DOKUZ EYLUL UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM
MASTER'S THESIS

THE IMPACT OF TURKISH MILITARY ON FOREIGN POLICY: RP-DYP COALITION GOVERNMENT PERIOD

Duygu KABAK

Supervisor

Assist. Prof. Dr. Müge AKNUR

İZMİR-2015

MASTER THESIS/PROJECT
APPROVAL PAGE

University : Dokuz Eylül University

Graduate School : Graduate School of Social Sciences

Name and Surname : Duygu KABAK

Title of Thesis : The Impact of Turkish Military on Foreign Policy: RP-DYP Coalition Government Period

Defence Date : 07/07/2015

Supervisor : Assist Prof.Dr.Müge AKNUR

EXAMINING COMMITTE MEMBERS

Title, Name and Surname	University	Signature
Assist Prof.Dr.Müge AKNUR	DOKUZ EYLUL UNIVERSITY	
Assist Prof.Dr.İrem AŞKAR KARAKIR	DOKUZ EYLUL UNIVERSITY	
Assist Prof.Dr.Ebru Deniz Ozan AYTEKİN	DUMLUPINAR UNIVERSITY	

Unanimity   (✗)

Majority of votes   ( )

The thesis titled as "**The Impact of Turkish Military on Foreign Policy: RP-DYP Coalition Government Period**" prepared and presented by Duygu KABAKis accepted and approved.

Prof.Dr. Utku UTKULU
Director

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this master's thesis titled as "The Impact of Turkish Military on Foreign Policy: RP-DYP Coalition Government Period" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honor.

Date

…/…/2015

Duygu KABAK

Signature

ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

The Impact of Turkish Military on Foreign Policy:

RP-DYP Coalition Government Period

Duygu KABAK

Dokuz Eylül University

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

International Relations Program

       Turkish military has always been dominant in Turkish politics as a result of direct and indirect coups and through the prerogatives it had received in the aftermath of each coup. Majority of these interventions were into the domestic politics of Turkey rather than the foreign policies. However, starting from mid 1990s until the end of 1990s, during the rule of Refahyol coalition government, Turkish military dramatically increased its interference into the foreign policy. Through the centers and departments it established, the military even became a significant actor of decision-making in foreign policy by interfering into Refahyol government's attempts to improve its relations with Iran, supporting the progress of Turkey's relations with Israel, permitting the extension of Operation Provide Comfort and backing Turkey's inclusion into the Customs Union.

       This thesis in an attempt to find an answer to this question— why Turkish military's power in foreign policy dramatically increased during the Refahyol government— will refer to three approaches. First it will analyze this increase with Claude Welch's classification of the "military control with partners" approach that measures different levels of military control in politics. It will argue that military with its prerogatives from the past and with the help of its civilian partners established its control in politics. Then it will examine the case study with the help of Michael Desch's framework on the relationship of civilian control and the intensity of the internal threats. The study will argue

that the existence of high external and internal threats will lead to poor civilian control, in other words, strong military control. Finally, the thesis will refer to Joe Hagan's fragmented regime analysis by arguing that when the power is shared between weak political parties, other societal actors such as the military will have a higher chance to intervene into domestic and foreign policies.

Keywords: Turkish foreign policy, Refahyol government, civil-military relations, civilian control, internal and external threats, and fragmented regimes.

ÖZET
Yüksek Lisans Tezi
Türk Ordusunun Dış Politika Üzerindeki Etkisi:
RP-DYP Koalisyon Hükümeti Dönemi
Duygu KABAK

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı
İngilizce Uluslararası İlişkiler Programı

Türk ordusu doğrudan ve dolaylı olarak gerçekleştirdiği darbeler ve her askeri darbe sonrası sahip olduğu ayrıcalıklar aracılığı ile Türk siyaseti üzerinde her zaman etkili olmuştur. Ancak Türk ordusunun müdaheleleri genelde dış politikadan ziyade iç politikaya yönelik gerçekleşmiştir. Ancak 1990'ların ortalarından başlayarak sonlarına doğru, Refahyol koalisyon hükümeti döneminde Türk ordusunun dış politikaya müdahelesi önemli derecede artmıştır. Ordu, kurmuş olduğu merkezler ve daireler aracılığı ile dış politikada Refahyol hükümetinin politikalarına müdahele ederek önemli bir karar verici olduğunu göstermiştir. Bu müdaheleler arasında Refahyol hükümetinin İran ile ilişkilerini geliştirmesi çabasını engellemesi, Türkiye'nin İsrail ile ilişkilerini geliştirme çabalarını desteklemesi, Huzur Harekâtının süresini arttırması ve Türkiye'nin Gümrük Birliği'ne girmesini desteklemesi sayılabilir.

Bu çalışma Refahyol hükümeti döneminde Türk ordusunun dış politikadaki etkisinin yoğun bir şekilde artmasının nedenlerini incelerken üç yaklaşımdan yararlanacaktır. Birinci olarak Claude Welch'in siyasette ordunun farklı seviyelerdeki etkisini inceleyen sınıflandırmasında "ortakların yardımı ile askeri kontrol" argümanından yaralanacaktır. Bu bağlamda Türk ordusunun geçmişten gelen ayrıcalıkları ve müdahelelerine ortak olan siviller sayesinde askeri kontrolü kurabildiğini iddia edecektir. İkinci yaklaşım olarak Michael Desch'in sivil kontrol ile iç ve dış tehditlerin yoğunluğu arasındaki ilişki üzerine

kurduğu çerçeveden yararlanarak Refahyol döneminde hem iç hem de dış tehditlerin yüksek olmasının sivil kontrolü azalttığını, diğer bir ifade ile askeri kontrolü arttırdığını savunacaktır. Üçüncü bir yaklaşım olarak Joe Hagan'ın parçalanmış rejim sınıflandırmasından yola çıkarak zayıf ve kırılgan koalisyon hükümetlerinin dönemlerinde ordu gibi diğer toplumsal grupların siyasete müdahele etme imkanının daha fazla olacağı iddia edilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk dış siyaseti, Refahyol hükümeti, sivil-asker ilişkileri, sivil kontrol, iç ve dış tehditler ve parçalanmış rejimler.

THE IMPACT OF TURKISH MILITARY ON FOREIGN POLICY:
RP-DYP COALITION GOVERNMENT PERIOD

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MILITARY CONTROL, INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL THREATS AND FRAGMENTED PARTY SYSTEM

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF

TURKISH MILITARY ON FOREIGN POLICY

DURING REFAHYOL COALITION PERIOD

ABBREVIATIONS

ACRS	Arms Control and Regional Security
AKP	*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*---Justice and Development Party
ANAP	*Anavatan Partisi*---Motherland Party
AP	*Adalet Partisi*---Justice Party
CENTO	The Central Treaty Organization
CHP	*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* --- Republican Peoples' Party
D-8	Developing-8
DEP	*Demokrasi Partisi* --- Democracy Party
DGM	*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri* --- State Security Courts
DİSK	*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* --- Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey
DP	*Demokrat Parti* – Democrat Party
DTP	*Demokratik Türkiye Partisi* --- Democratic Turkey Party
DYP	*Doğru Yol Partisi* --- True Path Party
EEC	European Economic Community
EMİM	*Ekonomik ve Mali İzleme Merkezi* --- Monitoring Center for Economics and Finance
EU	European Union
FKF	*Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu* --- Federation of Debating Societies
G-8	Group of Eight
HEP	*Halkın Emek Partisi* --- People's Labor Party
İBDA	*İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncıları* --- Raiders of the Islamic Great East
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
MASK	*Milli Askeri Stratejik Konsept*--- National Military Strategic Concept
MBK	*Milli Birlik Komitesi* --- National Unity Committee
MGK	*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*---National Security Council
MGSB	*Milli Güvenlik Siyaseti Belgesi* --- National Security Policy Document
MHP	*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* --- Nationalist Action Party
MİT	*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı* --- National Intelligence Agency
MNP	*Milli Nizam Partisi* --- National Order Party

MSP	*Milli Selamet Partisi* --- National Salvation Party
MTCA	Military Training and Cooperation Agreement
MÜSİAD	*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği* --- Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHAL	*Olağanüstü Hal* --- State of Emergency
OPC	Operation Provide Comfort
OYAK	*Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu* --- Turkish Armed Forces Assistance Fund
PJAK	Free Life Party of Kurdistan
PKK	*Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan* --- Kurdish Workers Party
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RP	*Refah Partisi* --- Welfare Party
RTÜK	*Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurumu* --- Radio and Television Supreme Council
SAREM	*Stratejic Araştırma ve Etüt Merkezi* --- Center of Strategic Research and Studies
SHP	*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti* --- Social Democrat Populist Party
TBMM	*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* --- Turkish Grand National Assembly
TİP	*Türkiye İşçi Partisi* --- Turkish Worker's Party
TSK	*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri* --- Turkish Armed Forces
TÜSİAD	*Türkiye Sanayiciler ve İşverenler Sendikası* --- Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
UN	The United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	The United States
USA	The United States of America
YAŞ	*Yüksek Askeri Şura* --- Supreme Military Council
YÖK	*Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu* **---** Higher Education Council

LIST OF TABLES

INTRODUCTION

Turkish military has always been dominant in Turkish politics. As one of the main powers that established the Republic of Turkey and promoted the reforms and principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, it always kept its significance in Turkish politics. As the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*—TSK) had always intervened into politics to supposedly bring peace and stability to the country. However, its interferences into the policies followed by the popularly elected governments hindered the democratic consolidation process in Turkey. For the accomplishment of consolidation of democracy in a country, the civilians must have the last say in every single political issue.

Turkish military's direct and indirect military interventions into politics that had taken place in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 were all related to domestic politics. While the military intervened to give an end to Prime Minister's authoritarian tendencies in 1960, it tried to give an end to leftist and rightist violence on the streets in 1971 and 1980 coups. In 1997, TSK was trying to give an end to the threats challenging the secularity characteristics of the Republic. Majority of Turkish military's interferences into politics were related to domestic issues rather than foreign policies. Although TSK had intervened into foreign policies in the past, these interventions did not diverge with the policies the government planned to pursue. However, from mid 1990s to late 1990s, during the rule of coalition government established by Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*—RP) and True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*—DYP) (shortly called Refahyol), Turkish military dramatically increased its interference into the foreign policy of Turkey. During Refahyol government the divergence between the military's and RP led coalition's foreign policies was dramatic. While the military was loyal to the traditional pro-western foreign policy of Turkey, Refahyol government under the domination of Islamist Refah Party (RP) was attempting to pursue a more pro-Middle Eastern and anti-Western foreign policy.

Consequently, during the period of Refahyol Coalition, Turkish military drastically interfered into foreign policies of the country including Turkey's relations with Iran and Israel, extension of Operation Provide Comfort and Turkey's inclusion to Customs Union. In many occasions Turkish military even acted as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the centers and groups it established to follow the foreign policy developments. This thesis will analyze TSK's interference into foreign policy in mid 1990s. The study will try to answer the question of why the Turkish military that has been interfering into domestic politics for many decades decided to get dominantly involved into foreign policy in mid 1990s. The thesis will investigate the changing role of the military on foreign policy and the special features of this period in terms of the military's supremacy over foreign policy contrasting the other periods.

The thesis in an attempt to analyze the increase in Turkish military's strong interference into foreign policy will refer to three sets of approaches. First one is Claude Welch's conceptualization concerning the degrees of the civilian control and the lack of civilian control. Welch claims that, even in the democratic regimes, there can be some degrees of military interference into the politics. Then he makes a classification to show these different degrees of military involvement into the politics. These categories include military influence (civilian control), military participation, military control with partners and military partner without partners. In this respect, this thesis will attempt to analyze and discuss the role of the Turkish military during the Refahyol coalition government by concentrating on Welch's military control (with partners) classification. Accordingly, the study will argue that during the Refahyol coalition period, Turkey had witnessed to lack of civilian control where the military control had prevailed by the assistance of its partner.

As the second approach that will help to analyze the research question of the thesis—why the Turkish military's interference into foreign policy increased dramatically in mid-1990s— the study will concentrate on a realist analysis of international relations through an examination of internal and external threat environment of the period. Internal and external threat environment will be analyzed with the threat variables designed by Michael Desch's framework on the levels of external and internal threats. Accordingly, he analyses the level of civilian control by

looking at the intensity of threats. In this context, Desch argues that in case of high external threat, the military concentrates on external affairs for example gets into preparation of a war. However, when the internal threats are high the military starts focusing on the domestic politics by sometimes bypassing the popularly elected government. Then, he comprehensively illustrates such different threat possibilities while analyzing their effects on the civilian and (or) military control in politics. In this sense, this thesis will claim that during the Refahyol coalition period, there were high internal and external threats in Turkey which led to "poor" civilian control, in other words, it led to high military interference into the politics.

As the third approach, that will help to analyze the research question of the study, the thesis will refer to one of the research traditions of comparative politics, the structural analysis. Structuralism concentrates on how structures shape the outcomes. In this context, the study will concentrate on the fragmentation of the regime in other words the establishment of a weak and vulnerable coalition government that is consisted of ideologically two opposing political parties. By following Joe Hagan's classification of regime fragmentation that includes, the regimes dominated by a single, individual leader, regimes dominated by a single, cohesive party/group in which there exist established, autonomous bureaucracies and institutions, the regimes dominated by a single party/group that is itself internally divided by established political factions and finally the regimes in which the ruling party/group shares power with one or more minor parties/groups. In this case the last classification of Hagan, the regimes in which the ruling party/group shares power with one or more minor parties/groups will help to analyze the decrease in civilian control over the military during the Refahyol government period. The thesis will argue that the weak and vulnerable structure of the coalition will lead to a fragile coalition government that will easily be dominated by other societal forces such as the military.

As a methodology, this thesis in order to examine the political developments during Refahyol period will refer to various secondary sources including journal articles, newspaper articles and books. In order to analyze the discourses of the senior members of Turkish Armed Forces and the leaders of the political parties, mainstream newspapers of the period will be searched. The thesis will also refer to

different laws and articles in order to examine the position of the Turkish Armed Forces and National Security Council in the Turkish constitution.

The first chapter of the thesis will focus on the theoretical framework of the thesis by discussing the three approaches that helps to analyze the research question. First, following a discussion of the civil-military relations within democratic consolidation theories, the study will focus on Claude Welch's theoretical approach, which discusses the different degrees of the military's interference into the politics and the lack of civilian control. Following Welch's analysis, the chapter will examine Desch's changing threat environment approach and the impact of internal and external threats over the military's effectiveness in politics. Finally, the chapter will focus on a structural analysis of the coalition governments and the impact of fragmentation and vulnerability of a government on its control over politics.

The second chapter of this thesis will give an overview of historical background of the role of Turkish military in politics since the late Ottoman Empire until the late 1990s. The chapter examines the gradual increase in military's political power by analyzing the 1960 and 1980 direct military coups and 1961 and 1982 constitutions written in the aftermath of these coups as well as the 1971 indirect military intervention. Moreover, this chapter examines the foreign policies taken by different governments throughout the Republican era by focusing on the most influential institutions or actors on foreign policy making during these periods. While it concentrates on the role of single leaders in the early years, it will examine the role Foreign Ministry during the 1960s and the role of the public opinion throughout the 1970s as well as the business groups in the 1990s. It will also concentrate on the role of the military in foreign policy by mainly concentrating on the coup periods.

The third chapter following a brief overview of the establishment of Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*—RP) and its foreign policy orientation concentrates on the role of the military in Turkish foreign policy making during the coalition that it established with DYP which is commonly known as Refahyol Coalition Government. The chapter will examine the issues of conflict between the military and the Refahyol coalition that includes anti-secular and anti-regime policies of RP and such statements of the RP members, Prime Minister Erbakan's visits to Middle

Eastern and African countries including Iran and Libya, the pro-sharia "Jerusalem Night" celebrations in Sincan and the invitation of the leaders of religious communities to Prime Minister's residence. All these anti-secular policies as well as the foreign relations threatening Turkey's integrity followed by the RP led coalition government led to the initiation of the 28 February process which is called as "post-modern military coup". The chapter will be concluded with an examination of the institutional and non-institutional mechanisms through which the military exerted its power to interfere into both domestic politics and foreign policies during the period under examination.

The main heart of the thesis, the fourth chapter will mainly concentrate on the analysis of the research question. It will analyze the increase in the military's role in foreign policy through mid to end of 1990s by examining the civil-military relations and lack of civilian control. The chapter will firstly examine Welch's categorization of different degrees of the military involvement into the politics by focusing on the "military control with partners" conceptionalization. Secondly, the chapter will focus on Desch's changing security environment analysis by highlighting the case of "high internal and high external threats". Finally, the chapter will concluded with the analysis of the regime structure in Turkey while concentrating on the weak and fragmented Refahyol coalition by referring to Joe Hagan's regime fragmentation classification.

Finally, the conclusion summarizes the conceptional tools developed in the theoretical framework in order to analyze the impact of Turkish military on foreign policy during the Refahyol coalition government. Starting from the late-Ottoman period until the late-1990s, it reviews the historical processes where the role and effectiveness of the military had gradually increased both on the domestic and foreign policy. Then it highlights the significance of the Refahyol coalition period of the 1990s in terms of the military's impact on foreign policy by referring to the contradictions between the military and the RP-led coalition that led to the 28 February coup. Then it refers to the mechanisms developed by the military to interfere into the foreign policy. Ultimately, the conclusion emphasizes the explanatory power of the theoretical framework of this thesis in analyzing the rising impact of the Turkish military on the foreign policy during the Refahyol coalition.

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MILITARY CONTROL, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS AND FRAGMENTED PARTY SYSTEM

Turkey has always been one of the interesting case studies in terms of civil-military relations literature and democratic consolidation theories. There are several indicators of democratic consolidation: political institutions, institutional design, civil society, socio-economic development and international factors.[1] Among them, civil-military relations are one of the most important indicators of democratic consolidation, which necessitates the civilian supremacy over the military and the military's commitment to the democratic constitutional order.[2] However civil-military relations and the role of the military within the politics in Turkey have not conformed to this pattern that has been prominent in the democratic systems. From the establishment of the Turkish republic until the 2000s, Turkey had suffered from the lack of civilian supremacy over the military, which have hindered the consolidation of democracy in the country. The military intervened into the politics through direct and indirect coups and/or sustained its dominance through institutional and non-institutional mechanisms.[3] Especially during the Refahyol government period, from mid 1990s until the end of 1990s the military was the most powerful decision maker in foreign policy and the establishment national security as well as the domestic politics.

Although Turkish military had been effective in the domestic politics of the country for decades, it has not very often intervened into foreign policy. However, during the Refahyol government it did not only intervene into foreign policy but almost ruled the whole foreign policy sphere. This thesis in an attempt to find an

---

[1] Larry Diamond, "In Searching of Consolidation", **Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives**, (eds. Larry Diamond et all.), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997, pp.xxi-xxxvi.
[2] Diamond, p.xxviii
[3] Müge Aknur, "The Impact of Civil-Military Relations on Democratic Consolidation in Turkey", **Democratic Consolidation in Turkey: State, Political Parties, Civil Society, Civil-Military Relations, Socio-Economic Development, EU, Rise of Political Islam, and Separatist Kurdish Nationalism,** (ed. Müge Aknur), Universal Publishers, Florida, 2012, (The Impact of Civil-Military), p.203

answer to the question of why the Turkish military was totally involved in foreign policy decision-making during the period under examination will refer to the civilian control analysis, the balance between the internal and external threats and a structural analysis by focusing on the existence of a 'weak, vulnerable and fragile coalition government'. During the Refahyol government, the lack of civilian control of the military, the rise of political Islam, and separatist Kurdish nationalism as internal threats (they can also be considered as external threats) and the threat coming from Iran, Iraq and Syria as external threats and the weakness and vulnerability of the Refahyol coalition government all contributed to supremacy of the military in politics which caused the lack of civilian control over the military. This chapter starts with analyzing the civil-military literature in terms of democratic consolidation theories. It then tries to find an answer to the question of why the military's power in foreign policy increased during mid to late 1990s by looking at the degrees of civilian control of the military by focusing on Claude Welch's classification. At the same time it concentrates on the impact of internal and external security threats to the changing position of both the military and the civilians by taking the framework of Michael Desch into consideration. Finally, the chapter is concluded by bringing a structural analysis by defining regime fragmentation caused by polarized coalition governments.

I. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND CIVILIAN CONTROL

Transition to democracy does not always lead to democratic consolidation. According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan there are three minimal conditions for democratic consolidation. These include free and authoritative elections, democratic transition and removal of the interlocking systems such as military prerogatives and authoritarian enclaves, and democratically ruling leader who also respect rule of law.[4] As already analyzed, among the factors affecting the democratic consolidation, such as civil society, economic society, civil-military relations, political institutions, political society, and socio-economic development, civil-military relations have a

---

[4] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies", **Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives**, (eds. Larry Diamond et al.), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997, p. 14

significant impact on the process of democratic consolidation. Even in societies that have democratic traditions; the most considerable challenge to democracy may be in the military sphere.[5] The following sections will first concentrate on the civil-military relations in the context of democratic consolidation and then the civilian control of the military by looking at the different degrees of military involvement in politics.

A. Civil-Military Relations

Military mentality poses a threat to democracy because of its dogmatic and authoritative worldview, which leads to conflict between the military and democratic values.[6] The balance of power between the military and civilians is the most important part of civil-military relations. In a democracy, although the military holds coercive power, it must not interfere in politics by using this power. In the democratic states where the military is subordinated to civilians, the mission of the military is to protect the country, not to govern it.[7] The whole literature on the civil-military relations is composed of this competition between civilian government and the military to use political power. Ideally the military would be governed according to the greater purposes of a nation. As Kohn said, "the purpose of the military is to defend society, not to define it."[8]

In the Western countries, the subordination of military power to political authority, called "civilian control" is used as a measure that can show the progress toward democratic consolidation.[9] The military establishment and police forces should be subject to civilian control in democratic governance.[10] As Felipe Agüero pointed out, "democracy cannot be consolidated until the military becomes firmly

---

[5] Robert C. Johansen, "Military Policies and the State System as Impediments to Democracy", **Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East and West**, (ed. David Held), Standford University Press, California, 1993, p. 213

[6] Johansen, p. 215

[7] Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin, "Civil Supremacy Over the Military: Its Nature and Limits", **Armed Forces&Society**, Vol.19, No.1, Fall 1992, p. 7

[8] Richard H. Kohn, "How Democracies Control the Military", **Journal of Democracy**, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1997, p. 141

[9] Kohn, p. 140

[10] Felipe Agüero, "Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America", **Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives**, (eds. Larry Diamond et al.), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, (Toward Civilian Supremacy), 1997, pp.177-178

subordinated to civilian control and solidly committed to the democratic constitutional order."[11] Kohn defines 'civilian control' as follows: "All decisions of government, including national security, are to be made or approved by officials outside the professional armed forces, in democracy, by popularly elected officeholders or their appointees."[12] In accordance with this definition, the military does not have prominent positions in spheres that are deemed civilian in the systems where civilian governments have supremacy over the military.[13] According to Agüero, in a democracy where the military is subordinated to civilian control, the democratically elected government has the ability to "1) conduct general policy without interference from the military, 2) define goals and the general organization of national defense, 3) formulate and conduct defense policy, and 4) monitor the implementation of military policy."[14] To do so, it is necessary to remove the military from power positions outside the defense area and make the military politically neutral which would prevent any possibility of military intervention in politics.[15]

Civilian supremacy also includes the transfer of military prerogatives to the civilians such as the determination of defense budget, force levels and promotion of military officers by the civilians rather than the military.[16] Additionally it requires the appointment of civilian political chiefs in the military and defense sectors. In order to secure civilian supremacy, the military should be "subordinate to only one other institution possessing effective final authority", which is called the "ministerial control" as defined by Samuel Huntington because it comes "in the form of a civilian departmental minister".[17] Therefore, the Ministry of Defense expands civilian power for the formulation and the conduction of defense and military policy. The effectiveness and influence of the civilians about the state policies concerning defense, internal and international security and having the power to making decisions

---

[11] Diamond, p. xxi-xxxvi.
[12] Kohn, p. 142
[13] Agüero, "Toward Civilian Supremacy", p. 177
[14] Agüero, "Toward Civilian Supremacy", pp.177-178
[15] Felipe Agüero, **Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective**, The John Hopkins University Press, London, 1995, (Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy), p.19
[16] Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy**, p. 20
[17] Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Vintage Books, New York, 1957, pp.86-88, quoted as by Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy**, p. 20

to go to war is one of the most significant determinants to measure civilian control.[18] In this system, the role of the military is limited to assisting the civilian powers in the formulation and implementation of national defense and international security policies.[19]

However, even in Western democracies where we assume that the civilian control of the military is totally accomplished, we can still witness the involvement of the military into the politics at different levels. Therefore, it is necessary to understand different levels of military's involvement into politics by concentrating on the assumptions of Claude Welch.

B. Degrees of Military Involvement in Politics

As already analyzed civilian control places ultimate responsibility of a country's security under the control of the civilians rather than the military. As defined by Huntington civilian control is "the proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by civilian authority."[20] All the decision concerning the country's defense should be under the control of the civilians.

As Claude Welch points out civilian control is a set of relationships caused by frequent changes in the balances of power between the civilian institutions and the military institutions within time.[21] He also claims that all military forces involve in politics at different levels, even in the consolidated democracies and thus, "civilian control of the military is a matter of degree".[22] This military involvement cannot be avoided due to the military's "organizational identity, autonomy, and functional specialization".[23] However, the crucial point is the acceptance of the "government's

---

[18] Kohn, p. 143

[19] Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, p. 19

[20] Samuel Huntington, **The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations**, Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1957, p. 72

[21] Claude E. Welch, "Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality", **Civilian Control of the Military, Theory and Cases From Developing Countries**, (ed. Claude E. Welch), State University Press, Albany, 1976, p.1

[22] Welch, p.2

[23] Welch, p.2

definition of appropriate areas of responsibility" by the military which is a prerequisite for the civilian control of the military. Therefore, as Welch points out

> *civilian control* means that *the military also lobbies as do other parts of the government; seeks to carry out a relatively specific set of policy objectives; and employs channels of decision-making within the military that do not breach its integrity as an institution, or, alternatively, ensures that this organizational integrity is subordinated to political institutions such as political parties. The armed forces thereby accept subordinate roles in the political system. Civilian control, as defined by Huntington, is thus 'governmental control of the military.[24]*

However, as already mentioned, civilian control always includes some degrees of military involvement into the politics. These different degrees of military participation into the politics depend upon the balance between the institutional power of both the military and the civilians. Schematically, the presentation of these degrees can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1: Welch's Illustration of Degrees of Military Involvement in Politics

Military influence (civilian control)	Military Participation	Military Control (with partners)	Military Control (without partners)

Source: Welch, 1976, p.2

Among these different degrees of military involvement, the first one is **military influence.** In this type, the military has a significant degree of involvement into politics however, this involvement stay limited with the ranking positions of military. Military leaders, within the hierarchical chain of command, make advices related with the strategic decisions; provide intelligence by using their specialized knowledge and make lobbies about budget. Military influence which is acceptable in various democratic countries due to the technical difficulty of the exclusion of the military forces from politics. Therefore it is regarded as the normal form of civilian supremacy. Nevertheless, there should be significant degrees of differentiation

---

[24] Welch, p.2

between political and military roles and the military's involvement should be limited. Besides, its influence should be carried through standardized channels such as the contacts between military and political leaders rather than the direct involvement of the military.[25]

The second degree of the military involvement is **military participation**, which is very close to military participation involves includes a secure and extensive area of policy autonomy to the armed forces by legislative enactments. In this type the civilians encourage the military to get involved in politics. For example, some political leaders may prefer to consult to the military in cases of the political disputes, so that they can gain superior position during these conflicts. Military forces may be take part in cabinet positions together with the civilian leaders and have the right to veto the political decisions. Therefore, the political decision may be taken by the dual consent of both military and civilian leaders which differentiates the conceptions of military participation and military influence from each other's.[26]

The third category of Welch which is the most explanatory categorization for this thesis to examine the position of the Turkish Armed Forces during Refahyol government is the **military control**. In military control the civilian government neither can direct the armed forces nor supervise its performing. Moreover, the military takes decisions on crucial subjects and consider these issues as their prerogatives while the civilians oppose these prerogatives. As explained above, in democratic regimes, there is a general acceptance of government's definition of appropriate areas of responsibility and respect to the civilian supremacy by the military. However, on one hand, if the military considers the government as illegitimate and does not accept its superiority and on the other hand, if the civilians insist on violating the military prerogatives, then military intervention into the politics is inevitable. Therefore, the military will control the politics.[27]

As it can be seen from the schematic presentation of degrees of civilian and military control, there are two types of military control. In the first form, the military

---

[25] Welch, p.3
[26] Welch, p.4
[27] Welch, p.5

does not govern explicitly which rather govern through extensive partnership.[28] In this alliance, the military entrusts its partner to sustain its policies and their partners maintain these policies while the role of military remained implicit. In the second variation, civilians can be in subordinate position while the military junta directly maintains its policies.[29]

II. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS ARGUMENT

Realism concentrates on acquisition, maintenance and exercise of power by states. This power can be hard and can be identified with military capabilities such as tanks, planes, missiles and troops. The power can also be soft and this power can have an impact on outcomes through ideas, wealth and economic political innovation.[30] According to Kenneth Waltz, states are the main actors in an anarchical international structure.[31] Realism concentrate on nation states and it makes analysis concerning certain international issues such as security, war, and other forms of violence. Realism accepts international relations as essentially conflictual and accepts human beings as selfish and aggressive creatures. Moreover, it characterizes international system by anarchy and balance of power and argues that all states try to continue their existence, in other words they all care about their survival. Therefore, they try to protect their state from all kinds of threats including internal and external threats. Since the international environment is considered hostile, national security turns out to be the top priority of the states.[32]

Therefore in a high threat environment, as the key component of the power, the military comes to the scene and uses hard power to protect the territories of its country. Consequently, it is significant to examine the relationship between the intensity of the threat and military's control in politics. Another approach that will

---

[28] Welch, p.5
[29] Welch, p.5
[30] Kelly Kate Pease, **International Organizations**, Fifth Edition, Pearson Education, USA, 2012, pp. 43-44.
[31] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Origins of War in Neorealist Theory", **Journal of Interdisciplinary History**, Vol. 18, Iss. 4, Spring 1988, p.618
[32] Pease, pp. 48-51.

help to analyze the reserach question of this study will be Michael Desch's analysis on the relation between the level of threat and level of civilian control.

The increase in military's control in politics in general is directly connected with the rise in the intensity of internal and external threats. The militaries put themselves in the center of politics when any kind of threat to the peace of the society or the territorial integrity of the country emerges. Militaries in general legitimize their intervention into politics with the rising intensity of the threats. In order to analyze military involvement into the politics through threats perspective; Michael Desch establishes a framework of measuring the level of civilian control in politics by looking at the intensity of internal and external threats. While taking the individual characteristics of the leaders, organization of military and civilian institutions and state formation into consideration as intervening variables, he focuses on the domestic and international threat concepts in his attempt to analyze the relation between military interventions and threats.[33] In this sense, this thesis tries to bring an explanation to the rise of Turkish military's role in both domestic and foreign policy during Refahyol government period by using Desch's argument of changing threat environments.

Strength of Desch's theory comes from its explanatory power which clarifies social and organizational mechanisms behind these intervening variables. Desch states that "the strength of civilian control of the military in most countries is shaped fundamentally by factors such as threats. These threats affect individual leaders, the military organization, the state and society.[34] According to Desch's civilian control vs threat approach, civilian control of the military is not only affected by internal powers, it is also shaped by the interaction of the external environment with these internal powers. Consequently, Desch claims that "differently configured units (a unit being a particular country's society and military with their particular attributes) in similar structural positions will usually behave similarly."[35]

Desch integrates both internal and external independent variables which affect three main internal actors that are the civilian government, the military and the

---

[33] Michael C. Desch, **Civilian Control of the Military**, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1999, p.11

[34] Desch, p.11

[35] Desch, p.11

rest of society. As an example of *external threats*, wars can be given, such as Cold War and Second World War, which caused significant external threats. In such cases, the attention of every state's is at the outside due to being under a great external threat. However, Desch puts emphasis on the *internal* (domestic) *threats* which divides state and directs all actors' attention inside. According to him, "internal threats have more complex effects upon the various actors within a state".[36] If internal threat intimidates only state and society, it does not affect civilian control. If internal threat comes from society and threatens both civilian government and military, then it could result to a military-supported dictatorship. If internal threat comes from the state to the military and society, it could lead to a military intervention. And lastly, if both state and society threaten the military, then it concludes with the military rule.[37]

Desch searches the answer of the question of 'how internal and external threats affect the military' and he notes that: "The structural threat environment should affect the character of the civilian leadership, the nature of the military institution, the cohesiveness of state institutions, the method of civilian control, and the convergence or divergence of civilian and military ideas and cultures".[38] He presumes various hypotheses analyzing the strength of civilian control of the military in different structural threat environments. The ultimate aim of Desch's is to analyze the interference level of the military into the politics thereby taking the internal (domestic) and external (international) threats as independent variables and by observing their strengths (high or low). While he attempts to define the levels of the intervention he uses the words 'ideal, good, poor and worst'. Here, a 'good' condition means civilian control of the military is accomplished and there is no military interference. The 'worst' means high military intervention, 'poor' means a medium interference and 'mixed' means low interference of the military into the politics. He classifies these different conditions in a chart which is illustrated below.

---

[36] Desch, p.12
[37] Desch, p.12
[38] Desch, p.13

Table 2: Desch's Illustration of Civilian Control of the Military as a Function of Location and Intensity of Threat

		External Threats	
		High	Low
Internal Threats	High	(Q3) Poor	(Q4) Worst
	Low	(Q1)Good	(Q2) Mixed

Source: Desch, 1999, p.14

In this chart, quadrant 1 (Q1) illustrates the situations where states while confronting high external threats are challenged by low internal threats. Desch states that, in such situations, civil-military relations becomes in the most stable condition since the military concentrates on external threats and does not get involved with internal threats since they are really low. When it comes to external threats, civilian institutions will tend to be more integrated and unified in order to vigorously resist these threats and they will trust to military forces to fight against international threats. The military will be much more in a harmony with the civilian governments if the necessary resources are supplied by the state during these external missions.[39]

In the second quadrant (Q4) of the chart, states, facing low external and high internal threats, are portrayed. In such a situation, the cohesiveness of civilian institutions may be decrease. They mostly concentrate on national security affairs and they could be weak and extremely divided. In order to gain military support in those domestic struggles, they encourage subjective control mechanisms. That means, while different civilian groups are competing for their conflicting interests, coordination and the cohesiveness of these civilians become impossible and one civilian group may attempt to increase its power at the expense of other civilian groups by encouraging the military. This situation politicizes the military and the effectiveness of the military increases within the domestic political system. Desch states that, in these situations, the military institutions tend to make direct military

---

[39] Desch, pp. 13-14

interventions into the politics which creates the 'worst' condition in terms of civilian control of the military. For example, most of the threats to Third World countries had been internal.[40]

In the third quadrant (Q2) of the chart, one of indeterminate threat environments is illustrated where the states face low internal and low external threats. In this case, civilian leadership may give up objective control that are divided and have conflicting interests on the one side. On the other side, military institutions may be divided and less cohesive because of the lack of clear threats which may reduce the military's capability of collective action. Therefore, low level civil-military conflict may be expected in such situation that the condition of the civilian control of the military is defined as 'mixed' in the third quadrant.[41]

The last quadrant (Q3) demonstrates the situation where the states face high internal and high external threats. This is also an example of indeterminate threat environment and one of the complicated situations along with the Q2. There is not any accuracy about the leadership styles in this situation whether a challenging security environment may bring experienced civilian leaders to power or not. While competing domestic and international threats lead to a division among civilian institutions on the one hand, it may unify the military institutions and orient them toward collective action against these high internal and external threats, on the other.

However these twofold threats may cause the unclearness for the military's position. On the one hand, the military may prefer to stay outside politics because of the existence of external threat which could defeat the military. On the other hand, the ideas of military and civilians may not be in harmony as well as there may be division among the civilians. In this situation, existence of high internal and external threats brings out concerted actions and the effectiveness of the military. As a consequence, this fourth situation is defined as 'poor' in terms of civilian control of the military.[42]

The case study of this thesis why Turkish military's impact in foreign policy dramatically increased during Refahyol government will be analyzed with this last

---

[40] Desch, pp.14-15
[41] Desch, pp.16-17
[42] Desch, p.17

quadrant in which both internal and external threats are high and the civilian control of the politics is low. In this case study it will be shown how there was no harmony between civilians and the military and how the military became more effective in politics.

