

T.C.  
DOKUZ EYLÜL ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ  
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI  
İNGİLİZCE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER PROGRAMI  
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL  
INTEREST CONCEPT IN THEORIES OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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2009

## Yemin Metni

Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak sunduğum “**A Comparative Analysis of the National Interest Concept in Theories of International Relations / Ulusal Çıkar Kavramının Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorilerinde Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analizi**” adlı çalışmanın, tarafımdan, bilimsel ahlak ve geleneklere aykırı düşecek bir yardıma başvurmaksızın yazıldığını ve yararlandığım eserlerin kaynakçada gösterilenlerden oluştuğunu, bunlara atıf yapılarak yararlanılmış olduğunu belirtir ve bunu onurumla doğrularım.

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**Programı** : İngilizce Uluslararası İlişkiler  
**Tez Konusu** : Ulusal Çıkar Kavramının Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorilerinde Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analizi  
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### Ulusal Çıkar Kavramının Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorilerinde Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analizi

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Ulusal çıkar kavramının hem günlük hayatta hem de akademik alanda önemli bir yere sahip olduğu rahatlıkla söylenebilir. İlk bakışta kavram kesin bir anlama sahipmiş gibi görünse de ulusal çıkar hakkında birkaç çalışmanın incelenmesi kavramın kesin bir anlama gelmediğini iddia etmek için yeterlidir. Üstelik her teori, kavramı kendi epistemolojisi açısından yorumlamaktadır. Bu sebepten, kavram olarak ulusal çıkar tek bir anlam ifade etmez; aksine, tarafından yorumlandığı teoriye göre farklı anlamlar kazanabilir.

Kavramın yukarıda bahsedilen belirsiz içeriğini göz önüne alarak, bu tez ulusal çıkar kavramını değişik açılardan incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır; bu sebepten ulusal çıkarın doğasına doğru yapılan bir uğraş olarak tanımlanabilir. Çalışma beş bölümden oluşmaktadır. Her bir bölüm kendi içinde birkaç alt bölüme ayrılmaktadır. Her bir bölümün büyük bir kısmı o bölümde ulusal çıkarı inceleyen teorinin kavramlarını tanımlamaya ayrılmıştır. Ulusal çıkar kavramı her bir bölümün en son kısmında o bölümde söz konusu olan teori hakkında verilen bilgiler ışığında tanımlanmıştır.

İlk bölümde Reelpolitik düşünce ve onun ulusal çıkara yaklaşımı incelenmiştir. İkinci bölümde Liberal düşünce ve onun ulusal çıkar anlayışı irdelenmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde Konstrüktivizm ve onun ulusal çıkara yaklaşımı tanımlanmıştır. Dördüncü bölüm Marksizm ve onun ulusal çıkar hakkındaki eleştirilerine ayrılmıştır. Son bölümde ise Eleştirel Düşünce ve onun ulusal çıkar hakkındaki eleştirisi sunulmuştur.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Çıkar, Devlet, Güç, İdeoloji, Pozitivizm, Rejim, Rekabet, Sınıf, Sistem, Ulus

## **ABSTRACT**

### **Master Thesis**

## **A Comparative Analysis of the National Interest Concept in Theories of International Relations**

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**It can easily be argued that the concept of the national interest has a significant place in both daily life and academic domain. Although the concept seems to have a definite meaning at first glance the analysis of a few works about the national interest is enough to claim that the concept does not have a definite meaning. Moreover each theory comments the concept in accordance with its epistemology. Thus, the concept of the national interest does not signify one meaning; on the contrary, it can have different connotations with regard to the theory by which it is interpreted.**

**Taking into consideration uncertain content of the concept mentioned above, this thesis aims to analyse the concept of the national interest from different points of view; thus, it can be defined as an endeavour towards the nature of the national interest. This work consists of five chapters. Each chapter is divided into several subsections in itself. A large portion of each chapter is separated to describe the concepts of the theory which analyses the national interest in that chapter. The concept of the national interest is described in the last part of each chapter in the light of the knowledge given about the theory at issue.**

**In the first chapter, the Realpolitik thought and its approach to the national interest are analysed. In the second chapter, the Liberal thought and its national interest understanding are considered. In the third chapter, Constructivism and its approach to the national interest are described. The fourth chapter is separated for Marxism and its critique about the national interest. In the last part, the Critical Thought and its critique about the national interest are presented.**

**Key Words:** Interest, State, Power, Ideology, Positivism, Regime, Competition, Class, System, Nation

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## INTRODUCTION

If the state and the nation are conceptualized as coherent concepts being used interchangeably, the *national interest* signifies the interests of a nation or a state or a nation-state. Establishing a *complementary* relationship between the state and the nation will inevitably equip the nation-state with some interests. Such an understanding treating the state as an *atomistic* unit understands the politics as competition among the like-units (states). However, if the nation is described as a fragile sense of belonging without any timeless character and if the nation-state is seen as the *legitimate* child of the modernity rather than the ultimate point of political governance in the history, then the *seemingly* natural overlapping relationship between the state and the nation is ruptured; consequently, there remains nothing like the national interest. Likewise, the equilibrium between the state and the nation also crumbles. Thus, it can be claimed that the *perspective* creates the opinions about the *truth*.

The significance of the *perspective* due to its role in the process of the construction of the truth about anything displays itself also in the *tension* among the *epistemological wars* about the content of the truth about the politics. Every perspective has its own rules of conduct, its own methodology, ontology and epistemology. So, from where one looks at what s/he sees is directly influenced from the position s/he occupies in the world. This is a significant point, which should be made at the beginning of this thesis. It is the epistemological *relativity* according to which where one stands and what s/he wants to do are in a dialectical relationship with his/her position in the *conjuncture*.

Without ignoring the relationship between the perspective and the knowledge about the nature of truth, it can be claimed that there is no point in insisting on only one definition of the national interest. On the contrary, every unit/actor in the society will understand the concept in relation with its position in the system. This thesis aims to investigate the national interest understandings of these different positions in

the society in the light of five IR theories: Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, Marxism and Critical Theory.

In the first chapter, Realpolitik paradigm and its stance towards the national interest are interrogated. There are three main bodies of the first chapter. The first part, as an introductory passage, briefly analyses the arguments of some significant realist philosophers like Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes because of their contribution to the Realpolitik tradition. The common theme found in their writings is the evil and power-seeking character of the human nature. For example, for Thucydides, politics is a game of competition driven by an endless struggle for power inherent in human beings. For Machiavelli and Hobbes, the will to power inherent in human beings must be taken under control. The means Machiavelli proposes to control such an evilness is to create a *Prince* while the Hobbesian solution is to create a *Leviathan* to which all individuals must transfer their rights if they wish to survive in a world of *war of all against all*. Universal ethics or universal normative questions are not among the concerns of the Prince and the Leviathan because they are primarily concerned with securing the comfort of their subjects in lieu of elevating the *universal good*. Thus, it can be argued that power occupies a significant place in the writings of these Realpolitik philosophers.

Like Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, Morgenthau is another important representative of the Realpolitik tradition. He can be regarded as one of the most significant pioneers of the modern form of the classical realism. Like the three fathers of Realpolitik thought mentioned above, Morgenthau is also sceptical about the benign nature of human beings; for that reason, he also starts his political analysis by grounding it on the timeless power-seeking character of human beings. For Morgenthau, there is no escape from power which is ubiquitous in every aspect of life. Thus, power politics can be used as another name for Morgenthau's realism. Morgenthau's realism is state-centric and can be regarded as a guide for the statesman. In terms of his realist understanding, the international system is dominated by sovereign nation-states above which there is no *higher* authority. For that reason, each state is an *end* itself and the relations between them are *competitive*.

As the realm is anarchic and competitive, it becomes quite natural that states seek *power* to realize their national interests.

The national interest understanding of Morgenthau takes the state as the reference point and regards the statesman as the actor of the politics. The statesman, in this regard, must analyse the circumstances of domestic and international politics and determine and implement the best policy available. As an actor of the international politics, the statesman following a successful foreign policy must try to elevate the common good of his country. Drawing a line of difference between the international politics and domestic politics, Morgenthau's realism tries to erect a sovereign state with an overarching interest that is *survival* as the supreme national interest.

Resembling to Morgenthau's realism about the issue of the competitive nature of the international politics, neo-realism goes one further step than realism thanks to its endeavour to construct a theory of the international system. As the representative of the neo-realist strand in the Realpolitik tradition, Waltz is inclined to analyse the international politics by systematically theorizing it. Like the economical theory of physiocrats, Waltz came up with a theory which only deals with the structure of the international politics. According to this theory, politics is competitive; but it is not because of the evilness of the human nature. On the contrary, it is competitive due to the *anarchy* inherent in the structure of the international system. The international system occupies a significant place in Waltzian analysis. The contribution Waltz makes to IR is, to an important degree, about the methodology. His aim was to construct a theory of international politics modelled after the natural sciences. Waltz was of the opinion that IR had to develop as a science. Thus, he was opposed to the analysis of the international relations under the shadow of formerly popular methods of analysis based on history, philosophy, sociology and the like.

According to Waltz, the statesman is not an actor with high agential power to change or regulate the international structure as he wishes because of the systemic

constraints imposed on him. These systemic constraints are the anarchy, the distribution of capabilities and functional similarity. These concepts will be comprehensively analysed later; but it is important to bear in mind that these three imperatives proposed by Waltz can be regarded as constituting the breaking point between Morgenthau's modern form of realism and neo-realism. They are the *systemic* imperatives rather than being deliberative products of the statesman. That means the statesman must take these systemic constraints into consideration when he is on the threshold of taking significant decisions related to the interests of his country.

In the light of these knowledge about the neo-realist strand, it is argued that its national interest understanding is system-centric rather agent-centric. The state is still the most important actor; but it operates under the conditions of anarchy and must obey the competitive logic of the system, acting in line with the systemic signals in order to ensure its survival. Neo-realism argues that the state must adapt itself to the anarchical international system in order to fulfil its national interests. If the state ignores the systemic constraints and the competitive nature of politics, it can be punished because the system demands uniform behavioural patterns. Thus, the national interest of the state, for neo-realism, can be described as to adapt to the international structure and defend its position in the system.

Neo-realism led by Waltz is generally described as defensive neo-realism; but there is also another strand in the neo-realist theory: offensive neo-realism. Offensive neo-realism resembles to defensive neo-realism; but it differs from defensive neo-realism because of its conception of power. For example, in Waltzian neo-realism states seek power in order to protect and stabilize their position in the system whereas in offensive neo-realism states are interested in power in order to pursue hegemony if possible. This is the main difference between the two strands of the neo-realist theory, which will be analysed in detail in the following chapters.

In the second chapter, liberalism and its three variants will be analysed, and the national interest understanding of each will be described. After a brief

introduction about liberalism as a general theory, in the second section, liberal internationalism and its emphasis on free trade and democracy are discussed. The interest conception of liberal internationalism is defined as the *community interest*. The community here signifies the context composed of the liberal democratic states. Defending democracy and free trade, liberal internationalism is more inclined to believe in the potential goodness of individuals than realism. For the liberal internationalists, it is not because of the human nature the world is in a miserable situation; but it is because of the undemocratic states, which distort the harmony of the world. Thus, the internationalists advise free trade and the spread of democracy in order to improve the conditions of all the humanity and to create a community of liberal democratic states. According to them, if every state becomes liberal and democratic, then the world will be composed of liberal democratic states that respect the freedom of human beings.

In the third section, idealism and its national interest prescription will be analysed. Idealism, regarded a variant of liberalism, is much more *state-centric* than liberal internationalism because it analyses the world politics more at the state level than at the individual level. As will be seen, for the liberal internationalists, the individual is *prior* to the state. On the contrary, the idealists do not aim to transcend the state. The solutions idealism has proposed to regulate the world events show its state-centric characteristics. The League of Nations, the collective security system and the national self-determination are evident signs of the *statism* of the idealist thought. The national interest understanding of idealism is state-centric like realism; but it is more prone to prevent hostility among states by creating international institutions than to accept the competition and conflict as the permanent features of the international politics.

In the last section, (neo)liberal institutionalism and the main characteristics of this strand are described. For the institutionalist perspective, the world cannot be thought only in terms of the inter-state relations. On the contrary, there are numerous international institutions with increasing influence on state behaviour and other actors. According to the (neo)liberal institutionalists, multi-national corporations and

non-governmental organizations signify the birth of a new era which can be described as complex interdependency. The latter generally means that the world increasingly involves complex relationships which are not only between the states but highly varied and numerous. They can be between states, between international institutions and states, between civil society actors and states, between international institutions and civil society actors and so on. In short, for the institutionalists, the world is different today. Nye's mention about the third industrial revolution, which implies the information revolution by means of the development of the communication technologies, confirms that the world is no more one-dimensional under the command of the atomistic nation-states.

The institutionalists see the international environment as anarchical like the neo-realists; but they differ with regard to their approaches to cooperation among states. Beneath that difference lies their disagreement about the relative versus absolute gain, which is explained in detail in the chapter. For the neo-realists, international cooperation is not much possible, while the (neo)liberals insist that cooperation can be achieved by means of creating international regimes. Because of the institutionalist emphasis on cooperation, its *national interest* understanding will be constructed in reference to the notion of cooperation under the heading of the cooperative interest.

Constructivism is another IR theory analysed in this thesis. In this chapter, the first aim is to display the main propositions of constructivism according to which norms and ideas matter in politics. The constructivist thought, for the sake of analysis, is divided into three subgroups: state-centric constructivism, international society-centric constructivism and critical constructivism.

The first strand called as state-centric constructivism borrows many concepts from realism. Thus, there is a relationship between state-centric constructivism and realism. State-centric version of constructivism analyses anarchy and investigates the ways for collective identity formation among states. Although it claims that the identities and interests of states are defined in an intersubjective manner, it still takes

some features of the state as fixed. For example, the state interests are said to be constructed in accordance with the intersubjective constraints, but these interests represent subjective preferences. In addition to these subjective interests, there are also objective interests, which all states must fulfil in order to survive. The distinction the state-centric constructivism makes between the subjective and the objective interests may cause to think of it as a bridge between neorealism and neoliberalism.

The second variant of constructivism called as international society-centric constructivism claims that the normative structure of international politics has a constraining effect on state behaviour and determines its interests. According to this view, which is influenced from the English School, the structure of international society has two tiers: normative and surface. The first represents the dominant norms in the international society and the second tier is thought to consist of international organizations, which are practical agents, which teach states about the validity and influence of international norms. For the society-centric version of constructivism, the state is a normative-adaptive entity and its national interests are inevitably norm-bound.

The last variant is critical constructivism, which tries to *deconstruct* the constructed character of politics. For this variant, the state is not the representative of the society and not a subject which naturally has some interests and identities. Rather, the state's well-being depends on the success of its *ideological hegemony* over its citizens. The state, in that sense, is an apparatus of repression constructing itself on the exclusion of some groups and individuals in the society. For critical constructivism, the state cannot have pre-given (national) interests and identities. Being interested in the construction process of the national interest only as a discourse, the critical constructivists see the national interest as a subjective preference and regard it the reflection of the *dominant* discourse in the society.

The fourth chapter analyses Marxism and its national interest understanding; but it transforms the national interest into the socialist interest because Marxism

analyses the politics with regard to the notion of class. In the first section, some arguments like nationalism, capitalism and the nation-state are evaluated from a Marxist perspective. For Marxism, nationalism is an *invention* required to meet the demands of the capitalist market. Thus, the *territorial body* of the state refers to its *commercial capacity* while its borders are its *tariff walls*. Ideology is seen as the dominant discourse of the dominant class in the society. Hegemony is described as the leading capacity of the dominant class to gain the consent of the subordinated people in the society in order to reproduce its legitimacy in the eyes of the oppressed people. In the second section, Leninism, as the breaking point, is analysed. The imperialism theory of Lenin and the world-system theory of Wallerstein are analysed in the light of which the concept of the socialist interest is constructed. According to Lenin's theory of imperialism, the world does not have a linear progress; rather, some states will improve its well-being by exploiting some other weak states. Thus, there arises a disproportional relationship between the centre and the periphery, as Wallerstein argues.

The concept of the socialist interest is a constructed term referring to political party understanding of Gramsci for whom the political party is the Modern Prince, which has the capacity to lead the societal forces with a view to change. Referring to Lenin, a *dual* task among the world proletariat is mentioned. According to this model, the task of the peripheral forces is to struggle for the national question whereas the task of the central forces is to work for the international socialism. This division of labour among the world's working classes is described as an analytical objective of the socialist interest.

The last chapter analyses the critical thought and its possible criticism of the national interest. Here the national interest is also transformed and has become the humanity's interest. In the first section, positivism and the rationality understanding of the modern mind are criticized. In the next section, the realist and the (neo)realist strands in the Realpolitik thought are examined. In the third section, modernity is analysed and its deficiencies are displayed. In the next part, critical theory is described as a normative enterprise due to its aim to improve the world rather than

help the status quo to reproduce itself. The fifth part criticizes the nationalism and describes the nation as an *imagined community*. Later, globalization as a process is defined and its possible contribution to the dissolution of the nation-state is investigated. In the next part, the notion of the world citizenship is described because it is seen as the first step to improve the condition of the humanity. Then, the theory of the communicative rationality theory of Habermas is examined. In the tenth part, postmodernism is analysed. Feminism is also another issue this chapter touches upon before elaborating on the notion of the humanity's interest.

In the last section, the concept of the humanity's interest is described. The humanity's interest implies a longing for an *alternative* world order and is composed of two realms. The first one is related to the *cosmopolitan level* and the other is related to the *intra-state level*. The concept is developed by means of the dialectical relationship between these two levels. The humanity's interest is not a concept that was developed before by any critical theorist in an *explicit* manner. Rather, it is an *eclectic* concept developed in the light of the critical arguments presented in this chapter. The *cosmopolitan level* can be seen as a *general* common denominator on which all the critical theorists can come to agreement. Respect for the difference and the transcendence of the nation-state are the two objectives of this level. The intra-state level is related to more concrete actions *within* states. It implies that if the internal structures of states acquire democratic features, the world of states will also be democratic. The concept of *democracy* here must not be confused with the Western form of the political system; rather it means a *communitarian* conception of democracy, which never found the chance of application.

## FIRST CHAPTER

### THE REALIST PARADIGM AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

This chapter, divided into three main sections, aims to evaluate the realist understanding in IR. The first part briefly introduces the ideas of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes and their conceptualization of politics. After this brief introduction of ancient classical realism, the modern version of classical realism, Morgenthau's realism, is evaluated. The concepts like the state, nationalism, power and balance of power are described in terms of the realist understanding in order to comprehend the realist conception of the *national interest*. The state, in the realist understanding, is seen as a unit which tries to maximize its power for its survival. The pursuit of power is seen as an *innate* potential of the human being. As a result of this will to power, there arises a mechanism called as balance of power which can be seen in every field of life such as family, organizations and civil society. When the analysis is carried out at the state level, the states also become individuals seeking their *own* good. Thus, a balance among them also emerges. The cement sticking the whole society becomes *nationalism* which emerged after the French Revolution. It can be argued that realism treats the states as atomic units wishing to survive and pursue their own national interests.

In the third section, *neo-realism* is analysed. Its core concepts like international system and anarchy as permanent features of international politics and the need for theory to evaluate the state behaviour are explained. Neo-realism's ambition to construct a theory in order to evaluate world politics is seen as the *breaking point* between classical realism and neo-realism. As also will be seen, realism tries to catch the soul of every *specific* event in the history so as to deduct *general* hypotheses. On the contrary, neo-realism begins its inquiry with some core concepts as a *priori*. It also analyses the specific events; but it is inclined to explain world politics in a *structural* and *theoretical* manner. Thus, it can be claimed that the paths and the methods of two schools are different from each other. As both schools

will be dealt with in the following pages in a comprehensive manner, it is enough to finish this introductory part here.

### 1.1. THUCYDIDES, MACHIAVELLI AND HOBBS

Realpolitik can be described as the study of politics and history (or political history) as it *really is* rather than how it *ought to be*. The aim is pursuing the laws of politics rather than attributing any *normative* dimension to the analysis. Trying to understand the logic of politics, the Realpolitik thinkers took the human nature as *a priori* on which they constructed their propositions. From Thucydides to Hobbes, human nature is seen as the source of an endless desire for power. In *History of the Peloponnesian War*, there is a sentence verifying this statement: “The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept”.<sup>1</sup> Whatever the causes are, the result is determined by *power*. For example, the cause of the war between Athens and Sparta stems from “the Athenian efforts to obtain a favourable balance of power”.<sup>2</sup> In the final analysis, *power* is the last word and the power of one side becomes the loss of the other side. Power is regarded as a *zero-sum* game. According to the zero-sum understanding, “the actors in the international system must deprive one another of their power in order to add it to their own”.<sup>3</sup> Dunne and Schmidt characterizing Thucydides as the first *structural* realist because of his emphasis on human nature as an *independent* variable argue that Thucydides’ realism implies that “international politics is driven by an endless struggle for power which has its roots in human nature”.<sup>4</sup> As the concept of power is regarded as a universal

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<sup>1</sup> Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, “Realism: The State, Power, and the Balance of Power”, Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (ed.s), **International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond**, 3rd edition, Boston, Allyn&Bacon, 1999, p. 59.

<sup>2</sup> Richard Ned Lebow, “Classical Realism”, Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (ed.s), **International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 56.

<sup>3</sup> Sean Molloy, **The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics**, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 90.

<sup>4</sup> Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism”, John Baylis and Steve Smith (ed.s), **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations**, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 149.

and timeless characteristic of human beings who create and regulate the (political) relations, then it becomes inevitably natural that politics becomes a *game* of power.

Machiavelli can be regarded as another representative of the Realpolitik tradition. During his time, Italy was not a *monolithic* territorial nation-state; but it was composed of fragments like Milan, Venice, Florence, Geneva and so on. Machiavelli claimed that Italy had to establish its *Risorgimento* (the Italian Union) like France, Spain and England, which achieved to establish their central kingdoms. For Machiavelli, it was only a *Prince* who could only achieve to create such an Italian union. The Prince must be such a *sovereign* that in his eyes every means to accomplish the desired end is deemed *legitimate*. Here a rupture between the morality and the politics arises. Machiavelli claiming that “the use of power is different from the morality” argues that morality cannot be a guide for the sovereign in his strategic actions. For that reason, state leaders must have “a different kind of morality which accorded not to traditional Christian virtues but to political necessity and prudence”.<sup>5</sup> Thus, a “dual moral standard” emerges. One is for the “individual citizens living inside the state”. That means individuals are personally free to pursue the universal *truth*, if they wish. The other standard is for the state “in its external relations with other states”.<sup>6</sup> That means there cannot be any moral commitment among the states. So, the politics, in Machiavellian sense, does not necessarily include *ethical* considerations.

Thomas Hobbes, another proponent of the Realpolitik thinking, also begins his inquiry by evaluating human nature. According to Hobbes, “men are equal; they interact in anarchy; and they are driven by competition, diffidence and glory”.<sup>7</sup> For Hobbes, competition aims gain, diffidence aims safety and glory aims reputation. That the human beings are afraid of each other (a war of all against all) implies *diffidence* among them. As there is fear among human beings, each one of them will inevitably try to oppress the others for the sake of his/her own benefits in a

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<sup>5</sup> Dunne and Schmidt, (2001), p. 143.

<sup>6</sup> Dunne and Schmidt, (2001), p. 143.

<sup>7</sup> Jack Donnelly, “Realism”, Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True (ed.s), **Theories of International Relations**, 3rd edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 32.

*competitive* manner. As a result, s/he will provide safety for herself/himself. After safety, there arises *glory* which signifies the *symbolic* power of the individual against other human beings. For Hobbes, human beings cannot sustain their life under these conditions; they need to create an *order*. Being “sceptical of altering human nature” like most realists, Hobbes proposes to constrain these forces inherent in human nature by means of creating a Leviathan rather than by trying to alter them.<sup>8</sup> Hobbes regards it dangerous that every one is *equal* because anyone can do anything if s/he wishes. For that reason, it is vital that the relations between human beings be regulated. Who will achieve this task? For Hobbes, it is the state as a *Leviathan*, which will end the diffidence among human beings. However, the state can only emerge if people accept to *transfer* their rights and authorities to it. Whether the state is under the command of a king, a monarch or the oligarchy does not matter much, because, in the final analysis, it is the state power, which is separated from the society with its high authority with a view to making the human beings live in harmony.<sup>9</sup>

## 1.2. REALISM

Realism can be defined as a *theory* of power, which “rose from the ashes of the discredited idealist approach”<sup>10</sup>. Idealism is inclined to believe in the potential goodness of human nature. But, with the eruption of the World War II the idealist vision of international relations was attacked and it was claimed that international relations were to be analysed in a *descriptive* manner without any *normative* commitment: what it is rather than how it ought to be.<sup>11</sup> After the War, *realism* began to be a powerful discourse of IR. One reason may be that “the prescriptions it offered were particularly well suited to the United States’ rise to become the global

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<sup>8</sup> Donnelly, (2005), p. 34.

<sup>9</sup> Murat Sarıca, **100 Soruda Siyasi Düşünce Tarihi**, İstanbul, Gerçek Yayınevi, 1987, p. 63.

<sup>10</sup> Dunne and Schmidt, (2001), p. 142.

<sup>11</sup> Atıla Eralp, “Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininin Oluşumu: İdealizm-Realizm Tartışması” Atıla Eralp (ed.), **Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar**, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2006, p. 70.

hegemon”.<sup>12</sup> When one considers that the US left its *isolationist* policy after the War, such a comment about the rise of realism in the academic discipline seems to be correct.

Human nature is a common theme in both ancient and modern forms of classical realism. The ancient thinkers’ views on the subject have already been explained in the previous section. The leading representative of modern classical realism, Morgenthau, also claims that “politics... is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature... which has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India and Greece endeavoured to discover these laws”.<sup>13</sup> The will to power and the need for domination (*animus dominandi*) are regarded as the central motives of the human nature. According to these two notions, human beings cannot be understood without reference to their *innate* potential to seek power. Due to this will to power, human beings tend to dominate the others until there is no one to dominate.<sup>14</sup> Under these two notions, there lies the *Christian* ethics, which emphasizes the sin of pride in human nature according to which man’s pride and will to power disturb the harmony of creation; so, all human beings are innately flawed.<sup>15</sup> Because of their emphasis on the human nature, “there is a significant degree of continuity between classical” realists such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, and modern realists like Morgenthau.<sup>16</sup>

In the next three sections, the three key concepts to which realism attributes much importance will be analyzed: state, power and balance of power. After this analysis, the national interest understanding of realism will be described.

