japan was a part of the modernization package imported from the modernized West by the restoration leaders. Internal reaction against the enforcement of the government support of Shinto was a minor, however not negligible force that pushed the government to give up a major policy contradicting religious freedom (Yoshiya, 1968: 337-338). The failure of the two religious programs of the early Meiji state made way to the establishment of the principle of religious toleration. The government implicitly admitted the practice of Christianity by 1873 after 250 years of persecution, and stopped the interference to the Buddhists by 1875 (Yoshiya, 1968: 338). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Meiji government used Shintoism and the institution of Emperor, which is referred as Tenno, to control the subjects of the Emperor and make them accept the implementations of the government for modernization process (Yumiko, 1999: 174). According to Buluş, Halliday mentions that the key factor in industrialization success was working masses' acceptance of low wages due to ideological mystification of religion; conscription, using force to make the workers work, abysmal working conditions in mines, factories and dormitories, and constant cruelty and exploitation (Buluş, 2002: 159).

II. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

A. International Context and Political Situation

After the destruction of Janissaries, the field was open for the Sultan Mahmud. Most of the reformer cadre his cousin Sultan Selim possessed had run to Egypt. Under Mehmet Ali Pasha, these ran-away cadre found a safe haven to work; and the reforms implemented in Egypt proved themselves indeed useful. Immediately after the Janissaries, a new army called Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye was created. Mahmud was impressed by Mehmet Ali Pasha, thus the Sultan asked for assistance for the setup of the army. Mehmet Ali refused the call for help (Ortaylı, 1987: 36). Instead, the Sultan turned west for help.

Just a year after, the navy was burned down in Navarino by the Western powers who supported Greece's independence. The new army of Egypt created by Mehmet Ali Pasha was very successful in suppressing the Greek revolt. However, Western powers' interference turned the tide and the Empire lost its navy and the War. Russia, a year later, attacked the Ottomans. The new army was still in set-up process; therefore, it did not do much against the Russians. The war ended a year later in 1829, resulting in Ottoman defeat and the independence of Greece. Mehmet Ali Pasha was not content with its governorship. He attacked Syria, defeated the Ottomans twice and occupied it. He then defeated the Ottomans near Konya in 1832. Mahmud asked help from the West, but only the Russians answered the call. Russians' presence in İstanbul stopped Mehmet Ali's troops. He took the governorship of Syria with the consent of the Sultan. Russians, for their efforts, got the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi, which the Ottomans accepted to close the straits if Russia would involve any wars with a third country. Britain was very discontent with Mehmet Ali Pasha, who was the instigator (Zürcher, 2004: 37). The Sultan was in need of help, but the Western powers were against the Ottomans. Prussia emerged as the Polaris to guide the army. Field-Marshall Helmuth von Moltke (only a lieutenant then) came to İstanbul, became an advisor in 1835, and planned a reorganization for the military until 1839 (Lewis, 1969: 82). However, due to cultural problems, which Moltke mentioned in his letters (Lewis, 1969: 82), Prussian influences in this time stayed limited (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 45).

In 1838, to get support for their campaign against Mehmet Ali Pasha, the Ottoman sought the British support. The government signed the Baltalimanı Treaty, which opened the Ottoman territory to English goods without high import tax. Both Ottoman and British negotiators understood the treaty as an agreement aimed against the interests of Mehmed Ali, a rebel but still an Ottoman subject and thus bound by the treaty (Kasaba, 2008: 13). In 1839, the Sultan attacked Mehmet Ali Pasha to get Syria under central government's control. The Ottomans were defeated at Nizip and saved by Austrian navy who stopped Mehmet Ali Pasha's navy in the Mediterranean.

It has been known since the time of Selim III that the West could not have been risen thanks to its military organizations alone, and that the financial resources and tax collection system that sustained them should also be created within the Empire (Mardin, 1991: 14). If we look at Mahmud's approach in this regard, centralization efforts came forth. We see two things: Strengthening of bureaucracy and abolition of tımar system. For a long time, bureaucrats were complaining about their working conditions since Koçi Bey (Lewis, 1969: 89). Mahmud tried to improve the conditions of his officials. Just two weeks after the destruction of Janissaries, he declared abolishing the confiscation of the property of persons banished or condemned to death (Lewis, 1969: 90). The tımar system was in a decline for a long time as was explained in chapter two. However, it survived until Mahmud's reign. His predecessor Selim had turned Anatolian tımars into domains and gave them to mültezims, which he used the money from mültezims in his new army. Mahmud abolished all the tımar system in 1831 and remaining sipahis who could fight absorbed into new army as cavalry, the remaining were given pensions (Lewis, 1969: 92). This was the end of feudalism in the Empire.

In 1834, Mahmud started to pave the way to Tanzimat by changing two key and ancient administrative offices, Sadrazam and Şeyh-ül İslam. Mahmud revoked the title of sadrazam and vezir, and implemented Başvekil (Prime Minister) and vekils (ministers). Sadrazam's power were distributed to the new vekils and Başvekil became coordinator among the ministries (Berkes, 1998: 97-98). On the other hand, Mahmud took the office of Şeyh-ül İslam out of the government and equated it with the millet organizations. Mahmud saw the Office of Şeyh-ül İslam as "un-reformable" and gave the judicial power from Sadrazam to Şeyh-ül İslam, which only had a power of jurisdiction over Muslims (Berkes, 1998: 98). Mahmud also created "Bab-ı Ali", the Sublime Porte, which contained the office of Başvekil and its subordinate offices to administer foreign and domestic affairs (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 36). A cabinet which had the titles of Meclis-i Hass-ı Vükela (the Sultan's Council of Ministers), Meclis-i Hass (the Sultan's Council), or Meclis-i Vükela (Council of Ministers) in various periods, was constituted under the authority of Başvekil (Prime Minister) for the coordination, and implementation of executive responsibilities of each ministry and create the policy of the government (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 37).

In 1838, the first penal codes outside of Şeriat was started to be written which defined the responsibilities of government officials and proceedings when an investigation occurred about those officials (Berkes, 1998: 98). This coding made the officials responsible against the law, not to the Sultan. In order to create this kind of legislation, in 1838 the Sultan, with the recommendation of Mustafa Reşit Pasha, ordered for the creation of a couple of councils which had advisory capacity only, composing of distinguished officials both current and former, to check legislative proposals and to constitute new legislations (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 38). The most important one among those was the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, which the new reforms were discussed; and in the later years, heads of the non-Muslim communities attended to express their opinions on matters (Davison, 1963: 28). Mahmud was also somewhat successful of diverting the revenues of Vakıfs to state treasury. He paved the way to his successors to divert the money to treasury and severely demolished the power of the ulema by creating Ministry of Evkaf and giving every vakıf in existence under the ministry's control (Lewis, 1969: 92).

Mahmud worked with the unique reform officials, which had helped him shaping and executing his earlier plans. These were; in military, Hüsrev and his protégés, Sait Mehmet and Halil Rifat; Edhem Pertev Pasha in internal affairs; Akif in external affairs. At the helms of this skeleton crew, there was Mustafa Reşit, who prepared programs for reform in various aspects of government and convinced the Sultan to carry them out (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 36). Mahmud died of tuberculosis on the verge of Tanzimat's declaration. His oldest son, Abdülmecid, succeeded him.

Mustafa Reşit Pasha, although being the minister of foreign affairs, took the charge of reforming edicts and their promulgation. The government officials had to build up a legal system to guarantee the freedom and equality of the people, to create a modern state machinery, and to facilitate economic progress. Finally, they had to encourage the development of modern cultural institutions (Berkes, 1998: 137). Tanzimat Fermanı, literally means "Reorganization Charter" proclaimed in 1839, with such principles as the security of life, honor, and property of the subject, the abolition of tax-farming and all the abuses associated with it, regular and orderly recruitment into armed forces, fair and public trial of persons accused of crimes, and equality of persons of all religions in the application of these laws (Lewis, 1969: 107). The Tanzimat Charter contained the idea of limiting the arbitrary executive powers of the Sultan. It did not contain any idea of popular sovereignty, but it declared the abolition of the central concept of the medieval doctrine of sovereignty (Berkes, 1998: 146). As the Charter did not provide for any popular representation, the source of legislation would be the councils of deliberation (meşveret) (Berkes, 1998: 146). The council was invested with law making powers, but the laws accepted by it through free discussion and majority decision acquired legal sanction only through ratification by the ruler (Berkes, 1998: 146).

Reşit Pasha introduced a new system of prefectures and departments modelled after the French system with salaried official in charge of them to replace tax farmers and pashas (Lewis, 1969: 108). Tanzimat made it possible to declare laws besides Şeriat. Until that time, it was impossible to declare new laws because the law was the law of the god and it could not be changed (Lewis, 1969: 109). The formalization of Mahmud's concept of adalet (the administration of justice in terms of equality before the law) as the basis for the Charter's Fundamentals was bound to create the difficulty of reconciling statute laws with a number of practices derived from the Şeriat and perpetuated through the millet system (Berkes, 1998: 147). Thus, the creation of a commercial law based on French system that created a judiciary organ enraged the ulema. Abdülmecid caved in under the pressure of the ulema and "perpetrator" of the law, Mustafa Reşit Pasha was released from his duties by the new Sultan and sent to Paris as the ambassador (Lewis, 1969: 110).

Tanzimat was not liked by the old regime's remnants such as mültezims and pashas (Karal, 2006: 66). The subjects of the Empire in one of the provinces rebelled against these reactionary remnants (İnalcık, 2006: 109). On the other hand, the western public applauded for accepting the Tanzimat Charter as part of the Empire's civilization. (Karal, 2006: 66). After Mustafa Reşit Pasha's dismissal, the new prefecture system was abandoned for the old system due to reactionary pressure, but the reforms somewhat continued. In 1843, a conscription law made all imperial subjects responsible to serve in the army, however it was depended on a lottery based system (Hacısalihoğlu, 2007: 61). In 1845, Mustafa Reşit Pasha returned to the government as foreign minister and one year later became sadrazam. In the same year, each provincial government was attached with a council in which the non-Muslim communities were represented, and this council was asked to check on the actions of the governor, first in three provinces, and then all of them (Davison, 1963: 48). The effectiveness of the local councils, once established, varied from place to place and year to year, and with the quality of the membership and of the local governor. Nevertheless, often the councils worked poorly (Davison, 1963: 100).

One of the important development of the Tanzimat period was the codification of law. The modern conditions the Empire found itself in, and reforms processes forced the Empire to codify a legal system based upon formal statutes (Berkes, 1998: 160). Tanzimat Charter mentioned of loyalty to Şeriat while admitting new laws were needed. Thus, Şeriat was envisaged to be written as a positive law with Western elements blended into it (Berkes, 1998: 161). In 1847, mixed civil and criminal courts were created, with European and Ottoman judges in equal numbers and procedure drawn from European practice (Lewis, 1969: 114). In 1850, the commercial law the ulema opposed in 1841 was promulgated. A revised penal code followed the commercial law (Lewis, 1969: 114-115) and an entirely new one based on French penal code declared in 1858 (Berkes, 1998: 164).

In 1852, Mustafa Reşit Pasha was deposed again and all of the reforms stopped. His provincial reform again cancelled. In 1853, the Crimean War started with Russia. Under the threat of Russia, in 1854, to show how sincere it was about the reforms, the Empire brought the reformers back (Lewis, 1969: 115). This time, Mustafa Reşit Paşa's protégés, Ali and Fuad Pashas took the reins. In 1856, "Islahat Fermanı", the Reform Edict was promulgated. A week later Paris Treaty were signed and The Ottomans, with the help of Britain and France, defeated Russia. Treaty marked the Ottoman Empire's place in Concert of Europe and its independence and integrity were guaranteed by the treaty (Davison, 1963: 9). Tanzimat's political leaders objected capitulations and decreased the privileges of foreigners whenever possible. Ali Pasha started this at the negotiations of Paris Treaty while trying to abolish the capitulations. The Western powers refused, given the reason as the state of the courts and tax collection system (Davison, 1963: 262).

Reform Edict implied political, legal, religious, educational, economic, and moral reforms in which equality, freedom, material progress, and rational enlightenment would be keynoted (Berkes, 1998: 153). It declared the abolishing discrimination against non-Muslims, and poll-tax. Military service was thrown open to all people, not just Muslims. Although, if the non-Muslims did not want to do it, they could pay the exemption tax. The edict again abolished tax farming and made all the subjects of the empire equal before the law, irrespective of religion (Lewis, 1969: 116). It reaffirmed the apostasy from Islam would not be punished by death declared in 1844 (Davison, 1963: 55). The Reform Edict was removing privileged situation of the Muslims who had been the “dominant nation” until then, and trying to establish an “Ottoman” citizenship irrespective of religion (Mardin, 1991: 16). The millet system were to be reorganized as so that the temporal affairs of the non-Muslim communities would be supervised not by the clergy alone, but by delegates in the councils (Davison, 1963: 55). The Tanzimat Council replaced the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (Davison, 1963: 52).

Muslim subjects of the Empire showed resentment against the Edict, including Mustafa Reşit Pasha, who thought the reforms for non-Muslims were going too fast (Davison, 1963: 55). Greeks, who were the second privileged millet after Muslims were also not happy to be regarded as equals with other non-Muslim subjects of the Empire (Davison, 1963: 59).

Legal reforms continued. In 1858, land code and a new penal code; In 1860 reorganization of commercial courts which incorporated with mixed courts; in 1861 new commercial code; and in 1863 maritime code were constituted and all of them were based on French system (Lewis, 1969: 118-119).