III. REGIME FRAGMENTATION AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Comparative Politics explain events and outcomes through three research traditions which include culture, structure and rational choice. While rational choice focuses on actors and considers actors as rational choosing the alternative that will maximize their interests, the cultural approaches bring an explanation to the outcomes by looking at the culture of a society. Similar to social constructivism, it claims that cultural issues such as religion, nationality etc, shapes the outcomes. The third one structural analysis claims that the structures shape outcomes. Structuralists focus on social and political institutions and emphasize formal organizations of regime characteristics.[43] Structuralism is a methodology and a scientific approach, which considers a social phenomenon that are governed by autonomous law-governed structures rather than making a historical interpretation. According to this approach, the structures of these institutions have determinative effects over social phenomenon.[44]

In this context, the governmental system as a structural phenomenon shapes the decision-making in a country and as a result the policies of the governments. Whether the country is ruled by presidential system or parliamentary system has a significant impact on how the decisions are made in this country. As another example after elections, whether a government with a parliamentary system is ruled by a majoritarian government or a coalition government also shapes the policy-making in the country.

In the parliamentary systems, the political party that receives the highest number of votes establishes the government. The leader of this party is automatically

[43] Ira Katznelson, "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics", **Comparative Politics, Rationality, Culture and Structure**, (eds., Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1997, pp.81-88.
[44] Theodore R. Schatzki**, "**Structuralism in Social Science**", Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,** https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/structuralism-in-social-science, (21.06.2015)

appointed as the prime minister by the president. In other words, the president gives the job of establishing a government to this party. The newly established government asks for the vote of confidence by the parliament and once it receives it, it can start running the country. If it can't receive vote of confidence the president appoints the leader of the second party to establish a government. In parliamentary systems government can also abolish the parliament and call for an election.

Turkey that follows a parliamentary system also follows a proportional representation system as its election system. Proportional representation system compared majoritarian election system is more democratic giving the chance to many parties to be represented in the parliament. Therefore, in countries that follows proportional representation system while majority government can be established, there is a higher chance of establishment of coalition governments.[45] In other words, the proportional representation system mostly leads to a situation where no party gains the majority of seats and leads to coalition government.[46] It creates more fragmented situation than the situation of majoritarian government of one single party.

Coalitions are usually formed between the parties which have close ideological positions or between the parties within the same ideological bloc such as the blocs on the left or on the right. Even when these parties belong to the same ideological bloc they will still have differences of opinions in many policies and they may establish unstable coalitions. While these differences come together with a veto power that is carried by coalition partners, it is getting more difficult to create a stable and common policy.[47] It even gets worse when the coalition members belong to different ideologies. In such cases these parties try to follow different domestic and foreign policies without consulting each other and such a situation leads to chaos. Therefore, fragmented regimes are established in these countries.

According to Hagan, regime fragmentation "concerns the degree to which central political leadership of a government is fragmented by persisting, internal

---

[45] Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, **Comparative Government and Politics**, Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2004, p.274
[46] Hague, p. 275
[47] Jacob De Haan, Jan-Egbert Sturm and Geert Beekhuis, "The Weak Government Thesis: Some New Evidence", **Public Choice**, Vol. 101, p. 164

political divisions in the form of competing personalities, institutions/bureaucracies, factions, or competing parties or other such political groups."[48] This fragmentation and political divisions are crucial within a regime due to the possibility that they would lead to conflicts in the foreign policy decision making process and prevent the decision makers to pursue particular actions. Hagan also differentiates political divisions within three basic political arenas that are the cabinet, the legislature and the leaders of political parties. These types of regimes are classified by Hagan at the five categories ranging from much unified regimes to highly divided ones.[49]

The first fragmented regime type is *regimes dominated by a single, individual leader*. This situation occurs when there is a little power exists within the regime independently of the leader. Because the leader dominates all bureaucracy, and thus, there is little autonomy that belongs to other institutions. Soviet Union under Stalin regime and Franco's Spain can be given as examples of regimes dominated by a single, individual leader.[50]

The second fragmented regime type is *regimes dominated by a single, cohesive party/group in which there exist established, autonomous bureaucracies and institutions*. This happens when there is a single political group or leader again. However this group or leader does not have complete dominance over the party, legislative or executive branches. There is an institutionalization of other groups and they have influence within policy making process as it happened during Brezhnev period in the Soviet Union.[51]

The third fragmented regime type is *regimes dominated by a single party/group that is itself internally divided by established political factions*. It occurs because of the competition among these political factions for the party leadership. Therefore they differ in policy matters and do not agree with each other. Italian

---

[48] Joe D. Hagan, "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy", **New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy**, (eds. Charles F. Hermann at all), Allen&Unwin, Boston, 1987, p.344
[49] Hagan, p.344
[50] Hagan, p. 345
[51] Hagan, p. 345

Christian Democratic Party can be given as example of a party that is internally divided by political factions.[52]

The fourth fragmented regime type is *regimes in which the ruling party/group shares power with one or more minor parties/groups (which probably do not share the same ideology).* This situation occurs when the dominant party does not have absolute majority in the parliament and thus one or more minor or junior groups share the authority. Coalition government of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats in Germany is one of the examples of this regime type.[53]

The fifth fragmented regime type is regimes *in which there is no clear dominant party or group-there exist a coalition of autonomous groups.* In this situation, regime is witnessed to the absence of leadership that would direct the regime. Policy making is fragmented due to both lack of leadership and threats of any group within the regime to withdraw from the coalition. Israel is a good example because of the fragmentation between Labour and Likud party in the coalition.[54]

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the democratic systems, existence of civilian control of the military is a presupposition. However, as Claude Welch states, 'civilian control is a matter of degree' and thus military probably participates in politics at different levels. For this reason this thesis firstly attempts to clarify these different levels of military participation in politics. The thesis mainly focuses on "military control with partners" conceptionalization of Welch in order to demonstrate the position of Turkish military in the political structure during the period under examination.

As part of realism, the thesis concentrates on the relation between the intensity of the threats and the civilian control or in other words, military's control. In this context, the study resorts to Desch's framework that examines the relationship between internal and external threats and civilian control. This thesis focuses on

---

[52] Hagan, p. 345
[53] Hagan, p. 345
[54] Hagan, p. 345

"high internal and high external threats" categorization of Desch in an attempt to analyze the impact of military on foreign policy during the Refahyol coalition period.

As the third approach that helps to examine the case study, the thesis focuses on a structural analysis of comparative politics by looking at the regime fragmentation during the period under examination. It takes the vulnerability and fragility of the coalition governments into consideration in this analysis. It considers the types of governments and their strength or weaknesses as other important determinants to explain the prominence of the military.

CHAPTER 2
THE IMPACT OF THE ARMED FORCES ON
TURKISH POLITICS AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

As the leading force behind the creation of the Turkish nation-state and the guardian of the Kemalist ideology and principles, TSK had always had a unique position in Turkish politics. In its attempt to protect Atatürk's reforms and principles Turkish military has sometimes intervened into the politics directly or indirectly, published memorandums or monitored the political system through its institutional and non-institutional mechanisms. Although the Turkish military mainly intervened into domestic politics, there were periods such as mid to late 1990s when it also intervened into foreign policy and determined the agenda of foreign policy. This chapter will analyze the role of the military in Turkish politics by mainly concentrating on its influence in domestic politics starting with the Ottoman period and continuing with the early years of the Republic, multi-party period and the 1990s where the military's impact on also foreign policy making dramatically increased. In this analysis besides the role of military in politics, the chapter will also analyze the external and internal actors that affected the foreign policy making in Turkey. The period of mid to late 1990s, as the main subject of this thesis, where the military's impact on foreign policy drastically increased, will be examined in a separate chapter.

I. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS DURING THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE PERIOD

The nomadic Turkish tribes living in Central Asia were warriors moving from one region to another and settling to these areas. They established their army before the formation of their nation. The warrior character of Turks continued during the Selçuk Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire.[55] The Ottoman Empire was created by the

---

[55] Gareth Jenkins, **Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics**, Routledge, United States, 2001, p.10

military conquests and the frontiers of the empire were determined by the army which led the empire to become a powerful world empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[56] Machiavelli had also identified this power of Ottoman Empire with the regular central army.[57]

During the Ottoman period, the society was composed of two main categories: The sultan, the military and the ulema (religious officials) who were at the top of the society as the ruling elite and Muslim and non-Muslim subjects were located at the bottom who were mainly worked as merchants and peasants.[58] The ruling elite did not create an autonomous body in the Empire. They were the slaves and the servants of the Sultan.[59] The civil and military bureaucracy acted as the representatives of the sultan's power and the most important officers.[60] The military's right to carry arms, being exempt from paying taxes and receiving regular wages had demonstrated its power and significance in the Ottoman society. Furthermore, the population that was called reaya, consisted of the landless agricultural community had to pay taxes. The military bureaucracy that served as intermediaries between the center and the periphery had a close connection with the state. This intermediary role of the military also continued during the period of Kemalist republic.[61]

Ottoman army was composed of three parts; a slave army, a territorial army and auxiliaries. Members of this slave army were mainly non-Muslim; some of them were captured in war or purchased from slave traders and the rest of them were brought as tax gift from Christian communities in Balkans. The name of this system was devşirme which constituted the origin of the Ottoman army. These were young boys taken from the non-Muslim societies. They were trained in the palace schools. While the clever ones took positions in the palace, the others were trained as soldiers to fight in the Sultan's royal army, the Janissaries (Yeniçeri—New Army).[62] The

---

[56] William Hale, **Turkish Politics and the Military**, Routledge, London, New York, 1994, (Military) p.3
[57] Taner Timur, **Osmanlı Toplumsal Düzeni**, İmge, Ankara, 1994, pp.279-280
[58] Nilüfer Narlı, "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey", **Journal for Turkish Studies**, Vol.1, No.1, Spring 2000, p. 108
[59] Hale, **Military**, p.3
[60] Eric J. Zürcher, **Turkey: A Modern History**, I.B. Tauris&Co, Third edition, New York, pp.11-12
[61] Narli, p. 108
[62] Hale, Military, p.3

Janissaries formed the largest part of the Ottoman army as infantries that established a regular army. As a standing army, they were always ready for the war.[63] The second pillar of the army was Territorial Army that was consisted of semi-feudal *Sipahi* cavalry.[64] Although, the most of the agricultural land was the property of the sultan, the right of disposition was delivered to sipahis, the cavalries. During the time of war, these sipahis were expected to join the Ottoman army while during the peacetime they were busy collecting taxes, maintaining law and order in their territories and train their cavalries for the war.[65] The slave army (janissaries) and the Territorial Army (sipahis) formed the largest part of the Ottoman Army and they were supported by the auxiliaries which was the third pillar of the organization of Ottoman Army. The auxiliaries were non-military and less professional members of the army that generally consisted of local Muslim population.[66]

The analysis of three kinds of militaries during the Ottoman Empire demonstrates the highly integration of the army and the political system with the diversified functions of the army such as military conquest, tax collection, maintenance of law and order. The army became the counter force behind the state against to the feudal system and constituted the strength of the Ottoman Empire.

In the 18th century Ottoman Empire fell behind the technological, economic and military developments of the newly emerged nation states in Western Europe. Ottoman Empire neither has not gone through the Renaissance and Reform processes Europe had experienced not it experience the industrial revolution of Europe. This backwardness mainly showed itself on the military front when Ottoman militaries started losing wars.[67] In order to reach technological level of Europe in the military, Sultan Selim III established Nizam-i Cedid (new order) in 1793. This was a new modern military corps based on European model.[68] The military officers who were sent to Europe were trained by European trainers and they imported Western technology and organization model to the empire. Besides this military technology transfer, these soldiers that were sent to Europe also became the vanguard of Western

---

[63] Zürcher, p. 15
[64] Zürcher, p.
[65] Timur, pp.5-6
[66] Hale, Military, p.
[67] Zürcher, p. 19
[68] Hale, Military, p.15

style of modernization and established first secular schools, attempted to simplify the Turkish script and established westernized institutions.[69]

It is argued that, with the weakening power of the Empire, the politicized military abandoned serving to the sultan's authority and played a crucial role in the reform movements such as constitutional revolutions in the absence of a bourgeoisie class which existed in the Western countries.[70] The military constituted the progressive face of the Empire in contrary to the unprogressive elements and became the only institution remained alive from the Ottoman Empire.[71] With its westernized and secular characteristics, military took place in the foundation of new Turkish Republic and became an effective institution in this new Republic's modernization and consolidation process.

II. THE IMPACT OF TURKISH MILITARY ON DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE REPUBLICAN ERA

As the founders of the Republic of Turkey and the guardians of Kemalist principles and reforms, Turkish military's impact in politics of the young Republic of Turkey was significant. The military did not intervene into politics as long as the Kemalist principles and reforms were kept intact. However, once they were in danger, the military did not refrain from interfering into politics. In the early years of the Republic as part of the state elite that was in charge of the modernization process, the military had a vital effect in Turkish politics.

A. The Role of Turkish Military in Domestic and Foreign Policy During the Early Years of the Republic

Following the Ottoman era, in the aftermath of the First World War and Turkish War of Independence, the new Turkish state was established under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal who was also a military officer in the Ottoman Empire. Newly established Turkish state relied on the Western ideals and democratic

---

[69] Jenkins, p.10
[70] Begüm Burak, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: To Guard Whom and From What?", **European Journal of Economic and Political Studies**, Vol.4, No.1, Summer 2011, p.147
[71] Burak, p.145

principles. Turkish military elites played a crucial role in the establishment of the modern nation-state. In the early years of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal tried to isolate the military from the politics and requested from the military commanders to take off their uniforms if they wanted to get involved in the politics. In spite of this precaution, TSK remained as an important institution in Turkish politics during this period acting as the protector of Kemalist principles and reforms. Kemalist reforms and principles have particularly focused on the secularity of the nation and the creation of a nation state. These were difficult reforms to accomplish since the people had lived under the Ottoman autocratic rule for more than 600 years. Religion was important in their life and they did not know what a nation state meant. Through various rebellions such as Sheik Said, which aimed to establish an Islamic system, these reforms were challenged. They were all suppressed by the military.[72]

The military undertook the role of preserving the principles of Kemalism and the security and has been the leading force in Turkish modernization that represented a challenge to the Islamist and separatist challenges.[73] In other words, Turkish Armed Forces from the very beginning have had a substantial mission and an autonomous status to protect the state from external and internal enemies, to secure the "survival of the state" and accepted the self-assigned task of legitimate guarantor of Kemalist ideology.[74] However this political and institutional autonomy created a fragile democracy in Turkey and gave the chance to the military to interfere into politics whenever they felt a threat to their reforms and principles.

In the early years of the Republic, the military's role was limited to the domestic politics. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk kept the military out of the realm of foreign policy.[75] This period can be categorized as the leader dominated foreign policy orientation since Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü determined most of the foreign policy decisions. The military as the guarantors of Kemalist reforms and

---

[72] Baskın Oran, "1923-1939: Göreli Özerklik 1", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, (ed. Baskın Oran), Vol.1, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, (Göreli Özerklik-1), p.74
[73] Narli, p. 108
[74] Burak, p.144
[75] İlhan Uzgel,"TDP'nin Oluşturulması", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**,(ed. Baskın Oran), Vol.1, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, (TDP), p.74

principles was busy with the establishment of the modern nation state. [76] Although the foreign policy was not under the control of the military it was actually dominated by two ex-military leaders, Atatürk and İnönü.

During the interwar period, Turkey attempted to keep its neutrality by not allying with neither side. During the War, Turkey followed a balance of power politics and signed Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship Agreements with all the neighboring countries to keep itself out of war. During this period, Turkey was only interested in the problems left over from the Lausanne Conference.[77] Turkey signed non-aggression pacts with both sides. However, the chaotic international atmosphere after the invasion of Poland by the Germany put Turkey in a difficult situation. However, despite the German threat. Rather than being directly involved in the war, Turkey remained as a non-belligerent state and managed to join the war in the last three months of the war on the side of the Ally Forces, as a result of successful diplomacy of İnönü. In this sense, during this period Turkish foreign policy can be considered as de facto neutrality due to its success to abstain from entering into war while taking parts within the alliance.[78]

B. The Role of the Military in Domestic and Foreign Politics During the Multiparty Period Until the 1980s

Transition to multi-party period had taken place with the participation of Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti* –DP) to the 1946 elections. The dynamics of Turkish politics tremendously changed during the multi-party era and throughout the 1960s and 1970s. As a result of its electoral victories DP has been in power for a decade from 1950 until 1960. DP that was mainly supported by the periphery, the rural masses curtailed military's role in domestic politics. As a result of DP's authoritarian tendencies and the anti-secular policies, Turkish military overthrew the

---

[76] Müge Aknur, "TSK'nın Dış Politika Üzerindeki Etkisi", **Türkiye'nin Değişen Dış Politikası**, (ed. Cüneyt Yenigün and Ertan Efegil), Vol.1, Nobel, Ankara, 2010, (TSK), p. 129
[77] Oran, "Göreli Özerklik-1", pp.241-254; William Hale, **Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000**, Frank Cass, London and Portland, 2000, (Turkish Foreign Policy), pp.71-72
[78] Baskın Oran, "1939-1945: Savaş Kaosunda Türkiye: Göreli Özerklik-2", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, (ed. Baskın Oran), Vol.1, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, (Göreli Özerklik-2), pp.387-398; Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp.103-104

DP government from power through the 1960 coup. The liberal atmosphere brought by the 1961 Constitution caused the formation of the extreme rightist and leftist movements that led to an anarchic atmosphere, forcing the military to intervene into domestic politics once again in 1971 and in 1980.

Republican Peoples' Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP*) that ruled the country as the single party since the establishment of the republic until the 1950 elections could be considered as a member of the coalition between the military-civil bureaucracy, trader-industrialists and large land owners.[79] As a result of transition to multi-party politics and DP's coming to power, Turkish military was not able to play an active role neither in domestic nor foreign politics of the country. Besides its limited and technical help during Turkey's membership to Baghdad Pact and NATO, the military did not have much influence in the foreign policy decision-making process during the 1950s.[80] Concerning foreign policy, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes did not consult the military when he decided to send troops to Korea as part of the United Nation's operation. When he received a reaction from the Armed Forces, he stated that "If necessary, I can rule the military with the reserve officials".[81] This statement showed how the civilian administration of the period was dominant in both domestic and foreign politics. However, towards the end of 1950s, Menderes left the foreign policy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. [82]

As a result of deteriorating economy and the increasing opposition to the authoritarian tendencies of DP government, DP government became more autocratic to preserve its power vis-à-vis the rising oppositions by implementing censorship to the press, establishing investigation committees, imposing martial laws and outlawing the demonstrations. Between the 1950 and 1960, the DP rule created resentment on the pro-secular and modernist elites in Turkey as a result of its Islamist-populist policies. In attempt to decrease the role of the military and the bureaucracy in the politics while increasing the influence of the entrepreneurs and landowners, Prime Minister Menderes took the Constitutional power in his own control. While this policy led to growth in size of the middle class, the prestige and

---

[79] Tevfik Çavdar, **Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi: 1839-1950**, İmge, Ankara, 2004, p.446
[80] Aknur, TSK, p.130
[81] Uzgel, TDP, p.77
[82] Uzgel, TDP, p.75

the influence of the military-bureaucracy weakened rapidly.[83] In addition to these, DP's economic programme had caused to trade deficit due to high quantity of import of materials and machinery. The value of Turkish lira immediately fell as a result of devaluations and inflation.[84] Moreover, the investigatory commissions established by the DP to inspect the activities of the opposition became the means of the oppression over the opposition. These commissions led to the critics of the public opinion and the students who started demonstrations on the streets. These demonstrations harshly suppressed by the DP government.[85] All of these developments and the problematic political and economic atmosphere led to the first military coup in the Republican history of Turkey in 1960.

1.   27 May 1960 Coup d'état

As a result of anti-democratic and anti-secular policies of DP government, junior members of the military intervened into the politics and implemented the coup d'état on 27 May 1960. National Unity Committee (*Milli Birlik Komitesi*-MBK) that ruled the country until the 1961 elections was established under the leadership of General Cemal Gürsel. According to the Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Service Internal Service Code of 1961, "duty of the armed forces is to protect and safeguard Turkish territory and the Turkish Republic as stipulated by the constitution".[86] In this respect, the military's intervention into the politics was legal due to the military's duty to protect the state. According to the first declaration of National Unity Committee, military manifested its mission as giving an end to the fights on the streets. Moreover, it also declared that Turkey was still loyal to NATO and CENTO in its foreign policy.[87] MBK acted such as the legislative and executive institution and issued a new constitution in 1961 which increased the civil liberties and social

---

[83] Kemal H. Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980" **State Democracy and the Military**, (ed. Ahmet Evin and Metin Heper), Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1988, (Military Interventions), pp.138-139
[84] Zürcher, pp.226-236
[85] Zürcher, pp.239-240
[86] David Capezza, "Turkey's Military Is a Catalyst for Reform: The Military in Politics", **The Middle East Quarterly**, Vol.16, No.3, Summer 2009, http://www.meforum.org/2160/turkey-military-catalyst-for-reform, (09.06.2015)
[87] Çavdar, p.86

rights. [88] 1961 Constitution increased the liberties and established a Constitutional Court.[89] However, besides these liberal institutions, National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*-MGK) was established in order to control the system and prevent any possible attempt that would try to contest the Kemalist principles and revolutions that became a state ideology of Turkish nation state.

As a result of the 1960 coup and the prerogatives the military received in the 1961 coup, TSK started to get more involve into politics. MGK was founded with the Article 111 by the 1961 Constitution "in order to assist the Council of Ministers in decision making process related to national security issues and providing necessary coordination, was responsible for submission of basic views to the Council of Ministers".[90] Along the same line, establishment of 'Armed Forces Union' provided the military full authority over the political authority in order to prevent any future possible attempts to interfere into politics by the junior officers.[91] In addition, Turkish Armed Forces Assistance Fund (*Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu-OYAK*) was founded in 1961.[92] These institutions enabled TSK to widen its autonomy both institutionally and economically, thus increasing its power in Turkish politics. Moreover, with the new Constitution, the General Staff became directly responsible to the Prime Minister's Office instead of Ministry of National Defense, which also contributed to the increase of the weight of the military in the political system.[93] The 1961 Constitution and the establishment of MGK enabled military's direct involvement to domestic policy actively. Accordingly, during the 1970s the military intervened into politics through an indirect coup by memorandum.

Following a couple of coalition attempts in the aftermath of 1960 coup in the early 1960s, in the 1965 elections, the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi-AP*), which was a

---

[88] Burak, p.149

[89] According to 1961 Constitution, "Sovereignty belongs to the nation, unconditionally" and "Turkish nation uses its sovereignty according to the principles laid down in Constitution, by the competent authorities" that describes the mission of Constitutional Court as a competent authority which can control the constitutionality of laws issued by the parliament http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=template&id=176&lang=0 (18.12.2012)

[90] http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Ingilizce/Tarihce/tarihce003_en.htm (18.12.2012)

[91] Çavdar, p.109

[92] "OYAK acts as an insurance company and also as a financial institution that provides its members with the financial support in the form of credit products that address their particular needs at different stages of their life." See http://www.oyak.com.tr/EN/corporate/oyak-in-brief.html (18.12.2012)

[93] Uzgel, TDP, p.79

successor of the DP, won the majority of the votes and ruled the country until 1971. The increase in the extreme rightist and leftist movements as a result of the liberal constitution and the international environment, new ideology-based parties such as Turkish Worker's Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi-TİP*) were established. AP was not able to suppress the clashes between increasing extreme rightist and leftists and stop the violence. AP's legitimacy crisis and incompetence led to the 1971 military memorandum.[94]

Besides the tumultuous domestic politics, Turkey had experienced the Cyprus crisis where it had decided to launch a military intervention in 1964 under the Treaty of Guarantee but then stepped back as a result of a warning that came from the American President Johnson. US's unilateral decision to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in 1963 as well as the rise in the leftist ideology increased the anti-US sentiments in Turkey.[95] Turkey's deteriorating relations with the US led the Turkish governments to pursue a relatively more autonomous foreign policy throughout the 1960s by attempting to improve its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union as well as the nonaligned and Middle Eastern countries. As a result, Turkey remained neutral during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.[96]

2.   12 March 1971 Memorandum

As a result of liberal atmosphere created by the 1961 constitution, the demands of social justice and political right increased. As already stated TİP that was recently established managed to enter the parliament in the 1965 elections. The rise in students and workers' demonstrations and the ruling AP's support for the statist-elitists, conservative Islamist groups as well as the nationalists increased the polarization and violence in the country. When the government could not respond to this chaos, the military this time intervened into politics though a memorandum on

---

[94] Zürcher, pp.245-258; Roger P. Nye, "Civil-Military Confrontation in Turkey: The 1973 Presidential Election", **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, Vol. 8, No. 2, Apr., 1977, pp. 211-213
[95] Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp.133-139
[96] Baskın Oran, "1960-1980: Göreli Özerklik-3", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, (ed. Baskın Oran), Vol.1, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, (Göreli Özerklik-3), pp.673-679

the 12th of March 1971 (it is commonly known as 12 March Memorandum). By intervening into politics in March 1971, the military actually, "exercised a veto over civilian authorities with the goal of preserving the social and economic status quo".[97]

Following the 1971 memorandum, in an attempt to give an end to the extreme leftist and rightist violence, the military through some constitutional amendments put restrictions to fundamental rights and freedoms. For example, according to the amendment to Article 11, "fundamental rights and freedoms could be limited for the benefit of the integrity of the state with its territory and nation, republic, national security and public order" and through the addition of Article 136 to the 1961 Constitution, "State Security Courts" (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri-DGM*) were established in 1973.[98] The DGMs were established for the trial of the cases concerning the internal and external threats to the security of the state and the crimes against the unity of the state and the Republic.[99] These crimes included 99 different Articles covered by the Penal Code such as genocide, war crimes, fire arms, strikes and lockouts. Among these Articles, the most famous ones were 141, 142 and 163 of the Penal Code. 141 and 142 were used against the Leftist ideologies while the 162 directed against the anti-secularist and religiously-inspired activities. The DGMs that included military judges could also put civilians into trial. Therefore, these courts increased the impact of the military in judiciary.[100]

The 1971 amendments improved the strength of the TSK both politically and economically. The amendments stressed the concept of "national security" that securitized the civil and political realms in favor of the Armed Forces. Moreover, the amendments lessened monitoring, control and auditing of military spending, as well as extending the role of MGK from "recommending" to "submitting" to the Council of Ministers while dropping the word "assisting".[101] According to 1961 Constitution, the armed forces' representatives would join the MGK. By the 1971 amendments, the word "representatives" was replaced by "commanders". As a result of these

---

[97] Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey**", Comparative Politics**, Vol. 16, No. 1, Oct., 1983, p23
[98] Çavdar, p.209
[99] Abdullah Pulat Gözübüyük, "Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemelerinin Görevleri", http://www.ankarabarosu.org.tr/siteler/ankarabarosu/tekmakale/1974-1/7.pdf, (05.06.2015)
[100] William Hale, "Turkish Democracy in Travail: The Case of the State Security Courts", **The World Today**, Vol. 33, No. 5, May 1977, (Turkish Democracy), pp.187-188
[101] Burak, p.151

changes, the five commanders of the army had automatically become the members of the MGK increasing the autonomy of the military.[102] These amendments also expanded the strength of the MGK both on domestic and foreign policy concerning the national security issues. However, rather than playing an active role on foreign policy, military remained within the borders of more technical issues on foreign policy in these years.

While the military in alliance with the state elite intervened briefly into foreign policy during the 1960 coup and its immediate aftermath, in the 1970s, public opinion played a significant role in foreign policy making. The foreign policy issues which were above politics and political parties were now discussed by the civil society organizations and the public.[103] The extreme rightist and leftist movements on the street in an indirect way shaped the Turkish foreign policy; particularly Turkey's deteriorating relations with the USA. While the military still had a say in the events like the Cyprus crisis, the public opinion was quite influential in decision-making.

12 March coup by memorandum led to the establishment of a technocratic under the leaderships of Nihat Erim, Ferit Melen and Naim Talu. While the parliamentary groups of the political parties kept their seats in the parliament, a group of technocrats under the influence of the military commanders established the government. Technocratic governments continued restricting freedoms through new constitutional amendments; however, they could stop the clashes on the streets.[104] Once the elections were restored, in the 1973 elections Bülent Ecevit the young leftist leaders of CHP made the mistake of allying with the Islamist National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP*). This coalition did not last long, but in their short period in power they implemented the Cyprus Peace Operation in the summer of 1974. The rightist parties under the title of National Front took over the power and ruled the country until the 1977 elections. Late 1970s were the years of chaos with the vulnerable and fragile coalition governments that could not stop the polarization and violence on the street. The second National Front government was

---

[102] Ergun Özbudun, **Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation**, Lynne Rienner Publication, London, March 2000, p.108
[103] Uzgel, TDP, pp.78-80
[104] Nye, pp.213-228

also incompetent of stopping the bloodshed that included the Maraş and Çorum Massacres and the 1st of May events of 1977 in Istanbul.[105]

Cyprus Peace Operation was the most significant foreign policy decision of the Ecevit-Erbakan coalition government in 1974. This operation was also a sign of Turkey following an independent foreign policy from the USA. By intervening into Cyprus affairs, Turkey was actually challenging its alliance with the USA. The US ban on Turkish production of opium in 1971 and the US arms embargo to Turkey in 1974 had also contributed to the deteriorating relations between the two countries. Consequently, Turkey had continued its multi-dimensional foreign policy throughout the 1970s. Besides the anarchy on the streets, economic problems reached to a peak point as a result of the increase in oil prices and policies followed by the USA. Turkey continued improving its relations with the Middle Eastern countries and continued its neutral position between the Arab states and Israel during 1973 Arab-Israeli War.[106]

C. The Role of Military in Domestic and Foreign Politics During 1980 Coup Period

1971 military memorandum did not resolve the problems within the country and the polarization between the Leftists and Rightists, Nationalists and Kurds and Sunni and Alevis increased tremendously. Fragmented weak coalitions enhanced the polarization. This period had witnessed to the increase in number of the university students and industrial proletariat, which led to the mass mobilization under the leftist organizations, parties and trade unions such as the Federation of Debating Societies (*Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu*-FKF) and the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*-DİSK) as well as political parties such as TİP, which were established in 1960s. In contrary to the leftist ideology, the right-wing political movements also increased under the organizations and the parties such as Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket*

---

[105] Zürcher, pp.258-262
[106] Oran, Göreli Özerklik-3, pp.673-679

Partisi-MHP) and the 'Hearths of the Ideal' (*Ülkü Ocakları*).[107] As stated before, this high mobility and politicization in the society increased violence between these opposite groups. In addition to this polarization, the coalition governments established between the 1973 and 1980 were mostly weak that led to the influence of the small extremist groups within the political system.[108] Political collapse of the state enhanced the legitimacy crises and power vacuum. This social unrest, increased violence between the ideologically fragmented groups and the legitimacy crisis also deepened the economic crisis in the 1970s where the industrial bourgeoisie demanded the structural changes in the Turkish economy. In these circumstances, 24 January 1980 economical measures were offered by the government as prescriptions of International Monetary Fund which would lead country to market oriented economy, in other words, to the liberalization in the economy.[109] However under these economic and political conditions, implementation of 24 January measurements was very difficult.

Eventually, on 12 September 1980, military intervened into politics and Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren and the Generals of Navy, Land and Air Forces seized the control of the state. Besides bringing numerous restrictions on freedoms, the coup administration also implemented the 24 January decisions that brought the capitalist system as well as the market economy to the country. Starting from September 1980 until November 1983 elections, Turkish military became the single authority dominating both domestic and foreign policy in the country.[110] In the aftermath of the 1980 coup d'état, all political parties were banned. Turkish politics was reorganized through the formation of a new legal-institutional framework. The 1961 Constitution, which had seen as a liberal constitution, was replaced by the authoritarian 1982 Constitution.[111] "The new Constitution put extensive limits on basic rights and liberties, which could now be curtailed by law for the protection of national or public concerns. It also put restrictions on the organization and activities

---

[107] Zürcher, pp.253-257
[108] Zürcher, p.262
[109] Ayan, p.7
[110] Aknur, "TSK", p.130
[111] Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey", **State Democracy and the Military**, (ed. Ahmet Evin and Metin Heper), Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1988, (The State), p.126

of political parties and voluntary associations".[112] In addition to these restrictions, the influence of the Islam in Turkish politics had enhanced as a result of the "green belt" doctrine of the military regime that encouraged the Islamist movement against to the communist threat.

Authority and the efficiency of the MGK on the decision-making process increased with this new constitution as the number of military members in the MGK also increased. The new constitution also forced the cabinet to give priority to the decisions of the council meetings.[113] Additionally in 1983, MGK and MGK Secretariat were given the power to enable the usage of secretariat as a mechanism to set down the security policies and influence the policies of the cabinet.[114] "These institutional mechanisms allowed the military to perform its guardianship role, without resorting to direct interventions or forceful coups."[115]

1982 Constitution that was created by the military authorities made authoritarian changes in every aspects of life as militarizing and providing strict controls over them. Establishments of Higher Education Council (YÖK) and Radio-Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) brought centralized military control over the universities and media.[116] Along the same line, the right to establish trade unions and principles of the political parties were restricted, while the duties and powers of MGK and DGM were increased. As a striking example, in the event of the declaration of martial law in the DGM's jurisdiction area, DGMs in those areas could be converted to Military Commissions.[117] In short, 1982 Constitution limited the basic rights and liberties, as well as the scope of the civilian judiciary branch. But at the same time it strengthened the political autonomy of the military as well as the authority of the president.[118] In the first elections held in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, in November 1983, Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi—* ANAP) came to power. Although the Turkish military orchestrated the elections in such a way to bring the parties of their own choice to power, people voted for Özal

---

[112] Toprak, The State, p.127
[113] Yaprak Gürsoy, "The Changing Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: Democratization Through Coup Plots?" **Democratization**, Vol. 19, No. 4, August 2012, p.742
[114] Uzgel, TDP, p.81
[115] Gürsoy, p.742
[116] Burak, p.152
[117] Çavdar, p.268
[118] Burak, p.152

who was not their choice. Özal followed an economic liberalization policy during this period.

Despite the fact that, 12 September 1980 military coup increased the power of the military and of its most important branch to get involved in the politics, of MGK, prime minister/president Turgut Özal controlled both domestic and foreign politics in Turkey from mid-1980s until 1990s, as a result of his dominant leadership style. [119] Moreover, as a result of Turkey's economic integration to the capitalist world the role of the business world increased in foreign policy-making in the 1980s. Turgut Özal was also a truly liberal political leader who intensified economic liberalization programme in Turkey by re-established the ideological bond with the West. Özal applied for the membership of the European Economic Community for the in 1987, but did not succeed. Moreover, he signed Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement in 1980 and it re-opened its bases to the US under this treaty. In return, the US increased military and economic aid s towards Turkey. While Turkey was restoring its relations with the West, its relations deteriorated with the Soviet Union until 1985. However, after Gorbachev came to power in 1985 in the Soviet Union, Turkey and the Soviets started to develop their bilateral relations.[120] Besides Turkey's developing relations with the US and the West, Turkey had continued its economic relations with the Middle Eastern countries and became the biggest trade partner of Iraq. During this period, Arab-Israeli Peace negotiations had also led to a development in Turkish-Israeli relations. In sum, this period Turkish foreign policy could be defined as relative autonomy under the Western axis according to Baskın Oran.[121]

---

[119] Aknur, TSK, p.130
[120] Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp.164-166
[121] Baskın Oran, "1980-1990: Batı Bloku Ekseninde Türkiye-2", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol.2**, (ed. Baskın Oran), İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, (Batı Bloku), pp.9-11

D. The Role of Military in domestic and foreign policy in the early 1990s

While in the early 1990s, the leadership of Turgut Özal as the president dominated Turkish politics, the second half of 1990s was again under the influence of the military. Özal's ANAP that dominated politics for two terms between 1983 and 1991 lost the elections to Süleyman Demirel's DYP and Erdal İnönü's Social Democrat Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti* –SHP). Turkey went back to coalition governments once more time after an eight year of single party rule.

The most significant internal threats of the 1990s were the rise of Kurdish nationalism that showed itself as the PKK terror and political Islam. Kurdish problem that showed itself as Kurdish Workers Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan –PKK) attacks became the major problem in the 1990s. Following the first Gulf War, Kurdish problem became internationalized in which the Turkey's neighbors were also involved. Rise in PKK attacks particularly from the neighboring countries increased the military's impact on politics while pursuing a low-intensity war against to the organization.[122]

In addition, the rising political Islam based upon the Turkish-Islamic synthesis policy of 12 September 1980 and coming to power of the RP an Islamic fundamentalist party enhanced the concerns of modernist bureaucratic and military elites that provide legitimacy to the military to involve in the politics.[123] Corruption of political system, increase of the mafia activities and gangs, Susurluk scandal and the surfacing of the relations between mafia and politics led to the loss of citizen's confidence on political parties.[124] Turkish military was able to exclude itself from this corrupted spectrum and kept its credibility in the eyes of the public. Another factor that led to the rise of military's power in politics was the political instability throughout the 1990s arising out of the existence of weak coalition governments and the inability and inefficiency of politicians of the period. Moreover, 1982

---

[122] İlhan Uzgel, "Türk Dış Politikasında Sivilleşme ve Demokratikleşme Sorunları: Körfez Savaşı Örneği", **SBF Dergisi**, Aralık-Ocak 1998, (Körfez Savaşı) p. 315
[123] Uzgel, TDP, p.86
[124] Uzgel, Körfez Savaşı, p. 315

constitution provided legal and institutional opportunities for the military to get involved into the politics.