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<sup>12</sup> Dunne and Schmidt, (2001), p. 142.

<sup>13</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, **Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace**, Brief edition, New York, McGraw-Hill 1993, p. 4.

<sup>14</sup> Molloy, (2006), p. 92.

<sup>15</sup> Keith L. Shimko, “Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism”, **Review of Politics**, Vol. 54, No. 2, 1992, p. 288.

<sup>16</sup> Dunne and Schmidt, (2001), p. 143.

### 1.2.1. The State

In terms of the realist understanding, the international system is dominated by sovereign nation-states over which there is no *higher* authority. For that reason, each state is an *end* itself and the relations between them are *competitive*. The realm in which states operate is anarchic due to the absence of a higher authority above them. As the realm is anarchic and competitive, it becomes quite natural that states seek *power* to realize their interests.

Realism can be seen as a *statist* theory. The state is understood as the expression of the whole nation or the *general will*<sup>17</sup> of the whole citizens of that state. It regulates the social order and prevents looting and fear in society.<sup>18</sup> Realism assumes that states are the *only* significant actors in world affairs. It does not treat subnational actors or transnational actors as distinct and autonomous actors, but rather it subsumes them.<sup>19</sup> Thus, “the ontological given for realism is that sovereign states are the constitutive components of the international system and sovereignty is a political order based on territorial control”.<sup>20</sup> One of the famous characteristics of realism is its separation between the domestic political *order* and the international *disorder*. As realism sees the state as an apparatus creating harmony in the domestic sphere, a division between domestic and international politics becomes unavoidable.

*Realism assumes that states are unitary actors... a state does not speak to the rest of the world through multiple voices. If a conflict arises between a state's foreign and defence departments, realists say it will be resolved authoritatively: Only one policy will be directed toward the world. Since realists assume that states are able to rely on a single position in their foreign policy, they need not take domestic politics into account when explaining a state's international behavior.*<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Sarica, (1987), pp. 83-84.

<sup>18</sup> John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry, **Devlet**, (trans.) İsmail Çekem, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005, pp. 13-16.

<sup>19</sup> J. Martin Rochester, “The "National Interest" and Contemporary World Politics”, **The Review of Politics**, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1978, p. 82.

<sup>20</sup> Stephen Krasner, “Realism, Imperialism, and Democracy: A Response to Gilbert”, **Political Theory**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1992, p. 39.

<sup>21</sup> James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, **Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World**, 2nd edition, Boulder, Westview Press, 2000, p. 14.

*Authoritatively* and *one* have significant implications for the conduct of survey. The former reminds “the classic Weberian definition of the modern state which [has]... a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence”.<sup>22</sup> The sovereign state has the *final* say in disputes both in relations with its citizens and the relations with actors abroad.<sup>23</sup> The latter, *one*, supports the fact that realism takes the state as the unit of analysis and treats it as a *black box* purged of all contradictions and differences. In sum, it can be argued that a state, from the realist lenses, has a “corporate identity.” That means, with its “self-organizing qualities”<sup>24</sup> the state constitutes itself as an actor.

The state, as an actor, must ensure its *survival* in a *self-help* situation. *Survival* becomes the first objective of the state, as there is nothing to prevent states from the coercive actions of other states. Thus, “survival is held to be a precondition for attaining all other goals”.<sup>25</sup> Survival is conceptualized in such a way that it seems as though there are some states in the world, which may try to exterminate others. The absence of a higher authority to enforce rules on states makes it possible to think about such a possibility of extermination. Accordingly, “politics only signifies simply the survival of states confronting the potential threat created by the existence of other states”.<sup>26</sup> For that reason, with the instinct of survival, states must take the danger of being eroded into consideration and make their policies in accordance with that principle. This point is stated *exactly* by Morgenthau in his article in which he seeks to outline the principles of the US national interests: “In a world where a number of sovereign nations compete with and oppose each other for power, the foreign policies of all nations must necessarily refer to their *survival* as their minimum requirements”.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> John M. Hobson, **The State and International Relations**, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 200.

<sup>23</sup> James N. Rosenau, “The Relocation of Authority in a Shrinking World”, **Comparative Politics**, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1992, (A) pp. 259-260.

<sup>24</sup> Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, **The American Political Science Review**, Vol. 88, No. 2, 1994, p. 385.

<sup>25</sup> Dunne and Schmidt, (2001), p. 151.

<sup>26</sup> Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism”, **International Organization**, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1988, p. 498.

<sup>27</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, “Another “Great Debate”: The National Interest of The United States”, **The American Political Science Review**, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, 1952, p. 972. (emphasis added).

Survival is the overriding principle of the international relations. “Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals such as tranquillity, profit and power”.<sup>28</sup> As the realm of the international relations is anarchic, states cannot trust each other. In this *self-help* situation, ensuring the survival and security may sometimes entail the use of force. This right of the state to use of force is seen legitimate and this right once more *affirms* the legitimate *monopoly* of the state over the means of physical violence. In a self-help situation, it is seen dangerous “to place the security of one’s own country in the hands of another. What guarantee is there against betrayal?”<sup>29</sup> Because of the absence of a “world leviathan or world state, there is nothing to prevent inter-state conflict from recurring”.<sup>30</sup> Thus, Waltz argues that states “must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves. Self-help is necessarily the principle of action in anarchic order”.<sup>31</sup>

### 1.2.2. Modern Nationalism

Modern nationalism is famous for its replacing dynastic identifications with the national affiliations. It is claimed to have blossomed with the French Revolution. In this section, the relations between modern nationalism, the human nature and the state will be analysed.

For Morgenthau, “a nation as such is obviously not an empirical thing. A nation as such cannot be seen. What can only be empirically observed are only the individuals who belong to a nation.” For that reason, the power of a certain nation only means the power “of some individuals who belong to the same nation”.<sup>32</sup> Those some individuals are inescapably the administrators of the state, its president,

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<sup>28</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, **Theories of International Politics**, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1979, p.126.

<sup>29</sup> Viotti and Kauppi, (1999), p. 69.

<sup>30</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 21.

<sup>31</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 111.

<sup>32</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 116.

ministers or representatives. In realist understanding, the statesman has the final say. When Morgenthau's statement is remembered, what is implied here can be understood more easily: "We look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his conversation with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts".<sup>33</sup> There is a statesman as a *model* who must be observed to comprehend the political dynamics because *he is the* final authority over the decisions about the state. So, there arises a *disparity* between statesmen and the public. How can this disparity be solved? The answer is again found in the human nature. Morgenthau claims that

*not being able to find full satisfaction of their desire for power within the national boundaries, the people project those unsatisfied aspirations onto the international scene. There they find vicarious satisfaction in identification with the power drives of the nations... Power pursued by the individual for his own sake is considered an evil to be tolerated only within certain bounds and in certain manifestations. Power disguised by ideologies and pursued in the name and for the sake of the nation becomes a good for which all citizens must strive.*<sup>34</sup>

Modern nationalism has become a *form* for the *content*, the human nature. Morgenthau describes modern nationalism as a "secular religion" and argues that the identification of the masses with the power of a nation replaced the identification with the dynastic interests after the Napoleonic Wars. Here it can be argued that there occurred a "psychological transference", in a Freudian sense, which made the state "the most exalted object of loyalty". The reason why the state gains a *sacred* status with transference is that, for Morgenthau, "libidinal impulses, repressed by the society, were mobilized by the state for its own ends".<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 5. Here it must be indicated that Morgenthau's language is the very expression of the masculine statism. His using masculine personalities in his examples verifies this statement. The language spoken for the sake of the state and the overarching role attributed to the state confirm this observation. This issue will be discussed in the section of the critical theory.

<sup>34</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 117.

<sup>35</sup> Lebow, (2007), p. 61.

### 1.2.3. Power

Power is an inevitable concept in the Realpolitik thinking. Realism gives much prominence to power and its role in the politics. For Morgenthau, “power is an all-permeating fact which is of the very essence of human existence.”<sup>36</sup> As a part of the human existence, it also takes place in the human-to-human or state-to-state relations. That means power is also an inevitable part of the inter-state relations. For Morgenthau, “international politics... is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.”<sup>37</sup> So, whatever an individual or a state wishes to do, it necessarily struggles for power, because “the drives to live, to propagate and to dominate are common to all men.”<sup>38</sup> In addition, power is *institutionalized* in the structure of the daily life in family, local or professional organizations and the state. Therefore, there is no escape from the power politics.<sup>39</sup>

Morgenthau makes four distinctions “between power and influence, between power and force, between usable and unusable power, between legitimate and illegitimate power”.<sup>40</sup> The distinction between power and influence can be seen in the relations between the president and his/her secretary. According to Morgenthau, secretary can only influence the decisions of the president but s/he has “no power over the president”. S/he can persuade the president but cannot compel. This difference between the secretary and the president is the difference between the influence and power.<sup>41</sup> The difference between power and force shows itself in the difference between military operations and political power. Political power is not “the actual exercise of power”. It can be identified by threat and it has a *deterrence* effect. On the contrary, force can be seen in the nature of the war. If political power “becomes an actuality in war, it signifies the substitution of military for political

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<sup>36</sup> Robert W. Tucker, “Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political "Realism"”, **The American Political Science Review**, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1952, p. 215.

<sup>37</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 29.

<sup>38</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 37.

<sup>39</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 37.

<sup>40</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 31.

<sup>41</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 31.

power”.<sup>42</sup> Thirdly, the difference between usable and unusable power can be seen in the characteristics of conventional force and nuclear force. Nuclear force can be used “as a rational instrument of foreign policy”; but “the actual use of that force remains irrational” because nuclear force has a global effect. In addition, there is not one country, which has nuclear force. Rather there may be more than one country with nuclear force. Moreover, the user of that force will, in turn, be effected by nuclear arms. For that reason, no state can dare to use nuclear force. The dictum of nuclear force may be summarized in that sentence: “If you destroy me with nuclear weapons, you will be destroyed in turn”.<sup>43</sup> Conventional force, in contrast, “is usable as an instrument of foreign policy” as it has “limited damage”.<sup>44</sup> As for the fourth distinction, it is the difference between legitimate and illegitimate power. Legitimate power is “morally and legally justified”. In addition, it also “has a better chance to influence the will of its objects than equivalent illegitimate power, which cannot be justified”.<sup>45</sup> Morgenthau gives the example of robber and police. The power of the police is respected whereas the robber cannot find any justification for its action. After analysing these four distinctions about the concept of power, it is now the time to mention about the opinions of Morgenthau on power.

Morgenthau argues that “the struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience.”<sup>46</sup> For that reason, the distinction between the domestic *order* and international *disorder* must be exaggerated. This is because both of them are “a struggle for power, modified only by the different conditions under which this struggle takes place in the domestic and international spheres”.<sup>47</sup> They are the results of the same instinct of the human being: the will to power. For that reason, “*all* politics is an expression of the same human drives and subject to the same pathologies.” Thus, the differences between these two are “differences of degree, not of kind”.<sup>48</sup> Claiming that the struggle for power is ubiquitous in all

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<sup>42</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 31.

<sup>43</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 31.

<sup>44</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), pp. 31-32.

<sup>45</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 32.

<sup>46</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 32.

<sup>47</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 32.

<sup>48</sup> Lebow, (2007), p. 57.

aspects of life, Morgenthau argues that it is not surprising that international politics is the power politics.<sup>49</sup>

As for the elements of the national power, the national power is composed of some factors. These are geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, and the quality of government.<sup>50</sup> Geography and natural resources are the *stable* elements of the national power. They are much significant because the geographical situation of a country can bring it many advantages as it can bring many disadvantages. Natural resources are also of vital importance because “self-sufficiency in food, or lack of it” determines to a large extent the success of a state policy.<sup>51</sup> Industrial capacity refers to the military strength of the nation. Industrial capacity of a nation determines its relative power against the other nations. “The drastic increase in the importance of industrial capacity for national power has also accentuated the traditional distinction between great and small powers.”<sup>52</sup> Thus, the technology is a very much important component of the state. As another element, military preparedness refers to “a military establishment capable of supporting the foreign policies pursued”.<sup>53</sup> Technology, leadership, and quality and quantity of armed forces are the main elements of the military preparedness. Population is another component of the national power. “A country inferior in size of population to its competitor will view with alarm a declining rate of growth if the population of its competitor tends to increase more rapidly”.<sup>54</sup> However, the size of the population is not sufficient; there is also the quality of the population, which must also be taken into consideration. The age distribution, for example, is a qualitative feature of the population. As another element, national character is also significant in the national power. For example, “in Russia, the tradition of obedience to the authority of the government and the traditional fear of the foreigner have made large permanent military establishments acceptable to the population”.<sup>55</sup> National morale is another

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<sup>49</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 38.

<sup>50</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), pp. 124-165. The sub-elements of each one are *generally* excluded.

<sup>51</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 128.

<sup>52</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 135.

<sup>53</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 138.

<sup>54</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 141.

<sup>55</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 147.

component of the national power. It is “the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government in peace or war”.<sup>56</sup> The power of the national morale is related to the government’s quality. Thus, government must be cautious about not depriving any segment of the society of their “rights and of full participation in the life of the nation”.<sup>57</sup>

The quality of diplomacy and the government can be regarded as the most significant elements of the national power. Diplomacy, for Morgenthau, “is the art of bringing the different elements of the national power... which concern the *national interest* most directly”.<sup>58</sup> Morgenthau describes diplomacy as *brain* and morale as *soul*. Diplomacy is the task of bringing “the ends and means of foreign policy into harmony with the available resources of national power”.<sup>59</sup> The significance of diplomacy will be analysed in the section on the national interest. The quality of government is another component of the national power. The government must make a balance between resources and policy, and most importantly have popular support for its actions. That means “it must secure the approval of its own people for its foreign policies”.<sup>60</sup> This issue is directly related to the pursuit of the national interest, which will be also analysed in the section on the national interest.

#### **1.2.4. Balance of Power**

Both domestic politics and international relations are the result of the same instinct of the human being: the pursuit of power. “The anarchic character of the international system” and its competitive nature make it inevitable for states to pursue power politics.<sup>61</sup> But, the drive for power is infinite like the human desires.

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<sup>56</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 149.

<sup>57</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 152.

<sup>58</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 155. (emphasis added).

<sup>59</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 155.

<sup>60</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 160.

<sup>61</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 163.

For that reason, it is quite natural that there must be a *mechanism* to check the power of some states against the others. This system is called as *balance of power*.

Balance of power “signifies the stability within a system composed of a number of autonomous forces”.<sup>62</sup> The aim of the balance of power is to prevent “any element from gaining ascendancy over the others”.<sup>63</sup> There are two functions of the balance of power, for Morgenthau. The first one is “to fulfil stability in the power relations among the nations”. The other is to “insure the freedom of one nation from domination by the other”.<sup>64</sup> But, the concept has many dimensions. Even Morgenthau uses the concept in four different means. Balance of power: “(1) as a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs, (2) as an actual state of affairs, (3) as an approximately equal distribution of power, (4) as any distribution of power”.<sup>65</sup> Morgenthau states that “whenever the term is used without qualification, it refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality”.<sup>66</sup> Claude also uses the term in three different ways. Balance of power: as (1) a situation, (2) a policy, and (3) a system. Balance of power as a situation means an equilibrium or disequilibrium “between the members of the family of nations”.<sup>67</sup> The second implies the purposeful actions of states to create or preserve equilibrium. It is a “policy of prudence”.<sup>68</sup> The third usage of the term does not refer to “a certain type of power configuration... [but] a certain kind of arrangement for the operation of international relations in a world of many states”. Concepts such as “the instruments, the rules and the operation of the balance of power”<sup>69</sup> affirm the *systemic* character of balance of power. It is a system “operative in the field of international relations”.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 184.

<sup>63</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 185.

<sup>64</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), pp. 189-190.

<sup>65</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 183.

<sup>66</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 183.

<sup>67</sup> Inis L. Claude, Jr., **Power and International Relations**, 8th edition, New York, Random House, 1967, p. 13.

<sup>68</sup> Claude, (1967), p. 18.

<sup>69</sup> Claude, (1967), p. 20.

<sup>70</sup> Claude, (1967), p. 21.

Balance of power is different from collective security because they differ as to their principles of foundations. “Balance of power alliances are formed by certain individual nations against other individual nations or an alliance of them on the basis of what those individual nations regard as their separate national interests”.<sup>71</sup> On the contrary, collective security entails *cooperation*. If an aggressor attacks any state, the other states are hoped to punish the deviant other. For that reason, they are different because of their aims. Balance of power accepts the separate national interests of the nation states whereas the collective security insists on the collective interest.

Balance of power can be seen as an *institution* which is not generated spontaneously; rather it is a conscious machinery. As Morgenthau argues, “the balance of power would not automatically occur... Rather than being self-sustaining, the balance of power had to be intentionally constructed by states.”<sup>72</sup> For this to happen, states must be powerful enough. However, norms are also very important here because “the balance of power is nested or embedded within social norms that operate across international society.”<sup>73</sup> That means there must be a *social* context in which balance of power, as an institution, can blossom. Unlike the Morgenthau’s realism, neo-realism does not give much importance to the *conscious* actions of states to construct a balance system. Rather, Waltz claims that balance will occur whether states want it or not. He enumerates two requirements for the emergence of the balance of power. The first one is that the order must be *anarchic* and the other is that the order must be “populated by units wishing to survive”.<sup>74</sup> This issue will be analysed in the section of neo-realism. After indicating the core realist concepts, In the next section, the national interest understanding of realism will be analysed.

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<sup>71</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 209.

<sup>72</sup> Hobson, (2003), pp. 51-52.

<sup>73</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 52. Hobson says that “Morgenthau draws close to Hedley Bull as well as to constructivism more generally”.

<sup>74</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 121.

### 1.2.5. The National Interest

National interest lies at the core of foreign policy analysis, being the main principle of statesmen. Through calculations of power and the national interest, statesmen are expected to create *order* out of anarchy and moderate conflicts between autonomous and competitive states by his wise and intelligent policies. The statesman must elevate the interests of his nation which is “the ultimate point of reference in contemporary international affairs”.<sup>75</sup>

Morgenthau defines the national interest “in terms of power”.<sup>76</sup> That means power is the ultimate result and cause of the national interest taking its roots from *the will to power* inherent in human nature. “The concept of national interest provides the actor in international politics with the necessary rationale for his actions.”<sup>77</sup> The national interest has timeless validity; but it has specific applications. That means its *form* can change as a result of particular situations; but its *content* does not change and remains the same over time. As Morgenthau argues, “the idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and... unaffected by the circumstances of time and place”.<sup>78</sup> The rules of politics never change, but the national interest may need to be adjusted in the light of necessities or conjuncture. The interests of a state must depend on its power and place in the anarchic environment. So, it must be determined “by the technical considerations of power. Ideals which are not the reflection of the power interests of a state must be treated as somehow unreal, or, as abstract moral principles... because, contemporary struggle is one between power and power”.<sup>79</sup>

To implement necessary policies in accordance with the national interest becomes the *moral* duty of the state. “The national interest itself has moral dignity, because the national community is the only source of order and the only protector of minimal moral values in a world lacking order and moral consensus beyond the

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<sup>75</sup> Molloy, (2006), p. 87.

<sup>76</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 5.

<sup>77</sup> Molloy, (2006), p. 85.

<sup>78</sup> Morgenthau, (1952), p. 972.

<sup>79</sup> Tucker, (1952), pp. 215, 217.

bounds of the national state”.<sup>80</sup> This is closely related to the emergence of nationalism after the French Revolution. Morgenthau reminds the dangers that emerged with the rise of nationalism. He claims that “nationalism destroyed international society”<sup>81</sup>, one of the consequences of which was the weakening of the international morality. The nation-state gained a “divine prestige” over “the cosmopolitan aristocratic society”. That means the rules of the game changed with the French Revolution, and the national affiliations became stronger than the dynastic interests. In addition, loyalty of the individual to the nation made the individual “to disregard universal moral rules of conduct”. Following this, there emerged a conflict between “the universal ethics” and “the morality of the nation”.<sup>82</sup> Thus, Morgenthau’s attributing “moral dignity”<sup>83</sup> to the national interest should be evaluated in this regard. However, this morality does not mean the application of abstract moral principles divorced from political reality. On the contrary, it means the application of moral principles derived from political reality. As the moral principles must derive from the idea of national interest, this kind of morality is considered as superior to a foreign policy inspired by universal moral principles.<sup>84</sup>

“The national interests are the embodiment of the nation as a whole and their pursuit is the natural and inalienable right of the nation-state”.<sup>85</sup> As states are the main actors of the international politics, they must pursue the interests that best suit their needs. Thus, in realism, “statesmen are supposed to represent the objectively existent national interests”.<sup>86</sup> The concept of the national interest is used “as a mental map through which decisions regarding foreign policy events are reached”.<sup>87</sup> But, this is not so easy to achieve. Morgenthau reminds the possibility of the usurpation of the national interest by supranational interests such as religious bodies and international organizations. In order to eliminate that possibility, he suggests that

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<sup>80</sup> Robert C. Good, “The National Interest and Political Realism: Niebuhr's Debate with Morgenthau and Kennan”, **The Journal of Politics**, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1960, pp. 604-5.

<sup>81</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 239.

<sup>82</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 241, 240.

<sup>83</sup> Donnelly, (2005), p. 50.

<sup>84</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions”, **The American Political Science Review**, Vol. 44, No. 4, 1950, pp. 854-854.

<sup>85</sup> Yong Deng, “The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations”, **The China Quarterly**, No. 154, 1998, p. 313.

<sup>86</sup> Deng, (1998), p. 311.

<sup>87</sup> Deng, (1998), p. 325.

“national interest must be the lowest common denominator where sectional interests and the national interest meet in an uneasy compromise”.<sup>88</sup> That means balancing between the groups composing the domestic society. The national interest, as a fuzzy and dangerous concept, does not need to serve all the needs of particular groups in the society; but it must not also exclude domestic demands from its agenda. It must try to create a balance between the demands of domestic groups.<sup>89</sup>

Morgenthau claims that diplomacy is “the promotion of the national interest by peaceful means”.<sup>90</sup> It aims to bring about peace in international relations. According to him, diplomacy has to carry out nine tasks to be successful. Given the limits of space, these nine tasks will be presented here as the *general national interest objectives* which all states must pursue.

*Firstly*, “diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit”.<sup>91</sup> According to Morgenthau, “impos[ing] one’s own religion as the only true one upon the rest of the world is as futile as it is costly”. After the World War II, the two world powers (USSR and USA) were trapped in this crusading mentality as they strove to diffuse their own political religions (ideologies) to the rest of the world as the only truths. Such an understanding, however, must be refuted.<sup>92</sup>

*Secondly*, “the objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest and must be supported with adequate power”.<sup>93</sup> According to this second point, diplomacy must preserve the territorial integrity and the “national security... is the irreducible minimum”.<sup>94</sup> However, diplomacy must also be aware of the fact that the nuclear age caused many transformations in the structure of the political system. For that reason, a nation can no longer “use its diplomacy to

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<sup>88</sup> Morgenthau, (1952), p. 974.

<sup>89</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 384.

<sup>90</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 361.

<sup>91</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 381.

<sup>92</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 382.

<sup>93</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 382.

<sup>94</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 382.

purchase its security at the expense of another nation”.<sup>95</sup> On the contrary, there arose a nuclear interdependence, which foster the comfort of all nations.

*Thirdly*, “diplomacy must look at the political scene from the point of view of other nations”.<sup>96</sup> Hobson comments on this point by claiming that “diplomats must relate at an *intersubjective* level, putting themselves in the shoes of opponents and must be willing to compromise on *secondary* issues”.<sup>97</sup> For that reason, without being trapped in the understanding of “self-partiality” each bloc must try to make “the distance that separates both spheres of national security” much *wider* in order to prevent any possible negative confrontation. If the distance between the national security understandings of each bloc is much wider, the hesitation of each bloc about the national security can find the chance of being settled in a more comprehensive platform.<sup>98</sup>

*Fourthly*, “nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not *vital* to them”.<sup>99</sup> The aim of this principle is to “keep in balance interests that touch each other at many points”. But this entails that the sides feel secure themselves. To feel secure and to make a compromise on some matters that are not vital to the national interest of each party depend on compliance with the other three rules. But they are not enough, for that reason there are five other rules to be met. The next five rules are the extensions of the fourth rule.<sup>100</sup>

The *fifth rule* is to “give up the shadow of worthless rights for the substance of real advantage”.<sup>101</sup> This rule is related to the choice between “the political wisdom and political folly”.<sup>102</sup> This task of diplomacy dictates that statesman should not only follow the *letters* of the law blindly insisting that some “issue[s] cannot be

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<sup>95</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 383.

<sup>96</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 383.

<sup>97</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 53. (emphasis added).

<sup>98</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 383.

<sup>99</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 383.

<sup>100</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 384. (emphasis added).

<sup>101</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 384.

<sup>102</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), pp. 384-385.

compromised” with the law.<sup>103</sup> Rather, he should also take into consideration that he does not have any right “to render... [his] people miserable, but he must “make them happy”.<sup>104</sup> According to this fifth principle, to make the nation happy is the duty of the statesman in the light of justice.<sup>105</sup>

The *sixth* rule of diplomacy is that “never put yourself in a position from which you cannot retreat without losing face and from which you cannot advance without grave risks”.<sup>106</sup> This principle is related to positioning of a state although the situation encountered does not necessitate it. Policies pursued solely for glory or prestige, or some involvements in the domestic affairs of other nations are the examples of this principle. Two of the prime examples for the former are the policies of “Napoleon III on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870” and the policies of “Austria and Germany on the eve of the First World War”. American involvement in Indochina can be given as an example for the latter, illustrating that violation of this principle does not bring any benefit. On the contrary, the emerging result may be significant loss.<sup>107</sup>

The *seventh* rule is to “never allow a weak ally to make decisions for you”.<sup>108</sup> This principle claims that a state must eschew from identifying its national interest in favour of its weak ally. For example, Great Britain and France did not object to the Ottoman Empire’s defining their national interests in favour of itself. On the eve of the Crimean War, the Ottomans were largely successful to manipulate these two states for a possible war against Russia. The Ottoman Empire was aware of the fact that “the Western powers would support it in a war with Russia”. Hoping the possible help of France and Britain to itself in a war with Russia, the Ottoman Empire found it best to “provoke that war”.<sup>109</sup> As a result, Britain and France faced a situation in which they supported the Ottoman Empire. That means a relatively weak state like the Ottoman Empire, manipulating the events so as to benefit from the

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<sup>103</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 384.