In 1861, the Sultan Abdülmecid died and his younger brother Abdülaziz ascended to the throne. The new Sultan was different from his older brother in administration. Many times he got into conflict with Fuad and Ali Pashas; and did not give them the autonomy his brother had granted them (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 64). These conflicts prevented and slowed down the pace of the reforms. Nevertheless, Pashas succeeded to declare a new law on Vilayets in 1864, which the eyalets (states) converted into vilayets (provinces). New nizamnames (constitutions) for the principal non-Muslim millets of the empire were the first fruit of the political leaders’ efforts for basic administrative reform. In 1862 Greeks, in 1863 Armenians and 1865 Jews were placed under organic law, which diminished the power of the clergy (Davison, 1963: 114).

Ali and Fuad resigned from the government due to disagreements over foreign policy, especially about the way to handle revolt in Crete and relations with the Serbian state (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 64). In 1867, the French pressured the Sultan for the implementation of the reforms, which the Sultan refused to comply (Lewis, 1969: 121). Due to the revolts, a Russian intervention was imminent, thus the Sultan gave in to the demands of the French for the backing of the West, and brought Ali and Fuad back (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 64). Crete revolt ended with greater autonomy granted to the island. During the revolt, to reestablish Ottoman image in the West, for the first time in history, an Ottoman Sultan, Abdülaziz, visited European countries in 1867 (Davison, 1963: 235). Fuad and Ali died in 1869 and 1871, respectively, and without no apparent heirs.

In the meantime, the jurisdiction of the newly built courts outside of Şeriat were in expansion. It expanded to the areas of civil law; and to create a distinction between the Şeriat and new laws, codification of civil law was needed (Berkes, 1998: 165). Cevdet Pasha who was a former ulema was chosen to handle the task. Divan of Judicial Ordinances and Council of State was constituted in 1868 (Lewis, 1969: 121) headed by Cevdet Pasha (Berkes, 1998: 166). A book of law, called "mecelle" (meaning the code) was started to be written under him, which codified an easy part of the fiqh. It took sixteen volumes and was written until 1876 (Berkes, 1998: 168-169). There were oppositions from Şeyhülislam's office, which halted the codifying process for a certain amount of time. The core part of the Şeriat, the family, marriage and inheritance laws never had a chance to be codified due to ulema's opposition (Berkes, 1998: 169).

The death of Ali and Fuad, combined with the defeat of France, the external driving force of the reforms, against Prussia in 1871, made the reform movement fell from grace. Abdülaziz quickly started to assert his dominance on government matters, and sought for an Islamic state in which he would be called caliph and oppose the modernization (Lewis, 1969: 124).

Ali and Fuad Pashas were not in favor a parliamentary system. They thought that an ordinary Ottoman subject did not possess the education that would be needed for a parliamentary system (Davison, 1963: 88). Ali and Fuad Pashas thought that a government that was centralized and tightly controlled would be the best choice in order to reach their aims, and modernization efforts would be curbed if a representative government formed due to representative government's less efficient nature. The democratic reforms in a true sense could have only been implemented after the Ottoman state as a whole was modernized (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 133).

The constitutional movement was first born as a reaction against Tanzimat reforms in 1859. According to the understanding of the group, a genuine application of the Şeriat would entail the formation of an assembly representative of the people, and a government directly responsible to the ümmet (Berkes, 1998: 204). A second group called Young Ottomans were formed in 1865. They escaped from the Empire in 1867 to Paris then to London. The Young Ottomans were in full agreement in demanding a "constitutional" government. They wanted to put an end to the absolutism of the Sultan since they believed that it was not possible to retain the absolute rights of the ruler while reforming the laws of the state (Berkes, 1998: 205). Despite their agreement on these points, the Young Ottomans were confused and in disagreement over the matter of achieving their aims. They were not revolutionaries, they did not belong to any class possessing real or potential power, they only had their education to separate them from the impoverished peasants (Berkes, 1998: 206-207).

The most prominent figure of the Young Ottomans was Namık Kemal. He brought forth that a legitimate government had to be based upon the consent and control of the people and that legislation had to be separated from the executive power. This was done by emphasizing certain factors in Islamic political thought and conveniently relegating others to the background. For him, a good government is a government which fulfills the political desiderata religious law a.k.a. Şeriat (Mardin, 2000: 289). According to him, the Tanzimat introduced codes from sources alien to the Islamic legal traditions and thus undermined the integrity of the fiqh system, which was the legal foundation of the Şeriat (Berkes, 1998: 216). He was concerned about chasm between the traditionalist conservatives and the imitative Westernists. This led him to search both for those elements of the culture that were obstacles to progress and for those aspects of Western civilization that should not be taken over (Berkes, 1998: 215). Cevdet Pasha, although advocating the same idea of Şeriat's profound importance as Namık Kemal, opposed Namık Kemal on the issue of constitution. The man who led the movement to the stage of implementation of the constitution was an extraordinarily successful governor of non-Muslim and non-Turkish provinces, Mithad Pasha (Berkes, 1998: 223).

Prior to constitution, starting from 1869, major reforms were introduced into the army organization as a result of Prussian influence. A law on nationality was declared to assert a secular Ottoman citizenship instead of conversion to Islam. All the people living in the Ottoman soil would be regarded as Ottoman citizen unless the citizen proved otherwise, and the law defined that no citizen could become a citizen of another country (Davison, 1963: 263) which was a direct attack against extraterritoriality, which capitulations brought. Abdülaziz wanted to modernize both the navy and army due to the never-ending Russian threat, therefore, he significantly increased the budget of both (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 86). Prussian model of 1860 was chosen to be the role model in 1869. Although the army was defeated in 1878, the progress of the army was credited by domestic and foreign authorities (Davison, 1963: 265-266). A big navy in numbers were also created in 1864. In 1876, it became the third biggest navy in Europe (Davison, 1963: 266). The civil bureaucracy grew dramatically, from roughly 2.000 scribes in service as of 1770–90 to the 35.000–70.000 civil officials serving at a time under Abdülhamid (Kasaba, 2008: 21).

The Sultan's and his ministers' reckless spending, the cost of the army, navy and problems of interest payments catapulted the provinces in turmoil (Lewis, 1969: 159). Britain and France were furious and anti-Ottoman sentiment rose in the West. With the fall of Tanzimat era, anti-Western sentiment also rose in the Ottoman Empire (Berkes, 1998: 220). A plan was proposed in an effort to hold the empire together. This was the proposal advanced by Mithad Pasha and Halil Şerif Pasha in 1872 that the Ottoman Empire should become federalized like the new German Empire to stop the independence movements (Davison, 1990: 106). The other plan looked to the creation of some sort of chamber of deputies. The idea grew more attractive, particularly after the inability of the government to deal effectively with the Balkan revolts of 1875 (Davison, 1990: 106). A symbol of this discontent was the Manifesto of the Muslim patriots, issued anonymously in March 1876. It argued a consultative assembly was needed to cure for all of the problems, which might begin with limited powers, but which might eventually grow to be somewhat like the English parliament (Davison, 1990: 106).

On May 1876, Mithad succeeded in having Abdülaziz deposed and, as President of the Council of State under the new ruler Murad V, initiated the formal discussion for a constitutional regime (Berkes, 1998: 223). However, since 1867, Murad was living under close surveillance of his uncle, Sultan Abdülaziz, and this situation seriously strained his mental stability during decade coming to 1876. Two incidents destroyed his mental stability. First, apparent suicide (actually assassination) of his uncle Abdülaziz. Second was the murder of Hüseyin Avni Pasha (Lewis, 1969: 162). After these two incidents, he refused to appear in public. The situation was dire, and Mithad went to see Murad's younger brother Abdülhamid. Mithad wanted promises from Abdülhamid to pass the constitution if he became the Sultan.

The first Turkish constitutional experiment was carried out under the pressures of international politics, which reached their height in 1876-78, the crisis years of the so-called Eastern Question (Berkes, 1998: 224). It was about Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. German Chancellor Bismarck was looking for a way to carve up the Balkan Territories of the Empire. The threat of war made Bismarck to listen the British and gather for a convention (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 173). Russia's aim was repudiation of the terms of the 1856 Paris Treaty. By the summer of 1876, the Western governments accepted the convention of an international conference in İstanbul, in order to formulate a program of reforms to be carried out under European supervision and partial occupation of the Balkan provinces (Berkes, 1998: 224-225). Mithad Pasha thought that promulgation of the constitution would deter the West from intervening in Ottoman internal affairs under the pretext of "enforcing reforms" (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 174). The conference ended when Mithad Pasha refused heavy demands of the Western Powers, and warned the political leaders to be ready to defend itself alone in the possible war (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 175).

At the first meeting for the constitution in early June 1876, the Sadrazam Rüştü Pasha claimed that the nation was not suited to a constitutional system, and gave as his chief arguments that the people were ignorant, and that they therefore would misuse any liberties given to them (Berkes, 1998: 227). Ulema on the other hand, was against the participation of non-Muslims to the affairs of state due to being against the Şeriat. After Abdülhamid's ascension to the throne in September 1876, Mithad Pasha and Abdülhamid started to argue over the constitution's essence. Abdülhamid wanted a constitution, but one that would suit his own needs (Berkes, 1998: 227). The issue was centralized versus decentralized government. Mithad advocated a decentralized government. However, it was seen just as the proposals of Russia and the Western powers to divide the Empire into zones of influence along economic, religious, or ethnic boundaries (Berkes, 1998: 230). Abdülhamid consistently strove for the maximum degree of centralized power and for a minimum suppression of the powers of the sovereign. Both internal and external developments were to Abdülhamid's advantage and Mithad's disadvantage (Berkes, 1998: 231). The ideological confusion and compromising haste of the constitutionalists produced a document whose dominant note was not the safeguarding of the rights of the people, but the safeguarding of the rights of the sovereign and the sacredness of the Caliph (Berkes, 1998: 231). The constitution was promulgated on 23 December 1876.

The Parliament was formed as having two wings: The Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan) and the Chamber of Notables (Meclis-i Ayan). The Council of State kept both of its former functions and served as the Supreme Court of Appeal in cases of administrative law, and as the main body in charge of preparing bills for proposals initiated by the Chamber of Deputies, the Chamber of Notables and ministries. (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 176). The first thing to be said about the Constitution is that it was not framed by representatives of the people, but granted by the ruler. It had been given shape by bodies none of which could claim to represent the people. The ruler was not bound by the Constitution; the Constitution was bound by his will. The Constitution itself gave the ruler the right to dismiss the National Assembly and prorogue the Constitution (Berkes, 1998: 246).

The Parliament had two sessions that lasted about five months between 1877 and 1878. The war of 1877-1878 with Russia started during the sessions. Russia attacked from both the Balkans and the Caucasus for a swift victory. Although started very badly, defense at the Şipka Pass and Kars stopped the Russians. The Ottomans' greatest vulnerability was its not yet developed command structure and lack of officers (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 185). The long sieges in the both fronts had broken the Ottomans, and encouraged by the situation, Serbia declared war. The Ottomans' withdrawal scattered the army and the Ottomans sued for armistice while Russians were approaching Istanbul (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 187). It was an unconditional surrender to the Russia. Abdülhamid used this situation for his advantage, and by using the power, which was granted him in the constitution, he dissolved the parliament, and the Young Ottomans movement was dissolved with it.

The Treaty of Yeşilköy fulfilled the demands of Russia. Serbia and Montenegro were going to be independent; The Empire would recognize Romania's independence and pay compensation for the war. Bulgaria would become autonomous with its own administration, however it would be under Ottoman control (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 188). The east Anatolian districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum were given as reparations (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 189).

Abdülhamid, though hostile to liberal or constitutional ideas, was by no means opposed to reform and modernization. If selected carefully and applied, he saw the means of reinforcing both the Empire and himself in it (Lewis, 1969: 178). He understood modernization in the form of getting the technique of the West, its administrative system, and especially its military organization and education. Besides, he was trying to strengthen Islam among his subjects (Mardin, 1991: 17). In the early years of his reign, the whole Tanzimat movement reached its fruition and climax and so did the centralization and despotism (Lewis, 1969: 179). He developed a structure of personal control that made possible an extensive and complete autocracy than anything ever achieved previously with the centralized governmental system created thanks to the Tanzimat reforms (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 212).

He completed the Tanzimat period with his reforms, however the method he chose was destructive on the developing political life in the Empire. His intention was to take away the power of Porte, the bureaucracy; he wanted the power reside with the throne. In order to do that, he took control of the bureaucracy and governed it from the Palace. After 1878, the palace had the power of mabeyin (private secretariat) structure that was developed by his uncle, Abdülaziz, into a bureaucracy (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 213). Beneath the Sultan, there were several major figures who advised the Sultan on various matters.

After the failed coup to bring Murad back to the throne, Abdülhamid were determined to strengthen his one-man rule. He immediately assigned Gazi Osman Pasha as müşir who was a known conservative (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 189). In the later years, he became the chief of palace service and head of the Privy Council (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 213). The Privy Council composed of government and military leaders, both current and former, who were tasked with inspecting the army and civil service to reveal inefficiency and disloyalty also advising the ruler on public policy

(Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 213). There was also a secret police organization directly controlled by the Palace. This force used informants to hold the bureaucracy under control and for the eradication of opposition. Ministries, which was created in Tanzimat, still served their functions, albeit with a little overhaul in some ministries.

In the Berlin Conference, Russia's envisions in Yeşilköy Treaty was divided into three. Autonomous Bulgaria would be controlling the land extending from the Danube to the Balkan Mountains only. Remaining parts would be retained under Ottoman rule. Bosnia would be occupied by Austria, governed by Austrian civil servants, however it would be regarded under Ottoman rule (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 191).

