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THE NATURE OF THE CHANGE IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EURASIA BETWEEN 2002-2011: AN ADJUSTMENT CHANGE

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this master's thesis titled as "The Nature of the Change in Turkish Foreign Policy towards Eurasia between 2002-2011: An Adjustment Change" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honor.

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ABSTRACT
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The Nature of the Change in Turkish Foreign Policy towards Eurasia between 2002-2011: An Adjustment Change
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The phenomenon of change or reconstruction in foreign policy design is an important theme in the discipline of International Relations. In the post-Cold War era, the actors such as Turgut Özal and İsmail Cem laid the ground for change in Turkish foreign policy towards Eurasia with the novelties they brought, but the real change was supposedly experienced in the period of Ahmet Davutoğlu between 2002 and 2011. The primary purpose of this study is to examine the changes in Turkish foreign policy towards Eurasia under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party between 2002-2011 with comparisons to the foreign policy designs of its predecessors. This study argues that the change that occurred as a result of the adoption of the Strategic Depth doctrine in Turkish foreign policy does not provide sufficient evidence to assert that there was a shift of axis in the TFP towards Eurasia. Instead, the change in TFP can be regarded as "adjustments changes" on the basis of Hermann's categorization of foreign policy change.

Keywords: Turkish Foreign Policy, Hermann, Foreign Policy Change, Eurasia, Strategic Depth Doctrine, Axis shift.

ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi
2002-2011 Arasında Avrasya'ya Yönelik Türk Dış Politikasındaki Değişimin Doğası: Ayarlama Değişikliği
Can AKYURTLU

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Dış politika tasarımında değişim ya da yeniden inşa olgusu, uluslararası ilişkiler disiplinde çok önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Turgut Özal ve İsmail Cem gibi aktörler Avrasya bölgesine yönelik Türk dış politikasına getirdikleri yeniliklerle değişimin zeminini oluşturmuşlardır, ancak asıl değişimin 2002 ve 2011 yılları arasında Ahmet Davutoğlu döneminde yaşandığı iddia edilmiştir. İşbu çalışmadaki temel amaç 2002-2011 yılları arasında Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi yönetimindeki Avrasya'ya yönelik Türk dış politikasındaki değişimleri, seleflerinin dış politika tasarımlarıyla kıyaslayarak incelemektir. Bu çalışma, Avrasya'ya yönelik Türk dış politikasında Stratejik Derinlik doktrininin entegre edilmesi ile yaşanan değişimin eksen kayması yaşandığını iddia etmek için yeterli kanıt sağlamadığını ve yaşanan değişimin Hermann'ın dış politik değişim kategorizasyonunda yer alan "ayarlama değişiklikleri" sınıfında değerlendirilmesi gerektiğini öne sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Dış Politikası, Hermann, Dış Politika Değişimi, Avrasya, Stratejik Derinlik Doktrini, Eksen Kayması.

THE NATURE OF THE CHANGE IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARDS EURASIA BETWEEN 2002-2011: AN ADJUSTMENT CHANGE

CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER TWO
TURKISH EURASIANISM AND THE TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER THREE

JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY
FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER FOUR

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS ARMENIA 2002-2011: AN
ADJUSTMENT CHANGE

ABBREVIATIONS

BSEC	Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
EU	European Union
JDP	Justice and Development Party
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
U.S.	United States
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
TFP	Turkish Foreign Policy
TCCA (TIKA)	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

LIST OF FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

States act in line with certain customs and behavior patterns while conducting their foreign affairs, and those customs and patterns are ever changing. Thus, foreign policy change constitutes one of the central themes of the International Relations discipline.

The first decade of the 20th century witnessed remarkable changes in Turkish foreign policy (TFP). Notably, 2002 marked the beginning of momentous changes in TFP. In this thesis, the primary intention is to explore the nature of the changes and shifts in TFP towards Eurasia during the single-party governments headed by Justice and Development Party (JDP) between 2002 and 2011 by comparing them to the foreign policy designs of JDP's predecessors.

Strategic Depth doctrine constitutes the theoretical foundation of the foreign policy vision of JDP. Therefore, this work puts special emphasis on Strategic Depth doctrine. The main character and the intellectual architect behind the concept of strategic depth is Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was one of the prominent actors of the foreign policy design during the period of 2002-2011. Davutoğlu served as the chief foreign policy adviser of the Prime Minister between 2002 and 2009, and then was promoted to the Foreign Affairs Minister position where he served between 2009 and 2014 (Altunışık, 2009: 173).

It can be argued that, despite the breaks and turns that took place in many areas in the international system, there was continuity in TFP from the early years of the republic till the end of the Cold War. Survival and existential fears remained as the core concerns of the traditional TFP. Under such threat perception, TFP had been shaped by two guiding principles, namely preserving the status quo and following a Western-oriented foreign policy (Oran, 2001a: 29-30).

As a young republic, Turkey had witnessed four events that changed the world, namely, World War I (and the following Turkish War of Independence), World War II, the Cold War and the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. These four major systemic events compelled Turkey to act with a threat-oriented mindset while formulating its foreign policy in order to ensure its survival. For this reason, this study takes these four events as breaking points and examines the evolution of TFP

in four parts: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Period, World War II Period, Cold War Period and post-Cold War era.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk period is the period when the political regime and foreign policy principles were established in Turkey soon after Atatürk created a new secular Turkish nation-state from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire (Fuller, 1997: 9). After the Independence War, the main concerns that shaped TFP can be described as ensuring sovereignty in the international arena and integrating with the international community. Thus, the Turkish political elite gave the utmost importance to preserving Turkey's independence and implementing a peaceful foreign policy approach based on international law while resolving the interstate problems. Furthermore, the primary goals of traditional TFP, maintaining status quo and Westernization, were established during the period of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Aydın, 2003: 306-228).

More precisely, early TFP practices intended (1) to maintain existing international relations in line with the existing borders and power balances, and (2) to implement a West-oriented foreign policy design. The ultimate Kemalist rationale was to guarantee the national survival within the existing borders of the Turkish Republic. Therefore, the security concerns had the priority in early TFP design. Moreover, the reforms initiated by Atatürk intended to eradicate the remnants of the Ottoman era and to exclude religion from public governance. The new Turkish state turned its face entirely to the West, and maintaining and reinforcing the newly gained independence became the core concern of the Kemalist foreign policy.

The well-designed foreign policy making under the guidance of Atatürk, which had the focus on peace at both home and abroad resulted in a stable period until the eruption of World War II. The War tested TFP in various ways. In those years, the primary focus of TFP was to keep the country out of the war in order to protect the newly founded Turkish Republic from the destructive effects of World War II, and TFP succeeded in that until the final turn when the outcome of the war started to become clear (Deringil, 1980: 63).

A bipolar world system emerged after the World War II as Europe lost its status as the dominant power in the world system, while the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. emerged as the first superpowers of the world. The ideological race between the U.S.

and the U.S.S.R. was the defining theme of the latter half of the 20th century. Its key geopolitical and geostrategic position located Turkey in the middle of many critical Cold War geographies. For instance, Turkey had a common border with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Neighboring a superpower had both advantages and disadvantages for Turkey. While being adjacent to the U.S.S.R. in the context of security policies increased the importance of Turkey in the Western security system, its position next to an expansionist superpower brought limitations and existential threats to Turkey.

In this period, securing the territorial integrity constituted the primary goal of TFP. In line with that, Turkey made an effort to position itself in the democratic bloc. It is important to note that this effort was not only a result of the Soviet threat to territorial integrity but also a necessary outcome of the policy of Westernization.

Contrary to the expectations, the Cold War ended in a peaceful manner, and the end of the Cold War greatly affected Turkey and became the catalyst of significant changes in the formulation of TFP. This system-altering development made it imperative for Ankara to reshape foreign policy, since Turkey started to face new problems that it had not encountered before (Müftüler-Bac, 1996: 255-258).

In the eras prior to the post-Cold War era, Turkey did not have a separate foreign policy towards Eurasia region. TFP towards Eurasia was seen as part of the TFP towards the U.S.S.R., and in line with the status quo principle, Turkey respected the U.S.S.R.'s sovereignty over the Eurasia region and regarded Turkic states as part of the Union (Fuller, 1997: 36).

This situation changed after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., because 6 of the 15 republics that gained their independence were Muslim countries. In addition to that, five Turkic Republics gained independence in that period, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The emergence of these new republics led to great excitement in the Turkish political scene and public sphere due to the presence of common origin, cultural affinity, and linguistic ties with these states (Bal, 2006: 397). In other words, the prospect of a Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China became a hot topic in Turkish politics. There were multiple reasons behind Turkey's desire to increase its relations with the newly independent Turkic states, and two reasons in particular

stand out amongst others. Firstly, there was a widespread belief amongst the Turkish politicians that Turkey's strategic value to the Western bloc declined with the end of the Cold War. Secondly, the rejection of Turkey's membership application by the European Community gave rise to a massive disappointment in Turkish society. Consequently, the establishment of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and increase in the importance of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in the eyes of Turkish foreign policymakers can be regarded as signs of Turkey's attempts to detach itself from the constraints of the unidimensional Western-oriented foreign policy practices of the Cold War era and integrate Eurasia region as the new dimension into TFP (Aras and Fidan: 2009: 200).

More clearly, the emergence of the independent Turkic states in the Eurasia region and the disappearance of the communist threat compelled Turkey to reformulate its foreign policy in accordance with the necessities of the post-Cold War era.

The break from the traditional TFP practices towards Eurasia started in the early 1990s under the leadership of Turgut Özal. Özal followed a foreign policy, which focused on creating alternatives and developing multidimensional strategies. To this end, he adopted a political understanding that emphasized mutual interest and economic relations towards the Turkic Republics and Muslim countries without breaking ties with the West. Moreover, Özal stressed that Turkey was different from the West because it was a country with a Muslim majority and suggested that Turkey had to be seen as a bridge between the East and the West (Ataman, 2003: 53).

In addition to that Ottomanism revived under the name of neo-Ottomanism and Eurasianism started to become a part of the TFP formulation during the period of Turgut Özal. It should be highlighted that Özal's mixture of neo-Ottomanism and Eurasianism advocated an inclusive foreign policy based on tolerance of the previously negatively described identities in the surrounding regions and presented itself as a challenge to the traditional TFP which he considered as isolationist and indifferent towards its neighborhood (Laçiner, 2003: 200-202).

Another prominent figure of the TFP in the post-Cold War period was İsmail Cem who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey between 1997 and 2002. Cem was critical of the traditional TFP's disregard of Turkey's cultural and

historical roots and suggested effective deployment of the Ottoman Empire's heritage and Turkey's multicultural and diverse ethnic composition to make Turkey a regional power in Eurasia (Cem, 2001: 3). Furthermore, Cem's era exhibits the characteristics of a more flexible and active approach in TFP towards Eurasia since Cem's understanding of Eurasianism considered Turkey as the center of Eurasia due to its shared culture, history, and fate with that region (Örmeci, 2011: 228). In other words, Cem regarded Eurasia dimension as a new component of TFP and attributed an all-embracing mission to Turkey, which was non-peripheral and not confined to the outskirts of Europe (Cem 2002, 2).

In addition to that, unlike the Russian understanding of Eurasianism, Cem's Eurasianist paradigm was not against the West. He referred to a blend of Asian and European identities to expand the horizon of TFP in multiple regions and made efforts for the restoration of relations with neighboring countries by initiating a process called 'the Neighbourhood Forum' (Uzgel, 2009: 72). The ultimate aim of this approach can be considered as using the historical and cultural ties with the Eurasia region to foster the process of European Union membership (Cem, 1997: 5-12).

To sum up, under Özal's and Cem's guidance, Turkey tried to make up for the lost time and tried to increase its influence in the Eurasia region by establishing extensive cultural, economic and political relations with the newly independent Turkic states in the region without damaging its ties with the West. Therefore, it can be suggested that the JDP government was not the first Turkish government that tried to pursue a more active and multi-faceted foreign policy towards the Eurasia region.

After 2002, Turkey experienced remarkable shifts in its foreign policy framework under the governance of JDP, and the foreign policy outlook was mainly shaped by the doctrine introduced by Ahmet Davutoğlu, namely Strategic Depth doctrine (Kirişçi, 2009: 35-36).

Even if various academic studies suggest that TFP underwent a structural change with the adoption of the Strategic Depth doctrine and the introduction of new patterns and processes to TFP, this study argues that in case of the Eurasia region the changes brought by the Strategic Depth doctrine represent the continuation of the change process initiated during the Özal and Cem periods (Bal, 2011: 304).

We might list the main components of the foreign policy design of Turkey in the first decade of the 21st century as: (1) 'Zero problem' attitude towards Turkey's neighboring regions, (2) mature and exceptionally close regional integration and cooperation in terms of politics, economy, commerce and diplomacy with the South Caucasus, Balkans, Middle East and Eurasia regions, and (3) making effective use of the geostrategic position of Turkey by implementing a rhythmic approach in diplomacy (Aras, 2009: 127). Moreover, under the leadership of JDP Turkey adopted a more active role in international organizations.

Migdalovitz lists the main international achievements of the Turkish Republic during that period as follows: (1) Turkish government attained the position of general secretary in the Organization of the Islamic Conference; (2) Turkey participated in G-20 Group of major economies in the world; (3) Turkey nominated an Assistant Secretary General of NATO; (4) Turkey acquired a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council; and (5) Turkey attained more seats on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank executive boards (Migdalovitz, 2010: 1).

Turning back to the change in TFP, it can be argued that the new foreign policy's listed achievements concerning the international organizations does not imply a break from the Western orientation of Turkey at all. Moreover, Özcan and Usul pointed out that the history of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and Europe provided a great potential to improve the ties with the European states rather than causing issues for Turkey (Özcan and Usul, 2010: 123). The first JDP government exerted great efforts in order to improve Turkey's ties with the European Union and to this end, the ruling party officials frequently highlighted the importance they attributed to the relations with the NATO and EU. As a result of these efforts, Turkey attained candidate status in 2005 (Keyman, 2009: 16). Furthermore, in line with the Strategic Depth doctrine, the new rhetoric of TFP started to encourage intense cooperation in political, economic and diplomatic spheres.

The September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. became a turning point in international relations in the sense that the religion-based terrorism has become the new global threat against peace and security at all levels. This situation necessitated a pilot country with an Islamic majority like Turkey to reflect its Western-oriented characteristics. The active foreign policy practices of the Davutoğlu era might also

be attributed to this need. In a similar manner, Turkey has been in an extensive European Union membership process and adopting policies as a result of its decisive stance towards the EU membership. Turkey's reform agenda for EU membership also initiated a transformation in its vision and perspective. Foreign policy reforms adopted by Davutoğlu initiated the deconstruction of the exclusively security-based Kemalist foreign policy structure.

On the other hand, Turkey also experienced some serious confrontations with its Western allies during the JDP period, such as the 1 March crisis in 2003 due to the rejection of the United States demands from Ankara to use Turkish territories for invading Iraq and the deterioration of the relations with Israel due to the Gaza Flotilla attack on 31 May 2010. However, during that period Turkey chose to be flexible in its relations towards the EU and the United States, and did not implement directional changes in its foreign policy. Similarly, Turkey took significant steps to improve its relations with Armenia and Greece. More importantly, Turkey exhibited a constructive attitude and showed a willingness to take part in the talks regarding the unification of the Cyprus Island. Turkey also improved its ties with the countries in the Middle East, Caucasus and Eurasia regions with a notable emphasis on Turkey's close ethnic, cultural, religious and historical ties with those regions. It may be argued that these close ties with the Eastern states are not an indication of the desire to establish a new foreign policy paradigm; instead, they represent the search of Turkey for an alternative dimension to supplement and reinforce its ties with the West. In other words, Turkey intended to develop close relations with the Eastern nations in order to become an important actor in the eyes of the West and the relations with these countries might be regarded as complementary to the Western world.

As for the Eurasianist elements in his foreign policy, Davutoğlu placed great emphasis on the unique geostrategic position of Turkey that involved being a junction point between Europe and Asia. Moreover, he believed that Turkey was in need of an active foreign policy that befitted to its centrality and responsibilities originating from its cultural and historical roots. However, as just mentioned above and similar to Özal and Cem, Davutoğlu considered the relations with the Eurasia region as a complement rather than an alternative to TFP's existing Western

orientation. Consequently, it can be claimed that there are Westernist and multiculturalist elements in Davutoğlu's understanding of Eurasianism (Akıllı et al, 2017: 24-36).