<sup>104</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 385.

<sup>105</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 385.

<sup>106</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 385.

<sup>107</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 385.

<sup>108</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 385.

<sup>109</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 385.

discomfort between Russia, Britain and France, achieved to incorporate the wills of the two powerful allies (Britain and France) in line with its own interests whether these two states wished or not. For that reason, this seventh principle warns that states must be cautious not to let their weak ally to drag them to a war which is not in their *main* interest.<sup>110</sup>

*Eighthly*, “the armed forces are the instruments of foreign policy, not its master”.<sup>111</sup> This rule declares a *division of labour* between the military and the diplomacy. According to this principle, the military must only be involved in war in order to assist peace. If war is inevitable, then the military must deal with this issue; but it cannot master all the foreign policies of the nation. The objective of any foreign policy must be peace, not war. “In a society of sovereign nations, military force is a necessary instrument of foreign policy... As war is fought in order to make *peace* possible, foreign policy should be conducted in order to make peace permanent”.<sup>112</sup> So, both military and diplomacy must know their place in the conduct of foreign affairs of the nation.

*Ninthly*, “the government is the leader of the public opinion, not its slave”.<sup>113</sup> According to this principle, government must be *rational* in that a government may sometimes “concede some of the objectives of the other side and give up some of its own” in order to reach the aim which is, for it, the national interest of the nation. However, the nation may think more *emotionally* than in a *rational* manner. For that reason, the statesman must be careful about achieving “a prudent balance” between his policies in the name of the nation he governs and the emotions and the passion of the masses. At this point, it seems that Morgenthau does not support the democratic control of foreign policy decisions. Rather, the statesman with his wisdom and prescience must pursue a policy in accordance with the national interest. However, this should be done by paying due regard to the feelings of the nation, because the national morale, as discussed earlier, composes an important aspect of the national power.

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<sup>110</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), pp. 385-386.

<sup>111</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 386.

<sup>112</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), pp. 386-387. (emphasis added).

<sup>113</sup> Morgenthau, (1993), p. 387.

### 1.3. NEO-REALISM

This section will analyse neo-realism and its assumptions about the international relations in order to conceptualize its understanding of the national interest. Kenneth Waltz, as the leading student of the neo-realist school, will be the main guide in this section; but other writers such as Mearsheimer will also be referred to when the distinctions in this school of thought are explained. Two camps in the neo-realist theory will be taken into consideration: defensive and offensive. Offensive realism is treated as a strand of the Waltzian structuralism because of the primacy Waltz attributes to the construction of an IR theory in the light of philosophy of science. Firstly, Waltz's understanding of theory will be analysed. How must be a (social science) theory? What does a theory imply? These questions are dealt with in the first part. Then, the understanding of the international system in neo-realism will be described. In this part, offensive structuralism will be analysed in comparison to the Waltzian structuralism. In the section on the national interest, the neo-realist understanding of the national interest will be conceptualized.

It must be firstly stated that neo-realists did not develop an exact definition of the national interest. It is a high probability that they have taken the national interest *a priori* and have not seen it necessary to comment on this concept *specifically*. Yet, in the writings of the scholars called as the neo-realists, there is an emphasis on the concept of the national interest although it is not as strong as in the writings of Morgenthau. For that reason, this section is mostly an ambitious effort to grasp the national interest understanding of neo-realism from the texts of the neo-realists. The knowledge implicitly carrying a national interest understanding will be analysed and I will try to put together a neo-realist understanding of the national interest.

The section includes comparisons between the classical realists such as Morgenthau and the neo-realists. It also tries to make deductions from the neo-realist conceptualization of the structure of the states-system in order to reach a national interest understanding.

### 1.3.1. Theory

Neo-realism can be regarded as a *systematized* realism because it tries to construct a theory which primarily deals with the system of states rather than only analyse the unit behaviour to make inferences about the international relations. It differs from the traditional realist conceptualization of international politics with respect to its assumptions. In Waltz's words, "the idea that international politics can be thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure is neo-realism's fundamental departure from traditional realism".<sup>114</sup> Classical realism tries to explain politics by referring to human nature. Neo-realism, on the other hand, chooses international structure characterized by anarchy as its major explanatory variable. Thus, *a priori* of neo-realism is anarchy instead of human nature. This is the ontological difference between realism and neo-realism. Methodologically, neo-realism also signifies a rupture from the classical realism in that it tries to provide a *structural* explanation of world politics. "Classical realism understood the constraints inherent in anarchy but failed to develop a serious account of its structure".<sup>115</sup>

For neo-realism, a theory of international politics is different from a theory of foreign policy. The analysis of foreign policy must observe all of the political phenomena to make assumptions; but a theory of international politics equips itself with a theoretical standpoint on which it constructs its hypotheses. If necessary, a theory of international politics can also benefit from the unit-level deductions; but, (structural) theory is first and foremost. For example, Marxism also benefits from the arguments about the internal characteristics of the phenomena (i.e. states) it analyses; but it has a general framework to apply in its scientific inquiry: *class*. Like the Marxist notion of class, Waltz also has a notion called as the *international system*. This notion, described in Waltzian structural theory comprehensively, is the *theoretical standpoint* upon which Waltz builds his theory of international politics. That notion makes the Waltzian theory a structural endeavour.

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<sup>114</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", **Journal of International Affairs**, Vol. 44, No.1, 1990, p. 30.

<sup>115</sup> Andrew Linklater, "Neo-realism in theory and practice", Ken Booth and Steve Smith (ed.s), **International Relations Theory Today**, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, p. 243.

For Waltz, theory is an *artifice* and an intellectual construction by which we select facts and interpret them. Waltz claims that theory must grasp *repetitions* and *regularities* among the *unique* historical phenomena. So, a distinction between fact and theory becomes inevitable. For Waltz, reality is *complex*; but theory must be *simple*. Morgenthau also stresses the significance of theory by claiming that “a scientific theory is an attempt to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena without which it would remain disconnected and unintelligible”.<sup>116</sup> However, Waltz claims that Morgenthau only “sought to paint a picture of foreign policy”<sup>117</sup> and he “failed to take the fateful step beyond developing concepts to the fashioning of a recognizable theory”.<sup>118</sup>

Waltz gives the example of the *physiocrats* who firstly tried to define economy as a distinct field. The physiocrats were “the first to think of an economy as a self-sustaining whole made up of interacting parts and repeated activities”.<sup>119</sup> So, with the physiocrats, economy has become a field with its distinct code of conduct. That was an important step because defining economy as a distinct field brought with itself its own means of investigation. As a result, economy, as a science, was born and was regarded as “a domain that can be studied in its own right”.<sup>120</sup> Waltz argues that “what the physiocrats did for economics is exactly what Raymond Aron and Hans Morgenthau... believed to be impossible for students of international politics to accomplish”.<sup>121</sup> Aron and Morgenthau did not see it possible to develop a theory of international politics in its own right because they saw economics different from the study of international relations. For Aron, the study of international relations deals with “unique events and situations”<sup>122</sup> and, thus, generalization of the historical events and construction of a theory of international relations were deemed impossible.

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<sup>116</sup> Morgenthau, (1952), p. 963.

<sup>117</sup> Waltz, (1990), p. 25.

<sup>118</sup> Waltz, (1990), p. 26.

<sup>119</sup> Waltz, (1990), p. 24.

<sup>120</sup> Waltz, (1990), p. 23.

<sup>121</sup> Waltz, (1990), p. 25.

<sup>122</sup> Waltz, (1990), p. 25.

Unlike the modern classical realists such as Morgenthau and Aron, Waltz claimed that it is possible to construct a theory of international politics. What are (or should be) the characteristics of such a theory? Waltz argues that laws are different from theories in that laws “are facts of observation” whereas theories “are speculative processes introduced to explain them”. The most important distinction is that “laws remain, theories come and go”.<sup>123</sup> Theories are *tools* constructed to explain *laws*. First of all, “theory isolates one realm from all others in order to deal with it intellectually”.<sup>124</sup> That is the *specification* of a domain in its own right. That is the very thing Waltz aimed to achieve. Waltz tried to make the international relations a distinct field and turn it into a scientific discipline as that of a natural science. For Waltz, after specification, the necessity of *simplification* arises. Simplification is necessary because theory does not aim to understand and explain all the events; rather it *omits* some events from its framework in order to create a *simple* theory. Another reason is the need to cope with the complexity of the daily *facts*. Theory means a “retreat from the real”<sup>125</sup> in that it does not directly aim to describe the observed facts; but it tries to develop a *causal* logic among the *ostensibly* disparate facts. By simplification, “theories lay bare the *essential* elements in play and indicate the necessary relations of cause and interdependency.”<sup>126</sup> Depending on the internal coherence of the theory, the hypothesis inferred from that theory can seem persuasive. If this hypothesis cannot be *falsified* by the new hypotheses claiming the opposite, the former can become *law* in time and until being falsified, it is regarded as true.

Waltz’s theory is systemic in that it does not start from the internal characteristics of the units to make inference about the behaviour of units. “Predicting outcomes from attributes”<sup>127</sup> of states is described as the *second image* by Waltz. Second image theorists try to explain war or any other events by referring to the state structure. For them, the structure of states can be used as explanatory variables to explain political phenomena. It is a second image assumption that if

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<sup>123</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 6.

<sup>124</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 8.

<sup>125</sup> Molloy, (2006), p. 115.

<sup>126</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 10. (emphasis added).

<sup>127</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 60.

“separate states become *internally* more perfect”, then the problem of war will “wither away”.<sup>128</sup> However, Waltz was not satisfied with this *domestic analogy* of the second image. He thought that the *causal* logic of the international relations can be found neither in the *first image* arguing that “the locus of the important causes of war is found in the nature and behaviour of man”<sup>129</sup> nor in the *second image* emphasizing the internal structures of states. His dissatisfaction with the first and the second images stimulated Waltz to develop the *third image*, which is the subject of the next section.

It can be inferred from the statements above that Waltz gives much significance to the development of IR as a *distinct discipline* in its own right. For that reason, he tried to construct a *systemic* theory of international relations.

### 1.3.2. The International System

Unlike neo-realism, classical realism is primarily an *inductive* theory in that all its explanations are “unit or bottom-up explanations”.<sup>130</sup> As explained in the previous section, classical realism represents the *first image*<sup>131</sup> because of its reference to the human nature to explain the political outcomes. In addition to its first image theorising, classical realism also differs from neo-realism due to its conceptualization of *anarchy*. Lamy argues that, for realism, “anarchy is a condition of the system, and states react to it according to their... qualities”. As for the neo-realists, Lamy indicates that, they believe that “anarchy defines the system”. According to this assumption, all states are functionally similar and “they all experience the same constraints presented by anarchy” (functional similarity).<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, **Man, the State, and War**, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 155.

<sup>129</sup> Waltz, (1959), p. 16.

<sup>130</sup> Steven L. Lamy, “Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism”, John Baylis and Steve Smith (ed.s), **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations**, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 185.

<sup>131</sup> Waltz, (1959), p. 16.

<sup>132</sup> Lamy, (2001), p. 186.

According to Shimko, who argues that Morgenthau did not stress the *explanatory power* of anarchy, the ways Morgenthau and Waltz referred to *anarchy* are not the same. For Morgenthau, “anarchy was relevant in the sense that it failed to provide constraints in the form of a higher authority to restrict man’s baser desires, which are reflected in state behaviour, to dominate others”.<sup>133</sup> In Morgenthau’s realism, anarchy is a “permissive force, not a causal force”.<sup>134</sup> That means the struggle of peoples or states for power “is not an anarchy-induced imperative”, but rather stems from “lust for power and domination”.<sup>135</sup> Called as the first-image by Waltz, for the classical realists like Morgenthau, anarchy is the result of the innate desires of the human beings. It is not endowed with an “explanatory power”.<sup>136</sup> However, in the neo-realist view, anarchy *defines* the system. It is a *producer* rather than being a *product* (or result). Neo-realism does not make the human nature its point of departure; instead, anarchy becomes a defining feature of the international politics. Thus, for neo-realism, “the only thing that need be assumed is the possibility of being exploited, not the desire to exploit”.<sup>137</sup> This sentence indicates the main difference between realism and neo-realism. The former is interested in the human nature whereas the latter takes international anarchy (i.e. the absence of a central international authority with the authority to make and enforce rules) as the starting point. Unmindful of the human nature-based arguments, neo-realism tries to attribute an explanatory role to anarchy and it does not look for the reasons of cheating and exploitation between states in the human nature; rather it seeks them in the anarchical character of the international system.

What is system? For Waltz, the system is “composed of a structure and of interacting units. The structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole... and states are the units and their interactions form the structure of international political systems”.<sup>138</sup> Structure has an ordering principle, creates functional similarity and is defined in accordance with the

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<sup>133</sup> Shimko, (1992), p. 294.

<sup>134</sup> Shimko, (1992), p. 293.

<sup>135</sup> Shimko, (1992), p. 293.

<sup>136</sup> Shimko, (1992), p. 293.

<sup>137</sup> Shimko, (1992), p. 294.

<sup>138</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 79.

distribution of capabilities. The ordering principle of the international structure, according to Waltz, is *anarchy*. Functional similarity means that the differences among states with regard to their regimes or ideological affiliations do not matter because states perform *similar functions*. For example, *survival* is common to all states. As for the distribution of (military) capabilities, which leads to multipolarity, bipolarity or unipolarity, it is not a “unit attribute, but rather a system-wide concept”.<sup>139</sup> That means the capability of a state in an anarchical political atmosphere cannot be measured alone but only in relation to other states’. So, power is *relative*.

The distribution of capabilities in the system is a phenomenon that emerges due to the *relative* feature of power. For example, in a simple and *stylistic* formula, unit A has fifty grams of power while unit B has forty grams of power. The power each has does not mean anything by *itself alone*. Their power only acquires significance and utility when they are evaluated and *compared* in *relation* to each other. That means the power of each state *intrinsic* to their *internal* qualifications only gains importance with regard to the distribution of capabilities as a result of which “states are differently placed”.<sup>140</sup> Thus, in neo-realism, the questions about states’ behaviour are answered by reference to their places in the anarchical international system; not by reference to their internal characteristics.

As previously explained, in Waltzian structuralism a system is composed of a *structure* and units. The structure has two functions. Firstly, it creates a “device that works to produce a *uniformity* of outcomes despite the variety of inputs”. Secondly, structure “designates a set of *constraining* conditions” upon the units.<sup>141</sup> That means, in accordance with the principle of functional similarity, units differing with regard to their characteristics tend to behave similarly in accordance with the ordering principle of the *anarchical* system. The structure’s *constraining* feature shows itself in the *uniform* behavioural patterns of the units dictated by the logic of the system.

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<sup>139</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 98.

<sup>140</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 97.

<sup>141</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 73. (emphases added).

That means “structures select by rewarding some behaviours and punishing others”.<sup>142</sup> How does structure operate?

Waltz indicates that structure does not act as agents do. Structure can be defined as a *context* in which states find themselves and operate. “Structures do not work their effects directly.”<sup>143</sup> Rather, structure can be indirectly observed in the behaviour of units. There are two means through which structure affects state behaviour: socialization and competition. *Socialization* implies the units’ influencing each other reciprocally and in turn being influenced from the *interaction* between them. For example, “A influences B. B, made different by A’s influence, influences A... A’s own activity enters into the stimulus which is causing his activity.”<sup>144</sup> For that reason, Waltz argues that the behaviour of each unit can no longer be understood by “taking a unilateral view of either member”.<sup>145</sup> This is because they are *socialized* as a result of their interaction. Then the context (their socialization) becomes an *independent* reality constraining their actions.

The other means of structural influence is *competition*. Waltz claims that “socialization encourages similarities of attributes and of behaviour. So does competition”.<sup>146</sup> Competition encourages similarity of behaviours by rewarding the behaviour coherent with the logic of the structure. Waltz gives the example of competitive economic systems in which “behaviours are selected for their consequences”.<sup>147</sup> Here structure plays the role of an *intervening* variable between the behaviour and outcome. In structural explanation, behaviour does not directly lead to outcome; rather structure has a *relative autonomy* from the actor and his/her behaviour. Having an *indirect* influence on the actors, structure *intervenes* between the actor’s behaviour and the outcome. As the system’s logic is founded upon competition like in the microeconomical theory, then the system punishes some behaviour unsuitable to its own logic (i.e. uncompetitive) while rewarding the ones

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<sup>142</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 74.

<sup>143</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 74.

<sup>144</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 74.

<sup>145</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 75.

<sup>146</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 76.

<sup>147</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 76.

acting in accordance with the system's logic. "Where selection according to consequences rules, patterns emerge and endure without anyone arranging the parts to form patterns or striving to maintain them".<sup>148</sup> That means the context in which the units find themselves acts like a *passive* actor in that it does not have a direct effect on actors; rather it indirectly determines the context in which the units (are compelled to) compete with each other.

### 1.3.3. State, Power and Balance of Power

Unlike the classical realists, Waltz does not refer to human nature, which, according to the former, seeks power as an *end*. Waltz sees the pursuit of power as a means for survival. In anarchical type of international relations, "security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek other goals as tranquillity, profit, and power. Because power is a means and not an end".<sup>149</sup> The survival is the ultimate aim of all states on which Mearsheimer also agrees as an *offensive* neo-realist. He argues, like Waltz, that other goals of states apart from survival such as "prosperity and protecting human rights... take a back seat to survival, because if a state does not survive, it cannot pursue those other goals".<sup>150</sup> For that reason, power must firstly serve the survival of the state.

Power, as a means to ensure survival, can also become an *end*. In Mearshemier's words, "states should maximize power, and their ultimate goal should be hegemony".<sup>151</sup> Here power becomes an *end* which states must strive for. This apparent contradiction with the above stems from the different power understandings of defensive and offensive neo-realists. Defensive neo-realists see it futile "to pursue hegemony",<sup>152</sup> whereas offensive neo-realists defend the idea that states must try to

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<sup>148</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 77.

<sup>149</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 126.

<sup>150</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism", Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (ed.s), **International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity**, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 74.

<sup>151</sup> Mearsheimer, (2007), p. 75.

<sup>152</sup> Mearsheimer, (2007), p. 75.

gain as much power as possible because of firstly to ensure the survival in the system and secondly, to pursue hegemony. Ensuring the survival treats power as a *means* while the struggle for hegemony treats power as an *end*. Because only the accumulated power can give the state the chance to pursue hegemonic projects. After this brief explanation of the power understandings of the two neo-realist strands, it is now plausible to proceed with the differences between Morgenthau's and Waltz's conceptualizations of the state.

This question is answered by Hobson. The first difference, according to Hobson, is that state, for classical realism, is as an *agent* with "international agential power".<sup>153</sup> According to this assumption, "as states change, so does the international system".<sup>154</sup> On the contrary, for neo-realism, state is "adaptive" to the international system. That means "the anarchical states system is *ontologically* superior to the units and is an autonomous and self-constituting realm". The state does not have much agential power as claimed by classical realism. In addition, the international system cannot change; rather, it "has been a realm of necessity and violence". Secondly, classical realism argues that, as previously mentioned in the section on the national interest of realism, "states might come to cooperate in the future through super-intelligent *moral diplomacy*". However, neo-realism claims that "anarchy and power differentiation" force states to be interested in "short-term relative gains" rather than "long-term absolute cooperative gains".<sup>155</sup> So, there is the *superiority* of relative gain over the absolute gain.

Thirdly, classical realism, especially Carr's realism, argues that state sovereignty can change over time "via extension of domestic citizenship rights". That means "the state in its socialized national form is not the highest form of political expression".<sup>156</sup> Rather, it can be transformed into politically (and morally) more satisfactory forms. This understanding can be seen as an optimistic assumption as it does not treat the state as a sacred and ultimate form of political organization. However, neo-realism objects to this assumption by claiming that "autonomous

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<sup>153</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 45.

<sup>154</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 18.

<sup>155</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 18. (emphasis added).

<sup>156</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 18.

nation-states are the central actors in IP [international politics]”. They will remain as the “highest form of political expression... despite economic interdependence or globalization”.<sup>157</sup>

Fourthly, classical realism (Morgenthau’s realism) argues that international morality can have effect on the behaviour of states; but neo-realism claims that the national interest of states is survival “which is unchanging”.<sup>158</sup> As indicated in the section of classical realism of Morgenthau, he takes into consideration the importance of international norms (at least analytically) much more than the structural theorists like Waltz.

Fifthly, classical realism gives importance to the “domestic agential state power” and argues that this power can affect state behaviour and change the character of international politics. This is a *unit-level* assumption. However, neo-realism argues that although “states have high domestic agential power”, they are like the *billiard* balls which cannot “override the determining nature of anarchy”.<sup>159</sup>

Lastly, classical realism claims that “in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, states had high international agential power and created a relatively peaceful international realm”. But, in the modern era, with the rise of nationalism, state conflict became a normal activity between states. So, it is seen that states can sometimes change the political structure by their agential power. In contrast, neo-realism claims that “states have no agency to shape IP [international politics] nor mitigate the logic of anarchy, and must ignore international *morality* as a basis for action/policy”. The only aim of the state is to survive in a “world of competing states... [because] norms have no autonomy to promote international peace”.<sup>160</sup>

It can be claimed that neo-realism describes the state with no *domestic* agential power to change the international politics. For that reason, it can be regarded more pessimistic than classical realism about the competitive nature of politics. For

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<sup>157</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 18.

<sup>158</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 18.

<sup>159</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 18.

<sup>160</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 18.

neo-realism, the nature of the IP is unchanging because it feeds on the state's *survival* instinct. Each state pursuing this instinct makes a *contribution* to the *maintenance* of the conflict-ridden states-system. Before elaborating on the power understandings of the two variants of neo-realism, offensive and defensive, it is plausible to discuss the neo-realist view on the international cooperation understanding of the neo-liberal institutionalists.

On the matter of international cooperation, there is consensus within the neo-realist camp as they all see cooperation among states impossible due to the supremacy of the *relative* gain over the *absolute* gain. Waltz, Mearsheimer and Grieco all agree on the fact that in the anarchical international relations cooperation is impossible. Grieco claims that international institutions cannot facilitate cooperation.<sup>161</sup> Mearshemier also does not see it possible that international institutions lead to cooperation. Rather, he claims that “institutions have minimal influence on state behaviour, and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world”.<sup>162</sup> Waltz also disagrees with the institutionalists about the issue of cooperation. He deploys concepts such as integration “to describe the condition within nations” and *interdependence* “to describe the condition among them”.<sup>163</sup> The difference between these two concepts lies in the *anarchical* character of the international system and the *hierarchical* character of the domestic system.

Waltz argues that in domestic system there can be *specialization* because all the segments in the society benefit from this specialization. He claims that “Kansas depends Washington for protection and regulation and Washington depends on Kansas for beef and wheat”.<sup>164</sup> The domestic society is organized in an *hierarchical* manner. “In an hierarchic realm, the units are differentiated, and they tend to increase the extent of specialization.”<sup>165</sup> On the contrary, international system is determined by the ordering principle of *anarchy*. “In anarchic realms, like units coact.”<sup>166</sup> This is

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<sup>161</sup> Grieco, (1988), p. 494.

<sup>162</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, **International Security**, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1994-1995, p. 7.

<sup>163</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 104.

<sup>164</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 104.

<sup>165</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 104.

<sup>166</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 104.

related to the principle of *functional similarity*. As the units are the billiard balls over which there is no higher authority to enforce laws, Waltz argues that interdependence among states does not lead to a *long-term cooperation* due to the principle of relative gain. He enumerates two reasons for the limitations on the cooperation of states.

The *first* one is that “in a self-help system each of the units spends a portion of its efforts, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others”.<sup>167</sup> That means in a self-help *international* system, there cannot be any division of labour among states as each state is preoccupied with its own survival in the absence of a central international authority. On the contrary, in the domestic society where the rights to life and property of individuals are secured by the central government, “specialization... works to everyone’s advantage”.<sup>168</sup> The division of labour among the units (universities, factories, companies, army and so on) benefits all. In the international system, on the other hand, since the question of who will gain more (relative gain) overwhelms any other concern and the consequent mistrust and suspicion stand as the major barriers before any international cooperation, it can be argued that in the international system “the condition of insecurity... works against [states’] cooperation”.<sup>169</sup>

The *second* reason is the constraining effect of the structure over the cooperative actions of states. Because states, like firms in a competitive market, “are constrained to strike a compromise between maximizing their profits and minimizing the danger of their own demise”. As a result, “the domestic imperative is to specialize” which does not work internationally because of the fact that “in a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest”.<sup>170</sup> As Mearsheimer argues, if the state does not guarantee its own survival, it cannot promote its economic prosperity. For that reason, *survival* is first and foremost among all the aims of the state.<sup>171</sup> Having mentioned the state-system and the importance of survival, it is now appropriate to analyse the concept of *power*

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<sup>167</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 105.

<sup>168</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 105.

<sup>169</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 105.

<sup>170</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 105.

<sup>171</sup> Mearsheimer, (2007), p. 74.

from the points of view of the offensive and defensive neo-realists. Then, the concept of balance of power will be analysed.