The Empire lost 40% of its whole territory and 20% of its population (around 6 million people), in which 3 million of them were Muslims. Financially, it lost a great amount of revenues, however a portion of it was compensated by the remaining vassal states' tributes, and also newly independent states shouldered some portions of the Ottoman public debt due to the agreement (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 191). In the following years, the Empire lost Bosnia to Austria, Tunisia to France, Egypt to Britain, and East Rumelia to Bulgaria. Berlin Conference was the mark of the beginning of the rapprochement of the Ottomans and Germans. Abdülhamid requested military advisors from Germany after the conference and in 1882, this advisor committee started to serve in the army. Their main aim was to develop officers for the army and in order to do that; they reorganized the Military and Naval academy and secondary schools. Germany’s influence continued until the end of the Empire.

In 1879, the Ministry of Justice was established and it was given authority over commercial courts. It took control over all non-religious courts; however, Muslim courts stayed under the jurisdiction of şeyhülislam. Mixed courts were regulated with a new law. A new civil procedure was tried to be enacted due to capitulations, however foreign missions in the Empire refused it (Lewis, 1969: 183) and claimed that Muslims' judging of non-Muslims fairly and honestly was impossible (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 248). This failure made the drafting committee obsolete in the Sultan’s eyes, and it was dissolved in 1888. It returned only after 1908.

Abdülhamid had an intention of modernization for all the armed forces of the state, however financial problems forced his hand to rely on land power, an Ottoman tradition. The navy that his uncle Abdülaziz built with enormous amount of money fell into decay in the Golden Horn, thus the Empire became dependent on German industry primarily for cannons and weapons (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 245). In 1886, the conscription system went under a reform and became more encapsulating. The obligation of service were extended to all Muslim males of age 20 and above, although the traditional exemptions were kept, the Turkish refugees from the Balkans were included in the obligation of service (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 245-246).

Abdülhamid introduced the liberal political thought of West to some Ottomans while producing hundreds of educated bureaucrats via his schools. These Ottomans rejected the idea of "from top to bottom" modernization was the only way to accomplish the modernization. Their arguments suggested that if only political and social reforms went hand in hand with the physical reforms, these reforms would be strong and profound (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 255). In the late 1880s, Abdülhamid tried to balance the budget by reducing the staffs of the Sublime Porte and the army by letting many graduates go, which made the voices of protest of the graduates who felt an entitlement for employment in government grow even stronger (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 256). These outcasts found themselves in a loosely formed coalition which formed gradually, the Young Turks (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 255). Their aim was the restoration of constitutional rule and of the Parliament, which had been suspended since 1878 (Berkes, 1998: 304). The most important one amongst this loosely formed coalition was a secret committee consisted of army officers called the Ottoman Society of Union and Progress.

The group tried a coup in 1895, which they failed and escaped to Europe. The Sultan was angry, he seemed himself as a reformer and was resentful towards those who opposed him from Europe rather than helping him modernize the Empire. Thereby, the Sultan called for them to help in his endeavors (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 257). There were some to defect to Sultan’s cause, which dispirited the movement. By 1897, the Young Turks was scattered. The movement was revived in 1901 when the nephew of the Sultan, Prince Sabahattin joined them in Europe. Between 1902 and 1906, the Young Turk movement continued to expand. Even in İstanbul, factions of the movement started to appear. As the time passed, the officers of the army who were a part of the movement gained ranks and became more aggressive in their stance (Lewis, 1969: 205). The Salonica group became the helmsman of the whole group in

1907. Japan's success story, which had a constitutional government, was gaining a big attraction during these times in the Empire, especially after Japan defeated Russia in 1905.

In 1908, the Young Turks movement controlled most of the armies in the Balkans. The army in Monastir gave an ultimatum to the Sultan saying that if the Sultan would not enact the constitution, the army would come to İstanbul to depose him (Lewis, 1969: 208). Abdülhamid gave in to the demands and enacted constitution after 30 years.

B. Economic Structure and Growth

One of the targets of the reforms was to centralize the revenues while centralizing the Empire (Pamuk, 2008: 101). That is why, Mahmud began to withdraw the authority to collect taxes from the more powerful notable families and gave it to others (Pamuk, 2018: 93), and took control of the Vakıf revenues in 1831. After Tanzimat, to collect tax revenue, the Empire sent its bureaucrats to regions; but ayans were powerful, and did not let them collect the taxes. The Tanzimat Charter had promised new measures in law and justice, taxation, military service, and generally in civil administration. More money would be required to carry them out. The Empire's revenues did not increase under the new direct collection system (Davison, 1990: 61). Due to that, tax farming returned to the scene. However, thanks to technological developments, such as communications and railways, the central government increased its control, and tax revenues of the central government rose slowly but steadily. Annual tax revenues of the central government had increased from about 3% early in the 19th century to about 12% of Gross Domestic Product just before World War I. The revenues rose due to the diminishing shares of the tax farmers and pressure over small and medium-sized producers, the tax rate never changed (Pamuk, 2018: 102).

When the Tanzimat Charter was promulgated, there was no Ministry of Finance in the Empire. An institution that controls all expenses nationwide, Divan-ı Muhasebat (Court of Exchequer), could only be established in 1879. Until 1863, there was no regular and systematic budget in the Ottoman Empire. It was impossible for the Empire to abolish tax farming under these circumstances. Serious accounting techniques have entered the Ottoman finance under the influence of a foreign body, which handled revenues as creditors known as Duyunu Umumiye (Public Debt Administration) (Ortaylı, 1987: 104).

The most economically important development of this period occurred just before Tanzimat Charter; the Empire signed Baltalimanı Free Trade Treaty with Britain in 1838. Baltalimanı Treaty increased the tax on exports to 12% and fixed the duty on imports at 5% (Pamuk, 2018: 97). Before that, it was 3% on both import and export. In addition, while local merchants continued to pay internal customs, foreign merchants were exempted from this, thus secured an important privilege. The Empire was losing an important source of revenue that it turned to, especially during periods of financial crisis (Pamuk, 2018: 97). By supporting the specialization in agriculture and delaying the beginnings of protectionism and industrialization, the free trade treaty prevented higher rates of growth for the Ottoman economy (Pamuk, 2018: 145).

In 1840, an imperial decree authorized the establishment of an Ottoman bank which was envisioned to be in European lines (Lewis, 1969: 111) but no action could be taken under the circumstances the Empire's financial situation was in. The situation was related to issuing paper money (Ortabağ, 2018: 19). It is clear that paper money was issued because of a treasury crisis emerged mainly due to the struggle with Egypt (Ortaylı, 1987: 104). Prior to paper money, when Ottoman sultans had been faced with such crises and could not easily increase revenues, they had resorted to debasing the coinage (Ortaylı, 1987: 104). In foreign trade relations and payments, the paper money was not valid because it was found not sufficient. The paper money was also destabilizing the financial markets (Ortabağ, 2018: 19). For this reason, in 1844, at a fixed standard, coins that the edges could not be trimmed were introduced into circulation. Thus, it was the first time in Ottoman history that a coin started to be circulated all over the country with a fixed standard and value, and was printed in a central mint (Ortaylı, 1987: 106).

The paper money was vulnerable to counterfeiting, and it was hard for the Treasury to check on its genuineness. There were complaints about the harm they caused, and finance ministers began to make plans to abolish paper money. However, the Crimean War strained the state budget, and only in 1862 the paper money was abolished. (Davison, 1990: 68).

The foreign investments in the Empire were in the infrastructure areas such as railways. However, the foreign investments in areas such as agriculture and mining were limited. Foreign investors only tried to increase the volume of foreign trade in order to integrate the Ottoman economy to the global economy (Pamuk, 2008: 63-64). The Empire financed the expansion of its bureaucracy and military partly through rising tax revenues; the increases that derived from heavier tax burdens was coming mainly from the agrarian population and the overall expansion of the economy (Quataert, 2000: 71). These were not enough for modernization efforts, thus the Empire started to look for other resources. External borrowing was an option, however, they were aware of the risks such as the increased control of the West over the economy, thus they mostly refrained from doing it. However, with the Crimean War of 1853-56, first external borrowing was realized due to the state's inability to collect taxes on foreign trade because of Baltalimanı Treaty. During the financial crisis and the political turmoil in Lebanon in 1860–61, the Empire lowered the customs duties collected on exports to 1% gradually (Pamuk, 2018: 98) and raise the imports to 8%. In 1861 financial crisis, British and French help enabled the Empire to convert its local loans and create the Imperial Ottoman Bank. A new loan was negotiated by this new bank (Lewis, 1969: 120).

The rapid expansion of external trade during the 19th century caused the branches of manufacturing and trade organized around guilds declined steadily, especially in fields that faced competition from imports (Pamuk, 2018: 99). The manufacturing sector only started to emerge again in the late 19th century (Ortaylı, 1987: 158).

As part of the initial reforms, the government set up a series of state owned factories, essentially to meet the needs of the army, the navy, and the palace. Highly paid engineers, technicians, and even laborers were brought in from Europe to work in these factories and lead the production (Pamuk, 2018: 100).

Although the goods produced were bought by the state as a protection against competition from imported products, many of these factories could not sustain their operations; by 1850s they already stopped production (Pamuk, 2018: 100). Although the initiative itself failed, the technical experience the workers gained was an important aspect for the future (Buluş, 2002: 183).

Private factories established by both Ottoman and foreign capitalists; thanks to that the silk industry, which had been driven out of business two decades earlier by British competition, was revived in 1845. By 1876, there were around 23 silk factories. French, Swiss and British invested in many sectors such as cotton plants, candle and glass plants, canning factory etc. (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 123). Because of the free trade treaties in existence, these enterprises could compete against imports only in sectors where transport costs were high, raw materials could be found locally and cheaply, and where low wages created an important advantage (Pamuk, 2018: 131). Most workers were women and girls, receiving wages that were the lowest in the entire Ottoman manufacturing sector (Quataert, 2000: 135). Private investors were also invested in mining sector after the monopoly of the state was lifted in 1861. Mostly coal, iron, lead, silver, and copper were extracted.

In 1855, the government started to abolish the gedik method, which was basically an obstacle in entrepreneurship by blocking anyone who wanted to enter a specific manufacturing or trade business unless there was an opening left by previous tradesman (Seyitdanlıoğlu, 2017: 715).

Since the start of the Tanzimat period, agricultural sector was under scrutiny but the developments about it were slow. Investments that would provide the development foreseen at the end of the agricultural research that started with serious intentions could only be realized with a very limited extent due to the limited financial capacity (Güran, 2006: 485). Land Code of 1858 recognized private ownership of agricultural land and freed the sale and purchase of agricultural land (Pamuk, 2018: 124). Agricultural products were commercialized, thus a market for agricultural products were created in the Empire (Quataert, 2000: 131). Consequently, the production increased and so did the tax revenues. In the 28-year period between 1848 and 1876, tithe revenues nearly quadrupled (Güran, 2006: 489).

In the period of 1820-1914, the foreign trade volume increased tenfold. However, while the export of manufactured goods that was relied upon non-agricultural manufacturing were declining due to not being able to compete with foreign goods, the export of agricultural products was increasing due to foreign demand (Pamuk, 2007: 209-210).

Millions of Muslims migrated to Anatolia and other regions of the empire during the 19th century after the loss of Balkan territories. The Empire tried to encourage the incoming population to engage in agriculture by settling them in rural areas; also gave them 12-year tax exemption (Pamuk, 2018: 123). Small and medium-sized family enterprises remained the most important form of enterprise in agriculture due to the scarcity of labor and the relative abundance of land (Pamuk, 2018: 122). Waged labor appeared in some regions of large commercial cultivation, especially in Çukurova. Family plots prevailed where land was abundant and the state was able to support the small farms. Large ownership prevailed where large landowners were powerful and where land was more scarce and valuable (Pamuk, 2018: 124).

The use of modern agricultural tools increased but most of the increases in agricultural production derived from placing additional land under cultivation (Quataert, 2000: 133-134). The improvements of the security in the provinces during the first half of the 19th century after a very difficult and long period of wars also helped increasing the agricultural productivity (Pamuk, 2018: 120).

There were emerging discrepancies amongst the regions. Export-oriented agricultural production was concentrated in coastal areas. Central Anatolia began to turn toward domestic and foreign markets only after the construction of the railways in the 1890s. In contrast, the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions remained largely excluded from domestic and foreign markets. These low producing regions also received a very low numbers of immigrants (Pamuk, 2018: 124). The lack of an integrated nation-wide market hurt the overall progress of economy.

Two decades of rapid external borrowing resulted in a default in 1876. The subsequent negotiations led to the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Duyunu Umumiye) and the government was forced to surrender part of its sources of revenues to this European creditor organization for the service of the debt in 1881 (Pamuk, 2018: 103). The government agreed with its creditors and the Ottoman Bank to abandon the bimetallic system as part of the debt restructuring agreement of 1881 and adopted gold standard (Pamuk, 2018: 108).

The salt and tobacco monopolies, the taxes collected from fishermen and alcoholic drinks, the tithe collected from raw silk, and the annual taxes paid by the province of Eastern Rumelia were all surrendered to the Ottoman Public Debt

Administration (Pamuk, 2018: 109). As a result of the tight fiscal discipline of the Public Debt Administration, the government could again borrow long-term in European financial markets at more favorable terms and lower interest rates (Pamuk, 2018: 110). The growth rate of the economy during this period was close to 1% annually (Pamuk, 2006: 815).