CHAPTER ONE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH

Highly strategic significance of Turkey together with its status as a member of NATO and a candidate state of the European Union has made the Turkish Republic a vital regional and global actor in international politics. In recent decades, Turkey has experienced significant changes in its foreign policy. Especially, the EU accession process, the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 events necessitated certain changes in Turkish foreign policy (TFP). Those changes also had reflections on the TFP towards the Eurasia region. Since the early 2000s Turkey has been trying to play a proactive and multi-dimensional role nearly in every development that occurred in Eurasia region by utilizing its historical ties with the region, and its democratic and secular state characteristics. Notably, the end of the bipolar Cold War system enabled the return of Eurasianism to the political scene in Turkey and allowed Turkey to pursue an active foreign policy towards the Eurasia region.

It can be claimed that one of the crucial turning points for the Turkish Republic is the entry of Justice and Development Party (JDP) into the political scene by winning the majority of the seats in the Turkish Parliament in 2002 general elections, primarily due to the ten-percent threshold in the Turkish election system. Henceforth, Turkey experienced single party governments under the leadership of JDP. Foreign policy outlook of the leading party was mainly shaped at least till 2016 by the doctrine of Strategic Depth introduced by Ahmet Davutoğlu who was the former foreign policy adviser and the former Foreign Minister of Turkey during the period of 2002-2011.

The aim of the present study is to explore the nature of change in Turkish foreign policy in the period of 2002-2011 in the context of Eurasia through the comparison of traditional and contemporary TFP. While doing so, this paper will seek answers to the questions of; 'When did the process of change in Turkish foreign policy begin?', 'How did the Eurasianism affect Turkish foreign policy?', 'Did

Eurasianism take the place of Westernism in Turkey?', 'Does the Strategic Depth doctrine have an impact on the recent foreign policy change towards the Eurasia region?', and consequently, 'Can we talk about an axis change in Turkish Foreign Policy?'

This work applies Charles Hermann's typology on foreign policy change to TFP and establishes that Turkey experienced adjustment changes, program changes, and problem and goal changes. However, although TFP has undergone a significant process of change, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that there is an axis change in TFP. In case of TFP towards the Eurasia region this work suggests that, in line with Hermann's categorization of foreign policy change, the shift in the TFP towards Eurasia region can be regarded as an adjustment change only.

Moreover, this work argues that the disappearance of the bipolar structure of the Cold War period and the related re-adjustment process in the geopolitical status quo allowed Turkey to pursue an active foreign policy in the Eurasia region. It is argued that the seed of the change that took place after 2002 was laid by the predecessors of JDP who were in power in the immediate post-Cold War era. Accordingly, this work is going to analyze Turgut Özal, İsmail Cem and Ahmet Davutoğlu periods in TFP and claim that the rupture from traditional TFP started after the end of the Cold War and gained momentum in the JDP era. Firstly, when Özal came to power in 1983, Turkey's relations with the Western bloc had already deteriorated due to the Cyprus Crisis and the military coup of 1980. After the collapse of the U.S.S.R., Özal tried to reverse Turkey's declining status within the Western bloc by acting as a role model for the newly-independent Turkic states in the Eurasia region by supporting their Westernization process. For that reason, Özal's understanding can be considered as Westernist Eurasianism. Özal also tried to establish political, economic and cultural relations with those Turkic states, seeking in particular to diversify Turkey's trading partners (Oran, 2001: 380-396). Secondly, İsmail Cem placed great emphasis on the historical ties with the Eurasia region and criticized traditional TFP for ignoring Turkey's historical and cultural roots with that region. Cem was also a firm believer in the idea that Turkey is a part of the West; so, what he aimed was to utilize these historical and cultural roots and become a regional power in Eurasia region while finalizing the European Union membership process

(Cem, 1997: 5-12). In that sense, Cem's approach towards the Eurasia region can also be considered Westernist. Furthermore, it can be claimed that the traditional TFP has had two major goals: these are, namely, preserving the status quo and Westernism (Oran, 2001: 46-53). Contrary to the traditional approach, Cem initiated a proactive foreign policy approach towards the Eurasia region during his tenure. Lastly, Davutoğlu era can be considered as a combination of the Westernist and Multiculturalist Eurasianism. Similar to Cem, Davutoğlu suggested that Turkey had to take advantage of its history and cultural ties with the Eurasia region and emerge as a leading country in the region (Davutoğlu, 2001: 489-499). In addition to that Davutoğlu picked from where Cem left off on proactive approach and made proactivity a fundamental aspect of TFP formulation. Moreover, Davutoğlu's open call for a Eurasian Union can be regarded as a significant indicator of multiculturalist elements in his foreign policy framework. Contrary to Cem and Özal, who regarded Ottomanist and Eurasianist elements as being complementary to the Western identity of Turkey, Davutoğlu placed the Ottoman Empire and Islamic roots at the core of Turkey's identity.

Most of the literature concerning the change in the TFP tends to focus solely on JDP era. This study aims to contribute to the academic debate by suggesting that the change in TFP was initiated during the Özal and Cem eras and then continued within the JDP era under the guidance of Davutoğlu between 2002 and 2011.

1.2. RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

In the first section, reflections of Eurasianism on concrete policies towards Eurasia region will be put forth with emphases on Turgut Özal, İsmail Cem and Ahmet Davutoğlu periods, and the continuities and changes in TFP, if there are any, in those periods will be analyzed. These three periods are selected due to the potent influence of Eurasianism on foreign policymaking in these eras. This discussion on Eurasianism is expected to reveal the major components of recent TFP towards Eurasia and shed a light on the recent shift in TFP framework under the Strategic Depth doctrine.

Subsequently, the foreign policy framework of JDP will be scrutinized with a special emphasis on (1) the place of Strategic Depth doctrine in the foreign policy design of JDP, (2) the theoretical Framework of the Strategic Depth doctrine and (3) the core principles introduced to the TFP by the Strategic Depth doctrine.

It can be claimed that the Strategic Depth doctrine of Ahmet Davutoğlu has been the ideological guideline of the process of change in the TFP. The Strategic Depth doctrine initiated a structural amendment in foreign policy formation in Turkey by introducing new patterns and processes to foreign policy practices. The methodological components of the Strategic Depth can be indexed as, (1) visionary approach, (2) consistent and systematic foreign framework, and (3) adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style (Davutoğlu, 2010b).

The operational components which were introduced to the TFP by Strategic Depth can be listed as, (1) balance between security and democracy, (2) zero problems with neighbors, (3) improving relations with the neighboring regions and beyond, (4) multi-dimensional foreign policy, and (5) rhythmic diplomacy (Davutoğlu, 2010). Both the methodological and operational components of the Strategic Depth doctrine are going to be explored and explained. Then Hermann's typology on foreign policy change is going to be applied to the Davutoğlu era's TFP, and it will be argued that the change in TFP can be classified as an adjustment change. In that part of the work, empirical data provided from the Development Assistance Reports of TİKA, is going to be used to support the claim of adjustment change and explain why the change in the TFP cannot be regarded as a change of program, problem or goal.

In addition to that, the impact of methodological and operational components of the Strategic Depth doctrine on the adjustment change in TFP will be investigated and it will be suggested that the three methodological and three operational components of the Strategic Depth doctrine in particular can be identified as the seeds that led to significant increase in the intensity of adjustment changes in TFP. We can list those methodological components as (1) visionary approach, (2) consistent and systematic foreign framework, and (3) adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style; and the operational components as (1) to develop relations with

the neighboring regions and beyond, (2) multi-dimensional foreign policy, and (3) rhythmic diplomacy.

The fourth chapter of this work is a case study where the relations between Turkey and Armenia in 2002-2011 period are going to be analyzed in order to support the adjustment change claim. Even though, Turkey and Armenia made various attempts to normalize their relationship, most of those attempts could not create the desired outcome. This chapter will focus on those attempts with particular emphasis on trade, energy and security relations and point out why the changes in aforementioned should be categorized as adjustment changes only.

The last chapter is the conclusion part of the thesis and is going to deliberate on the major discussion points and findings that were put forward in the previous chapters.

So far, there is no consensus amongst the political scientists about the definition of Eurasia. Yet we can identify two commonly used definitions of Eurasia. On the one hand, the broad definition of Eurasia, developed and named by Prussian naturalist Von Humboldt, involves the incorporation of Asian and European geographies (Özder 2013: 66). On the other hand, the narrow definition of Eurasia refers to the geographical area defined as the Eurasian Balkans by Brzezinski. The Eurasian Balkans include nine countries, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Afghanistan (Brzezinski, 1997: 123-125). In Turkish Eurasianism, Eurasia is generally defined in a narrow sense with particular emphasis on the Turkic Republics. In line with Turkish Eurasianism, the narrow definition of Eurasia will be employed in this work.

As for the methodology concerning the collection of data, this study benefits from both primary and secondary sources. As for the primary sources, the information obtained from the speeches of the prominent political actors of the era, official press releases and documents released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey, empirical data obtained from Turkish Development Assistance Reports published by TIKA and academic works of the leading political actors of the era are the most significant. As secondary sources, the data collected from previous

academic studies are examined while investigating the change in TFP towards Eurasia.

A limitation on the time period and the region of focus is essential for the sake of the methodological and theoretical integrity of the study. The main reason for focusing on the period in question is that JDP came to power as a single party government in 2002 and asserted a new vision for foreign policy. After having consolidated its power in its first term, the JDP government took decisive steps in its second term starting in 2007 to realize its foreign policy vision and continued its efforts towards that end successfully until the unfolding of the Arab Spring in 2011. That is the reason why this study confines itself to the 2002-2011 era during the long rein of the JDP rule that still continues.

1.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

Even though we all know what change refers to in our daily lives, its meaning is hard to grasp when it comes to the area of foreign policy. Foreign policy change might be caused by a change in the regime of a state, redistribution of the power in the international system or the reason might just be a change of government in one or more states. Of course, these different types of causes of foreign policy change will neither have the same velocity nor the same intensity. Determining the magnitude of the change is important because a change in a foreign policy of a country might have an impact on the neighbouring states or even on the international system itself. For instance, the collapse of the U.S.S.R. resulted in a major foreign policy shift in almost every county around the globe. Moreover, it became a catalyst that led to a major alteration in the international system.

In general, foreign policy change can be categorized into two. First, change that is the result of government change or state transformation. Second, change that happens when the existing government settles on to push in various foreign policy directions. Foreign policy change that results from a change in the political system is also labeled as foreign policy redirection. The second, meanwhile, occurs when the present actors change their course in foreign policy. Accordingly, the nature of the change tends to be more "self-correcting". (Hermann, 1990: 5).

Countries design their foreign policy towards other states and international organizations in line with their interests, aims, and status in the international community. Countries might follow diverse modes of foreign policy in order to reach their targets and guard their national interests. According to the Realist school of thought in International Relations (IR) discipline, which this work also adopts, the primary goals of a state's foreign policy are (1) to secure its entity and ensure its survival, (2) to increase its power within the international community and (3) to sustain state's prestige in the international arena (Rasheed, 1995: 95). Baldwin argues that there are two basic categories shaping the foreign policy formation of a state, namely the subjective and the objective determinants together with their respected conditions related to domestic and international dimensions. We might list the objective determinants, which are often similar for almost every country as maintaining the national sovereignty, the protection of territorial integrity, and the promotion and fulfillment of national interest. On the other hand, the subjective circumstances differ from country to country; they refer to the country-specific features in the foreign policy formation, such as state ideology, and the historical and geographical background of state (Baldwin, 1997: 5-26).

Foreign policy problems have been addressed by Realists in terms of security. For realists, in an anarchic international system survival and security are the most important matters for states. For this reason, all other economic, social, and cultural matters are treated as secondary to national security or their worth are assessed in terms of their relationship to national interest defined in terms of power and security. Furthermore, moral values have no independent impact on international politics. States, being rational actors, are supposed to act on the basis of cost-benefit calculations and maintain and preferably increase their relative power position in the international arena (Viotti and Kauppi, 2010: 42-43). As a result, according to the Realist perspective, foreign policy is a tool to accomplish and further national interests. Concerning change in foreign policy, the main realist focus is on changes that have an impact on the balance of power between states (Morgenthau, 1978: 4-12; Waltz, 1979: 116-123).

Concerning foreign policy instruments, Kesler divides them into two categories, namely the hard power and soft power practices. We might define the

hard power as the use of military force to attain foreign policy targets, whereas the soft power applications refer to the use of instruments such as diplomacy, negotiation, foreign aid, and economic tools to achieve foreign policy goals (Kesler, 2005: 11).

1.3.1. Literature Review on Foreign Policy Change

The change or the reconstruction of foreign policy design is a crucial subject in discipline of IR. However, there exists relatively limited literature focusing on the change and the reconstruction phenomenon in the foreign policy framework. Rosenau introduced an early book into the reconstruction literature with a particular focus on foreign policy change. The principal argument of the manuscript is that foreign policy change materializes as a result of internal and external needs (Rosenau, 2006: 30). In another landmark study, Holsti elaborated on the patterns and practices of foreign policy shifts (Holsti, 2015: 1-21). In addition to that the academic works of Rosati, and of Hagan, Rosati, and Sampson constitute significant research pieces focusing on the change in foreign policy design since they provide an insight on why and when foreign policy change occurs (Rosati, 2004: 110; Hagan, Rosati and Sampson, 1994: 3-22). Similarly, Welch introduces an organizational theory with cognitive and motivational psychological aspects focusing particularly on the frequency of foreign policy changes (Welch, 2011: 30-51).

The common feature of those literature is their focus on the structural alterations in foreign policy design and the notion that there might be different patterns and sources behind the change phenomenon. Nevertheless, we might argue that the recent events in the international arena reveal limited occasions or cases reflecting a structural change in foreign policy mode or design. States act under some customs and behavioral patterns while conducting their foreign affairs, and these customs and behavioral patterns are ever changing. According to Modelski, significant events such as large-scale wars or systemic changes can be seen as the primary sources of the change in the international system (Modelski, 1987: 7-11). There is no doubt that contemporary developments in world politics have an impact on the foreign policy of states. In today's world, we observe changes in the foreign

policy framework of countries mainly due to the wars, domestic riots, economic crises or as a result of conjectural shifts in the international system. In addition to that, the regime changes and the state transformations can also be regarded as sources of shifts in the foreign policy frameworks or patterns. We might propose the Central and the Eastern European countries in the post-Cold War era and the countries affected by the Arab Spring wave like Tunisia and Egypt as sample cases for new foreign policy orientation arising from a regime change. Besides, Holsti argues that internal political developments may also influence the foreign policy pattern of a nation. Therefore, domestic politics might have a potential impact on a foreign policy framework shift. Moreover, Holsti evaluates the patterns in foreign policy framework shifts in numerous countries, and concludes that most of the policy changes stem from leader-led orientations. In other words, Holsti emphasizes the role of elite groups or leaders during foreign policy change processes. However, the foreign policy change might not only be attributed to leader-oriented practices because foreign policy alteration might have different causes such as internal pressures, external pressures or factors related to cultural and historical background of the country (Holsti, 2015: 1-21).

1.3.2. Typology on Foreign Policy Change

Before analyzing the change in foreign policy, what change refers to in foreign policy must be defined. This work acknowledges that the foreign policy of states is an ever-changing phenomenon, but usually these changes are encountered in forms of minor-changes and self-corrections. Impact of these changes to the bigger picture is limited. In accordance with that, such minor-changes and self-corrections will not constitute the primary focus of this paper. In order to analyze the change in foreign policy this work borrows some insight from Charles Hermann's typology related to the foreign policy change. Hermann depicts four types of foreign policy change. We might list Hermann's categorization as follows (Hermann, 1990: 5-6):

Adjustment Change: In this category, the change is observed in the scope of beneficiaries such as the modification of the target groups and/or in the intensity of endeavor, such as the implementation of policies with greater or lesser effort. On the

other hand, the reasons, the modes and the way that foreign policy is conducted do not change under the adjustment change category of Hermann. To sum up, adjustment change mainly refers to a change in the level of effort while other variables stay as they were.

Program Change: Under this category, the policy shift includes a change in the methods and the means of policy implementation. The methods and means that are used change while the goal and/or the problem stays the same. As compared to the adjustment changes, which imply quantitative changes in existing policy preferences, the program changes reflect the qualitative adjustments including the new policy practices. More clearly, primary purpose of foreign policy does not alter, just the policy practices change.