As a positionalist/defensive neo-realist, Waltz argues that “the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system”.<sup>172</sup> *War* is still an instrument of war; but, as Lamy argues, the neo-realists do not believe in the inevitability of war. Rather defensive neo-realists “have sympathy for the neo-liberal argument that war can be avoided by creating security institutions... that diminish security dilemma and provide mutual security for participants”.<sup>173</sup> Although they do not believe that conflict and the feeling of insecurity among states can be resolved, defensive neo-realists are more prone to maintain the position of the state in the anarchical system. For that reason, maximizing power is meaningless if it will not contribute to the survival of the state. Waltz by giving the example of the competition between the USSR and the USA claims that neither of them wished to have much power to change the system; but, they aimed to maintain their status quo which is “the minimum goal of any great power”.<sup>174</sup>

Waltz mentions about the powerful states because the weak states do not have much chance to affect international politics. They “operate on narrow margins”.<sup>175</sup> He simply states that “so long as the major states are the major actors, the structure of international relations is defined in terms of them”.<sup>176</sup> Due to the distribution of capabilities, some states become more powerful than the rest. However, he cautions that power must not be equated with control. According to the “American definition of power”, power means “the ability to get people to do what one wants them to do when otherwise they would not do it”.<sup>177</sup> Waltz does not accept this definition of the concept and argues that “to identify power with control is to assert that only power is needed in order to get one’s way”. However, this is not the case because power is only one of the causes among other variables. For Waltz, “an agent is powerful to the

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<sup>172</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 126.

<sup>173</sup> Lamy, (2001), p. 187.

<sup>174</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 191.

<sup>175</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 195.

<sup>176</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 194.

<sup>177</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 191.

extent that he affects others more than they affect him”.<sup>178</sup> This is not to claim that military power is not important; but it is just that power does not necessarily bring control. Power helps the state to prevent other states from taking harmful actions against itself because of the *dissuasion/ deterrence* effect of power. Yet, that does not mean that military power can solve every problem. Rather, power is an element used to maintain the position of the state in the state-system and to preserve the status quo.

Unlike the positionalists (defensive neo-realists) who see power as a means to preserve the position of state, the offensive neo-realists, accepting “most of Waltz’s ideas and a good portion of the assumptions of traditional realism”,<sup>179</sup> see power as a means to form a bloc against the expansionary states. They assume that war can emerge at any time. Thus, states must “gain as much power as possible and, if circumstances are right”, they must “pursue hegemony”.<sup>180</sup> This evaluation can be regarded as the breaking point between the two strands of neo-realism. Mearsheimer enumerates five assumptions of realism, which he also agrees with. The first one is that “the international system is anarchic”. The second one is that “states are potentially dangerous to each other”. The third one is the uncertainty of states about others’ intentions. The fourth one is the motive of survival. The last one is that “states think strategically about how to survive in the international system”.<sup>181</sup>

Agreeing with all these assumptions, Mearsheimer adds three other, claiming that these five assumptions “can create incentives for states to think and sometimes to behave aggressively”.<sup>182</sup> The other three assumptions of Mearsheimer are as follows. The first one is that “fear is a potent force in world politics”.<sup>183</sup> States fear each other for two related reasons. Firstly, they are not sure about other states’ intentions, and secondly, states have the “capability to offend against each other”.<sup>184</sup> The second one is that each states tries to ensure its survival. As “other states are potential threats”, it is natural that states “cannot depend on others for their

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<sup>178</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 192.

<sup>179</sup> Lamy, (2001), p. 187.

<sup>180</sup> Mearsheimer, (2007), p. 72.

<sup>181</sup> Mearsheimer, (1994-1995), p. 10.

<sup>182</sup> Mearsheimer, (1994-1995), p. 11.

<sup>183</sup> Mearsheimer, (1994-1995), p. 11.

<sup>184</sup> Mearsheimer, (1994-1995), p. 11.

security”.<sup>185</sup> The last one is that states try to “maximize their relative power positions over other states”.<sup>186</sup> This is because the more power a state has the more secure it feels itself. For that reason, it is not foolhardiness to increase power (as an end in itself). “The aim is to acquire more military power at the expense of potential rivals.”<sup>187</sup>

Therefore, it can be argued that it is their approach to war that differentiates the two neo-realist strands from one another. The positionalists do not see the war as a solution; rather, they propose the maintenance of the status quo. However, the offensive neo-realists agreeing with the assumptions of the positionalists, additionally argue that if there arises the chance it is not trivial to behave aggressively towards other states. They believe that since the main objective of each state is survival, the best instrument to achieve that objective is the power maximized in a *relative* manner to others’.

As for the concept of balance of power, its conceptualization by Waltz is different from Morgenthau's understanding of the concept. Waltz argues that “for Morgenthau, balances are intended and must be sought by statesmen who produce them. For me, balances are produced *whether or not intended*”.<sup>188</sup> Waltz claims that balance of power is a theory which “explains why a certain similarity of behaviour is expected from similarly situated states”. It does not predict the behaviour of each unit because to understand the responses of each unit to the anarchic political structure entails analysing the foreign policies of each unit. Theory is only a *guide* used to explain general laws; but it does not exactly explain *specific* actions of states. Hoping that a balance of power theory will predict behaviours of all states, according to Waltz, means confusing theory with foreign policy analysis, which Morgenthau cannot abstain from.<sup>189</sup> For Waltz, anarchy and the wish to survive are necessary conditions for the balance to occur. Against Morgenthau who thinks that balance of

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<sup>185</sup> Mearsheimer, (1994-1995), p. 11.

<sup>186</sup> Mearsheimer, (1994-1995), p. 11.

<sup>187</sup> Mearsheimer, (1994-1995), p. 12.

<sup>188</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories”, **The American Political Science Review**, Vol. 91, No. 4, 1997, p. 914. (emphasis added).

<sup>189</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 122.

power is an institution which is “maintained through states abiding by rules”, Waltz claims that balance is a rule that emerges whether states want it or not.<sup>190</sup>

The difference of neo-realism and classical realism about the concept of balance of power lies in the *systemic* understanding of balance by the neo-realists and the *initiative* understanding by the classical realists. In the systemic understanding of power, “the focus is not on explaining the behaviour of a particular state; but on explaining how changes in the distribution of power within an anarchic international system shape the constraints, opportunities and incentives facing states”.<sup>191</sup> On the contrary, the classical understanding of the balance of power “focuses not on systemic constraints and international outcomes but on the behaviour of states”.<sup>192</sup>

In the neo-realist understanding, “anarchy is the permissive cause of war”.<sup>193</sup> Following Rousseau, Waltz argues that war occurs because there is *nothing* to prevent it from occurring. Like the repetitive character of wars, balance of power is also the repetitive feature of the international politics, according to neo-realism. Thus, like wars, the causes of which can be found in the structure of the anarchical international politics, the causes of balance of power are also to be found in the underlying logic of the state-system that is anarchy. According to neo-realism, if there is more than one state, balances will *naturally* occur as a general law of politics. This is because each unit will necessarily wish to survive in the absence of an international authority to make and enforce laws. For that reason, Waltz skips from balance of power as an *institution* to balance of power as an *occurrence* because of the structural imperative of the anarchy, which is survival.

Such an understanding of balance power theory can be deduced from “the work of offensive and defensive”<sup>194</sup> neo-realists. The only minor difference between them is that defensive neo-realists “assume that states are primarily motivated by

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<sup>190</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 121.

<sup>191</sup> Susan B. Martin, “From Balance of Power to Balancing Behaviour: The long and Winding Road”, Andrew K. Hanami (ed.), **Perspectives on Structural Realism** New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 62.

<sup>192</sup> Martin, (2003), p. 62.

<sup>193</sup> Waltz, (1959), p. 234.

<sup>194</sup> Martin, (2003), p. 67.

survival, while offensive neo-realists assume that states are power hungry”.<sup>195</sup> As for the manageability of the balance, for Waltz, bipolar state-system is easier to manage when compared with multipolar world. For that reason, “the most beneficial to the preservation of order in international politics is that of bipolarity”.<sup>196</sup> He argues that “in a bipolar world there are no peripheries”. For that reason, two blocs directly confronts each other and “anything happens anywhere is potentially of concern to both of them”.<sup>197</sup>

Having briefly explained the neo-realist thought on the concepts of state, power and balance of power, it is now time to develop the neo-realist understanding of the national interest. In the next section, the latter will be analysed in the light of the knowledge given so far.

#### **1.3.4. The National Interest**

The neo-realist conception of the national interest, like the classical one, is also defined in terms of *power*. However, the neo-realists, particularly the defensive strand, do not see power as an *end* in itself, but rather as a means for survival. Neo-realists treat states as self-interested, rational and unitary entities, which are preoccupied with *relative* gains. The question Waltz asks “who will gain more in a cooperation”<sup>198</sup> must be evaluated with regards to this point. That means neo-realism emphasizes the importance of relative gains over absolute gains. This is because, “the imperative of survival confronts states with a security dilemma and this dilemma compels states to be primarily concerned with relative gain”. For that reason, “the fundamental goal of all states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities”.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> Martin, (2003), p. 67.

<sup>196</sup> Molloy, (2006), p. 121.

<sup>197</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 171.

<sup>198</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 105.

<sup>199</sup> Grieco, (1988), p. 498.

Waltz does not clearly define the concept of the national interest. Rather he tries to give a structural account of world politics. His reader is supposed to *deduce* the national interest understanding from his writings rather than get an exact definition of the concept. In his book, Waltz gives the *conceptual* definition of the national interest only in *one* page. He argues that “to say that a country acts according to its national interest means that, having examined its security requirements, it tries to meet them”<sup>200</sup>. This sentence includes the main assumption Waltz explained thoroughly in his *Theory of International Politics*. This section will construct the national interest understanding on the basis of this statement with the help of the concepts such as anarchy, state, power, position and international system.

In the neo-realist understanding, system is composed of structure and units. Structure is seen as an intervening variable “between the actions and intentions of states and the outcomes that result”.<sup>201</sup> Structure is anarchical because there is no world leviathan to “prevent inter-state conflict from recurring”.<sup>202</sup> When the absence of a world government and the self-interested character of states come together, the result becomes such that “states are free to pursue their own national interest but are forever insecure, because war can break out at any time”.<sup>203</sup> Hobson indicates that Waltz drawing an analogy between international political structure and Adam Smith’s theory of market argues that

*just as the market emerges as a result of the spontaneous actions of individuals and firms (who do not seek order but only self-interested personal gain), so the international political structure emerges out of the spontaneous actions of self-interested states pursuing their own selfish national interests. But, once formed, the international system constrains the actors (i.e. states).*<sup>204</sup>

The argument above once more reminds that structure is a very significant variable in Waltzian structuralism. When structure is endowed with an autonomy higher than that of the sovereign nation-states, it becomes possible to argue that the

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<sup>200</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 134.

<sup>201</sup> Martin, (2003), p. 64.

<sup>202</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 21.

<sup>203</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 21.

<sup>204</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 22.

*internal* features of the units cannot tell anything about the *interests* of the state. Determining the interests of a state depends on discovering its *position* in the system, which is the result of the distribution of the capabilities. The power of a state can be estimated “by comparing the capabilities of a number of units. Although capabilities are attributes of units, the distribution of capabilities across units is not”.<sup>205</sup> In accordance with the distinction Waltz makes between hierarchy and anarchy, it is possible to claim that the units *domestically ordered* interact in an *internationally disordered* environment. Accordingly, “the sovereign positional state, imbued with a high degree of domestic agential power follows its national interest or survival imperative, but has no international agential power”.<sup>206</sup> As a result, the anarchical feature of the system is beyond the control of the nation-states. Thus, states are faced to follow their national interests in an anarchical system; every action states take in order to elevate their own good contributes to the *reproduction* of the anarchical system. States, domestically agential power, have no international agential power to regulate international affairs. For that reason, they must be interested in their short-term interests rather than concentrate on the long-term benefits, because what will happen tomorrow cannot be known.<sup>207</sup>

Neo-realism begins the analysis

*with the [anarchical] structure of international politics and consider [state] behaviour as a direct adaptation to this structure. By treating states as undifferentiated units, responding quite predictably to the structure of international relations, they rarely feel compelled to couch their analyses explicitly in terms of the national interest- although an assumptive perspective on the national interest, involving proper responses to the realities of power, is implicit here. Like traditional realism, this approach leaves no room for heterogeneity of national interests.*<sup>208</sup>

Nincic’s evaluation as such points out that Waltz is not directly interested in developing an understanding of the national interest; but he also takes the primacy of

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<sup>205</sup> Waltz, (1979), p. 98.

<sup>206</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 30.

<sup>207</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 30.

<sup>208</sup> Miroslav Nincic, “The National Interest and Its Interpretation”, **The Review of Politics**, Vol. 61, No. 1, 1999, p. 38.

the state as a priori implicitly. Thus, as Nincic rightly argues, neo-realism differs from classical realism with regard to “the *path* by which it is led to its conclusions, rather than by the conclusions themselves”.<sup>209</sup> As a result, the national interest understanding of neo-realism, like classical realism, is also based on the survival of the state as the ultimate point of reference; but the path the neo-realists follow do not entail *describing* the specific events. In Morgenthau’s realism, the statesman is like an *artist* and the politics is an *art*. The wise president and the state he represents have high agential power and the statesman interpret the political events in order to prescribe beneficial policies for the sake of the state. On the contrary, in neo-realism, anarchy, as a timeless characteristic of politics, always chases after states and makes them to define their national interests under the terms of its *dictate*. The power and position of the state are significant variables to determine the national interest. As a result, it can be argued that the national interest of a state is determined by “its goals and by its relation to other states”.<sup>210</sup>

## Conclusion

This chapter sought to explain the national interest understandings of classical and structural neo-realisms based on a succinct account of their main assumptions. It can be inferred from this research that the competition between these two major schools of realism is not about the *content* but rather about *methodology*. As methodology changes, some concepts also change; but the essence of politics remains the same: *power*. Realism treats power as an *end*; neo-realism treats power as a *means* to ensure survival. However, they both refer to its necessity. Thus, it can be argued that realism and neo-realism are *state-centric* theories developed to be guides to statesmen.

In this concluding part, it can be argued that realism and neo-realism are attractive theories with regard to their power-oriented structure. As will be seen in

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<sup>209</sup> Nincic, (1999), p. 37. (emphasis added).

<sup>210</sup> Waltz, (1959), p. 211.

the criticisms of both schools in the following chapters, both schools tend to *reproduce* and *legitimize* the power-oriented politics. Thus, they both gain attractive status in the eyes of state leaders or state representatives who think in terms of power. When the nation or the state is taken as the ultimate point of reference and the politics is conceptualized as a *game of power* among states as the main actors of politics, then it becomes quite natural to exclude some groups from this *game*. As will be explained in the chapters on Marxism and Critical Theory, the realist paradigm is mostly criticized because of its statist and masculine character. For Marxists, realism ignores the class structure of the state, and thus the economic dimension, while for the critical theorists, it excludes the identities which cannot be assimilated into the state structure. As will be seen in the chapter on Critical Theory, realism and neo-realism are not the last words about the politics. On the contrary, they can also be *transcended* by new means of inquiry.

## SECOND CHAPTER

### LIBERALISM AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

In this chapter, the liberal thought and its three different versions will be analysed. The first section is an introductory summary of the main tenets of liberalism. In the second section, the liberal internationalism, which is sometimes used as a substitute for liberalism, is described, particularly its emphasis on free trade and democracy in order to create an harmonious *society of states* committed to a “community interest”.<sup>1</sup> Liberal internationalism is the most classical form of liberalism with its individual-centric approach to politics. Attributing a potential goodness to human nature and hoping that human beings can heal the world are normative approaches, which realism may not feel much sympathy with. Believing in the potential goodness of people, the liberal internationalists claim that “the natural order has been corrupted by undemocratic state leaders and out-dated policies such as the balance of power”<sup>2</sup> rather than by the evil human nature as claimed by realists. For that reason, they advocate that free trade and travel must be promoted in order to create “one common tie of interest”<sup>3</sup> among states. So, the concept of the national interest in liberal internationalism can be metamorphosed into the *community interest*. But *a priori* of this liberal argument is that all states are (to be) designed in accordance with the *liberal democratic* principles. This is, for the liberal internationalists, the most efficient way of creating a common interest among the states as a whole.

In the third section, idealism will be analysed. Idealism being a variant of liberalism is much more *state-centric* than liberal internationalism. It can be claimed that the level of analysis in liberal internationalism is the *individual* whereas the level of analysis in idealism is the *state*. For that reason, idealism has given much

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<sup>1</sup> Scott Burchill, “Liberal Internationalism”, Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (ed.s.), **Theories of International Relations**, London, Macmillan, 1996, (A), p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Tim Dunne, “Liberalism”, John Baylis and Steve Smith (ed.s), **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations**, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 170.

<sup>3</sup> John M. Hobson, **The State and International Relations**, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 70.

importance to state policies and has not sought to transcend the boundaries of the state on behalf of the autonomous rational individual like liberal internationalism has. Thus, it is not surprising that the solutions idealism has proposed have state-centric characteristics. The League of Nations (founded to prevent another world war) and the collective security system it erected in lieu of the balance of power are evidence for the latter. The national self-determination (proposed by the American President Woodrow Wilson) is another sign of the *statism* of the idealist thought. Thus, the national interest conception of idealism is state-centric like realism; but it is much prone to *conflict resolution* by means of an international institution like the League of Nations than taking the anarchical character of the international politics for granted. The principle that one's security is the security of all constitutes the idealist premise. The right of the self-determination of nations is also welcomed in the idealist school.

In the last section, (neo)liberal institutionalism and its emphasis on the globalization process and the rise of non-state actors are analysed. Institutionalism claims that international institutions must be taken into consideration as they “carry out a number of functions the state cannot perform”.<sup>4</sup> According to the (neo)liberal institutionalists, “transnational corporations and non-governmental organizations”<sup>5</sup> are the obvious instruments of *interdependency* among states. Interdependency implies a *complex* relationship in world politics, making it “no longer an exclusive arena for states”.<sup>6</sup> The institutionalists see the international environment as anarchical like the realists; but the breaking point between these two schools of thought is their approach to cooperation among states. As will be explained below, the relative/absolute gain divide constitutes the basis of this breaking point as the (neo)realists, emphasizing relative gain, do not regard international cooperation a close possibility, while the (neo)liberals insist on such possibility with their emphasis on absolute gain. This point determines the two schools' different conceptualizations of the national interest. The *national interest* conceptualization of

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<sup>4</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 171.

<sup>5</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 170.

<sup>6</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 170.

(neo)liberal institutionalism must therefore be seen as mostly defined by the possibilities of cooperation among states.

## 2.1. LIBERALISM

Liberalism is closely related to the Enlightenment and the rise of the capitalist relations. With the Enlightenment, the individual and reason gained prominence against the *metaphysical* thought. With the capitalist relations, the bourgeoisie became the *dominant* actor in the society. The liberal thought implies the emancipation of the human being from the transcendental authorities by means of reason and being *rational economic units* in the society. The first assumption (reason) concerns the philosophical side of the debate while the other assumption (economic) constitutes the economical dimension. Philosophically speaking, the individual has become the most important unit in the society with his/her capacity of determining what is the best for him/her.<sup>7</sup> In accordance with the second assumption, the individual is regarded as a self-interested *rational* unit. Rationality, in this sense, implies the calculation of “the optimum balance between the means and aims and the maximization of the self-interest”.<sup>8</sup> The individuals, as *atomic* units, are supposed to be able to follow their economic and political interests. “By pursuing their own self-interest”, individuals are supposed to be “inadvertently promoting the public good”.<sup>9</sup> The mentality lying under this statement is that the self-interested character of individuals does not constitute a threat for the society; in contrast every individual following his/her interest contributes to the elevation of the *public good*.

As the cornerstone of the society, the individual is henceforth the main unit (of analysis), which cannot be *reduced* any more. S/he cannot be transcended and

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<sup>7</sup> Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, “Pluralism: Decision Making, Transnationalism and Interdependence”, Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (ed.s), **International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond**, 3rd edition, Boston, Allyn&Bacon, 1999, p. 201.

<sup>8</sup> Levent Köker, **İki Farklı Siyaset: Bilgi Teorisi–Siyaset Bilimi İlişkisi Açısından Pozitivizm ve Eleştirel Teori**, Ankara, Vadi Yayınları, 1998, p. 99.

<sup>9</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 166.

has some *inalienable* rights. For example, the American Declaration of Independence summarizes the rights of the individuals as “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”.<sup>10</sup> The other rights such as “popular consent, limits of sovereignty” (Locke) and “the social contract” (Rousseau)<sup>11</sup> are also the political side of the debate. They constitute the essence of democracy as a political form of representation. Ethical right (humanness) and political rights (citizenship) are the extensions of the *Enlightened reason*, the economic root of which is the capitalist investment and “the right of property”.<sup>12</sup> So, it would not be wrong to argue that the *ideal* individual of liberalism is the rational individual electing his/her representatives and respecting the right of property. As a result, liberalism was the voice of a new era heralding the modernity. It is also important to note that liberalism taking its root from the *human being* had to believe in his/her potentiality. Otherwise, it might *falsify* itself. For that reason, it is argued that liberalism is much more optimistic about the human nature than realism. The reason of this is mostly because of the fact that liberalism has broken off all the metaphysical affinities. So, it became vital for liberalism to believe in “the capacity of human beings to realize their inner potential”<sup>13</sup>, *at least* in theory. In the final analysis, the unit accepted as the cornerstone of the society is the individual rather than transcendental forces.

### 2.1.1. Liberal Internationalism

The Enlightenment period witnessed the rise of many ideas such as democracy, the supremacy of reason and the rule of law. What all these terms have in common is that “there is individual at the core of the moral value”.<sup>14</sup> In the liberal

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<sup>10</sup> Scott Burchill, “Liberalism”, Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True (ed.s.), **Theories of International Relations**, 3rd edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 67.

<sup>11</sup> Burchill, (2005), p. 67.

<sup>12</sup> Jonathan Wolff, **Why Read Marx Today?**, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 25.

<sup>13</sup> Burchill, (1996), (A), p. 31.

<sup>14</sup> John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry, **Devlet**, (trans.) İsmail Çekem, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005, p. 4.

thought, the individual is “the basic unit of analysis”.<sup>15</sup> But the individual of liberalism is expected to be rational and conscious about his/her activities and decisions. Believing in “the perfectibility of the human condition”,<sup>16</sup> the liberal thought supposes that all individuals are enlightened and rational. Contrary to the realist argument, which regards war as an inherent nature of international politics, liberals think that peace can be achieved in the international domain by means of the liberal democratic principles and the decisions of rational individuals.

There are two notions of liberal internationalism: democracy (the political dimension) and free trade (the economic dimension). The most important values emerging with the rise of democracy are “citizenship and constitutionalism”.<sup>17</sup> Citizens are supposed to have influence over the political process. Being the prerequisites of peace and harmony, democracy is seen by liberals as an important tool to prevent war. War being “the product of the aggressive instincts of unrepresentative elites”<sup>18</sup> is a meaningless activity, which can be prevented by means of free trade and democracy. Because, “when the citizens who bear the burden of war elect their governments”<sup>19</sup>, war becomes *irrational*. There is no benefit an ordinary citizen may get from the war. Free trade is another instrument of liberal internationalism to prevent war and to construct a peaceful world order. The individual who recognizes that war has many devastating effects begin trusting in the *mitigating* effects of free trade. This is because free trade “binds together, by one common tie of interest and intercourse, the universal society of nations throughout the civilised world”.<sup>20</sup> Thus, the solution to the conflicts, for liberals, becomes “the free movement of commodities, capital and labour”.<sup>21</sup> However, at this point the *state* problematic arises. How do the liberal internationalists see the state? For Adam Smith, “the economy functions optimally when it is allowed to operate free from state or political intervention”.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, the state must be *minimal*. According to

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<sup>15</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 66.

<sup>16</sup> Burchill, (2005), p. 58.

<sup>17</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 165.

<sup>18</sup> Burchill, (2005), p. 59.

<sup>19</sup> Burchill, (2005), p. 59.

<sup>20</sup> Burchill, (2005), p. 63.

<sup>21</sup> Burchill, (2005), p. 63.

<sup>22</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 66.

the “spontaneity thesis”,<sup>23</sup> the economy is an autonomous domain with its own rules. If the state intervenes into the economic life, “the self-regulating hand of the economy is cut off”.<sup>24</sup> For that reason, the liberal conceptualization of the state is the opposite of the *state* conceptualization of the *mercantilist* school, according to which “the state plays a crucial role in... protecting embryonic industries from external competition”.<sup>25</sup> Liberals suggest that the state must *only* protect the *context* in which free trade occurs but it should not interfere into the economic life. They believe that “state interventionism is bad because, by distorting prices, it prevents the price mechanism from optimally allocating resources”.<sup>26</sup>

Like realists, liberals also believe in the distinction between the *inside* and the *outside* of the state. The argument that “the legitimacy of domestic political order ...[is] largely contingent upon upholding the rule of law and the state’s respect for the human rights of its citizens”<sup>27</sup> exemplifies this logic. The desire of expanding the *good domestic* to the international realm verifies the continuing separation made between the *inside* and the *outside*. Trying to expand the *zone of peace* instead of insisting on the inevitability of the conflict in politics, liberal internationalism aims “to reproduce the concepts and processes of domestic law at the international level”.<sup>28</sup> It is assumed that “the spread of legitimate domestic political orders would eventually bring an end to international conflict”.<sup>29</sup> Kant’s conception of the *perpetual peace* is a desirable and possible condition, which can be achieved by extending “the social contract between individuals in domestic society to states in the international system”.<sup>30</sup> But this requires citizenship and republicanism. Otherwise, Kant argues, “under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing to go to war”.<sup>31</sup> For that reason, the individual’s gaining *citizen status* has much importance for the liberal

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<sup>23</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 66.

<sup>24</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 66.

<sup>25</sup> Burchill, (2005), p. 71.

<sup>26</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 68.

<sup>27</sup> Burchill, (2005), p. 66.

<sup>28</sup> Burchill, (1996), (A), p. 41.

<sup>29</sup> Burchill, (2005), p. 57.

<sup>30</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 166.

<sup>31</sup> Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics”, Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (ed.s) **International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism**, 3rd edition, Boston, Allyn&Bacon, 1999, p. 241.

internationalists. If everybody becomes a rational individual governed by the republican constitution, then the world will consist of republican states, and their liberal- and republican-minded citizens.