Among the external reasons that caused the increase in military's influence during this period included regional conflicts and instabilities in the Middle East, Caucasia and Balkans emerged after the dissolution of Soviet Union. These conflicts and instabilities increased the security concerns and high politics measures of Turkey which required powerful military to overcome these problems.[125] As a country close to the regions of crisis, a 'national security state' perspective emerged in Turkey. In fact the external and internal threats in Turkey most of the time overlapped each other. These internal and external threats will be analyzed comprehensively in the last chapter of the thesis.

Concerning the international environment 1990s started with the ambiguity of post-Cold War period. In this context, Turkey was quite uncomfortable about the new configuration of world politics and its decreasing strategic importance. The "strategic importance" discourse shaped Turkish Cold-War policy. In the absence of Cold-War parameters, Turkey attempted to show that it was still significant for the US and world politics. Moreover Turkey was located at the key point for Middle Eastern politics that would be the focal point in the following years. Turkey has built its foreign policy upon being pivotal state in the region and initiated an active foreign policy discourse during Özal period between 1990 and 1993. Özal tried to show that Turkey still was significant for world politics and attempted to fill the gap remained from the Soviet Union.[126]

In order to accomplish all those goals, Turkey required strong military power which would take an important place in the NATO military operations in these regions and join to UN Peacekeeping operations.[127] Since Özal was a strong and dominant leader, during his period the military was not able to directly control the foreign policy.[128] Özal's hegemony in foreign policy can be observed in the resignation of Chief of General Staff Necip Torumtay when he did not agree with

---

[125] Uzgel, TDP, p.86
[126] Cüneyt Yenigün, "Türk Dış Politikasında Üçüncü Dalga", **Türkiye'nin Değişen Dış Politikası,** (ed. Cüneyt Yenigün and Ertan Efegil), Vol.1, Nobel, Ankara, 2010, pp.63-70
[127] Uzgel, TDP, p.86
[128] Uzgel, TDP, p.86

Özal's attempt to take the military into the Gulf War.[129] This event explicitly demonstrated the inability of the military to get involved in the foreign policy during Özal period.

However, following Özal's period, between 1993 and 2002 there were weak coalition governments which could not pursue a similar active foreign policy. Rather they pursued pro-US foreign policy. The military filled the gap that was created with the incompetence of coalition governments during this period. Moreover the military took initiatives mostly in the foreign politics by making visits to other states and implementing military agreements with these states. [130]

Moreover, the instability in the coalition governments led to the frequent change of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Again this gap created by these frequent changes was filled by the military.[131] For instance, during the coalition governments' period between 1993 and 2002, 13 Ministers of Foreign Affairs had changed. Consequently, during this period Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not direct the foreign policy and could not take part in the foreign policy. As a result of all these weaknesses, the military had taken part in the decision making process of foreign policy.

III. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Turkish military always had a prominent status within the political system within the Turkish history. It was the representative of the Sultan's power and an opponent of the ruling elites during the Ottoman Period. The military also inherited this privileged position during the Turkish Republic where the military was the founder of the Republic. Although Atatürk kept the military out of the realm of politics after the establishment of the Republic, the military still functioned as the guardians of the Kemalist reforms and principles. However, until the multi-party era,

---

[129] Derya Sazak, "İşte Musul-Kerkük Sırrı", **Milliyet**, 6 January 2002, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2002/01/06/siyaset/asiy.html (29 December 2012); "Orgeneral Necip Torumtay'ın Anıları: Turgut Özal, Körfez Krizi ve PKK", 30 January 2012, http://www.susmazkalem.com/2012/01/orgeneral-necip-torumtayn-anlar-turgut.html, (29 December 2012)
[130] Yenigün, pp.71-72
[131] Yenigün, p.70

since the pro-Kemalist CHP was in power, the military did not need to be directly involved in politics. During the DP government, this situation dramatically changed as a result of the challenging and anti-secular policies of the DP rule. The military directly intervened into politics and realized the 1960 coup.

Following the 1960 coup d'état, the MGK that improved the capabilities of the military to involve in the policy-making processes was established. Additionally, the authority and strength of the MGK was enhanced in the aftermath of 1971 military memorandum via Constitutional amendments. Moreover, after the 1980 military coup, the role of the military in Turkish politics drastically increased by empowerment of the MGK's authority and increase in the numbers in the military commanders in the MGK, establishment of new institutions such as DGM, YÖK and RTÜK. Through these institutional mechanisms, the military started to dominate the political and social life in Turkey. However its intervention into politics was limited with the domestic politics.

Throughout the 1990s, as it will be analyzed in detail in the following chapters, the military had started to get involved directly in the foreign policy making processes. Besides the gradual increase in the institutional power of the military, the internal and external dynamics and the threats that Turkey faced in the 1990s had also contributed to the increase in influence of the military. As a result, during the Refahyol government, the military came to the fore as the most powerful institution on Turkish foreign policy.

CHAPTER 3

CONFLICT BETWEEN REFAHYOL GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY CONCERNING FOREIGN POLICY AND THE MILITARY'S INTERVENTION INTO FOREIGN POLICY

Throughout the 1990s, Turkish politics had suffered from the rule of fragmented and vulnerable short-term coalition governments. RP and DYP coalition government, commonly referred as Refahyol, had constituted one of the most extreme and marginal examples of these weak coalition governments in the mid-1990s. Refahyol coalition government remained in power for almost a year from June 1996 until June, 1997. While the senior partner of the coalition RP was representing the conservatively religious sectors of Turkey, the junior partner DYP as the center right party had followed the official state ideology of secularism and free market capitalism as well as keeping harmonious relations with the military. Refah Party as the continuation of "national outlook" movement was not fond of either the secular state or the military elites that had been acting as the protectors of secularism for decades. Conservatively Muslim ideology and its detest towards secularism led the RP elite to react to the secularist policies that have been practiced for decades. RP's such policies alarmed the TSK led them to replace "reactionary Islam" as the first threat at the national security agenda.[132]

TSK by following its traditional role of protector of the Kemalist reforms and principles and promoter of the national unity of the Turkish state, have always occupied a significant position in the Turkish political system. This position of the military was deepened though the military coups and constitutional privileges. The role of the Turkish military in domestic politics extended over the foreign policy domain due to various factors, such as the securitized international environment during the Cold War and its structural remains in the 1990s, Kurdish separatist movement and its extension towards the neighbor states which led to cross border

---

[132] The other threat was the Kurdish separatist movement that was supported with the armed attacks of PKK. These two threat perceptions of the state had highly securitized both domestic politics and the foreign policy which led to the direct involvement of Turkish military forces on both domestic and foreign policy domains.

military operations.[133] During the Refahyol government rule, Refah Party's Islamist character and the rise of the radical Islamist terrorist activities, such as those of Hezbollah and HAMAS had tempted the Turkish Military to intervene into foreign policy as well as the domestic politics. As already stated Turkish General Staff had placed reactionary Islam as its top national security threat during the 1996-1997 period putting it at an equal level with the threat of Kurdish separatism.

In general in Turkish political history the civilian governments and the Turkish military had followed harmonious policies concerning the international threat.[134] However, during Refahyol government this harmony was disrupted as a result of the foreign policy discourses and practices of conservative Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan's visits of Middle Eastern and Far Eastern countries rather than the Western countries as soon as he came to power can be considered as the government's contradicting foreign policy vis-à-vis the military. Moreover, his rejection of continuing strategic ties with Israel was another alarming development for the military. Consequently, Turkish General Staff, during this period particularly when the PKK attacks reached to their peak point did not want to leave the foreign policy decision to the popularly elected conservative government. Therefore, the TSK compared to other periods had become very influential in Turkish foreign policies. Turkish military had intervened into Turkish foreign policy through tools such the speeches given by senior officers concerning foreign policy, official visits of Chief of General Staff and other Generals to other states, signing of military agreements with other states as well as establishment of new institutions in the MGK and the General Staff related to foreign policy. Therefore, the Refahyol coalition government era constituted a very sophisticated example of the Military Forces' effectiveness in both domestic politics and foreign policy. In fact, the Refahyol Government period became the peak point of military's direct involvement hitherto in Turkish foreign policy.

---

[133] Gencer Özcan, "Doksanlarda Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politikasında Askeri Yapının Artan Etkisi", **En Uzun On Yıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar**, (ed. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut), Büke Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000, (Askeri Yapının Artan Etkisi), p. 66
[134] Strategic Comments, "Politics and the Turkish Military", **International Institute for Strategic Studies,** Vol. 3, No. 5, 1997, p.1

In order to analyze the impact of the military on Turkish foreign policy during Refahyol coalition, this chapter will first examine the establishment of the Refah Party, its ideology as well as the establishment of Refahyol Coalition. Then it will focus on the foreign policies –that alarmed the military— followed by the government. Following the analysis of conflict of issues between Refahyol government and the military, this chapter will mainly examine on the role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy by concentrating on the institutional and non-institutional mechanisms through which the military exerted its power in foreign policies. Finally, the chapter will concluded by a brief examination of the 28 February process and the collapse of the Refahyol Government.

I. POLITICAL VICTORY OF REFAH PARTY IN 1995 ELECTIONS AND REFAHYOL COALITION IN POWER

Refah Party received 21.38 percent of the votes in the December 1995 general elections Turkey. After months of bargaining finally in June 1996 RP leadership managed to establish a coalition government with DYP which received 19.2 percent of the votes. This was the first time a religiously conservative party was serving as the senior partner of a coalition in Turkey. Throughout the 1970s, predecessor of RP, MSP was able to join various coalitions. However, it served as the junior partner of these coalitions. As the successor of MSP which was closed by the 1980 military administration, RP was established in 1983 and in 1987 Necmettin Erbakan took over the leadership. Erbakan who had been one of the most significant figures and leaders of Islamist politics had started his political life within Süleyman Demirel's AP in 1960s and had pioneered "national outlook" movement (*Milli Görüş Hareketi*).

National Outlook Movement was based on the idea of returning to origins of the national and Islamic values as an alternative to the imitation of Western values.[135] The national outlook tradition has had anti-Western bias in foreign policy. It supported cutting the ties with the West and developing closer relations with the

---

[135] Levent Baştürk, "The National Outlook Movement", **Siyaset ve Toplum**, July 1999, http://siyaset-toplum.blogspot.com/1999/07/national-outlook-movement.html, (20.07.2013)

Muslim World. Successors of Refah Party also supported the principles of neo-Ottomanism, Islamism, national independence and just order.[136] RP's 'just order' principle emphasized the necessity for greater social justice and equality that was considered as a third way between communism and capitalism. Just economic order rested on the principles of "the absolute harmony of economic interests among Muslims and the state's duty to manage the economy". It also underlined the negative effects of Western imperialism that created the conflicts among Muslims and caused the economic backwardness of Muslim countries.[137] Therefore, Islamic brotherhood would be the most superior motivation for the development Turkey. Moreover, Islamic Brotherhood would help Turkey to overcome serious problems such as the Kurdish problem. The party was also supported by informal networks such as Preacher and Prayer Leader Schools (*İmam Hatip Okulları*) and religious order networks including the Nakşibendi order (*Nakşibendi Tarikatı*), the İskender Paşa Congregation (*İskender Paşa Cemaati*) and the National View Organization (*Milli Görüş Teşkilatı*). Support of these organizations increased the popularity of the party in the 1990s.[138]

The first electoral experiment of RP in 1987 general elections was disappointing since it joined the elections unprepared. In the 1991 general elections, RP received 16 percent of the votes and won 62 of the parliament's 450 seats.[139] RP succeeded in the local elections of March 27, 1994 with its share of 21 percent of the votes and held the mayor's office in 28 Turkish cities including İstanbul and Ankara. The popularity of the Refah Party continued in the general elections of December, 24, 1995 and it became the first party winning 21.38 percent of the votes.[140] Following the RP, DYP although its percentage of its votes was less than ANAP came as the second party in the parliament as a result of the number of its seats it

[136] Ruşen Çakır, **Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi**, Metis, İstanbul, 1994,(Ne Şeriat), p.20

[137] Atilla Yayla, "Erbakan's Goals", **The Middle East Quarterly**, Vol.4, No.3, September 1997, http://www.meforum.org/358/turkeys-leaders-erbakans-goals, (27.04.2015)

[138] Birol A. Yeşilada, "The Virtue Party", **Political Parties in Turkey**, (ed. Barry Rubin and Metin Heper), Frank Cass, London, 2002, pp.70-74

[139] Refah Party joined 1991 elections in alliance with Reformıst Democracy Party-Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi and National Work Party-Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi. Mehram Kamrava, "Pseudo-Democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities: The Rise and Demise of Turkey's Refah Party**", British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 25, No. 2, November, 1998, p. 287

[140] "İşte YSK'nın Sonuçları", **Milliyet**, 28.12.1995, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/7EM2v1gVoNiIbRipj6NMwg_x3D__x3D_, (25.02.2014), p.19

won. While DYP captured 135 seats in the parliament with 19.2 percent of the votes, ANAP had only 132 seats with its share of 19.6 percent of the votes.[141]

Table 3: 1995 General Elections in Turkey

	Number of Votes	Percentage of Votes	Number of Seats
Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*-**ANAP**)	**5,527,288**	**19.6**	**132**
Republican Peoples Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*-**CHP**)	**3,011,076**	**10.7**	**49**
Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*-**DSP**)	**4,118,025**	**14.6**	**76**
Truepath Party (*Doğruyol Partisi*-**DYP**)	**5,396,009**	**19.2**	**135**
Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*-**RP**)	**6,012,450**	**21.4**	**158**

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute[142]

The Western world showed its discontentment with the results of 1995 general elections in Turkey by advocating the establishment of a coalition government between DYP and ANAP. They were concerned about an Islamist party coming to power. They were afraid of a deviation from traditional Turkish foreign policy. However, Iran was quite happy with these results.[143] In the domestic sphere, the military and the media as well as the central bourgeoisie that was known as Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (*Türkiye Sanayiciler ve İşverenler Sendikası –TÜSİAD*) also opposed the establishment of a coalition government between RP and DYP. Similar to Western countries, they all supported a

---

[141] http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul, (02.07.2013)

[142] http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul, (02.07.2013)

[143] "Dünya Seçimi Konuşuyor", **Milliyet**, 26.12.1995, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (25.02.2014), p. 18; Refahsız Uzlaşma", **Milliyet**, 27.12.1995, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (25.02.2014), p.18

coalition between DYP and ANAP.[144] For instance, TÜSİAD had put an advertisement on the newspapers stating that "the electorate chose center-right" and showed its preference for DYP and ANAP coalition.[145] Along the same line the Chief of General Staff, General İsmail Hakkı Karadayı had also stated that they did not want to see RP in the coalition.[146]

The establishment of Refahyol coalition took about six months. President Demirel gave the mission of establishing the 53rd government to the RP's leader Erbakan, however neither ANAP nor DYP wanted to establish a coalition government with RP. As a result, the second and the third parties that received the highest number of votes, DYP and ANAP established the 53rd government of Turkish Republic on March 6, 1996 under the premiership of Mesut Yılmaz.[147] However, in a very short time, as a result of the disagreements between ANAP and DYP leaders, 53rd government collapsed. Moreover, RP's proposal for parliamentary investigation concerning the leaders of these parties, Tansu Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz contributed to this collapse.

Following the failure of the short-term DYP-ANAP coalition, despite her initial reluctance and warnings she received from the military and the business world, DYP leader Çiller established a coalition government with RP. Refahyol coalition government was established under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan on June 28, 1996 with the formulation of 'rotating premiership' with Çiller who would become prime minister in two years.[148] In this newly established coalition government while

---

[144] Hakan Yavuz, "Milli Görüş Hareketi: Muhalif ve Modernist Gelenek", **Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce: Vol:6: İslamcılık**, (ed. Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekingil), İletişim, İstanbul, 2004, (Milli Görüş Hareketi), p.601
[145] "Refahsız Uzlaşma", **Milliyet**, 27.12.1995, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (25.02.2014), p.18
[146] Hakan Akpınar, **28 Şubat: Post-Modern Darbenin Öyküsü**, Ümit Press, Ankara, 2001, p.25
[147] "Hükümet Bitmiştir", **Milliyet**, 25.05.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (26.02.2014), p.1
[148] "Refah İktidarda", **Milliyet**, 29.06.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (01.03.2014), pp.1-14

Erbakan became the prime minister, Çiller served as the vice prime minister and minister of foreign affairs.[149]

Although two parties did not have much in common ideologically and politically, the corruption allegations both parties held against each other forced them to establish this artificial coalition.[150] DYP which was founded in 1983 by Süleyman Demirel as a continuation of first AP and then DP was a liberal, right-wing party supporting economic liberalism. The policies of the party such as advocating social welfare, democratization and the free market economy increased the party's popularity in the 1990s. The party supported the establishment of civilian supremacy over the military and even questioned the constitutional role of the MGK and the political power of the military.[151]

Under Tansu Çiller's leadership, the party particularly concerning the Kurdish question, left its traditional discourses and relied more on the military solution by abandoning the civilian control over the military principle. The party eventually became more conservative and authoritarian. For instance, Chief of General Staff, Doğan Güreş stated that Çiller was the easiest prime minister to work with since she decided to resolve the Kurdish question militarily. During the 1995 national elections, Çiller's election campaign concentrated on the issues of Turkey's membership of the Customs Union and the struggle against Kurdish separatism. She also criticized RP for exploiting religion, moving the country away from Europe and collaborating with the PKK.[152]

Consequently, there were deep ideological disagreements between RP and DYP. While the RP was representing Islamist right, DYP was a moderate-right party. RP was proposing a third way between the communism and capitalism and the DYP was a supporter of economic liberalism and free market. DYP's enthusiasm for Turkey's European Union (EU) candidacy contradicted RP's hostility toward the EU

---

[149] "Erbakan Dönemi", **Milliyet**, 09.07.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (01.03.2014), p.1

[150] Özlem Tür, **Islamist Movements: The New Social Movements of the Middle East : A case Study**, (Unpublished PhD Dissertation), Durham University, UK, 2003, p.211

[151] Ümit Cizre, "From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party", **Political Parties in Turkey**, (ed. Barry Rubin and Metin Heper), Frank Cass, London, 2002, (From Ruler to Pariah) p.87

[152] Cizre, From Ruler to Pariah, p.92

and other Western powers. Similarly, while DYP was promising the extension of the mission of the Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) in its election campaign, RP was completely against to this operation.[153] Finally, the Kurdish issue was one of the most striking examples of the disagreement between the two parties. While the Kurdish problem was considered in the context of Islamic brotherhood by RP, DYP was considering the issue from a security perspective and looking for a military-focused solution. Due to such disagreements and differences between the policies of RP and DYP, it was really hard for these parties to work as coalition partners. These conflicts caused regime fragmentation in Turkey during the Refahyol coalition period.

Refahyol coalition also inherited significant foreign policy problems from the former government such as Operation Provide Comfort, Customs Union Agreement and water and PKK problem with Syria.[154] During this period the domestic politics was also shaken by shocks of the corruption allegation, increasing inflation, rising prices and the fragmented political system. Apart from these issues, the main topic of Turkish domestic politics during Refahyol coalition government was the uproar of Kurdish question as a result of the suppression of Kurdish political movements by the military forces particularly throughout the 1990s. Besides the Kurdish problem, in the aftermath of the establishment of Refahyol government, from the military point of view, a new internal threat, the rise of political Islam came to the agenda, Therefore, the tension between the military and the governing party increased tremendously.

---

[153] Operation Provide Comfort was a mission that was conducted by the Western powers as a result of UN Security Council Resolution in 1991 following the refugee crisis emerged in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis. This mission aimed to make humanitarian aid to the Kurdish refugees and ending the Iraqi repression of the Kurdish people. However, many Turkish politicians were suspicious of the mission that it aimed at establishing a Kurdish state in the region. Ramazan Gözen, "Operation Provide Comfort: Origins and Objectives", **Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi**, Vol.50, No.3, 1995, p.177

[154] Sami Kohen, Yorum, "Dış Politikada İşler Yürüyor", **Milliyet**, 27.12.1995, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (03.03.2014), p.18

II. FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION OF REFAHYOL GOVERNMENT

Throughout the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath Turkish governments had pursued pro-western foreign policy that went parallel to economic integration with the neo-liberal economic system.[155] In the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey had faced Soviet threat which demanded control of the Turkish Straits and the Turkish territories such as Kars and Ardahan. Due to this increasing Soviet threat, Turkey sought a Western alliance and the US started to protect Turkey through both Truman doctrine issued in 1947 and Marshall Aid given in 1948.[156] As a result, Turkey became a NATO member in 1952. Throughout the 1950s, DP governments followed a loyal pro-Western foreign policy. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, as a result of the Cuban missile crisis, Johnson Letter and Arms Embargo that are related to Cyprus Crisis, Turkey distanced itself from the US and followed a more multi-dimensional foreign policy which included the improvement of relations with the Middle Eastern countries.[157] However, despite this multi-faceted foreign policy Turkey always continued its pro-Western foreign policy which did not only include USA as a Western power but also the EU. Turkey's application for the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 and the signature of the Association Agreement (Ankara Agreement) with the EEC in 1963 demonstrates Turkey's pro-European in addition to its close relations with the US.

Throughout the 1980s the ANAP governments under Turgut Özal's premiership and in the early 1990s coalition governments of DYP and Social Democrat Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*-SHP) followed pro-western foreign policies. Contrasting this traditional foreign policy orientation, Erbakan during his election campaigns followed different foreign policy rhetoric by emphasizing the need to establish stronger links with the Islamic world.[158] For instance, before the RP's electoral victory, a member of RP, Hasan Dikici, had

---

[155] Kemal Kirişçi, "Turkey and the Muslim Middle East", **Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy**, (ed. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı), Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, 2000, p. 41
[156] Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy**,** pp. 109-116
[157] Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp.148-162
[158] Philip Robins, **Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War**, Hurst&Company, London, 2003, (Suits and Uniforms), p.146

exhibited RP's foreign policy orientation particularly concerning the EU in his speech in 1993 as follows:

The EU is an integration model based on a Christian-Western culture..... It is a Catholic European Union established according to a Christian ideology. Turkey is a Muslim country with the aim of increasing the material welfare of the Turkish people, to try to have a place in the EU means to abandon our political, social and cultural values.[159]

In the same vein, Erbakan made various speeches concerning the need to cooperate with Muslim states rather than qualifying for the full membership of the EU. He considered the membership to the EU same as resigning the Serves Agreement.[160] RP supported the suspension of the all diplomatic ties with the EU and the abolition of the accession to Customs Union. In its elections campaigns RP had prioritized the establishment of an independent foreign policy from the West. According to its election manifesto, Turkey's place was within World Union of Muslim Countries and Turkey was supposed have a leading role among these countries.[161] Erbakan's Islamic foreign policy orientation can first be observed in his proposal for the creation of Islamic Common Market instead of accession to the European Union and the creation of Islamic United Nations in place of United Nations and the establishment of the other Islamic versions of significant current international organizations that would help to build a "new Muslim world order".[162] This new world order would be based on just order (*adil düzen*) which had provisioned the prohibition of interest rates. Another issue RP concentrated on as part of its foreign policy was Turkey's relations with Israel. RP as an opposition party in the early 1990s stressed on all occasions that Israel was a Zionist state and supported the suspension of the all diplomatic ties with Israel. RP also stated that it opposed the OPC.[163]

---

[159] Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, **Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach**, Routledge, New York, 2003, p.133
[160] Serves Treaty was signed after the First World War in 1920 which was guaranteeing the partition of Ottoman territories between the great Powers. Therefore, Serves syndrome shows the paranoi of territorial partition and Turkey's mistrust toward the outside world. See Bozdağlıoğlu, p.134
[161] Hasret Dikici Bilgin, "Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey's Pro-Islamist Parties", **Turkish Studies**, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2008, p. 409
[162] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, pp.146-147
[163] Çakır, Ne Şeriat, pp.20-55

Syria and Iran were the first countries that congratulated the premiership of Erbakan following the establishment of the Refahyol government.[164] Moreover, Syria promised unlimited cooperation with Turkey if RP would have kept its previous statements about the abolition of all cooperation agreements with Israel.[165] Similarly, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was the first leader to visit Turkey following the establishment of the Refahyol government. Mubarak while supporting Turkey's relations with Israel warned the RP-led government concerning its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, the moderate Islamist movement that opposed Mubarak regime in Egypt.[166]

Once coming to power, the primary focus of the Refahyol government in its foreign policy was the Middle East. During his premiership, Erbakan only traveled to Islamic countries in order to improve Turkey's relations with these states.[167] Minister of Justice, Şevket Kazan, visited Iraq to negotiate the opening of Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline and the situation of Kurds in Northern Iraq.[168] Iran was the first country that Erbakan visited after coming to power in 1996. This visit was severely criticized by the Turkish state elites and the media. They considered this visit as a rupture from the traditional foreign policy of Turkey. Both the state elite and the military considered Iran as an Islamic republic that was trying to export its revolution to Turkey and supporting the PKK attacks. Erbakan as soon as coming to power violated foreign affairs' protocol tradition by meeting Iran's deputy secretary of state and by not including diplomatic representatives in this meeting.[169] Although the tensions between Iran and Turkey had increased because of the news about mutual

[164] Bozdağlıoğlu, p. 134

[165] Interestingly enough, Israel declared that it was aware of Turkey's interests in the Middle East and they were ready to support Turkish Arab relations as long as these relations did not harm Israel. In addition Israeli government invited RP-DYP government representatives to Israel. See Banu Güven, "Suriye'den Sınırsız İşbirliği Vaadi", **Milliyet**, 12.07.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_ , (10.03.2014), p. 17

[166] Ö. Kunter Öymen, "Mısır'dan Sürpriz Destek", **Milliyet**, 12.07.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (10.03.2014), p.17

[167] Kirişçi, p.88

[168] Vahap Yazaroğlu, "Saddam'a Ani Ziyaret", **Milliyet**, 10.08.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (10.03.2014), p.15

[169] Evren Değer, "Bölgede Barışı İran Bozuyor", **Milliyet**, 21.07.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (10.03.2014), p.17

bombing in Turkish-Iranian border, the meeting was still realized. Moreover, RP also had ignored the report of National Intelligence Agency (*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı-MİT*) about Iranian support for terrorist organizations such as PKK and Hezbollah and the replacement of PKK headquarters in Syrian territories.[170] In Erbakan's Iran visit, both countries signed a $20 billion gas and petroleum agreement including the construction of gas pipeline from Tabriz to Turkey which would increase trade volume between two countries to $2.5 billion per year.[171] In the meeting, Turkey claimed that PKK forces slip into Turkish territories from Iranian border. However, Iran refused these claims and offered cooperation to Turkey against terrorism. Although these initiatives were highly criticized by both MIT officials, the military and the US, Turkey and Iran promised for cooperating against terrorism.[172]

Another region Erbakan visited with a large delegation of businessmen was the Far East. Erbakan attempted to establish closer relations with some of the Asian tigers as potential trade partners.[173] By not taking the oppositions and critics into consideration, Erbakan started his ten day's Far East visit with Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. In these countries, he mainly held official talks concerning trade and defense industry including military vehicles, ammunition and F-16 aircraft. Erbakan also held talks on common strategies and the cooperation for the development of Islamic Development Bank in order to improve Turkey's relations and solidarity between Islamic countries.[174] In his meetings with the leaders of these countries he mostly bypassed the Foreign Ministry staff by excluding the translator. The purpose of these visits was to form a D-8 (Developing-8) initiative that would be established within the developing Islamic countries to propose a bloc against to

---

[170] Değer, p.17; Bozdağlıoğlu, p.134; Erbakan, similar to the former prime minister and president Turgut Özal, frequently by-passed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in his foreign policy decisions. He even sometimes excluded diplomats from his meetings with foreign ambassadors and leaders from Syria and Iran. See Kirişçi, p.42 and Barçın Yınanç, "Dışişlerine By-pass", **Milliyet**, 25.07.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/dopD5s4xzAJPQDAMYDIU3A_x3D__x3D_ (03.06.2015)

[171] William Hale, "Economic Issues in Turkish Foreign Policy", **Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy**, (ed. Alan Makovski and Sabri Sayarı), The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, 2000, (Economic Issues), p. 35

[172] "Orduda Rahatsızlık", **Milliyet**, 07.08.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (11.03.2014), p.16

[173] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, pp.156-157

[174] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, pp.156-157

industrialized G-8 (Group of Eight) countries.[175] D-8 was going to be composed of Islamic countries such as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt and Nigeria in order to develop the cooperation between these Islamic countries.[176] According to William Hale, the motivation of this initiative was ideological rather than economic since the seven member countries of D-7 with the exception of Iran had only compromised 3.9 percent of Turkey's foreign trade in 1995.[177]

The most disputed official visit of Erbakan was Libya. Erbakan's visit to Libya received a lot of criticism from the military as well as President Süleyman Demirel. Moreover, Minister of Internal Affairs, Mehmet Ağar resisted to give Erbakan a visa for this journey because of the statements and criticism of Libyan leader, Qaddafi, concerning Turkey's treatments towards Kurdish people.[178] Despite all these criticisms, Erbakan insisted on initiating this visit in order to show his loyalty to the Islamist countries and organizations which had supported him in his election campaigns both financially and politically. Moreover, he aimed to neutralize the negative effects of signing an agreement with Israel and the extending the OPC mission both to his constituencies and the Islamist countries that were concerned about these policies of Turkey.[179] The media considered this trip as a "shame trip" and "Libya disaster". In the meeting, Qaddafi criticized Turkish foreign policy in an arrogant manner by stating that "Turkey was in cooperation with Zionist Israel, an archenemy of Libyan state and it was also opening airbases to NATO and the US against to its Muslim neighbors".[180] More importantly, his most shocking statements were about Turkish governments' policies concerning the Kurdish issue. He said that

---

[175] Hale, "Economic Issues", pp.34-35
[176] Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "İran'la İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol.2**, (ed. Baskın Oran), İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, p. 581
[177] Hale, Economic Issues, p.34
[178] "Kaddafi Hükümeti Çatlattı", **Milliyet**, 28.09.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (11.03.2014), p.14
[179] As it will be analyzed later in detail, RP-led government had extended the Operation Provide Comfort mission and signed an agreement with Israel that created a contradiction in the sense of its foreign policy orientation and took the reactions of its electoral base.
[180] Serpil Çevikcan, "Kaddafi Şoku", **Milliyet**, 06.10.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (11.03.2014), (Kaddafi Şoku), p.1

Turkey had persecuted Kurdish people and Kurdistan state should be established.[181] These accusations made shock waves in Turkey leading to the critics of the leader of the junior partner of the coalition DYP, Çiller as well as the leaders of the opposition parties. They all criticized Erbakan's irresponsible foreign policy and his signing of a joint declaration with Qaddafi. They tabled a motion of censure in the assembly against Erbakan's Libyan visit but this censure was rejected by the majority. Turkish ambassador in Tripoli was called to Turkey by the request of President Demirel. Erbakan was only worried about the statement, "PKK is a terrorist organization" on the joint declaration. He did not respond to these critics. He stated that Libya was not a terrorist state and Turkey did not support the embargo towards Libya.[182] Erbakan was also criticized by the Western countries for his visit of Libya. Financial Times published an article about Turkey's offer to sell the water from Manavgat River to Libya with the comments that it was rather an offer to improve the political relations between these two countries rather than only having economic concerns.[183]

Following his controversial visit to Libya visit, Erbakan visited Nigeria which can be also be considered as problematic since Erbakan government agreed to help the police and armed forces of the Nigerian dictatorship with their telecommunication service. While many western countries had suspended trade relations with Nigeria and applied economic embargo towards this country after the military coup in 1993, Turkey was improving its trade relations with Nigeria. Such a foreign policy would diminish Turkey's credibility in the eyes of the West.[184] Although Minister of Internal Affairs, Mehmet Ağar rejected to give visa to Erbakan's visits in Africa, Erbakan continued his visits making the agreements he made in Africa questionable and invalid.[185] TSK was also concerned about Prime

[181] Çevikcan, Kaddafi Şoku, p.1
[182] Serpil Çevikcan and Ümit Bektaş, "Libya Faciası", **Milliyet**, 07.10.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_ , (11.03.2014), p.1
[183] "Manavgat Suyu Libya'ya Hediye", **Milliyet**, 04.10.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (12.03.2014), p.21
[184] Serpil Çevikcan and Ümit Bektaş, "Erbakan: Üfler, Yok Ederiz", **Milliyet**, 09.10.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (12.03.2014) p.16
[185] Aydın Hasan, "Skandal Gezi Resmen Yok", **Milliyet**, 10.10.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (12.03.2014), p.16

Minister Erbakan's visits to Islamist states and his attempts to improve Turkey's relations with the authoritarian countries.[186]

Erbakan's visit to Egypt also led to another diplomatic scandal as a result of improper behavior of Egyptian authorities towards Turkish delegate. Firstly, RP deputies were not taken into presidential palace and secondly during the visit, Egyptian authorities did not raise Turkish flag. Although Turkish delegation had preferred not to meet with Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian President Mubarak invoked Erbakan about RP's relations with Muslim Brotherhood as well as Turkey's relations with Israel. Although this meeting was unsatisfactory, Minister of State, Abdullah Gül, who was functioning as Minister of Foreign Affairs (although Çiller was the official Minister of Foreign Affairs), stated that this meeting reached its aim with the initiation of cooperation in trade and military issues.[187]

While Prime Minister Erbakan was attempting to improve Turkey's relations with the Middle East, African and Far East countries without asking its coalition partner, the official Minister of Foreign Affairs Çiller was busy with her attempts to improve Turkey's relations with the West. Therefore, Refahyol coalition government was represented by two different ideological pillars: While RP was in favor of Islamism, DYP supported secularism. Sami Kohen, a well-known columnist of daily Milliyet asked how a country could follow a double lane in its foreign policy. Kohen underlined the duality in foreign policy by pointing out that while Çiller was declaring the continuation of all military cooperation agreements with Israel, the RP deputies were stating the necessity to revise of these agreements.[188] After the establishment of the RP-DYP coalition government, Çiller organized a meeting with ambassadors of European countries and explained them that DYP was in charge of the foreign policy of secular Turkey. Interestingly enough "while Çiller was meeting

---

[186] "Anlamlı Görüşme", **Milliyet**, 04.10.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_,
(14.03.2014), p.18
[187] Serpil Çevikcan and Ümit Bektaş, "Mısır'a Olaylı Gezi", **Milliyet**, 04.10.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_,
(12.03.2014), p.21
[188] Sami Kohen, Yorum, "Çift Şeritli Dış Politika Nasıl Olur?", **Milliyet**, 11.07.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_,
(12.03.2014), p.18

with European leaders to confirm Turkey's Europeanness, Erbakan was receiving the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood as his first foreign visitor".[189]

Although RP followed a contradictory foreign policy to the traditional foreign policy of the Turkish Republic, it still had to keep harmonious relations with the Kemalist elite, particularly with the armed forces. Erbakan avoided confronting the military. Consequently, he identified his trips to Asia and Africa as part of multi-dimensional foreign policy in order not to jeopardize Ankara's traditional ties with the West.[190] Meanwhile by visiting these countries he also showed his constituency that he was trying to establish strong ties with these Muslim states. In fact, while Erbakan attempted to increase Turkey's relations with Islamic countries in the Middle East, he also paid attention not to damage the relations with Western powers and Israel. For that reason he maintained Turkey's traditional relations with the West by making crucial decisions related with the Customs Union, OPC and the Military Cooperation Agreement with Israel. According to Philips Robin, Erbakan's foreign policy could be characterized as pragmatism combined with Islamism that complemented the existing foreign policy of Turkey as establishing new relations with the Islamic world.[191] He states that;

> *The critical months between December 1995 and February 1997 proved to be a period when the competing ideological visions of Kemalism and Islamism wrestled and at times battled with each other in the domain of foreign affairs. With the imperatives of domestic politics and the tussle for the soul of the Turkish nation-state uppermost during this period, foreign policy, whether played out as the military's feverish embrace of Israel or the Welfare government's opening to the Islamic world, had comparatively little to do with foreign affairs.[192]*

Similarly, Gencer Özcan, while analyzing the contradictions in the foreign policy decisions of Erbakan, points out that Erbakan had been in a difficult situation between his priorities in foreign policy and the policies dictated to him by the military. His Islamist ideology in the context of foreign policy had been under the pressure of the TSK.[193] Sami Kohen also pointed out that the real reason lied behind

---

[189] Bozdağlıoğlu, p.135
[190] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p.156
[191] Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan", **Survival**, Vol. 39, No. 2, Summer 1997, (TFP Under Erbakan), p. 83; Robins, (TFP Under Erbakan), p. 83
[192] Robins, TFP Under Erbakan, p. 83; Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p.160
[193] G. Özcan, Askeri Yapının Artan Etkisi, p.65

Erbakan's U-turns in his foreign policy was the contradictions between the necessities of realpolitik and his opposing ideological principles to this realpolitik. As a result, Erbakan followed a pragmatic foreign policy at the expense of the contradicting his ideology. He tried to avoid critics both from the military and his coalition partner that would lead to any crisis within the coalition.[194]

Following the Far East visit of Erbakan, Refahyol government was forced by the military to sign a "Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement" with Israel. This agreement was followed with four more cooperation agreement.[195] This agreement contradicted the foreign policy of RP that was against any kind of improvement of relations with Israel. The government kept this agreement as a secret from the media in order to avoid the disappointment of the RP electorate. Another example of the contradicting foreign policy of the RP was the extension of OPC mission. In its election declaration, RP had promised that the deployment of OPC would be strictly forbidden.[196] In the first days of his premiership, Erbakan was stuck within a difficult situation between his ideology and the necessities of the real politics. During the bargaining concerning about the extension of the OPC mission, RP requested some compensation from the US such as softening of the embargo towards Iraq, economic help for Turkey and authority for controlling the flights in the region. Consequently, RP accepted the extension of OPC.