Problem and Goal Change: In this category, initial setback or objective that foreign policy focuses upon changes. In this type of foreign policy change, the problems that a foreign policy seeks to handle change that in turn alters its purpose.

International Orientation Change: This category refers to the most intense level of foreign policy alteration and includes a holistic readjustment of the foreign policy components of the country. As opposed to the above-mentioned milder forms of foreign policy changes, the orientation shift refers to redirection of foreign policy orientation and structural change in the country's self-identification and role in the international arena.

In order to illustrate these categories of foreign policy change, Hermann examines the U.S. foreign policy towards Vietnam as an example. Firstly, the increase in the volume of the U.S. military and economic assistance to Vietnam in the 1950s and early 1960s can be considered as an adjustment change. Because while the foreign policy goal of attaining victory by military power had stayed the same, intensity of the effort dedicated to achieve the foreign policy goal had changed. Secondly, Hermann considers the introduction of U.S. soldiers to the war in 1965 as a program change because while the problem and the goals stayed the same, methods had changed. Furthermore, the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Vietnam and returning to support the South Vietnamese army can be described as a second program change. Thirdly, acceptance of the result of the Vietnam War by the U.S. constitutes a problem and goal change since the purpose of the U.S. foreign policy

was altered. Instead of trying to defeat North Vietnam by military means the U.S. decided to end the war. Lastly, even though it is open to debate, the U.S.'s reluctance to participate in and use military power in large-scale wars after the Vietnam catastrophe can be seen as an international orientation change since the U.S. started to rely more on other soft power tools despite its sheer military might (Hermann, 1990: 5).

1.3.3. Change Theme in Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkish foreign policy literature does not provide a new theory yet it contributes to the theoretical debate through regional studies (Karacasulu, 2012: 155). Özcan and Usul assess Turkey's foreign policy formation within the context of continuity with a particular focus on the foreign policy practices of the JDP governments during the period between 2002 and 2011. They argue that the foreign policy adjustment observed in the recent single party government periods does not imply a divergence from the traditional orientation of TFP (Özcan and Usul, 2010: 123).

Generally, academics concur that under JDP governments Turkey experienced the first three categories of the foreign policy change in Hermann's typology, yet there is not enough evidence to talk about an international orientation change (Cop and Zihnioğlu, 2015: 10). Firstly, the increase in the involvement and the activity in the Eurasia region and towards neighboring states can be considered as an adjustment change. Even though predecessors of JDP governments aimed to intensify the relations with Eurasian countries, their efforts were not as much comprehensive and multi-dimensional as those of the JDP. Thus, there is a notable increase in the quality and quantity of relations towards the Eurasia region during the JDP rule.

Secondly, under JDP governments during the period of 2002-2011, Turkey had recourse to its soft power more than its hard power to achieve its foreign policy goals. This shift from hard power practices to soft power practices and the introduction of new foreign policy instruments such as rhythmic diplomacy, active use of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in foreign affairs and increase in the

level of presence in international organizations can be regarded as program change (Aras: 2009: 135-138). Thirdly, Turkey went through a goal and problem change by implementing a policy of zero problems with the neighbors. With this policy Turkey aimed to form deeper relations not only with the countries within its proximity but also with the whole Middle East and Balkans regions with the purpose of attaining regional leadership. Fourthly, as this work intends to claim, even though Turkey had some minor changes in its international orientation, such as improvement of the relations with Iran and the deterioration of relations with Israel, these issues do not provide enough evidence to propose that Turkey went through a full orientation change (Altunışık and Martin, 2011: 570).

In addition to that, some claim that the Eurasianism has replaced the traditional Western orientation of Turkey. Even if there is an observable deceleration on Turkey's relations with the West especially regarding Turkey's commitment to the EU membership process and resolution of the Cyprus dispute, it is not possible to claim that Turkey is now Eurasianist country. Öniş defines this change in the foreign policy attitude as 'Soft-Eurasianism' and state that the relations with the West might be looser, but they still continue (Öniş and Yilmaz, 2009: 11-12).

CHAPTER TWO
TURKISH EURASIANISM AND THE TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter investigates the impact of Eurasianism on Turkish foreign policy framework during the period after the Cold War. Discussion on Eurasianism is expected to reveal the major components of the recent Turkish foreign policy design and explain the recent shift in Turkish foreign policy framework under the Strategic Depth doctrine. Impact of Eurasianism on TFP can be explored under three distinct periods, namely: (1) Özal period between 1983 and 1993, (2) İsmail Cem period between 1997 and 2002, and (3) Davutoğlu period between 2002 and 2011. The main argument of this chapter is that Eurasianism together with neo-Ottomanist elements had a remarkable impact on the TFP towards Eurasia. This section of the thesis intends to respond to the question of 'how did the Eurasianism affect Turkish foreign policy?'.

2.1. EURASIANISM IN TURKEY

2.1.1. Patterns of Eurasianism in Turkey

The impact of Eurasianism on Turkish foreign policy began in the 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the independent Turkic states in Central Asia. It should be noted that even though classical Eurasianism affected the Turkish intellectuals due to the interactions between Russia and Turkey at that time, its effects remained limited. It is possible to suggest three crucial reasons for that limited impact. First of all, both Russia and Turkey regarded each other as the major rivals in the region. Secondly, classical Eurasianism emphasizes the superiority of Russian culture and history with a desire for the elimination of Western ideologies. So, as members of a nation state, it was not possible to embrace Eurasianism as it is by the Turkish intellectuals. The third reason is that classical Eurasianism targets the establishment of the Russian Empire within the Eurasian landscape.

On the other hand, neo-Eurasianism managed to find fertile ground amongst the Turkish intellectuals. However, the Turkish interpretation of Eurasianism has some distinct elements from Russian neo-Eurasianism. Firstly, Russian Eurasianism intends to establish a Russian state within the original territories of the Soviet Union, whereas Turkish Eurasianism does not have any intention to reclaim the regions ruled by the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, the Russian form of neo-Eurasianism includes communist and ultranationalist elements, whereas Turkish Eurasianism is deployed by both leftist figures and rightist nationalists in a milder form (Aktürk, 2015: 70). As for the third difference, Russian neo-Eurasianism promotes a foreign policy framework with a balanced emphasis on different regions of the world, whereas Turkish Eurasianism tends to give greater importance to the East and aims to establish powerful coordination with the Eastern states like Iran, India, Pakistan, and Russia. Lastly, Turkish Eurasianism does not have theoretical roots as deep as those of Russian neo-Eurasianism. In other words, Turkish Eurasianism cannot challenge ideologies like Ottomanism and Islamism when it comes to the historical and theoretical roots (Laruelle, 2008b: 9). As a result of the recent TFP pattern with relatively higher activism in the international arena, Eurasianism has increased its impact on the TFP framework. The next section details the diverse roots of Turkish Eurasianism.

2.1.2. Reflections on the Different Types of Eurasianism in Turkey

The first root of the Turkish Eurasianism can be regarded as the neo-Ottomanism, which arguably became one of the pillars of TFP after the 1990s. The Ottoman Empire was amongst the greatest empires in history. Ottomanism emerged as a result of the need to eliminate the nationalist riots across the empire's territories. The primary rationale behind Ottomanism was to establish an overall identity above the nationalist roots of individuals living in the territories of the Ottoman Empire (Demirag, 2005: 145). In other words, Ottomanism was deployed by the Ottoman elites in order to create a collective political identity for its citizens (Karpat, 2000: 6). Since these efforts were not enough to revive the Ottoman soul amongst its citizens,

the Ottomanism was replaced by the Turkish nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century.

Ottomanism ideology in Turkey revived under the name of neo-Ottomanism during the period of Turgut Özal and became the prevailing pattern in foreign policy making during that period. It should be noted that neo-Ottomanism under Özal was in favor of an inclusive state together with openness to the diversities in social and political life (Laçiner, 2003: 200-202). It should also be mentioned that Özal's form of neo-Ottomanism emerged as an alternative to the Kemalist foreign policy making in Turkey. During his tenure the main intention of Özal was to establish close and friendly relations with the states located in the former Ottoman regions. The foreign policy design with a neo-Ottomanist vision initiated close political, social and economic interactions with (1) the Turkic states such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan, and (2) the countries located in Caucasus and Balkans. A similar pattern can be observed in the recent foreign policy formation in Turkey, since JDP's foreign policy also showed neo-Ottomanist tendencies (Cağaptay, 2009: 1-3). Neo-Ottomanist patterns adopted by the Turkish foreign policymakers also have Western-oriented and Pan-Islamist components. The Western-oriented components of the neo-Ottomanism found their reflection in the support to development compatible with Western societies and policies concerning the protection of democratic values.

The second root of Turkish Eurasianism is the pan- or neo-Islamism, a mainstream ideology dating back to the 1800s, which intends to unify all Muslims in the world under the roof of Islam (Özcan, 1997: 23-25). Ethnicity is disregarded under pan-Islamism as opposed to the ethnicity-based ideologies such as pan-Arabism and pan-Turkism. The pan-Islamist approach was embraced first by Abdulhamid II during the late periods of the Ottoman Empire in order to eliminate the Western intervention in the Empire's domestic affairs and to establish social unity within its territories to protect the Ottoman Empire. However, these efforts could not manage to prevent the collapse of the long-lasting empire. Due to the Kemalist and secular policies in the new Turkish Republic, the Islamist and Ottomanist approaches were overlooked until the Özal period. Turgut Özal used pan-Islamist rhetoric within his policy formation. The neo-Ottomanist pattern adopted by

Özal might be regarded as a combination of nationalism, Islamism and Turkism since Özal intended to integrate societies with Turkish and Islamic roots under an official community (Jenkins, 2008: 111-140). Pan-Islamist ideology was also extensively adopted by the Welfare Party in Turkey during the last couple of years of the 1990s. The Welfare Party in Turkey as the leading coalition partner in multiple governments had an Islamist-rooted foreign policy understanding with a special focus on the Islamic states in the proximal regions. In accordance with that, the Turkish governments headed by the Welfare Party disregarded the Western states in official visits (Bilgin, 2008: 411-412). As a reflection of the pan-Islamic tone in TFP during the Welfare Party's governance, Prime Minister Erbakan was opposed to having close relations with the Western actors such as the United States, European Union, and Israel. Consequently, he adopted low-level foreign policy relations with these states and communities during his governance period. However, the pan-Islamist mode of foreign policy adopted by the Welfare Party was put on hold with the "February 28 post-modern coup" (Çandar, 2000: 1-18). In 1997, the Turkish military forced the government led by the Welfare Party to adopt policies to guarantee secularism in Turkey.

The third root of Turkish Eurasianism can be considered as the pan-Turkism, which found ground in the late 19th century amongst the thinkers of the Turkic nations located in the Russian Empire and might be regarded as a response to the aggressive Russian policy stance in the Eurasia region (Shlapentokh, 2007: 40). The main intention of the pan-Turkism is to establish a Turkic Union with particular emphasis on ethnicity.

2.1.3. Perspectives in Turkish Eurasianism

Neo-Eurasianism has found ground amongst Turkish intellectuals under three different forms, which can be classified as: (1) Nationalist Eurasianism, (2) Multiculturalist Eurasianism, and (3) Westernist Eurasianism (Akıllı et al, 2017: 23). The first mode of Eurasianism in Turkey is nationalist Eurasianism, which might be characterized as the turning the political attention to the Eastern states such as Iran, India, Pakistan, Syria, and Russia as candidate countries for a prospective

international alliance. Pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism, and Ottomanism are the major components of nationalist Eurasianism, which is in favor of nationalist ideals and thoughts. Nationalist Eurasianism is against the imperialism of the United States and intends to establish a Eurasian Union in order to prevent the United States' domination in world politics. The second mode of Eurasianism in Turkey is multiculturalist Eurasianism, which advocates the unification of all individuals living in the region of Eurasia without any special focus on ethnicity. The main intention of multiculturalist Eurasianism is to create an alternative union among Russia, Turkey, Turkic States, India and Iran in opposition to the Western-oriented unions. This mode of Eurasianism is also against Western imperialism. The last mode of Eurasianism in Turkey is Westernist Eurasianism, and has been the favored approach in the recent TFP framework. Westernist Eurasianism intends to establish close and friendly relations with the Eurasian countries while also following Western-oriented policies. In other words, this pattern favors pursuing good relations with the West while also working on Eurasian integration. Therefore, Westernist Eurasianism might be regarded as the softest version of Eurasianism, since it considers any form of unification of Eurasian states as a complementary rather than an alternative gathering to the existing Western-oriented unions (Akıllı et al, 2017: 24-36).

2.2. DIFFERENT PERIODS OF EURASIANISM IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

The impact of Eurasianism on TFP practices can be evaluated under three distinct periods: (1) Prime Minister and President Turgut Özal's period, (2) Foreign Affairs Minister İsmail Cem's period, and (3) Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's period.

2.2.1. Turgut Özal Era

In the 1970s, Turkey experienced isolation from the international system due to the embargo laid by the U.S. as a response to the Cyprus crisis. Turkey's relations with the Western bloc suffered significantly during that period. However, Turkey

could not also turn its face to the communist bloc due to its NATO membership. Furthermore, with the military coup in 1980, the country was faced with serious political, social and economic tensions. As a way of dealing with increasing economic problems, Turkey regarded the Arab world as an alternative axis and therefore increased its economic relations with its neighbours during the 1980s (Aykan, 1993: 102-103). Turgut Özal attained political power under these economic and political circumstances. The main political will of Özal was to enhance democracy and liberal economy together with freedoms and rights in Turkey. Özal's strategy on foreign policy was to establish good relations with both the Western and the Eastern states. He implemented radical adjustment policies in order to heal and improve political and economic relations with the West and increased economic relations with the Eastern states in the neighbourhood.

The trends and behavioral patterns of TFP were restructured under Özal's rule. Özal tried to abandon the traditional foreign policy discourse that was static, ideological, passive and timid. Moreover, Özal's ideology was composed of Ottomanist and pan-Turkist elements. A multi-dimensional, pragmatic, proactive and economy-oriented foreign policy design was adopted during his era (Ataman, 2003: 49-64). Therefore, this work claims that Özal's foreign policy practices carried Eurasianist characteristics. At first, Özal's form of Eurasianism might be classified as Westernist Eurasianism with a special focus on the Turkic republics that gained independence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Turkey tried to play a big brother role for these newly independent states with the support of Western countries in order to make them more Western-oriented and to eliminate the effects of the communist legacy on these states. In addition to that, TIKA was founded in 1992 during Özal's rule as a technical assistance organization under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The aim of the organization was to carry out economic, social and cultural activities in the countries where the Turkish language was spoken.

Özal effectively pursued this strategy, in harmony with the Western governments and Turkey acted as a role model for those Turkic states in Central Asia. Özal also intended to establish a Turkish political union with a special focus on economic and cultural development without establishing a solely ethnicity driven unification to integrate the Turkic states.

As for the second indicator, Özal aimed to enhance Turkey's foreign policy potential by emphasizing Turkey's strategic importance for the Western countries in attaining regional stability (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003: 188-189). To this end, Özal supported the establishment of the Council of Turkic Speaking States in 1992 with special emphasis on free movement of goods and individuals amongst the Turkic states. Furthermore, Özal also tried to establish meaningful political and economic relations with Turkic states in order to put forward Turkey as the main bridge for their resources to be transported between the East and the West. Moreover, by leaning towards to the East, Özal tried to reduce Turkey's dependence on the West, and by improving relations with Europe, he aimed to reduce Turkey's dependence on NATO and the United States (Bilgin and Bilgiç, 2011: 186-187).

As for the third indicator of Eurasianism in Özal's foreign policy approach, Özal tried to diversify Turkey's trading partners through the establishment of economic relations with the states located in various regions of the world. Under this pattern, Özal enhanced Turkey's economic and political relations with the states in Turkey's close hinterland throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Ankara increased trade and commercial relations with the Arab states, tried to have good relations with Greece, and initiated rapprochement with Israel and Iran during this period. As the famous American expert on Turkey Graham Fuller argued, the changes implemented in the Özal era were the greatest in the history of Turkey since Atatürk established a new secular Turkish nation-state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire (Fuller, 1997: 9).

2.2.2. İsmail Cem Era

İsmail Cem served as the Foreign Minister of Turkey during the period of 1997-2002. Cem had the belief that conventional TFP framework ignored Turkey's cultural and historical roots. He emphasized that the heritage of the Ottoman Empire had been completely disregarded in foreign policy making of the new Republic.