#### 2.1.1.1. The Community Interest

The liberal internationalists do not see the state as the only unit of analysis; rather, they are *mostly* inclined to see the world through the lenses of the rational individual. The rational individual being *economically* liberal and *politically* republican constitutes the structure of the state. The state consisting of such individuals is assumed to share the political environment with other *liberal republican* states, resulting in the notion of the community of the liberal republican states. That is the “inside-out approach”,<sup>32</sup> which assumes that “the exogenous behaviour of states can be explained by examining their endogenous political and economical dispositions”.<sup>33</sup>

Community interest can be thought as the common interest among the liberal republican states. The liberal dimension of the latter refers to the mode of *free trade*. According to the free trade argument, states must be *minimalist* and must not be “envious of each other”<sup>34</sup> although the gains of all states are *not* always equal.<sup>35</sup> Like the neoliberal institutionalist emphasis on the *absolute gain*, the liberal internationalists claim that the liberal states, unmindful of who will gain more, must try “to enhance their interests through cooperative trading arrangements”<sup>36</sup> by means of which “one common tie of interest”<sup>37</sup> (i.e. the *reciprocal* benefit of free trade) emerges.

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<sup>32</sup> Burchill, (1996), (A), p. 29.

<sup>33</sup> Burchill, (1996), (A), p. 29.

<sup>34</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 70.

<sup>35</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 70.

<sup>36</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 70.

<sup>37</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 70.

Republicanism, the political dimension, means the creation of a state based on the *consent* of its citizens.<sup>38</sup> This state must have a constitution which must serve the interests of its citizens and must respect the individual autonomy. The republican state is based on representation which prevents the arbitrary decisions of the ruler/president. As there is the individual at the core of decision-making, s/he choosing his/her representatives participates in the political process by means of voting. For Kant, such a *republic* is the first condition of peace because he thinks that war does not occur between the liberal republican states;<sup>39</sup> the war is “found especially in autocratic states” in which “the masses have no say in foreign policy”. In addition, it is also these masses who endure the costs of the war. For that reason the solution, for Kant, is the restriction of the “high domestic agential power”<sup>40</sup> of the ruler and the expansion of the democratic rights and duties such as the rights to elect and to be elected.

Once the requirements for a liberal republican state are met and it comes into being, the assumption is that there will be not be any violence among those states because each will benefit from the continuity of the system. The liberal republican states as a *community* are supposed not to go war against each other. According to the thesis of *pacific federation* there exists a *zone of peace* among the liberal states. It is argued that if the number of liberal states increases in the world, the *global peace* becomes much more probable.<sup>41</sup> Here comes the question of what differentiates Kant from the idealists. The answer may be that Kant did not develop any specific “systematic organizational embodiment”<sup>42</sup> to maintain peace. Rather, he thought of “something like a less formally institutionalized League of Nations”.<sup>43</sup>

Kant states that “the right of nations shall be based on a federation of free states”.<sup>44</sup> This argument supports the claim that “a law-governed international

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<sup>38</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 71.

<sup>39</sup> Mark F. N. Franke, **Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations and Critique of World Politics**, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2001, p. 32.

<sup>40</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 70.

<sup>41</sup> Doyle, (1999), p. 237.

<sup>42</sup> Doyle, (1999), p. 239.

<sup>43</sup> Doyle, (1999), p. 245.

<sup>44</sup> Franke, (2001), p. 31.

society could emerge without a world government”.<sup>45</sup> Rather than creating a *world Leviathan* to control the trajectory the politics, a *federation* of free states is seen more beneficial. The other proposition of Kant is that “cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality”.<sup>46</sup> This proposition derives from the concept of the *cosmopolitan citizenship*, a concept also often referred to by Linklater, according to whom the duty of the ethical universalism must be to create world citizenship in lieu of national citizenship.<sup>47</sup>

Rather than trying to directly shape the politics by means of an international institution, the liberal internationalist view is much more inclined to the improvement of the *internal* structures of each state. It argues that liberal democracy is the best form of governance by which the individuals can develop themselves autonomously. With the spread of liberal democratic principles throughout the world, it is assumed that war can be eliminated from politics. Thus, this liberal interest (i.e. the elimination of war) is the ultimate reference point, which must be the objective or interest of all the nations.

### 2.1.2. Idealism

The liberal internationalists do not treat the state as their primary unit of analysis; but they are mostly *individual*-centric. Idealism is different from liberal internationalism in that the idealists are much more state-centric than the liberal internationalists. They are more inclined to the state level than the individual level.<sup>48</sup> Like the internationalists, the idealists also believe in the goodness of human nature and the “Enlightenment’s faith in the possibility of improving civilization”.<sup>49</sup> For

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<sup>45</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 166.

<sup>46</sup> Franke, (2001), p. 31.

<sup>47</sup> Andrew Linklater, **Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity**, London, Routledge, 2007, p. 36.

<sup>48</sup> Cynthia Weber, **International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction**, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 41.

<sup>49</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 41.

that reason, it can be seen as “the progressivist doctrine of the 1920s and 1930s”.<sup>50</sup> The idealists, like the liberal internationalists, also see the causes of war in the “evil institutions and structural arrangements that motivate people to act selfishly and to harm others”<sup>51</sup>, not in the innate selfishness of the human beings. However, the point which differentiates the idealists from the liberal internationalists, is the idealist argument that “international society must reorganize itself *institutionally* to eliminate the anarchy that makes problems such as war likely”.<sup>52</sup> Thus, the idealists can be regarded as more state-centric than the liberal internationalists.

Unlike the liberal internationalists, the idealists are “sceptical that *laissez faire* economic principles, like free trade, would deliver peace”.<sup>53</sup> Hobson, for example, is against the argument that “capitalism was inherently pacific”<sup>54</sup> because he saw the imperialism as “the primary cause of conflict in international politics”.<sup>55</sup> Because the imperialism led the capitalists compete with each other and even go to war. As a result, the classical liberal argument that free trade will eventually bring peace has become obsolete. Therefore, the idealists are more inclined to believe that peace must be *constructed* in contrast to the internationalist claim that free trade (automatically) brings peace. This means peace requires conscious actions of states; it is *not* a spontaneous phenomenon in tandem with the free trade. The World War I was a catastrophe for the world. Millions of people died because of the war. The importance of this war is because of the fact that it is a *world* war, *not* a regional war. For that reason, elimination of the war (as a phenomenon) completely from the world politics required the “collectivist aspirations in place of the conflictual relations”.<sup>56</sup> The creation of the League of Nations is an example of such a collectivist understanding.

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<sup>50</sup> Peter Wilson, **The International Theory of Leonard Woolf**, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 12.

<sup>51</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 41.

<sup>52</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 41. (emphasis added).

<sup>53</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 167.

<sup>54</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 167.

<sup>55</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 167.

<sup>56</sup> Vivienne Jabri, “Reflections on the Study of International Relations”, Trevor C. Salmon and Mark F. Imber (ed.s), **Issues in International Relations**, 2nd Edition, New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 20.

Emphasizing the role of reason to mitigate the international conflicts and seeing the human being as *rational*, the idealists assume that the international conflicts can be resolved without having to resort to force. *Democracy* is regarded as the precondition of peace whereas the dictatorships are deemed as the real causes of war. For that reason, the transformation of the dictatorships into the democratic form of governances was of high priority for the idealists. The aim of the politics was declared, by the idealists, “to educate people of all nationalities to a higher notion of internationalism”.<sup>57</sup> The crucial point here to emphasize is that idealism is opposed to “the futile pursuit of narrow national interests” and it proposes “the abandonment of the self-destructive policy of the balance of power”.<sup>58</sup> It tried to establish a new world order mainly based on the principles of the *collective security* and *self-determination*, each of which will be explained in the next section as the *national interest* objectives of the idealist school.

### 2.1.2.1. The National Interest

Idealism arose after the World War I with the aim of preventing the emergence of another world war. Towards that end the idealists prescribed and promoted certain policies such as the national self-determination and the collective security, both of which were presented as being in the direct interests of all nations. Their overall alleged objective was to construct a *peaceful* world order. Unlike the liberal internationalists, the idealists generally treated the *state* as the primary unit and level of analysis. As Wallerstein states, what Wilson (as an idealist) was doing was only the extension of the liberal principles to the state level rather than restricting these rights only to individuals.<sup>59</sup> So, in the idealist agenda, the state was becoming an *individual* endowed with some rights like the national *self-*

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<sup>57</sup> Wilson, (2003), p. 13.

<sup>58</sup> Wilson, (2003), p. 13.

<sup>59</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, **Liberalizmden Sonra**, (trans.) Erol Öz, İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 1998, p. 109.

determination. Therefore, the national self-determination can be regarded as nothing more than the transposition of freedom from the *individual* to the *state* level.<sup>60</sup>

For Wilson, peace in international relations required the striving and consent of all nations. Force was not looked upon favourably as an instrument to deal with the international conflicts. Instead, in the aftermath of the World War I, Wilson promoted the principle of national self-determination, which means the right of all nations to determine their own future. As the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the era of the collapse of the empires and the rising of the nation-states, the principle of the national self-determination was a euphonic and cunning policy option to handle the *nationality* problem in a peaceful way.<sup>61</sup> The sixth, the tenth and the twelfth articles of Wilson's Fourteen Points are directly related to the nations subsumed in the empires such as Russian, Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empires.<sup>62</sup> According to Wilson's fourteen points, the populations (*nations*) living in these empires must decide their own futures, because it was assumed that the self-determination of all nations would make important contributions to the general well-being of the humanity. It can be asked if there is an antinomy between the sympathy for the nationalist aspirations and the Wilsonian internationalism. For Peter Wilson, this is not the case because the idealist internationalism had a belief in "a natural division of labor between nations".<sup>63</sup> According to this argument, each nation had its "own special task to perform". Such an understanding reminds the *comparative advantage* notion of the classical liberalism according to which every state must specialize in

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<sup>60</sup> Wallerstein, (1998), p. 109.

<sup>61</sup> Wilson represents the *liberal* side of the debate of the national self-determination (American context) whereas Lenin represents the socialist side of the debate (Soviet context).

<sup>62</sup> The main points of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points are as follows: "1. Open covenants openly arrived at, 2. Freedom of the seas alike in peace and war, 3. The removal of all economic barriers to trade..., 4. Reduction of national armaments, 5. A readjustment of all colonial claims..., 6. The evacuation of Russian territory and the independent determination by Russia of her own political development and national policy, 7. The evacuation and restoration of Belgium, 8. The evacuation and restoration of France and the return of Alsace-Lorraine, 9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy along national lines, 10. Self-determination for the people of Austria-Hungary, 11. A redrawing of the boundaries of the Balkan states along historically established lines of nationality, 12. Self-determination for the peoples under Turkish rule..., 13. The independence of Poland with free access to the sea guaranteed by international covenant, 14. The formation of a general association of nations under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." Dunne, (2001), p. 168. As seen in Fourteen Points, the sixth, the tenth and the twelfth points are directly related to the question of empires at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>63</sup> Wilson, (2003), p. 18.

the area it can perform best.<sup>64</sup> According to the latter, trade will provide benefits for both sides because they have chosen the right policy by specializing in the areas which they can perform best in lieu of competing in vain in all areas. Thus they both benefit from trade and they also contribute to the mechanism of the market relations. Also in the case of Wilsonian nationalism and internationalism, it can be seen that the nations have *dual* tasks because

*by developing their own nationalism... nations promoted the cause of internationalism. In serving themselves, nations also served humanity. In the twentieth century this doctrine of the latent harmony between nationalism and internationalism provided the philosophical basis for the Wilsonian conviction that national self-determination was the key to world peace.*<sup>65</sup>

Wilson's policy of the national self-determination can be criticized on many grounds. For example, Cox argues that it was only a strategy to gain the appreciation of the subordinated groups about the liberal democracy. In addition, it is also a possibility that Wilson used the policy of the national self-determination as an "antidote to Bolshevism".<sup>66</sup> The evaluation of these criticisms is beyond this paper. However, the important point to remember is that the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the beginning of the era of the nation-states as the empires were breaking down. Hence, it is not surprising that Wilson might have also aimed at looking sympathetic to the newly founded nation-states. After introducing the policy of the national self-determination, it is appropriate to continue with another fundamental policy of the idealist school, which is collective security seen as an important contribution to the world peace.

Idealists did not have "a blind faith in the balance of power".<sup>67</sup> Rather, they stressed the need to construct a collective security system. Resting on *domestic analogy*, the idealists wished to construct "a system of governance which has democratic procedures for coping with disputes".<sup>68</sup> It was necessary that the international politics should also be regulated like the domestic society. With such an

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<sup>64</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 68.

<sup>65</sup> Wilson, (2003), p. 18.

<sup>66</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 168.

<sup>67</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 167.

<sup>68</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 167.

aim, the League of Nations was founded after the World War I. The Covenant of the League of Nations was based on the idea of the collective security, which is opposed to the balance of power system. In balance of power theory, “the dilemma of preponderance was insoluble” as power was seen as a necessary instrument of foreign policy. The supporters of the balance of power theory do not see it possible to eliminate anarchy from the world politics as each state is interested in its own self-interest. Thus, the balance of power is used as a strategy to balance the power of the preponderant states in the power politics.<sup>69</sup> But, the idealists, being opposed to the method of the balance of power, “purported to solve this dilemma... [by] postulat[ing] a preponderance which would be available to everybody for defensive purposes”. That means the international community (the states-system) will have “force to deter any violation of the common order”.<sup>70</sup>

The distinction between the balance of power and the collective security lies in their approaches to the states-system. For example, balance of power is *decentralized*. According to Claude, “[i]t was essentially a euphemism for anarchy”. Within a situation of balance of power, states are isolated autonomous individuals, which try to “affect the general power situation”.<sup>71</sup> On the contrary, the collective security is much more *community-centric* than the balance of power theory in that the collective security “treats the states of the world as a single community, laced together by unbreakable ties of interdependence”.<sup>72</sup> According to the collective security, every state has a benefit to gain from the continuity of the “common order”. This is because the collective security does not see the world composed of isolated power-seeking states; rather, it perceives states chained to one another with a *common interest*, which is *preponderant* over the separate national interests of all the countries. That is the universal agreement on peace which gave rise to the creation of the League of Nations. Article 16 of the League of Nations indicates that “in the event of war, all member states must cease normal relations with the offending state, impose sanctions, and... commit their armed forces to the disposal of the League

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<sup>69</sup> Inis L. Claude, Jr., **Power and International Relations**, 8th edition, New York, Random House, 1967, p. 112.

<sup>70</sup> Claude, (1967), p. 113.

<sup>71</sup> Claude, (1967), p. 113.

<sup>72</sup> Claude, (1967), p. 114.

Council should the use of force be required to restore the status quo”.<sup>73</sup> In the idealist thinking, the security of one is regarded as the security of all. For that reason, the collective security is also called as the *collective defence*,<sup>74</sup> which signifies the defence of the international order from the actions of the aggressive states.

The mutual benefit understanding of the *idealist* national interest is explained by Cook and Moos who argue that “a concept of national interest which denies the right of other nations to exist naturally promotes hostility... to a point where others are prepared to seek and pursue not only the destruction of the existing government, but even the elimination of the nation's people”.<sup>75</sup> For these two thinkers, the state must define its national interest “on the presumption of collective permanence” which means that the real interest of a nation is both for its own people (as a particular) and the humanity (as the general).<sup>76</sup> We here see the affinity between the national and the international as a Wilsonian principle. The national interest, for the idealists such as Cook and Moos, must “rest on a larger common appeal directed to universal interests”.<sup>77</sup> Every state trying to uplift its own national interest as such, will also contribute to the general well-being of the humanity.

Here a correlation between Adam Smith and the idealists can be made. Smith argues that every individual pursuing his/her own interests will inevitably contribute to the general interest of the society by means of the *spirit* of commerce. Such an assumption must be accepted *a priori*, which depends on the usefulness of free trade and the virtues of the invisible hand. In short, such an understanding must be inherent in the minds of the individuals as their *common sense*. When looked at the idealists, it is possible to observe that, for them, every society has an interest which must satisfy “both the people of the particular nation and others simultaneously”.<sup>78</sup> If states agree on the context in which they will pursue their own self-interests, then there will be no problem. For example, if every state takes the idea of the collective

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<sup>73</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 168.

<sup>74</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 167.

<sup>75</sup> Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moos, “Foreign Policy: The Realism of Idealism”, **The American Political Science Review**, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1952, p. 347.

<sup>76</sup> Cook and Moos, (1952), p. 346.

<sup>77</sup> Cook and Moos, (1952), p. 349.

<sup>78</sup> Cook and Moos, (1952), p. 347.

security as *a priori*, the problem of hypocrisy can be dealt effectively and the natural contradiction between the national and the international can be circumvented.

This section analysed two major policy recommendations of the idealist school and presented them as the national interest objectives of the idealist policy. According to the self-determination principle, every state has the right to determine its own future. This is a democratic discourse taking its roots from the Enlightenment philosophy. The other course of policy is the collective security, which is the other side of the debate. Beneath the idea of the collective security lies the aspiration of creating a voluntary organization to defend the rights of the nations engaged in this organization. In the ideas of the national self-determination and the collective security, there is the desire of creating a *world federation* composed of secure/free and democratic states. Freedom and democracy are related to the self-determination. By determining their own futures, the nations become free and by respecting the right of other nations they become democratic. Only then, the idea of a “*pacific federation*”<sup>79</sup> consisting of free and democratic states becomes a real possibility.

### **2.1.3. (Neo)Liberal Institutionalism**

The third liberal strand called as (neo)liberal institutionalism is different from the other two liberal strands in that it places emphasis on the rise of (formal or informal) organizations in the world politics. According to the institutionalist perspective, the emergence and the proliferation of the international organizations as the new actors in world politics make it impossible to conceive the international politics in terms of the relations between states only. For that reason, the institutionalist strand is more inclined to define the world politics as “*cobweb or complex interdependence*”<sup>80</sup> rather than see it as the politics among only states or in the *billiard ball* image. The (neo)liberal institutionalists do not, however, believe

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<sup>79</sup> Doyle, (1999), p. 237.

<sup>80</sup> J. Martin Rochester, “The Paradigm Debate in International Relations and Its Implications for Foreign Policy Making: Toward a Redefinition of the “National Interest””, **The Western Political Quarterly**, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1978, (A), p. 51.

that “commerce breeds peace”<sup>81</sup>; rather, they tend to argue that “cooperation is not automatic, but requires [constant] planning and negotiation”.<sup>82</sup>

The assumptions the institutionalists share with the (neo)realists are that the international environment is anarchic and the “states are the most significant actors”.<sup>83</sup> The point differentiating these two schools is their approach to the possibility of cooperation under the conditions of anarchy. The institutionalists insist that cooperation is possible by means of creating *regimes* whereas the (neo)realists claim that anarchy is the *essential* structure of the international politics, rendering cooperation between states difficult, if not impossible. For the latter, “states are self-interest oriented, and an anarchic and competitive system pushes them to favour self-help over co-operative behaviour.”<sup>84</sup> The institutionalists also agree with the (neo)realists that states are *egoistic*; but their departure point is that being egoistic does not necessarily prevent cooperation as all sides engaged in cooperation stand to gain. The concept of gain from a cooperation is understood differently by the (neo)realists and the institutionalists. The (neo)realists are interested in who will gain *more* from a cooperative venture (relative gain) as they are always suspicious of the future intentions of the party who gets the largest share. This ever-lasting suspicion translates into hesitation in cooperating with the other parties. On the other hand, what matters most for the institutionalists is the absolute gain each party will get from cooperation regardless of its size. If all parties are better off with cooperation, then so be it is the motto of the institutionalists. The gains of each party may be *unequal* but it is not important because the liberal states are assumed not to be “envious of each other”. Unmindful of who will gain more, they must try “to enhance their interests through cooperative trading arrangements”.<sup>85</sup> This is because of the (neo)liberal assumption that cooperation is “fundamental to the *long-term* utility-maximizing interests of states”.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 176.

<sup>82</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 176.

<sup>83</sup> Dunne, (2001), p. 177.

<sup>84</sup> Steven L. Lamy, “Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism”, John Baylis and Steve Smith (ed.s), **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations**, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 190.

<sup>85</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 70.

<sup>86</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 98.

One of the major rationales behind the establishment of international regimes is “to prevent defection and cheating”<sup>87</sup> among cooperating. This issue will be discussed in the last section of the *cooperative interest*. It is firstly necessary to explain some main concepts of (neo)liberal institutionalism like information revolution, globalization and interdependence.

*Information revolution* can be thought as the result of the improvements in the media technologies. It is the *third* industrial revolution for Nye who divides the industrial revolution into *three* categories. The first is the industrial era when steam was applied “to mills and transportation” around the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The *second* revolution was the introduction of “electricity, synthetics and the internal combustion” around the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>88</sup> At the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century there arose a new era commonly called as post-industrial. The crucial aspect of this new era is “the enormous reduction in the cost of transmitting information”.<sup>89</sup> In addition, “the dynamics of technology... associated with the microelectronic revolution... have made social, economic, and political distances so much shorter... [and] the interdependence of people and events so much greater”.<sup>90</sup> The importance of the new era heralding the information revolution does not *only* lie in the instant character of the internet and the easier communication among the distant parts of the world; but the importance of the information revolution is mostly because of its contribution to the erosion of the state *sovereignty*.

State sovereignty in the age of information has been eroding. “States face dilemmas in trying to protect their sovereign control over information”,<sup>91</sup> because the information available on the internet is open to everyone’s *scrutiny*. Thus, such an openness and transparency make it hard for states to sustain their absolute authority over their citizen’s consciousness and perspectives. In addition, the distinction between the inside and the outside of the state is also *eroding*. The legal

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<sup>87</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 90.

<sup>88</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., **The Paradox of American Power**, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 44.

<sup>89</sup> Nye Jr., (2002), p. 43.

<sup>90</sup> James N. Rosenau, “The Relocation of Authority in a Shrinking World”, **Comparative Politics**, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1992, p. 255.

<sup>91</sup> Nye Jr., (2002), p. 48.

borders of a state are not subject to change (except through external and internal wars) “but they *blur* in practice”.<sup>92</sup> The state’s loss of power to control the information its society has access to may result in the incapability of the state to sustain its *absolute de facto* legitimacy over the territory it controls.

*Globalization* can be thought of as the natural *ally* of the information revolution. It is the information revolution of the 21<sup>st</sup> century that differentiates the contemporary globalization from the general notion of globalization. “Globalization... is virtually as old as human history”, however, the new thing about the current form of globalization is its “thicker and more complex” character.<sup>93</sup> The current globalization has become *liquid*. In no time in history was it possible to transmit “gigabytes of magnetically stored digital information”<sup>94</sup> in a few seconds.

With the emergence of the technological innovations, the concept of power has also changed. In addition to the conception of power only in terms of military capabilities, there also arose the notion of *soft power*, which implies the state’s “ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others”.<sup>95</sup> Shaping the others’ preferences is “associated with intangible power resources such as an attractive *culture, ideology, and institutions*”.<sup>96</sup> The essence of the soft power may be expressed in that dictum: “If I can get you to *want* to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do *not* want to do.”<sup>97</sup> The argument here requires that the power of a state should *not only* be measured in military terms but also in terms of its capability to keep up with the recent technological improvements in the information technologies. Because of the rise of the new media technologies and “the growth of worldwide networks of interdependence”<sup>98</sup>, a state must be capable of using the instruments of soft power because the “countries that are well placed in terms of soft power do better”.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Nye Jr., (2002), p. 57. (emphasis added).

<sup>93</sup> Nye Jr., (2002), p. 78.

<sup>94</sup> Nye Jr., (2002), p. 43.

<sup>95</sup> Nye Jr., (2002), p. 9.

<sup>96</sup> Nye Jr., (2002), p. 9. (emphases added)

<sup>97</sup> Nye Jr., (2002), p. 9.

<sup>98</sup> Nye Jr., (2002), p. 78.

<sup>99</sup> Nye Jr., (2002), p. 69.

*Complex interdependence* is another feature of the contemporary world. In this era, there are “multiple channels [that] connect societies”.<sup>100</sup> There are actors such as firms, environmental groups, and international organizations in addition to states. Moreover, “military issues do not necessarily outweigh economic or environmental issues”.<sup>101</sup> So, there is no more any *hierarchy* between the issues such as *high* and *low* politics. Also, it is not common today to solve the inter-state disputes *only* by force. Increasing complex interdependency among states makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to deal with the issues only in terms of *hard* power. Hence, the possible uses of soft power have gained prominence in the relations between states.<sup>102</sup>

Like the information revolution and the globalization, complex interdependence also makes contribution to the erosion of the state sovereignty. Since the transnational interactions or interdependency among states are “beyond the ability of central governments to manage, governments’ means of solving problems”<sup>103</sup> are disappearing. For that reason “the idea of the state’s autonomy” is becoming more significant than that of “the state’s sovereignty”.<sup>104</sup> This is not because the state has come to an end but it is because of the fact that the state is becoming *only* one of the actors in politics. In other words, the authority of the state is *shrinking* in this globalized era.<sup>105</sup> There have arisen many supranational or subnational groups which weaken “the highest authority” of the state. So, states are “no longer as competent as they once were” because “authority is not tangible or fixed in time and space”.<sup>106</sup>

With the emergence and the proliferation of the new actors in the politics, the process of decision-making also ceased to be *immune* from the influence of the non-state actors. Although the state is still the *final* decision-taker, the influence of the

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<sup>100</sup> James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, **Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World**, 2nd edition, Boulder, Westview Press, 2000, p. 38.

<sup>101</sup> Rosenau and Durfee, (2000), p. 39.

<sup>102</sup> Rosenau and Durfee, (2000), p. 39.

<sup>103</sup> Michael Suhr, “Robert O. Keohane: a contemporary classic”, Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever (ed.s), **The Future of International Relations**, London, Routledge, 1997, p. 99.

<sup>104</sup> Suhr, (1997), p. 99.

<sup>105</sup> Rosenau, (1992).