At first, the Tanzimat's elites did not understand the importance of advanced communications to increase the government's administrative capability. Besides the postal service between İzmir and İstanbul that was established in 1823, nothing was done before the Crimean War (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 119). During the Crimean War of 1856, the British and French introduced the telegraph into the Empire. Following the war, the telegraph was utilized to put the İstanbul government in direct contact with its provinces. Later, it transformed into a service for the public thanks to the establishment of Telegraphy Department (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 120).

The railroad investments after the Crimean War were completely shouldered by foreign investors, as the Empire did not have neither the capital nor the expertise. Big concessions were given to the investors, which strained the treasury, however, in the end railroads connected the centers of the Empire (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 121). In 1913, the railroads reached 6247 kilometers in the whole empire. However, normal roads did not get the same treatment the railroads got. They even regressed due to lack of maintenance. Ports also suffered from this neglect (Lewis, 1969: 184-185).

C. Social Structure and Education

Sultan Mahmud was thinking that attire change could also facilitate to change old habits. Mahmud assumed the role of a trailblazer and implemented the changes himself first. The Sultan then started the change in the army and made them wear European style tunics and trousers in 1828 (Lewis, 1969: 100). A year later, for civilians, the turbans, ample trousers, old-fashioned shoes, and decorative paraphernalia were dropped; and beards were shortened or shaven completely, European pants were adopted. Besides the headgear, no attire encountered resistance from the subjects. (Berkes, 1998: 122-124). Turbans and robes were allowed only for religious officials of the different millets (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 49). Fez, although having European roots, became the definitive headgear of Muslims in the later years of the Empire (Berkes, 1998: 125).

On 13 March 1840, the Rumi calendar, based on the Julian calendar, was adopted. Both Rumi and Hijri, which the latter was based on the Lunar calendar, were used together until 1870. However, in 1870, to prevent duality, only the Rumi calendar was started to be used.

In early 19th century, the Ottoman Empire's social structure was composed of millets, religious communities that were living under Şeriat as semiautonomous. Equality however did not exist. Muslims were at the top as the ruling community. Behind them, there were Christians, first the Greeks then the Armenians. The Jews came last (Küçük, 2006: 382). The attire each millet was wearing were different to differentiate them in the public spaces. Non-Muslims had to pay poll-tax, could not rise to the higher posts in the bureaucracy, could not convert form Muslim subjects of the Empire, their testimony was not counted in the Muslim courts (Davison, 1990: 113).

Western ideas were pouring into the Empire in the 19th century. Non-Muslims were the first recipient of these ideas. As Christian groups in the empire absorbed the ideas of liberty and nationality, they complained more frequently and loudly about the lack of equality (Davison, 1990: 113). The central government was trying to prevent the disintegration of the empire by reorganizing the social structure. Tanzimat Charter tried to answer this exact problem by giving guarantees of security of life, honor, and property, along with reforms in taxing and conscription methods and equality of subjects, regardless of their religion (Davison, 1990: 114). The charter failed to address to connect the governed and the one who governs. Western pressure rose after this failure. In 1856 Paris Treaty, there was an article specifically addresses for the salvation of this problem (Küçük, 2006: 380). This article led to the proclamation the Reform Edict.

Edict promised equal treatment for the members of all communities such as educational opportunity, appointment to government posts, the administration of justice, taxation and military service (Davison, 1990: 114). There was also an anti-defamation clause which prohibited the calling such slurs as "gavur" to non-Muslims. The Edict of 1856 faced great reactions from Muslims. There was a big uprising in Syria against the equality of Christians and Muslims. Muslims attacked Christians in Jeddah after 1858. French and British consuls were killed. British and French navies bombed the city. Despite Jeddah being Ottoman soil, they captured and executed 10 of the perpetrators themselves (Küçük, 2006: 382). There was also riot in Lebanon in 1861, which resulted in a Christian governor's assignment over Lebanon.

Non-Muslims were also angry about the Edict. The clergy opposed the restriction of their powers on their communities they had for a long time. Non-Muslims subjects, on the other hand, were generally satisfied with the rights granted, but was not fond of the military service being extended to them. The topic they reacted the most was the issue that all subjects would be considered equal. They were fine with Muslims being at the top; however they did not want to be regarded equal to the Jews (Küçük, 2006: 382).

With the new rights brought by Tanzimat and especially the 1856 Edict, the situation of the minorities living in the Ottoman Empire became much better than the Muslims. There was no basis in the religious traditions of Turkish Muslims to organize themselves as a "millet", as in non-Muslim communities. The only foundation was the assumption that the Ottoman State was the state of these Muslims. Although Tanzimat set out to reunite the disintegrating Ottoman society, the experience was completely the opposite (Küçük, 2006: 384). Nevertheless, the secularization of the Ottoman society was increasing year by year.

In 1840s, a flux of immigrants started to pour into the Empire running from oppression and massacres. Most of the refugees were Turkish, Tatar, and Circassian, due to Russian conquest of their lands located at the west and north of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Between 1848 and 1850 thousands from Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland joined them (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 115-116). After the Crimean War, around one million Tatars were started to migrate to the Empire running from Russians. Runaway Cossacks of Russian army and Bulgarians who were settled in the Crimea by Russia started to come. After the 1877-78 war with Russia, around one million immigrants came to the Empire until 1896. The number of male Muslims doubled in a 50 year span, from 1831 to 1882 (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 116).

After 1826 with Mahmud solely holding reins, changes in governmental and administrative structures brought the role of education in the modernization process. Mahmud had already promulgated that the primary education as compulsory in 1824. However, this proclamation was not very applicable for its time before implementing the reformist ideas. Ulema and their ilim were not the answer to transform the Empire for the new era. Thus, the Sultan started to his reforms from the higher education institutions. Tanzimat educational policy was largely driven by goals of elite formation but gradually produced wider results (Kasaba, 2008: 22).

In 1831, the Lancastrian school system, in which more advanced students taught less advanced ones was brought to the Empire by Protestant priests. Christian millets opposed this school system and protestant sect due to undermining their religious authority (Berkes, 1998: 103). Mahmud saw this system as an opportunity for the new army. The new army was in need of officers, and mature soldiers who had the ability to teach were selected to train the new officers (Berkes, 1998: 102).

After this experience, the system wanted to be extended to the Muslim civilians by the Board of Useful Affairs. However, şeyhülislam strangled the idea when it came to him. Then, the focus turned to the secondary schools (rüşdiye) to prepare the children who would go to higher education. First rüşdiye schools opened in 1840. However, after a certain time, a person from ulema was appointed as the administer of secondary schools which halted their proliferation (Berkes, 1998: 106-107). Heads of the millets and medrese were also against the new school system. Primary education stayed as the way it was until 1908. Secondary education on the other hand, was torn between the new system and the old system.

Higher education institutions had opened previously in the Empire. They had already established themselves. In 1827, Naval Academy was separated from Mühendishane. In 1834, Military Academy was opened which the instructors were Turkish. A year later, some students were sent to abroad. In 1840 French and Prussian instructors started to work in the Military Academy (Berkes, 1998: 111-112).

Mahmud opened State Medical School in 1827 and Surgery School a year later. In 1831, there was a reorganization of the schools; in 1838 they were combined together as Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şahane. The education language would be Turkish and French, but French was temporary until everything about the curriculum were translated into Turkish (Berkes, 1998: 113-114). In 1866, Turkish was the sole language, which was used in the medical School. The school was open to any subject, irrespective of their religion.

In 1845, with an Edict, Sultan Abdülmecid told the Sadrazam and the ministers that they should do their parts for the public works and the welfare of the people; and wanted the public to be educated by opening the necessary schools in appropriate places of the country. In 1846, the Ministry of Public Schools was established, and, although slowly, new schools started to be opened as rüşdiye and idadi (high school). In 1857, Ministry of Education was formed. With the advice of the French Minister of Education, in 1869, Regulation for Public Education (Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi) was issued and systematized the previous works of the last thirty years. In addition, it also contained plans that were implemented for the next thirty years (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 108).

The locals shouldered the cost of the elementary schools (building and maintaining), while the cost for the rüşdiye and idadi schools was shared with the central treasury (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 108). Above idadis, there were lycees, Mekteb-i Sultan-i (School of the Sultan). The lycees were paid from the Sultan's personal funds entirely. In 1868, first sultani was opened in Galatasaray. Instruction of the language was French and curricula was Western secondary education. This was the first attempt by a Muslim government to provide such a secondary education in Western language (Lewis, 1969: 122). Sultani both had Muslim and non-Muslim students. The heads of the millets objected to the attendance of children who belonged to their faiths due to the fear that the students' faiths and moral teachings would be diminished by secular influence of the school. Muslims' reason for keeping their children out was the Christian tendencies of the school. In 1873, Darüşşafaka, a lycee level school for orphaned Muslims opened with the financial help of the Sultan (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 109).Then there were teacher-training schools. The schools were opened to educate primary and secondary school teachers, which opened in 1848, and legalized in 1868. However, there were hardly any differences between them and medreses. All graduates was charged with the task of teaching in state owned schools for ten years after they graduated, helping the state to meet the shortage of teachers that haunted the government for many years (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 109). The government began to support and encourage secular education for girls around 1862. The beginning of secondary and trade schools for girls soon necessitated the opening of the teacher training schools for girls. It opened the modern era of official employment of Muslim women in 1873 (Berkes, 1998: 176).

In 1850s, interests of missionaries and foreign tradesmen increased for the Empire so much so that foreign schools started to be established such as Robert College in 1863. These schools were free to be established and operated wherever they wanted to, however, the books they used in their curricula needed to be checked and certified by the Ministry of Education so as to assure that they did not violate the morals of the Empire, which these schools ignored most of the time (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 110). At elementary level, Islahhane for orphans and Sanayi Mektebi was opened particularly for the resurgent Ottoman industry.

The Tanzimat's school system was created as not a university but higher technical schools such as Mülkiye, Harbiye, Mühendishane etc. These were opened to meet the needs of military and civil bureaucracy cadres, but they were not schools that provided real specialization training (Ortaylı, 1987: 145). However, Mustafa Reşit Pasha planned a university, called Darülfünun, as early as 1846 (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 109). Darülfünun was opened only in 1863, however remained in a shapeless state from 1863 until 1868. The Regulation for Public Education made way for the permanent establishment for the institution. Darülfünun opened in 1870 with three faculties: Philosophy and Letters; Law; and Mathematical and Physical Sciences (Berkes, 1998: 180). However, it abruptly shut down a year later. The curriculum of Darülfünun later added to the Mekteb-i Sultan-i (Berkes, 1998: 191). Moreover, Cevdet Pasha as the Minister of Education opened it in 1874 once again; however, it was closed again in 1881. Its definitive opening occurred in 1900 (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 110).

Education reform continued under Sultan Abdülhamid. Sadrazam Said Pasha submitted a letter to the Sultan in 1880 saying that only knowledge and uprightness can secure the advancement of the state (Lewis, 1969: 179). Besides extending and reorganizing the existing schools such as Mülkiye and Tıbbiye, Abdülhamid also opened schools of finance (1878), law (1878), fine arts (1879), commerce (1882), civil engineering (1884), veterinary science (1889), police (1891), customs (1892), and a new medical school (1898), albeit most of it were short lived (Lewis, 1969: 180).

Mekteb-i Sultan-i stood at the apex of the Abdülhamid period's education. It changed character over the years, leaning towards to a more Turkish one.

In a period of less than thirty years, just between the years of 1867 and 1895, the number of elementary schools that had a secular flavor and students attending these schools doubled. 90% of the boys and more than 33% of girls who were school-aged were attending an elementary school by 1895. However, the education of the girls rarely went beyond elementary level. Out of a 19 million population that had 5 million non-Muslims and 14 million Muslims, which was a population less than at the start of the 19th century, 1.3 million were attending schools, and non-Muslims had the majority in attendance percentages (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 112-113). Estimates suggest general Muslim literacy rates equaling about 2–3% in the early 19th century and perhaps 15% at its end (Quataert, 2000: 169). Another measure of literacy is to count the number of books and newspapers being published. Before 1840, only eleven books annually were published in Istanbul while that number had increased to 285, produced by ninety-nine printing houses, in 1908 (Quataert, 2000: 170).

Turks' discovery of themselves as a "millet" developed slowly during the Tanzimat period. One of the most significant developments about this issue was the writing of the medical books in Turkish rather than French. This localization need was first seen in Mahmud's era and came to fruition in 1866 (Berkes, 1998: 194). The Turks' gradual sense of differentiation from Arabs came to surface during 1896 when the debate concentrated on language (Berkes, 1998: 319).

In 1860s, the founder of Ottoman Scientific Society which published the Journal of Sciences (Mecmua-ı Fünun), Tahir Münif first proposed a change in the Arabic scripture due to its incompatibility with the Turkish language and for being the perpetrator of the low literacy rates. A new vowel system was thought to connect the consonants; however, nothing concrete came out of it. Nevertheless, it continued to be discussed throughout the period (Berkes, 1998: 196-197).

In 1860s, İbrahim Şinasi as the first modern Turkish writer advocated that using short sentences and simple Turkish would be more beneficial to reach the masses. He was also the first person to use the word "millet" as in nation (Berkes, 1998: 198).

A discussion over the simplification of Ottoman Turkish reflected the transformation of the people. According to Şemsettin Sami, the traditional Ottoman literature was dead and a new one was penetrating the language from the West, thus making simplification necessary. The idea of a Turkish nation emerged from education and literature as an aspect of modernization, not in political arena as in nationalism (Berkes, 1998: 320-321). The Young Turks were in a struggle for holding the Empire together, thus they never entertained the idea of a Turkish nation until the Balkan wars. When Abdülhamid finally took control, a period of censorship also started. Due to the censorship, the press of this period published semi-scientific subjects and reading for entertainment and leisure appeared (Berkes, 1998: 277-278).