Similarly, the implementation of Customs Union agreement was another foreign policy that contradicted RP's originally planned foreign policies. Erbakan had made harsh criticisms towards the EU and the Customs Union before coming to power. He had stated that the West wanted a dependent Turkey in order to prevent the unity of Islamic countries. In the same vein, RP had proposed Islamic version of

---

[194] Sami Kohen, Yorum, "Değişmemek mi Daha İyi?" **Milliyet**, 24.07.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (12.03.2014), p.18

[195] "İsrail'le Yeni Projeler", **Milliyet**, 29.08.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (01.03.2014), p.18

[196] 24 Aralık 1995 Refah partisi Seçim Beyannamesi, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITA L%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/199601072%20RP%20SE CIM%20BEYANNAMESI%201995/199601072%20RP%20SECIM%20BEYANNAMESI%201995. pdf, (18.03.2014), p.30

the Customs Union as an alternative in its 1991 party program.[197] However, once coming to power RP government was forced to accept Turkey's entrance to Customs Union.

In sum, although the foreign policy orientation of RP was opposing the traditional pro-Western foreign policy orientation of Turkey that was supported by secularist elites including the military and RP's coalition partner, DYP, RP elite was forced to step back from its foreign policies and follow pro-Western policies. Therefore, this situation created contradictions between the discourses made by the elites of RP and the policies followed by the party.

III. ISSUES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE REFAHYOL GOVERNMENT

Turkish Armed Forces that have historically assigned themselves the mission to protect the principles and reforms of Kemalism approached to RP's policies with caution. Turkish General Staff demonstrated its opposition to this anti-secular party on all occasions and following the 1995 general elections insisted on the establishment of Anayol coalition government by ANAP and DYP. Although the majority of the military members voted for DYP in the general elections and high-ranking military officers stated that "even our generals gave vote for Çiller", they did not expect DYP to establish a coalition with RP.[198] However, the Anayol coalition did not last long and Refahyol coalition was established. In every occasion the military showed its discomfort with the establishment of Refahyol coalition. However, neither the rejections of the Turkish General Staff nor the other parts of the society such as TÜSİAD, could prevent the establishment of Refahyol government.

This controversy between the Turkish General Staff and RP has deepened during Erbakan's premiership due to RP's controversial policies. These policies were considered as anti-secular and anti-regime by the General Staff. Erbakan's visit to the Middle East, Africa and the Far East constituted the first conflict between the two

---

[197] Bahar Üste, "Türkiye'de İktidara Gelen Siyasal Partilerin AET/AT/AB İlişkileri Hakkındaki Görüşleri ve Yönetim Yapısına Etkileri", **Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi**, Vol.8, No.3, 2006, p.343
[198] Akpınar, pp.38-75

sides. Especially his visit to Libya and Qaddafi's attitude towards the Turkish delegation drew heavy criticisms from the military. Despite a secret crypto about the necessity to cancel the Libya visit and the opposition of the traditional state bureaucracy, Erbakan had still realized this visit which in turn deepened the anti-Refah Party sentiments in the military.[199]

Anti-secular declarations of RP deputies and ministers had also contributed to the conflict between the military and RP. In 1994, before his premiership, Necmettin Erbakan had made a statement on social order change in Turkey and whether it would be through peaceful methods or violence.[200] Similarly, in May 1997, İbrahim Halil Çelik, RP representative of Şanlıurfa, stated if the state elite and the military attempted to close the Schools of Prayer Leaders and Preachers (*İmam Hatip Okulları*), there would be bloodshed in the country and Turkey would have gone through a worse experience than Algeria. He also stated that he was longing for *Sharia* (Islamic Law) in the country.[201] Along the same line, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, another RP Deputy, who had defined Turkish military as the "hearth of the prophet" (*peygamber ocağı*) condemned the law that prohibited the entrance of graduates of Schools of Prayer Leaders and Preachers to the military schools.[202]

RP also invigorated its election promises with the submission of a "Quinary Army Package" (*Beşli Ordu Paketi*), which provoked the Army. This package included the subordination of the Turkish General Staff to the Ministry of National Defense, judicial review of the decisions of the Supreme Military Council, lifting of the headscarf ban, land transportation of pilgrims to Mecca, rescheduling of official work hours with consideration to Friday prayer.[203] Turkish General Staff had strongly reacted to this package and published a report with the help of the Ministry of Internal Affairs concerning the transportation of pilgrims to Mecca. This report

[199] Akpınar, p.102

[200] Aylin Güney and Petek Karatekelioğlu, "Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects", **Armed Forces&Society**, No. 3, Spring 2005, p.447

[201] Hasan Köni, **Transformation of the Turkish Religious Right With Focus on the Impact of State Elites, Globalization and Europeanization**, (Unpublished PhD Dissertation), İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, Ankara, 2012, p.85

[202] "RP'li, Mehmetçik'e Muhammetçik Dedi", **Milliyet**, 14.11.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTVg_x3D__x3D_, (19.03.2014), p.16

[203] "Refah'tan Beşli Ordu Paketi", **Milliyet**, 18.11.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTVg_x3D__x3D_ , (19.03.2014), p.17

found the land transportation of pilgrims unsafe and opposed the RP's proposal to increase the number of pilgrims from 61,000 to 250,000.[204]

The military's anti-Refah sentiments had become apparent in many occasions. For example, the military forced Erbakan to sign an agreement to discharge the reactionary military officers from the TSK.[205] A harsh power struggle had taken place between the Armed Forces and RP concerning the discharge of these officers. The Supreme Military Council (*Yüksek Askeri Şura-YAŞ*) organized a meeting on December 9, 1996 in order to discuss the reactionary activities of 58 military officers. Erbakan's avoidance of attending the meeting on the first day led to the comments about his reluctance to take responsibility in the discharge of these officers. On the second day, Erbakan attended the meeting and tried to defend these officers arguing that they were only practicing their religious duties. However, Chief of General Staff Karadayı made a harsh speech stating that the military would not interfere into the religious practices of its members if such practices did not disrupt their military duties. He added that the military personnel who were discharged were found to have engaged in ideological and organizational reactionary activities by receiving commands from religious organizations.[206] Eventually, Erbakan was forced to sign the decision of the discharge of 69 officers. Out of 69 officers 11 of them were discharged as a result of disciplinary actions and the rest were discharged due to their reactionary activities. This event was the sign of a serious conflict between the military and the Refahyol government. As revenge to the discharge of reactionary military officers, RP through a decree issued at midnight transferred 50 trillion Turkish Liras from the budget of the National Defense Ministry to that of the Prime Ministry.[207]

The main issue of conflict between the Armed Forces and the RP was the foreign policy statements and the policies followed by the government. As already

---

[204] Utku Çakırözer, "Erbakan'ın Hac Yenilgisi", **Milliyet**, 16.12.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTVg_x3D__x3D_, (20.03.2014), p.16
[205] Akpınar, p.145
[206] Akpınar, p.145; Evren Değer, "YAŞ Erbakan'sız Toplandı", **Milliyet**, 10.12.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTVg_x3D__x3D_, (21.03.2014), p.15
[207] Güneri Civaoğlu, "İki Vahim Girişim", **Milliyet**, 19.12.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTVg_x3D__x3D_ , (20.03.2014), p.19

analyzed, the Middle East and Far East visits of Erbakan constituted one of the main criticisms of the Military Forces towards the government's foreign policy orientation. Moreover, RP's negotiation with Iran to cooperate in defense industry received harsh reaction from the US government. The Turkish General Staff also opposed this project and described this military cooperation attempt of the government with a terrorist and aggressor state as a utopia.[208]

Furthermore at the beginning of 1997, the tension between the military and the government started to get worse when RP elite insisted on granting of the freedoms to the female university students to wear headscarf in classes,[209] the construction of a mosque in Taksim Square and the invitation of the leaders of religious communities (*tarikat*) leaders to evening meal during Ramadan (*iftar*) in Prime Minsiter's residence. These policies followed by the government increased the tensions between the ruling party and the state elites, civil society organizations as well as the military. Particularly, the confrontation between the military and RP became more visible after the "Jerusalem Night" in February 1997. Jerusalem Night was organized in a town called Sincan by the RP Mayor Bekir Yıldız to commemorate the Palestinian people who were massacred in Jerusalem by Israeli soldiers in 1967 during the Israeli invasion of Jerusalem. Mayor Yıldız also invited Iranian Ambassador Rıza Bagheri to this gathering. Moreover, this commemoration had taken place at the same time with the anniversary of Ayotallah Homeyni's return to Iran from his exile in 1979. During the commemoration a tent that resembled the al-Aqsa Mosque was constructed and a play that presented the war between the Israeli soldiers and Palestinians was staged. People who joined the gathering chanted the slogans for a *sharia* regime and attacked to the pillars of secularism in the Turkish Republic under the posters of HAMAS and Hezbollah leaders.[210] The military reacted to this event severely by sending tanks and troops to Sincan the

---

[208] "Ordu Neden Rahatsız", **Milliyet**, 22.12.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTVg_x3D__x3D_ , (20.03.2014), p.1

[209] "Türbana Formül Aranıyor", **Sabah**, 30.01.1997, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1997/01/30/f08.html (03.04.2014)

[210] Akpınar, p.167

following day.[211] Although, this event was announced as a planned military exercise by the military, commentators and the people had interpreted it as the first footsteps of a coup d'état.[212] Besides the military, civil society organizations, major trade unions, and the electorate of the opposition parties joined in public protests that were called "protecting the Republic" protests.

In sum, it can be stated that there were ideological divergences between the RP and the military. The military from the beginning showed its discontent about RP coming to power. Following the establishment of Refahyol government the military openly showed its opposition to the domestic and foreign policies followed by the RP. These conflicts showed themselves in the areas of Prime Minister Erbakan's visit to Middle East, African and Far East countries, anti-secular statements of RP deputies and ministers, RP's submission of a "Quinary Army Package", discharge the reactionary military officers from the TSK, the construction of a mosque in Taksim Square, the invitation of the leaders of religious communities leaders to evening meal during Ramadan in Prime Minister's residence and finally Jerusalem Night celebrations in Sincan.

IV. THE FEBRUARY 28 PROCESS AND THE COLLAPSE OF REFAHYOL COALITION GOVERNMENT

Such provocative policies followed by the RP and the statements made by its members led to the harsh reactions from the state elites including the civilian bureaucracy as well as the military. The military forced President Demirel to include the issue of *irtica* (religious reactionary movements) into the agenda of the MGK. Although Demirel was reluctant to do so in order to avoid the emergence of a crisis, he was forced to include the issue into the agenda.[213] Demirel even stated that he wanted to do this without the bayonet (*Bu işi süngüsüz halletmeliyiz*), meaning that he wanted to do this without hurting the feelings of the religiously conservative

[211] Gencer Özcan, "The Military and Making of Foreign Policy in Turkey" ,**Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power**, (eds. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi), Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2001, (Making of Foreign Policy), p.23
[212] "Tanklar Sincan'dan Geçti", **Sabah**, 05.02.1997, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1997/02/05/f01.html (03.04.2014)
[213] Köni, p.86

groups and creating serious reaction from these groups.[214] While President Demirel suggested the government to act prudently on the issues of religion and secularism, at the same time he advised the military to approach this issue with caution.[215] He was invited to the office of General Staff on January 18, 1996 for a briefing by the military concerning irtica threat against secularism, pluralist democracy and the rule of law in the Turkish Republic and to discuss the measurements to be taken.[216]

Meanwhile, on 13 February 1997, 10 people including Bekir Yıldız, Mayor of Sincan were arrested by the DGM for organizing Jerusalem Night.[217] The public protests which had started as a reaction to Susurluk incident,[218] turned into general opposition movements to the government. However, Erbakan did not take these warnings, criticisms and the public protests seriously into consideration. He argued that the problem was not a problem of secularity. These people were using secularism as an excuse to show their hostility to the religion.[219] As a result of Erbakan's and Refahyol government's negligence of these warnings, the MGK recommended a list of resolutions to fight against political Islam in their monthly meeting on the 28th of February 1997.[220]

The monthly meeting of the MGK on 28 February 1997 had started with the presentation of a report named "The Impact of Radical Religious Organizations on the Regime" prepared by the MİT and another report named "Reactionary (irtica)

---

[214] Hasan Cemal, **Türkiye'nin Asker Sorunu: Ey Asker Siyasete Karışma**, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, Mayıs 2010, p.213

[215] Metin Heper and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, "Civil Military Relations in Israel and Turkey", **Journal of Political and Military Sociology**, Vol. 2, No. 33, Winter 2005, p.239

[216] Köni, p.85

[217] Ahmet Köprülü, "Sincan'da 10 Tutuklama", **Milliyet**, 14.02.1997, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTVg_x3D__x3D_, (04.04.2014), p.17

[218] Susurluk Scandal began as a simple traffic accident that took place on November 3, 1996 on a highway outside of the Susurluk district. However, further investigations in the following days of this accident clearly revealed the connections between state-mafia-police and demonstrated the severity of the state-sponsored assassinations. As a result, this simple accident immediately turned into a scandal that had clear effects over the political system in Turkey where the politicians accused each other and threatened with disclosing their connections with this scandal. As a result, wide-ranging demonstrations had started in the society with the slogan of "one minute of darkness for the continuation of light" which turned into an opposition movement against the Refahyol government. See, James H. Meyer, "Turkey's Leaders: Çiller's Scandal's", **Middle Eastern Quarterly**, Vol.4, No. 3, September 1997, pp.29-31

[219] Tür, p.217

[220] Heper and Shifrinson, p.239

Activities" written by the military intelligence.[221] According to Article 118 of the Turkish Constitution, the MGK was established as an advisory body and it was composed of the President, four government representatives and five military officers.[222] In this context, the generals presented a program of measures to curb the danger of these reactionary activities.[223] This meeting was closed to the media and the press. Only the list of recommendations that were composed of 18 articles was announced.[224] This list of recommendations mainly included (1) the extension of compulsory education from five to an uninterrupted eight years that would result in the closure of secondary parts of Prayer Leaders and Preachers Schools and, (2) supervision of the private schools that belong to tarikats (religious communities) by the Ministry of National Education, (3) the closure of unofficial Quran courses, (4) the implementation of dress code and once again prohibition of wearing headscarves for women and religious caps and long beards for men in public offices, (5) controlling the media which demonstrated the military as the enemy of religion and which supported the discharged military officers from the TSK because of their religiously reactionary activities, (6) termination of the appointment of Refah Party members for civil service, (7) monitoring and scrutinizing of bank accounts that belonged to the religious communities.[225] In this direction, the government was 'officially advised' which actually meant 'forced' to pass necessary regulations to prevent the rise of religious and fundamentalist groups' activities.[226]

Principally, this package of measures aimed at restraining the impact and efficiency of the Islamists in education, economy and inside the state apparatus.[227] At this point, Hakan Yavuz points out that the state due to its failure to handle new actors such as Islamic Refah Party and Islamic bourgeoisie, Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*-MÜSİAD), attempted to criminalize these groups with the help of the

---

[221] Akpınar, p.195
[222] http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us, (30.04.2015)
[223] "1997-Postmodern Coup", **Global Security**, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/tu-military-coup-1997.htm, (30.04.2014)
[224] David Cutler, "Factbox-Turkey's 'post-modern coup' of 1997", **Chicago Tribune**, 08.05.2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-08/business/sns-rt-turkey-militaryfactboxl5e8g3gvr-20120508_1_erbakan-islamist-led-government-akp, (30.04.2014)
[225] Tür, p. 218 and Köni, p.87
[226] Tür, p. 218
[227] Zürcher, p.300

February 28 Process.[228] The military that was in direct contact with the press during the February 28 process worked hard to normalize the idea of military intervention into politics in public opinion.[229] To do so, the press frequently published declarations and comments of senior military officers concerning the important political issues and their critics of the anti-secular policies followed by the Refahyol government. Along with the media and the press, the military also mobilized the major business associations, syndicates, university rectors and the judiciary against Refah Party. By doing so the military brought new allies on its sides. [230] For that very reason, the events of 28 February 1997 was called as the 'soft coup' due to the military's reliance of soft power rather than using hard power measures. With these measures the military was giving a message that Erbakan's government should resign 'voluntarily' or be forced out by the military power.[231] As Yavuz stated;

> *This 'soft coup' is also known as the 'February 28 process' because the coup was not only limited to the removal of the RP-led government but was also a process for the state establishment, mainly the military and civilian bureaucracy, to monitor, control and criminalize all Islamic activism as a security threat and institutionalize permanent legal framework for ostracizing devout and/or active Turkish Muslims from the market, educational and political spheres…Assertive Kurdish and Islamic identity claims have reinforced the 'securitization' of domestic politics in Turkey and the institutionalization of national security state, in which the military has the economy, education and foreign policy.[232]*

February 28 was a 'process' as a result of its continuous effects over Turkish politics that resulted in the limitation of Refah Party's political effect both in domestic and foreign policy.[233] "This was a period in which there was complete military supremacy over civilian politics."[234]

Following the MGK meeting on February 28, 1997 and the military's list of recommendations, tensions did not diminish between the government and the

---

[228] M. Hakan Yavuz, **Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009,(Secularism and Muslim Democracy), pp.64-65

[229] Ali Bayramoğlu, **28 Şubat: Bir Müdahalenin Güncesi**, Birey Press, İstanbul, 2001, p. 89

[230] Müge Aknur, "Civil-Military Relations During the AK Party Era: Major Developments and Challenges", **Insight Turkey**, Vol.15, No.4, 2013,(Civil-Military Relations), p. 135

[231] Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy**,** pp.64-65

[232] Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy, pp.64-65

[233] Gencer Özcan, "Giriş", **Onbir Aylık Saltanat**, (ed. Gencer Özcan), Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1998, (Giriş), pp.14-15

[234] Aknur, Civil Military Relations, p. 135

military. The government officially accepted the 28 February recommendations but it did not get into the action of implementing them.[235] The military had established a group called "Western Working Group" (*Batı Çalışma Grubu*) in order to follow up the anti-secular and fundamentalist Islamist activities of Refah Party and monitor whether the government was implementing the 28 February recommendations or not.[236] As a result of reluctance of the government to implement the 28 February recommendations and to take measures towards anti-secular activities, the MGK put forward its demands again this time as an ultimatum.[237] Eventually, this conflict turned into an open warfare between Refah Party and the military. The military moreover, mobilized different parts of society such as trade unions and employers' federations against to the government. Consequently, the government could not resist to the attacks of secularist elite that had been continuing for months and lost its absolute majority in the parliament on May 20, 1997 when the Refahyol government had gone through vote of confidence.[238] As a result, Erbakan resigned his position on June 18 and president Demirel asked Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the opposition party ANAP, to form the new government. Consequently, ANAP established a coalition government by including the government along with the Bülent Ecevit's DSP and Hüsamettin Cindoruk's Democratic Turkey Party (*Demokratik Türkiye Partisi*-DTP). The first task of this new coalition government was to implement the reforms demanded by the military.[239]

V. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING REFAHYOL COALITION GOVERNMENT PERIOD

Turkish Military historically has had a prominent role in Turkish politics due to its role as the founder and protector of the Republic as well as Kemalist principles

---

[235] Zürcher, p. 300
[236] "Military watchdog group monitors spreading fundamentalism", **Hürriyet Daily News**, 06.14.1997, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=military-watchdog-group-monitors-spreading-fundamentalism-1997-06-14, (13.10.2014)
[237] Zürcher, p.300
[238] David Cutler, "Factbox-Turkey's 'post-modern coup' of 1997", **Chicago Tribune**, 08.05.2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-08/business/sns-rt-turkey-militaryfactboxl5e8g3gvr-20120508_1_erbakan-islamist-led-government-akp, (30.04.2014)
[239] Zürcher, p.301

and reforms. The military also consolidated its central role in politics through direct and indirect military interventions into domestic politics. Particularly, following the 1980 military coup, TSK strengthened their position in politics by expanding the MGK's authority and its dominance within this institution. The military's dominant role in domestic politics could also be observed in foreign policy throughout the 1990s and particularly during the rule of Refahyol government. During this period, the military interfered into many foreign policy issues directly and indirectly.

As the leader of the junior partner of the coalition party, Tansu Çiller acted as the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Refahyol government. However, RP elites did not permit her to play a significant role in this position. Çiller during this period was in vulnerable position due to the rising political pressure over DYP that resulted from the Susurluk Scandal and other corruption investigations about herself.[240] Çiller could not resist the political demands of Erbakan because she needed his support so that corruption against her would not be resurfaced. As a result of Çiller's vulnerability, as soon as coming to power in July 1996, Refah Party elites started to dominate the foreign policy decisions by bypassing Çiller and her party. The priorities of Refah Party dominated these decisions as a result of both decisive personal initiatives of Erbakan and the activities of Abdullah Gül, who was known as the "shadow foreign minister".[241] As stated before, during the first six months in power, Refahyol coalition government headed by Erbakan, had to confront a series of controversial foreign policy issues. These issues included the relationship with Israel; the Customs Union with EU, the Cyprus issue and OPC II towards northern Iraq.[242] During the election campaigns Erbakan stated that he would follow opposing foreign policies to the traditional foreign policies of Turkey that were also confirmed by the military. Upon coming to power Erbakan also repeated these policies such as breaking relations with the EU and Israel and giving an end to OPC. However, such statements alerted the General Staff that decided to get directly involved in foreign policy-making process.

[240] Gencer Özcan, "Kuramdan Gerçekliğe Giden Yol", **Onbir Aylık Saltanat**, (ed. Gencer Özcan) Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1998, (Kuramdan Gerçekliğe), p. 265
[241] G. Özcan, Kuramdan Gerçekliğe, p.266
[242] Philiph Robbins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan", **Survival**, Vol. 2, No. 39, 1997, (Turkish Foreign Policy), p.83

During this period, the military did not only intervene into domestic and foreign politics, but rather determined politics itself by placing foreign policy problems under its own monopoly and by securitizating these problems by pushing them out of political domain.[243] Securitization as a concept refers to the state branding "…certain religious, ethnic, class or ideological groups and movements as a national security or even 'existential' threat, thus justifying coercive and often extra-judicial measures against them".[244] In the same vein, Ümit Cizre states that in order to do so the army resorted to two methods: First the military either threatened the civilian politicians with the possibility of staging another coup or by issuing public statements that were often derogatory. Second, regarding government policies, the military constructed the concept of national security in such a way that it legitimized the political role of the military as guardians.[245] In this context, creating a convergence in the relations between Turkey and Israel, orientation of the public opinion against Syria and Iran through leaking intelligence to the press and military reports about Kurdish and religious reactionary movements threats, the armed forces had prepared a ground for themselves to influence politics via its effectiveness in the foreign policy and security issues.[246] In sum, while the military directly determined Turkish foreign policy by the help of various formal and informal mechanisms, Refahyol government became the 'main opposition party' because of its ineffectiveness in the foreign policy domain.[247]

A. Mechanisms Used By the Military to Increase Its Power in Turkish Foreign Policy during the Refahyol Government

TSK exerted its power in foreign policy through the help of some institutional and non-institutional mechanisms. The military increased its political power both in domestic politics and foreign policy through its existing 'advisory' bodies such as

---

[243] Bayramoğlu, p. 51

[244] Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy, pp.64-65

[245] Ümit Cizre, "Ideology, Context and Interests: The Turkish Military," **The Cambridge History of Turkey**, (ed. R. Kasaba), Vol:4, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, (Ideology), p.303

[246] Bayramoğlu, p. 51

[247] Gencer Özcan, "Ana Muhalefet Hükümetinin Ortadoğu Politikasından Kesitler", **Onbir Aylık Saltanat,** (ed. Gencer Özcan), Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1998, (Ana Muhalefet), p. 217

MGK and its Secretary, working groups and task forces.[248] Moreover, the military became an efficient player in the foreign policy through use of informal mechanisms such as the foreign country visits and public statements and briefings of high ranking military officers as well as military training and intelligence agreements with other states such as Israel. Securitization of the Kurdish problem, military's operations towards northern Iraq and the military's leading role in peacekeeping operations in many countries also contributed to the consolidation of the military's role and power in Turkish politics while pushing the issues into the realm of hard politics.[249]

According to Ali Bayramoğlu there are four indicators of the military's direct involvement into politics. First indicator is the direct involvement of the Turkish General Staff in the political realm along with the MGK and the policy making in vital issues. Second indicator is Turkish General Staff's participation in the decision making processes of foreign policy making by signing the military and defense cooperation agreements by bypassing the civilian authority. The third one is military's direct confrontation with its undesired actors through establishing hegemony over the legal mechanisms such as media and the press while orienting them against these undesired actors. The last one is the preliminary steps the military had been taking on the vital issues such as the Kurdish question.[250]

1. Foreign Visits of High-Ranking Military Officers

During the last months of Refahyol government, the problem of duality in Turkish foreign policy caused by policies followed by the coalition partners had increased.[251] While Çiller got stuck in corruption investigations, RP had increased its power within the government. Although Çiller was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erbakan and other RP deputies such as Abdullah Gül became effective in the foreign policy realm through their statements and foreign visits. During the governance of

---

[248] Gerassimos Karabelias, "Dictating the Upper Tide: Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Özal Decade,1993-2003", **Turkish Studies**, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2008, p.460
[249] G. Özcan, Giriş, p.25
[250] Bayramoğlu, p. 52
[251] Gencer Özcan, "Sonun Başlangıcı", **Onbir Aylık Saltanat, (**ed. Gencer Özcan), Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1998, (Sonun Başlangıcı), p.201

Refahyol government, Prime Minister Erbakan and other primary Refah Party deputies had travelled mainly to Islamic countries. Syria and Iran as Islamic countries were the first countries that congratulated the establishment of Refahyol government and the first official visit to Refahyol government was from Hosni Mubarak, the leader of Egypt.[252] On all occasions, Erbakan showed his orientation towards Middle Eastern countries while he was criticizing the military and economic ties with Israel. He even argued that rather than becoming a member of the EU, Turkey should have established an economic organization with its Muslim brothers in other words with the Muslim countries.

However, there were other primary players in the Turkish foreign policy making such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President Süleyman Demirel and most intensely, the military. In the aftermath of the February 28 MGK meeting, decisions taken by the MGK had placed Refah Party in an awkward position that reflected also in the foreign policy domain. In the aftermath of the meeting the military started directly dominating Turkish foreign policy with the help of President Demirel.[253] In this respect, during Refahyol government a dichotomy emerged in the foreign policy orientation between Refah Party and the military which was the advocate of the traditional foreign policy of the Turkish state. In this context, high-ranking Military officers frequently made visits to non-Islamic states, clearly in response to Erbakan's Far East and Middle East visits. The General Staff used these visits as a tool to become effective in foreign policy and to make the necessary contacts with Israel and the West to maintain the traditional Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy.

For example, in February 1997, Turkish Chief of General Staff, İsmail Hakkı Karadayı and Defense Minister Turhan Tayan visited Israel. Reciprocally Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs David Levy and Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai visited Turkey.[254] Karadayı and Tayan's visits were really meaningful since these visits demonstrated the superiority of the Military in foreign policy initiatives both in

---

[252] Bozdağlıoğlu, p.135
[253] G. Özcan, Sonun Başlangıcı, p.202
[254] Mesut Özcan, **Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East**, Ashgate, England, 2008, p.124

terms of their timing and agenda.[255] General Karadayı's visit to Israel had taken place shortly after the organization of Jerusalem Night in Sincan. Therefore such a visit was considered as a signal to the governing party Refahyol as well as the West showing TSK's role as the supporter of the traditional Turkish foreign policy that included a close relationship with Israel.[256] Chief of General Staff Karadayı was received by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Ezer Weizman along with his counterpart. Such a high level treatment of General Karadayı showed the importance Israel had attached to this visit.[257]

Karadayı paid this visit to make a military cooperation agreement and negotiate the framework of Military Training and Cooperation Agreement between Israel and Turkey including technology transfer, intelligence sharing and joint military exercises.[258] This agreement and the military's initiative to sign it without asking the permission of the government showed the power of the military in foreign policy. Karadayı's visit of Israel as well as public statements of Deputy Chief of General Staff Çevik Bir identifying Iran as a "terrorist state", had clarified the military's position against Refah Party's foreign policies.[259] More interestingly, two days after General Karadayı's visit to Israel, MGK met on February 28, 1997 and 'proposed' a package of measures to the government.[260] On one hand, rather than civilian governments, TSK was taking initiatives in the foreign policy making process through these visits and other mechanisms such as briefings, public statements and military operations. On the other hand it was consolidating its role within domestic politics as a result of MGK decisions and its effectiveness in foreign policy.

Although Erbakan government initially rejected Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Levy's visit in April 1997, as a result of Karadayı's intervention Erbakan was forced to meet Levy.[261] Similarly, earlier Erbakan had also ignored Israeli Prime

---

[255] G. Özcan, Askeri Yapının Artan Etkisi, p.81

[256] G. Özcan, Sonun Başlangıcı, p.201

[257] Hasan Kösebalaban, **Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism and Globalization**, Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2011, p. 138

[258] Burhan Eliş and Vahap Yazaroğlu, "Rejim Kaygımız Yok", **Milliyet**, 27.02.1997, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3 D__x3D_, (04.04.2014), p.18

[259] G. Özcan, Askeri Yapının Artan Etkisi, p.81

[260] Kösebalaban, p.138

[261] Kösebalaban, p.138

Minister Netanyahu's letter that congratulated his premiership.[262] However, Erbakan could not resist to the military's insistence to continue relations with Israel at a strategic time when the PKK terror attacks reached to its peak point.

In May 1997, Deputy Chief of General Staff Bir also visited Israel within the context of regular strategic dialogue meetings in order to discuss regional security problems. In this meeting –in which the US authorities attended— necessary measures against potential Syrian and Iranian threat as well as holding joint military exercises and exchanging intelligence were discussed. Despite criticisms towards these meetings by the Arab states and Refah Party, these contacts continued through the initiatives of the TSK and were later turned into a military and economic partnership with Israel.[263]

Another example of military's direct diplomatic initiatives was Chief of General Staff Karadayı's visit to Cyprus in January, 1997 without informing the government. Karadayı's Cyprus visit, instigated with an invitation from Rauf Denktaş, the President of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and it was very important as being the first visit at the Chief of Staff level.[264] During his visit, Karadayı declared that the armament in South Cyprus created a situation "unacceptable in terms of the national and strategic interests of Turkey", that this situation posed a heavy threat risk against regional peace and NATO solidarity. He warned that Turkey should not be criticized for her reactions to Southern Cyprus and Greece.[265]

2. Public Statements of High-Ranking Military Officers and Briefings to High-Level Bureaucrats

One of the efficient methods of the Armed Forces concerning both Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy was "giving briefings to high level bureaucrats of the ministries of foreign affairs and of justice, academics and leading journalists"[266] and making public statements for appealing directly to public opinion.

---

[262] Bilgin, p.410
[263] G. Özcan, Ana Muhalefet, pp.232-233
[264] G. Özcan, Sonun Başlangıcı, p. 205
[265] G. Özcan, Sonun Başlangıcı, p.205
[266] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.21

As Özcan put it, "military authorities also made public statements, issued press releases or in some cases-leaked sensitive information to the press".[267] These non-institutional mechanisms contributed to the consolidation of Turkish military's de facto authority in Turkish foreign policy alongside domestic politics. Turkish public has been accustomed to this indirect form of military interference in domestic and foreign policy. High-ranking military officers frequently had shown their influence over critical foreign policy issues, such as Iraq, Iran, Cyprus, Turkish-EU relations and relations with Israel through their public statements on these topics.[268]

On many occasions, high ranking military officers demonstrated their negative attitudes towards some countries, particularly to the Middle Eastern countries by using institutional and non-institutional mechanisms. For instance, Erbakan had proposed "Cooperation on Defense Industry with Iran" in order to develop bilateral relations with Iran that would align with RP's Islamic foreign policy orientation. On 16 December 1996, a high-ranking military officer of General Staff criticized this attempt in his speech. He stated that "[Turkey] will not make a military cooperation with a country that poses threat to Turkey. This country is in an effort to export its regime and it also supports Kurdish terrorist activities towards Turkey … Turkey imports its military technology from the West. In addition, Iran does not have military technology, itself, what we will take from them (?)" and "…Turkish foreign policy orientation is obvious and this attempt is only a utopia".[269] The next day, Defense Minister Tayan in a speech stated that such cooperation was not possible for Turkey.[270] These statements evidently showed military's direct involvement into foreign policy.

The tension between the Military and Refah Party had emerged during the decisions of the Supreme Military Council (*Yüksek Askeri Şura-YAŞ*) which enabled the discharge of military officers as a result of their reactionary activities. Reactions to these decisions by the party base and the policies of the party administration to

---

[267] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.21
[268] Aknur, TSK, p. 142
[269] Evren Değer, "Genelkurmay'dan Erbakan'a Ret", **Milliyet**, 16.12.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3 D__x3D_, (06.04.2014), p.17
[270] Evren Değer, "Çin'le Gizli Füze Anlaşması", **Milliyet**, 20.12.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3 D__x3D_, (06.04.2014), p.16

ease off the reactions had triggered the tension between the TSK and Refah Party. Refah Party's reactions to decisions of the YAŞ took the shape of a 50 trillion TL cut in the National Defense Budget, "Shah Analogy" of Rafsanjani's daughter and appointment of a female teacher wearing headscarf to the school in Ankara garrison.[271] In return, the Military listed the issues it felt uncomfortable with in its public statement on December 22, 1996. In the press release, the Military particularly criticized the speech of Rafsanjani's daughter during her visit to Turkey with Rafsanjani. In this speech she made an analogy comparing the last period of Shah Regime in Iran and the current situation in Turkey and responded with the argument of similarity between the last period of the Ottoman Empire before its collapse and current Iran.[272] Rafsanjani's visit to Turkey clarified the different views towards Iran between the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff and the Refah Party elite. Through these statements, the military also manifested its position against Iran and its reserve to the possibility of developing close relations with this state.