<sup>106</sup> Rosenau, (1992), p. 259.

non-state actors over the politics is not only becoming highly probable but also significant. This situation can be explained by the *turbulence model* according to which there have arisen *three* parameters changing the structure of the world politics. The first parameter is the skill revolution as the *micro* parameter. It implies that the individuals being less “emotionally and imaginatively skilful” in the past have now become (or have been forced to become) more skilful both emotionally and imaginatively. They began to think about the world events in a more comprehensive framework wondering “how distant events in the larger world might affect them”.<sup>107</sup> The second parameter is the *micro-macro* parameter, which is about the state authority. According to this parameter,

*to challenge the authority of the state and to then redirect legitimacy sentiments toward supranational or subnational collectivities is to begin to deny that the state has the ultimate decisional power, including the right to resort to force... If a state cannot prevent outside actors from calling attention to its human rights record and thereby intervening on behalf of political prisoners, then the reach of its sovereignty is certainly reduced.*<sup>108</sup>

The third parameter referred to as the *macro* parameter is about the evolution of the “anarchic system of nation-states” into a system composed of states and subsystems.<sup>109</sup> According to this parameter, “the state-centric world is no longer predominant”<sup>110</sup> due to the rise of many power centres. Thus, a shift has occurred from the state-centric to the multi-centric world. If the state-centric world (STW) and the multi-centric world (MCW) are compared concerning a number of issues, it is seen that the “prime dilemma” of the STW is *security* while the prime dilemma of the MCW is *autonomy*. For the STW, there are almost two hundred actors in politics whereas for the MCW there are “hundred of thousands”. For the STW, “the ultimate resort for realizing goals” is armed force while for the MCW it is cooperation and compliance. In the STW, “susceptibility to change” is “relatively low” whereas for MCW it is “relatively high”. Bases of decisional structures for the STW is “formal authority” and “law” while for the MCW they are “various types of authority” and

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<sup>107</sup> Rosenau and Durfee, (2000), p. 52.

<sup>108</sup> Rosenau and Durfee, (2000), p. 56-7.

<sup>109</sup> Rosenau and Durfee, (2000), p. 52.

<sup>110</sup> Rosenau and Durfee, (2000), p. 57.

“effective leadership”.<sup>111</sup> Thus, there are some differences between the STW and the MCW about significant issues, situating them differently as far as their perception of and approach to politics are concerned.

Having indicated the main features of the (neo)liberal institutionalism, in the next section the institutionalist emphasis on *cooperation* will be investigated and an *interest* conception (under the conditions of anarchy) will be constructed. In this regard, the concept of *regime* gets due emphasis as for the (neo)liberal institutionalists, the creation of international regimes is very significant because of the critical role they play in the regulation of relations between states in a world of *diffused* power and authority.

#### **2.1.3.1. The Cooperative Interest**

The vision of (neo)liberal institutionalism of the international politics is such that the world is interdependent and composed of complex relations. Since one of its main arguments is that power has become *multi-dimensional* in the era of complex interdependence, it is impossible for (neo)liberal institutionalism to define the national interest *only* in terms of *hard* power capabilities of the state. The increasing need to “manag[e] complex interdependence and the various processes of globalization”<sup>112</sup> imply the inevitable and necessary multi-dimensional feature of power in the globalized era. As the world has become *smaller* because of the information technologies and the *internationalization* of the *localities*, the management of the politics has begun to entail cooperation between states on an increasing number of issues. For example, “atmospheric pollution, terrorism, the drug trade, currency crises and AIDS”<sup>113</sup> necessarily demand cooperation as they are trans-boundary issues with international implications. Thus, *cooperation* can be regarded as the fundamental *interest* of the (neo)liberal institutionalists.

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<sup>111</sup> Rosenau and Durfee, (2000), p. 58.

<sup>112</sup> Lamy, (2001), p. 191.

<sup>113</sup> Rosenau, (1992), p. 255.

Rosenau argues that in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries there was not a concept like the national interest; instead, there was “the will of the prince” or “the dynastic interests”.<sup>114</sup> With the rise of the nation-state, such old loyalties were replaced “by new ones that reflected the new loyalties”. With this *paradigm shift*, there arose concepts related to the latter such as the “national honour, the public interest and the general will”.<sup>115</sup> This, according to the neoliberals, renders the national interest a historically *specific* concept, which is devoid of any exact or constant definition. It can be understood differently in different times. Accordingly, its realpolitik usage is criticized. Rosenau argues that “the ever greater interdependence of nations and the emergence of increasing numbers of supranational actors... diminish reliance on the concept”,<sup>116</sup> at least on its traditional usage. In this section, the traditional definition of the concept is refuted for the sake of developing the notion of the *cooperative interest*. From the point of view of a *cobweb* understanding, the politics is no longer a game between the *billiard balls*.

For the (neo)liberal institutionalists, the contemporary era witnesses “the loss of control”.<sup>117</sup> This term implies the situation of “a tiny planet of people with interlocking and inseparable destinies moving aimlessly through time and space”.<sup>118</sup> So, it is no longer possible to think and conceptualize politics only in terms of the capability of the *territorial* state. States have become “incapable of managing their national destinies” in an isolationist position. Interdependence and loss of control force states to cooperate. The management of the world affairs entails the “joint action” of states because a certain problem of a state may directly or indirectly become the others’ problem one day as well.<sup>119</sup> Therefore, “all interests everywhere are indivisible and... the national interest is a contradiction in terms”.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> James N. Rosenau, **The Study of World Politics Volume 1: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges**, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 246.

<sup>115</sup> Rosenau, (1992), p. 247.

<sup>116</sup> Rosenau, (1992), p. 253.

<sup>117</sup> J. Martin Rochester, “The “National Interest” and Contemporary World Politics”, **The Review of Politics**, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1978, p. 90.

<sup>118</sup> Rochester, (1978), p. 91.

<sup>119</sup> Rochester, (1978), p. 91.

<sup>120</sup> Rochester, (1978), p. 92.

In the (neo)liberal understanding, the interests of all states can be combined together in a cooperative manner. But cooperation is not a *spontaneous* activity; rather it must be constructed by means of *regimes*. (Neo)liberal institutionalism's emphasis on the non-state actors inevitably makes us to consider its *paradigm* of regime. Regime means "a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations".<sup>121</sup> Regimes are founded in order to facilitate cooperation between states in an interdependent world. To Keohane, "international regimes [are]... governmental arrangements which were intended to regulate and control transnational and interstate relations".<sup>122</sup> Rather than denying the relevance of the nation-state, Keohane argues that regimes rests "upon sovereignty and self-help".<sup>123</sup> In that sense, Keohane "subscribe[s] to the most fundamental premise of the Waltzian realism".<sup>124</sup> He does not ignore the characteristics of states such as being *egoistic* and *rational*; rather, the only thing he tries to do is to develop a "functional theory of international regimes" in order to investigate the possibility of cooperation under anarchy.

(Neo)liberal institutionalism accepts some concepts of (neo)realism such as *anarchy* and *self-help* while not rejecting at the same time the possibility of creating common institutions to regulate the inter-state affairs in a *post-hegemonic* world. Against the *hegemonic stability theory* which claims that there must be a *hegemon* to regulate cooperation among states, the (neo)liberal institutionalists indicate that cooperation can be constructed in the absence of a *hegemon* as well by means of regimes as the instruments of cooperation.<sup>125</sup> At this point, it is useful to enumerate some characteristics and benefits of the regimes.

Firstly, "regimes are absolutely autonomous of anarchy and the distribution of power, but only relatively autonomous from states".<sup>126</sup> That means states create

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<sup>121</sup> Chris Brown, and Kirsten Ainley, **Understanding International Relations**, 3rd edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 129.

<sup>122</sup> Suhr, (1997), p. 103.

<sup>123</sup> Suhr, (1997), p. 103.

<sup>124</sup> Suhr, (1997), p. 103.

<sup>125</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 38.

<sup>126</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 96.

regimes for eschewing the *relative gain* problematic. Regimes are relatively autonomous from states, but they “have considerably more power than that granted by neorealism”.<sup>127</sup> As they are relatively autonomous from states, they can play significant roles to mitigate the anarchy. Secondly, the (neo)liberal institutionalists regard cooperation “fundamental to the *long-term* utility-maximising *interests* of states”.<sup>128</sup> If states create regimes and defend these institutions, they can fulfil their “*long term interests*”.<sup>129</sup> The fundamental role regimes play in the process of cooperation is to “prevent defection and cheating”.<sup>130</sup> For example, cheating is usually subject to several graded penalties depending on the nature of the regime while cooperation and the absence of hypocrisy are rewarded by reciprocity. Reciprocity teaches states the positive feature of the logic of the absolute gain (not cheating/ compliance with the regime norms are rewarded). Thirdly, regimes are assumed to “enhance the density and spread of information which reduces the tendency for defection and cheating”.<sup>131</sup> This is because “asymmetrical distribution of information” reduces the chance of cooperation, because no state will be sure about the intentions of the others. It is only within an environment of transparency (provided by international regimes) that mutual trust can develop among states which only then begin to see cooperation more beneficial rather than surrendering to the self-help logic of anarchy. When uncertainty is reduced, the responsibility towards neighbours also become possible and *free-riding* can be minimized.<sup>132</sup>

Consequently, for the (neo)liberal institutionalists, the international regimes facilitate cooperation among states by providing them with the means to enhance their power under the conditions of anarchy.<sup>133</sup> Regimes are the instruments by which states can maximize their *interests*. If states come to believe by participating within a regime that that reciprocity will provide them with much more benefits than defection, then regimes can be said to have fulfilled their main function and can survive.

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<sup>127</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 98.

<sup>128</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 98. (emphases added).

<sup>129</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 98. (emphases added)

<sup>130</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 98

<sup>131</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 99.

<sup>132</sup> Suhr, (1997), p. 105.

<sup>133</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 102.

As a result, it can be claimed that the national interest understanding of (neo)liberal institutionalism depends on a *cooperative* understanding. The *reciprocity* principle emphasized by the (neo)liberal institutionalists signifies the *cooperative* feature of the national interest. According to this approach, each party will gain from cooperation (absolute gain) even though the portion of gain of each may be of different size. The ultimate reference point is to survive under anarchy by cooperating under the umbrella of the international regimes by benefiting from the anarchy-mitigating benefits they provide rather than by submitting to the *competitive* logic of anarchy and becoming introvert and suspicious of the others' intentions.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has tried to explain the three main strands in the liberal thought and analysed the *national interest* understandings of these three schools. *Liberal internationalism* is the classical form of the liberal thought. It gives much importance to free trade and democracy, and claims that if all the states in the world are ruled by democracy and based on market economy, then the wars will be eliminated from the world. So, its aim is to create a *community* of the liberal democratic states with common interests. It does not give the *state* a crucial role vis-à-vis the society. It believes in the spirit of the *invisible* hand of the economy to regulate the society.

The *second* liberal strand is the *idealist school* which is more state-centric than the liberal internationalism. With the eruption of the World War I in the first quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the idealists saw it necessary to regulate the world politics at the state-level. The national self-determination and the foundation of the League of Nations were both evidences of the support given to the nation-state as a legitimate mode of governance in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The solutions the idealists were proposing were similar to the liberal internationalists'. However, the difference of

the idealists was their extension of the liberal discourse from the *individual* to the *state* level.

The third strand in the liberal thinking is (neo)liberal institutionalism, which, preoccupied with the international organizations, claims that the world has become interdependent. Thus, seeing the state as the only actor is no longer possible. In Rosenau's words, there is *turbulence* in the world politics, meaning complex interdependency among state, inter-state, sub-state, trans-state and non-state actors, and the disappearance of the assumed hierarchy of issues. In such a turbulent world, the national interest is inevitably related to *cooperation* problematic in an anarchical international environment. For the (neo)liberals who think that anarchy can be mitigated by the creation of international regimes, have aimed to develop a theory of regimes to confirm that cooperation is not only possible under the *supervision* of a *hegemon* but also in its *absence* because regimes create common interests for their members. The possibility of cheating by the regime members (states) is prevented by means of the flux of the information. As each state, thanks to the information, becomes confident about the others' intentions, it then becomes possible for all of them to trust each other. If a state tries to cheat the others with the expectation of secretly gaining more, it is subjected to punishment. If it does not, then the reciprocity that develops as a way of rewarding makes states begin to feel bound by the same kind of *interests*.

## THIRD CHAPTER

### CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the world has been *intellectually* more plural compared to the Cold War era. The Cold War was an era dominated by the realist paradigm ascending on the *corpse* of the idealist school of the interwar period, which was thought to be *falsified* with the eruption of the World War II. The *consensus* about the *failure* of the idealist school to prevent another World War can be seen as an influential motive that resulted in the rise of realism as an undisputed *hegemonic discourse*. With the realist paradigm gaining dominance after the World War II, the politics was mostly *imprisoned* in *Realpolitik* thinking during the Cold War years. And this situation led many IR theorists to evaluate world politics only from the perspective of realism. It seems that the legitimacy and the popularity of realism during the Cold War years culminated in realism's domination of the academic realm. As Smith argues, there arose a dialectical relationship between the academy and the foreign policy circles with theory and practice reinforcing one another; the kitchen of Realpolitik was the (American) academy whereas the conduct and consequences of Realpolitik confirmed the Realist finding of the academy. In turn, the realist arguments looked as if they were *realistic* and *neutral*, masking their US-specific content.<sup>1</sup>

In the 1970s, the concepts and hypotheses of realism were challenged by the *neoliberal institutionalist* thought led by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye who were mostly interested in explaining world politics in reference to *complex interdependence*. For these neoliberals, the increasing interdependence between states and the rise of transnational actors, non-state actors and multi-national corporations in political life signified the birth of a new era. As the states became more interdependent, it was no more possible to define the borders of international politics solely in terms of the actions and decisions of states. The institutions have

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<sup>1</sup> Steve Smith, "The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: "Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline"", **International Studies Review**, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2002, p. 67.

also come to be regarded as significant explanatory variables to explain the increasing complexity of international politics.

In addition to this neoliberal challenge, there also emerged another critic of realism. It was Waltz's *neorealism* born out of the realist tradition. Neorealism was an attempt to *theorize* the classical realism. Despite its differences from classical realism, it also analysed international politics in reference to power politics but in a structural manner. However, with the transformation of the *bipolar* world system and emergence of a plethora of new items on the international agenda following the demise of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, it became plausible for many to try to explain the politics of the changing world by means of different *theories* or *approaches* such as identity politics, feminism, environmentalism, critical theory, postmodernism, and *constructivism*, in lieu of either neorealism or neoliberalism.

This chapter aims to give main theoretical arguments of constructivism and try to analyse the discourse of national interest in accordance with the principles of constructivist framework. Firstly, an overall description of constructivism is provided including its main principles, and theoretical challenges. This is followed by an explanation of its main ontological and methodological differences from rationalist theories like neorealism and neoliberalism. Then, in reference to Hobson, the divisions within the constructivist approach are briefly discussed, namely state-centric constructivism, international society-centric constructivism and critical constructivism.

Statist and critical approaches within constructivism can be regarded as being in juxtaposition to one another while the international society-centric approach is a bridge between the two. For that reason, such a categorization of the three subgroups is considered as an appropriate guide for the conduct of study. After providing the main features of these three approaches, the rest of this chapter tries to analyse the concept of the *national interest* in accordance with the arguments of each *subgroup* in constructivism. At the end, it becomes clear that constructivism cannot provide an

overall and timeless conception of the national interest as three different conceptualizations compete with each other.

### 3.1. CONSTRUCTIVISM

The end of the Cold War created a new political atmosphere in which many theoretical challenges against (neo)realist and (neo)liberal arguments have risen. Constructivism is one of these challenges. Its rise is as important as its theoretical arguments. Why has constructivism emerged with the end of the Cold War, but not earlier? Reus-Smit proposes four factors accounting for the rise of constructivism as an academic endeavour. The first one is the new atmosphere that emerged with the end of the Cold War. The other one is related to the incompetence of rationalist approaches “to explain recent systemic transformations” beginning with end of the Cold War. The third one is the interest of the constructivists “to demonstrate the heuristic power of non-rationalist perspectives”. And the final one is the enthusiasm of this new generation to move constructivism, “from the margins to the mainstream of theoretical debate”.<sup>2</sup>

The inefficiency of rationalist theories, especially neorealism, to explain the systemic changes in world politics can be seen as the major factor, which makes it possible for constructivism to come forward with its own logic of inquiry. The end of the Cold War can also be seen as the beginning of a new era in which it has almost become common sense that the concepts of grand narratives or holistic theories like Marxism or Realism cannot sufficiently explain the realities of the new world. This distaste for holistic ideologies and theories may be the reason why constructivism is generally regarded as an analytical framework or a methodological approach amounting to a new meta-theory rather than as a new theory of

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<sup>2</sup> Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True (ed.s), **Theories of International Relations**, 3rd edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p 197.

international politics.<sup>3</sup> It is seen as an analytical tool, which tries to investigate the *genesis* of “the nature of actors in world politics, the nature of the context that surrounds those actors and the nature of the interactions between actors”.<sup>4</sup> Another factor, the relationship between the *context* (structure) and the *actor*, can also be added to these constructivist concerns.

The nature of actors implies the identities and the interests of the actors and the *genesis* of these two. Interested in *genealogical* inferences about politics, constructivism is opposed to neorealism and neoliberalism because of these *neos*' borrowing of “the choice-theoretic assumptions of microeconomic theory” to construct their arguments. Using the methods of that theory, neorealism and neoliberalism develop a rational model of the state that is atomistic and self-interested. So, the interests and identities of states, according to this rationalist logic, become formed before any social interaction - states are seen “exogenous to social interaction”. In terms of that logic, politics becomes the realm of competition between these egoistic states with each seeking to gratify its own material satisfaction.<sup>5</sup> Constructivism owes its very being to its enthusiasm to explain the formation of interests, ideas, norms, identities, beliefs, and so on, and the influence of these phenomena on the socio-political context. It emphasizes the importance of norms and intersubjective beliefs in the process of identity and interest formation instead of taking the identities and interests as given. Hence, it is apparent that for constructivism states' interests are not stable and cannot be always inferred from the *logic* of the system since they can change.

The nature of the context (structure) is another issue dealt with in constructivism. For Wendt, the social structure has three elements. These are shared understandings, material resources and practices.<sup>6</sup> Shared understandings are the

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<sup>3</sup> Alexander Wendt, **Social Theory of International Politics**, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Alice Ba and Matthew J. Hoffmann, “Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes”, **International Studies Perspectives**, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2003, p. 19.

<sup>5</sup> Reus-Smit, (2005), p. 192. See also Wendt, (2003), p. 15.

<sup>6</sup> Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics”, **International Security**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1995, p. 73.

intersubjectively held ideas or beliefs. The intersubjective quality of an idea affects the relationship between actors. For example, in a context where it is believed that states are egoistic, the idea of a security community cannot emerge.

Material resources include items such as gold, money, arms and the like. Their significance for states derives from the states' intersubjective knowledge about them. This is because material resources cannot alone define anything, they are endowed with meaning by means of shared understandings. For example, the slave and master relationship must be "constituted by the social structure known as slavery".<sup>7</sup> If a day comes when such a relationship is no longer seen as a *norm* or as an institution, then the relationship collapses, as its *ideational bond* gets damaged.

Practice can be regarded as standing between ideas and materials because it unites them in a certain way. Ideas matter for societies, so do the material resources. But, unless material resources and ideas are combined with a view to having an effect on social context, they become meaningless. Practice, as a medium, undertakes the mission of constructing a relationship between ideas and materials. For instance, a glimpse as a *practice* can sometimes mitigate the hostilities between two *things*. Hence the importance of practice vis-à-vis ideas and materials.

The nature of the context refers to "a particular historical context".<sup>8</sup> The *particular* here signifies a particular *social* character of the context. It is the social character of the context that is emphasized in constructivist approach because the societal and ideational characteristics of the system are as important as material factors. In Wendt's words, "the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material". This argument is critical of the materialist assumptions, which do not give much importance to the roles of ideational factors in social life. In addition, "these structures shape actors' identities and interests, rather than just behaviour".<sup>9</sup> This second argument is contrary to the rationalist logic, as rationalism supposes that the structure has a regulatory role over the behaviour, not

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<sup>7</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 25.

<sup>8</sup> Ba and Hoffmann, (2003), p. 20.

<sup>9</sup> Wendt, (1995), p. 71.

on the interest; because it takes the interests as given. For constructivism, ideas can have constitutive effects on behaviours, interests, identities and actions as well as regulatory functions. As the context has a *social* character, the ideas and norms (ideational variables) that define the context can change over time. For that reason, it becomes impossible to put forth timeless and universal arguments about the nature of political context and to hide behind the “all-encompassing truths or Big-T claims”<sup>10</sup>.

The nature of interactions between actors is also important. This interaction is related to the relationship between the *self* and the *other*. First of all, the *self* entails having an identity. How one understands itself is closely related to how it defines its interests, since “an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is”.<sup>11</sup> So, it is obvious that “interests are dependent on identities”.<sup>12</sup> One, first of all, has to identify itself then it can have some interests depending on its identity. But, this identity construction cannot be achieved alone, because “a person is no one when alone and someone only when recognized by persons around her”.<sup>13</sup> Wendt gives the example of sovereignty in order to confirm the importance of recognition in politics, because a state cannot be a sovereign state by itself; but it needs being recognized by other states as a sovereign. And the sovereignty as a norm and institution must also have validity and acceptance in society,<sup>14</sup> because it is the sovereignty as an institution by which states are constructed and operate as sovereign. Thus, sovereignty is not an intrinsic quality of the state, but it is an identity a state may come to have. As it is a norm or an institution, its *form* can be changed or transformed because it is not an absolute truth, which can be taken for granted.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, **Annual Review of Political Science**, Vol. 4, 2001, p. 394.

<sup>11</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 231.

<sup>12</sup> Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, **The American Political Science Review**, Vol. 88, No. 2, 1994, p. 385.

<sup>13</sup> Erik Ringmar, “Alexander Wendt: a social scientist struggling with history”, Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever (ed.s), **The Future of International Relations**, London, Routledge, 1997, p. 301.

<sup>14</sup> Wendt, (2003), pp. 10-13.

<sup>15</sup> Wendt, (1994), p. 393.

It is the *other* that makes it possible for one to situate itself. However, the kind of relation between the two actors depends on whether one sees the *other* as an enemy or as a friend. If one state sees the *other* as an enemy, then the political atmosphere will be a self-help situation as claimed by neorealists. But, if the identification with the *other* is positive, then it becomes possible to speak about collective identity and collective interest. So, the relationship between the two actors whether they will be friends or foes depends on the perception of the *other* by the *self*.<sup>16</sup>

The relationship between the structure and the agency is also one of the most important concerns of the constructivist approach. It is an *ontological* issue. In Wendt's words, it refers to the problematique of "what causes what?"<sup>17</sup> In addition, the ontology, as Checkel notes, constitutes "the main quarrel" between constructivism and mainstream theories.<sup>18</sup> In one of his articles, Wendt deals with the problematique of the *ontological primacy* in depth and indicates that constructivism's ontology is the mutual constitution of the agent and the structure. Otherwise, for Wendt, the danger of making either agent or structure the ontologically primitive unit arises. To prevent this, Wendt proposes *structuration theory*, which presupposes that "social structures are only instantiated by the practices of agents" and "the agents' conceptions of what they are doing" also affirms the social structure. Because social structure cannot exist independently of agents, it needs human intervention in order to gain a social meaning. Against the *individualist* ontology of neorealism and the *holistic* ontology of World-system theory, Wendt proposes an ontological understanding, which is based on the *dialectical* relationship between the agent and the structure. According to this model, neither structure nor agent can exist without the other, because they are mutually constituted.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 228.

<sup>17</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 5.

<sup>18</sup> Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory", **World Politics**, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1998, p. 327.

<sup>19</sup> Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory", **International Organization**, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1987, p. 359.

The four characteristics of constructivism indicated so far constitute the *common denominator* almost all constructivists might accept. However, beyond this constructivists are divided into subgroups. The first subgroup is the state-centric constructivism which uses the *state* as an object of inquiry in its research. The second one is the international society-centric constructivism, which is more interested in norms and the capacity of these norms to change political life. For this reason, it has common features with the English School tradition in some respects. The last one is the critical constructivism mostly indebted to the works of critical theorists who aim to deconstruct the discourses and unveil the power relations hidden in them.

The relationship of all subgroups in constructivism with some other theories of International Relations is a powerful reminder that constructivism is not a *theory*, but an *eclectic mode* of thinking and analysing. Indeed, the Wendtian or state-centric model is closely related with the realist school of IR while the international society-centric version of constructivism mostly borrows from the concepts of the English School. The critical constructivism, on the other hand, is a variant of critical theory.

### **3.1.1. State-Centric Constructivism**

State is perhaps the most controversial issue in the disciplines of International Relations and Political Science evidenced by the existence of several competing approaches analyzing different aspects of this political entity. One of the most controversial aspects of the state concerns whether to take state as the main political unit or see it as an “analytically, but not in fact, unitary actor”<sup>20</sup> or completely reject it to avoid “producing the identity of the state as decision-maker”.<sup>21</sup> As the last two arguments will be analysed in the following sections, this section deals only with the

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<sup>20</sup> Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1996.

<sup>21</sup> Cynthia Weber, **International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction**, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 60.

state-centric constructivism. In this section, state-centric constructivism is identified with the works of Wendt, although there are also others who are similarly oriented.

Wendt can be regarded as a statist constructivist because he attaches great importance to states because of their functions in political life. For him, *stateless* political analysis means *treeless* forest.<sup>22</sup> The titles of some of his seminal articles such as ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ and ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’ signify Wendt’s obvious interest in *state* as “the unit of analysis”.<sup>23</sup> Wendt believes that as states *exist*, in the final analysis, they cannot be excluded from the intellectual investigation. But, this does not mean that the structure of states should not be problematized. Constructivism, indeed, tries to undertake this mission by investigating the genesis of the interests and identities of states. However, Wendt asserts that “if we want to analyse the system of states we cannot de-center their elements all the way down” despite the objections of critical theorists.<sup>24</sup> So, we must take states as given and see them as a data to be analysed. This is simply because it is impossible to analyse everything at once. But, this does not mean complying with or giving in to the methodological and ontological assumptions of neorealism or neoliberalism, which treat states as self-interested and (material) value- maximizers.