III. COMPARISON OF JAPAN AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION PERIOD

This section will focus on the comparison of the respective countries by analyzing their similarities and divergences over their modernization processes**.**

A. International Context and Political Situation

Centralization of the state was the core of the modernization process for both countries. Japan accomplished this only after restoration by paying a lot of money to the daimyos. Ottomans on the other hand started the centralization process before this period by the Sultan, albeit slowly. The Sultan exerted his control over his country after the destruction of Janissaries; however, due to wars the Ottomans had with West, there were losses of territories.

A modern army, which did not exist before in Japan, was constituted by conscription method with many hurdles along the way. Army was firstly based on French model, after 1870s, it turned its face to German model. The navy was based on the British model. Both army and the navy accomplished their tasks when it is due, i.e. Taiwan campaign at the beginning of the restoration, then in Satsuma rebellion and lastly in defeating China in 1895. After the Janissaries had perished, Ottomans created a new army, however, due to the chaotic period the Ottomans found themselves in, first the ongoing rebellion in Greece, then the war with Russia, the military never found the time to develop itself. Egypt’s new army suppressed the Greek rebellion and Russia burned down the navy. Conscription by lottery was proclaimed with Tanzimat and every member of the millet system could serve in the military in theory, but there was also an exemption tax for non-Muslims in the Tanzimat Charter. There were also regional exemptions, such as someone who was born İstanbul would not be conscripted.

The class system of Japan was abolished with the Charter Oath, and subjects of the Emperor was free to find the occupation they desired. Ottomans did not have traditional class system, however there was a system called millet who divided people into religious communities, which followed a hierarchy. This hierarchy was abolished in two steps, first by the Tanzimat Charter, then by the Reform Edict.

When we talked about the late comers, we mentioned there was a top-down reform movement. Certain group of people; in Japan some low level samurai, in the Ottomans the bureaucrats who came out of the Translation Office were the helmsmen of the reforms. It does not mean that these certain groups were homogeneous in ideology and agreed on the path it needed to be taken. The internal clash was inevitable.

In Japan, this happened much earlier in the reform process and had much more bloody consequences. After Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, reform process continued much smoother and oligarchs were more homogeneous. Japan's elites had much more room to work with to implement the reforms.

In the Ottomans case, rival groups, which was the representation of the traditional regime such as ulema continued their opposition in every step of the way. However, due to the destruction of the Janissaries, this group had no means of physical coercion over the Sultan and bureaucrats who wanted the reforms. Nevertheless, the idea of being convenient to Şeriat was the glass container for the reforms that needed to be shattered at some point. However, in the period of 1826-1876, the reform process was a "tug of war" between bureaucrats from the translation bureau and ulema. Bureaucrats, such as Mustafa Reşit and his protégés Ali and Fuad were removed from their offices several times due to ulema's opposition and when they were not in office; most of the reforms were halted. After 1876 and Abdülhamid's ascension to the throne, ulema gained the upper hand, but it was too late to overturn the reforms which had been embedded to the state apparatus and people's lives over the years.

Esenbel emphasizes that if we look at Japan's modernization structurally, we see a relentless reform process in their state apparatus, social structure and legal system. Ottomans on the other hand, were creating new structures and apparatus adjacent to already existing one in order to save the Empire. They never thought of giving up the historical features of the Imperial house (Esenbel, 1999: 19).

Japanese oligarchs' core ideal for reforms were to abolish the capitulations, which were imposed upon the Shogunate by the West in 1858. The restoration officials' concentration was solely on this issue. Every reform was to strengthen the country enough to overturn the unequal treaties, which they successfully did in 1894. Ottomans gave capitulations willingly to France centuries before in order to divide the Christian Europe. After the industrial revolution, this situation started to erode the economy. Baltalimanı Treaty of 1838 with British again made to gain support of the British against Russia. Ali and Fuad Pashas once asked to overturn the agreement, which were declined by the Western powers in 1856 due to incompetent legal system. The effort to modernize the system stemmed from to keep the empire together, but economic implications were overlooked.

Preparation of constitution were seen as the one of the cornerstones, if not the most important one for both countries. The ideas they were drawing was different however. Japan's oligarchs wanted a constitution because the Western Powers had constitutions. The Ottoman bureaucracy wanted a constitution because it was the way to hold the empire together by giving voice to the subjects from every part of the empire. While Japan had showed an effort to draft a constitution approximately a decade, the Ottomans' draft was ready in six months.

The parliament of both countries had bicameral system, which composed of upper and lower houses. Being eligible to the parliament however was different. In Japan's case, one needed to be a male property holder older than 25 years old who pay 15 yen per annum which amounted around 1% of the males of Japan. The Ottomans' criteria for eligibility differed from upstate to İstanbul but being male and over 30 was a requirement. If one was living in upstate, he needed to be a property holder and regional council member. The one living in İstanbul had no such criteria. Due to time constraints, only voters were municipal assembly members.

Japan's performance was better about political institutions and legal modernization; however, the Ottomans were better in political participation. Japan completed its administrative, commercial, judicial modernization by 1895, excluding the civil code, which was adopted in 1898, and promulgated the constitution in 1889.

The Ottomans on the other hand, promulgated the constitution in 1876 but could not utilize it properly until 1908, and gave the universal suffrage to men in 1909 (Esenbel, 1999: 11). Tanzimat's legal system that was the numerous laws such as penal code and commercial code was based on French laws. Codification efforts of Şeriat were made which resulted in Mecelle, but codification of Şeriat dealing with the family, marriage and inheritance were never codified.

The first diplomatic contact between these two countries also occurred in this period. A part of the Iwakura Mission was sent to İstanbul in 1873 to review the effects of unequal treaties in another country. Britain in this period was protecting the Ottomans against Russia. In the Pacific region with rise of Japan, Britain chose to ally with Japan against Russia. Britain urged the Ottomans and Japan to make good relations in 1876 (Esenbel, 2012). Japanese naval students made a brief visit over this advice in 1878.

B. Economic Structure and Growth

With the free trade agreements, which both countries were signed, their economies had been wide open to the global trade. Even though it was unable to control the tariffs and imports, Japan's articulation to the global economy was very fast. Japan knew it had to compete against western exports by producing on their own commodities. Japan had a very severe case of budget deficit in the first 20 years of Meiji restoration.

Silkworm manufacture led the industry in this disadvantageous competition. In 1860, a blight on the silk worms devastated Europe and Ottoman Empire's silk industry. A massive amount of capital entered into Japan for decades thank to this blight. Japan used this massive source of income for further developing its manufacture capability. Constant need to export manufactured goods gave Japan a competitive edge, which the Ottomans never gained. The Ottomans did start to develop its manufacture industry in the late 19th century, however the industry remained limited to small businesses with next to none capital investments. This manufacturing industry supplied only a limited portion of the internal demand. Esenbel's figures are remarking: The Ottomans were producing only one third of their total consumption, Japan on the other hand, were producing double of their total consumption (Esenbel, 1999: 26).

After centralization, both countries tried to improve their tax collection system. Japan changed the definition of land tax with Land Tax Law of 1873 and created a constant revenue source for the modernization efforts. Ottomans tried to abolish traditional tax farming methods, but could not capitalize on it. Its bureaucrats could not collect taxes in the former ayans' territories. The tax rate never changed, thus the government started to extract tax from the producers directly and diminished the tax farmers' share slowly by the power of centralization.

Both countries brought private ownership of land and the agricultural production stayed in the small- family units in both, even though there was a heavy handover incident of lands to big landowners after 1880s' austerity measures in Japan. After failing to control the inflation, Japan restructured its financial system in 1880s. It created a central bank to control the inflation and went back to the silver-based currency, which helped to reduce inflation. The Ottomans had always problems with the inflation and budget deficits. Ottomans adopted bimetallic system in 1840; and around Crimean War, first external borrowing occurred that led to the bankruptcy in 1875, which brought the Western intervention as Public Debt Administration and for the restructuring for their debts, the Ottomans adopted the gold standard. Japan was very cautious about external borrowing due to it might cost Japan further freedoms, and did not borrow any money from external sources until it overturned the unequal treaties.

Both countries had problems to find investors to new industries. Japanese state invested in many sectors and they were not profitable. With the austerity measures in 1880s, they sold these investments at a low cost to private investors, who at a later time encapsulated nearly all of Japan's industrial endeavors. Later called as zaibatsu, these companies' harmonious relations with the state, accelerated Japanese industrialization like no other country had accomplished before. High technology and low wages made Japan competitive in the World market. The Ottomans brought European laborers and advisors to setup state investments but they could not sustain them and went bankrupt in 1850s. Around this time, private investors set up their own manufacture companies. However, the products only competed in the markets that the costs were too high for imports. Japan reached more than 4% of economic growth rate in this period, while the Ottomans was around 1%.

Both states had established light industries for their industrialization. Textile manufacturing was both countries' main industry. Both countries had little state investments over railways, however its own domestic firms financed Japan's railways; foreign companies on the other hand financed the railways of the Ottomans.

Also in this period, Ottomans had heavy war reparations to be paid which strained the economy further. Japan by defeating China received reparations and use this money to develop its heavy industry by building Yawata Steel Works.

C. Social Structure and Education

Both states' leaders were thinking they need to change the attire. Western attire was adopted in Japan in public spaces; however, people would still live in their home and dress as a traditional Japanese. Ottomans banned the traditional attire for everyone except the clergy and made people dress western clothes, but instead of hat, the sultan chose fez for headgear. Both countries subjects were reacted and resisted to change. Therefore, both the Emperor and the Sultan became a trailblazer and made the changes on themselves first. Western diplomats advised the change of attire to both nations, although there were western diplomats who were against the attire change in the Ottomans due to the failure of distinguishing whether someone was a Muslim by looking their attire.

Both countries' subjects were dominantly living in the rural areas and working in the family farming businesses. In Japan, the industry started to be established around rural areas to facilitate rural people to work in the factories. In the Ottoman Empire, manufacturing businesses were established on coastal towns due to logistical issues. Japan population reached 41 million in a densely populated area, while the Ottomans were living relatively in vast, but sparsely populated lands at 19 million. Textile sectors workers were mainly women in both Japan and the Ottoman Empire.

Both countries had riots in their many regions; however, the substance of the riots in each government differed. Japan had peasant riots in 1880s after austerity measures hit them hard, thus, their discontent was economic. Ottomans were dealing with secessionist movements all over the empire, and losing territories.

Japan made the primary education compulsory in 1872 and gave the children a western education with the intent to create subjects who would be useful in the upcoming industrialization efforts. On the other hand, Ottoman Empire although made the primary education compulsory, the leaders could not touch its curriculum not to instigate the ulema. Until 1908, no young children received a westernized primary education. The Ottomans, due to feeling understaffed in its bureaucracy and military, tried to educate officers and bureaucrats. There was not a university but technical schools and secondary schools to accomplish this endeavor.

Japan's rescript of Education in 1890 reduced the westernized curriculum and added subjects to teach Japanese moral and loyalty to the Emperor. This document was a cornerstone for the creation of national identity in Japan. Turkish national identity also stemmed from education. To eradicate the illiteracy problem, some elites thought to change the script; Sultan Mahmud's decision of making Turkish as the main language for medicine books also played a big part in creating awareness. In literature, simplification efforts of writers also had an impact. Nevertheless, literacy rates remained very low for the Ottomans, around 15% at the end of the 19th century. This problem never occurred in Japan thanks to their schooling habits in Tokugawa era; Japan had higher literacy rates even than Europe at the end of the 19th century with 80%.

Japan's and the Ottomans' approach to religion was very different. Although governed by Muslims, Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire. Religious division was the basis of the society and law. Moreover, there was hierarchy amongst them and conditions such as a non-Muslim could easily convert to Islam but a Muslim could not convert to Christianity, which would result in death penalty. Tanzimat Charter and subsequent Reform Edict brought equality and tolerance over religious matters and conversion. Japan having a brief encounter with Christianity in Sengoku and Edo period and a ban in the latter, had a hard time with it after Emperor Meiji's ascension. To exert the Emperor's legitimacy, the Rescript on religion in 1868 was banning other religions and persecuting the Japanese Christians. The West's threat over not abolishing the unequal treaties made Japan tolerant towards Christianity and other religions, albeit informally. Under these conditions, Japan chose to promote state Shintoism harder to the subjects to block Christianity's proliferation amongst them.

Japan's hastiness to implement the reforms in this particular period is astounding. Although there were hit-and-misses such as the banking system, Japan's choices for reforms were proven effective. The Ottomans were never relentless as Japan to implement reforms. The Ottomans' elite who decided on the reforms were having arguments on reforms for decades from legal system to education.

Luck was also on Japan's side. It is hard to explain the blight on the silkworms in both Europe and the Ottoman Empire, and Japan's acquisition of near monopoly over silk production nearly for 40 years other than luck.

Japan also had relatively good relations with Western powers at this time, especially the US and Britain. There was no immediate threat unlike the Ottomans had felt from Russia or any other powers. The Ottomans' diplomacy was under constant stress throughout this period, which made solely focusing on reforms harder. In the end of their respective reform process period, Japan was about to be a great power, while the Ottomans were finding themselves in a power vacuum. The first diplomatic contact also occurred between two countries in this period.

CHAPTER FOUR

COMPARISON OF JAPAN AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE AFTERMATH PERIOD

The previous chapter explained useful and futile steps of both nations during the reform process. Japan, especially in the economic field, despite its lack of resources, did an immense job at the expense of bad work practices. The Ottomans' financial status had serious problems, especially after the external borrowing. Subsequent moratorium of 1875 was one of the reasons undermined the Ottomans' reliability in the eyes of Britain.