General Karadayı also gave an interview to the Journal of Anadolu, focusing on Turkey-EU relations, three days after Rafsanjani's visit, concentrating on secularity and terror issues.[273] In this release, Karadayı mentioned recent discussions about secularism in Turkey and emphasized the importance of European integration and Turkey's membership to the EU for the survival of a secular regime. Karadayı also referred to the terror problem and the requirements to create a "joint action plan" through the collaboration of all state institutions taking economic, political and social measures in order to eliminate the PKK terror. More importantly, he underlined the necessity to stop the political and economic support given to the PKK by Turkey's neighbors in its fight with terror. He actually referred to Iran when he mentioned the neighbors.[274] Similarly, in June 1997, General Bir criticized Foreign Minister Tansu

---

[271] Evren Değer, "Ordu'nun 4 Rahatsızlığı", Milliyet, 22.12.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3 D__x3D_, (06.04.2014), p.27
[272] Değer, Ordu'nun 4 Rahatsızlığı, p.27
[273] Değer, Ordu'nun 4 Rahatsızlığı, p.27
[274] "Karadayı'dan Laiklik Uyarısı", **Milliyet**, 25.12.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3 D__x3D_, (15.04.2014), p.13

Çiller about her lack of attention towards the EU-Turkey relations in a briefing given to the bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry by the General Staff.[275]

Chief of General Staff in its report to the MGK stated that besides the Iranian support to Kurdish terrorism, Syria and Iraq were also providing weapons to the PKK members. Therefore, they pointed out the urgency of putting the Defense Agreement with Israel into effect.[276] According to this report, Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian nuclear, chemical and biological weapons posed a serious security threat towards Turkey, and Turkey should immediately conclude the Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement with Israel in order to balance this threat in the region. Contrary to Refah Party's enthusiasm to develop bilateral relations with Iran through a cooperation agreement and its opposition to cooperation with Israel, the military initiated a cooperation agreement with Israel. As already stated, the military strongly opposed close relations with Iran through its public statements, press releases and reports. Moreover, when Libyan leader Qaddafi publicly criticized Turkish-Israeli cooperation and stated "Turkish army is governed by Jews", high-ranking military officers had asked the president to withdraw Turkey's ambassador in Libya.[277]

The "Jerusalem Night" was one of the most significant events that indicated the existing polarization between the military and the government. In February 1997, Deputy Chief of General Staff General Çevik Bir gave a speech in Washington. In this speech he called Iran a 'registered terrorist state' and accused it for exporting 'Islamic revolution to Turkey', 'supporting the PKK' and 'manufacturing weapons of mass destruction'.[278] Following the Sincan events General Bir visited the USA along with a civilian committee to make negotiations on defense industry investment on February 20 1997. After his meeting with NATO General Secretary, he gave an

---

[275] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p. 27
[276] Evren Değer, "Türkiye'ye Füze Tehdidi", **Milliyet**, 27.12.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3D__x3D_, (15.04.2014), p.18
[277] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.22
[278] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.22

implicit message to Refah Party in an interview while he was talking about rolling tanks in Sincan and stated that "we have just put our weight to adjust democracy".[279]

Moreover, the Jerusalem night turned into a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Iran and following the Sincan event, Turkey's ambassador to Iran was immediately recalled.[280] The Jerusalem Night also irritated the Israeli government which was attentively watching Refah Party's pro-Sharia policies and attempts to improve its relations with Iran. In this respect, in an interview General Karadayı gave to the well-known Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, indicated that Israel's worries about Turkish-Iranian relations were unnecessary since Turkey had guaranteed that it would not share Israeli know-hows with any other country without making an agreement with these countries and Israel.[281]

The Military had strongly showed its reaction to the Jerusalem Night by sending several military tanks to Ankara's Sincan district on February 4, 1997. This was actually a visual demonstration of the military's opposition to the government's activities. Eventually, after the contradictory practices of Refah-led government such as the Jerusalem Night, invitation of religious leaders to the evening meal during Ramadan at the Prime Minister's residence and RP deputies' attendance to the iftar invitation of Rıza Bagheri, the Iranian ambassador, the military dominated MGK decided to take measures against reactionary activities of the government in its February 28 monthly meeting.[282] Although these decisions were kept secret at the beginning, after the MGK meeting, an 18 point declaration was made public. By taking these decisions at the MGK meeting and broadcasting these directives, the military had made use of the media as a tool to spread its views about critical issues rather than using its hard power.[283] In other words, without overthrowing the government and taking direct control, the military used all other channels to influence the public opinion and regulate the government through the official

---

[279] Yasemin Çongar, "Bir: İran Tescilli Terörist", **Milliyet**, 21.02.1997, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3 D__x3D_, (18.04.2014), (Bir: İran Tescilli Terörist), p.14

[280] Çongar, Bir: İran Tescilli Terörist, p.14

[281] Burhan Eliş, "İsrail'e Paşa Sözü", **Milliyet**, 25.02.1997, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3 D__x3D_, (18.04.2014), p.18

[282] Akpınar, p. 201

[283] Akpınar, p.114

ideology of the Turkish state. As Itzkowitz Shfrinson and Metin Heper pointed out, "the military, instead of taking power into its own hands, orchestrated popular pressure upon the government".[284] By doing so, the military justified its direct impact in both domestic politics and foreign policy in Turkey.

The other effective mechanism used by the military to show its impact in foreign policy was through the briefings given by the senior military members to the media, press, and the state bureaucrats such as university administrators and high ranking officers in the Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Justice.[285] During the times of conflict between the military and the government, TSK had made strategic assessments through these briefings.[286] The military aimed at affecting the public opinion and the decision making process rather than leaving foreign policy making process to the monopoly of RP. Moreover, through the help of its hard power capability, the military was signaling its possible direct involvement into the controversial decisions of foreign policy and domestic policies taken by RP. The military had started their series of briefings concerning national security with the first one given to President Demirel at the General Staff's headquarter. In this briefing they informed President Demirel of the fundamentalist activities of the government.[287] Particularly, following the February 28 meeting, the military increased the frequency of these briefings. According to February 28 indictment, that was prepared in 2013 and targeted the post-modern military memorandum in 1997 during Refahyol government, the General Staff gave briefings to the members of the judiciary on June 10 1997, press, academicians, businessmen, civil society organizations, rectors and *YÖK* on June 11, 1997.[288] In these briefings, the main topic was the reactionary Islamic activities in Turkey and the necessity of the implementation of measures by the government. The briefing was given by Fevzi Türkeri, head of the General Staff Counterintelligence Section. Along with the criticism of the government's Islamic policies and the "secret agenda" of the

---

[284] Heper and Shifrinson, p.239
[285] G. Özcan, Askeri Yapının Artan Etkisi, p.81
[286] Bayramoğlu, p.157
[287] Cemal, p.230
[288] "Şok Belgeler Ortaya Çıktı", **Sabah**, 11.06.2013, http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2013/06/11/sok-belgeler-ortaya-cikti, (30.04.2014)

fundamentalist organizations in Turkey targeting secularism, Türkeri, referred to fundamentalist circles' relations with certain Islamic countries. He stated that;

> ....the ultimate goal of the fundamentalist activities was to rearrange the state administration according to religious rules.....Iran provides all kinds of material and moral support. Hizbullah, Salam and Islamic Movement organizations are given direction by Iran. Their leaders are trained in Iran....and Libya has been maintaining relations via the Islamic Salvation Front.....Sudan, meanwhile, provides logistic support, financial assistance, military training and camping facilities.....[289]

The military also gave briefings that are titled "Aegean and Turkish-Greek Problems" and "PKK and terrorism".[290] During one of these briefings given by the General Staff, Iran and Syria were accused of supporting Kurdish separatism and conservative reactionary movements which threatened the regime in Turkey.[291]

3. Military, Training and Intelligence Agreements with Israel

Prime Minister Erbakan's public statements concerning foreign policy during his election campaign and after the establishment of Refahyol government was based on the notion of change from the traditional foreign policy to the idea of Islamic brotherhood with the Islamic countries in the Middle East by establishing alternative international institutions and developing cooperation with them.[292] Despite his rhetoric of "change" in foreign policy making during Erbakan's governance, "continuity" seems to best explain Turkey's foreign policy orientation in this period.[293] Turkey's relations with Israel constituted one of the most significant examples of this continuity.

Despite some ups and downs concerning the Arab-Israeli conflicts, Turkish-Israeli relations have historically been harmonious. Turkish-Jewish relations can be traced back to the Ottoman period. When Jews were deported from the Catholic

---

[289]"General Staff's Ultimatum-like Briefing", **Hürriyet Daily News**, 06.13.1997, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/general-staffs-ultimatum-like-briefing.aspx?pageID=438&n=general-staffs-ultimatum-like-briefing-1997-06-13, (30.04.2014)
[290] Akpınar, p.230
[291] G. Özcan, Giriş, p.15
[292] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Güvenlik Kıskacında Türkiye-Ortadoğu İlişkileri", **En Uzun Onyıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar**, 2nd edition, (ed. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut), Büke Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000, (Güvenlik Kıskacı), p.332
[293] Altunışık, Güvenlik Kıskacında, p.332

Spain in 1492, they had taken refuge in the Ottoman Empire. [294] In the 1930s, the Turkish state opened its borders to Jews who escaped from German holocaust and gave Jewish academicians and scientists a chance to work in Turkish universities.[295] Turkey also became the first Muslim state to recognize Israel in 1949 after Israel's declaration of statehood.[296] Although there were some diplomatic crises, the Israeli effort to develop military and diplomatic relations with Turkey and the signing of the Peripheral Pact in 1958 demonstrated the extensive relationships between these two countries.[297] The Peripheral Pact included the import of military equipment from Israel to Turkey and military cooperation in a state of emergency. It also included shared diplomatic campaigns and cooperation to increase the volume of trade, which was the nucleus of the latter Turkish-Israeli military cooperation.

In the 1980s, Turkish-Israeli relations deteriorated because of the conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors starting with Israeli government's declaration of Jerusalem as the capital city in 1980 and the first intifada (Palestinian uprising) in 1987.[298] During this period Turkish governments, that avoided any policy that would dissatisfy Arab countries, had reduced its diplomatic relations with Israel to the level of second secretary. The peace process between Israel and Palestine had contributed to the normalization of the relations between Israel and Turkey in the 1990s.[299] The changing climate in the Middle East region starting with the Madrid and Oslo peace negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors reduced Turkey's anxiety which created legitimacy for Turkey to take a step toward Israel. There were also other determinants contributing to the rapprochement between these two countries, such as Turkey's rising security problems emanating from PKK activities and the Gulf

---

[294] Graham E. Fuller, **Yükselen Bölgesel Aktör: Yeni Türkiye Cumhuriyeti**, trans. by Assoc. Dr. Mustafa Acar, Timaş, İstanbul, 2009, p.214
[295] Çağrı Erhan and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Filistin Sorunu ve İsrail'le İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, (ed. Baskın Oran), 1st edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, p. 636
[296] Mahmut Bali Aykan, "The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy From the 1950s to the 1990s", **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1993, p. 92
[297] Amikam Nachmani, **Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean**, Frank Cass, London, 1987, pp.64-74
[298] Mensur Akgün, "Ortadoğu Maceraları", **Onbir Aylık Saltanat: Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Dış Politikada Refahyol Dönemi,** (ed. Gencer Özcan), Boyut Press, İstanbul, 1998, pp.169-168
[299] Süha Bölükbaşı, "Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol. 29, No. 3, Autumn 1999, pp. 30-31

War.[300] Therefore Turkey searched for a strategic partner across for its rising security problems.

Turkey started to develop its relations with Israel gradually without annoying the Arabs and restored its diplomatic relations by raising the level of its diplomatic representation. During the meetings of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) and Madrid and Oslo peace talks, Israeli representatives and Turkish senior diplomats made direct contacts.[301] Political relations improved gradually in terms of the level of diplomatic visits: In 1992, Minister of Tourism Abdülkadir Ateş, in 1993 Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin and in 1994 Prime Minister Tansu Çiller visited Israel. Finally in 1996 President Süleyman Demirel paid a visit to Israel.[302] These visits eventually turned into routine visits. "Alain Gresh claimed that the 'impetus for the alliance' came from the Turkish generals rather than from Israel"[303] or diplomats and ministry of foreign affairs.

Erbakan's discourse concerning anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic statements before the elections did not change when he came to power. However, he was forced by the military to intensify the relations between the two countries through new agreements.[304] As Ofra Bengio noted; "The Turkish military was the driving force behind the military agreements between Turkey and Israel" in the 1990s which manifested the direct involvement of Turkish military in the foreign policy making process during Refahyol government.[305] According to Bengio, the military increased its role in Turkey's foreign and security policy by expanding its de facto and de jure authority over the civilians in power and became the architect of the military assistance between Turkey and Israel.[306]

The military relations between these two states had started to improve and eventually these relations turned into a strategic partnership at a later stage. On

---

[300] Efraim Inbar, **Türk-İsrail Stratejik Ortaklığı**, trans. by Suna Ercan and Özgül Erdemli, ASAM, Ankara, 2001, p. 19
[301] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, pp.257-258
[302] Inbar, p.23
[303] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p.257
[304] Altunışık, Güvenlik Kıskacında, p.332
[304] Altunışık, Güvenlik Kıskacında, p.332
[305] Ofra Bengio, **The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders**, Palgrave Macmillan, NY, 2004, p. 80
[306] Bengio, p. 81

January 23, 1996, the Turkish General Staff signed a secret cooperation agreement with Israel in Tel-Aviv, without the knowledge of the Turkish government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[307] This framework agreement was published by Aksiyon Magazine in Turkey causing serious reaction of the government.[308] Despite Erbakan's rejections and criticisms to the Military Agreement with Israel, the TSK insisted on continuing with the agreement arguing that the cancellation of the modernization project of Turkey's 54 Phantom-4 fighter aircraft by Israel would lead to the deterioration of relations between the two countries and would weaken Turkey in its fight with PKK.[309] Eventually, realizing that he could not cancel the agreement Erbakan approved it.

This military and security cooperation between Turkey and Israel in the 1990s had come to effect in two stages: The first was the signing of the framework agreement for Military Training and Cooperation Agreement (MTCA) on February 23, 1996 and the second was the signing of framework agreement on August 26, 1996 for technology transfer, intelligence sharing and training of military members between these two countries.[310]

Military relations between Israel and Turkey proceeded one more step further after the signing of the Military Training and Cooperation Agreement during the visit of the vice chief of general staff, Çevik Bir, to Israel in 1996. This agreement included joint air force training activities, exchange of military information, experience, personnel, cultural and social information, access to each other's sports and art facilities on military bases, cooperation and use of one another's military documentaries, using of airspace of the other country.[311]

The main targets on this joint training activities and exchange of military information were mainly Syria and Iran. Moreover, Israel also provided intelligence

---

[307] Akgün, pp.168-169
[308] Akgün, pp.168-169
[309] Murat Kul, "Erbakan Fantom 2000'i Onayladı", **Milliyet**, 30.11.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/hjxSaSQBepGvmpOUyNQ_x2B_wQ_x3D__x3D_ , (04.05.2014), p.17
[310] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkish Policy Toward Israel," **Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy**, (eds. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari), The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., 2000, (Toward Israel), pp. 66-67
[311] Kemal Balcı, "Turkey Opens Up to Israeli Warships After Combat Jets", **Turkish Daily News**, 12.04.1996, http://www.hri.org/news/turkey/trkn/1996/96-04-12.trkn.html, (07.05.2014)

concerning the PKK which can be considered as the most significant threat for Turkey throughout the 1990s.[312] In addition, Israeli military forces provided intelligence and ammunition to Turkish military forces in the Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian borders and military agreements were signed concerning naval forces which envisioned joint training activities in the Mediterranean Sea.[313] According to an article published on Defense News, military cooperation between Turkey and Israel disturbed Syria, Iran and Iraq as changing the geostrategic balance within the region. The article also claimed that this military rapprochement between Israel and Turkey had strengthened the dual isolation of Iraq and Iran by the USA. Erbakan rejected this argument in order not to either dissatisfy Muslim neighbors or harm the possibility of building a Muslim brotherhood among Islamic countries.[314]

Due to the discordance between the military and RP during the Refahyol government period, TSK frequently by-passed the government and especially the RP side of the government through giving briefings to the political leaders on certain issues and making public announcements on significant issues concerning the security and foreign policy.[315] Another way of by-passing RP was dealing with the DYP side of the government on security policies. For example, when its projects concerning the Defense Industry were blocked by Erbakan, the General Staff by-passed him by seeking the help of Çiller who approved the projects during Erbakan's Middle East visits.[316] These projects included the production of assault helicopters, modernization of Phantom-5 planes, and announcement of a tender for F-16 planes, other weapon projects, purchase of unmanned combat air vehicles and the increase in the Defense Industry Officers' salaries.

---

[312] Inbar, p. 28
[313] Inbar, p. 28
[314] "Suriye'nin Kabusu", **Milliyet**, 05.12.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/hjxSaSQBepGvmpOUyNQ_x2B_wQ_x3D__x3D_ , (07.05.2014), p.18
[315] Bengio, p.81
[316] Evren Değer, "Hoca'ya By-Pass", **Milliyet**, 14.10.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/hjxSaSQBepGvmpOUyNQ_x2B_wQ_x3D__x3D_ , (04.05.2014), p.16

4. Military Operations

Military operations conducted by TSK in the 1990s towards both the Kurdish movements in Turkey and those across the border strengthened the military's position in Turkish politics, increasing its impact in Turkish foreign policy making. The 1990s witnessed the securitization of both the domestic and foreign policy issues by the Military. By doing so, the Turkish military brought internal and external problems into the scope of hard politics which gave the armed forces an autonomous position within Turkish foreign policy.

a. Internal Military Operations

As it will be examined in more detail in the following sections, there were two major threats in the national security agenda of Turkey in the 1990s i.e. the rise of Kurdish nationalism that showed itself as the increasing PKK attacks and the rise of political Islam. Kurdish problem was a long-running internal problem that was inherited from the period of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. However, it became more significant as a result of the outbreak of the armed attacks of the Kurdish Workers Party (*Partiya Karkaran Kurdistan*-PKK) in early 1980s. It had started its attacks in the southeastern part of the country in 1984.[317] Even though Turkish state overestimated these attacks at the beginning, it was forced to take this issue seriously when the PKK attacks had increased after in mid and late 1980s. Therefore, these attacks were classified as a national problem that required a general understanding above politics.[318]

In the 2945 'MGK and MGK General Secretary Law', that was written in accordance with Article 118 of the constitution, national security is defined as follows: "National security expresses the protection of constitutional order of the state, its national existence and unity, its all kinds of interests within international arena including the political, social, cultural and economic interests, and its

---

[317] Müge Aknur, **Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: An Analysis of Civilian Leaders-Incentive Structures, Political Capacity and Institutional Context**, VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, Saarbrücken, Germany, 2008, (An Analysis of Civilian Leaders), p.90

[318] Burak Ülman, "Türkiye'nin Yeni Güvenlik Algılamaları ve 'Bölücülük'", **En Uzun On Yıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar**, (ed. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut), Büke Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000, p. 108

conventional law (*ahdi hukuk*) against all kinds of internal and external threats."[319] Such a definition permits the legislative regulations to give the power for the determination and implementation of national security measures to the MGK instead of the cabinet.[320] Especially, during the 1990s, operations of the PKK had escalated controlling a large part of the southeastern part of Turkey.[321] Therefore, the increase in the number of PKK operations was perceived as a threat to territorial integrity by TSK putting it as the highest priority in Turkish national security agenda in 1992.[322] Rather than perceiving this problem as a socio-economic or a cultural one, the military considered it as a national security matter which led to direct military operations towards PKK.

By the mid-1990s starting from 1993 on, governmental and parliamentary policies towards the Kurdish Question had started to become more rigid because of three determinants.[323] These were the declaration of the Kurdish threat as the top security threat in national security agenda by the MGK in 1992; increase in the armed attacks of PKK in the southeastern region which reached to the level of low intensity conflict and; Çiller's coming to power in 1993 who had pursued more militaristic policy towards the Kurdish question rather than democratic policies.[324] In the following years, instability in Turkish politics, short-term coalition governments and weak political leaders in power had also contributed to the continuation of this situation. The Refahyol period had also carried the same characteristic with other coalition governments that were established in the 1990s. During the Refahyol government era, series of political problems such as the Susurluk incident, corruption investigations, controversial political discourses of Refah Party deputies and the revival of radical Islamist threat left the initiative on the Kurdish Question to the TSK.

The Military already had the initiative to act on the Kurdish Question which it had considered as a 'terror' and 'national security' problem. The first serious counter-action that had started by the military was through the usage of the civilians

---

[319] Ülman, p. 102
[320] Ülman, p.103
[321] Jenkins, p.68
[322] Aknur, An Analysis of Civilian Leaders, p.86
[323] Ülman, p. 110
[324] Ülman, pp.110-111

in the southeastern region against PKK militants, This was done with the help of the "village guard system" that was launched in 1985.[325] In 1987, Governorship of the State of Emergency of Region (*Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği- OHAL Bölge Valiliği*) was established.[326] Other security measures taken by the military against the PKK threat were the establishment of Gendarme Command of Public Security of Region (*Jandarma Asayiş Bölge Komutanlığı*) and Special Operations Team (*Özel Harekat Timi*), and the modernization of Military Forces.[327] These security measures continued throughout the Refahyol Government Period. Despite Refah Party's perception of the Kurdish issue as a social and spiritual issue which could have been overcome through Islamic Brotherhood and despite its criticisms towards the military's policies in the region that were based on hard power, the military was the most effective actor in combating against the PKK threat in this period.[328] As a result, while the military was combating against the PKK threat, it also increased its effectiveness within the Turkish political system and became the most dominant actor during the Refahyol government in foreign policy making and fighting against the Kurdish separatism threat.[329]

b. External Military Operations

The Kurdish question is hard to classify as to whether it is an internal or an external issue. Robins states that "the Kurdish issue in the internal domain affects foreign policy, and vice versa."[330] Due to Kurdish population living in the neighboring states, Iraq, Iran and Syria, the issue had already been a regional concern. Consequently, involvement of the other countries into the Kurdish problem, including Iraq, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Israel, Greece, Southern Cyprus, Armenia as well as some European countries also expanded the size of the

---

[325] Adnan Çelik, "1990'lı Yılların Olağanüstü Hâl Rejimi ve Savaş: Kürdistan Yerellerinde Şiddet ve Direniş", **Toplum ve Kuram**, No. 9, Bahar 2014, p. 102
[326] Çelik, p.102
[327] Ülman, p. 108
[328] Ülman, p. 118
[329] Ülman, p. 118
[330] Philiph Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue", **International Affairs** Vol. 69, No. 4, 1993, (The Overlord State), p. 658

problem.[331] They have given financial, military and intelligence supports to nationalist Kurdish movement in Turkey. In addition to this, intensive military operations in the southeastern part of Turkey conducted by TSK in 1990s had also caused to the escalation of the Kurdish problem in terms of PKK terror attacks. These military operations had limited success in the long run. Many Kurdish nationalists, who escaped from the arrests and the suppression of the Turkish state, took refuge in Syria and thus PKK started to organize itself in Syria.[332] Especially in the 1990s, PKK started its armed attacks from Syria towards Turkey. In addition to Syria, PKK also established headquarters and training bases in other Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq, Iran and Lebanon.[333] Therefore, the Kurdish Question became an externalized problem rather than being an internal problem from the very beginning. Therefore, while combating against PKK, the Turkish military did not only need to make internal military operations, but also had to conduct cross-border military operations to Syria, Iraq and Iran.

First Gulf War made Kurdish Question more complicated and led to the TSK's greater involvement in foreign policy issues in the region. Gulf Crisis highlighted Turkey's insecurities particularly concerning the Kurdish issue.[334] In 1990, Gulf War started with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and as a result, 34 states, including the US, the Western European and Arab states, established an international coalition through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and conducted a military operation against Iraq. Although TSK did not effectively participate in this US-led international coalition, they still provided logistical support. TSK deployed troops on Iraqi border, implemented UN embargo decisions towards Iraq, closed down the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipelines which was critical for Iraqi oil trade and opened its NATO air bases to US war crafts in order to show

---

[331] Ülman, p. 120

[332] In addition to Middle Eastern neighbors of Turkey, many Kurdish nationalists took refuge in Western European countries. These people affected their perception about Turkey and the human rights' violations in Turkey. By 1990s, there were approximately 500,000 Turkish Kurds in Europe who were mainly gained asylum in Germany, France and Sweden. As a result of these Kurdish refuges' financial and political support to the PKK, these Western countries had also been indirectly involved in the Kurdish question. See Robins, The Overlord State, pp. 662-663

[333] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p. 173

[334] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", **Journal of Contemporary European Studies**, Vol. 14, No. 2, August 2006, (Turkey's Iraq Policy), p. 183

Turkey's strategic importance in the post-Cold War period.[335] "On 17 January 1991 the Turkish parliament passed, by a margin of 250 votes to 148, a government motion allowing the participation of TSK in military actions against Iraq and the use of foreign bases in such a war."[336]

After the Gulf War, Kurdish issue turned into more complex and regional crisis as a result of Saddam's severe attacks towards Iraqi Kurds who revolted against Saddam regime. Saddam's suppression of Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq caused to the fled of 400,000 Iraqi Kurds in Turkish border. As a result, the US had to create a no-fly zone in the 36th parallel in Turkey.[337] The US, Britain and France formed the OPC to enforce a no-fly zone in the northern Iraq above the 36th parallel in order to keep Saddam's forces out of the north and hence guard Iraqi Kurds.[338] Turkey's position was really crucial for the enforcement of OPC that was operated out of Incirlik airbase in Turkey and in return, Turkey gained US consent for its cross-border military operations against PKK.[339] The mandate of Turkish Forces, participated in OPC, was extended in every six months by the votes of Turkish Grand National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi-TBMM*).[340] The periodic renewal of the mandate of OPC in the Turkish parliament had by time become a really disputed issue.[341] By the initiation of OPC, security dilemma of Turkey reached to the peak due to the mass flight of Kurdish refugees in a safety zone in Turkish border creating the emergence of a Kurdish authority in the Northern Iraq. With the fled of Kurdish refugees to Turkey many PKK members also managed to enter the Turkish territories. Consequently, the MGK had consistently recommended the renewal of its mandate and parliament has always followed its recommendations.[342] Rather than the

---

[335] Melek Fırat-Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Ortadoğu'yla İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, 2. Cilt,** (ed. Baskın Oran), İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, (Ortadoğu'yla İlişkiler), p. 552
[336] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "The Middle East in Turkey–USA Relations: Managing the Alliance", **Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies**, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013, (The Middle East), p. 162
[337] Michael M. Gunter, **The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey**, Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2008, p. 14
[338] Altunışık, The Middle East, p. 162
[339] Altunışık, Turkey's Iraq Policy, p. 184
[340] Operation Provide Comfort renamed Operation Provide Comfort II (OPC2) after 16 July 1991 which was called as Operation Poised Hammer. After 1996, it was renamed as Operation Northern Watch (ONW). See Faruk Sönmezoğlu, **II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası**, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.546
[341] Altunışık, Turkey's Iraq Policy, p.184
[342] Jenkins, p.75

Turkish parliament, MGK was more eager to renew OPC since the existence of a safe haven in northern Iraq would facilitate the TSK's cross border operations towards PKK without the interference from Iraqi forces.

Even though TSK and state elite did not want to see the rise of a Kurdish authority in Northern Iraq since such an entity could be a role model for Kurds of Turkey, they still had to accept a de facto Kurdish authority developed in the Northern Iraq.[343] In the absence of Iraqi central authority in the north, regional Kurdish powers such as Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) started to control this area. PKK exploited this political vacuum by increasing its guerilla operations across the border in southeastern part of Turkey.[344] Consequently, Turkey started to initiate cross border military operations towards Northern Iraq to stop PKK attacks. Turkish military conducted a series of military operations towards PKK camps in Northern Iraq that were called Operation Steel, Operation Hammer and Operation Dawn. These operations that led to high number of causalities were operated through the deployment of large troops in this region.[345] Among these operations, the one the Turkish military held in 1995 included entrance of 35,000 soldiers into Northern Iraq.[346]

These cross border operations that had started during Özal period dramatically increased during Çiller's premiership when she allied with the military in her fight against the PKK. Unlike Çiller's methods of fighting through military means, Erbakan in an attempt to resolve the Kurdish issue had proposed Just Order (*Adil Düzen*) as an Islamist formula for ethnic coexistence. In the 4th General Congress of Welfare Party in 1993, he identified Kurdish question as follows:

> *(a) the materialist and racist character of Turkish nationalism, (b) Economic underdevelopment of the region, (c) Lack of democracy in the Southeast, (d) Destruction of Islamic Brotherhood by Republican policies of modernization without providing a substitute in its place, (e) External forces, i.e. the activities of the Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), the US-led peace-keeping operation*

---

[343] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p.313
[344] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p.314
[345] "Gün gün tüm sınır ötesi operasyonlar", **NTVMSNBC**, http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/436717.asp, (02.10.2014)
[346] Haldun Çancı and Şevket Serkan Şen, "Turkish Dilemma After Operation Desert Storm: 1990-1991: An Analysis of 'Negative Consequences'", **Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research,** Vol. 23, No. 3, 2010, p.286

in northern Iraq and Israel and (f) the state of Emergency Rule (OHAL) in the region.[347]

As a result of its Islamic Brotherhood policy, Refah Party received a large number of votes in the Kurdish-populated southeastern region, and even showed around 36 Kurdish deputies as candidates in the 1995 elections.[348] However, concerning the fight with PKK, Erbakan could not resist to the military and was forced to turn a blind eye to the TSK's suppressive policies particularly at a time when the PKK terror was continuing at full speed.

Despite his criticisms towards OPC prior to 1995 elections, Erbakan could not keep this promise during Refahyol government. During the meetings of the renewal of OPC in the parliament, RP softened its earlier discourses towards OPC and offered to discuss the issue in a closed session.[349] By doing so, RP wanted to share the responsibility of this decision with the parliament. Before the voting of OPC, Turkish General Staff gave a briefing to Prime Minister Erbakan and senior representatives of the political parties concerning OPC. In this briefing, General Staff underlined the necessity of the renewal of OPC which was crucial for the continuation of cross border military operations towards PKK camps that were very close to Turkish border.[350] Despite all disadvantages of the OPC, the military insisted on the renewal of OPC2. By doing so, the military planned to justify its repeated cross border military operations in the Northern Iraq against PKK as gaining a freer hand in this region out of the US criticism.[351]

As a consequence, the mandate of OPC was renewed in July 1996 until the end of 1996. On December 1996, the OPC was renamed as the 'Surveillance Force' or the 'Northern Watch' to remove the negative impression of OPC on public opinion. Under Operation Northern Watch, 1400 soldiers and 50 war crafts were going to serve in İncirlik air base.[352] During this decision-making process it was

---

[347] Burhanettin Duran, "Approaching The Kurdish Question via Adil Düzen: An Islamist Formula of the Welfare Party For Ethnic Coexistence", **Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs**, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1998, pp.113-114
[348] Duran, p.111
[349] Gencer Özcan, "Yalan Dünya Sanal Politikalar", **Onbir Aylık Saltanat**, (ed. Gencer Özcan), Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1998, (Yalan Dünya), p.185
[350] G. Özcan, Yalan Dünya, p.186
[351] Robins, Suits and Uniforms**,** p.316
[352] Sönmezoğlu, p.551

claimed that the implementation of Operation Northern Watch in May 1997 was accepted by the military without informing the government. In other words, the Refahyol government was excluded in such an important decision.[353]

The military also showed its effectiveness in foreign policy making by putting Kurdish issue (and later Islamic fundamentalism) as the highest priority in the national security agenda. While fighting against the PKK threat, the military always referred to the linkage between the PKK and the neighboring countries thereby underlying the extraterritoriality of Kurdish issue and the necessity of cross border operations. By doing so the military securitized the Kurdish issue and proposed the use of military power for the solution of the Kurdish problem. In addition, it increased its political power as becoming the primary actor in the most significant problem of the country. Alongside its domestic dimension, existence of the external dimension of the Kurdish problem enabled to the Military's involvement into the foreign policy issues which led to the expansion of its efficiency in the processes of foreign policy making and the implementation.

B. Institutional Mechanisms Used By the Military to Increase Its Power in Turkish Foreign Policy during Refahyol Government

In the Turkish political structure, government, foreign ministry, presidency and parliament are considered as the bodies that have constitutional power for foreign policy making.[354] In principle, the military does not have direct constitutional authority and responsibility to interfere into foreign policy decision-making. However, in the process of foreign policy making, these political institutions consult the military and make use of its expertise regarding the national security matters.[355] Although the military does not have a direct constitutional authority, it had played an active role through using its institutional capacity and technical knowledge and participation in the official platforms such as MGK. As Gareth Jenkins pointed out functions of the military had been limited with the security and defense policy and it

---

[353] G. Özcan, Askeri Yapının Artan Etkisi, p.84
[354] Uzgel, TDP, p. 91
[355] Aknur, TSK, p.129

rarely attempted to intervene into the other policies of government.[356] However, the military's definition of security tended to be much broader than the ones in the West. This definition did not only encompass the threats to the country's territory or internal public order, such as terrorism, but it also included the perceived threats to Kemalism.[357]

Foreign Ministry is the main body that executes the foreign policy in Turkish Republic. However, throughout the 1990s, existence of weak, fragmented and unstable coalition governments led to the frequent changes in the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and this change prevented the execution of stable and permanent foreign policy agenda.[358] The multipolar political structure created by the end of the Cold War also led the Turkish military to use executive powers together with the government. In addition, the military continued putting its influence over the state bureaucracy through its institutional mechanisms. As a result, TSK held a high degree of autonomy in politics and particularly in foreign policy via MGK, General Secretary of MGK and institutional structuring regarding Foreign Policy at the General Staff such as working groups, centers, departments and concepts in the 1990s.[359]

As already analyzed in the previous chapters Turkish military historically as the founder and the guardian of the Turkish Republic, consolidated its power within the domestic politics and foreign policy through coup d'états. Moreover, the previous section examined some of the informal mechanisms resorted by the military to increase its power in foreign policy during Refahyol government. These included foreign visits and public statements of high-ranking military officers, training and intelligence agreements as well as internal and external military operations. This section will focus on its institutional (formal) mechanisms through which the military exerted its power in foreign politics.

---

[356] Jenkins, p.41
[357] Jenkins, p.41
[358] Uzgel, TDP, p.91
[359] Aknur, TSK, p.129

1. MGK

MGK (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*—MGK) was initiated through the establishment of the Supreme Defense Assembly in 1933 which was renamed as National Defense Supreme Council in 1949.[360] MGK was founded by Law No. 129, in accordance with Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution. According to the 1961 Constitution, the MGK, which was under the chairmanship of the President, was composed of the Prime Minister, the Commander of the TSK, State Minister(s) and Deputy Prime Minister(s), Ministers of National Defense, the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Transportation and Labor as well as the Armed Forces Commanders.[361] Duties of the MGK were to make the guidelines for the national security policy, to prepare national plans, to take the necessary legal measures and advice to the Council of Ministers primary views concerning national security.[362] Through these duties, in the decision making process regarding national security issues, the MGK was helping and providing coordination to the Council of Ministers. Although it was an advisory body concerning the national security issues, still it functioned as the major decision-maker on foreign policy and security issues.[363] While the MGK technically could only give advices to the government, in practice governments tended to follow its suggestions.[364]

In the meetings of MGK, decisions were taken by majority vote. Due to the chain of command within the military members of the MGK, the military members did not have any disagreement. They operated as a block on the contrary to the civilian members of the MGK that usually had different opinions.[365] Moreover, because of the long and comprehensive preparation process of the military members of the Council compared to the civilian members, they became more influential in the decision-making process in the meetings of the MGK. As a result, military authority consolidated its political hegemony through constitutional/legal channels

---

[360] http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us, (26.10.2014)
[361] http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us, (26.10.2014)
[362] http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us, (26.10.2014)
[363] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.17
[364] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.17
[365] Aknur, TSK, p.137

while participating in the decision making process in the MGK.[366] The 1961 Constitution gave MGK constitutional status and Chief of General Staff became responsible directly to the Prime Minister instead of the Ministry of National Defense.[367]

The authority of the MGK had gradually expanded through constitutional amendments in 1973 and 1982 that indirectly led to increase of the military's weight within the security and foreign policy.[368] According to Article 111 of 1961 Constitution, the authorities of the MGK were defined as following: "The MGK shall communicate the requisite fundamental recommendations to the Council of Ministers with the purpose of assisting in the making of decisions related to national security and coordination".[369] In that case, the responsibility of the MGK was limited with the "communicate" the requisite fundamental recommendations. In the aftermath of 12 March 1971 memorandum, power of the MGK was expanded with the 1973 amendment from "communicating" with the government to "making recommendations" to the government.[370]

Finally, the position of the MGK was completely enhanced through the 1982 amendment which put the priority consideration by the government to the recommendations of MGK. According to Article 118 of 1982 Constitution;

> *...the MGK shall submit to the Council of Ministers the advisory decisions on the identification, formulation and implementation of the national security policy of the State and its opinions on necessary coordination. The decisions of the Council concerning the measures that are deemed imperative for the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of the society shall be deliberated by the Council of Ministers.* [371]

According to this Article, "the Council of Ministers was supposed to give priority consideration to the decisions of the MGK concerning the measures that it had deemed necessary."[372] Furthermore, the number of military commanders

---

[366] Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "The Autonomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", **Comparative Politics**, Vol.29, No.2, Jan., 1997, (Political Autonomy) p.157
[367] Uzgel, TDP, p. 91
[368] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.17
[369] **The 1961 Constitution of the Turkish Republic**, http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf, (03.06.2015), p.30
[370] Cizre Sakallıoğlu, Political Autonomy, p.157
[371] http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us, (30.10.2014)
[372] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.17

participating in the MGK increased at the expense of the civilian members enhancing the political hegemony of the military within the MGK.[373] The commander of the gendarmerie was also included among the permanent MGK members in addition to civilian members of the MGK –these were president, prime minister and the ministers of defense, foreign affairs and interior and the military members including the commanders of army, navy and the air force.[374] In the meanwhile, according to the order of priority within the state protocol, Chief of General Staff was higher than the ministers and had the equal position with the prime minister while determining the agenda of the state.[375]

Additionally, 1982 Constitution expanded the definition of "national security" by including the various issues within the national security concept such as domestic politics and foreign policy issues, economics, as well as education.[376] According to MGK Law of 1983, national security was redefined in the following terms: "National security means the defense and protection of the state against every kind of external and internal threat to the constitutional order, national existence, unity, and to all its interests and contractual rights in the international arena including in the political, social, cultural and economic spheres."[377] As a result of this new definition of the national security concept, the scope of national security had been expanded. The MGK started to make suggestions on the jurisdiction of council of ministers such as the determination of the curriculum in schools, regulation television channels and broadcasting hours, removal of the penal immunity of Kurdish deputies in the parliament, closing down certain prisons and television channels, making bureaucratic appointments of the ministry of public works in the southeast, stating the substance of the laws on terror and capital punishment.[378] Therefore, the MGK became the most dominant actor in the determination of the national security agenda and the most decisive part of a dual system of executive decision making along with the Council of Ministers.[379] Consequently, the military

---

[373] Cizre Sakallıoğlu, Political Autonomy, p.158
[374] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.17
[375] Bulut Gürpınar, "Milli Güvenlik Kurulu ve Dış Politika", **Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi**, Vol. 10, No. 39, Autumn, 2013, p.81
[376] Aknur, TSK, p.136
[377] Jenkins, p.46
[378] Aknur, TSK, p.136
[379] Cizre Sakallıoğlu, Political Autonomy, p.158

which had already a significant weight within the MGK, gained a determining role over the council of ministers' decisions.