Wendt argues that “states are real actors to which we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and intentionality”.<sup>25</sup> He develops “a structural theory of international politics which takes the state as its basic unit”<sup>26</sup> and in which “states are ontologically prior to the states system”.<sup>27</sup>

Although Wendt believes that internal dynamics of the state play significant roles in state’s constructing itself, he excludes this internal composition from his investigation. He defines these internal dynamics as the essential *corporate* feature

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<sup>22</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 9.

<sup>23</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 9.

<sup>24</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 244.

<sup>25</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 197.

<sup>26</sup> Ringmar, (1997), p. 291.

<sup>27</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 198.

of the state. His point of departure is the state, since he believes that, to repeat once more, everything cannot be analysed at once. Corporate identity of a state refers to certain desires of the state. Wendt enumerates them as the physical security, ontological security, recognition by others and meeting the human aspiration for a better life.<sup>28</sup> This corporate body of the state has an “auto-genetic quality” which means, in the words of Wendt, they are “constitutionally exogenous to Otherness”.<sup>29</sup> So, they are formed *before* any social interaction. But, in addition to this corporate identity, Wendt also differentiates three other identities: *type* identity, *role* identity and *collective* identity.

In addition to corporate identity, type identity is social category of states “that share some characteristics, such as regime types or forms of state”.<sup>30</sup> This identity is also the intrinsic quality of the state like corporate identity because the regime, the constitutional arrangements or the bureaucratic structure of a state are also constituted by internal processes. It may be possible for a state to be affected by a certain *fashion of politics*, which gains legitimacy and common sense status by means of its common appeal to most of the states. Yet, state structure and its type identity are closely related to the *social* atmosphere in which the state operates. It is the *particular* relationship between the state power and the society, alongside other factors, which determines the type identity of a state.

Role identity refers to the relationships between states. Whether the states will be enemy or friends depends on the perception of the *other* by the *self*. As a state cannot alone decide if it is a friend or foe by nature, it must situate itself in relation to an *other* to define its own character. For that reason, the role identity’s realization can only be carried out by the institutionalization of this role in social structure in reference to the *other*.<sup>31</sup>

The last identity is the collective identity on which Wendt has written an article where he seeks the ways of cooperation among states. Collective identity

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<sup>28</sup> Wendt, (1994), p. 395.

<sup>29</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 225.

<sup>30</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink, (2001), p. 399. Wendt, (2003), pp. 225-226.

<sup>31</sup> Wendt, (2003), pp. 227-228.

entails identifying with the *other* in a positive continuum. The degree of collective identity depends on the extent to which social identity “involve[s] an identification with the fate of the Other”. Collective identity becomes possible if “positive identification with the welfare of another” is achieved. Thus, to construct collective identity, the *other* must be seen as the extension of the self, not an independent other.<sup>32</sup> The construction of collective identity plays a crucial role in Wendtian constructivism in that it makes the cooperation between states possible. Cooperation is enabled when one state gets interested in the security of the *other* as if the security of the *other* is its own responsibility.

As to the properties of the state in Wendtian analysis, Wendt suggests five properties of the state in his *Social Theory of International Politics*. These are an institutional-legal order, an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, an organization with sovereignty, a society and territory.

The institutional-legal order is necessary for the state’s institutionalization and its gaining acceptance in society with the help of “law and official regulations”. “[T]he law is essential to state-society complexes”, as there must be some equilibrium between the state and its citizens. Applying Weber’s state definition, Wendt proposes two functions of the state. The first one is the maintenance of internal defence, which means “reproducing the domestic conditions of society’s existence”. The other one is the external defence, which aims to protect “the integrity of those conditions from other states”. Monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence means the creation of “a police force for internal security and an army for external”. And the monopoly on these forces refers to their command and control by the head of the state.<sup>33</sup>

The other feature of state is sovereignty. Wendt divides this into two parts: internal and external sovereignty. “Internal sovereignty means that the state is the supreme locus of political authority in society”, i.e. the only authority to give official decisions. External sovereignty, on the other hand, means “constitutional

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<sup>32</sup> Wendt, (1994), p. 386.

<sup>33</sup> Wendt, (2003), pp. 202-204.

independence”. It is a judicial issue, not an empirical one. External sovereignty is concomitant with recognition. It implies the status of the state in the eyes of other states. That means the state is viewed as *the* legitimate authority over its territory and nation by other states surrounding it. Recognition, which means “willingness to live and let live”,<sup>34</sup> is a *norm* held by states towards each other. For that reason, external sovereignty and recognition are concomitant.

As for society, it refers to the terrain on which political authority is applied. A state entails a society over which it can exercise its power. There is an internal relationship between the state and its society, and the content of this relationship, as Wendt argues, depends on the form adopted by state structures. For example, fascist, communist, and democratic structures lead to different state-society complexes.<sup>35</sup>

Finally, territory refers not just to a land with certain boundaries over which state exercises its authority but also involves belonging. Also, Wendt makes a distinction between the authorities of churches and firms, and that of the state asserting that the authority of the state, unlike others’, is territorial. It encompasses a spatial existence.<sup>36</sup>

As should be clear from these explanations, the state occupies a significant place in Wendt’s works, since states, according to him, are the realities of political life. This makes the state the starting point of Wendt’s analysis. Having overviewed Wendt’s evaluations of the state, I will now try to present Wendt’s views about the national interest in the following section.

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<sup>34</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 209.

<sup>35</sup> Wendt, (2003), pp. 209-211.

<sup>36</sup> Wendt, (2003), pp. 211-214.

### 3.1.1.1. The National Interest

Wendt, being a statist, describes the concept of the national interest from the realist lens. For him states' "behavior is motivated by a variety of interests rooted in corporate, type, role and collective identities".<sup>37</sup> But, while most of these identities may change over time, Wendt claims that there are some universal national interests of states "in virtue of their corporate identity".<sup>38</sup> Wendt defines the interests based on the corporate identity as the *objective* interests of all states. These objective interests are physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem. Wendt argues that if states want to reproduce themselves they must meet these requirements.

Physical survival refers to the survival of "the state-society complex".<sup>39</sup> Although this term has been mostly identified with the preservation of the existing territory, it does not necessarily involve such a preservation. For example, some states sometimes see it in their national interest "to allow peripheral territories to secede".<sup>40</sup> Thus, physical survival does not *always* or *necessarily* entail the preservation of territorial borders; it is mostly related with the existence of that state.

Autonomy means the ability of a state to control its own resources, to make its own constitutional arrangements and so on. It entails liberty which means sovereignty because, without sovereignty, a state cannot reproduce its internal needs and cannot respond to the outsiders. But, for Wendt, autonomy is "a matter of degree" and "as with survival, what counts as securing autonomy will vary from case to case".<sup>41</sup>

One of the other components of the national interest is economic well-being. It briefly refers to the maintenance of the existing economic order, the modes of production, economic recourses and so on. Economic well-being may be growth-

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<sup>37</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 233.

<sup>38</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 234.

<sup>39</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 234.

<sup>40</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 235.

<sup>41</sup> Wendt, (2003), pp. 235-236.

oriented, but that is not an obligation. For Wendt, there were many states, the modes of production of which did not depend on growth. Growth is a term which gained popularity with the rise of capitalist relations. For Wendt, Capitalist logic had to identify growth with economic well-being in order to legitimize the economic order “by increasing the material benefits”.<sup>42</sup> However, according to him, “there may yet come a day when the national interest requires a different articulation of well-being”.<sup>43</sup>

The last component of the national interest is the collective self-esteem, which “refers to a group’s need to feel good about itself”.<sup>44</sup> That means being respected or recognized by the other. If the others respect the self, the collective self-images become positive. But if other states disregard and humiliate the self, the collective self-images become negative. For that reason, the maintenance of collective self-esteem depends on mutual respect and cooperation. That means if two or more states achieve to respect each other and think that cooperation is more useful for all of them than unilateral acts, then it becomes possible to speak about collective self-esteem.

For Wendt, these four objective interests are the national interests of all states. Many transnational actors may arise and seek to undermine states’ autonomy. However, “states keep trying to reproduce themselves”.<sup>45</sup> The important point here is the need to reconcile the objective interests with the subjective interests. For example, objective interests stem from the corporate body of the state, whereas subjective preferences refer to the temporary needs encountered. For example, prescribing a policy for a terrorist bombing illustrates this point. In the long run, a consensus between the two kinds of interests should be reached. In addition, the subjective preferences should be regulated in accordance with the needs of objective interests. This is because claiming that interests and identities are socially constructed does not imply that every preference, interest or identity is arbitrary and random. So, it is not fruitful to argue that “states are free to construct their interests

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<sup>42</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 236.

<sup>43</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 236.

<sup>44</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 236.

<sup>45</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 238.

any way they like”.<sup>46</sup> However, that does not also mean that the interests and the identities are provided by the logic of the system, as neorealism and neoliberalism claim. As well known, “the question [as formulated in these two theories] is not whether states are self-interested *sometimes*... but whether they are by *nature*”.<sup>47</sup>

Wendt claims that if states are self-interested by nature, so we can take self-interest as given. But if the states become self-interested by *nurture*, then we can investigate the processes through which state interests are formed.<sup>48</sup> So, the question Wendt asks is not “whether there are pressures on states to be self-interested”, but the question is whether states can achieve to transcend those pressures in order to identify with the other positively. And this problem is directly related to the issue of collective interest and collective identity. For that reason, it is now time to look into the possibilities for cooperation among states.

In Wendtian constructivism, states are not self-interested by nature. Although they are inclined to preserve their corporate body and may have certain objective interests such as autonomy or survival, it is not plausible to claim that states cannot form a collective identity no matter how they define their collective interests. For Wendt, states can have collective interests when they begin to stop perceiving their security and interests in selfish terms. So, against the realist or neorealist arguments which claim that anarchy has a constraining effect on states’ optimism towards each other, Wendt claims that anarchy does not have an intrinsic nature, but it is a social construction. “Anarchy is what states make of it”.<sup>49</sup>

Wendt claims that if today states find themselves in a self-help world, this is not because of the structure, but process. It is the process which makes it possible for structure to have existence and causal power.<sup>50</sup> Process entails practice and interaction. Practice may generate new understandings about the self and the other

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<sup>46</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 238.

<sup>47</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 239.

<sup>48</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 239.

<sup>49</sup> Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics”, **International Organization**, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992.

<sup>50</sup> Wendt, (1992), pp. 394-395.

by inducing an interaction between units. This contradicts the ontological assumptions of realism and neorealism, according to which “it is the human nature or domestic politics of predator states... that provide the initial impetus... of conflict”.<sup>51</sup> However, if people or states always gave their decisions “on the basis of worst-case possibilities”<sup>52</sup>, then neither society nor interaction between these units would become possible.

For Wendt, some assumptions and decisions must be made on the basis of probabilities. Interaction is also very important for the emergence of such probable decisions and actions. Interaction means mutual action, which could create intersubjective understandings between the two *subjects*. Every decision-maker is a *subject* by means of its ability to think and act. So, if the subject differentiates itself from the animals by means of its intelligence and *rationality*, and if there are many subjects rather than only one, it is possible to speak about cooperation and collective interests. Because as the actor sees itself as a rational unit, then it can also understand that self-help is not an inherent logic of the system to which all states must obey throughout their existence.

However, the latter understanding is dependent, above all, on taking a ‘first’ step by one of the units. If the first step is not taken by one of the actors, then the system continues to reproduce itself and its institutions. In order to prevent the reproduction of the states with so-called egoistic and introvert characters, practice can be used as an effective tool to create mutual trust between states. For example, forming a *security community* can help states to reduce their “anxieties about being engulfed if they give the Other some responsibility for the care of the Self”.<sup>53</sup> This is because the security community is a construction of states according to which “the members of that community will not fight each other”,<sup>54</sup> and, instead, commit themselves to use other peaceful methods to solve their disputes. As a result, Wendt thinks that cooperation between states is not impossible despite the fact that it is not

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<sup>51</sup> Wendt, (1992), p. 395.

<sup>52</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 348.

<sup>53</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 363.

<sup>54</sup> Wendt, (2003), p. 299.

that easy. Collective action and collective interest can be constructed by means of practice, interaction and intersubjective understandings.

### 3.1.2. International Society-Centric Constructivism

This variant of constructivism is much influenced by the English School, because it emphasizes the *societal* character of international politics. Due to this relationship between the English School and the international society-centric constructivism, it is firstly necessary to indicate the basic propositions of the English School about international politics.

The English School has an interpretive mode of inquiry, which is “against the rigid application of [positivist] scientific methods”.<sup>55</sup> Deriving its arguments from philosophy, history and law, “rather than operationalizing concepts and formulating testable hypotheses”,<sup>56</sup> the English School evaluates international politics from a *social* perspective, emphasizing the human element in its making.<sup>57</sup> Dunne points to four characteristics of the English School that differentiate it from other IR theories. Firstly, for the English School, *the subject matter* of IR is to conceptualize patterned interactions not only between states but also other actors such as non-governmental organizations, transnational and subnational groups, institutions and so on. The relationships between all these actors and their effect on political structure should be included in the agenda of IR.<sup>58</sup> Secondly, *the historical understanding* has a special place in the English School. As Dunne argues, “academic knowledge needs to have historical depth”.<sup>59</sup> From this perspective, for instance, it is not sufficient to accept given facts such as the superiority of the USA. Rather, the research should be geared towards investigating how and why the USA became a superpower or regards itself

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<sup>55</sup> Tim Dunne, “The English School”, Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (ed.s), **International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity**, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 130.

<sup>56</sup> Dunne, (2007), p. 134.

<sup>57</sup> Robert Jackson, **The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States**, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 97-101.

<sup>58</sup> Dunne, (2007), p. 131.

<sup>59</sup> Dunne, (2007), p. 131.

as such.<sup>60</sup> Thirdly, the English School believes that it is impossible to escape from *values*. For that reason, one has to be aware of his/her values, and academicians ought to aim at a position of detachment particularly as far as their desire for policy relevance or for political influence is concerned. This is necessary to maintain the integrity of the academic enterprise.<sup>61</sup> Finally, the English School claims that IR is a *normative enterprise*. For Bull, the aim had to be “to construct[ing] a form of international society that was orderly and just”.<sup>62</sup>

The English School is interested in the fact that “sovereign states form a society”<sup>63</sup>, although it is anarchic. Like realists, the English School also begins its analysis with *the condition of anarchy*; but it does not reject the possibility of reforms to heal the hitches of politics. The English School believes that violence between states can be mitigated to a considerable extent with the help of morality and international law because states developed a common diplomatic culture over the years. This common culture, be it sovereignty, diplomacy or balance of power, helps “the constitution of an international social consciousness”.<sup>64</sup> This international social consciousness contributes to the emergence of an international society meaning

*the habitual intercourse of independent communities... It is manifest in the diplomatic system; in the conscious maintenance of the balance of power to preserve the independence of the member communities; in the regular operation of international law, whose binding force is accepted over a wide though politically unimportant range of subjects... All these presuppose an international social consciousness.*<sup>65</sup>

All states have “a common interest in placing restraints on the use of force”.<sup>66</sup> It is this common interest, according to the School, that has made it possible for

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<sup>60</sup> Dunne, (2007), p. 131.

<sup>61</sup> Dunne, (2007), p. 131.

<sup>62</sup> Dunne, (2007), p. 132.

<sup>63</sup> Andrew Linklater, “The English School”, Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True (ed.s), **Theories of International Relations**, 3rd edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 87.

<sup>64</sup> Timothy Dunne, “The Social Construction of International Society”, **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1995, p. 379.

<sup>65</sup> Dunne, (1995), p. 376.

<sup>66</sup> Linklater, (2005), p. 87.

states to form an international society. However, the latter is differently conceptualized by the students of the English School. Of the two different conceptions of international society, one is the *pluralist* conception of Bull and the other is the *solidarist* conception of Vincent. According to the pluralist conception, “international societies can exist in the absence of linguistic, cultural or religious agreement”.<sup>67</sup> Sovereignty and non-intervention are seen as two prerequisites for the emergence of international society.<sup>68</sup> There is respect for the sovereignty of all states. For that reason, pluralist conception of international society is state-based. States are regarded as “the principle bearers of rights and duties in international law because there is no agreement in the society of states on universal principles of human rights”.<sup>69</sup> Pluralist are inclined to make assumptions at the state level and prioritize *order over justice*. Because, for Bull, “the provision of international order [is] the ultimate foundation for the protection of human values”.<sup>70</sup> Otherwise, it would be impossible to have an international society “unless each state, while claiming sovereignty for itself, recognized that every other state had the right to claim and enjoy its own sovereignty as well”.<sup>71</sup>

According to the solidarist conception of international society, individuals are the “legitimate subjects... of international society”.<sup>72</sup> In the pluralist understanding, the individual is regarded as the *object* of international society because of the absence of an “agreement in the society of states on universal principles of human rights”.<sup>73</sup> States are assumed to be the carriers of the international norms. But, the solidarist conception takes the individual as the most important element of international society. Vincent’s solidarist conception of international society does not confine itself to the conceptualization of international society at the state level. Rather, Vincent sees it possible to speak about *universal* values about human rights. At this point, Vincent differs from Bull in that he does not prioritize order over

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<sup>67</sup> Linklater, (2005), p. 89.

<sup>68</sup> Dunne, (1995), p. 378.

<sup>69</sup> Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention”, **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 21, No.3, 1992, p. 467.

<sup>70</sup> Wheeler, (1992), p. 469.

<sup>71</sup> Wheeler, (1992), p. 469.

<sup>72</sup> Wheeler, (1992), p. 468.

<sup>73</sup> Wheeler, (1992), p. 467.

justice. Accordingly, Vincent sees humanitarian intervention as instrumental to protect human rights, which states sometimes do not respect.<sup>74</sup> For that reason, it can be argued that Vincent represents a step further than Bull and is more optimistic because he speaks about *world society* shared by individuals as a platform to “persuade their governments to act to uphold basic rights”.<sup>75</sup> World society is a more comprehensive term, which also includes international society. In world society, the principle of non-intervention can be “suspended... in those cases where basic rights are massively violated”.<sup>76</sup> Or, put differently, “where great injustice is embodied in the existing order, the society of states should legitimise a duty of humanitarian intervention”.<sup>77</sup> Because for the notion of world society, the basic rights of individuals are at least as important as the rights of states.

Emphasising the significance of norms and institutions as the basis of international society, the English School resembles constructivism in some respects. For example, like Wendt’s phrase ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’, a phrase can also be constructed like “[international] society is what states have made of it”.<sup>78</sup> Diplomacy, as an institution, can enhance the chance of dialogue among states laying the basis for the emergence of intersubjective understandings necessary for the maintenance or consolidation of international norms and institutions of international society.

In this study, the international society-centric variant of constructivism is identified with the arguments of Martha Finnemore who tries to “move scholarship away from agent-oriented approaches”<sup>79</sup> and who is interested in the structure side of the agent-structure debate. Finnemore’s main interest lies in the systemic feature of international society, which determines the state actions. In that sense, she seems inclined to structuralism. Rather than focusing on agents and their rational actions to maximize their power and security, the international society-centric constructivism

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<sup>74</sup> Wheeler, (1992), p. 477.

<sup>75</sup> Wheeler, (1992), p. 477.

<sup>76</sup> Wheeler, (1992), p. 478.

<sup>77</sup> Wheeler, (1992), p. 478.

<sup>78</sup> Dunne, (1995), p. 376.

<sup>79</sup> Checkel, (1998), p. 330.

claims that the interests and identities of states depend much on the *normative* structure of international society. That means states may sometimes happen to obey some norms created by the dynamics of international society, although these norms may be in direct conflict with their direct or short-term policy concerns.<sup>80</sup> This, in turn, is related to the states' acting in line with the *logic of appropriateness* at times rather than with the realist *logic of instrumentality or consequences* always.

Finnemore asserts that logic of *appropriateness* can also predict human or state behaviour just as the rationalist logic of *consequences* does. She believes in the constitutive and regulatory power of international norms and institutions. That means norms and institutions create such an international society that the states will have to make and implement their policies in line with this normative structure of international society.<sup>81</sup> International society, for Finnemore, has two tiers. The first tier is the *normative or deep structure* of international society. This tier contains many norms and “appropriate behavioural patterns”<sup>82</sup> to which states must submit. Finnemore claims that there are three dominant examples of appropriate behavioural patterns. These are *bureaucracy* which is thought “as the most appropriate way of exercising authority”, the *market* which is seen as “the most legitimate means of organizing economic life”, and *human equality* which means respect for human rights and “broad notions of equality”.<sup>83</sup> These three norms or institutions are regarded common for almost all states. The second tier of the international society is the *surface structure*. International non-state actors and international organizations are seen as the actors of the surface structure. These organizations “transmit and diffuse the norms of the deep structure”. They are seen as “pro-active norm carriers”. In Finnemore’s analysis, deep structure and surface structure are the independent variables, while state behaviour is the dependent variable.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Dunne, (2007), p. 140.

<sup>81</sup> Dunne, (2007), p. 140.

<sup>82</sup> John M. Hobson, **The State and International Relations**, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 149.

<sup>83</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 149.

<sup>84</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 150.

For Finnemore, “state policies are not the outcome of national requirements”,<sup>85</sup> as international forces shape the interests and policies of states. International organizations and international normative structure are the “active teachers which guide states to initiate policies that are congruent with certain international norms of behaviour”.<sup>86</sup> But the important point here is that such norms of international behaviour may not empower actors, and they may even “go against the actor’s power interests”.<sup>87</sup> At this point, Finnemore reminds us Waltz, because she does not take into consideration the internal structure of states. For her, no matter what the internal structures of states are, states are supposed to pursue similar policies in certain types of situation because of the international society’s (threat of) sanction on states. The national interest conception of this variant of constructivism will help further clarify it.

### **3.1.2.1. The National Interest**

International society-centric constructivism emphasizes the significance of norms and their constitutive effects on state behaviour. The norms take their roots from the intersubjective ground of international society and they are activated by agents such as non-governmental or civil society organizations. As the English School asserts, there are not only states in the political world, but also many different actors. These actors can be seen as the media through which the normative structure of international society is shaped.

The conception of the national interest of the international society variant of constructivism reflects the society-based argument that “states are... normative-adaptive entities”.<sup>88</sup> That means states act in accordance with the ordering principle of international society. In Finnemore’s analysis, the ordering principle is the normative structure of international society. So, states submit to the logic of

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<sup>85</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 150

<sup>86</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 150.

<sup>87</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 150.

<sup>88</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 154.

appropriateness instead of maximizing power. The reason why states feel obliged to conform to the normative *trends* of international society is that they are in need of being recognized as *civilian* rather than barbaric.<sup>89</sup> Two examples will be given to illustrate this point. The first one is the end of the apartheid period. The other one is the economic developmental norm.

*The end of the apartheid* signifies a *paradigm shift* in international politics, because the end of the apartheid period is directly related to the social context in which slavery lost all its legitimacy. The anti-apartheid norm influenced many states' policies. The U.S., for example, did not see it necessary to impose sanctions on the South Africa in the early 1980s about racial equality; but in 1985-1986 period, the U.S. changed its policy towards the South African government. Although the economic interdependence between the South Africa and the U.S. had not decreased at this time, why did the U.S. change its policy towards this racist regime? For the society-centric view, as traditional approaches cannot explain this systemic change it is vital "to pay attention to how norms can define state interests".<sup>90</sup>

When examined closely, it is seen that the anti-apartheid norm did not initially have any direct positive effect; but after two or three decades, it became obvious that the social context was transformed by means of global movements against the apartheid regime. In early 1960, the UN resolutions brought the issue of racial equality onto the agenda of international politics; but the U.S. was against "impos[ing] mandatory sanctions on the South African government".<sup>91</sup> However, as the social context changed over time, the states, even the U.S. could not ignore this fact. Because, the social structure began to have a constraining effect on states. Thus, within the re-constructed social context "the anti-apartheid norm served to alter U.S. notions of its interests".<sup>92</sup> As a result, the U.S. saw it necessary to support the anti-apartheid norms because of the changing mentality about racial issues. It was after the U.S. and the world community imposed sanctions on the South African government to change its racist policies against the indigenous population in that

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<sup>89</sup> Hobson, (2003), pp. 154-155.

<sup>90</sup> Ba and Hoffmann, (2003), p. 26.

<sup>91</sup> Ba and Hoffmann, (2003), p. 26.

<sup>92</sup> Ba and Hoffmann, (2003), p. 26.

country that the South African government agreed to the urgency of ending the apartheid regime. Only then, the apartheid regime was over. This example shows that “norms matter” in international society.<sup>93</sup> Besides, despite the fact that “they do not necessarily determine outcomes”, it has become apparent that norms can “reformulate understanding of interests”.<sup>94</sup> The second example also points out this fact. As seen below, the norms do not have only regulatory roles, but they also constrain state preferences and limit the range of policy options.

*Economic developmental norm* means that “rich nation states have a duty or obligation to help alleviate poverty in third world countries”.<sup>95</sup> Before 1968, the objectives of the national economy policy entailed the maximization of national capital accumulation. The aim was to “prioritise production over distributive-values”.<sup>96</sup> But, by the 1970s economic developmental norms meant not “privileging production”, but it entailed “ensuring welfare redistribution”.<sup>97</sup> Finnemore argues that such a shift was not in the direct interests of states. But, with the activities of Robert McNamara, the president of the World Bank, it became a common sense that developed countries had a duty to help the third world countries to overcome their economic problems. This belief of McNamara about the moral obligation of the rich states to help the poor was the first tier of the international society. With the application of the poverty alleviation policies, the second tier of the international society was also activated. In the end, the harmonization of the belief and its application by the “organizational structure of the World Bank” brought about the change in the political agenda.<sup>98</sup>

In the light of the arguments mentioned, it is obvious that the normative structure of international society can constrain the actions of states and even define their policies and interests. In the society-centric analysis, the state is the normative-adaptive entity, which has low agential power. The normative structure reconstructs

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<sup>93</sup> Ba and Hoffmann, (2003), p. 26.

<sup>94</sup> Ba and Hoffmann, (2003), p. 26.

<sup>95</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 154.

<sup>96</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 153.

<sup>97</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 154.

<sup>98</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 154.

the interests of states, although those may be in conflict with the states' (short-term) material interests.