At the end of the war with China, although being the victor, Japan felt as the defeated side. Western intervention over Liaotung, especially Russia's involvement in the intervention made Japan to take certain steps for the upcoming decade. The Ottomans domestic politics were in turmoil and went through a revolution, which stripped of all the power of the Sultan.

This chapter will look at the aftermath, consequences and outcomes of the period of the modernization process of both countries. The diplomatic relations between them will also be detailed out.

I. JAPAN

A. International Context and Political Situation

From here on out, Japan's imperialistic endeavors started to take place. Between 1894 and 1945, there was not a single decade when Japanese troops were not in action overseas (Beasley, 1999: 231).

The Unequal treaties had been reversed in 1894, China was defeated in 1895 and it had to pay huge amounts of indemnity. Japan had the respect of the West. However, it had to give up Liaotung peninsula due to western intervention.

Japan was particularly upset with Russia's intentions after it gave up the peninsula. The cabinet started preparations for a potential war against Russia by expanding army and navy with the authorization of the parliament in 1896 (Duus, 1976: 130). Japan began to allot half of its national budget to military expenditure in 1897 (Henshall, 2004: 94). Russia was building railways, showing an expansion intention. Then, in 1898, Russia leased Liaotung from China for 25 years (Henshall, 2004: 92).

In the meantime, the parliament promoted the suffrage and decreased the amount of tax it needed to be paid to be eligible to the parliament. This move made the eligible males' ratio from 1% to 2% in 1900 (Gordon, 2003: 127). The government was also in constant change. Between 1896 and 1901, the prime minister changed seven times. Ito Hirobumi left the government, although his party stayed at the helms until World War II (Henshall, 2004: 93). In 1899, Japan managed to revoke the most favored nation clause and extraterritoriality rights according to 1894 treaty (Auslin, 2004: 200). Fiercely debated Civil Code was promulgated in 1898 after some revisions in family sections. The draft was giving much more power to individual and women than desired, in the final version these were not present (Lehmann, 1982: 257). It should be added that German Civil Code of 1896 heavily influenced Japanese Civil Code of 1898 (Lehmann, 1982: 258).

During this period, the Boxer Rebellion occurred in China, and Japan was one of the countries that sent troops to suppress it. Russia was also in this set of countries. Russia occupied a part of Manchuria, which Japan protested. Japan was seeking an agreement with Russia about this particular problem. Before leaving the government, Ito Hirobumi tried to broker a treaty to prevent hostilities. Japan would recognize Russian interests in Manchuria in return for Russia recognizing Japanese interests in Korea, which Russia refused (Henshall, 2004: 93). While Hirobumi was in Europe to settle the issue, the solution to the problem was reached in London.

In 1902, Britain and Japan signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which envisioned countering Russia in the East Asia. Two states signed the treaty as equal nations, which marked Japan status as a modernized and privileged country among the big nations in international society.

Japan, with the backing of Britain, again tried to negotiate with Russia. Russians however, was thinking Japanese were bluffing, thus dillydallied every intent of Japan to negotiate (Jansen, 2002: 439). Japan waited until 1903, then declared war on Russia in February 1904, after hitting them two days prior (Henshall, 2004: 94). After a long siege, Japan took Manchuria's capital. The war, which spanned 18 months, were bloody. Both sides had around 70.000 casualties. The Destruction of

Russia's Baltic navy in the Straits of Tsushima gave Japan the upper hand (Jansen, 2002: 440). The President of the United States Theodore Roosevelt offered to be the mediator between two countries in Portsmouth in 1905. Japan used this advantage wisely. It took over the Liaotung leasing from Russia, mining rights in south Manchuria, and a part of Sakhalin as indemnity. Japan also made Russia recognize its freedom of action over Korea. Korea became a Japanese protectorate, then a colony of Japan in 1910 (Beasley, 1999: 235), moreover, there was no objection from the West. A year later, Japan gained full tariff control as 1894 agreement had envisioned (Auslin, 2004: 200).

Emperor Meiji died in 1912, which marked the end of Meiji Restoration. Japan would go on with his son, Emperor Taisho, enter the World War I beside Britain, and attend the conference in Versailles in 1919 as the victor alongside with five great nations.

B. Economic Structure and Growth

In this period, there was no fundamental technological change, only the expansion of existing industries. A substantial contribution to economic growth at this time was made by the heavy investment in infrastructure, such as ancillary services like banking, transport and communications, public utilities, education, and economic institutions (Crawcour, 1997: 56).

The banking system completed its development period in 1900 with certain specialized banks' creation based on German and French models for long-term investments (Crawcour, 1997: 57). Bank funding, and the relationship between a company and its bank, became increasingly important in the early 20th century (Francks, 1999: 35). Most loans still went to finance trade, commerce, land improvements, agriculture, and local handicraft production, but the larger city banks, the zaibatsu banks, and the special banks played an increasingly important part in developing new factory industries, raising funds abroad, and financing government deficits (Crawcour, 1997: 58). Japan adopted the Gold Standard in 1897, which made the foreign capital to enter the country easier to finance its deficits. Deposits Bureau of the Ministry of Finance were entrusted postal savings besides postal transfer savings and certain other funds belonging to the Government. In 1914, there were 12 million depositors and 189 million yen of deposits, mostly coming from farmers. It provided a channel for directing the savings of the people towards enterprises sponsored by the State (Allen, 1981: 58).

Before World War I, the railway sector absorbed more public and private investment than did any other single industry (Crawcour, 1997: 59). Banks played a significant part in mobilizing funds for private railway investments (Francks, 1999: 35). After 1880s, the imperial government did not leave the railway sector altogether. Through the Railways Bureau of the Public Works Ministry, it licensed, regulated and subsidized the private rail sector, while continuing to construct new lines itself as well (Francks, 1999: 57). The Imperial government had appeared as not interested in railway sector in the late 19th century. As a peculiar development, Japanese government nationalized the railways in 1906-1907. Crawcour suggests that during that time, the railways lost their substance as a profitable sector, and government had always favored state operation of the railways because of their national economic and strategic importance, and had licensed private companies only because of fiscal exigencies (Crawcour, 1997: 60). Francks states that it came at a very high cost to buy it and political pressures resulted in the construction of numerous unprofitable local lines, so that revenues were inadequate to cover interest and other cost (Francks, 1999: 58).

Between 1894 and 1907, the national debt had increased tenfold. Japan now had to spend money on the development of Korea, the Liaotung Peninsula and South Manchuria (Allen, 1981: 50). Just before the World War I, the expenditure rose to more than twice that of the early years of the century. The national income was also growing, and Japan was able to meet this expenditure out of taxation. The land tax had been raised from 2.5% to 5% for urban sites and 3.3% for rural sites in 1899. For Russian war, it was raised again in 1905, and later it reached 11,5% (Allen, 1981: 51). Between 1883 and 1913, Japan's labor force increased from 22 million to 26 million. Although non-agricultural sector’s labor force doubled and agricultural sector lost a slight labor force, agricultural sector was still the biggest sector in Meiji Japan. Agricultural tenants increased in ratio, from 35% in 1885 to 45% just before World War I (Crawcour, 1997: 73).

Japan’s annual expenditure, national debt and import of foreign capital were the main actors starting from 1900s. The productivity was increasing together with tax revenues; it could find loans, which had low interest rates in turn showed that the investors were trusting Japan (Allen, 1981: 52).

Japan's cotton and silk sector took over the world in 1910s. Japan became the world's largest producer of cotton and silk in the 1910s and 1920s (Lipton, 2008: 54). Japanese-grown cotton itself was of poor quality and raw cotton had to be imported. Japan was so successful in promoting the cotton textile industry as a means of import substitution that by the end of the period it was able to export the product by adding value to it by producing goods out of cotton (Henshall, 2004: 99).

In 1901, Yawata Steel Works started production. The heavy industries started to grow after this factory. Nevertheless, Japan's production capacity was limited, only supplied nearly half of the metals it consumed, and mainly imported the metals it needed (Allen, 1981: 82). Japan also invested in building ships in 1895, and by 1913 Japan reached the capability to produce war ships (Allen, 1981: 84-85). In the meantime, the usage of electricity was also rising. Even General Electric invested in new factories to produce electrical components. However, the production capacity components remained small until World War I (Allen, 1981: 86-87).

C. Social Structure and Education

By the beginning of the 20th century, virtually 100% of Japanese children attended the compulsory period of primary education - first three years, then four, and in 1907 raised to six (Lehmann, 1982: 260). University of Kyoto was opened in 1897. In 1899 the government required each prefecture to found at least one higher school for girls (Gordon, 2003: 106), then Japan Women's University was opened in 1901. In 1913, female students were admitted to the imperial universities of Tohoku (opened in 1907) and Kyushu (1911) (Lehmann, 1982: 228). Civil code of 1898 was still strict on women. Although women were granted the right to inherit, own property and even to become household heads, this could occur only within certain strict qualifications (Lehmann, 1982: 231).

Meiji Japan was successful in creating a sense of nationalism. It is safe to say that the war with China and Russia fueled the nationalism. The wars stimulated the government to support Shinto as a means to bolster national unity (Lipton, 2008: 81). Hibiya Riot of 1905 was stemmed both by international and domestic discontent. It occurred due to the lack of indemnity clause in the Treaty of Portsmouth signed with

Russia. Japanese people protested this outcome so furiously that martial law was declared in Tokyo (Lipton, 2008: 84). The protests also had the economic aspects due to rising taxes, caused by the war with Russia.

The rural population's ratio was 72% in 1913 (Allen, 1981: 64). The number of industrial workers had reached approximately half a million by that time, and more than half of these were females (Lipton, 2008: 85), and they worked in horrible conditions. The total population was around 50 million by 1912.

Socialist movements were on the rise since late 19th century due to westernization of education; and Imperial Rescript of Education in 1890 addressed these issues. The government was also vigilant to suppress these movements whether by law such as Public Police Law of 1900 or outright banning the Social Democratic Party right after its inauguration (Lipton, 2008: 86). There were many labor strikes throughout the decade. However, the government was getting harsher. A handful of activists in the socialist camp plotted to assassinate the Meiji emperor. The police uncovered the plan and used it as pretext to arrest a far larger number of socialists (Gordon, 2003: 134). Twelve people were hanged in 1911. Known as the "Great Treason Incident", it marked the authoritarian rule of the coming future. As a result of the Great Treason Incident, a Special Higher Police Force was established in 1911, also known as "thought police" (Henshall, 2004: 96).

II. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

A. International Context and Political Situation

In 19th century, some political ideas were emerging and gathering momentum in the Ottoman Empire such as Islamism, Turkism, Ottomanism, nationalism, liberalism, conservatism, democracy, autocracy, centralization, decentralization. In The Young Turk era, these ideas intensified, revved up, and was polarized (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 273).

The Young Turk movement, which toppled Abdülhamid's power, had only one thing in mind; saving and defending the Empire. The Young Turks were consisted of Muslim Turks who were predominantly soldiers that were educated in Abdülhamid's schools. However, the prominent one amongst them, namely the Society of Union and

Progress, the faction who toppled Abdülhamid never had concocted a concrete political program other than the Parliament's reopening (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 274). The Union and Progress did not take over the government initially; they were staying behind the throne, but they sent seven people to advise the government on issues. During this time, it seems there was a power vacuum. No one knew where the authority lied, whether it would be parliament, the Sultan or the sadrazam (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 274).

First, the secret police and the censor to the press were abolished. Sadrazam was responsible for the appointment of all of the ministers, regional governors and the members of the Council of State with the approval of the Sultan. This procedure was also implemented to the lower bureaucracy. Ministers and governors also were to appoint their subordinates (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 275). The Union and Progress stated that they would meddle to the government no more. A lot of new regulations and bureaucratic restructuring ensued.

At first, The Young Turks were divided into factions. Liberals became “Ahrar Fırkası”, the Liberal Party in 1908; the Union and Progress became a political party in 1909 (Lewis, 1969: 213). Before that, Union and Progress chose to support the candidates, which shared their ideas from behind the scenes (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 276).

The power vacuum the revolution created cost the Empire a lot. Austria annexed Bosnia, and Bulgaria proclaimed independence, Crete joined Greece. This situation had greatly damaged the revolution in public eye (Lewis, 1969: 214). The elections of November 1908 were stormy but without fraud. The Parliament were proportional to population percentages of the millets in the Empire. The representatives of less popular political factions tried to block the parliamentary process unless their demands were granted. Muslim representatives on the other hand were divided into three: Union and Progress supporters, the supporters of the throne and the independents. This chaotic environment made Council of State's bill proposals impossible to be discussed in the parliament (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 278).

Abdülhamid and its supporters turned against the Union and Progress after witnessing the ineffectiveness of the parliament. They demanded Şeriat, condemned the equality between a Muslim and non-Muslim. The actual attempt of counter-revolution occurred on 13 April 1909. Some soldiers demanded Şeriat, and the abolishment of the constitution. Abdülhamid accepted the mutineers' demands. However, the "Army of Deliverance" or "Operation Army" came from Salonica and suppressed the mutineers on 23 April (Lewis, 1969: 216). On 27 April, Abdülhamid was deposed for supporting counter-revolution supporters and his younger brother Mehmet Reşad took the throne. Abdülhamid was sent to Salonica.

The Union and Progress became a party and declared its program would bring universal suffrage to all males over 20 years old. Public primary education would be compulsory and free, a new labor law and tax system would be enacted (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 282-283). In 1909, the sovereignty was taken from the throne by the parliament; the Sultan from then on just had symbolic powers.