Cem's primary suggestion regarding the making of TFP was to make use of the Ottoman Empire's rich multicultural and multiethnic legacy to enhance Turkey's regional power. In that sense his thoughts were in line with the neo-Ottomanist

perspective. Cem believed that the deployment of Ottoman figures and rationale would enable Turkey to expand its foreign policy horizon to multiple regions of the world such as Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Therefore, it might be argued that İsmail Cem had the tendency to use the Asian identity of Turkey in conjunction with the European elements of Turkish history. Cem tried to bring pro-activism to the TFP design through the use of unique identity, geopolitical location and culture of Turkey. He emphasized the unique blend of Asian and European identities in Turkey's identity to expand TFP perspective. In other words, İsmail Cem was not in favor of the dichotomies such as the West vs. the East and Islam vs. secularism (Örmeci, 2011: 228). Therefore, it might be argued that Cem's foreign policy understanding carried the elements of Westernist Eurasianism.

A proper regional dialogue was a necessity in Cem's foreign policy design in order to find long-term resolutions for long-lasting regional problems, and he regarded direct institutional contacts as the best way of improving the dialogue between states (Cem, 2002: 3). Cem considered Turkey as the center of Eurasia since Turkey had a common culture, history, and fate with the countries located in this region. The foreign policy practices of his era put significant emphasis on the European Union membership and Cem explained the rationale behind this as follows:

> *Concerning Turkey's European Union candidacy and membership, I always ask myself what Turkey will contribute to the EU; what its real input will be; what enhancement Turkey will bring to the EU. And, what advantages will Turkey gain by being part of the EU?*
> *As for the advantages, I believe that being part of the EU will provide Turkey with a challenge and with a greater opportunity to attain a higher level of rationality in all aspects of its organisational, political, social, democratic and economic life. The historical, cultural and geographical settings of Turkey, which provide for ample interaction with our international environment, enhance the contribution of external dynamics* (Cem, 2000: 8).

Thus, Cem believed that Turkey could become a crucial actor in both European and Eurasian politics and turn the European Union into an inclusive global alliance.

2.2.3. Davutoğlu Era

Tüfekçi suggests that there are some intersection points between Davutoğlu's ideas and Eurasianism. Firstly, Panarin suggested Eurasian countries to get involved in each other's problems regardless of their language, ethnic origin or religion. Similarly, Davutoğlu's approach advocated Turkey's involvement not only in its neighbors' problems, but also in issues of all countries in its surrounding regions such as Eurasia, Middle East, and Balkans. Secondly, just like Eurasianists who deemed Russia as a focal point, Davutoğlu considered Turkey as a center country with deep connections to the Eurasia region. Moreover, his aspirations extended to the territories previously owned by the Ottoman Empire, just like Russia saw ex-Soviet countries as its near abroad (Tüfekci, 2012: 105-107).

Thirdly, similar to the Dugin who highlighted the centrality of Russian lands and the importance of geopolitics in his book called 'Foundations of Geopolitics', Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth put great emphasis on the geopolitical location of Turkey and the opportunities as well as challenges presented by it (Dunlop, 2004: 43-44; Grigoriadis, 2010: 4). Strategic Depth considered Turkey's geopolitical location as an unutilized natural resource and suggested ways to fully utilize it. Fourthly, just like Eurasinists, Davutoğlu was in favor of establishing comprehensive economic, political and social relations amongst Eurasian states. He considered this process as the first step in the creation of a Eurasian Union. Lastly, Eurasinists always had the dream of a Eurasian Union. In a similar fashion, Davutoğlu promoted Turkey's involvement in regional unions and expressed his dedication for a Eurasian Union by deeming it a necessary precondition for world peace (Tüfekci, 2012: 107-109).

Davutoğlu often stressed that political and economic sustainability in the region could be attained through the active participation of Turkey particularly in peace-enhancing practices. Davutoğlu also emphasized that the geopolitical, historical and cultural inheritance of Turkey had to be utilized while formulating TFP. By Eurasianist practices that deployed diverse and cultural diplomatic methods Davutoğlu intended to increase the foreign policy influence of Turkey. As a reflection of that he said "… effects of having diverse Caucasian, Balkan, Middle

Eastern, Iraqi Turcoman and Anatolian elements, even in small groups, are seen in everyday life in today's Turkey, where diverse cultural elements meet under the umbrella of the Turkish state. Turkey's geography harmonizes these elements" (Davutoğlu, 2008: 79).

Öniş and Yılmaz stress that the orientation of foreign policy practices of JDP especially in the post-2005 period shifted from the West to the East. They characterize the new policy pattern as "Soft-Eurasianism" (Öniş and Yilmaz, 2009: 11-12). In line with Eurasianism, which gives greater emphasis to the geostrategic position of Russia, Davutoğlu continuously stressed the unique geostrategic position of Turkey. In a similar manner, Davutoğlu also depicted Turkey as a bridge between the continents of Europe and Asia, and proposed that Turkey had to adopt an active foreign policy pattern that befitted to its centrality and responsibilities arising from its cultural and historical roots. Consequently, it can be suggested that Davutoğlu era might be characterized as a period with characteristics based on both Westernist and multiculturalist Eurasianism.

CHAPTER THREE
JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY
FRAMEWORK

Turkish foreign policy went through a significant process of change especially after the Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power in 2002. This chapter intends to scrutinize the major components of the foreign policy design of Turkish governments headed by JDP between 2002 and 2011. Firstly, the foreign policy design of JDP will be explained with references to JDP's divergence from the National Vision Movement (*Milli Görüş Hareketi*). The main ideological guideline of this change can be considered as the Strategic Depth doctrine of Ahmet Davutoğlu (Aras 2014: 404). Accordingly, the second section will investigate the foreign policy design of the JDP with a special emphasis on the (1) Strategic Depth doctrine, (2) theoretical framework of the Strategic Depth doctrine, and (3) the core principles introduced to TFP by the Strategic Depth doctrine.

This chapter is going seek to answer the questions of: (1) 'Is there an axis change in Turkish Foreign Policy?', (2) 'Did Eurasianism take the place of Westernism in Turkey?', and (3) 'Does the Strategic Depth doctrine have an impact on the recent foreign policy change towards Eurasia region?'.

3.1. THE SHIFT FROM NATIONAL VISION IN FOREIGN POLICY DESIGN

The 28 February post-modern military intervention caused frustrations amongst the followers of the National Vision Movement due to the frequent closure of their political parties (Gümüşçü and Sert, 2009: 953). Those dissatisfied members increasingly directed their criticisms at the management of the movement and claimed that directing assaults against the Kemalist and secularist ideology was not the right way of attaining successful results for political Islam in Turkey (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 44-45). Consequently, the inner party discussions resulted in a fragmentation within the National Vision movement, i.e. the Traditionalists and the Reformists. Traditionalists, generally an old generation of political Islamists, advocated an orthodox type of political Islam, which was hostile towards the West

and Kemalism, and were headed by Necmettin Erbakan. On the other hand, milder political practices towards the West and Kemalism were proposed by the Reformists. (Gümüşçü and Sert, 2009: 954). Those confrontations and struggles amongst the two camps resulted in the establishment of a new political party named Justice and Development Party in 2001 under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The newly established political party managed to attain the majority in the parliament in 2002 general elections by attaining 34 percent of the votes and ended up becoming the single party governing the Turkish Republic since 2002.

The unexpected political success of JDP shortly after its establishment triggered detailed discussions amongst academicians and intellectuals. This prominent success might be attributed to various developments which occurred prior to the establishment of the new political party. Firstly, the previous political scene in Turkey had been continuously dominated by tensions within the coalition governments; political deadlocks often occurred due to the short-term political interests of coalition parties. The second factor that triggered the success of the new party was the economy. Turkish economy had experienced severe economic downturns, fluctuations and macroeconomic imbalances during the coalition governments' period. Severe devaluation in domestic currency had led to a significant increase in the number of unemployed people and triggered the historical domestic banking crisis. Turkish citizens were in desperate conditions due to the long-lasting high inflation rates and persistent corruption cases. Therefore, voters had reached the consensus that the coalition governments were not capable of dealing with the above-mentioned long-lasting problems of Turkey. Furthermore, JDP also managed to increase its voting performance through the establishment of a new discourse by distancing itself from its National Vision roots and adopting a more centre-party orientation.

The core political vision of JDP might be characterized as conservative democracy with a proper distance from the hard-line political Islam. Consequently, the establishment of a political philosophy based on conservative democrat identity managed to attain large support from nearly all segments of Turkish society (Akdoğan, 2004: 106-109). Furthermore, JDP introduced a new political approach as opposed to its political Islamist roots in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the

Kemalist elites. The major decision-making figures of JDP and the party program frequently stressed that the new political vision had ruptured all its ties with the National Vision movement. Furthermore, party programs repeatedly emphasized that new political vision would be loyal to the fundamental norms and values of the Turkish constitution together with accepting religion as a connective component of society. In addition to that, Rabasa and Larrabee point out that JDP also tried to emphasize that the party had the intention to protect secularism since they considered secularism as a major cornerstone of the state, which guarantees the religious liberty of individuals in the society (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 46-487).

In a similar fashion, the new political party also differed from the National Vision outlook which had no interest in having relations with the Western hemisphere. To the contrary, JDP realized the importance of having good relations with the Western states and European Union, and tried to attain close relations by promoting high standards of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Turkey (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 4). Moreover, Rabasa and Larrabee argue that the transition process adopted by JDP might be regarded as a crucial instance for political participation of an Islamist political party without distorting social cohesion in the society. (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 2-3). The shift from radical Islamist political framework to the conservatism rhetoric enabled JDP to become a political party with a more central right-wing position in the Turkish political arena. The leading figures of the party frequently implied their close ties with the rhetoric and policies of Özal and Menderes in order to support the central axis of the party. To persuade the Turkish voters, the prominent figures of the new political party frequently repeated that the JDP does not have any secret Islamist-oriented agenda. Furthermore, the party programs claimed that the secular political framework in Turkey would be perceived in a way that protected the freedom of Turkish citizens to choose and live their religion. In a similar manner, they suggested that the state should adopt a secular political system in order to guarantee its neutral position toward all its citizens.

Another major component of political endeavor of JDP was its effort to confine the Turkish military to its main role of defense and to prevent it from intervening into politics. To this end of weakening the hold of the military in politics

while increasing the power and authority of civilian authorities, JDP governments extensively implemented constitutional and other legal reforms in line with the European Union standards as demanded by the EU accession process.

3.2. THE STRATEGIC DEPTH DOCTRINE

Since its foundation the Republic of Turkey obtained significant achievements in its foreign policy and attained memberships in various important international institutions. However, it can also be claimed that Turkey was too reliant on its hard power and reluctant to take initiative. This situation started to change after the JDP government came into power in 2002. During the new government period, TFP underwent a period of change, and Turkey tried to return to the Middle East, Balkans and Eurasia regions as a stabilizing force with the intention of turning its past history with those regions from disadvantage to advantage. In this sense, it can be said that by using the strong position of being the ruling party, JDP tried to make a foreign policy revision, which could not be realized by its predecessors because of the political turmoil that occurred after the Cold War (Sayari 2000: 181-182). Another important point about JPD is the fact that it has an Islamic past and presents its vision of foreign policy as a critique of the foreign policy of the previous periods.

While considering JDP's ideas and practices regarding foreign policy, two leaders of the party stand out. One of them is Ahmet Davutoğlu who is the author of the Strategic Depth book, which constituted the theoretical basis of the foreign policy understanding of the party. In addition to his theoretical contributions, Davutoğlu also served as chief foreign policy adviser of the president, and Foreign Affairs Minister in the years between 2002 and 2011 before being appointed to the Prime Minister position in 2014. The other significant figure is the leader of the JDP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has deeply influenced Turkish domestic and foreign policy (Oran 2013, 130-132). In this work, the main focus will be on Ahmet Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth doctrine, and the new concepts and principles that the Strategic Depth brought to TFP since it constitutes the fundamentals of the change in the TFP. The bedrock assumptions and theoretical framework of the Strategic Depth concept

were discussed in the book which was entitled as "Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position" by Ahmet Davutoğlu in 2001. Therefore, we base our discussion on the doctrine by evaluating the framework introduced in this book. Strategic Depth doctrine provides the theoretical foundation of foreign policy vision of JDP. Under the guidance of Strategic Depth doctrine, JDP introduced new concepts and principles to TFP formation, such as the balance between security and democracy, zero problems with neighbors, proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy, multi-dimensional foreign policy and rhythmic diplomacy. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the concept of Strategic Depth in order to be able to make sense of the recent patterns in TFP.

The shift that the Strategic Depth brought to TFP was reflected in nearly all subcomponents of TFP and the main theme in this policy shift was the repositioning of Turkey in the global political, social and economic arenas with a special focus on eliminating the existing prejudices against Turkey. We might describe the new foreign policy framework as one with a greater emphasis on the solution-oriented mechanisms, political stability, peace enhancement, eliminating extremism and preventing terrorism. Moreover, the new paradigm encourages Turkey to play a leading role in the establishment of dialogue and a tolerance-based world.

Grigoriadis depicts the main axiom of Strategic Depth doctrine as the enhancement of the nation's prestige and impact on world politics by utilizing Turkey's geostrategic landing and historical linkages (Grigoriadis, 2010: 4). Walker stresses that historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey's control over the major strategic waterways and strategic landing are the major pillars of Strategic Depth doctrine (Walker 2007: 33). Walker also lists the major policy implications of the doctrine as follows: Firstly, Turkey should preserve its close ties with its traditional allies such as the United States and Europe while establishing multi-dimensional relations with its estranged neighbors such as Russia and Iran. Furthermore, Turkey should also establish good economic and political relations with newly emerging great powers like China and India in order to reduce the dependency of Turkey to the Western world. Secondly, Turkey should employ its Ottoman heritage and historical ties, and take greater responsibility for regional stability in the Middle East, Balkans, Caucus and Eurasia regions. And finally,

Turkey should also establish stronger relations with states located beyond the borders of the Ottoman Empire (Walker 2007: 34-44). The latter has already been observed in the foreign policy practices when JDP established versatile relations with countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, and acted as a role model for economies located in Central Asia.

Murinson stresses that the Strategic Depth doctrine emphasizes the geostrategic location of Turkey and implies that Turkey should pursue a multifaceted foreign policy rather than a one-sided policy approach. In particular, the foreign policy decision-making in Turkey should take the interactions amongst different basins into account (Murinson, 2006: 947-948). Furthermore, Strategic Depth doctrine implies that Turkey should refrain from acting as a representative of the West while formulating its foreign policy towards its close proximity. Instead, Turkey should promote its distinct characteristics such as being a secular and democratic state with a Muslim population. However, it should be emphasized that according to the Strategic Depth doctrine the foreign policy formation should not also be insensitive to the interests of the West (Murinson, 2006: 950-951).

3.2.1. Theoretical Framework of the Strategic Depth Doctrine

Davutoğlu suggests that he aimed to answer two questions while writing his work: (1) How can strategic analysis be achieved? and (2) How can we analyze Turkey's strategic depth? In his work, Davutoğlu regards the Strategic Depth as a strategic analysis of Turkey with emphasis on the international conjuncture and as a reassessment of Turkey's historical background and geographical position in the new global order (Davutoğlu 2002: 175).

In line with Davutoğlu's work, we might highlight the following points regarding the doctrine. First of all, the geopolitical position and historical ties of Turkey necessitates multilateral as well as bilateral foreign policy making (Davutoğlu 2002: 178-181). Moreover, the strong ties of Turkey with the countries within its proximity necessitates the involvement of Turkey in all sorts of social, economic and political developments, while doing so Turkey has to be in the center due to the strategic importance of its geography and historical heritage. Furthermore,

the doctrine necessitates Turkey to take an active role in regional developments in order to reduce the influence of other regional actors who are in pursuit of their own agendas. Being the main actor in defining regional policies would also help moderate the perception of Turkey as a representative of the West in the eyes of other regional actors. Therefore, the Strategic Depth doctrine urges Turkey to implement its own foreign policy design (Oğuzlu, 2009: 44).

Davutoğlu also indicates that Turkey should increase its economic interdependency in globally integrated economic and financial markets. In order to do that, Turkey should pursue economic policies and foreign policy practices towards the establishment of proper economic linkages with a diverse variety of economy actors outside the Cold War dynamics (Kirişçi, 2009: 42).