2. MGK General Secretariat

With the 1982 Constitution and Law No. 2945, MGK General Secretariat was established along with the MGK under authority of the Prime Minister.[380] It possessed extensive authorities until the 2001 constitutional amendments in the context of European Union adjustment process.[381] According to Law No. 2945, Secretariat-General of the MGK was responsible with "... conducting all relevant works, researches, analyses and evaluations within the framework of the duties of the MGK and submitting the findings together with the proposals to the President, the Prime Minister and the MGK."[382] Additionally, it was responsible for collecting information, preparing briefing papers for the MGK meetings and formulation, implementation and change of the national security policy. In this context, it had very serious effect over determining the agenda of MGK meetings. Besides, in the fulfillment of its duties, General Secretariat of the MGK was authorized on the behalf of the president, the prime minister and the Council.[383] This situation indirectly gave executive power to the Secretariat-General along with extensive authority and many opportunities that it became a unique body where all the intelligence was gathered. Accordingly, the military increased its influence during the regular MGK meetings by virtue of the Secretariat-General. Due to the key role of the Secretariat-General in the preparation of National Security Policy Document (*Milli Güvenlik Siyaseti Belgesi - MGSB*), the military had the opportunity to determine the internal and external threats of Turkey and to establish and manage the national security policy of the state.[384]

---

[380] http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us, (03.11.2014)
[381] Aknur, TSK, p.137
[382] http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us, (03.11.2014)
[383] Aknur, TSK, p.137
[384] Gencer Özcan, "National Security Council", **Democratic Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector in Turkey: 2005/2006**, (ed. Ümit Cizre), Status Report, LIT Verlag Zurich,2007, (MGK), p.42

3. Institutional Structuring of the General Staff regarding Foreign Policy

In parallel to the centers, working groups, departments and committees established under the Foreign Ministry, the Turkish General Staff also founded similar institutions in order to follow the activities of the governments and effect both the domestic, foreign and security policy in 1990s.[385] Furthermore, it had drawn up two crucial documents to identify internal and external threats to the national security. These were MGSB and National Military Strategic Concept (*Milli Askeri Stratejik Konsept*-MASK). Besides the military's central role in the formulation and the execution of the foreign and security policy through its dominant role within the institutions such as MGK and General Secretariat of the MGK, it also monitored and scrutinized civilian politicians' foreign and security policy executions whereby establishing such centers and groups, and preparing these documents.

a. Centers and Groups

Due to the military's concern with internal and external security issues, the Turkish military was closely interested in both domains and thus established various departments, centers and groups within its scope.[386] Although the perspective of the military concerning the security and foreign policy was presented to the government through the MGK briefings, the military still established its own infrastructure of expertise within the Turkish General Staff.[387] These structures were able to research and write briefings on various issues. In 1983 Turkish General Staff think tank was established and its authority was extended by General Çevik Bir in 1996.[388] In this context, the military established 43 working groups under the Turkish General Staff's authority. The first one was founded in 1981 and its number had increased rapidly since 1996.[389] Some of these working groups included "Internal Security Department" (*İç Güvenlik Dairesi*), "Greece-Cyprus Department" (*Yunanistan-Kıbrıs Dairesi*) and "Human Rights Department" (*İnsan Hakları Dairesi*), "Western

---

[385] Aknur, TSK, p.138
[386] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p. 77
[387] Jenkins, p. 50
[388] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p. 77
[389] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p. 77

Working Group", (*Batı Çalışma Grubu*) that was investigating the rise of fundamental Islamism, "Eastern Working Group" (*Doğu Çalışma Gurubu*) that was examining the fight against the separatist Kurdish movement, "Trust Working Group" (*Güven Çalışma Grubu*) to deal with the Cyprus issue, "Barbaros Working Group" to organize the S-300 missiles crisis between Turkey and Greece, "European Union Working Group" to examine the Turkey-EU relations following the declaration of Turkey's EU candidacy, "Monitoring Center for Economics and Finance" (*Ekonomik ve Mali İzleme Merkezi*-EMİM) to investigate the money laundering trafficking in the 1990s.[390] The military also created "Prime Ministerial Crisis Management Center" (*Başbakanlık Kriz Yönetim Merkezi*) in order to ensure the coordination in the situations of internal and external crisis and "Center of Strategic Research and Studies" (*Stratejic Araştırma ve Etüt Merkezi*-SAREM) in order to make researches and produce strategies concerning the security and inform the General Staff about these researches and strategies.[391] In addition to these centers, the military officers took on administrative positions within the research departments in civil institutions such as EMİM under YÖK.[392]

These working groups were in fact established by the Turkish General Staff for special projects such as coordinating plans for the military exercises or creating training materials for the military, rather than having a political mission.[393] Consequently they were not permanent and they were dissolved and formed according to the changing circumstances. However, some of these working groups became much more politically oriented during the 1990s.[394] Among these groups, Western Working Group which was established under the supervision of the Naval High Command in February 1997 to fight against political Islam was the most significant one.[395] This group was created during the Refahyol government in order to monitor the increasing activities of fundamentalist Islamists, their attempts to

---

[390] İlhan Uzgel, "Between Preatorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy", **Ankara University The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations**, Vol.34, 2003, (Between Preatorianism), p. 195
[391] Aknur, TSK, p.139
[392] Uzgel, TDP, p.87
[393] Jenkins, p.50
[394] Jenkins, p.50
[395] Jenkins, p.50

change the secular regime and RP's support for these activities.[396] The military was already suspicious about the RP's reluctance to take the measures recommended by the MGK in its February 28 meeting. For that reason, the military established this group as a watchdog and a monitoring department under the West Operation Concept. The duties of this group were monitoring violent extremist groups such as Hezbollah; investigating various levels of central government, media, civil society organizations, local administrations, trade unions and employers' organizations as well as schools and universities controlled by pro-Islamist groups and identifying suspected Islamist sympathizers in these institutions.[397] The main purpose of the Western Working Group was to monitor the implementation of the 28 February decisions, particularly the imposition of 8-year continuous education.

b. Documents

In addition to its dominance within the MGK, TSK has also become influential in the determination of foreign policy through the preparation of some documents regarding the foreign policy such as MGSB and MASK. MASK is prepared by the General Staff in order to determine the institutional, operational and logistics needs regarding the defense requirements of TSK. Under this concept, the definition of the 'national security' is also made by taking the internal and external threats into consideration. This document was revised in 1992 and 'Kurdish separatism' was defined as the main threat and 'Islamic fundamentalism' was also added in 1997. [398]

MGSB is the most important document among the documents prepared by the military. It is a highly secret document which determines the priorities within internal and external threats to the national security. It also develops the strategies for responses to the emergency situations and presents a comprehensive framework of

---

[396] "Military watchdog group monitors spreading fundamentalism", **Hürriyet Daily News**, 06.14.1997, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=military-watchdog-group-monitors-spreading-fundamentalism-1997-06-14, (07.11.2014)
[397] "Military watchdog group monitors spreading fundamentalism", **Hürriyet Daily News**, 06.14.1997, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=military-watchdog-group-monitors-spreading-fundamentalism-1997-06-14, (07.11.2014)
[398] Uzgel, TDP, p.87

foreign and security policy for the government.[399] It is also called as 'Secret Constitution', 'God of laws' and "Red Booklet" in order to reveal the significance of the MGSB. It is accepted that any laws, regulations and international treaties that have been adopted cannot be contradict with the provisions of this document.[400] This document that has been prepared since 1963 is regularly revised by the end of each year according to the requirements of the national security by taking the views of the General-Secretariat of MGK into consideration. It is also renewed every five years according to the changing new security conditions.[401]

According to the Article 2b of the MGK Law, national security policy is defined as following: "the policy which seeks to ensure national security and the achievement of national goals, covering the fundamental principles of the way in which internal, foreign and defense policy is implemented as determined by the Council of Ministers, taking into consideration the opinions expressed by the MGK."[402] However, the Council of Ministers does not take part in the preparation of the MGSB. The MGSB is prepared by the Turkish General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Intelligence Organization under the coordination of General Secretariat of MGK.[403] Therefore, due to the key position of the General-Secretariat of MGK in the formulation of the MGSB, the military had had a central role in the foundation and orientation of the foreign and security policies.

Following its preparation, the MGSB is presented to the MGK for approval. Except of the civilian members of the MGK, other civilians in the government do not see the document. After its approval by the MGK, it is presented to the Council of Ministers for signature and finally it is published in the Official Gazette. However in 1997, when the MGSB was updated, it was not submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval until the second half of 1997. After the replacement of the Refahyol coalition government by a tripartite coalition headed by ANAP, the MGSB was submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval in November 1997. According to the 1997 amendments in the MGSB, foreign threats included Greece, Syria and Iraq.

---

[399] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, pp.78-79
[400] Aknur, TSK, p.141
[401] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.20
[402] Jenkins, p.47
[403] Jenkins, p.47

According to 1997 revision in the MGSB, Islamic fundamentalism (which was headed by the RP) and Kurdish separatism were listed as equal primary threats in endangering national security. It also established a direct link between domestic and foreign threats with the claims of Syrian support to Kurdish separatism and Iranian support to Islamic fundamentalism. The 1997 MGSB also identified the relationship between Mafia and ultra-nationalists (*Ülkücü*) as domestic threat for the first time. [404]

While Erbakan and Çiller in opposition criticized the 1997 MGSB, new Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz stated that "all the laws and international treaties should be in compliance with the document."[405] After the establishment of three party coalition government this document was approved without any parliamentary debate. As a conclusion, it is possible to state that none of the governments in Turkey was able to pursue a policy that would have contradicted the content of the document. [406]

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 until the 1990s, TSK that assigned themselves the mission to protect the principles and reforms of Kemalist ideology, have occupied a significant place in the Turkish political life. However, the military with minor exceptions mainly played a significant role in domestic politics rather than the foreign policy until the 1990s. Throughout the 1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s, concerning the foreign policy domain there was always a full harmony between the military and the civilian governments. However, once the military faced a government such as Refahyol that did not agree with the traditional pro-western foreign policies[407] followed since the early years of the Republic, it started to get involved into the foreign policy.

In an attempt to analyze the increasing role of the Turkish military in the late 1990s, this chapter examined the contradicting policies of the RP-led coalition

---

[404] Jenkins, p.48; G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.20
[405] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.20
[406] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.20
[407] Although throughout the 1970s and 1980s Turkish governments from time to time diverted from their pro-western foreign policies this was all done under the military's control.

government and the factors leading to the conflict between the government and the military. These factors were the anti-secular and anti-systemic domestic and foreign policy discourses and the policies followed by the RP. In the domestic politics, the RP's proposal for the judicial review of the decisions of the Supreme Military Council, lifting the headscarf prohibition and its members' pejorative discourses concerning secularism and the regime were met with reactions by the military. Moreover, concerning the foreign policy, the military was disturbed with Erbakan's visits to the Islamist countries, his negative discourses towards the Western countries and Israel and his avoidance of following the traditional foreign policy, such as the accession to the EU. Due to these reasons, the long-standing harmony between the military and the civilian government had been broken during the Refahyol government and this rupture had led to the intervention of the Turkish military to the foreign policy making process.

The chapter then analyzed the impact of the military in Turkish foreign policy making during Refahyol government period through its some formal and informal mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms included foreign country visits and the public statements of high-ranking military officers and their briefings to high-level bureaucrats; military, training and intelligence agreements with Israel; and internal military operations conducted against the PKK and the cross-border military operations conducted towards the Iraq, Iran and Syria. Besides these mechanisms, the military became effective through its strong presence in the MGK, General Secretary of the MGK; through establishing some groups, departments and centers regarding foreign policy such as Western and Eastern Working Groups; and preparing some crucial documents regarding the foreign and security policy, such as MGSB and MASK.

It can be concluded that the rise of the political Islam, Refah Party's anti-secular foreign policy orientation and its support for the Islamic fundamentalism caused to the emergence of a conflict between the military and civilian authorities. The military was highly disturbed from the foreign policy discourses and the practices of the RP which advocated close relations with the Islamic countries and used an anti-Western rhetoric. In addition to the military, the other state elites such as bureaucracy, the opposition parties, the media, business associations and even the

coalition partner, the DYP, had criticized the RP by underlining the danger of RP's departure from Turkey's traditional, pro-Western and secular foreign policy. The Refahyol government already had characteristics of a double-headed government which was consisted of two different ideological stances and thus created a regime fragmentation in Turkey. Therefore, the military as a guardian of the Kemalist revolutions and the principles became the most dominant actor in the foreign policy making during Refahyol government. Both the fragmented regime and the lack of civilian political hegemony and the increasing national security threat perception of the military during the Refahyol government led to the emergence of the military as a dominant actor in Turkish foreign policy making. Consequently, this process concluded with the 28 February process which is known as "postmodern coup" and breakdown of the Refahyol party.

CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF
TURKISH MILITARY ON FOREIGN POLICY
DURING REFAHYOL COALITION PERIOD

Refahyol Coalition period was one of the most significant phases in Turkish politics in terms of civil-military relations in Turkey in which the impact of military in foreign policy was very strong. This was an exceptional period when the military for the first time ruled the foreign policy decision-making process by bypassing the popularly elected government. Although, there have always been military influence in Turkish domestic politics throughout the mid to late 1990s, this influence was transferred to foreign policy. This was an exceptional period concerning the military's prominence in the foreign policy making process which is supposed to be under the civilian responsibility.

Therefore, in an attempt to analyze the dominance of the military and the lack of civilian supremacy over the military concerning the foreign policy making during this period, this thesis firstly examines the degree of the civilian control of the military. It analyzes the military superiority in Turkey by referring to Claude Welch's categorization of the degree of military interference in politics that includes military influence (civilian control), military participation, military control (with partners) and military control (without partners). The degree of military interference into the politics increases from first category toward the last category, respectively. Within this theoretical framework, the chapter will focus on the category "military control (with partners)" in order to analyze the interference of Turkish military into foreign policies, the chapter will firstly focus on the military control in domestic politics and, then military control in foreign policy. Then it will examine the civilian partners of the military that assisted the military.

The study will then focuses on the changing security environment of Turkey by applying Michael Desch's internal and external threat framework. It will argue that when a state faces both high internal and external threats, then the civilian

control of the military will become "poor". In order to analyze the security environment throughout the 1990s in Turkey, this chapter will first concentrate on internal threats including rise of political Islam and Kurdish nationalism. Then it focuses on the international threats including threats coming from neighboring countries, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Greece.

The last approach to analyze the increase in military's interference into foreign policy throughout mid-1990s to late 1990s will refer to the structural analysis of comparative politics. In this context, the study will concentrate on the structure of the regime, more particularly on the weak and vulnerable structure of the coalition government to analyze the dominant role of the military in foreign policy. It will argue that when a dominant party does not gain the majority in the elections and when the ruling party shares the authority with one or more minor parties, the regimes becomes fragmented and vulnerable. Moreover, if these parties are ideologically fragmented, then the system becomes even more vulnerable. Consequently, this section will be concluded with an analysis of the policies followed by Refahyol coalition, the ideological and political cleavages between the coalition partners, and the regime fragmentation and vulnerability of Turkey during the Refahyol era.

I. LACK OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN TURKEY DURING REFAHYOL GOVERNMENT PERIOD

In order to accomplish the democratic consolidation process in a country, the military should be subordinated to the civilian control.[408] As already stated in the first chapter civilian supremacy means all decisions of the government, including the national security decisions, are taken by the democratically elected politicians and their appointees rather than other institutions such as the armed forces.[409] As stated by Felipe Agüero, in order to fulfill the necessary principles for the military subordination to the civilian control, democratically elected government are supposed to have the ability to "conduct general policy without interference from the

---

[408] Diamond, p.xxviii
[409] Kohn, p. 142

military, define goals and the general organization of national defense, formulate and conduct defense policy, and monitor the implementation of military policy."[410]

Taking this theoretical framework into consideration, it can be argued that lack of civilian control over the military during the Refahyol coalition government had previously been experienced in Turkish politics. However, during the period under examination, lack of civilian control over the military had been a more significant phenomenon in the foreign policy domain. Ümit Cizre refers to the autonomy and the sacred position of Turkish military as the main reasons for the difficulty of asserting civilian supremacy in Turkish politics.[411] This lack of civilian supremacy is the result of the historical, institutional and the political autonomy of Turkish military. Accordingly, İlhan Uzgel states that "...Although the Turkish military accepts the legitimacy of civilian authority in principle, it both intervened in the political process, and by using various mechanisms, controlled and infiltrated into crucial civilian institutions."[412]

In the domestic sphere, this lack of civilian control of the military could be observed through various practices of the military and the inability of Refahyol coalition government to conduct general and defense policy without the interference of the military. The military came to the forefront as the most striking institution against the civilian authority of the Refahyol government. Moreover, the political system was divided between the Islamists represented by the RP and the secular front represented by the military as the main opposition party against the Refahyol.[413] Although, there was disagreement between the military and the government in domestic politics, it was not frequent to see such disagreements in the foreign policy. Interestingly, during this period, this disagreement was easily seen in the foreign policy domain where the long-running harmony between the civilians and the military was broken. Therefore, the military became more effective in the process of foreign policy making. It started to define foreign policy goals, formulate defense policy and monitor the implementation of these policies which normally falls into the civilian sphere. Foreign policy became the battlefield between Refah-led coalition

---

[410] Agüero, Toward Civilian Supremacy, pp.177-178
[411] Cizre Sakallıoğlu, Political Autonomy, p.151
[412] Uzgel, Between Preatorianism, p.181
[413] Uzgel, Between Preatorianism, p.184

government and TSK. As Philips Robin argued, competing ideological parties such Kemalism and Islamism, battled with each other in the domain of foreign affairs.[414] The practices of the military control in politics, the inability of the Refahyol government to establish its authority in Turkish foreign politics and the impact of changing security environments over the lack of civilian control of the military will be comprehensively explained in the following sections.

A. The Degree of 'Civilian Control of the Military' in Turkey

As Claude Welch states civilian control is a set of relationships caused by frequent changes in the balances of the powers of civilian political institutions and the military institutions within time.[415] He also claims that all military forces involve in politics at different levels, even in the consolidated democracies. Thus, "civilian control of the military is a matter of degree".[416] For that reason as already analyzed in the first chapter on theoretical framework, he makes classifies the stages of the military effectiveness in politics and/or lack of civilian control of the military. These are military influence, military participation, military control (with partners) and military control (without partners). According to this theoretical model, Turkey can be placed under the category of military control (with partners) during Refahyol Coalition Period. In other words, military control (with partners) argument of Welch can explain the rise of military's power in foreign policy during this period. Welch points out that if the military control is established, then the civilian supremacy over the military disappears. In this context, the civilian government cannot control or supervise the military. Furthermore, the military becomes more effective on the decision making process on critical topics and believes that decision making on these issues were part of special prerogatives given to it[417] In Turkey military showed its impact in both domestic and foreign policies and the next sections will examine these interferences.

---

[414] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p.160
[415] Welch, p.1
[416] Welch, p.2
[417] Welch, p.4

1. Military Control in Domestic Politics during Refahyol Government

The military had already gained power in Turkey until the late 1990s by the help of military coups and prerogatives it gained in the new constitutions and through constitutional amendments. However, the Refahyol coalition period constitutes more sophisticated case in terms of the military control and the lack of civilian supremacy over the military compared to the previous periods. In the domestic politics, the military emerged as the main opposition party representing the principles of secularism and the demands of secular groups in the society vis-à-vis the Islamist threat posed by RP. The military was already against the establishment of a coalition government between RP and DYP and did not hesitate to exhibit its stance against the RP. The Chief of General Staff stated that they did not want to see RP in the government and explained his will about the establishment of a coalition between the moderate right wing parties ANAP and DYP.[418] As Welch pointed out, if the military considers the government as illegitimate, then it does not accept the supremacy of the government. Therefore the military starts controlling the politics.[419] Similarly, it can be said that TSK did not respect the power of RP-led civilian government as a legitimate power; rather it considered the RP as a source of Islamist threat. Therefore, it did not hesitate to intervene into the politics through the usage of different mechanisms.

One of the most significant examples concerning the military's involvement in the domestic politics during the Refahyol government was the discharge of 58 military officers that were claimed to get involved in the reactionary activities. The military brought this issue to the agenda of Supreme Military Council's[420] meeting in spite of Erbakan's reluctance to discharge these officers. Although Erbakan was unwilling to discharge these officers, he was forced by the military members to sign

---

[418] Akpınar, pp.38-39

[419] Welch, p.4

[420] According to law of Supreme Military Council stated in law no.1612, prime minister is the head of the Council which prepares the main programme and the objectives of the military. The members of the Supreme Military Council are prime minister, the chief of General Staff, the defense minister, commanders of the ground and air forces and the navy, army commanders, the gendarmerie general commander, the fleet admiral and full generals and admirals in the TSK and the decisions are taken by the majority of the votes. However these decisions are recommendary and they are put into effect when the prime minister, president or the related minister approve them. See Turkish Review, http://www.turkishreview.org/interviews/20q20a_540620, (07.05.2015)

this decision.[421] According to Agüero, in the countries where the civilian supremacy over the military existed, civilians had the priority to determine the defense budget, and the promotion of the military officers.[422] The discharge of the military officers in a democratic country would be under the domain of the civilians. In Turkey too, the discharge of these officers according to the Law of Supreme Military Council needed the approval by the civilian authority. However, military's domination in this decision shows the lack of civilian supremacy and the de facto military control in Turkey during Refahyol government.

The public statements of high-ranking military officers and their briefings in different occasions regarding the general politics can be shown as other significant examples of the effectiveness of the Turkish military in politics including defense policies. These public statements and the briefings were about the security threats in Turkey including fundamentalist-Islamist activities as well as PKK and terrorism. Furthermore, in the case of decisions taken by the RP-led coalition that opposed the military's policies, TSK signaled its hard power capability to affect the politics. For instance, military's sending troops and tanks to Sincan district in the following day of the Jerusalem Night could be shown a sign of the military's reference to its hard power capability to initiate a military coup.[423]

The role and the position of the MGK within Turkish politics had been an important institutional mechanism through which the military exerted its power in politics. As already analyzed, according to 1982 Constitution, the Council of Ministers were supposed to give priority consideration to the advisory decisions taken by the MGK on the identification, formulation and implementation of the national security.[424] Based on this authority, MGK recommended a list of measurements against political Islam that is known as '28 February process' or 'soft coup'.[425] Through these recommendations, the military aimed at limiting the influence of the Islamists supported by the RP, in education, in the economy and

---

[421] Akpınar, p. 145
[422] Agüero, Toward Civilian Supremacy, p.20
[423] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.23
[424] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.17
[425] Heper and Shifrinson, p.239

inside the state organizations.[426] These issues such as education and economy were related to the general politics of the state and thus they were the prerogatives of the civilian government rather than the military.

However these issues were associated with the necessities of national security of Turkey by the MGK. Therefore, the recommendations of the MGK rather than taking the shape of advice turned into comments. This period witnessed the complete military supremacy over civilians.[427] Following the 28 February decisions, the military also established "Western Working Group" in order to monitor the anti-secular activities of RP and implementation of 28 February recommendations.[428] Moreover, the military had also established the "Eastern Working Group" to monitor the Kurdish separatist activities. In addition to these, there were many other groups and centers that enabled the military to interfere into domestic and foreign policies.

2. Military Control in Foreign Policy during Refahyol Government

Although Turkish military had always played a prominent role within the domestic politics, it was not common for the military to intervene into the foreign policy where there was usually a consensus between the military and the civilian governments concerning foreign policies. Turkish foreign policy orientation with a few exceptions has always been pro-Western until the 2000s. However, during Refahyol government this orientation changed its direction and the foreign policy became a battlefield between the RP and the military. Due to the pro-Islamist foreign policy discourse and practices of the RP and pro-secular and pro-Western policies of the military, the struggle between the two parties intensified. As already analyzed in the previous chapter, Erbakan's visits to foreign countries were mainly to Muslim countries. The first countries that congratulated Erbakan's premiership were also Muslim countries. As a reaction to Erbakan's visits, the commanders and high-ranking military officers travelled to non-Islamist countries to establish diplomatic

---

[426] Zürcher, p.300
[427] Aknur, The Impact of Civil-Military, p.145
[428] "Military watchdog group monitors spreading fundamentalism", **Hürriyet Daily News**, 06.14.1997, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=military-watchdog-group-monitors-spreading-fundamentalism-1997-06-14. (08.05.2015)

ties with and maintain the pro-Western foreign policy orientation of Turkey. Interestingly, the Turkish press published news with the title of "foreign policy of the military" that demonstrated Turkish media's consideration of the military as an actor in foreign policy decision-making.

Among the visits of high-ranking military officers, Chief of General Staff, Karadayı's visit to Israel is a significant example of military's interference into foreign policy decision-making since he made this visit without the confirmation of the civilian authorities, the popularly elected government. The timing and the consequences of the visit was significant since it took place right after the "Jerusalem Night" as a warning to the RP and a message for the Western world that Turkey was determinant to protect its secularity. In other words, the military was showing RP that it could follow its own foreign policy independent from the government. The visit was also proving the western world that Turkey was continuing to follow its pro-Western foreign policy by allying with Israel. As already analyzed, just before this visit Turkey and Israel negotiated the framework of Military Training and Cooperation Agreement that contained technology transfer, intelligence sharing and joint military exercises.[429] Defense policy of the country was completely dominated by the military since the TSK signed a defense agreement with Israel without receiving confirmation from the government. These policies followed by the military had been important evidences of military's supremacy in foreign policy making.

Another example of military's dominance in foreign policy making had been the public statements and briefings given by high-ranking military officers to high level bureaucrats, academics, journalists or ministers of foreign affairs concerning foreign policy issues. Although in a democratic country the mission of the military is limited to assisting the civilian authority in the formulation and implementation of national or international security, during the Refahyol coalition period, the role of Turkish military exceeded these duties.[430] Rather than assisting civilian authority, the military attempted to create pressure over the civilian government through these

---

[429] Burhan Eliş and Vahap Yazaroğlu, "Rejim Kaygımız Yok", **Milliyet**, 27.02.1997, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3 D__x3D_, (04.04.2014), p.18

[430] Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, p.4

statements. In this vein, the military did not hesitate to criticize Erbakan's discourses, foreign visits and diplomatic ties with Islamist countries. Erbakan had criticized EU, OPC, Customs Union and Israel during his election campaigns. However, once he came to power, as a result of military's pressure, he was forced to implement Customs Union agreement, extend the mission of OPC and sign the most comprehensive agreement with Israel in the history of Turkish Republic. Moreover, when the RP did not pay attention to the criticisms of the military concerning its relations with Iran –which was defined as a registered terrorist state by the military— and invited Iranian ambassador to Jerusalem night, the military reacted harshly to the government and initiated the 28 February coup.

As already analyzed in the previous chapter, the military also exerted its power in foreign policy through its institutional mechanisms, such as MGK, the centers and groups it established and the strategic documents it prepared. MGK was the strongest institutional mechanism through which the military exerted its power in foreign policy. Throughout the 1990s, military dominated MGK was responsible to make the guidelines for the national security policy, to prepare national plans, to take the necessary legal measures and advice to the Council of Ministers primary views concerning national security.[431] The MGK directly determined the relations with the foreign states by labeling some of them as threat to the national security of Turkey. These states included Iran, Syria and Iraq. In addition, it established working groups such as "European Union Working Group" that aimed to monitor Turkey's EU candidacy process. In the same vein, the military prepared significant documents such as MGSB and MASK. To dominate foreign policy decisions. Particularly, MGSB was considered as a "secret constitution" which determined the national security agenda of the country in the 1990s. By using these mechanisms, the military dominated the foreign policy and reduced the status of Refahyol to a 'main opposition government".

---

[431] http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us, (26.10.2014)

B. Civilian Partners of the Military during the Refahyol Government

As already analyzed during the period under examination the Turkish military established its control both in domestic and foreign policy. However, an important issue that should be pointed out concerning this military control is the civilian actors that supported this military control. Consequently, the establishment of the military control in Turkey during the Refahyol era cannot be examined without taking the role of other civilian actors into consideration. The military had not only increased its superiority over the Refahyol government through its institutional and non-institutional mechanisms, but also with the help of civilian groups. Rather, the military control was established through both underlining the military's historical importance and the role played by the pro-Kemalist civilian elites. These elites from time to time called out the army against the fundamentalist Islamist threat which was supported by the ruling RP elite. Therefore, the degree of 'lack of civilian control' or in other words, 'military supremacy over the civilians" can be considered under the category of "*military control (with partners)*" according to the conceptualization of Welch. During this period, the most significant partners of the military were pro-Kemalist (which also means pro-secular) media, pro-Kemalist parties such as CHP and pro-Kemalist business organizations such as *TÜSİAD*. In short, the military entrusted this Kemalist establishment in order to sustain its pro-secular domestic and foreign policy orientation against the anti-secular policies of RP-dominated coalition government. In the same vein, Ahmet Kuru stated that;

> *...ideological allies, particularly in the judiciary, political parties, and the media, in addition to some segments of society, provided the Turkish military with the necessary political power and encouragement. These influential civilians embraced assertive secularist, Turkish nationalist and anti-communist ideologies, which made them worried about "Islamic reactionary," "Kurdish separatist" and "communist" threats. They regarded the military's oversight of politics as the most effective way of avoiding these threats. This is not to suggest that the Turkish military reluctantly intervened in politics as a result of civilian pressure; on the contrary, the military used these three threats to keep its allies constantly alert and its political role justified.[432]*

In other words, according to Kuru, the most important reason that lied behind the formation of an ally between the military and its civilian partners was their

---

[432] Ahmet T. Kuru, "The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism, and Communism", **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2012, p.37

shared ideological agenda and the challenge they faced by the opposing ideological coalition.[433] Historically, pro-secular segments of the society have already seen the military as the most trustworthy institution and the safeguard of secularism in Turkey.

Similarly, during the Refahyol government, these partners, who had serious concerns about the pro-Islamist RP and its becoming a coalition partner, became the most important supporters of the military to create a military control. In the aftermath of 1995 general elections, TÜSİAD's advertisements about its preference of ANAP and DYP coalition rather than any formulation of the coalition with the RP can be referred as a significant example to the anti-RP sentiments of the pro-Kemalist business organization.[434]

Such concerns and anti-RP sentiments of the secularists were immediately provoked through the contradicting discourses and the policies of Refah-led coalition government. Additionally, the military also alerted its civilian allies about the Islamist threat and fed their concerns against the RP by giving briefings to high level bureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of justice, academics and leading journalists, making public statements about the Islamist threats and releasing some sensitive information to the press.[435] These briefings and the public statements turned into effective means of anti-government political demonstrations by the military for appealing the support of the civilian allies. In other words, the military was not a passive receiver of this support; rather it maintained the support of its civilian partners by referring to Islamist threat.[436]

The media was one of the most important allies of the military during the Refahyol government and it criticized the government on all occasions. The news about radical Islamist groups and *tarikats* such as Aczmendis had started to be published everyday and thus, the threat of fundamentalism was frequently underlined by the media. For instance, the Libya trip of Erbakan was published under the title of

---

[433] Kuru, p.45
[434] "Refahsız Uzlaşma", **Milliyet**, 27.12.1995,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_,
(25.02.2014), p.18
[435] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.21
[436] Kuru, p.52

"shame trip" or "Libya disaster".[437] Accordingly, Minister of Internal Affairs, Mehmet Ağar resisted for giving visa for Erbakan's Libya trip. Through such criticisms and the implementations, a secular front was established against the Refahyol government and this front while supporting the military, put pressure on the government.

Following the "Jerusalem Night", the criticisms and concerns of pro-Kemalist groups had extremely increased. President Demirel had written a letter to Erbakan and warned him sternly about the disturbance of the public of the anti-secular policies followed by his party. Demirel also had referred to the article of the Constitution that stated the secularity of the state.[438] As already analyzed, following the Jerusalem Night, the military had sent tanks and troops to Sincan district as a harsh warning to the government. Following the Sincan event, Deputy Chief of General Staff General Çevik Bir gave a speech in Washington and stated that "we have just put our weight to adjust democracy"[439] RP elites insisted that General Bir were supposed to be put on trial for giving such speeches. However, the opposition parties and also DYP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported General Bir and they blocked any judicial attempts to prosecute him. Additionally, civil society organizations, major trade unions and constituents of the opposition parties attended in public protests against the government and its anti-secular political practices and, chanted the slogans of "protect the Republic"[440] This was a quite extensive protest to Erbakan by the secular segments of the society. Furthermore, the most extreme public protests against the government had started after Susurluk Accident when the questions about the state and mafia connections were disclosed. Therefore, the protests had started with the slogan of "one minute of darkness for continual light"

[437] Serpil Çevikcan, "Kaddafi Şoku", **Milliyet**, 06.10.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (11.03.2014), p.1

[438] Akpınar, p.182

[439] Yasemin Çongar, "Bir: İran Tescilli Terörist", **Milliyet**, 21.02.1997, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3 D__x3D_, (18.04.2014), p.14

[440] "Tanklar Sincan'dan Geçti", **Sabah**, 05.02.1997, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1997/02/05/f01.html, (03.04.2014)

and every night approximately 30 million people had started to turn off their lights at exactly same time.[441]

II. IMPACT OF CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS ON CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

The security environment that includes the internal and external threats also has a significant impact on military's role both in domestic and foreign politics. Michael Desch focuses on the domestic and international threat conceptions and how the civil-military relations are affected from these structural factors. According to his framework, civilian control of the military is shaped by the interaction of the internal powers and the external environment. Accordingly, he postulates four different hypotheses examining the strength of the civilian control of the military in different structural environments.[442] He states that in the states that face high internal and high external threats, the civilian supremacy over the military becomes "poor". In this case, civilian institutions may be divided vis-à-vis such threats while the military institutions may unify against these high internal and external threats to take collective actions. Therefore, in such situations the military may be increasingly involved into the politics while the civilian supremacy over the military decreases.[443]

---

[441] "Turkish protesters to hold 'one minute of darkness' on various issue", **Hürriyet Daily News**, 05.01.2011, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-protesters-to-hold-one-minute-of-darkness-on-various-issues.aspx?pageID=438&n=one-minute-of-darkness-for-continual-light-revisited-2011-05-01, (13.05.2015)
[442] Desch, pp.11-13
[443] Desch, p.17

Table 1: Desch's Illustration of Civilian Control of the Military as a Function of Location and Intensity of Threat

		External Threats	
		High	Low
Internal Threats	High	Poor (Q3)	Worst (Q4)
	Low	Good (Q1)	Mixed (Q2)

Source: Desch, 1999, p.14

The increase in both external and internal threats during the Refahyol government explains why the military's role in foreign policy-making increased dramatically. During Refahyol period both the rise of political Islam and Kurdish nationalism as internal threats dramatically increased. Moreover, there was a drastic rise in external threats as can be observed in Turkey's conflicts with Iraq, Iran, Syria and Greece. There was also an overlapping of internal threats with external threats since Iraq and Syria also contributed to Turkey's PKK problem.

A. Internal Threats

MGSB is a very important military document which identifies the priorities within the domestic and international threats to the national security, elaborates the strategies for responses and prepares a framework of foreign and security policy for the government.[444] According to the 1997 amendments in the MGSB, in addition to Kurdish separatism, Islamic fundamentalism was identified as the primary domestic security threat.[445]

---

[444] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, pp.78-79
[445] G. Özcan, Making of Foreign Policy, p.20

1. Rise of Political Islam

Turkey is an overwhelmingly Muslim society where Islam has always been dominant within the society and politics. Ottoman Empire was an Islamic Empire and it was ruled according to the religious laws where the each community was subjected to its own religious law according to *millet* system.[446]Following the War of Independence in the aftermath of the First World War, an independent secular nation state was established and the historical connection between Turkish national state and Islam was separated. Even though Turkey formally implemented secularization reforms during Republican era, Islam has still remained as a considerable cultural force in Turkey. This influence could be seen both during Islamist rebellions in the initial period of the Republic and in the establishment of the pro-Islamist parties during the transition to multiparty period. Islamist values became more important under DP and AP governments because of their vigorous support to Islamist activities.[447]

In the 1960s, Islam had become more visible both in societal, cultural and political domain. For example, Necmettin Erbakan had established Islamist-oriented National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*-MNP) in 1969. MNP was the first party that explicitly underlined a 'national-spiritual' (*millî-manevî*) and 'religious-moral' (*dinsel-ahlâkî*) discourse in its founding declaration.[448] Shortly after the closure of MNP, a new Islamist party, the MSP was founded in 1972 again under the leadership of Erbakan who had pioneered "national outlook" movement as a pro-Islamist and anti-Western political party.[449] Firstly, MSP established coalition government with CHP in 1974 and then took part in the first and second National Front Governments (*Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümetleri*) in 1975 and 1977 along with other rightist parties. It was closed down after the 1980 military coup as a result of its anti-secular policies.