There was an internal turmoil in every part of the empire, Albanians, Greeks and Armenians were all working towards separation. Albanians rebelled and took concessions from the Empire repeatedly. Italians on the other hand, attacked Tripoli at the end of 1911 and blockaded the Aegean Sea by occupying Dodecanese Islands. The Balkans were getting heated, that is why the Empire could not send ample support to Tripoli. Italy annexed Tripoli and internal turmoil made the Union and Progress lose power.

Liberal Union Party, now called as Freedom and Accord Party, was the opposing force against the Union and Progress. They had won a by-election in December 1911, and was aiming to get to the government. Against this endeavor, the Union and Progress resolved the parliament and conducted an election under their control, which they swept the seats (Lewis, 1969: 222).

A peace was reached with Italy, and Treaty of Ouschy was signed in late 1912. The Empire lost Tripoli legally. Immediately after the treaty, the Balkan Wars started and Italy never gave the Dodecanese Islands back (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 293).
Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece attacked the Ottomans just after the conclusion of the Treaty of Ouschy. Due to problems that the Union and Progress had in their midst, the army was disorderly and still trying to reorganize after so many years of Abdülhamid's control. In four months, the Empire lost all of the remaining territories in the Balkans. Thousands of refugees were coming to save their lives from the onslaught (Shaw and

Shaw, 1977: 294). The Union and Progress fell from the government and Liberal Union came back to power and asked for the armistice.

During the armistice talks, upon the gossip of the situation of whether giving Edirne or not inseminated; and the Union and Progress could not stand still. The group led by Enver attacked Bab-ı Ali and made the Prime Minister resign. Ensuing London Conference could not reach a decision and the armistice broke up. Edirne fell to Bulgarians in March. The Empire accepted the peace deal in May 1913 and lost Edirne. A coup attempt by Liberal Union was suppressed, and Union and Progress took full control of the Empire in June 1913 (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 296).

A month later, the Second Balkan War started and the Empire capitalized on it. Bulgaria was the one who attacked its allies in the previous war. Bulgaria was thinking that it had done most of the work in the first war and deserved more land but its allies worked against it, trying to take Macedonia from its hands. The Union and Progress made the army march to Edirne and without any resistance took the city back with all of the Eastern Thrace. Treaty of Bucharest in 10 August 1913 ended the war for the Empire.

The loss of the Balkans and non-Muslim territories made way to the start of the rise of Turkish nationalism.

Before the war, there were three ideological groups in the parliament. The Westernists, the Islamists and the Turkists (Berkes, 1998: 337). As their names suggested, the Westernists advocated full westernization by casting the old order out. The Islamists were advocating the state was in decline due to not embracing Şeriat fully. One of them, Mehmet Akif, also looked up to Japan due to its accomplishments in the international arena yet kept its traditionalist look. And there was the Turkists, under the influence of Ziya Gökalp. According to Gökalp, the ümmet of islam would break up and secular, democratic nation of Turks would emerge. Nationality was based on culture; and the combination of religion, tradition and modern economy and technology would create that nation. (Berkes, 1998: 338-346). All three ideologies were in demand of social reforms, albeit in their own way.

The Islamists especially was interested in Japanese case. They all believed that the Japanese knew what to imitate and borrow from and what to reject and retain. According to this faction, Buddhism did not stopped Japan to progress (Berkes, 1998:

361). The Turkists started from this notion, and looked for the declined traditional institutions in need of elimination, and reform. Before doing any borrowing, it was necessary to eliminate any institution that was not compatible with modern civilization, because they lost their function. Western civilization would be taken from Europe as it was the modern civilization, but their culture would be designed to suit the needs for modern Turkish culture (Berkes, 1998: 364).

After the Union and Progress asserted its power, it began the reform process. The ministries went into reorganization in which each of the ministry's responsibility were clearly defined. The tax system was reformed. The tithe tax was abolished and tax rate were raised to meet the budget (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 305-306). A new Provincial Law was passed; a new gendarme organization were established and its control was given to Ministry of Interior, Municipality of İstanbul was modernized to sufficiently carry out the public works (Lewis, 1969: 228).

In 1915, the complete secularization of the schools, religious courts and foundations, and also the containment of the şeyhülislam's power outside of the temporal realm was proposed by Ziya Gökalp (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 306). In the late 1916, şeyhülislam was removed from the cabinet and turned into a department, and Şeriat court were given under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Justice; medreses were given to Ministry of Education (Berkes, 1998: 415-416). In 1917, Family Law was passed to protect women's rights such as making marriage a contractual act, the right to initiate divorce and creating obstacles for polygamy. However, the law was not a secular law, and it had parts of Islamic, Jewish, Christian, and secular European origins (Berkes, 1998: 417-418).

After the Balkan Wars, a reform movement also started in the army. Germany sent a military mission led by Liman von Sanders in 1913. The Budget of the army doubled and modernization began. New equipment was bought; military factories were modernized. All the senior officers from Balkan Wars were forced to retire. A British naval mission also came to help to modernize the navy. The government also ordered two war ships from Britain (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 308-309). The government was trying to balance the western powers while trying to solve the problems of the government.

In 1914, the Empire entered the World War I besides Germany, and after four years of battles, it was defeated. Occupied and dismantled by the victor British and French forces, the nationalistic officers started a war in the only remaining land left, Anatolia.

B. Economic Structure and Growth

All factions of the Young Turks had believed that the loss of financial and political independence was the result of the Hamidian autocracy, and they had entertained hopes of Western support for a fresh start towards economic recovery (Berkes, 1998: 333). They had realized that only way to progress was economic development by changing the economic system. Liberals in the movement were against the capitulations and believed that if the Empire would ask nicely, the Europeans would lift them and give loans for restructuring the economy (Berkes, 1998: 334). The Europeans not only rejected to revoke them, if they were to give the Empire more loans, they demanded new concessions.

Economic life after 1908 could be called liberal between 1908-1913 and national economy between 1914-1918 (Ergin, 2017: 115). By 1913, when the idea of nationalism won the debates of ideologies thanks to Balkan Wars, it looked like the only way to gain economic independence was to revoke capitulations unilaterally, and under the circumstances the Empire and its government was in, this kind of behavior would mean war.

National Economy thus entered the scene. Frederich List's ideas, which also affected the Meiji leaders, was highly regarded amongst Union and Progress. In this context, the replacement of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie by the Turkish and Muslim bourgeoisie was one of the important goals of the Union and Progress (Coşkun, 2015: 131).

When the Empire entered the World War I, the government revoked the capitulations unilaterally and suspended the activities of Public Debt Administration. This was protested even by the Empire's ally, Germany (Coşkun, 2015: 133). The war cut the ties of the foreign connections and the government could not even import 3% of its total 45 million liras of imports (Toprak, 2012: 96-97). New customs tariffs were adopted on 14 September 1916 and became 30% until the end of the World War I (Akşin, 1980: 279).

Merchants and artisans in the Ottoman Empire and all foreigners who had been exempt from tax until then had been subjected to Dividend Tax as of 1914 (Coşkun, 2015: 135). The Industrial Incentive Law was amended in 1915. According to the new principles, the workers and civil servants working in the factories were obliged to be citizens, unless they had a specialization not available in the country (Akşin, 1980: 282). Itibar-ı Milli Bank was established in 1917. Only citizens could buy its shares. In addition, this bank was envisaged to assume the functions of a central bank when the bank developed and the political environment permitted (Akşin, 1980: 283). There were several other banks established to provide the necessary loans to entrepreneurs.
Guilds were established in 1915 to support local (Muslim) traders, tradesmen and small business owners in order to create a Muslim bourgeoisie (Akkuş, 2008: 123). The Armenian deportation and Greek immigration during the World War I created a vacuum in Anatolian bourgeoisie. The vacuum was filled with newly emerging Muslim bourgeoisie. One hundred twenty three domestic joint stock companies established during World War I (Ergin, 2017: 121). Thus, domestic and foreign trade started to be dominated by the Turkish-Muslim element largely. The legal regulations and incentives implemented by the state played an important role in this (Akkuş, 2008: 123).

Agriculture suffered greatly due to wars. Labor force became scarce and the government even resorted to forced labor to increase agricultural production (Ahmad, 1988: 279). The cultivated area decreased more than half in World War I (Ahmad, 1988: 281).

C. Social Structure and Education

Primary education was at core for the first time in the Constitutional period. Primary education was made compulsory in 1913, which would last 6 years to graduate (Uyanık, 2016: 290). The Ministry of Education, which previously had been concerned mainly with higher and intermediate education, was responsible for primary education. Courses in literature, history and philosophy were introduced into secondary education. Chairs in sociology, and philosophy, and "national studies" such as literature, history, and fine arts were introduced into the new University of İstanbul (Berkes, 1998: 419). This was the first time philosophy was taught. When the capitulations were revoked, the schools belonged foreign missions were closed and taken under control (Uyanık, 2016: 291). Medrese education was still ongoing, albeit there were efforts to reform it.

In 1916, the Gregorian calendar that takes migration of Prophet Muhammad as the starting year was adopted. Thus the year of 1916 was known as 1332 according to this calendar (Berkes, 1998: 421). Change of script to a Latinized one was also brought forward, and opposed universally. Reformist looked to add vowels to the Arabic script to make it understandable for Turkish, and it was even tested by ministry of war in telecommunications (Berkes, 1998: 422-423).

The government had attempted to involve Turkish middle-class women in activity outside the home since 1908. Even Islamic establishment such as ulema was used to further the standings of the women in society via fetvas (Ahmad, 1988: 279). The wars and the lack of labor created an opportunity for women to work. Women started to work at the factories and offices. Women even organized under an organization called as "The Society for Muslim Working Women" (Ahmad, 1988: 280). Women also attended to the agriculture to help it stay afloat.

In 1914, the population of the Empire stagnated around 19 million due to territorial losses (Karpat, 1985: 190). Literacy rate was thought to be around 14% and agricultural labor was around 80% (Eldem, 1970: 275-309).

Throughout the World War I, the peasants were exploited a lot. They mostly endured it due to fatalism indoctrinated to them. There were also many emerging bandit groups. Mostly constituted of army deserters; bandits became a security problem throughout the World War I (Ahmad, 1988: 282). The reform process that society went through was sufficient to create classes, both in the towns and in the countryside, with a strong commitment to the survival of a Turkish nation state. However, much of Turkish society in Anatolia, as the vast majority of the Empire, remained untouched of reforms (Ahmad, 1988: 284).

III. COMPARISON OF JAPAN AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE AFTERMATH PERIOD

This section will compare how the aftermath period ensued for each country by analyzing them face to face. In international context section, their relations will also be mentioned.

A. International Context and Political Situation

Imperial ambitions of Japan became apparent in this time. What was remarkable is Japan’s adaptation of Western diplomatic ways and its usage to reach its goals. Contrast to that, there is an apparent naiveté regarding the Young Turks in diplomatic power play. The shortsightedness of their projections, mostly seeing the reopening of the parliament would solve the problems of the Empire, cost them severely by the loss and annexation of many Balkan states.

Japan’s alliance with Britain was the mark showing Japan among Great Powers. Three years later when they defeated Russia and made the US initiate the mediation and peace process was no less than a great power’s military and diplomatic prowess. The Ottomans on the other hand, was defeated by its former suzerainties and lost almost all of the Balkan territories. The Ottomans’ isolated situation played role in this; therefore, the government did everything it could to make an alliance with Britain and France before World War I started. However, Germany was the only one who accepted the Ottomans as its allies.

Both states abolished capitulations in their own way. Japan by negotiation and the Ottomans by unilateral decision. The Ottomans were trying to empower the parliament, thus the government passed universal suffrage to all male citizens. Japan was still demanding its male citizens to be a taxpayer above a certain amount of threshold. Albeit, in the latter years of their respective period, both nations’ gradually developing political arena regressed. The Ottomans suffered from this situation more, however Japan was deliberately suppressing political views it deemed problematic. This situation reached its apex with Great Treason Incident in Japan. The Ottomans’ successive and destructive wars it had in a short period of time created a turbulent political arena which resulted in a failed coup attempt and total control of the Union and Progress until the World War I.

In legal arena, both nations passed a Civil Code, which emphasized traditional values while giving women some fundamental rights albeit in a narrow field. The power in the state apparatus also changed hands in the Ottomans. After 1909, the Sultan had no power to govern, the cabinet under the control of the Union and Progress assumed all of it.

During 1880s and 1890s, the Ottomans-Japan relations started by Japan's enthusiasm to conclude a trade agreement as an unequal treaty. There were eight reports which written by Japanese researchers about Middle East, reporting of Russians' southern ambitions and several explanations over agricultural matters (Esenbel, 2012: 274-276). In 1887, Emperor Meiji's younger brother, Prince Komatsu visited İstanbul. Abdülhamid wanted to further the relations and sent a frigate called Ertuğrul in 1889. Ertuğrul's journey lasted 11 months. The mission stayed in Japan for 3 months in Yokohama. On the way home, Ertuğrul was wrecked when a typhoon hit the ship in September 1890. Before the voyage, the ship was already in tatters and had a little chance to complete the journey back home. Japan rescued the surviving sailors and brought them to İstanbul in January 1891.

The international law of the period was not allowing these two country to make a legal diplomatic and trade relation. The capitulations, which they accepted, were preventing them to conclude any legal document. The Ottomans were trying not to give any trade concessions to another country after releasing itself from the most favored nation clause in 1856 Paris Treaty (Esenbel, 2012: 282-285). Before and during the years of Russo-Japanese war, Japan had initiatives to make supporters among Russia's Muslims, who were mostly of Turkic origin. Japanese Foreign Ministry had cold and distanced reports about the Ottomans' attitude during the war and deemed the Ottomans as unfriendly due to limiting Japan's intelligence initiative to take action in its own territories (Esenbel, 2012: 293-296).