Finally, the doctrine targets Turkey to become a global actor rather than being a junior partner of Western states. To this end, Davutoğlu stresses that while formulating its foreign policy, the Turkish Republic should employ its historical and geographical characteristics in optimum efficiency while harmonizing them with its core values. Similarly, the negligence of Turkish history in foreign policy making is seen as a great failure by Davutoğlu since Turkey has long-lasting historical, cultural and economic ties beyond its current borderlines (Davutoğlu, 2013: 83-86).

Davutoğlu elaborates on an approach that should be utilized while conducting an analysis in the social sciences, namely the multi-dimensional process. The concept of the multi-dimensional process involves five steps which should be undertaken in order to design proper solutions for global problems. We might list these steps as (1) illustration, (2) explanation, (3) grasp, (4) signification, and (5) orientation. These steps are necessary to conduct proper scientific analysis together with designing realistic foreign policy frameworks. The illustration phase involves the depiction of international problem by employing necessary input variables in order to prevent any misperception or limitation on its scope. Thus, there is a need for a profound and meaningful screening of the historical and geopolitical inputs with scientific objectivity in order to grasp the actual roots of the regional problems and provide solutions. Moreover, inadequate illustration phase might also result in mistakes in the following phases of the multi-dimensional process. In the second phase, the explanation of the observed problem is to be done by determining its

causes. In the next stage of grasp, the input variables which were determined in the illustration phase are taken into a mental process to comprehend the mechanics behind the observed problem. In the fourth phase, the observed problem is analyzed with a proper theoretical framework implied by the abstraction done in the grasp phase. The last stage, orientation, refers to finding solutions to the problem in line with the previous stages of the multi-dimensional process. This stage enables the creation of guidelines for foreign policy practices targeting the resolution of the observed problem. Since the orientation stage is regarded as the result of all other phases and as the source of policy practices, the socio-political responsibility should be added as an input variable to the scientific facts determined in the previous four stages; thus, to some extent, this phase also includes subjectivity (Davutoğlu, 2001: 1-2).

While conducting analysis in social sciences, the multi-dimensional process prevents researchers from falling into mistakes by getting them focused on an immediate illustration of the current picture. One dimensional, independent and instant pictures of the observed problem might also result in a superficial analysis which neglects the time dimension. On the other hand, the multi-dimensional process provides means for the establishment of a meaningful theory-fact interaction within a broader perspective (Davutoğlu, 2001: 4).

In other words, we need pictures of the observed problem taken at different times in succession to establish the cause and effect relationship. To the extent that an analysis can show changes in the positions of actors in the pictures and demonstrate the phenomenon of change, it can be considered worthwhile and deep (Davutoğlu 2002: 175-176).

In addition to the multi-dimensional process, Davutoğlu suggests that an inter-disciplinary stance should be adopted. The inter-disciplinary stance in policy design implies the interaction and integration of various disciplines, such as political sociology, political history, economics, religious studies and politics in the design of policies targeting international relations. In other words, this principle argues that international issues often have economic, social, historical and political roots, and such reflection necessitates the incorporation of knowledge derived from various disciplines noted above while designing policies towards the resolution of those

issues. In other words, since the diplomatic steps are not efficient or effective on their own to resolve international problems, an inter-disciplinary perspective should be adopted in order to conduct precise and healthy analysis while determining and grasping the underlying roots of international problems (Davutoğlu, 2001: 1-6).

The intense historical ties with the countries in Turkey's proximity along with the geographical position of Turkey necessitate the implementation of strategic scope while determining the position of Turkey in the international arena. To this end, the Strategic Depth doctrine centers its focus on historical and geographical depth together with a multi-disciplinary analysis (Davutoğlu, 2001: 6-8).

Moreover, Davutoğlu suggests that there are three options for societies that find themselves in a dynamic process of change within a dynamic international system. The first option is to adopt a static attitude that limits its own dynamism and to wait for the passage of the dynamism in the international system. States that choose to follow this path put aside their identity until the international system stabilizes. Davutoğlu considers this path as an option for societies that lack self-confidence to transform their potential dynamism into power parameters. The second option is to be carried away by the dynamism of the international system without making sense of the power elements in its own dynamism. This path is considered as a path for those societies that failed to identify themselves as a subject in history and instead chose to be carried by the flow of history. The third path is to transform its potential dynamism into a force parameter in the international arena. This choice is for the societies that can illustrate, explain and understand the sources and mechanisms of both internal and external dynamisms (Davutoğlu, 2001: 10).

In this context, Davutoğlu states that Turkey should choose the third path and integrate its historical and geographic depth with a rational strategic planning, and turn the aforementioned bi-directional dynamism into an opportunity (Davutoğlu, 2001: 11).

Strategic Depth also provides crucial insights about the theoretical orientation of Davutoğlu as it presents power as the core input in foreign policy design. This can be seen as an indicator of the Realist elements in Davutoğlu's approach (Davutoğlu, 2001: 16-17).

Davutoğlu establishes that the power parameters of a country are not independent from one another; they are dynamic elements that affect one another. Then he defines the components of power as (1) stable and (2) potential components, and also adds two more subcomponents to power parameters: (1) the strategic mindset and (2) the strategical planning and political will. These subcomponents are linked with stable and potential power parameters. While stable and potential power has a cumulative effect, those subcomponents have a multiplier impact on power. Stable power is added to potential power and then multiplied with the subcomponents. Thus, if the subcomponent is in a negative state, the result of calculation will be negative too (Davutoğlu, 2001: 34).

The stable parameters refer to constant components such as culture, history, and geography. In this context Davutoğlu introduces two more distinct concepts, namely, the boundary and the frontier. Boundary depicts the legal borders of a country, whereas frontier refers to the geographical space where people with historical ties live and which is likely to extend beyond the boundary. When the frontier and the boundary do not coincide, there is a high possibility of observing tensions/conflicts amongst countries in that zone (Davutoğlu, 2001: 17-20).

Another concept that is mentioned under the stable parameters by Davutoğlu is the land basin, which depicts the strategic region formed as a result of the intersection of multiple frontiers with political, economic and cultural links. However, the perception of the land basin by regional economies should be parallel. Otherwise, there is a high possibility of struggles and tensions amongst land basin countries (Davutoğlu, 2001: 21-22).

As highlighted by Davutoğlu, even if the stable parameters of power are fixed for countries, there is a possibility of reevaluating them. The conjunctural developments in global arena in particular might provide great opportunities for such a reevaluation (Davutoğlu, 2001: 23).

On the other hand, potential power parameters refer to the factors with fluctuating variables and might be listed as military, economic and technological capabilities of states. These variables determine the potential power of a state in the short term. In other words, potential power parameters represent states' immediate capabilities. Davutoğlu argues that countries have the capability to improve their

potential power parameters in the short and medium terms. There is a need for coordinated and efficient foreign policy planning in order to improve a state's power in the international arena; failure to do so may lead to the weakening of state in the international arena (Davutoğlu, 2001: 24).

The first subcomponent of the power parameters is the strategic mindset, which is defined as the common sense in a society regarding the place, identity and time. These common perceptions are determined through the stable power parameters and reflect the viewpoint of the society about their position in the world (Davutoğlu, 2001: 29). Davutoğlu states that even if one can develop the best strategies in the world, those strategies can only be implemented by a strategic mindset (Davutoğlu, 2002: 188).

Secondly, strategic planning and political will includes the formulation of short-term oriented tactics and long-term strategies in line with the countries' foreign policy targets. Davutoğlu claims that the countries that pursue a passive foreign policy due to the lack of political will are doomed to be controlled by the conjunctural fluctuations. Conversely, the countries that can follow a flexible and adaptable short-term policy together with a well-designed framework shall enhance their potential power and be able to attain their long-term targets (Davutoğlu, 2001: 31-34).

In short, on the one hand, good political planning combined with political will might elevate a country with weak stable and potential components of power above its potential. On the other hand, inconsistent strategic planning and weak political will might cause a country with strong stable and potential components of power to attain a power position at levels lower than its potential.

Amongst the aforementioned components of potential power, Davutoğlu highlights the human element. He claims that even though countries cannot change their geographical location or history, they can change their human capital. Qualified human capital constitutes the main element that the steady political will can transform into a power parameter by taking the decisive initiatives. To eliminate the negative impact of strategically inadequate mindset in policy design and to prevent potential wastes in power components, there is a need for well-educated human capital. Moreover, states should also ensure that they possess viable strategic

planning and a mindset to optimize the outcome of political initiatives (Davutoğlu, 2001: 34-37).

To sum up, as discussed above, the main components of a nation's foreign policy framework are stable and potential power parameters. Only when these parameters are analyzed and employed properly in foreign policy formation, the country might be able to take effective steps in its foreign policy.

Davutoğlu also emphasizes that a close coordination between strategic planning and power parameters is needed in order to implement long-term foreign policy strategies. To this end, he also highlights the importance of political stability and of powerful governments, which can be attained either through strong coalitions or single-party governments. The weak short-term coalition governments are not capable of making consistent long-term strategic planning. At the same time, there is a need for close coordination and communication between the political figures and the bureaucratic staff to create and sustain strong political will (Davutoğlu, 2001: 46-47).

Davutoğlu evaluates Turkish foreign policy in line with the theoretical framework of Strategic Depth doctrine and finds the traditional foreign policy making to be deficient in strategic mindset, strategic planning, and political will. He puts forward three main reasons for this. Firstly, he believes that Turkey does not have the required institutional and structural infrastructure to produce a strategic theory. Furthermore, he argues that since institutional and structural framework has the main responsibility in designing foreign policy, the bureaucratic and formal structures should refrain from implementing short-term oriented policies characterized by ideological concerns. Similarly, he states that foreign policy should be implemented with a strategic outlook; routine formalities, he argues, might block the formation of strategic thought and alternatives in accordance with the needs of the rapidly changing international politics. Moreover, the institutional, historical and identity-based differences in domestic society should not be a burden on strategic thinking. Relatedly, Davutoğlu places great emphasis on the establishment of an institutional infrastructure based on independent research centers and universities, which produce strategic thinking. (Davutoğlu, 2001: 45-51).

Secondly, Davutoğlu argues that Turkey's political stance in the international arena was dominated by existential concerns and threat perceptions. Consequently, this burden of self-defense negatively impacted the strategic thought in Turkey. He suggests that in order to create ideal conditions for strategic thinking, Turkey should give up ideological and threat-based approaches and instead utilize its historical and cultural ties with the surrounding regions (Davutoğlu, 2001: 52-58). In other words, for a long time, Turkey tried to design its foreign policy by focusing on its survival rather than following an active foreign policy based on the pursuit of exploitation of the opportunities.

Thirdly, Davutoğlu mentions about an insufficiency in strategic thinking due to the damaged state of strategic consciousness of Turkey. He explains this situation with a psychological phenomenon described as 'the divided self' which occurs when the ties between a person's body and ego are damaged. Davutoğlu identifies the disregard towards the historical roots of the Ottoman Empire as the main cause of the disturbed state of the strategic consciousness. For that reason, the Strategic Depth doctrine advocates an attitude against the self-alienation of Turkish society towards its historical roots. Moreover, Davutoğlu claims that Turkey failed to utilize its shared historical ties with the surrounding regions and advises to refrain from employing ideologically motivated approaches. Otherwise, there is a risk of losing strategic frontier advantages that can be derived from the esteemed historical ties. Thus, strategic thinking has to be restored through the revision of domestic dynamics to establish a stable working ground for foreign policy making (Davutoğlu, 2001: 59-61).

3.2.2. Reassessment of Turkey's Place in the International System

The doctrine draws attention to two additional requirements for Turkey to realize its strategic depth. The first one is a dynamic reassessment of the stable power parameters in order to reveal the actual potential of the country in foreign policy activities. The second requirement is the establishment of domestic political stability and peace, and the transformation of the stable and the potential power parameters into active policy basis in order to attain a multi-dimensional foreign

policy formation. Davutoğlu argues that in the early years of the republic, Turkey assessed its historical roots as threats to its new state building and disregarded the ties with the Ottoman Empire. This interruption of historical continuum prevented the establishment of proper identity awareness within the new nation-state. The identity problem resulted in negligence towards the regional developments and reluctance to take the initiative while formulating the TFP. In the long-term this negligence damaged Turkey's historical and cultural ties with its surrounding regions (Davutoğlu, 2001: 69-70).

In order to utilize its strategic depth, Turkey should reevaluate its stable power parameters because stable data does not mean static data; even if stable power parameters do not change, they might be reinterpreted when there is a change in time and space dimensions. The Strategic Depth doctrine highlights the need for transformation of institutional, historical and identity-based power sources into efficiently used parameters to construct an adaptable foreign policy framework (Davutoğlu, 2002: 181-182).

For instance, during the Cold War period, the Anatolian geography was regarded as the 'Turkish Barrier' in the NATO records. This assessment might be correct for that time and place because back then Turkey constituted a barrier between Europe and the U.S.S.R., but one cannot say the same for today's Anatolian geography. If one thinks with the Cold War mentality and still considers Turkey as a barrier in the contemporary world, it means that s/he failed to reinterpret the stable power parameters since, in today's world, Anatolian geography can be seen as a geography with a huge potential for regional integration projects. As a result, Turkey's stable power parameters must be reinterpreted in accordance with changes in time and space (Davutoğlu, 2002: 182).

In order to make such reinterpretation possible Davutoğlu introduces two subcomponents to the Strategic Depth, namely (1) the historical depth and (2) the geographical depth. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey has a historical depth because the histories of Central Asia, Balkans and Caucasus geography cannot be interpreted without internalizing the history of Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. As for Turkey's geographical depth, on the other hand, Turkey has borders with many

countries and is located between the Eastern and the Western worlds (Davutoğlu, 2013: 150).

As for the historical depth, historical assets provide unique opportunities and responsibilities for countries. Even if the history of a country is not changeable, there is a possibility of reinterpretation of history, which might change the natural sphere of influence for the country in its foreign policy activities. Also, voluntary alienation from the surrounding regions and the historical roots and the consequent one-dimensional foreign policy with a static framework might result in socio-political inconsistencies and instabilities in a country. The second subcomponent is the geographical depth, which defines the unique strategic position of a country and constitutes its core power parameter. The proximity of a country to socio-political and economic centers, such as canals, corridors, and zones with natural resources, depicts and determines the geopolitical aspect of its strategic depth (Davutoğlu, 2013: 150). The geopolitical positioning should not be regarded as a tool for maintaining the status quo and border security. Instead, geopolitical positioning should be seen as an instrument, which can provide means to carry countries from local level to global stage and present opportunities while they are formulating their foreign policy strategies. The prior condition for the shift from local to global stage is the use of geopolitics within a dynamic framework while conducting international economic, political and security-based relations (Davutoğlu, 2001: 117).

Davutoğlu introduces three geographical areas of influence for Turkey: (1) near land basin (2) near maritime basin and (3) near continental basin. Davutoğlu defines the near land basin as the country's natural areas of influence in line with the country's historical ties and geographical location. For Turkey, the near land basin refers to the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus regions. The near maritime basin for Turkey refers to the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf, and the Caspian regions. The near continental basin for Turkey refers to Europe, Northern Africa, Southern Asia, Middle Asia, and Eastern Asia (Davutoğlu, 2001: 118).

Davutoğlu suggests that if Turkey can take advantage of the permeability and interdependency between these regions, it can avoid being a passive element of the international system. Moreover, he argues that regional cooperation and integration

should be established in order to guarantee the existence of a widespread network with an optimum diversity, depth of cooperation and harmony (Davutoğlu, 2001: 118).

3.2.3. The Core Principles of the Strategic Depth Doctrine

This work proposes that Turkish foreign policy has entered into a process of transformation after 2002 and the Strategic Depth doctrine has been the ideological guideline for JDP in its foreign policy formulation. Accordingly, this part of the paper will discuss the new principles introduced to the TFP by the Strategic Depth. New TFP formulation can be analyzed under three methodological and five operational components according to Davutoğlu. The methodological components are described as (1) visionary approach, (2) consistent and systematic foreign framework and (3) adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style (Davutoğlu, 2010b).