In the aftermath of 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Islamist political movements got stronger in the Middle East as well as the Turkic Republics.[450] Accordingly, domino effect of Iranian Revolution spread over Turkey where the

---

[446] Zurcher, p. 21
[447] Komsuoğlu and Eskişar, p.325
[448] Komsuoğlu and Eskişar, p. 329
[449] National Outlook Movement was already explained previously.
[450] Zurcher, p.287

Islamist sentiments became more popular. However, the most considerable reason of the rising popularity of Islam in Turkey after 1980 was the issuing of the military rulers of 1980 coup of the Turkish-Islamist synthesis against the threat of communism.[451]   Religious education was encouraged and became a compulsory subject in all schools by the military coup administration.[452] During these periods, Islamic brotherhoods, such as *Nurcu, Nakşibendi* and *Süleymancı* had become ideologically, financially and organizationally effective in Turkish political life.[453] Additionally, the development of the Green Capital which was represented by the newly growing MÜSİAD, had also strengthened Islamic movements through their financial support.[454] Similarly, the first prime minister of the pro-coup period leader of ANAP Turgut Özal was also a religiously conservative leader. He also continued to support Islamist policies and religious communities.[455]

As a result of all these determinants briefly explained above, long adventure of Islamist experience in Turkey gradually gained power in 1990s and the clash and polarization between secularists and Islamist increased. For example, the dispute about and criticism of Islamist students towards the ban of wearing türban (a scarf that completely covers a woman's hair) in public buildings was an important issue during the 1990s. Radical Islamist groups such as Raiders of the Islamic Great East (*İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncıları*- İBDA) and Hizbullah (Party of God) intensified their terrorist activities and Fettullah Gülen movement grew quickly throughout the 1990s.[456] Uğur Mumcu, a secularist journalist who reported the connections of the fundamentalists with Iran and Saudi Arabia, was assassinated in a car bomb attack. Tension between Sunni-Alevi (Orthodox- Heterodox Islam) societies had increased and 36 poets and writers (mostly Alevi) were killed in Madımak hotel in 1993.

---

[451] Zeynep Şarlak, "Atatürkçülükten Milli Güvenlik Rejimine: 1990'lar Türkiyesine Bir Bakış", **Bir Zümre, Bir Parti Türkiye'de Ordu**, (eds. Ahmet İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu), Birikim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009, p.283

[452] Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee, **The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey**, National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, 2008, p.37

[453] Banu Eligür, **The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010, p. 62

[454] Baskın Oran, Dönemin Bilançosu, p.219

[455] Komsuoğlu and Eskişar, p. 336

[456] Zürcher, pp.290-291

In 1995 general elections, Islamist votes reached to a considerable size and led to the success of *RP*.[457] There was a large scale of support by the religious communities (*tarikats*), such as Nakshibendis. In addition, the political campaigns of female activists about the "headscarf ban", which attracted the sympathy of the conservative constituents, had also contributed to the success of the RP. Through the establishment of Refahyol government, radical Islamist activities were encouraged by the RP. Turkish Hizbullah intensified its terrorist activities in the Southeastern region of the country. The media started to publish frequently the news about extremist-Islamist groups such as Aczmendis (a religious community). Pro-Islamist policies followed by RP and the anti-secular discourses by the RP members tremendously increased during this period.

The headscarf demonstrations became a daily-routine by the female activists of RP. The RP gave various legislative proposals such as lifting the headscarf ban and rescheduling the working hours according to Friday prayer. These policies increased the worries of the secular segments of the society. Besides these policies, RP attempted to establish close relations with the Islamist states, especially with Iran. This closeness provoked the secular elites who were anxious about the "regime transfer" by Iran toward Turkey. The connection of the Islamist terror and the assassinations of secular journalists with Iran were already highlighted by secular elites and the military. As a result, the military project of controlled "Islamization from above" came to an intolerable point and led to the policies of radical secularization. It eventually led to the 28th February coup by the military who labeled the political Islamists as the first security threat along with the rising Kurdish nationalism in its security agenda.

2. Rise of Kurdish Separatism

During the Ottoman period in which the nationalities were defined according to their religious affiliation, Kurds were regarded as part of the majority group (that also included Turks and Arabs), the Muslim nation. Therefore, both Kurdish and

---

[457] It was a new party following the path of *milli görüş* which was established in 1983 and in 1987 Erbakan had become the leader.

Turkish national idea could not develop until the mid-nineteenth century.[458] However after the 18th century, ethnic separatism emerged within the Ottoman borders and provoked Turkish nationalism.[459] However, Kurdish population, who were considered as Muslim but not as Turks, faced a serious challenge during the establishment of Turkish nation-state. Since the Kurds were not classified as minorities (who were consisted of non-Muslims, Armenians, Jews and Greeks), they had a serious representation problem. Although they supported Mustafa Kemal during the War of Independence, they were not included in the establishment process of the young Republic. As a result, they had started to feel resentment against newly founded Turkish state.[460]

Moreover, authoritarian and assimilationist policies of the Turkish Republic increased self-consciousness of Kurdish population who had densely lived in the southeastern part of the country.[461] As a result, Turkish Republic witnessed three significant Kurdish rebellions from 1924 to 1936 which were the Sheik Said revolt in 1925, the Ararat revolt in 1930 and the Dersim revolt in 1936. They were also suppressed by the military.[462] The years following these revolts, between 1938 and 1960, can be evaluated as the "period of silence" in terms of the Kurds.

However, 1960s and 1970s have a particular importance in terms of mass mobilization of both Kurdish and Turkish movements. 1960 coup had carried a dual effect in terms of Kurdish Question. On one hand, the 1961 Constitution that expanded the civil liberties allowed the development of Kurdish mobilization. On the other hand, it put pressure on Kurdish movement through the establishment of MGK and policies of *MBK*.[463] The military, worried about the political mobilization in the Kurdish cities and patron-client relationship between the Kurdish leaders and DP,

---

[458] Eligur, p. 38
[459] Mesut Yeğen, "The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse", **Journal of Contemporary History,** Vol. 34, No. 4, Oct., 1999, pp. 558-559
[460] Hamit Bozarslan, "Kurds and the Turkish State", **The Cambridge History of Turkey Volume 4: Turkey in the Modern World**, (ed. Reşat Kasaba), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 337
[461] Aknur, An Analysis of Civilian Leaders, p.88
[462] Robins, The Overlord State, p.660
[463] Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya, "Kürt Hareketinin Örgütlenme Süreci Olarak 1970'ler", **Toplum ve Bilim**, No.127, 2013, p. 92

arrested 54 Kurdish DP members.[464] Ironically, Kurdish movements grew rapidly under the socialist movements of 1970s. Due to increasing authoritarian policies of the state over the Kurds after 1971 military memorandum, Kurdish movement started to radicalize and witnessed to the establishment of series of Kurdish parties supporting armed struggle. Among these PKK which was originally founded in 1978, as a Marxist-Leninist Party turned into a terrorist organization.

Following the 1980 coup d'état, as a result of the suppression of the socialist movement, the Kurdish movement gained more nationalist character rather than being a class based movement and stressed national liberalization in its discourse. 12 September 1980 military coup considered Kurdishness as an anomaly that needed to be treated with Kemalism and Turkishness. Kurdish language was outlawed, legally elected Kurdish mayors were discharged and imprisoned, the PKK members were arrested and all forms of expression of Kurdishness were banned.[465] Therefore the PKK failed to show its presence in Turkey under military rule. PKK militants fled to Syria and they were trained in Syrian camps. Moreover, Iranians and Iraqis also supported the PKK activities in their soils.[466]

In 1984, PKK operated its first armed attacks in the south-eastern part of the country (Şemdinli and Eruh attacks) and continued to launch its guerilla campaign until 1999 which was responded with harsh military operations by TSK.[467] The PKK developed speedily in size and popularity. The military started to describe this issue as a national problem and security issue that necessitates a general understanding above politics.[468] As a result of intensified attacks of PKK, Özal government created a "village guard" (*köy koruculuğu*) system with an amendment in Village Law in 1985. In parallel to Village Guard System in 1987, State of Emergency (*Olağanüstü Hal-OHAL*) was established in the Kurdish region and this system restricted and suspended many basic freedoms.[469] Özal at the same time tried to liberalize the policies and pursue a political solution to the Kurdish problem rather than continue

---

[464] Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, **Kürt Sorunu: Kökeni ve Gelişimi**, trans. by Ahmet Fethi, 2nd edition, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 1997, p. 128
[465] Bozarslan, p.348
[466] David McDowall, **A Modern History of The Kurds**, I.B. Tauris, London, 2004, p.422
[467] Aknur, An Analysis of Civilian Leaders, p. 90
[468] Ülman, p. 108
[469] Bozaslan, p.353

its military-dominant policies. In an attempt to do this, he legalized Kurdish, negotiated with Iraqi Kurdish leaders, attempted to bring education and broadcasting in Kurdish, opened Turkish borders for Northern Iraqi Kurdish refugees and introduced the idea of "safe haven" for Kurdish refugees.[470] However, Özal period led to a chaotic environment in the 1990s and increased the military domination with the effectiveness of "National Security State" rather than creating a hegemonic order.[471]

In the beginning of the 1990s, legal and political Kurdish movement also developed in parallel to intensified Kurdish guerilla campaign. In 1990s, Kurdish parties were established such as People's Labor Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*-HEP) and Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi*-DEP). Although these parties would be important mediators between Turks and Kurds, they could not live longer than 5 months. Many Kurdish deputies were arrested and (or) prohibited to make politics.[472] As a result of rising Kurdish resentment to the state, on 21 March 1992, Nevruz Day, thousands of Kurds made demonstrations in Cizre with the call of PKK which was considered as Kurdish intifada. The state responded to these demonstrations with the imposition of a curfew.[473] Consequently, Kurdish problem entered a more violent and military-focused phase after the death of Özal and with the premiership of Tansu Çiller.

At the beginning of her premiership, Çiller searched for a political solution to Kurdish Problem by meeting the opposition party leaders to begin a "national consensus" on the Kurdish issue. However, her attempts were futile. The increase in PKK violence led Çiller to change her discourse and resort to military methods through an alliance with the military. Consequently, by using the militaristic discourse, Çiller started to claim that allowing cultural rights such as education and broadcasting in Kurdish would lead to division of the country.[474] As Aknur stated Çiller was a weak political leader who had a significant role in decreasing civilian

---

[470] Aknur, An Analysis of Civilian Leaders, pp.91-101
[471] Alev Özkazanç, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Siyasal Gelişmeler: Tarihsel-Sosyolojik Bir Değerlendirme", **1920'den Günümüze Türkiye'de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim**, (eds. Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru), Phoenix, Ankara, 2012, pp.111-113
[472] Bozarslan, p.353
[473] McDowall, p.439
[474] Aknur, An Analysis of Civilian Leaders, p.149

influence over politics and increasing military role in policy-making.[475] Therefore Kurdish Question was considered as a national security problem and military-focused methods were used. During her premiership, the number of Special Teams (*Özel Tim*) and intelligence (JİTEM) organs of the gendarmerie increased.[476] She founded a military-dominated special Security Council which was responsible for the Kurdish problem and had an executive power to make decisions. Many Kurdish villages were evacuated and cross-border operations became routine in Northern-Iraq border that aimed to end material support to the PKK.[477] Çiller's efforts to solve Kurdish problem with military-oriented tactics led Kurdish problem to become more inextricable through rising Kurdish nationalism and vitalizing PKK attacks.

Following Erbakan's Refahyol government he highlighted "religious brotherhood" with Kurdish people in his discourses and proposed "National Outlook" for the solution of Kurdish problem.[478] The worst decision of the period was the encouragement of Hezbollah terror organization to combat against to the PKK in the south-eastern region.[479] However, Erbakan was not able to introduce a comprehensive and effective policy on Kurdish issue. In parallel to Çiller period and with the impact of Çiller as the junior member of the coalition, the military continued to be the main actor on Kurdish issue. Consequently, TSK continued military operations against the PKK. Erbakan was not even informed about the cross-border military operations mostly.[480]

The number of PKK attacks tremendously increased during this period as a result of a weak and vulnerable government. The low-profile war between the PKK and the TSK had also continued throughout the period. Since the first attacks of PKK until dissolution of Refahyol Government, 20,181 people (5,014 of them were civilians) had died in the military operations between PKK and TSK.[481]

---

[475] Aknur, An Analysis of Civilian Leaders, p.149
[476] McDowall, p.441
[477] Aknur, An Analysis of Civilian Leaders, pp. 166-167
[478] Levent Baştürk, "The National Outlook Movement", Siyaset ve Toplum, http://siyaset-toplum.blogspot.com/1999/07/national-outlook-movement.html, (13.03.2015)
[479] Ruşen Çakır, "Geçmiş, Bugün ve Gelecek Kıskacında Türkiye Hizbullah'ı", **Birikim**, (2007), http://rusencakir.com/Gecmis-bugun-ve-gelecek-kiskacinda-Turkiye-Hizbullahi/739, (13.03.2015)
[480] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p.316
[481] Kirişçi and Winrow, p. 148

B. External Threats

As the increase in external threats during the period under examination, this study will focus on Iran, Iraq and Syria. Moreover, as a result of this country's support to PKK, they caused the overlapping of internal threats with external threats. Iraq and Syria had been the main supporters of Kurdish separatism and Iran was provocateur of rising Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. Therefore these countries were counted as major external threats in the MGSB during the Refahyol Coalition period.[482] As Kürkçüoğlu and Fırat stated, "During the 1990s, Ankara's relations with Middle Eastern states was governed by regional security concerns that were compounded by Turkey's own internal problems".[483] In addition to these countries, Turkey was also in a troublesome relationship with Greece because of Aegean islands, continental shelf problem and the Cyprus issue.

1. Threats from Iran

Historically, Iran and Turkey had peaceful relations and their borders have not changed since the Treaty of Zahab (Treaty of Kasr-ı Şirin) that was signed in 1639. However, in the aftermath of Khomeni's Islamic Revolution in 1979, Turkey's military-dominated political establishment had security concerns toward Islamist political regime of Iran. According to Kemalist elites, the Islamic theocracy of Iran was the antithesis of secular Turkish Republic. Furthermore, ruling elites in Turkey worried about Iranian threat to the existence and identity of the Turkish state by sponsoring various fundamentalist-Islamist and terrorist groups in Turkey.[484] Accordingly, the connection of Iran to various unresolved assassinations of pro-secular journalists such as Uğur Mumcu and Çetin Emeç put this country at the top of the national security agenda.[485] Iran's close economic relations with the central Asian states also made Turkey anxious about any attempts of Iran to export its

---

[482] Jenkins, p.48

[483] Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Relations with Arab States", in ed. Baskın Oran, **Turkish Foreign Policy:1999-2006**, trans. Mustafa Akşin, the University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 2010, (Relations with Arab States), p.857

[484] F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader, "Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East", **Rand National Defense Research Institute**, Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2013, p.1

[485] Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp.313-314

Islamist regime to these countries. In addition, Iran had been suspicious of Turkey for its pro-secular foreign policy orientation and its alliance with the West. Despite the anti-Iranian sentiments of the Western powers, Turkey still continued to develop good economic relations with Iran and Iran became the most important trade partner in the region.[486]

Both countries have a considerable number of Kurdish populations and have been encountered with the emergence of separatist Kurdish movements under the leadership of PKK in Turkey and Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) in Iran. Two states did not go into cooperation on this issue. Moreover, Turkey accused Iran for giving support to separatist movement of PKK in Turkey.[487] Especially Turkish military has been skeptical about Iran due to the periodic incursions by the PKK from the Iranian border. In order to develop a joint perspective toward the Kurdish issue, both states signed a security protocol in 1993 specifying that they would not allow terrorist attacks from their territories towards each others'. However after 1995 during Çiller period, the relations between Turkey and Iran deteriorated again due to the increasing PKK attacks.[488]

During the Refahyol government, Turkish-Iranian relations got into a new phase. For instance, Iran was the first country that Erbakan visited after coming to power in 1996. Despite Erbakan's ambitions about the establishment of good economic, political and strategic relations with Iran, Turkish military was really suspicious about Turkish-Iranian rapprochement because of Iranian support to the increasing number of radical Islamist movements in Turkey. The military's insistence on signing a Military Training and Cooperation Agreement with Israel in 1996 can also be evaluated within this term. The main target of this agreement was Syria and Iran and therefore, both countries were really unhappy about this agreement.[489]

However, there were two other significant events that increased the tensions and caused diplomatic crises between these two countries. Firstly, Iranian president Akbar Rafsanjani did not visit the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal during his official

---

[486] Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, p.312
[487] Larrabee and Nader, p.11
[488] Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, p.312
[489] Inbar, p. 28

visit to Turkey in December 1996.[490] This event was harshly criticized by the secularist establishment in Turkey. Secondly, Iranian ambassador Rıza Bagheri's critics of Israel and his acclaim of sharia in his speech on the Jerusalem Night caused a diplomatic crisis between two countries. Bagheri was declared as persona non grata by Turkey and thus the relations between the two countries dramatically decreased.[491]

2. Threats from Iraq

In the 1990s, one of the most significant external threats perceived by Turkey was the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish authority in Northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Gulf War had started with Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Even though Turkey had been suspicious about Western stance concerning the Kurdish issue −whether they support the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq or not, Özal government had still played an active role in the Gulf War.[492] However, Gulf War was a Pandora's Box that led to the instability and insecurity in the region and increased Turkey's security concerns. During the war, Saddam had two requests from Turkey: To remain neutral and to not implement the UN Security Council's embargo toward Iraq. However, Turkey under Özal presidency, did not accept these demands and in order to show its strategic importance, it cooperated with the US by opening its İncirlik airbase to US-led multinational force and implementing UN embargo decisions towards Iraq by closing oil pipelines.[493] However, the unsuccessful multinational force against Saddam, the suppression of Kurdish revolt in the north by Saddam and the inflow of thousands of

---

[490] Majid Rafizadeh, "What's behind Turkey and Iran's strategic friendship?", **Al Arabia News**, 13.06.2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/06/13/What-s-behind-Turkey-and-Iran-s-strategic-friendship-.html, (18.05.2015)
[491] This Jerusalem Night had been already the inception of 28 February process. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Süleyman Elik, "Turkey's Growing Relations with Iran and Arab Middle East", **Turkish Studies**, Vol.12, No.4, 2011, p.645
[492] Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 307
[493] Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, Relations with Arab States, p.857

Kurdish refugees into Turkish border increased Turkish security concerns and hardened its position concerning Kurdish problem.[494]

As a result of severe suppression of Kurdish insurgency by Saddam, allied forces decided to create a safe haven for Kurds by establishing a no-fly zone on the 36th parallel. Turkey had also supported no-fly zone and joined Operation Provide Comfort by providing logistic and material support through its military personnel and air bases.[495] However these operations and establishment of a safe haven led to the emergence of a de facto Kurdish autonomy in the Northern Iraq as a result of the agreement between KDP and PUK in 1992. Existence of such an autonomy bothered Turkey since the Turkish governments were scared of the establishment of an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and its snowballing impact to Turkey. Accordingly, conflicts between Kurdish groups in the region created chaos and northern Iraq became a main base for PKK attacks toward Turkey.[496] Turkey's alliance with the Western coalition forces during the Gulf War was very costly due to Saddam's support of the PKK who was taking revenge from Turkey closing the pipeline. Closure of the pipeline ended all regular trade with Iraq and as a result, 1990 and 1994, Turkey's loss totaled to $20 billion.[497]

During the Refahyol government period, the OPC was renewed and the military continued its cross-border military operations which it started in full speed during the period of previous Çiller government. As already analyzed although RP criticized OPC during its election campaign, upon coming to power, it was forced by the military to extend its mandate.

---

[494] Sabri Sayarı, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol. 26, No. 3, Spring 1997, p. 46

[495] Turkey's initiation to this Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Northern Watch, and cross-border operations in the nortern Iraq has already been explained in detail in the previous chapter under "External Military Operations" title.

[496] Ayşegül Sever, "ABD'nin İkili Çevreleme Politikası ve Türkiye**En Uzun On Yıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar**, (ed. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut), Büke Press, Ankara, 2000, p. 357

[497] Bozdağlıoğlu, Kurds and the Turkish State, p.130

3. Threats from Syria

Throughout the 1990s, the most problematic issues in Turkish-Syrian relations had been the Syrian support to the PKK, disputes between these two countries over the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates and the Syrian claims over the province of Alexandretta.[498] Historically, the issue of sovereignty of the province of Hatay (Alexandretta), in other words its annexation by Turkey in 1939 had constituted one of the most troublesome subjects for Syria who claimed for the return of Hatay. However, Syrian government took this claim to its backburner in the 1990s.[499] Nevertheless, the other problems have still been alive. Syria frequently used PKK card against Turkey when it encountered problems about the flow of the waters of Euphrates and Tigris and it supported the training of the PKK militants in the borders and in the camps in Lebanon.[500]

In 1987 relations between Turkey and Syria seemed to have entered into a more peaceful phase when Prime Minister Özal visited Syria and signed a protocol with Syrian President Hafız al-Assad guaranteeing a water flow of 500 cubic meters per second to Syria. In addition to this protocol, a Security Protocol was also signed preventing the hostile activities against each other and guaranteeing the extradition of suspected individuals involved in insurgent actions.

However, in reality the problems continued between the two countries as a result of the PKK attacks from the Syrian territories. Moreover, Syria brought the water issue into a pan-Arab agenda.[501] In return, Özal stated that if Syria would continue its support to the PKK, Turkey might not keep the promises of the protocol of 1987. Moreover, the water problem escalated with the construction of Atatürk dam, which was a project conducted by Turkey in order to improve the agriculture in southeastern Anatolia. This construction created a serious problem between the two countries due to the decrease in the flow of the water. Although there were other

---

[498] "Relations between Turkey-Syria", **Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs**, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey%E2%80%93syria.en.mfa, (23.05.2015)

[499] Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, p.302

[500] Birgül Demirtaş, "Turkish-Syrian Relations: From Friend 'Esad' to Enemy 'Esed'", **Middle East Policy**, Vol.XX, No.1, Spring 2013, p.113

[501] Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, "From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian–Turkish Relations", **Security Dialogue**, Vol.37, No.2, June 2006, (Changing Syrian–Turkish Relations), pp.232-233

agreements between Turkey and Syria, such as a military agreement in 1992 that promised a joint struggle against terrorism and Syria's declaration of PKK as a terrorist organization, Syrian government had still continued to shelter the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan and support the activities of PKK. [502]

As a result, these mutual threat perceptions led to the power-balancing strategy of Syria by developing the relations with Armenia, Greece and Iran to encircle Turkey. In return Turkey focused on its Turkish-Israeli Strategic and Military Agreement in 1996. Especially in the mid-1990s, inflamed PKK attacks alarmed Turkish political and military elites and thus they started to initiate coercive diplomacy against Syria. Even though Turkey had sent a memorandum to Syria in 1996 asking to end its support to the PKK, it did not succeed. Finally, Turkey sent a memorandum to Damascus, again, in 1998 and this step concluded with the expulsion of Öcalan from Syria. [503]

4. Threats from Greece

Besides the Middle Eastern neighbors, Turkey's relations with a European neighbor were also full of problems. In the 1990s, Turkish-Greek relations were also in quite troublesome because of the Aegean islands, continental shelf issue and the Cyprus problem. Historically, the status of Cyprus has been an unsolved problem between the two countries and in 1990s it was used as a "carrot and stick" policy by Greece within the relations of European Union and Turkey. In all occasions, Greece had brought the Cyprus dispute into the agenda of the EU as well as proposing the full membership of Cyprus to the EU as a condition in exchange for removing its veto against accession of Turkey to the Customs Union in 1995. [504]

The other significant problem between Turkey and Greece, the continental shelf issue, came to the agenda again by the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea that came into force in 1995. Based on this Convention, Greece declared that it

---

[502] Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp.303-304
[503] Demirtaş, p.113
[504] Sule Chousein, "Turkish-Greek Relations: 1999-2010", **Balkan Araştırma Enstitüsü Dergisi**, Vol. 3, No.1, July 2014, pp.12-13

would prefer to increase its territorial waters beyond the 6 mile limit. Turkey reacted to this request announcing that it could use all kind of measures against this policy including the military means. As a result, the tension increased between the two countries in the mid-1990s and thus both parties put each other to the top of the external threat agenda.[505]

In addition, in 1996 another significant crisis had taken place between Turkey and Greece because of the dispute over the sovereignty of a small Aegean island, Kardak island (Imia Rocks). This event was immediately turned into a military competition between the two countries almost leading to a war. Although the tension was decreased by the help of the initiations of NATO General Secretary and Turkish President Demirel, this event still had been an important indicator of the risk of a possibility of a serious military conflict between Turkey and Greece.[506]

C. Analysis of the Rise of Internal and External Threats on the Decrease of Civilian Control in Politics

As argued by Michael Desch, if the external and internal threats are high in a country, then the civilian control in the politics is poor. This is exactly what happened in Turkey from mid-1990s until the late-1990s during Refahyol Coalition Government. As already analyzed the internal and external security threats of Turkey were quite high throughout the 1990s. The security agenda of the country was determined by a secret document prepared by the military which is called MGSB. According to the 1997 amendments in the MGSB, political Islam had the highest priority in the national security agenda of Turkey along with the PKK threat. In addition to these internal threats, in the late-1990s, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Greece were listed as the states that generated the main external threats toward Turkey according to the MGSB. The centrality of the MGSB in the determination of the security agenda of Turkey can be the proof of the effectiveness of the military to determine

---

[505] Fuat Aksu, "Turkish-Greek Relations and the Cyprus Question: Quo Vadis?", **UNISCI Discussion Papers**, No. 23, May 2010, p.211
[506] Aksu, p.211

the national security policy of Turkey and hence the domestic and foreign policy making process of Turkey during the Refahyol government.

Similarly, Desch states that on the one hand, high internal and external threats may lead to a division among civilian institutions; while these high threat perceptions alarm and unify the military to take the necessary measurements and make collective action against them.[507] Therefore, while the civilian control is poor, the role of the military in both foreign and domestic policy becomes high. Based on this framework, it can be concluded that the high internal and external threats in Turkey between the mid-1990s until the late-1990s, caused to a political atmosphere where the military was the most effective institution in domestic and foreign policy decision making process while the civilian government was in a very weak situation. The Turkish military was alarmed both by the inflamed domestic problems such as rising PKK activities and political Islam and foreign problems such as the threats perceived by Iran, Iraq, Syria and Greece. Meanwhile the Refahyol Coalition government had witnessed the political disputes among the coalition partners as well as the other civilian institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency. Therefore, while the civilian government was in trouble to produce stable policies toward these threats, the military became more dominant to shape both the domestic and foreign policy of Turkey.

III. REGIME FRAGMENTATION DURING REFAHYOL COALITION

This study in its attempt to analyze the dramatic increase in Turkish military's interference into foreign policy will resort to Joe Hagan's "regime fragmentation and political instability" explanation. In addition to Welch and Desch's theoretical frameworks, the study will also take the structure of the regime in Turkey into consideration. It can be argued that the fragmented regime and political instability in Turkey during the Refahyol Coalition government also provided a basis for the dominance of the military in foreign policy.

---

[507] Desch, p.61

As already analyzed in the theoretical framework chapter, parliamentary systems with proportional representative election systems may lead to majority governments or coalition governments. In fact, majority governments generate more stable and strong political structure vis-à-vis coalition governments. However, coalition governments in a sense are more democratic since they permit diverging ideas of political parties to come to the agenda. Coalition governments bring a higher level of presentation since the constituencies of couple of parties rather then one party is represented in the parliament. Coalition governments are mostly established between the parties who have similar ideological positions or belong to the same ideological blocs such as the blocks on the right or on the left. Although they are established by ideologically close parties, still they have more chance to establish unstable governments compared to majoritarian governments.[508] Consequently, coalition governments that are established with ideologically different or opposing parties can be considered as the least stable ones as it happened in the Refahyol case in Turkey from mid to late-1990s. In Turkey, the 1990s had already witnessed to short-lived coalition governments because of the absence of a strong single party that won a majority in the parliament in 1991, 1995 and 1999 national elections and thus this situation prevented the pursuit of permanent and stable policies.[509] Nevertheless, the Refahyol coalition government constituted one the most remarkable examples of these weak coalition governments due to the ideological cleavages and the controversies between the coalition partners.

Although both parties were on the right side of the spectrum in Turkish politics, there were still dramatic differences between the two. While DYP could be defined as a moderate-right and pro-secular party, RP had been a rigorous representative of Islamist right ideology which carried religiously extremist discourses. DYP's economic program could be considered as purely liberalism supporting free market economy while RP's economic program supports just order which means a third way between communism and capitalism and they also reject the interest rate as a result of Islamic principles. In terms of the relations with the military, they followed controversial policies. On the one hand, the DYP under

---

[508] Hague, pp.277-278
[509] Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, p.196

Çiller's leadership had very close relations with the military. DYP ruling elites preferred a military resolution to the Kurdish separatism. On the other hand, the RP ruling elite –that has suffered a lot in the hands of the military throughout the 1971 and 1980 coups when the coup leaders banned their predecessors—opposed any kind of military interference into politics. Historically, the Turkish military has had the mission of protecting Kemalist principles and revolutions and it had been the most important component of the pro-Kemalist establishment against Islamists. In this sense, Şerif Mardin's center-periphery notion can be explanatory for the ideological cleavage. According to this notion, it can be said that the RP was at the periphery which had traditional and Islamist values while the military and the DYP constituted the center of state-based secularizing modernist elites.[510] When the socio-economic positions of these parties' constituencies are taken into consideration, this center-periphery demarcation can be referred again.

These ideological differences and cleavages between the two parties could also be easily seen in their foreign policies. The RP was based on National Outlook tradition which advocated the development of close relations with the Muslim World and establishment of an Islamic Brotherhood rather than establishing close relations with the West that has attempted to exploit the Islamic world through imperialism. Imitating West would be adapting the corrupt practices of the West. For that reason, the RP had strong anti-Western sentiments and highly criticized Turkey's membership to the EU and other Western institutions, good relations with the US as well as Israel and the extension of OPC. Controversially, the DYP had adhered strictly to the traditional pro-Western foreign policy orientation of Turkey which was advocating Turkey's full membership to the EU, continuation of the good relations with the US and Israel and taking part in the missions of OPC. These important controversies came to the surface in the discourses of Çiller and Erbakan during the election campaign of the 1995 general elections.

Moreover, both sides in the election campaign accused of each other concerning domestic and foreign policies. For example, Çiller identified RP with the PKK and stated that RP was responsible for threatening the territorial integrity of the

---

[510] William Hale, "Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future", **The International Spectator**, Vol.XXXIV, No.1, January-March 1999, (Political Landscape), p.28

country by not planning dealing with the Kurdish problem through militaristic means. Actually in her elections campaigns Çiller repeated stating that as the guarantors of secularity her party would not establish a coalition RP that would threaten Kemalist principles.[511] Erbakan also criticized Çiller with harsh words accusing her alliance with the military and accusing her for being anti-religious.[512] These humiliating discourses were already showing the cleavages between the two parties. Even though they had used such degrading expressions against each other and declared the impossibility of establishing a coalition together, DYP and RP established Refahyol government in July 1996 for covering up each others' corruption scandals and for the sake of coming to power.

The December 1995 general election was held in the aftermath of serious economic and political problems such as the existence short-lived coalition governments, uproar of PKK attacks in the southeast, rapid devaluation and an increase in the unemployment.[513] In other words, there were already a systemic fragility and instability, and this systemic instability exacerbated due to the absence of a clear-cut victory for any one party in the 1995 elections.[514] As it was previously described in depth, the RP had the highest number of seats in the parliament (158) by receiving 21.4 percent of the votes and DYP (135) receiving 19.2 percent of the votes) and ANAP (132) receiving 19.6 percent of the votes. This was followed by DSP and CHP with 76 and 49 seats respectively. Although the DYP and ANAP shared much in common ideologically and politically their attempt to establish a center-right coalition ended up within 3 months. Parliament investigation of the corruption allegations about Çiller and ANAP's lack of support led to the resignation of the government. This also shows the weakness and the fragility of the system.

The 54th government established by the RP and DYP was an example of a highly fragmented regime according to the categorization of Joe Hagan. As already analyzed in the theoretical framework chapter Hagan makes a classification of four types of fragmented regimes including regimes dominated by a single, individual leader, regimes dominated by a single, cohesive party/group in which there exist

---

[511] Akpınar, p.124
[512] Akpınar, p.125
[513] Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, p.197
[514] Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p. 64

established, autonomous bureaucracies and institutions, regimes dominated by a single party/group that is itself internally divided by established political factions and finally regimes in which the ruling party/group shares power with one or more minor parties/groups. In this classification, the case study of this thesis can be analyzed through the fourth category that argues that such fragmented regimes emerge as a result of sharing power by the one or more minor parties/groups which occurs in the absence of a dominant party that gained absolute majority in the parliament and thus one or more minor or junior groups share the authority.[515]

In this sense, the RP (21.4 percent of the votes and 158 seats) and the DYP (19.2 percent of the votes and 135 seats) were two minor parties that shared the authority in the Refahyol Coalition Government between March 1996 and June 1997. As stated before, while sharing the authority, the ideological and political divisions between these two parties also caused to the rise of the fragmentation in Turkey. This fact could easily be observed in the disputes of the coalition partners during their governance. DYP deputies had frequently expressed their harsh reactions towards the RP's anti-secular and anti-systemic policies and discourses such as the insistence of RP deputies' on the abolishment of headscarf ban, construction of a mosque in Taksim, land transportation of pilgrims to Mecca, rescheduling of official working hours with consideration to Friday prayer.

Furthermore, foreign policy disputes between the two parties were more intensified. For instance, coalition partners had a great debate on the first days of the coalition about including the goal of EU membership to the program while they were writing the objectives of the government.[516] The first foreign visits of Erbakan to the Muslim countries had been a significant issue of conflict between the two parties. Particularly, Erbakan's visit to Libya had divided the government when Minister of Internal Affairs, Ağar did not give visa for this journey.[517] On contrary to the RP, Çiller was making visits to the Western countries, emphasizing the importance of the EU membership and giving support to the extension of the OPC mission

---

[515] Hagan, p. 345
[516] Akpınar, p.60
[517] Aydın Hasan, "Skandal Gezi Resmen Yok", **Milliyet**, 10.10.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (12.03.2014), p.16

contradicting Erbakan's policies. As a result, these fragmentations and political divisions made it difficult to produce a stable and common foreign policy by the Refahyol government. In addition to these factors, increase in the organized crime with the outbreak of Susurluk Scandal, rise of mafia activities and narcotic smuggling incidents and internal problems such as rising activities of Islamist terror and the PKK also delegitimized the government and made the system more fragile. In such a political atmosphere, the government that was weak vis-à-vis the military was not able to establish its supremacy over the military. Therefore, this lack of authority in the political system gave the opportunity to the Turkish military to dramatically influence both in the domestic and foreign policy of Turkey.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although Turkish military have had quite a privileged position in the Turkish political system, historically, the foreign policy had been out of interest of the military. This was mainly the result of the agreement of the military with the civilians concerning the traditional pro-Western foreign policy issues. However, Refahyol government had been a more exceptional period in terms of military's involvement in the foreign policy making process. Although the military's historical, institutional and constitutional autonomy have contributed to this situation, this thesis tried to make a structural analysis examining the determinants which led to military's effectiveness.

According to Welch's conceptualization, in the Turkish case and particularly during the Refahyol government period Turkish politics were under military control. Military control means that the military has the superiority over the civilian government and civilian institutions. While establishing its control, the military had the assistance of the pro-Kemalist establishment who made an alliance against the anti-secular RP-led coalition government.

Besides military control another important variable that explains the rise in military's power in politics during this period is the threat environment. Michael Desch's analysis of the effects of the internal and external threats on the civil-

military relations was the other significant approach which had an explanatory power of the increase in military's power in foreign policy during Refahyol period. During the period under examination, there were intensified internal problems in Turkey such as the Kurdish separatism in that was reflected with the increase in PKK terror and rise of fundamentalist Islam. In addition to these internal problems, there were significant problems between Turkey and its neighbors such as Iran, Iraq, Syria and Greece. From the Desch's analytical framework, it can be argued that these high internal and external problems caused to a "poor" civilian control while the military became more effective and had more intensive to struggle with these threats.

A third approach that explains the increase in military's power in foreign policy during this period is the regime fragmentation. The argument shows the weakness and fragility of the coalition governments compared to majoritarian governments due to the difficulty to follow a common and stable policy by the coalition partners. Particularly, when these coalition partners belong to different ideologies or opposing ideologies, then the fragility and the vulnerability of these coalitions increases. Similarly, the Refahyol case was the more keen to produce this instability because of the ideological differences between the RP and DYP that was the representative of religious-extremist and pro-secular dichotomy respectively. Therefore, the Refahyol government was in deadlock to follow a stable foreign policy. Furthermore, series of difficulties in the system such as economic problems, corruptions and political scandals had also made the system illegitimate. Additionally, the existence of the major oppositions to anti-secular RP by the pro-secular establishment had also weakened the government and had given the opportunity to the military to establish its control over the civilian government and became dominant in the foreign policy making.