Japan's victory encouraged the Young Turks. The Union and Progress looked up to the Meiji Restoration and even thought of bringing Japanese advisors to help to the reform process (Esenbel, 2012: 311). After 1910, two countries were on the opposite side of the history. Japan was further strengthening its relations with Britain, and was looking at Mesopotamia as an economic opportunity for its cotton textile sector; on the other hand, the Ottomans were trying to hold the empire together during the ensuing wars while reforming many aspects of the government and economy in a political isolation.

B. Economic Structure and Growth

Both countries revoked the capitulations allowing them to tax imports at the rate they would determine, however in different manners. Japan completed its banking system and provided loans for its growing business sectors and infrastructure. The Ottomans had some local banks opening in this period. The most important attempt came after the revoking of capitulations with Itibar-ı Milli Bank in 1917 as a central bank. This bank later merged with İş Bank in the republican era.

The Ottomans were trying to create a national economy, which would be self-sufficient. To extend capitalism in their own way, the Union and Progress tried to create a Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie class. Deportation of Armenians and Migration of Greeks created an opportunity to create such a class.

One of the significant developments was Japan's adoption of Gold Standard. This made Japan investable in the eyes of the British and foreign investment started to enter to country. On the other hand, the Ottomans' adoption of the Gold Standard was imposed unto it and aimed to restructure its debts.

Both countries debt was rising, Japan was able to finance it thanks to its growing income. Rising tax rates and exports were heavy contributors. Japan's silk and cotton industry rose to top spot in the world in this period. Heavy industry investments also started and shipbuilding reached the heights of world class.
Agricultural output was rising in Japan, however in the Ottoman Empire the ongoing wars created a severe labor force crisis while Japan's labor force was increasing.

C. Social Structure and Education

Both countries made primary education compulsory. Japan also opened a Women's university. On the Ottomans' side, women were getting more visible in the society and work environment supported both by the Young Turks and as a necessity to fill up the gap left by men due to wars.

The nationalism rose in both countries in this period. The victories in the war against China and Russia created a fiery sense of nation with the backing of state Shinto. In the Ottomans' case, after the defeats and the loss of Balkan and much of the non-Muslims, the Union and Progress started Turkification process, which had little effect in Anatolia but much effect in big cities. Requirements of national economy also necessitated this approach.

Both nations were still rural in this period, around 75-80%. However, there was big discrepancy about their population. Japan reached 50 million at the end of the

Meiji era; the Ottomans' population decreased due to losses of territory and wars and was about 19 million at the end of the Empire.

The Ottomans adopted Gregorian calendar only in 1916, nearly 40 years after Japan.

Both countries aftermath had evaluations of previous period, especially in the Ottomans' side. Ottomans were now going under a revolution of themselves and subsequent period of the revolution showed that they were analyzing and changing the reforms that came short during Tanzimat and Abdülhamid eras. Japan was also enhancing their reforms to reach greater heights.

Japanese government was trying to show themselves as a distinct power; a power rising in the Asia, apart from the West. Japan was fully integrated to the global economy in its own terms, which let it maneuver in the international political arena or rather in power politics, as it desired. The Ottomans' economy was also integrating to the global economy however they had no control over. After the failure to hold the empire together via democratic participation, economic independence became the most important goal of the Young Turks.

The Union and Progress' attitude to reform process was also significant. As the government, they started to take down whole institutions and build them as new ones, rather than building new institutions while keeping the old ones. Albeit, this did not extend to all of the institutions such as medreses. The government was also dealing with wars in every front and this seriously damaged their reform capabilities. They had the ideas but proper implementation was lacking.

While Japan completed its modernization process and became an industrialized state, the Ottoman Empire de facto ceased to exist in 1918. The legacy of the reforms flourished in the Republic of Turkey who sought after a modernization process similar to Meiji Japan.

CONCLUSION

At first glance, 19th century Japan and Ottoman Empire are very similar looking countries. They were both conservative and traditional. They felt threatened due to a powerful adversary. They were in need of a transformation to oppose this threat.

This threat's perception however was different. Japan went under existential crisis, which quickly undermined traditional political institutions. On the other hand, the Ottomans were in a constant war with West since its inception; to fight against a foreign threat was not something elusive for the Empire; that was its modus operandi. Having nearly identical population numbers with vastly different territorial mass, these two country were intriguing examples to compare against one another. Certainly, their periods do not collide with each other until the very end. This shows how fast Japan went through the modernization process. Just in a lifetime.

Comparisons and analysis are made via division of four time periods and every period further divided into three topics, namely International Context and Political Situation, Economic Structure and Growth, Social Structure and Education in order to look into the divergences of Japan and the Ottoman Empire in the path of the modernization process.

In the first chapter which was called pre-modern period, we looked at the countries' certain features such as geography, military, population, economy and social structure and how they differed from each other. We see that Japan's situation was more suitable for the upcoming modernization process than the Ottoman Empire.

In the second chapter, which was called the dawn of modernization, Japan and the Ottomans had different reactions against an immediate threat. The Ottomans tried militaristic reforms from the top branch of the government next to the existing military. In Japan, both the Shogunate and daimyos launched their own reforms. In result, Japan went under a revolution who took down Shogunate and brought the Emperor back in power, on the other hand, the Ottomans experienced a counter revolution, lost their pro-reformer top branch and waited for 20 years to restart again with another reformer top branch.

In the third chapter, which was called the process of modernization, we see both countries' beginning of reform process. In Japan's case, this was happening from a center that conducted the efforts from a single point rather than competing domains as mentioned in the previous chapter. Japan was establishing new institutions to facilitate its modernization efforts. The Ottomans were creating dualities; while keeping the old institutions, they were creating new ones besides old ones and trying make them work together. Throughout this period, Japan kept the integrity of the reform process, and always sought to better the country with an oligarchy under the Emperor. Japan's vision was clear, and would go great lengths to reform the country. The Ottomans however, was still having vicissitudes in their reforms due to power struggle between the Sultan-reformer bureaucrats and reformer bureaucrats-ulema. The Sultan himself were also in power struggle with both. This struggle prevented an efficient reform process. The superficiality of some reforms clearly shows us the Ottomans did not have the proper resolve at the time. Japan's victory over China further strengthened it resolve, however the Ottomans needed a proper revolution in 1908 to start proper reforms.

In the fourth chapter, which was called the aftermath, the revolutionary forces' lack of a long-term plan cost the Ottomans massive territories. Only after the loss and evaluation of the previous reforms, the new government began to conduct the reforms properly by creating new institutions and eliminating the old ones. Nevertheless, the never-ending warfare crippled their capacity to reform and focus solely on the country. In contrast, Japan improved itself on every field of modernization attempts it followed through without any regression. As a sign of accomplishment, Britain accepted Japan as an equal nation and Japan showed how much Britain was right when it defeated Russia three years later.

After reviewing and comparing the modernization process of both countries, I offer my humble opinion on how their modernization processes diverted from each other.

Japan's pre-modern period had two distinct features that made the restoration oligarchs' job easier. The first one was Tokugawa's alternate attendance, which created a semi-centralized system while having a feudal outlook with strict class divisions. The second one was emerging capitalist economy in the country during Tokugawa era via developing markets. Japan's seemingly unreal modernization results about adapting to the capitalist economy, articulation to global economy and creating a centralized country rather easily, which were depicted sometimes as a miracle, are no miracle; it had roots in the pre-modern era. Japan also had a homogenous population, speaking the same language and had same traditional practices. The notion of a "nation" thus was so much easier for Japanese people to adapt and the government to implement. The Japanese people had high literacy rates even in pre-modern era that eased the Meiji government's hands when educated people were needed in industrialization effort. The people were also had no problem with the Emperor's authority that also facilitated the economic and social reforms that created disturbances in social and economic life.

The Meiji Restoration was a destructive process; it was conducted against an old and crumbling establishment, and it destroyed the establishment's institutions and created new ones for its own endeavors. The political elites, mostly lower samurai, had limited knowledge of the West, but had the ability to quickly learn and adapt. Moreover, the oligarchs had one thing in mind, catch and overcome the West. In the later years of the Meiji era, young samurai who got an education in the West and learned the essence of the Western civilization became political leaders in the Imperial government that further helped in implementing the reforms. The Emperor Meiji was always in support of the reforms, and he was in collaboration with his ministers to better the country. The feeling of security thanks to lack of invasions and war helped the Imperial government to focus on modernization solely. In the early times of Meiji, there was only one hiccup in the modernization process. The oligarchs had an internal conflict, which in turn created the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877. After the reformers suppressed the rebellion, we do not see any internal conflict that could have stopped the reform process.

Japan was successful channeling the land tax it collected from the peasants to the budding industry. The industrial sector's working conditions were very harsh, and although it increased the overall wealth of the Japanese nation, the workers' condition did not change and sometimes it got worse.

Japan's geographic location was also important. It was very far away from the Western powers. Reaching the country was certainly an expensive task. In addition, there was no natural resources the West could have exploited. The terrain was rough and this situation limited the population to certain areas for settling. This situation had two consequences. Thanks to lack of resources, the West never showed interest in colonizing Japan. However, due to the lack of resources, Japan saw the only way to survive by exporting its manufactured goods and bringing money to the country.

The Ottoman Empire had its disadvantages from the start. In the pre-modern period, its centralized government structure diminished and feudalism emerged. The Empire's subjects were people who were from different religious and ethnic backgrounds who had problems uniting for a common goal. It created a massive disadvantage and turmoil when the modernization process started. The economic system was based on provisionism, sustaining of the abundance of goods, which encouraged and even necessitated importing goods while forbidding exporting. This severely crippled the accumulation of wealth in the Empire. The elites were also precautious not to create more disruption in the society with sacrificing the small manufacturers to the industrial sector that wanted to be established. The destructive modernization to build new institutions was a difficult task for the Ottoman elites to undertake.

People were illiterate, only a small group of elites knew how to read and write which stayed at very low levels until the end of the Empire. The Sultan's authority was always tested, different millets under the rule of the Empire many times protested reforms and even went further and demanded secession. The Empire's strive to create a "nation" under "Ottomanism" was definitely a harder task than Japan's process to create a Japanese nation. The Ottoman Empire's bureaucrats were certainly more knowledgeable about the West from their Japanese counterparts thanks to historical relations but failed to utilize this knowledge effectively.

Tanzimat era bureaucrats and some ministers were aware that militaristic and industrial borrowing were just the surface of the modernization process. Nevertheless, they had roadblocks in the implementation of a modern legal system, which sustained the economic and social life due to the opposing of the ulema and conservative bureaucrats. Granted, if all of the Sultans in this period would favor the reformist bureaucrats, the reforms would be implemented. However, after Mahmud II, we do not see the resolve in his successors Mahmud had. There were times that the Sultans gave in to the ulema's pressures such as Abdülmecid; Other times, the Sultan in power wanted to have the absolute power such as Abdülaziz and Abdülhamid, and they fired the reformer bureaucrats to get that power. First Mustafa Reşit, then Ali and Fuad were always going in and out of office due to this unstable political situation, and when they were out, the reform process was also stopping. There were also conflicts among the bureaucrats in what extend that the reforms should go. We see Cevdet Pasha, a former ulema, at the helms of the opposition most of the time.

The Ottomans also failed to bring a universal primary education to the children. Throughout the Tanzimat and Hamidian era until the 1908 revolution, the government did not look at the way of primary education, and left it in the hands of the ulema. The lack of reform in primary education curbed the formation of educated masses needed for changing political and social situation and robbed the Empire of potential political leaders, and informed and educated society. It should be noted that the Ottomans failed to be a modern state but it did not fail in all of the modernization process. All of the officers who built the Republic of Turkey was educated in the Ottoman schools.

The Ottomans, essentially a European state, were in a very close proximity to the West and their industry took a very long time to establish itself after free trade agreements. Even then, the industry could only compete with certain niche products in the market. This close proximity and geostrategic importance of the Empire also facilitated the wars against it. Many times budding reforms were killed due to the defeats the Empire sustained in warfare.

In Western countries, and also in the Ottoman Empire, society was brought, or tried to be brought, around a parliament. The Ottomans first tried this at regional level, bringing common people's representatives together to sustain them with a voice. However, social reconciliation failed to be achieved in this way in the Ottoman Empire. Japan has a unique case in social transformation. Although Japan established a parliament, the parliament was very weak throughout the Meiji era modernization process. Thus, the reconciliation of the Japanese people with the government was sustained through the Emperor himself. The traditional society was indoctrinated since 1890 institutionally to respect the Emperor, which facilitated the Bureaucracy's reform implementations. The political parties that emerged were under certain restrictions to operate.

Historical animosity between the religions of Islam and Christianity was also a roadblock for the Ottomans. Constant warfare decreased the chance of having friendly relations and positive outlook of people between these two factions. One of the Minister of Education of the Empire, Saffet Pasha's remarks on this issue is striking:

If the encouragement, respect, and protection bestowed upon the men of sciences and arts in the first two centuries of Ottoman history had continued for another two hundred years; if contact with the civilized nations of Europe had been established and maintained, and the pace of progress had been kept alongside those nations, the Turkey of today would be in a different state (Berkes, 1998: 184).

Buddhism or Shintoism and Christianity never had that historical animosity. Some Japanese people also went even further, and converted to other religions for the sake of knowledge and greater good of Japan. The West never approached Japan with contempt. They were mostly admiring Japan's reforms and progress.

In this study, the divergences of the Ottoman Empire and Japan in the path of their modernization in the 19th century was tried to be examined by using remarkable scholars' great works on several aspects of history.

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