Firstly, the visionary approach implies that the Turkish Republic should employ its unique understanding of regions in foreign policymaking rather than focusing on one dimension of the regional problems with a reactive manner. For instance, Turkey should not limit its relations with the Middle East on the basis of the fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party. The second methodological principle of designing a consistent and systematic foreign framework implies that Turkey should adopt a coherent and standardized foreign policy regardless of the targeted region. Furthermore, in order to prevent any inconsistency, the policies implemented in different regions of the world should not contradict one another. For instance, the TFP behavior towards the Eurasia region should not contradict with the TFP practices towards the Middle East or the Balkans. The last methodological principle of adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style implies that even though Turkey possesses one of the mightiest armies in its close proximity, it should not rely only on its hard power. Instead, Turkey should establish a new foreign policy dialect and increase the volume of soft power practices in regional and international politics (Davutoğlu, 2010b).

The five operational principles of the Strategic Depth, which were to guide the foreign policy, might be listed as follows: (1) the balance between security and democracy, (2) zero problems towards neighbors, (3) developing relations with the neighboring regions and beyond, (4) multi-dimensional foreign policy, and (5) rhythmic diplomacy (Davutoğlu, 2008: 79-83).

The first operational principle, the balance between security and democracy, suggests that Turkey should strike a balance between democracy and security since the legitimacy of any political system originates from its ability to sustain freedom and security within its territory. Therefore, Turkey should follow a policy that places greater emphasis on sustaining human rights while protecting the domestic and regional security. (Davutoğlu, 2008: 79-80).

The second operational principle of zero-problems with neighbors, which was a crucial component and the backbone of TFP under the JDP governments, implies the importance of foreign policy practices that promote minimum or zero tension amongst the countries that are located in Turkey's close neighborhood. The main rationale behind this principle is to establish a peaceful foreign policy environment within the close vicinity of Turkey in order to eliminate the economic and social burdens of all forms of regional disputes. Davutoğlu suggests that when there is peace in the region mutual relations between regional economies flourishes with an increase in interdependency. To this end, Turkey is in need of being an active participant in regional politics in order to maximize the impact of its foreign policy rather than sticking with the Cold War strategies. In addition to that, intense cooperation amongst the regional powers would increase regional welfare as a whole (Davutoğlu, 2008: 81).

The third operational principle of TFP is to develop relations with the neighboring regions and beyond. This principle implies that Turkey should not limit its foreign policy practices only to its neighbors and rather be active in all regions of the world. Davutoğlu claims that Turkey's regional influence extends to the regions of Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East. He proposes that Turkey should follow an active foreign policy by developing a high level of dialogue, economic and social integration, and mutual respect with its foreign policy partners in all regions (Davutoğlu, 2008: 81).

Furthermore, the above-mentioned principle also suggests that Turkey's national interests require the effective use of its geographical position since Turkey is a growing economy that is surrounded by regions with immense energy resources (Davutoğlu, 2008: 91-92). Consequently, while developing relations with neighboring regions, Turkey should take advantage of its geography and act as a transit country for energy sources. In addition to that, Davutoğlu believes that, instead of remaining passive to regional developments, Turkey should utilize its positive relations with neighboring regions and act as a mediator in times of crises to increase its influence even more (Davutoğlu, 2008: 81-82).

Davutoğlu elaborates on the mediation efforts of TFP in the last decade as follows; "Turkey is one of those countries which actively pursue peaceful settlement of conflicts through mediation. Within the last ten years, we have undertaken many mediation and facilitation efforts in a wide geography ranging from Balkans to the Middle East, from Africa to Central Asia." (Davutoğlu 2012)

The fourth operational principle of adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy suggests making foreign policy in a manner that ensures that the policies adopted by Turkey towards international actors and organizations complement rather than compete with one another. In other words, Turkey should seek to establish meaningful and complementary relations with multiple international actors and organizations such as NATO, EU and Russia (Davutoğlu, 2010b).

The last operational principle of the new TFP is the reliance on rhythmic diplomacy while conducting international relations. To achieve rhythmic diplomacy, Turkey should play an active role and take significant diplomatic initiatives while conducting its international relations (Davutoğlu, 2010b). The active role in question also involves being an active and dynamic actor in international organizations and platforms in order to become an actor on global issues (Davutoğlu, 2008: 82-83).

3.3. FOREIGN POLICY PRACTICES OF STRATEGIC DEPTH DOCTRINE IN EURASIA REGION

In this section, Hermann's typology on foreign policy change is going to be applied to the TFP towards the Eurasia region between the years of 2002 and 2011, and the process of change in TFP is going to be analyzed.

3.3.1. Change in Turkish Foreign Policy

Hermann classifies foreign policy change as (1) adjustment changes, (2) program changes, (3) problem and goal changes, and (4) international orientation changes (Hermann, 1990: 5-6). In case of the TFP towards Eurasia region, this work argues that the change in the TFP towards Eurasia region between the years of 2002 and 2011 can be regarded as an adjustment change. Adjustment change category refers to a change in the level of effort while the modes and the way that foreign policy is conducted stay the same. In this respect increase in TFP activism towards Eurasia region can be seen as an adjustment change (Altunışık and Martin, 2011: 570-571). Furthermore, the fact that the active and multifaceted foreign policy initiatives in JDP period were introduced to TFP by Özal in the post-Cold War period shows that the foundation of this activism was laid in the 1990s (Kaya, 2015: 15). It can also be claimed that the new geographical perspective which can be regarded as the groundwork of the Strategic Depth doctrine was first introduced to TFP by Cem in the late 1990s (Bilgin and Bilgiç, 2011: 191). So, it can be suggested that the change in the TFP started in the eras of Özal and Cem, and gained momentum under the Strategic Depth.

In this context, this work argues that Turkey's fundamental foreign policy methods, objectives, and international orientation did not change; the change in foreign policy occurred as a result of the new vision and the mindset introduced by the Strategic Depth doctrine. Compared to the previous periods, Davutoğlu's period gave importance to the adoption of a more active foreign policy framework, development of multi-dimensional relations, increasing the economic interdependency and utilization soft power practices (Kaya, 2015:3).

Before elaborating on the adjustment changes, one needs to explain why the other three categories are not fit to explain the change in TFP. Firstly, under the program change category, foreign policy changes are made in methods or tools used in foreign policy. In other words, the main purpose of foreign policy does not change; only foreign policy practices change. Moreover, program changes refer to qualitative changes. For instance, the use of soft power instead of hard power in order to achieve foreign policy targets can be regarded as an example of program change (Hermann, 1990: 5-6).

After the disintegration of the Soviet Regime, the prospect of a Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China became the subject of a new debate in Turkish politics and media. There were many reasons behind the interest for potential convergence with the peoples of Central Asia, from where the Anatolian Turks had migrated a long time ago. After the end of the Cold War, Turkish policymakers believed that Turkey's strategic value to the U.S. declined. In addition to that, Turkey's full membership application to the EU was rejected. The creation of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and a renewed focus on the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) might be perceived as a sign of Turkey's aim of integrating Eurasia to its foreign policy horizon (Aras and Fidan: 2009: 200).

The Central Asia policies of the U.S. and Turkey largely overlapped in the 1990s since both sides intended to balance the influence of Russia and Iran in the region. The U.S. policy towards Central Asia made it easier for Turkey to adapt to the new geopolitical reality.

In the 1991-1995 period, in order to replace the U.S.S.R.'s place in the Central Asia, Turkey followed an active policy at the expense of Russia, and at times even intended to break the Russian influence in the region. Turkey's efforts to become a model and leader in the region, along with its being the first country to recognize the newly independent Turkic countries in Central Asia (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) can be seen as examples of that active policy. In the same period, Turkey also pursued an unplanned and impulsive foreign policy with a Turanist rhetoric, which was accompanied by excitement for change in the region (Denizhan, 2010: 18).

Tüfekcioglu describes Turkey's relations with the newly independent countries in Eurasia during the early 1990s as unrealistic and romantic. He suggests that the relationship started in a romantic manner and was not later supported by realist foreign policy practices, which led to certain unwanted consequences for both sides The romantic approach, which was naturally shaped around kinship and brotherhood-related concepts at the beginning, became abstract and turned into political slogans without the support of tangible and visible works. As a result, they created an antipathy against Turkey in the newly independent Turkic states and became detrimental to the further development of transnational relations (Tüfekçioğlu and Aydıngün, 2012: 51-68).

The 1990 and 2001 economic crises prevented the strengthening of economic ties with the Eurasia region and also resulted in the failure of Turkey to become a model country. Thus, Turkey's interest in the Central Asian countries decreased rapidly since the late 1990s (Aras and Fidan: 2009: 201).

Under JDP, interest towards the Eurasia region flared up again when JDP started to emphasize economic cooperation together with social and cultural integration with the region (Denizhan, 2010: 22).

An analysis, which does not overlook the coexistence of change and continuity in TFP, should realize that the active, multi-dimensional and integration policy of the JDP period is actually a deepening and reinforcement of the foreign policy approach initiated by Turgut Özal and İsmail Cem with the utilization of new opportunities presented by the country's emerging economy.

In light of the aforementioned facts, one cannot claim that the TFP towards Eurasia region experienced a program change since the methods and tools used in order to achieve the foreign policy goals did not change, only the level of effort dedicated to foreign policy practices changed. In this regard, there was continuity in the main purpose of TFP.

Secondly, in Hermann's category of problem and goal change, aims and targets of foreign policy change (Hermann, 1990: 5). Altunışık and Martin identified a goal and program change in TFP and claimed that Turkey expanded its sphere of influence to the Middle East and Balkans regions and tried to form deeper relations with the countries in those regions with the intention of attaining regional leadership.

Aspiration towards regional leadership can be seen as a goal change in TFP, yet that change was limited to the Middle East and Balkans regions (Altunışık and Martin, 2011: 570).

In the case of Eurasia, it can be claimed that the goals like attaining regional leadership, ensuring regional stability and prosperity, and balancing the influence of other regional actors in the region were set right after the end of the Cold War, primarily in Özal and Cem eras. Consequently, this study argues that there was continuity in the TFP towards Eurasia in the context of foreign policy problems and goals. In other words, elements of continuity in TFP towards Eurasia region does not allow one to suggest that there was a change in foreign policy problems or goals.

Lastly, international orientation change category is the most intense level of foreign policy change and refers to redirection of foreign policy orientation and structural change in the country's self-identification and role in the international arena (Hermann, 1990: 5-6).

Altunışık and Martin analyzed the orientation change claims and concluded that even if the improvement in relations with Iran and the deterioration of relations with Israel might be considered as minor changes in international orientation, they do not provide enough evidence to propose that Turkey went through a full orientation change (Altunışık and Martin, 2011: 571-572).

In addition to that, the West had been the traditional ally of Turkish Republic since its foundation; consequently, while making an analysis on Turkey's foreign policy orientation, the main focus should be on the relations with the West.

Under the leadership of JDP governments, while Turkey started to behave more independently and to position itself separate from the great powers such as the U.S. and the EU, it is yet difficult to talk about an orientation change since Turkey continued to have institutional ties and various kinds of relations with the West.

As mentioned previously Öniş and Yilmaz proposes three different stages in the post-Cold War TFP: (1) the first wave of activism in the immediate post-Cold War context, (2) second wave of foreign policy activism with substantial emphasis on Europeanization during the JDP rule, and (3) the contemporary tension between Europeanization and Eurasianism (Öniş and Yilmaz, 2009: 1).

We can identify the second stage as the first tenure of the JDP, where the relations with the EU constituted the core of the TFP formulation. In this period Turkey presented its geopolitical position as a strategic advantage and its Muslim population as a potential cultural tool that could repair the Christian Club image of EU in order to speed up its own integration process with the EU (Aka, 2014: 65).

In addition to the EU, relations with the U.S. were also given importance by JDP officials. Davutoğlu emphasizes the importance of a modelled partnership with the U.S. as follows:

> *Modelled partnership means it is not an ordinary strategic partnership, something special. Why do we have such special character in our relations? Then we have to identify the uniqueness of the United States and the uniqueness of Turkey and the uniqueness of these relations that it is a model. The uniqueness of the United States in human history is the United States is the first global power in human history which emerged far away from Africa or Asia, which is the main land of human history* (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010).

As one can deduct from Davutoğlu's speech, undoubtedly the U.S. was still a part of the Western orientation of TFP in the second stage of post-Cold War TFP.

The second tenure of JDP can be regarded as the third stage of post-Cold War TFP. This stage was dominated by the tension between the Europeanization and the Eurasianism, and led to the shift of axis discussions in Turkey. Even though there was an observable deceleration on the West-Turkey relations due to the problems on several fronts, it is hard to claim that Turkey substituted its Western orientation with Eurasianism as Turkey's relations with the West, institutional and non-institutional, were maintained, though significantly in a much weaker form and level.

Moreover, orientation change claims for the period of 2007-2011 can be refuted on the basis of Realism's core assumptions. Realists suggest that security is the most important topic of foreign policy and all economic, social and cultural issues are secondary to it (Arı, 1996: 102). Turkey continued to cooperate closely with NATO on matters of security. For instance, Turkey expressed its commitment to NATO for defense and deterrence when it accepted the installation of NATO missile defense shield on Kürecik, Malatya (Reuters, 2010).

Even if Turkey started to have closer economic, social and cultural relations with Eurasia region in that period, its security remained dependent on the West.

Consequently, we can claim that changes in Turkey's external relations were not sufficient to suggest that there was an international orientation change between 2002 and 2011 on the basis of Hermann's categorization. As a result, the answer to the oft-asked question of 'was there an axis change in Turkish Foreign Policy?' is simply no, since Turkey did not change its orientation and continued to have strong connections with the West especially on defense and security.

Öniş and Yilmaz described this subtle change in TFP as 'Soft-Eurasianism', a mixture of Westernism and Eurasianism, and claimed that the relations with West might be looser, but they still persisted (Öniş and Yilmaz, 2009: 11-12). On the one hand, Turkey tried to reconcile its European orientation with the new trend towards Eurasianism while Eurasianism became a major part of TFP formulation between 2007-2011. On the other hand, the West remained as an important determinant in the making of TFP especially on security and defense matters.

Furthermore, while the foreign policy of the 1990s was indexed to security and fighting against PKK terrorism, the policy of zero problems with neighbors redefined national security around regional economic integration and active peace (Duran, 2011: 19).

Kaya (2015) mentions that Turkish foreign policy began to experience significant changes with JDP coming to power after the 3 November 2002 elections. He claims, however, that the change in Turkish foreign policy with the JDP period reflects a program change rather than an axis or program change. In this context, it has been highlighted that Turkey's international tendencies in its foreign policy goals did not change, while the real change was associated with the introduction of new tools and methods in foreign policy.

Balcı (2010) also stated that there was no axis change in Turkey's foreign policy but he is of the opinion that this is because Turkey had no axis, and Turkey had been in a process of successful change. Çandar (2010) also emphasized the absence of an axis change in Turkey's foreign policy. Ülsever (2010) was one of people who did not share that opinion, and argued that Turkey's foreign policy changed but this was not an axis change. Kohen (2010) mentioned that the change in Turkey's foreign policy was regarded as axis change by Western circles. Birand

(2010), on the other hand, explained that there were not many developments related to axis change, and therefore no axis change in Turkey's foreign policy.

Next section of this work is going to elaborate on the TFP change towards the Eurasia region in line with the adjustment change category of Hermann.

3.3.2 .Adjustment Changes in TFP Toward Eurasia Region

Hermann identifies two types of adjustment changes: (1) change in the level of effort and (2) alteration of the main recipients of foreign policy. In case of Eurasia, one can identify a continuity in foreign policy recipients, because the geographical area defined as the Eurasian Balkans by Brzezinski which includes nine countries, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Afghanistan continued to be the main recipients of TFP also in the new era (Brzezinski, 1997: 123-125). Yet one can suggest that there is a change in the level of effort concerning economic, social and cultural activities as TFP targeted the same Turkic Central Asian countries with a greater aspiration.

In order to identify the change in the level of effort, this work elaborates on Turkey's main soft power tool in Eurasia region, namely the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TCCA) (*Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı*, *TIKA*) and suggests that TFP shifted towards a deeper engagement with Eurasia region in terms of economic, social and cultural activities.

Six of the fifteen republics that gained their independence with the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. were Muslim countries. In addition to that, five of those republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) were called the Turkic Republics. Turkey has welcomed the emergence of the new republics and considered the presence of common origin, cultural affinity, and linguistic ties as an advantage (Bal, 2006: 397).