CONCLUSION

The Turkish military's intervention in domestic politics had always been more visible compared to its interferences into foreign policy throughout the history of Turkish Republic. Concerning the foreign policy issues, majority of the time there has been a harmony between the civilian governments and the military. In other words, foreign policy has not been an area of conflict between the two sides. During the early years of the Republic both the military and the civilian governments agreed on following a neutral policy. During the 1950s, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the military again allied with the civilians to join the Western side of the blocs of the Cold War. The military was content about its membership to NATO and the pro-western foreign policies followed by DP governments. Similarly throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (despite a brief disagreement with Prime Minister/President Özal concerning the Gulf War) the military and the popularly elected civilian governments agreed on the multi-dimensional foreign policy of Turkey. Even during Özal period in early 1990s when the military did not agree with Özal's policies concerning Turkey's involvement into the Gulf War, it still did not interfere into foreign policy. It was rather the opposition and even the members of Özal's former party ANAP who opposed him with his policies.

However, since the mid-1990s until the late-1990s during the Refahyol Coalition Government, the military became the most significant actor in the process of foreign policy making. It did not only interfere the foreign policies followed by RP-led Refahyol government but it also directly took the control of the foreign policy by establishing centers and departments under his domain and the policies followed and the discourses made by higher echelon of the TSK. Therefore, this thesis as a research question asked the question why the Turkish military's power in foreign policy dramatically increased during the Refahyol government from mid to late 1990s while the military has not been the main actor in foreign policy in other periods. In other words, the thesis examined the impact of Turkish Military on foreign policy during the Refahyol Coalition Government period.

Three approaches are utilized to analyze the research question of the thesis. The first one was the analysis of the degree of civilian control in politics framed by Claude Welch as part of the civil-military relations literature. In Welch's classification the increase in Turkish military's role in foreign politics is analyzed with military control with partners. In this analysis it is examined how the Refahyol government was not able to direct the armed forces or supervise its performing. Turkish military also did not recognize the formation of Refahyol government as a legitimate process and did not accept its superiority. However, TSK was not alone in its rejection of the coalition government; it had partners who shared the same ideas. These were the business groups, opposition parties, bureaucratic elites, secular and pro-Kemalist circles of the society who allied with the military in their denunciation of the policies followed by the Refahyol government.

The second approach or theory that brought an explanation to the rise of military's power in foreign policies during the period under examination is part of realist theory concerning the intensity of the internal and external threats. In foreign policy analysis realism argues that the foreign policies are shaped by the constant need to acquire and safeguard a country's security and power. For most realists the key components of power is the military and thus the military is the main force that tries to protect the survival and territorial integrity of a country from internal and external threats. Therefore, Desch examines level of the civilian control of the military by looking at the intensity of domestic and foreign threats. He argues that when the threats are high in both domestic and foreign policies, in other words, when both the internal and external threats are high the civilian control of the military is poor. To put it differently, in high threat environment the military intervenes into both domestic and foreign policies. During the period under examination the internal threats were high as a result of the rise of Kurdish separatist movement with the increasing attacks of PKK and the rise reactionary Islamist movements. Moreover, the external threats were high since Turkey had been going through serious problematic relations with Syria, Iraq and Iran as well as Greece. Almost all of these neighboring countries were also contributing directly and indirectly to the PKK attacks to Turkey. Therefore, in such a seriously problematic security environment, Turkish military was taking the control of the foreign policy.

However, if the government is ruled by a strong political party and leaders, even in such a complex security environment the military would not have the chance to control the foreign policies on its own. As can be observed in the 2000s where the internal threat of PKK attacks continued and new problems emerged with the neighboring countries such as the civil war in Syria, when a one single party Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP*) under a strong leader as Erdoğan is in power, the civilians can dominate both the domestic and foreign policies of the country. Therefore, as the third approach –to explain the main question of the thesis the increase in TSK's role in foreign policy in the 1990s— the thesis referred to a structural analysis by looking at the construction of the government. Structural analysis claims that the structures have a significant impact on policies and outcomes. As part of this analysis Joe Hagan's regime fragmentation was utilized and among his classification "regimes in which the ruling party/group shares power with one or more minor parties/groups" is employed for the analysis of this study. As the two minor parties, RP's as the Islamist and anti-secularist party sharing power with DYP as the center-right and pro-Kemalist party was problematic for any kind of decision-making. Moreover, when RP was supporting close relations with the Middle Eastern countries and particularly concentrating on improving its relations with Iran, DYP leadership was busy advancing its relations with the European countries and particularly the EU. There was not much agreement concerning both domestic and foreign politics between the parties. Moreover, the leadership of both parties was holding grudges against each other as a result of the corruption allegations they were holding against each other before coming to power as partners. Consequently, weak and fragile Refahyol government was totally a fragmented regime system that could not put forward its authority neither in domestic politics nor the foreign policy.

This thesis in order to bring these arguments together first started with the theoretical chapter and then continued with the historical background chapter. In this chapter it examined in depth Turkish military's role both in domestic and foreign policies as well as the institutional mechanisms through which the military intervened into politics. Then in the third chapter it examined both the domestic and foreign policies followed by the Refahyol government in depth as the case study of

the thesis. In the fourth chapter, the study evaluated the involvement of the military into the foreign politics through an analysis with the help of Welch's military control, Desch's threat environment and Hagan's fragmented system approaches.

This thesis had been limited to short snapshot of Turkish politics from the mid 1990s until the late 1990s. However, dynamics in Turkish politics dramatically changed with AKP's coming to power in early 2000s. In its attempt to make Turkey a full member of the EU, AKP continuing the policies of the prior government of three party coalition of DSP-ANAP-MHP passed a series of constitutional amendments and harmonization packages to curtail the role of military in Turkish politics. From the consolidation of democracy perspective these were the right moves towards the democratization of the country. The military was supposed to subordinate to the civilians. The EU was happy about these reforms as it had stated in may progress reports. As a result of these amendments and harmonization packages AKP governments managed to curb the institutional mechanisms through which the military used to exert its power in politics. Among these the most important was the decreasing power of the MGK. However, the military that lost its institutional mechanisms this time referred to non-institutional mechanisms such as the speeches given by the senior members of the TSK and in the first term of AKP, they were even influential in domestic and foreign policies through these mechanisms.[518]

However, once the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials started with the allegations of accusing military of plotted coups to overthrow the government through various methods, the military also lost its non-institutional mechanisms to exert its power into politics. In fact it started losing its credibility in the eyes of the public. From the façade it looked as Turkish civil-military relations were getting close to a democratic model since the military was subordinated to the civilians. However, that was not the case; while the civilian control of the military was established the democratic control of the military was not established since this time the military was being suppressed

---

[518] For a detailed analysis of this period see Aknur, "Civil-Military Relations", pp. 131-150: For a detailed analysis of the non-institutional mechanisms of the military in early 2000s see Uğur Burç Yıldız, **Avrupa Birliği Sürecinde Türkiye'de Sivil-Asker İlişkileri: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Dönemi**, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis), Dokuz Eylül University, Social Sciences Institute, European Studies Program, 2010, Ch.5, pp. 132-184.

by the popularly elected civilians. Conduct of investigations and trials were unfair and these trials have worn down the judicial system's impartiality and legality. Recently these trials were re-held and majority of the officers in prison were released. However, even such a move is not enough to repair the lost trust between the military and the civilians. Currently, the civilian control of the military is established in Turkey. However, democratic control of the armed forces is far from being consolidated. While the military dominated the civilians for decades, recently the civilians started dominating the civilians. In order to reach a democratic control of the armed forces both sides are supposed to respect each in their spheres of tasks and should not attempt to interfere into each others' spheres.

REFERENCES

"1997-Postmodern Coup", **Global Security**,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/tu-military-coup-1997.htm,
(30.04.2014).

"Anlamlı Görüşme", **Milliyet**, 04.10.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a
g_x3D__x3D_, (14.03.2014).

"Dünya Seçimi Konuşuyor", **Milliyet**, 26.12.1995,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a
g_x3D__x3D_, (25.02.2014).

"Erbakan Dönemi", **Milliyet**, 09.07.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a
g_x3D__x3D_, (01.03.2014).

"General Staff's Ultimatum-like Briefing", **Hürriyet Daily News**, 06.13.1997,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/general-staffs-ultimatum-like-
briefing.aspx?pageID=438&n=general-staffs-ultimatum-like-briefing-1997-06-13
(30.04.2014).

"Gün gün tüm sınır ötesi operasyonlar", **NTVMSNBC**,
http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/436717.asp, (02.10.2014).

"Hükümet Bitmiştir", **Milliyet**, 25.05.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a
g_x3D__x3D_, (26.02.2014).

"İsrail'le Yeni Projeler", **Milliyet**, 29.08.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a
g_x3D__x3D_, (01.03.2014).

"İşte YSK'nın Sonuçları", **Milliyet**, 28.12.1995,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/7EM2v1gVoNiIbRipj6NMwg_x3
D__x3D_, (25.02.2014).

"Kaddafi Hükümeti Çatlattı", **Milliyet**, 28.09.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a
g_x3D__x3D_, (11.03.2014).

"Karadayı'dan Laiklik Uyarısı", **Milliyet**, 25.12.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F
_T8_x2F_A_x3D__x3D_, (15.04.2014).

"Manavgat Suyu Libya'ya Hediye", **Milliyet**, 04.10.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a
g_x3D__x3D_, (12.03.2014).

"Military watchdog group monitors spreading fundamentalism", **Hürriyet Daily
News**, 06.14.1997,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=military-watchdog-
group-monitors-spreading-fundamentalism-1997-06-14, (13.10.2014).

"Ordu Neden Rahatsız", **Milliyet**, 22.12.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTV
g_x3D__x3D_ , (20.03.2014).

"Orduda Rahatsızlık", **Milliyet**, 07.08.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a
g_x3D__x3D_, (11.03.2014).

 "Orgeneral Necip Torumtay'ın Anıları: Turgut Özal, Körfez Krizi ve PKK",
30.01.2012, http://www.susmazkalem.com/2012/01/orgeneral-necip-torumtayn-
anlar-turgut.html, (29. 12.2012).

"Refah İktidarda", **Milliyet**, 29.06.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a
g_x3D__x3D_, (01.03.2014).

"Refah'tan Beşli Ordu Paketi", **Milliyet**, 18.11.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTV
g_x3D__x3D_ , (19.03.2014).

"Refahsız Uzlaşma", **Milliyet**, 27.12.1995,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a
g_x3D__x3D_, (25.02.2014).

"Relations between Turkey-Syria", **Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign
Affairs**, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey%E2%80%93syria.en.mfa,
(23.05.2015).

"RP'li, Mehmetçik'e Muhammetçik Dedi", **Milliyet**, 14.11.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTV
g_x3D__x3D_, (19.03.2014).

"Suriye'nin Kabusu", **Milliyet**, 05.12.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/hjxSaSQBepGvmpOUyNQ_x2B_
wQ_x3D__x3D_, (07.05.2014).

"Şok Belgeler Ortaya Çıktı", **Sabah**, 11.06.2013,
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2013/06/11/sok-belgeler-ortaya-cikti,
(30.04.2014).

"Tanklar Sincan'dan Geçti", **Sabah**, 05.02.1997,
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1997/02/05/f01.html, (03.04.2014).

"Turkish protesters to hold 'one minute of darkness' on various issue", **Hürriyet Daily News**, 05.01.2011, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-protesters-to-hold-one-minute-of-darkness-on-various-issues.aspx?pageID=438&n=one-minute-of-darkness-for-continual-light-revisited-2011-05-01, (13.05.2015).

"Türbana Formül Aranıyor", **Sabah**, 30.01.1997,
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1997/01/30/f08.html, (03.04.2014).

24 Aralık 1995 Refah Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi,
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULU
NAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYI
NLARI/199601072%20RP%20SECIM%20BEYANNAMESI%201995/199601072
%20RP%20SECIM%20BEYANNAMESI%201995.pdf, (18.03.2014).

Agüero, Felipe. "Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America", **Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives**, Eds. Larry Diamond et al., The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997, pp.177-178.

Agüero, Felipe. **Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective**, The John Hopkins University Press, London, 1995.

Akdevelioğlu, Atay and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu. "İran'la İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol.2**, Ed. Baskın Oran, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, p. 581.

Akgün, Mensur. "Ortadoğu Maceraları", **Onbir Aylık Saltanat: Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Dış Politikada Refahyol Dönemi,** Ed. Gencer Özcan, Boyut Press, İstanbul, 1998, pp.168-169.

Akkaya, Ahmet Hamdi. "Kürt Hareketinin Örgütlenme Süreci Olarak 1970'ler", **Toplum ve Bilim**, No.127, 2013, p. 92.

Aknur, Müge. "Civil-Military Relations During the AK Party Era: Major Developments and Challenges", **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2013, p. 135.

Aknur, Müge. "The Impact of Civil-Military Relations on Democratic Consolidation in Turkey", **Democratic Consolidation in Turkey: State, Political Parties, Civil Society,Civil-Military Relations, Socio-Economic Development, EU, Rise of Political Islam, and Separatist Kurdish Nationalism,** Ed. Müge Aknur, Universal Publishers, Florida, 2012, pp.203-205.

Aknur, Müge. "TSK'nın Dış Politika Üzerindeki Etkisi", **Türkiye'nin Değişen Dış Politikası**, Ed. Cüneyt Yenigün and Ertan Efegil, Vol.1, Nobel, Ankara, 2010, pp. 129-142.

Aknur, Müge. **Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: An Analysis of Civilian Leaders:Incentive Structures, Political Capacity and Institutional Context,** VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, Saarbrücken, 2008.

Akpınar, Hakan, **28 Şubat: Post-Modern Darbenin Öyküsü**, Ümit Press, Ankara, 2001.

Aksu, Fuat. "Turkish-Greek Relations and the Cyprus Question: Quo Vadis?", **UNISCI Discussion Papers**, No. 23, May 2010, p.211.

Altunışık, Meliha Benli and Özlem Tür. "From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian–Turkish Relations", **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 37, No. 2, June 2006, pp.232-233.

Altunışık, Meliha Benli. "Güvenlik Kıskacında Türkiye-Ortadoğu İlişkileri", **En Uzun Onyıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı**

Yıllar, 2nd Edition, Ed. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, Büke Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000, p.332.

Altunışık, Meliha Benli. "The Middle East in Turkey–USA Relations: Managing the Alliance", **Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies**, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013, p. 162.

Altunışık, Meliha Benli. "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", **Journal of Contemporary European Studies**, Vol.14, No. 2, August 2006, pp. 183-184.

Altunışık, Meliha Benli. "Turkish Policy Toward Israel," **Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy**, Eds. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., 2000, pp. 66-67.

Ayan, Sezen. "Siyasi Yapılanma Sürecinde 1961 ve 1982 Anayasası", **C.Ü. İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi**, Vol. 8, No.2, 2007, pp.3-9.

Aykan, Mahmut Bali. "The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy From the 1950s to the 1990s", **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1993, p. 92.

Balcı, Kemal. "Turkey Opens Up to Israeli Warships after Combat Jets", **Turkish Daily News**, 12.04.1996, http://www.hri.org/news/turkey/trkn/1996/96-04-12.trkn.html (07.05.2014).

Baştürk, Levent. "The National Outlook Movement", **Siyaset ve Toplum**, July 1999, http://siyaset-toplum.blogspot.com/1999/07/national-outlook-movement.html, (20.07.2013).

Bayramoğlu, Ali. **28 Şubat: Bir Müdahalenin Güncesi**, Birey Press, İstanbul, 2001.

Bengio, Ofra. **The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders**, Palgrave Macmillan, NY, 2004.

Bilgin, Hasret Dikici. "Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey's Pro-Islamist Parties", **Turkish Studies**, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2008, pp. 409-410.

Bozarslan, Hamit. "Kurds and the Turkish State" **The Cambridge History of Turkey Volume 4: Turkey in the Modern World**, Ed. Reşat Kasaba, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 130-353.

Bozdağlıoğlu, Yücel. **Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach**, Routledge, New York, 2003.

Bölükbaşı, Süha. "Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol. 29, No. 3, Autumn 1999, pp. 30-31.

Burak, Begüm. "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: To Guard Whom and From What?", **European Journal of Economic and Political Studies**, Vol.4, No.1, Summer 2011, pp.144-152.

Capezza, David. "Turkey's Military Is a Catalyst for Reform: The Military in Politics", **The Middle East Quarterly**, Vol.16, No.3, Summer 2009, http://www.meforum.org/2160/turkey-military-catalyst-for-reform, (09.06.2015).

Cemal, Hasan. **Türkiye'nin Asker Sorunu: Ey Asker Siyasete Karışma**, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, Mayıs 2010.

Chousein, Sule. "Turkish-Greek Relations: 1999-2010", **Balkan Araştırma Enstitüsü Dergisi**, Vol. 3, No.1, July 2014, pp.12-13.

Civaoğlu, Güneri, "İki Vahim Girişim", **Milliyet**, 19.12.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTV g_x3D__x3D_ , (20.03.2014).

Cizre, Ümit. "From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party", **Political Parties in Turkey**, Ed. Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, Frank Cass, London, 2002, pp.87-92.

Cizre, Ümit. "Ideology, Context and Interests: The Turkish Military," **The Cambridge History of Turkey**, Ed. R. Kasaba, Vol. 4, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p.303.

Cutler, David, "Factbox-Turkey's 'post-modern coup' of 1997", **Chicago Tribune**, 08.05.2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-08/business/sns-rt-turkey-militaryfactboxl5e8g3gvr-20120508_1_erbakan-islamist-led-government-akp, (30.04.2014).

Çakır, Ruşen. "Geçmiş, Bugün ve Gelecek Kıskacında Türkiye Hizbullah'ı", **Birikim**, 2007, http://rusencakir.com/Gecmis-bugun-ve-gelecek-kiskacinda-Turkiye-Hizbullahi/739 , (13.03.2015).

Çakır, Ruşen. **Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi**, Metis, İstanbul, 1994.
Çakırözer, Utku. "Erbakan'ın Hac Yenilgisi", **Milliyet**, 16.12.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTV g_x3D__x3D_, (20.03.2014).

Çancı, Haldun and Şevket Serkan Şen. "Turkish Dilemma After Operation Desert Storm: 1990-1991: An Analysis of 'Negative Consequences'", **Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research,** Vol. 23, No. 3,2010, p.286.
Çavdar, Tevfik. **Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi: 1839-1950**, İmge, Ankara, 2004.

Çevikcan, Serpil and Ümit Bektaş. "Erbakan: Üfler, Yok Ederiz", **Milliyet**, 09.10.1996,http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (12.03.2014).

Çelik, Adnan. "1990'lı Yılların Olağanüstü Hâl Rejimi ve Savaş: Kürdistan Yerellerinde Şiddet ve Direniş", **Toplum ve Kuram**, No. 9, Bahar 2014, p. 102.

Çevikcan, Serpil and Ümit Bektaş. "Libya Faciası", **Milliyet**, 07.10.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_ , (11.03.2014).

Çevikcan, Serpil and Ümit Bektaş. "Mısır'a Olaylı Gezi", **Milliyet**, 04.10.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (12.03.2014).

Çevikcan, Serpil. "Kaddafi Şoku", **Milliyet**, 06.10.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (11.03.2014).

Çongar, Yasemin. "Bir: İran Tescilli Terörist", **Milliyet**, 21.02.1997, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3D__x3D_, (18.04.2014).

Değer, Evren. "Bölgede Barışı İran Bozuyor", **Milliyet**, 21.07.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (10.03.2014).

Değer, Evren. "Çin'le Gizli Füze Anlaşması", **Milliyet**, 20.12.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3D__x3D_, (06.04.2014).

Değer, Evren. "Genelkurmay'dan Erbakan'a Ret", **Milliyet**, 16.12.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F
_T8_x2F_A_x3D__x3D_, (06.04.2014).

Değer, Evren. "Hoca'ya By-Pass", **Milliyet**, 14.10.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/hjxSaSQBepGvmpOUyNQ_x2B_
wQ_x3D__x3D_, (04.05.2014).

Değer, Evren. "Ordu'nun 4 Rahatsızlığı", **Milliyet**, 22.12.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F
_T8_x2F_A_x3D__x3D_, (06.04.2014).

Değer, Evren. "Türkiye'ye Füze Tehdidi", **Milliyet**, 27.12.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F
_T8_x2F_A_x3D__x3D_, (15.04.2014).

Değer, Evren. "YAŞ Erbakan'sız Toplandı", **Milliyet**, 10.12.1996,
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTV
g_x3D__x3D_, (21.03.2014).

Demirel, Tanel. "The Turkish Military's Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980",
Armed Forces& Society, Vol. 29, No. 2, Winter 2003, pp.266-274.

Demirtaş, Birgül. "Turkish-Syrian Relations: From Friend 'Esad' to Enemy 'Esed'",
Middle East Policy, Vol.XX, No.1, Spring 2013, p.113.

Desch, Michael C. **Civilian Control of the Military**, The Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, 1999.

Diamond, Larry. "In Searching of Consolidation", **Consolidating the Third Wave
Democracies: Themes and Perspectives**, Eds. Larry Diamond et all., The Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997, pp.xxi-xxxvi. – xxviii.

Duran, Burhanettin. "Approaching The Kurdish Question via Adil Düzen: An Islamist Formula of the Welfare Party for Ethnic Coexistence", **Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs**, Vol.18, No.1, 1998, pp.111-114.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Süleyman Elik. "Turkey's Growing Relations with Iran and Arab Middle East", **Turkish Studies**, Vol.12, No.4, 2011, p.645.

Eligür, Banu. **The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010.

Eliş, Burhan and Vahap Yazaroğlu. "Rejim Kaygımız Yok", **Milliyet**, 27.02.1997, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3D__x3D_, (04.04.2014).

Eliş, Burhan. "İsrail'e Paşa Sözü", **Milliyet**, 25.02.1997, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/R9Ug3B_x2B_zTH0fJyOhN_x2F_T8_x2F_A_x3D__x3D_, (18.04.2014).

Erhan, Çağrı and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu. "Filistin Sorunu ve İsrail'le İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Ed. Baskın Oran, 1st edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, p. 636.

Fırat, Melek and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu. "Ortadoğu'yla İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, 2. Cilt,** Ed. Baskın Oran, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, p. 552.

Fırat, Melek and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu. "Relations with Arab States", **Turkish Foreign Policy:1999-2006**, Ed. Baskın Oran, trans. Mustafa Akşin, the University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 2010, p.857.

Fuller, Graham E. **Yükselen Bölgesel Aktör: Yeni Türkiye Cumhuriyeti**, trans. by Assoc. Dr. Mustafa Acar, Timaş, İstanbul, 2009.

Gözen, Ramazan. "Operation Provide Comfort: Origins and Objectives", **Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi**, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1995, p.177.

Gözübüyük, Abdullah Pulat. "Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemelerinin Görevleri", http://www.ankarabarosu.org.tr/siteler/ankarabarosu/tekmakale/1974-1/7.pdf, (05.06.2015).

Gunter, Michael M. **The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey**, Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2008.

Güney, Aylin and Petek Karatekelioğlu. "Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects", **Armed Forces&Society**, No. 3, Spring 2005, p.447.

Gürpınar, Bulut. "Milli Güvenlik Kurulu ve Dış Politika", **Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi**, Vol. 10, No. 39, Autumn, 2013, p.81.

Gürsoy, Yaprak. "The changing role of the military in Turkish politics: democratization through coup plots?" **Democratization**, Vol. 19, No. 4, August 2012, p.742.

Güven, Banu. "Suriye'den Sınırsız İşbirliği Vaadi", **Milliyet**, 12.07.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a g_x3D__x3D_ , (10.03.2014).

Haan, Jacob De, Jan-Egbert Sturm and Geert Beekhuis. "The Weak Government Thesis: Some New Evidence", **Public Choice**, Vol. 101, p. 164.

Hagan, D. "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy", **New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy**, Eds. Charles F. Hermann at all), Allen & Unwin, Boston, 1987, pp.344-345.

Hague, Rod and Martin Harrop. **Comparative Government and Politics**, Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2004.

Hale, William. "Economic Issues in Turkish Foreign Policy", **Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy**, Ed. Alan Makovski and Sabri Sayarı, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 34-35

Hale, William. "Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future", **The International Spectator**, Vol.XXXIV, No.1, January-March 1999, p.28.

Hale, William. "Turkish Democracy in Travail: The Case of the State Security Courts", **The World Today**, Vol. 33, No. 5, May 1977, pp.187-188.

Hale, William. **Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000**, Frank Cass, London and Portland, 2000.

Hale, William. **Turkish Politics and the Military**, Routledge, London, New York, 1994, pp.3-15.

Hasan, Aydın. "Skandal Gezi Resmen Yok", **Milliyet**, 10.10.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (12.03.2014).

Heper, Metin and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson. "Civil Military Relations in Israel and Turkey", **Journal of Political and Military Sociology**, No. 33, Vol. 2, Winter 2005, p.239.

http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul, (02.07.2013).

http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=template&id=176&lang=0 (18.12.2012).

http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us (26.10.2014).

http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Ingilizce/Tarihce/tarihce003_en.htm (18.12.2012).

http://www.oyak.com.tr/EN/corporate/oyak-in-brief.html (18.12.2012).

Inbar, Efraim. **Türk-İsrail Stratejik Ortaklığı**, trans. by Suna Ercan and Özgül Erdemli, ASAM, Ankara, 2001.

Jenkins, Gareth. **Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics**, Routledge, United States, 2001.

Johansen, Robert C. "Military Policies and the State System as Impediments to Democracy", **Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East and West**, Ed. David Held, Standford University Press, California, 1993, pp. 213-215.

Kamrava, Mehram. "Pseudo-Democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities: The Rise and Demise of Turkey's Refah Party**", British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 25, No. 2, November, 1998, p. 287.

Karabelias, Gerassimos. "Dictating the Upper Tide: Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Özal Decade, 1993-2003", **Turkish Studies**, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2008, p.460.

Karpat, Kemal H. "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980", **State Democracy and the Military**, Eds. Ahmet Evin and Metin Heper Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1988, pp.138-139.

Kemp, Kenneth W. and Charles Hudlin. "Civil Supremacy Over the Military: Its Nature and Limits", **Armed Forces&Society**, Vol.19, No. 1, Fall 1992, p. 7.

Kirişçi, Kemal and Gareth M. Winrow. **Kürt Sorunu: Kökeni ve Gelişimi**, trans. Ahmet Fethi, 2nd Edition, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 1997.

Kirişçi, Kemal. "Turkey and the Muslim Middle East", **Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy**, Ed. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 41-88.

Kohen, Sami. Yorum, "Çift Şeritli Dış Politika Nasıl Olur?", **Milliyet**, 11.07.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a g_x3D__x3D_, (12.03.2014).

Kohen, Sami. Yorum, "Değişmemek mi Daha İyi?" **Milliyet**, 24.07.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a g_x3D__x3D_, (12.03.2014).

Kohen, Sami. Yorum, "Dış Politikada İşler Yürüyor", **Milliyet**, 27.12.1995, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_a g_x3D__x3D_, (03.03.2014).

Kohn, Richard H. "How Democracies Control the Military", **Journal of Democracy**, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1997, pp. 140-145.

Köni, Hasan, **Transformation of the Turkish Religious Right With Focus on the Impact of State Elites, Globalization and Europeanization**, (Unpublished PhD Dissertation), İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, Ankara, 2012.

Köprülü, Ahmet. "Sincan'da 10 Tutuklama", **Milliyet**, 14.02.1997, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/AWxc_x2B_RbymC1azebFlqJTVg_x3D__x3D_, (04.04.2014), p.17.

Kösebalaban, Hasan. **Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism and Globalization**, Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2011.

Kul, Murat. "Erbakan Fantom 2000'i Onayladı", **Milliyet**, 30.11.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/hjxSaSQBepGvmpOUyNQ_x2B_wQ_x3D__x3D_, (04.05.2014).

Kuru, Ahmet T. "The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism, and Communism", **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2012, pp.37-52.

Larrabee, F. Stephen and Alireza Nader. "Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East", **Rand National Defense Research Institute**, Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2013, pp.1-11.

Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. "Toward Consolidated Democracies", **Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives**, Eds. Larry Diamond et al., The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997, p. 14. McDowall, David, **A Modern History of The Kurds**, I.B. Tauris, London, 2004, pp.422-441.

Meyer, James H. "Turkey's Leaders: Çiller's Scandal's", **Middle Eastern Quarterly**, Vol. 4, No. 3, September 1997, pp.29-31.

Nachmani, Amikam. **Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean**, Frank Cass, London, 1987.

Narlı, Nilüfer. "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey", **Journal for Turkish Studies**, Vol.1, No.1, Spring 2000, p. 108.

Nye, Roger P. "Civil-Military Confrontation in Turkey: The 1973 Presidential Election", **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, Vol. 8, No. 2, Apr., 1977, pp. 211-228.

Oran, Baskın. "1923-1939: Göreli Özerklik 1", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Ed. Baskın Oran, Vol.1, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, pp.74-254.

Oran, Baskın. "1960-1980: Göreli Özerklik-3", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Ed. Baskın Oran, Vol.1, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, pp.673-679.

Oran, Baskın. "1980-1990: Batı Bloku Ekseninde Türkiye-2", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol.2**, Ed. Baskın Oran, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, pp.9-11.

Oran, Baskın. "1939-1945: Savaş Kaosunda Türkiye: Göreli Özerklik-2", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Ed. Baskın Oran,Vol.1, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, pp.387-398.

Öymen, Ö. Kunter. "Mısır'dan Sürpriz Destek", **Milliyet**, 12.07.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (10.03.2014).

Özbudun, Ergun. **Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation**, Lynne Rienner Publication, London, March 2000.

Özcan, Gencer. "Ana Muhalefet Hükümetinin Ortadoğu Politikasından Kesitler", **Onbir Aylık Saltanat,** Ed. Gencer Özcan, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1998, pp. 217-233.

Özcan, Gencer. "Doksanlarda Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politikasında Askeri Yapının Artan Etkisi", **En Uzun On Yıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar**, Ed. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, Büke Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000, pp. 65-84.

Özcan, Gencer. "Giriş", **Onbir Aylık Saltanat**, Ed. Gencer Özcan, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1998, pp.14-25.

Özcan, Gencer. "Kuramdan Gerçekliğe Giden Yol", **Onbir Aylık Saltanat**, Ed. Gencer Özcan, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1998, pp. 265-266.

Özcan, Gencer. "National Security Council", **Democratic Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector in Turkey: 2005/2006**, Ed. Ümit Cizre, Status Report, LIT Verlag Zurich,2007, p.42.

Özcan, Gencer. "Sonun Başlangıcı", **Onbir Aylık Saltanat,** Ed. Gencer Özcan, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1998, pp.201-205.

Özcan, Gencer. "The Military and Making of Foreign Policy in Turkey", **Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power**, Eds. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2001, pp.17-27.

Özcan, Gencer. "Yalan Dünya Sanal Politikalar", **Onbir Aylık Saltanat**, Ed. Gencer Özcan, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1998, pp.185-186.

Özcan, Mesut. **Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East**, Ashgate, England, 2008.

Özkazanç, Alev. "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Siyasal Gelişmeler: Tarihsel-Sosyolojik Bir Değerlendirme" **1920'den Günümüze Türkiye'de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim**, Eds. Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru, Phoenix, Ankara, 2012, pp.111-113.

Rabasa, Angel and F. Stephen Larrabee. **The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey**, National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, 2008.

Rafizadeh, Majid. "What's behind Turkey and Iran's strategic friendship?", **Al Arabia News**, 13.06.2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/06/13/What-s-behind-Turkey-and-Iran-s-strategic-friendship-.html, (18.05.2015).

Robins, Philip. "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan", **Survival**, Vol. 39, No. 2, Summer 1997, p. 83.

Robins, Philip. **Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War**, Hurst&Company, London, 2003.

Robins, Philiph. "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue", **International Affairs** Vol. 69, No. 4, 1993, pp. 658-663.

Sakallıoğlu, Ümit Cizre. "The Autonomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", **Comparative Politics**, Vol. 29, No. 2, Jan., 1997, pp.157-158.

Sayarı, Sabri. "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol. 26, No. 3, Spring 1997, p. 46.

Sazak, Derya. "İşte Musul-Kerkük Sırrı", **Milliyet**, 06.01.2002, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2002/01/06/siyaset/asiy.html (29.12.2012).

Sever, Ayşegül. "ABD'nin İkili Çevreleme Politikası ve Türkiye", **En Uzun On Yıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar**, Ed. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, Ankara, Büke Press, 2000, p. 357.

Sönmezoğlu, Faruk. **II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası**, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006.

Strategic Comments, "Politics and the Turkish Military", **International Institute for Strategic Studies,** Vol. 3, No. 5, 1997, p.1.

Şarlak, Zeynep. "Atatürkçülükten Milli Güvenlik Rejimine: 1990'lar Türkiyesine Bir Bakış", **Bir Zümre, Bir Parti Türkiye'de Ordu**, Eds. Ahmet İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu, Birikim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009, p.283.

Tachau, Frank and Metin Heper. "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey", **Comparative Politics**, Vol. 16, No. 1, Oct., 1983, p.23.

The 1961 Constitution of the Turkish Republic,
http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf, (03.06.2015).

Timur, Taner. **Osmanlı Toplumsal Düzeni**, İmge, Ankara, 1994.

Toprak, Binnaz. "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey", **State Democracy and the Military**, Ed. Ahmet Evin and Metin Heper,Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1988, pp.126-127.

Turkish Review, http://www.turkishreview.org/interviews/20q20a_540620, (07.05.2015).

Tür, Özlem. **Islamist Movements: The New Social Movements of the Middle East: A case Study**, (Unpublished PhD Dissertation), Durham University, UK, 2003.

Uzgel, İlhan. "Between Preatorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy", **Ankara University: The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations**, Vol. 34, 2003, pp. 181-195.

Uzgel, İlhan. "Türk Dış Politikasında Sivilleşme ve Demokratikleşme Sorunları: Körfez Savaşı Örneği", **SBF Dergisi**, Aralık-Ocak 1998, p. 315.

Uzgel, İlhan."TDP'nin Oluşturulması", **Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Ed. Baskın Oran, Vol.1, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, pp.74-91.

Ülman, Burak. "Türkiye'nin Yeni Güvenlik Algılamaları ve 'Bölücülük'", **En Uzun On Yıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar**, Ed. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, Büke Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000, pp. 102-120.

Üste, Bahar. "Türkiye'de İktidara Gelen Siyasal Partilerin AET/AT/AB İlişkileri Hakkındaki Görüşleri ve Yönetim Yapısına Etkileri", **Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi**, Vol.8, No.3, 2006, p.343.

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Origins of War in Neorealist Theory", **Journal of Interdisciplinary History**, Vol. 18, Iss. 4, Spring, 1988, pp. 617-618.

Welch, Claude E. "Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality", **Civilian Control of the Military, Theory and Cases From Developing Countries**, Ed. Claude E. Welch, State University Press, Albany, 1976, pp.1-5.

Yavuz, Hakan. "Milli Görüş Hareketi: Muhalif ve Modernist Gelenek", **Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce: Vol. 6: İslamcılık**, Ed. Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekingil, İletişim, İstanbul, 2004, p.601.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. **Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009.

Yayla, Atilla. "Erbakan's Goals", **The Middle East Quarterly**, Vol. 4, No. 3, September 1997, http://www.meforum.org/358/turkeys-leaders-erbakans-goals, (27.04.2015).

Yazaroğlu, Vahap. "Saddam'a Ani Ziyaret", **Milliyet**, 10.08.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/xwr4P4HH96q8gwxReou_x2F_ag_x3D__x3D_, (10.03.2014).

Yeğen, Mesut. "The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse", **Journal of Contemporary History**, Vol. 34, No. 4, Oct., 1999, pp. 558-559.

Yenigün, Cüneyt. "Türk Dış Politikasında Üçüncü Dalga", **Türkiye'nin Değişen Dış Politikası,** Ed. Cüneyt Yenigün and Ertan Efegil, Vol.1, Nobel, Ankara, 2010, pp.63-72.

Yeşilada, Birol A. "The Virtue Party", **Political Parties in Turkey**, Ed. Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, Frank Cass, London, 2002, pp.70-74.

Yıldız, Uğur Burç. **Avrupa Birliği Sürecinde Türkiye'de Sivil-Asker İlişkileri: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Dönemi**, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis), Dokuz Eylül University, Social Sciences Institute, European Studies Program, 2010, Ch.5.

Yınanç, Barçın. "Dışişlerine By-pass", **Milliyet**, 25.07.1996, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/dopD5s4xzAJPQDAMYDIU3A_x3D__x3D_(03.06.2015).

Zürcher, Eric J. **Turkey: A Modern History**, I.B. Tauris&Co, Third edition, New York.