TIKA was founded in 1992 during Özal's rule as a technical assistance organization under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The aim of the organization was to carry out economic, social and cultural activities in the countries where the Turkish language was spoken.

Adıyaman lists tasks of TIKA in Eurasia region as follows:

a. Developing cooperation with emerging Central Asian countries through projects which will contribute to the development of these countries.

b. To determine the cooperation and aid issues by taking the development goals and needs of these countries into consideration and to prepare necessary projects and programs for this purpose.

c. Providing assistance in the development of independent state structures, preparation of legislation, training of civil servants, and provision of assistance for the transition process to free market economy, especially in areas of banking, insurance, foreign trade, budget, and tax system. Sending experts to these countries and making the necessary arrangements for the provision of internships and scholarships for the education of civil servants and students from Central Asian countries.

d. Making necessary arrangements for the implementation of the cooperation programs in the fields of education and culture through Turkish cultural centers abroad.

e. To provide the necessary cooperation and coordination with other public institutions and organizations in matters related to the main services and duties of TIKA (Adıyaman, 2011).

When one looks at the years following the organization's establishment, it is noticed that there was a difficulty in finding resources for TIKA's activities due to the economic downturn in Turkey. Moreover, bureaucratic struggles within the institution also kept TIKA from realizing activities in with line with its establishment purpose. As a result, TIKA could not make a huge impact on the region until 1995. After 1995, TIKA intensified its activities in the region particularly with regards to educational and cultural cooperation by opening schools and cultural centers and allocating scholarships to citizens of Turkic Republics to help them receive higher education in Turkey. In addition to these developments, in order to meet the energy needs of Turkey, construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project started in this period (Denizhan, 2010: 21).

Within Cem's tenure as Foreign Affairs Minister, TIKA underwent a structural transformation process. In 1999, TIKA first became a state ministry- and

then a Prime Ministry-affiliated entity in 2001. TIKA became one of Turkey's top institutions that provided policy coordination between institutions with the ability to act independently from the state bureaucracy. While the 1990s resulted in significant changes in TIKA, JDP rule in the 2000s transformed it further. Even if the successive political and economic crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s led to a decrease in the intensity of Turkey's policy towards the Eurasia region, with the emergence of JDP in the Turkish political scene, Turkey intensified its relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia again (Denizhan, 2010: 22).

3.3.3. Impact of the Strategic Depth Doctrine on the Foreign Policy Towards Eurasia Region: TIKA's Activism

The intensification of relations with the Eurasia region can be seen as a reflection of some of the methodological and the operational components of the Strategic Depth doctrine. To repeat, those components are (1) visionary approach, (2) consistent and systematic foreign framework, and (3) adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style.

Firstly, the visionary approach implies that, while formulating its foreign policy, Turkey should employ its unique perspective of regions and leave reactive foreign policy formulation of the Cold War era behind. For instance, Turkey's vision for the Eurasia region cannot be reduced to the level of a political alliance of Turkic people on the basis of ethnicity. Under the guidance of the visionary approach, Turkey reinterpreted its place in the region in accordance with the structural historical developments and tried to attain regional leadership through economic, cultural and political integration (Davutoğlu, 2010b). Consequently, we can claim that the visionary approach is one of the main pillars of the adjustment change in TFP towards Eurasia region.

Secondly, consistent and systematic foreign framework suggests that Turkey should follow a coherent and continuous foreign policy pattern regardless of the target region of foreign policy practices (Davutoğlu, 2010b). Throughout the 1990s, Turkey's relations with the Eurasia region were not coherent or continuous.

In the 1990s, Turkish politicians gave big promises to the newly independent Turkic states and mostly failed to keep their promises mainly due to the economic crises and fluctuating coalition governments. This kind of fluctuating relationship diminishes the effectiveness of the foreign policy and parties tend to reset their relationship and start from scratch when there is a hiatus period in the relationship. In other words, Turkey's relations with the Eurasia region kept getting interrupted before Turkey reaped the benefits of its foreign policy and investments. Davutoğlu argues that coherent and continuous foreign policy causes the relationship between countries to increase exponentially (Davutoğlu, 2010b).

Analogy of a chain reaction can be used to explain this. Like chemical reaction causing another chemical reaction, in foreign policy practices, increase in cooperation in one area usually triggers cooperation in another area. So, when the relations are coherent and continuous, they will keep triggering cooperation in new areas and increasing interdependence. Recently, Turkey tried to utilize short-term tactics and long-term strategies in a coherent and continuous manner to achieve long-term strategic ends.

Figure 1: Comparison of Turkey's Development Assistance Between Years of 2002-2011.


Source: TİKA 2012: 20. [1]

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[1] Analytical data prior to 2002 cannot be attained in a healthy manner since the TIKA started to share its data on annual development aid provided by Turkey in 2005, after the task of reporting and

Impact of the consistent and systematic foreign policy framework principle can be seen in the recent adjustment change made by Turkey with a view to increasing its influence in the Eurasia region. Figure 1 empirically reinforces the claims about the impact of the utilization of coherent and continuous foreign policy applications. Turkey's official development assistance to all regions grew gradually without any interruption or hiatus period. Moreover, when the data in Figure 1 is integrated with the statistics in Figure 2, it is seen that the Eurasia region was no exception to this upward trend in the foreign development assistance provided by Turkey.

Thirdly, the adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style principle refers to relying on soft power tools over hard power tools. JDP focused on increasing the intensity of economic, social and cultural relations in Eurasia region in accordance with the adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style principle. In addition to that, JDP also concentrated its efforts towards promoting economic interdependence of the region and regional cooperation (Davutoğlu, 2010b).

Figure 2: Turkey's Official Development Assistance to South and Central Asia Between Years of 2005-2011.

Source: TİKA 2006: 31, TİKA 2010: 34, TİKA 2011: 50 and TİKA 2012: 80.

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keeping the inventory of development aids was transferred to the Turkish Cooperation and Development Administration (TIKA) with the Prime Ministry Circular No. 2005/11.

As can be seen from the figure one, the amount of the official development aid provided to less developed countries by Turkey, which was around 80 million dollars until the end of 2003, significantly increased over the years under the JDP rule (Adıyaman, 2011). After comparing the figure 1 and figure 2, one comes to the conclusion that as it was in the 1990s, the South and Central Asia were still the main beneficiaries of the Turkish official development assistance under the JDP governments.[2]

Consequently, the figures 1 and 2 provide us with the empirical evidence and support this research's claim that there was a steady increase in terms of the foreign policy practices as far as the utilization of the soft power is concerned before (during the tenures of Özal and Cem) and under the JDP governments. In other words, TFP went through an adjustment change since there was no alteration in the methods or tools used in TFP, only the level of effort given to the soft power practices such as foreign aid significantly increased under JDP rule.

Figure one shows a massive upsurge in the official development aid rates after 2005. This increase can be attributed to the change in TIKA's scope of authority. In 2005, TIKA was equipped with new powers, which authorized it to find funding for foreign aid and determine where to transfer these funds. As a result, Turkey's official development assistance exponentially increased over the years and rose to 1273 million dollars in 2011 (Adıyaman, 2011).

To make the difference clearer, between 2002-2011 while total official development assistance provided by OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries increased slightly more than twofold (from 58.6 billion dollars to 135.1 billion dollars), official development assistance provided by Turkey increased more than sixteen times (from 72.96 million dollars to 1273 million dollars) (OECD, 2019). In addition to that, when the official development assistance provided by TIKA to all regions between 2002-2011 is compared on a yearly basis, Africa stands out as the region with the highest proportional increase. Yet this situation might be attributed to the fact that Africa region was a new target of focus for Turkey. In 2011, Turkey's official development assistance to Africa, which was 0.1 million

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[2] Between 1992-2002, with the exception of 1999, the South and Central Asia was the top recipient of Turkey's official development assistance (OECD, 2019).

dollars at 2002, rose to 270 million dollars. In the same period Turkey's official development assistance to South and Central Asia region increased from 12 million dollars to 566 million dollars. When the aforementioned data is combined, it can be suggested that even if the official development assistance provided to Africa rapidly increased, total official development assistance provided to Africa region is still less than half of the development assistance provided to South and Central Asia region (OECD, 2019).

As for the operational components of the Strategic Depth doctrine, one can observe the impact of following components on the adjustment change towards Eurasia region: (1) developing relations with the neighboring regions and beyond, (2) rhythmic diplomacy, and (3) adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy.

Firstly, developing relations with the neighboring regions and beyond principle suggests that Turkey should not limit its foreign policy practices with any border or geographical frontier. Instead, Turkey should have a foreign policy towards all regions of the world. In light of this principle, Davutoğlu suggests that Turkey's regional influence extends to the regions of Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East regions. Accordingly, Turkey should develop intense dialogue and economic integration with those regions (Davutoğlu, 2008: 81). Consequently, we can consider this principle as one of the pillars of change in the level of effort towards the Eurasia region.

Secondly, having rhythmic diplomacy principle refers to the establishment of an active foreign policy framework, which refers to the state of being eager to take initiatives while conducting international relations. (Davutoğlu, 2008: 81-82). JDP is not the first Turkish government that tried to pursue a more active and multi-faceted foreign policy design. The elements of an active foreign policy approach in Turkey can be traced back to the presidency of Turgut Özal in the early 1990s. The 1999-2002 coalition government's Foreign Affairs Minister İsmail Cem also followed a multi-faceted and proactive foreign policy with a Western orientation (Öniş, 2011: 4-5).

Cem explained his vision for Eurasia's future in 1988 as follows:

> *.....The role of a shared history and of parallel cultural characteristics is highlighted and put into practice in all spheres of our foreign policy. It is worthwhile to note that there are twenty-six countries with which we shared for centuries a common history, a common, state and a common fate. This background provides for strong economic relationships and a unique platform for political co-operation. In this vast socio-political geography, Turkey, having the most dynamic economy, most advanced armed forces and the longest running democracy, has optimal conditions to contribute to stability and to enjoy the opportunities presented by the new "Eurasian Order". By virtue of its historical and cultural attributes and its privileged double-identity, European as well as Asian, Turkey is firmly positioned to become the strategic "Centre" of Eurasia* (Cem, 1988).

As can be inferred from the above manuscript, Cem attributed great importance to the shared history between Turkey and the Eurasian countries, and believed that Turkey could play a pivotal role in Eurasia. Similarly, Davutoğlu believed that Turkey's intense historical ties with the countries in Eurasia had to be properly utilized (Davutoğlu, 2001:83-84).

In that sense, it can be claimed that Cem and Davutoğlu's approaches coincided with each other and that there were similarities between the eras of Cem and Davutoğlu in terms of the reinterpretation and utilization of Turkey's history while formulating policies towards Central Asia.

JDP's foreign policy clearly represents a continuation of the rhythmic (proactive) model established by its predecessors with a remarkable increase in the volume of relations between the Eurasia region and Turkey (Öniş, 2011: 4-5).

Figure 3: Turkey's Foreign Trade Volume with Central Asia and Transcaucasia between 1990–2010.

Source: Bilgin and Bilgiç, 2011: 179.

As can be seen in Figure 3, the volume of the foreign trade between Turkey and Eurasia region had reached unprecedented level in 2010 with an almost 10,000 times increase from 1990 (Bilgin and Bilgiç, 2011: 179). This increase in the trade volume corresponds to Davutoğlu's rhythmic diplomacy principle because that principle considers soft power tools such as foreign trade invaluable and supplementary to foreign policy efforts (Davutoğlu, 2008: 82-83). This upsurge in the trade volume clearly indicates an adjustment change because it represents an increase of effort concerning the practice of active foreign policy.

Adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy is another source of the adjustment change in TFP towards Eurasia. The principle of multi-dimensional foreign policy emphasizes that Turkey should not have a one-dimensional foreign policy with a specific orientation. Instead, Turkey should establish meaningful and complementary relations with various actors in multiple regions. Especially, if Turkey sticked with the Cold-War era practices and followed a one-dimensional foreign policy in line with the interests of the West, that would only limit Turkey's foreign policy options.

According to Sander, where there is foreign policy, inevitably there are options, and not having an option is equal to not having a foreign policy. Moreover, foreign policy is based on production. Diplomacy produces the objectives and

elements of defense as well as security, peace, prestige, and better living conditions for a country (Sander, 1982: 07).

As stated by İsmail Cem, Eurasia dimension had become a new element of TFP after the end of the Cold War. Cem had envisioned an international mission for Turkey, which was non-peripheral and not limited to the outskirts of Europe. In that mission the emerging Eurasian reality occupied a key place (Cem 2002, 2).

The most important feature of the Eurasian region for Turkey might be considered to be its demography since as of 2010 the total population of the Turkic countries in the Eurasia region was above seventy million. While Turkey moved away from Europe for various reasons, the Eurasia region, with its rapidly growing Turkic population, emerged as an inevitable foreign policy alternative (Pew Research Center, 2015).

Kardaş stresses that the discussion on the shift of axis should not be ignored, but it should be emphasized that rather than shifting its axis, Turkey tried to diversify its foreign relations in order to progressively balance Western orientation by new relations (Kardaş, 2011: 38).

In conclusion, utilization of multi-dimensional in foreign policy formulation of Turkey can be seen as another source of the adjustment change in TFP towards the Eurasia region.

In light of the aforementioned facts and data, the answer to the question of 'did the Strategic Depth doctrine have an impact on the recent foreign policy change towards the Eurasia region?' is that the doctrine left its mark on the making of TFP towards Eurasia region and can be regarded as the cornerstone of the recent adjustment change in TFP.

CHAPTER FOUR
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS ARMENIA 2002-2011: AN ADJUSTMENT CHANGE

In this study against the claim that the relations between Turkey and Armenia changed or improved, it is argued that those initiatives of the JDP government failed and that there was no change in the Eurasian region that went beyond adjustment change. In other words, the basic hypothesis of this study:

H0   : The change in the relations between Armenia and Turkey between the years 2002-2011 is not an adjustment change.

H1   : The change in the relations between Armenia and Turkey between the years 2002-2011 is an adjustment change.

4.1. RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA IN GENERAL

Establishing relations with the Soviet Republics, which gained their independence with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), was the beginning of a new era in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey, which tried to stay away from regional conflicts during the Cold War, adopted a multifaceted foreign policy strategy after the collapse of the bipolar world order. The Caucasus and Central Asia became 'priority regions' due to ethnic, cultural and historical ties (Büyükkiraz, 2012: 5).

Soon after the establishment of the Caucasian states, Turkey pursued an approach involving a separate perspective for each state. In this context, the first contacts with Armenia were held in 1991. Sending Turkey's Moscow Ambassador Volkan Vural to Armenia in April 1991 was the first of these contacts. This initial contact was made to demonstrate the will of Turkey for the establishment of good neighborly relations. In its Declaration of Independence adopted on 23 August 1991, Armenia declared that it would struggle for recognition of the so-called genocide in the international arena. This situation negatively affected the atmosphere between the two countries. The Armenian Parliament declared not to recognize the Turkey-Armenia border which had been drawn in February 1991 by the Agreement of Kars. Despite these

developments, on 16 December 1991, Turkey recognized the independence of Armenia together with other Soviet Republics. But in the spring of 1992, Turkey declared that it would not establish diplomatic relations with Armenia as long as it did not recognize the boundaries of the two countries (Bal, 2011: 6).

Turkey accepted Armenia's independence in 1991 without any preconditions. In that period, Turkey allowed Armenia that was in serious economic trouble to use its borders for providing aid, which came from the West in 1992-1993. In 1992, Armenia was invited to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) as a founding member, although it did not have a Black Sea coast. In this way, Armenia, to improve its relations with both Turkey and Azerbaijan participated in an important diplomatic platform and became the member of an international organization to strengthen itself (Topal, 2015: 975).

In this context and especially in 1992, Turkey's help to Armenia which had economical problems, can be described as a step for the advancement of economic and political relations between the two countries. This is an example of adjustment change within Hermann's foreign policy classification. The step taken by Turkey, though not creating a radical change in relations between the two countries, involved a possible change. That is why it can be described as an adjustment change.

The normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations has a narrow scope. In theory, the efforts of the two countries towards normalization could actually go faster, but in recent years this progress had been more uneven. Both Turkey and Armenia made attempts towards normalization of relations, however, these attempts have been unsuccessful due to competing priorities of both parties. (Hill, Kirişçi and Moffatt, 2015: 129).

In addition to this, in the statements made about the Karabakh problem from the past to the present day, Turkey has stipulated that positive steps should be taken to solve the Karabakh problem in order to open the border gates. However, no positive steps were taken by Armenia to withdraw from the occupied territories. For this reason, especially on the issue of the border gates, there had been no change in Turkey's behaviour. Nonetheless, Turkey continued to seek ways to normalize relations with Armenia. Indeed, under the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, Turkey made a move and wanted to contribute more actively to the

establishment of peace, stability, trust, cooperation and solidarity in the region. In this context, Turkey attached special importance to establishing relations with Armenia and solving problems (Aras, 2009: 1).

With the formation of the "Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform", it is seen that Turkey took a step towards Armenia and tried to change the relations between the two countries. In this context, Turkey's initiative can be considered under adjustment change category of Hermann because it is a step in the direction of change. However, that initiative, though aiming at change, did not have a long-term impact.

4.2. RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA 2002-2011

The interview that Robert Koçaryan gave to Mehmet Ali Birand on February 1, 2001, gives a good understanding of his ideas about Turkey. The subject of this interview was Turkey's recognition of the so-called genocide and apology. Koçaryan repeatedly stressed that if Turkey apologized for the so-called genocide, they would not seek compensation and land from Turkey (Hurriyet, 2001). Turkish authorities did not give an official response to this interview. Only in June 2001 an unofficial response came from the late Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. During the U.S.'s Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's visit to Ankara, Ecevit said that in order to have relations with Turkey, Armenia should give up on the so-called genocide claims, completely evacuate Nagorno-Karabakh and open a safe corridor between Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan (Büyükkiraz, 2012: 11).

The coming of the Justice and Development Party to power had been a harbinger of change not only in relations with Armenia but also in Turkish foreign policy in general. One of the primary problems that the JDP aimed to solve was the normalization of relations with Armenia (Büyükkiraz, 2012: 13). In 2004 Erdoğan stated that he had visited all the countries that experienced major problems with Turkey with the exception of Armenia. He said "We have to establish a contact with Armenia also" (Yılmaz, 2004).

Important steps were taken in order to establish contact with Armenia in 2004. The Armenian President Robert Koçaryan was invited to the NATO summit

which was held in Istanbul. Koçaryan rejected this invitation and pointed out that there are no official diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia. This statement from Koçaryan reflected his foreign policy against Turkey (Büyükkiraz, 2012: 14).

In July 2008, an official invitation from the Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian to the Turkish President Abdullah Gul, started to normalize relations between the two countries. Gul became the first-ever Turkish head of state to visit Armenia. The 2008 visit revealed that there had been a secret meeting between Armenian and Turkish officials in Switzerland; it was the public opening of a new process of engagement. With the change of relationship between Armenia and Turkey, a win-win opportunity could have emerged. It would be a long-needed foreign policy success and new economic opportunities for Armenia. On the other hand, for Turkey, positive Turkish-Armenian relations could improve Turkey's standing in terms of the relations with the European Union and the United States. Re-opening the closed border and having positive diplomatic ties with Armenia could also improve Turkey's domestic reform process. In August 2008, regional landscape started to change with the conflict that occurred in Georgia. Russia now started to support the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey (Giragosian, 2009: 1).

Another diplomatic touch between Turkey and Armenia occurred when the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan invited Turkey's President Abdullah Gul to Yerevan, in order to watch Armenia-Turkey football match on 6 September 2008. After the invitation of Serzh Sargsyan, President Abdullah Gul went to Yerevan to watch the match between the two national football teams. Then the President of Armenia came to Turkey and watched the return match on October 14th 2009 with the invitation of the President of Turkey (Özbay, 2011: 5).

Turkey's consistent will to normalize its relationship with Armenia resulted in the signing of the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations between the two countries. Those Protocols provided a framework for the normalization of bilateral relations. On the side of Turkey, the protocols were referred to the Turkish parliament for approval. In Armenia, the Protocols were forwarded to the Constitutional Court for review of their constitutionality. Firstly, On 12 January 2010, the Constitutional Court declared

that the Protocols were in conformity with the Armenian Constitution. However, the Constitutional Court in its later reasoned decision of 18 January 2010 stated that the Protocols contained preconditions and restrictive provisions contrary to the letter and spirit of them. The decision thus undermined the rationale for the Protocols. In February 2015, Sarkisian withdrew the Protocols from the Armenian Parliament and declared the Protocols null and void on March 1, 2018 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019).

When Turkey's foreign policy moves towards Armenia are examined, the pursuit of a more moderate Armenian foreign policy by the JDP government involving steps such as inviting Kocaryan to the NATO summit held in Istanbul in 2004, the first visit by a Turkish leader to Armenia in 2008, followed by the "football policy", and the 2009 Protocols, even though unapproved, can be considered as adjustment changes within the framework of Hermann's foreign policy theory. Despite the continuous steps from Turkey to improve the bilateral relations, Armenia did not always retaliate in the same manner. Therefore, there had not been a fundamental change in the relations between the two countries.

4.2.1. Trade Relations

When Armenia occupied the Kelbajar region in 1993, direct trade from Turkey to Armenia was terminated; the border between the two countries was closed and the road / rail and airline connections were cut off (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). After the occupation, Turkey continued to call for its ending, while the relations were gradually limited between the two countries. On 5 April 1993, Hikmet Cetin, who was the Foreign Minister in the period of President Turgut Özal, stated to the press during his trip to the Turkic Republics that after the Armenian attacks against Azerbaijan all humanitarian aid flights passing through Turkey had halted and the aircraft wishing to pass would be shot and lowered if necessary (Arslanlı, 2015: 189-190). However, after 2002, trade relations between Turkey and Armenia started to increase year by year and it should be noted that the exports and imports between Turkey and Armenia increased more than 7 times (Tepav, 2014: 1-55). Yet this increase concerned only the volume of the trade, while

the type of goods and the way the trade was conducted between Turkey and Armenia did not change. In terms of Hermann's categorization, doing the same actions with greater effort is seen as adjustment change. So that, we cannot suggest that the increase in the volume of foreign trade refers to anything more than an adjustment change.

4.2.2. Energy Relations

In 1992, Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Romania, Ukraine and Bulgaria established the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC). BSEC's active fields are economy, trade, technology, etc. Turkey added the dimension of energy policy in the mid-1990s by signing energy agreements with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Turkey's invitation of Armenia to BSEC shows that Turkey is not only trying to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia but also develop economic and commercial relations. These friendly attempts from Turkey also found response from Armenia side. Ter-Petrosyan has pursued a policy of rapprochement with Turkey in order to reduce the impact of the Russian Federation. Ter-Petrosyan's policy of rapprochement is consistent with Armenia's policy of "opening to the West" (Öztığ, 2018: 417-418).

The absence of diplomatic relations and the closed land border with Armenia reduced the activity of Turkey in the South Caucasus, and Turkey was isolated from an important part of the region. The root cause of this situation is the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh that tightened the relationship between Turkey and Armenia, which was already troubled. Because of this conflict Turkey and Armenia could not find a mutual ground to establish political connections. This conflict also led to the closure of Azerbaijan-Armenia-Turkey road, which is the most ideal transport pipeline for Azeri oil (and now gas). If the border between Turkey and Armenia had been opened as stated in the first pipeline negotiations, this would reduce the dependence of both Baku and especially Yerevan on Moscow and help to establish better relations between the three countries. However, in the current context, the mega-energy projects realized in the region are bypassing Armenia and are being carried out over a more expensive route, Georgia. This situation isolates Armenia in

the region and pushes it into Russia's sphere of influence (Görgülü, 2014: 6). So in other words, even if there is a potential for a greater change, the change in TFP towards Armenia on energy relations cannot pass the level of adjustment change.

4.2.3. Security Relations

While the Cold War ended, Turkey thought that the existing security problems would disappear. Instead, the resulting power gaps have brought new and important security issues around. One of the areas where security problems got intensified is the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is important to Turkey because of historical, cultural, geopolitical and geo-economic reasons. Despite being one of the first countries to recognize Armenia's independence, Turkey cut off its diplomatic relations with Armenia because of the demand for land. Since 1993, due to the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey also closed its border with Armenia. Since 2009, Turkey's efforts to normalize relations with Armenia did not lead to the desired outcome due to political reasons in Armenia and Turkey. During the 1990s, Turkey struggled to fill the power gap in the region, but it did not succeed because of economic and internal political reasons, and this gap was finally filled by Russia. Turkey's South Caucasus policy in the 2000s was based on cooperation, interdependence, peace and stability. Within this framework, major projects such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline have been implemented in the economic field, especially in the energy sector. Turkey put forward the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh as a condition for normalization of the relations with Armenia. Turkey considered Azerbaijan's territorial integrity in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the framework of international law and favored finding a solution through negotiations (Sapmaz ve Sarı, 2012: 17). In conclusion, even though there were efforts to normalize relations between Turkey and Armenia it cannot be claimed that these efforts caused a change bigger than adjustment change in TFP towards Eurasia.

CONCLUSION

The primary goal of this work was to analyze the nature of changes and shifts in the TFP making towards Eurasia region during the governments led by JDP between 2002 and 2011 with comparisons to the foreign policy designs of the predecessors of JDP.

In order to determine the scope of change in TFP towards Eurasia, Charles Hermann's typology on foreign policy change was applied. The analysis based on this typology showed that the changes in TFP towards Eurasia between 2002 and 2011 should be categorized as adjustment change, which refers to an alteration in the level of effort while other variables stay the same. TFP in the Davutoğlu era targeting the Turkic states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan), involved increased level of efforts towards the cultural, economic and social areas compared to the previous periods.

Before the end of the Cold War, Turkey did not have a specific foreign policy towards Eurasia region since the Eurasia region was regarded as part of the U.S.S.R. In accordance with the status quo principle, Turkey did not follow expansionist policies, acknowledged the U.S.S.R.'s sovereignty over the Eurasia region and considered Turkic states as part of the Socialist union (Fuller, 1997: 36).

With the decline of the bipolarity of the Cold War era, Eurasia region emerged as a new dimension in TFP and Turkey initiated an active foreign policy approach towards it. That active approach, which started in the early 1990s under the leadership of Turgut Özal, increased in the following periods under the leadership of İsmail Cem and then Ahmet Davutoğlu. Therefore, this work argued that the seed of change that took place under the guidance of Davutoğlu was laid in Özal and Cem periods in the post-Cold War era and the process of change gained momentum with Davutoğlu after 2002. In other words, contrary to the common belief, which suggests that the change in TFP towards Eurasia region started after 2002 with the emergence of JDP in the Turkish political scene, this work proposed that the process of change in Turkish foreign policy began in the 1990s and, in case of the Eurasia region, there is an adjustment change in TFP.

In order to support the aforementioned adjustment change claim, empirical data obtained from the development assistance reports of TIKA was analyzed and it was found that: (1) the Turkish official development aid to Eurasia region increased gradually in the JDP period without any discontinuity or rupture; (2) as they were in the Özal and Cem eras, South and Central Asia were still the main target regions of the Turkish official development assistance; and (3) the methods and tools used in TFP towards Eurasia region did not change as soft power practices remained the primary tool of engagement. In the case of Eurasia region, only the level of soft power practices increased.

Various intersection points between TFP vision and Eurasianism was observed in this work. Firstly, the Eurasianist perspective that the Eurasian countries should get involved in each other's problems regardless of each other's language, ethnic origin or religion was adopted in TFP after the dissolution of the USSR. Secondly, just like the Eurasianists who regarded Russia as the center of Eurasia, Turkish foreign policymakers started to consider Turkey as the center of Eurasia. Thirdly, geopolitics, which is a fundamental concept in Eurasianism, became also a core concept in TFP. Fourthly, in line with the Eurasianist ideas, after the 1990s Turkey started to place greater emphasis on creating comprehensive economic, political and social relations amongst Eurasian states. Lastly, Özal, Cem and Davutoğlu all adopted the Eurasianist dream of Eurasian Union and regarded Eurasian Union as a necessary precondition for world peace.

Additionally, the latter part of the chapter concerning Turkish Eurasianism intended to explain the distinctive characteristics of Özal, Cem and Davutoğlu periods. Firstly, Özal adopted a multi-dimensional, pragmatic, proactive and economy-oriented approach in TFP, and included Ottomanist and pan-Turkist elements. Consequently, this work suggested that the impact of Eurasianism on TFP began in the Özal era. Secondly, under the guidance of foreign minister Cem, Turkey started to embrace a mixture of Asian and European identities to expand its foreign policy vision. Furthermore, Cem regarded pro-activism as the primary component of the TFP and intended to utilize Turkey's unique identity, geopolitical location and culture with a pro-active mindset. Finally, Davutoğlu placed great emphasis on the geopolitical, historical and cultural heritage of Turkey and utilized a pro-active

approach while formulating TFP. It should be reemphasized that under all three periods of the Turkish Eurasianism examined in this work, Eurasia was never considered as an alternative to the West and the concept of Eurasia was used as a tool in foreign policy formulation to strengthen the relations with the U.S. and the EU. In light of the aforementioned findings this work suggests that (1) Eurasianism affected TFP in all three periods, which were analyzed in this work, and (2) there are adjustment changes within Özal, Cem and Davutoğlu periods in terms of the utilization of Eurasianism in foreign policy formulation. In terms of foreign policy, Davutoğlu has some similarities and differences when compared with Özal and Cem periods. In Davutoğlu period as well as in other periods, a moderate relationship was observed in Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey's culture, history and nationalist side were included in the structure of this policy. In addition, the Davutoğlu period has both Western and multicultural Eurasian character. As for the differences, the main difference between Davutoğlu period and other two periods can be seen as the increase of effort concerning the soft power practices such as foreign aid, trade and cultural relations. Under Davutoğlu's guidance, the economic volume allocated to the above-mentioned areas has increased substantially.

Moreover, in this study, the axis shift claim, which suggests that Eurasianism replaced the Western orientation of Turkey, was refuted on the basis of *Realpolitik*. The latter considers security as the core topic of foreign policy and regards the rest of economic, social and cultural issues as complementary to security issues (Arı, 1996: 102).

In case of Turkey, during the period in question Turkey's security still heavily relied on the West, mainly NATO. Even if there was a remarkable surge in Turkey's relations with the Eurasia region in terms of trade, culture and diplomacy, its cooperation with that region on security matters remained fairly limited due to the distance between the Eurasia region and Turkey, and the presence of major powers such as China, U.S. and Russia in the region.

In light of that, it cannot be stated that Eurasianism replaced Westernism in Turkey since Turkey's security remained dependent on NATO. Öniş and Yılmaz characterized the shift in TFP as 'soft-Eurasianism' and suggested that the relations

with the West might have loosened, but they still continued (Öniş and Yilmaz, 2009: 11-12).

Moreover, the impact of the theory on practice was found to have great importance in this study. Particular emphasis in this thesis was given to the Strategic Depth doctrine of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was one of the most prominent foreign policy actors in Turkey both as a foreign policy adviser and then foreign minister during the period in question. In line with the adjustment change claim of this thesis, it was suggested that in case of Eurasia region there was no change in Turkey's primary foreign policy methods, objectives, and international orientation. An alteration in foreign policy towards Eurasia region occurred as a result of the vision and the mindset introduced by Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth doctrine.

Investigation of the foreign policy practices of the 2002-2011 period revealed that the Strategic Depth doctrine had a considerable impact on the adjustment change towards the Eurasia. The exploration of the impact of both the methodological and operational components of the Strategic Depth doctrine on the TFP towards Eurasia revealed that the three methodological components of that doctrine, i.e. visionary approach, consistent and systematic foreign framework, and adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style, along with its three operational components, i.e. to develop relations with the neighboring regions and beyond, multi-dimensional foreign policy, and rhythmic diplomacy, reinforced the adjustment change in TFP towards Eurasia.

Lastly, at the final case chapter of this work, hypothesis which suggests that the change in TFP towards Eurasia should be considered as an adjustment was tried to be proven by suggesting that the null hypothesis of this thesis is not correct. In order to do so, this work focused on the relations between Armenia and Turkey between the years of 2002-2011 and put forward a null hypothesis that 'the change in the relations between Armenia and Turkey between the years 2002-2011 is not an adjustment change.' Then this null hypothesis was tried to be falsified in terms of economic, energy and security relations between Turkey and Armenia. Consequently, it was concluded that even if there were attempts to realize a change that was much stronger than an adjustment change in the relations between Turkey

and Armenia, those attemps largely failed and change did not surpass the level of adjustment change.

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