### 3.1.3. Critical Constructivism

Critical constructivism is mostly indebted to the works of critical theorists. It aims to analyze the “reality constraints”<sup>99</sup> and deconstruct their very cementing elements. Wendtian analysis is state-centric and treats the state as the primary unit of analysis. The international society-centric constructivism also sees states as apparatuses of international politics, which are regarded as normative-adaptive entities that give their decisions under the constraint of the normative structure of international politics. Therefore, both of these approaches do not problematize the structure of the state. However, critical constructivism tries to deconstruct the hidden essence of the state by taking into consideration another factors like media, ideology, discourse and so on.

As critical theory and its conceptualization of the national interest will be analysed in the final chapter, in this section the main arguments of critical theory are not evaluated in depth. Rather, critical theory is treated here as a critical tool, which can help us gain different insights about the nature of things we may think of as *objectively true*. Firstly, the difference between conventional and critical constructivism is explained. This is followed by the (critical) constructivist view of the state. The validity of the proposition “anarchy is what states make of it” is interrogated in order to understand whether it is only states which can make something out of anarchy. Related to the latter issue is the question of whether human qualities can be attributed to states. In this regard, the state's illusionary appearance will be analysed and it will be argued that state is not the representative of the general will of its members, as it is an ideological apparatus, which has to construct itself on the marginalized and excluded identities of many social groups,

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<sup>99</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 286.

sexes or individuals. The national interest conception of the critical constructivism is analysed in the final section.

The constructivist framework indicated at the beginning of this chapter can be called as conventional constructivism according to which “meaningful behaviour... is possible only within an intersubjective social context”.<sup>100</sup> Actors’ identities and interests are defined by the intersubjective social context “through the media of norms and practices”<sup>101</sup> as well as culture, institutions, procedures, rules and so on. In conventional constructivism, there is a mutual constitution between structure and agency. Anarchy is seen as a social construction rather than a necessary result of the logic of international politics. As anarchy is seen as a social construction, which depends on the perceptions of states’ about one another, it becomes possible to speak about the construction of collective identity in lieu of competitive identities. It is the social practice, which can achieve such a collective understanding between states. In short, conventional constructivism is different from critical constructivism as it has a “minimal foundationalism”, which proposes that “a contingent universalism is possible”.<sup>102</sup> In addition, it is also the epistemological and methodological devotion of conventional constructivism to normal science, which makes it conventional.<sup>103</sup>

Critical constructivists, on the other hand, try to *transcend* the existing boundaries of thinking so as to propose alternative modes of thinking and suggest different insights instead of repeating the generally accepted discourses of the mainstream theories. Quoting Cox, critical theory aims to criticize the phenomena rather than solve problems. It knows that every perspective is bound to time and space. It is aware of the fact that “theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose”.<sup>104</sup> So, it inevitably becomes necessary that the existing structure of politics and the state be reconceptualized. Its aim is not to serve a particular group, but to

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<sup>100</sup> Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, **International Security**, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1998, p. 173.

<sup>101</sup> Hopf, (1998), p. 173.

<sup>102</sup> Hopf, (1998), p. 183.

<sup>103</sup> Hopf, (1998), p. 182.

<sup>104</sup> Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1981, p. 1539.

enlighten individuals about the real conditions of their life. What characteristics does the state have? What does make state a state? To whom does the state owe its very well-being? Critical theorists, Marxists and postmodernists may focus on these questions from different perspectives but they have one thing in common: a critical outlook.

Critical constructivism, unlike liberalism, does not see the state as a *neutral* instrument, which serves the interests of the public. On the contrary, it claims that the formation of state entails “the exclusion, repression, violence and the marginalization of minorities”.<sup>105</sup> Weber mentions about “normative statecraft”<sup>106</sup> with which she implies that the state creates a domestic society or a nation on which it claims sovereignty. The nation under the control of the state is usually assumed as being harmonious and unified. However, according to Weber, this is not the case because the domestic society as a unified nation is only an imagined community, which is “to be signified by the signifier (i.e. the state)”.<sup>107</sup> The state with a view to reproducing its existence “stabilize[s] domestic society with a unitary appearance”.<sup>108</sup> By means of logic of representation, state creates arbitrary distinctions and divisions. An opposition between the inside and the outside is constructed. This distinction entails the boundary between the *self* and the *other*. The *other* must be constructed as a threatening other so that state can acquire the *defence mechanism*, which helps it to legitimize its sovereign power vis-à-vis the domestic society. However, the boundaries between the *self* and the *other* are created within the society as well as within and without the territorial borders, since there may be some groups which “do not conform to the pure notion of the self”, the state.<sup>109</sup> Therefore, it becomes obvious that the state emerges out of a dual distinction process: external and internal. That means the state constructs its own identity against the threatening others which may be other states or *strangers* in the state who do not obey the disciplinary *personality* of the state. Weber argues that the strangers inside and the enemies outside are not real threats to the state. However, their

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<sup>105</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 157.

<sup>106</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 159.

<sup>107</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 159.

<sup>108</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 159.

<sup>109</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 159.

representation as such is necessary because state sovereignty feeds upon the intervention and threat. “[T]he task of ‘completing’ the state and domestic political community is not achieved once and for all... [but] it has to be constantly made and remade, imagined and re-imagined in order to produce the appearance of a state that is legitimate, natural and ‘complete’”.<sup>110</sup> Thus, it is not necessarily the case that intervention and sovereignty are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, for Weber, intervention is concomitant with sovereignty because every intervention affirms the capability of the state to exercise sovereignty over its citizens. As a result, state becomes able to succeed “to appear as representative of its own artificially created domestic political community”.<sup>111</sup>

According to critical constructivists, the state is gendered and racial. This is because “it creates a self that is based on one racial group and one heterosexual masculine-gendered group”.<sup>112</sup> That means women, gays, lesbians, or “domestic foreign aliens” become objects which must be repressed in order “to maintain the pure self”.<sup>113</sup> For that reason, militarism, paternalism and aggression become the dominant characteristics of states. Because of logocentrism, language is also constructed through binary dichotomies: “mind/body, subject/object, reason/emotion, public/private, etc”.<sup>114</sup> The former ones are thought to represent men with the latter ones representing women. As a result of this binary opposition, the division between private space and public space redoubles women’s slavery as women are imprisoned to the private space. In the final analysis, it is “a masculine-based public sphere and a feminine-based private sphere”, which defines the structure of the modern state. The state inevitably has a “gendered logic” and is a “masculinized state”<sup>115</sup>. However, on the basis of these arguments about the state and its structure, it is a mistake to hope that critical constructivism has positive evaluations about the concept of the national interest. This is because deconstruction brings out criticism. The criticism about the state as a masculinized apparatus with a

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<sup>110</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 160.

<sup>111</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 160.

<sup>112</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 162.

<sup>113</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 162.

<sup>114</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 162.

<sup>115</sup> Hobson, (2003), p. 162.

gendered logic prevents one to deduce an exact national interest conception out of the texts of critical constructivism. In the final section, the stand of critical constructivism vis-à-vis the concept of the national interest is analysed.

### 3.1.3.1. The National Interest

For critical constructivism, the national interest is a social construction behind which power relations are hidden. In order to reveal these power relations, critical constructivists see the national interest as a “rhetorical device through which the legitimacy of and political support for state action are generated”<sup>116</sup>. It is mostly seen as a “moribund analytical concept”<sup>117</sup> mainly because of its elusive character. However, its very moribund character can give it the power it needs to operate functionally in the political life. For that reason, one of the tasks of the critical thought becomes to delve into the nature of this concept so as to transcend it with an emancipatory aim. But, before analysing this concept, it is preferable to begin with the Cynthia Weber’s problematization of statist constructivism. Then Weldes’ analysis of the national interest is going to be described.

Weber claims that “by making the state the key decision-maker... constructivism contradicts its own argument that identities and interests are always in flux”.<sup>118</sup> According to her, conventional or Wendtian Constructivism, by making the state as the decision-maker, makes it impossible to challenge the state’s identity as the decision-maker, because this identity of state is taken for granted. Wendt, for example, “stabilizes the decision-making character of the state to functionally guarantee the truth of his myth”.<sup>119</sup> Weber sees Wendt’s claim ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ as a myth because Wendt’s model entails an *author* of international politics. So, when asked to Wendt who is the author of international anarchy, he will inevitably see it as the state. In Wendtian analysis, the state is finished with its

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<sup>116</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 276.

<sup>117</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 275.

<sup>118</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 60.

<sup>119</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 61.

already defined objectives and interests to a *certain extent*. On the contrary, for Weber, this situation is not that simple. Because there may not be a *real* author of the politics most of the time.<sup>120</sup>

Taking the film *Wag the Dog* “as an interpretive guide for functional critique of Wendt’s myth”,<sup>121</sup> Weber claims that Wendt’s myth is not competent enough. Because, as illustrated in the film, the ontological starting point of the authorship in politics may not always be as apparent as Wendt supposes. This is because the media can create such an atmosphere that seduction and production go hand in hand. Seductive feature of the production lies in its capacity to “withhold something from the visible, even though there may be nothing to see”.<sup>122</sup> Indeed, by means of the media, it becomes easier to interweave the real and the illusion together. “[T]hrough the medium of television... information and ideas are disseminated... what this practice of dissemination does is construct and reconstruct identities, interests and institutions...”<sup>123</sup> For that reason, it is not exactly possible to discern the points where the *real* stops and the *illusion* begins and vice versa.

The proposition ‘although there may be nothing to see’ is an important theme to be stressed. Weber’s belief that “authorship is unreliable”<sup>124</sup> contradicts Wendt’s arguments, which see the role of the state as the author of international anarchy. According to Weber, seductive process of production makes us believe that we can find the real author one day as we are left with “the illusion of an author/producer/decision-maker”. However, this is most of the time not really the case, as there is not a definite author who has determined what happened. For that reason, the question to ask becomes “how does an actor *appear* to be a real decision-maker/producer/author?” rather than “who is the real decision-maker/producer/author?”<sup>125</sup> Therefore, it is almost impossible to know the real author who is supposed to have directed the events.

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<sup>120</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 64.

<sup>121</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 61.

<sup>122</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 61.

<sup>123</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 70.

<sup>124</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 76.

<sup>125</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 76.

Conventional constructivism is attacked upon not only because of its state-centricism, but also for its incompetence to grasp the real nature of the national interest. Weldes points out this second issue, as she thinks that “Wendt’s anthropomorphized understanding of the state continues to treat states, in typical realist fashion, as unitary actors with a single identity and a single set of interests”.<sup>126</sup> Weldes claims that it is not only the relations between states that determine their interests and identities. Because of the need for a more comprehensive model to analyse the formation of identities and interests of states, Weldes applies a different constructivist framework. She argues that the national interest is a social construction. For that reason, it needs being interpreted by the state officials. *Interpretation* entails a common language, since the language is the very element which helps the state officials to make sense of the context surrounding them. The national interest “emerges out of a process of representation through which state officials make sense of their international context”.<sup>127</sup> And within these representations “the interests of the states are already entailed”.<sup>128</sup> It is the state officials who determine the decisions but that does not mean that they always act on behalf of the national interest. They may sometimes only suppose that they serve the state’s national interests. The construction of the national interest is not a finished and fixed task because “meaning is created and temporarily fixed by establishing chains of connotations among different linguistic elements”.<sup>129</sup> As the national interest is a meaning that emerges out of the representation process, it is surrounded by many textual references, making it difficult for a statesman to claim that s/he behaves consistently in line with the requirements of the national interest. In short, critical constructivists argue that the national interest is not a universal concept that is free of time and space. It is only a social construction, which can be interpreted differently at different times or by different state officials at the same time. So, there is an attack on the absolutist view, which attributes to the national interest a timeless and spaceless character.

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<sup>126</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 280.

<sup>127</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 277.

<sup>128</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 282.

<sup>129</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 284.

The social process of representation consists of “two analytically distinct dimensions” known as articulation and interpellation.<sup>130</sup> Articulation means creating meaning “out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources”.<sup>131</sup> The process of articulation produces “contextually specific representations of the world”.<sup>132</sup> As repeated long enough, “these linguistic elements come to seem as though they are inherently or necessarily connected”.<sup>133</sup> As a result, the national interest seems as natural and value-free. The observer claims that the situation has entailed such an understanding of the national interest. In the atmosphere, which arises after the process of articulation, the question asked becomes what the roles should be. With that question, the second part of the construction process gains prominence.

As the second part of the social process of representation, interpellation can be described as an operation through which ideology converts individuals into subjects. Individuals as the subjected *objects* to a higher *Subject* are, indeed, both “free subjects with a free will” and “subjected beings stripped of all freedom”.<sup>134</sup> This is a significant point, because it seems to propose an alternative mode of thinking according to which individuals are free as well as they are slave. For that reason, it is opposed to the rational choice theory in terms of which individual has reason to judge what is best for him. The Althusserian subject is subjected to a higher *Subject*. In terms of that Althusserian logic, the first meaning of subject means *agent* who acts and the second meaning of the term implies *citizen* who accepts the power and the right of a higher authority to rule him/her.<sup>135</sup>

By means of articulation and interpellation it becomes possible to create subject positions into which individuals can be fitted. The state to which individuals feel belonging is indeed an imagined community. But, the state is endowed with some interests because of its anthropomorphization as a Subject. The state, which is

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<sup>130</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 284.

<sup>131</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 284.

<sup>132</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 284.

<sup>133</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 285.

<sup>134</sup> Robert Paul Resch, **Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory**, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992, pp. 210-211.

<sup>135</sup> Bülent Somay, **Tarihin Bilinçdışı: Popüler Kültür Üzerine Denemeler**, İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 2004, p. 123.

thought to be a unified entity, also becomes an identity with which citizens can identify themselves. In the case study of the Cuban missile crisis that Weldes examines, it is seen that the U.S. as an imagined American community draws on “representation of belonging”.<sup>136</sup> As an organic relationship between the state and its members is established, then the citizens begin to describe their views in reference to the American national community, which is indeed a subject constructed by the dual mechanisms of representation. In the end, the state is seen as a neutral force with some interests and identities on its own divorced from time and space. As a result, the members in the domestic political community do not see it irrelevant to identify themselves with the state under the control of which they live. This is because the state has succeeded to be able to gain a special status in the society as a *subject* and the interests it claims to have gained “commonsensical appeal”.<sup>137</sup>

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter, the first aim was to show the main propositions of constructivism according to which norms and ideas matter in politics. It is indeed the very construction process of ideational factors, which helps us to understand the political affairs. The main body of constructivist thought is divided into three subgroups: state-centric constructivism, international society-centric constructivism and critical constructivism. Although the three variants of constructivism hold similar arguments about the importance of the role of ideas, norms and intersubjective understandings in politics, they differ from each other because of their different stands.

State-centric constructivism while critical of realist theory, also deploys many concepts of realism. It focuses on anarchy and investigates the process of collective identity formation among states. Although it claims that the identities and interests of states are defined in an intersubjective manner, it still takes some features

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<sup>136</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 288.

<sup>137</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 275.

of the state as fixed. For example, the state interests are said to be constructed in accordance with the intersubjective constraints, but these interests represent subjective preferences. In addition to these subjective interests, there are also objective interests, which all states must have in order to survive. For that reason, state-centric constructivism is seen as a bridge between neorealism and neoliberalism by Weber.<sup>138</sup>

The second variant of constructivism holds the view that international society has a constraining effect on state behaviour and determines its interests. According to this view, the structure of international society has two tiers: normative tier and surface tier. The first represents the dominant norms in the international society and the second tier is thought to consist of international organizations, which are practical agents who teach states about the validity and influence of international norms. In this model, the state is seen as a normative-adaptive entity and its national interests are inevitably norm-bound.

The last variant is much more critical than the other two variants. It tries to denaturalize the politics more ambitiously than the others. For this view, the state is neither the representative of the members of domestic society nor is a subject which naturally has some interests and identities. Rather, its very being depends on the success of its ideological hegemony over its citizens. The state is regarded an apparatus of repression, which constructs itself on the exclusion of some groups and individuals in the society. Gender and racial issues are examples of such a repression. For critical constructivism, state is a construction which owes its continuity to the success of the ideological interpellation which reproduces the state as a necessary apparatus.

As critical constructivists do not see the state as an organic unity with some pre-given (national) interests and identities, they are highly critical of state discourses, which depict the national interest as objective and universal. Rather, for them it is a subjective preference bound by space and time. Depending on the

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<sup>138</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 64.

perceptions of the state representatives about international affairs and the linguistic affiliations, the definition and the formulation of the national interest inevitably become the reflection of the dominant discourse in the society. For that reason, the critical constructivists do not accept the pre-given definitions of the concepts like the national interest. Rather they are interested in the construction process of the national interest as only a discourse which has a subjective root rather than a general concern to all the members of the society.

## FOURTH CHAPTER

### MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

This chapter presents some arguments of Marxism on the concepts of state, nationalism, capitalism, nation-state, ideology and hegemony, and the Leninist concepts such as imperialism, self-determination and the world-system theory of Wallerstein. Marxism, Leninism and World-System theory are brought together to make a comprehensive analysis. The aim is firstly to present the mentioned concepts so as to give a theoretical background and then to construct an *interest* conception in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist thinking. Since Marxism develops its arguments with regard to the concept of *class*, the concept of the national interest does not make much sense for it. For that reason, a Marxist understanding of interest is constructed under the rubric of the *socialist interest*. With a view to explaining the concept of the socialist interest, the Marxist understanding of the state is discussed and then the relationship between nationalism, capitalism and the nation-state is investigated. Meanwhile, the concepts like ideology and hegemony are also explained. Following this theoretical background, the *imperialism* approach of Lenin and the *world-system theory* of Wallerstein are discussed with an aim to construct a theoretical legitimization of the socialist interest.

It will be seen that there is only *one* interest for all Marxists: to transcend the capitalist society. However, as Marxism defends the unity of theory and practice, this general interest is extended to include also more practical issues like self-determination and the formation of the counter-blocs against the hegemonic world-system. Here it should be clarified that since the language Marxism speaks does not correspond to the language of the Realpolitik, the socialist interest does not include the realist concepts such as power and balance of power. The roles of two schools and their aims in the contemporary society are different. As Cox famously reminds, Marxism is revolutionary whereas the other is “problem-solving”.<sup>1</sup> Bearing in mind

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<sup>1</sup> Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1981, p. 1541.

this distinction, the last section of this chapter aims to construct an understanding of the socialist interest.

#### 4.1. MARXISM

Marxism is a theory of socio-economic determination. Its main assumption is that the economic base (relations of production and forces of production) constitutes the superstructure of the society (political and legal systems, culture and so on). As Marx argues, the mode of production of the physical life conditions the processes of societal, political and intellectual life.<sup>2</sup> This statement can be regarded as the main proposition of Marxist theory which does not locate its investigation on *preconstituted* social actors like states. Marxism is curious about the *construction* process of things and does not isolate its object of inquiry from the socio-economic context into which the object is born. As such Marxism has a historical and materialist methodology.

*Historical materialism* came into being by Marx's borrowing the concept of *historical* from the Hegelian *historical idealism* and the concept of *materialism* from the Hobbesian *ahistoric materialism*.<sup>3</sup> Historical materialism is a *theory* aiming to study the events in a historical and materialist manner. The historicism implies the necessity of making correlations between events. For example, understanding Bonapartism entails some knowledge about the French Revolution. The materialist side of Marxism implies the *concrete* analysis of the *concrete* phenomena. It suggests that the concrete objects must be the beginnings and the ends of the analyses without any *transcendental* reference.

Marxism trying to embrace the totality of the social world can be seen as “a body of concepts that claims to analyse the full range of social behaviour,

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<sup>2</sup> Karl Marx, **Ekonomi Politğin Eleştirisine Katkı**, (trans.) Sevim Belli, Ankara Sol Yayınları, 1978, p. 31.

<sup>3</sup> Jonathan Wolff, **Why Read Marx Today?**, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 27.

international relations included”.<sup>4</sup> For Marxism, a satisfying explanation of politics is only possible by “refusing to treat the discipline of International Relations as a discrete discourse with its own rigid intellectual boundaries, distinctive concepts, language and subject matter”.<sup>5</sup> So, the requirement “to identify a distinct conceptual terrain for study”<sup>6</sup> in International Relations is repudiated. Because, for Marxism, the demarcation lines between disciplines, as a way of *intellectual exclusion*, silence and subordinate some marginalized groups. That is why distinction between domestic and foreign policy is invalid for Marxist thought because Marxism believes that arbitrary categorizations like this will eventually lead us to misinterpret the world affairs going on.

Marxist theory contradicts many International Relations theories. For example, realism takes the state as the unit of analysis and describes it as an *internally homogeneous* political unit of international politics and it does not take into consideration the fact that state is not a monolithic unit, but a *political* body of competing class interests. On the contrary, for Marxism, “state is not an independent entity, but is rather located in a particular socio-economic and class context”.<sup>7</sup> Thus, international relations are not the relations between states, but between social formations.

Marxism demands that the analyses of the relations between states be carried out in accordance with the conditions in which these states operate. As actors, states are not preconstituted entities in the political environment. The roles and identities that states have are the reflections of a *historically structured* process, which consists of a *continuous* relationship between the forces and the relations of production. According to Cox, this is because “changes in the organization of production generate new social forces which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure of states... [So] Marxism examines the connections between power in *production*,

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<sup>4</sup> Fred Halliday, **Rethinking International Relations**, London, Macmillan, 1994, p. 71.

<sup>5</sup> Scott Burchill, “Introduction”, Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (ed.s), **Theories of International Relations**, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 10.

<sup>6</sup> Halliday, (1994), p. 62.

<sup>7</sup> Halliday, (1994), p. 64.

power in the *state*, and power in *international relations*".<sup>8</sup> Indeed, Cox's statement summarizes the basic Marxist argument. It implies that the process of production leads to centralization, this centralization finds its *form* in the state; as a result, the politics becomes the struggle between different *units* of productive forces.

For Marxism, while evaluating the politics, one cannot ignore the capitalist mechanism and the economic base capitalism depends on and emerges from. This is because the socio-economic system underpins the character of individual states and of their relations with each other. So, the position and the power of a state are determined in reference to its productive capacity. For that reason, "no analysis of international relations is possible without reference to capitalism, the social formations it has generated and the world system they comprise". Because, "ideas, institutions, events within a social formation, do not take place in isolation from the context of the underlying mode of production, but must rather be seen in relation to the totality and to the material determination within it".<sup>9</sup>

Marx's materialist conception of history suggests that individuals first satisfy their most fundamental material needs before they can do anything else.<sup>10</sup> This desire of satisfaction obliges people to be in a continuous relationship with nature and the other people around, and to learn to use their labour to satisfy their needs. It is his/her *labour*, which differentiates the human being from animals which can *only* make use of nature but cannot make any *intentional* efforts to *change it*. It is only the human being who is *sovereign* over nature and can change it in accordance with his/her needs.<sup>11</sup> So, human labour and production are to be distinguished from the activities of animals because human intervention involves a kind of *consciousness* and *purposiveness* which animals lack.<sup>12</sup> This consciousness finds its expression in

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<sup>8</sup> Cox, (1981), pp. 1550, 1547. (emphases added).

<sup>9</sup> Halliday, (1994), pp. 61, 60.

<sup>10</sup> Andrew Linklater, "Marxism", Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True (ed.s), **Theories of International Relations, 3rd edition**, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 112.

<sup>11</sup> Friedrich Engels, "Maymundan İnsana Geçişte Emeğin Rolü", (trans.) Arif Gelen, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, **Seçme Yapıtlar 3**, Ankara, Sol Yayınları, 1979, p. 90.

<sup>12</sup> Allen W. Wood, **Karl Marx**, 2nd edition, New York, Routledge, 2004, p. 32.

the production; men distinguish themselves from animals by way of producing their means of subsistence.

There is an interplay, a *natural relationship*, between human beings as *agents* and the nature as *structure*. In the words of McAnulla, “agency refers... to individual or group abilities (intentional or otherwise) to affect their environment. Structure... refers to context; the material conditions which define the range of actions available to actors”.<sup>13</sup> Hay argues that agency refers to the “capacity of an actor to act consciously... to attempt to realise his or her intentions. [It] implies a sense of free will, choice or autonomy”.<sup>14</sup> However, in the social production of their life, the relations human beings enter into, to an important degree, are predetermined and independent of their will.<sup>15</sup> As a result, depending on the relationship between the structure (as an institution) and individual behaviour, certain roles and social relations that are linked to the social practices emerge.<sup>16</sup>

There is also a second relationship among human beings, called as *social relationship* referring to a determinate mode of cooperation of several individuals.<sup>17</sup> The character of the cooperation among individuals depends on the nature of the relations of production and the location of individuals during the process of production. The position of individuals in production is determined by the mode of property and the division of labour. The first mode of property is tribe property and it is related to the agricultural production, which only meets the demands of the family in which the division of labour is not much developed.<sup>18</sup> But, with the division of labour in society, new relations emerge and the mode of property metamorphoses into many forms (e.g. communal ownership, state ownership or private ownership). So, the division of labour plays a significant role in history, as it “governs the constitution and dissolution of the social groups from primitive

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<sup>13</sup> Quoted from Paul Wetherly, **Marxism and the State: An Analytical Approach**, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 74.

<sup>14</sup> Quoted from Wetherly, (2005), p. 74.

<sup>15</sup> Marx, (1978), p. 23.

<sup>16</sup> Wetherly, (2005), pp. 74-75.

<sup>17</sup> Karl Marx, **Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy**, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964, p. 62.

<sup>18</sup> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, **Alman İdeolojisi [Feuerbach]**, (trans.) Sevim Belli, Ankara, Sol Yayınları, 2008, (B). p. 41.

communities to classes”.<sup>19</sup> In addition, the division of labour differentiates the interests of the people involved in the production process.<sup>20</sup> This is because the ownership of the means of the production obliges the mass of humanity to surrender its labour to those that own the instruments of production in order to survive.<sup>21</sup> Out of this relationship, alienation arises.

The alienation between the owner of the means of production and the worker displays itself in the mode of property since the *collective* process of production has a nature that conflicts with the *individualistic* ownership. The *second* kind of alienation is among the workers. As the workers are not conscious about their productive capabilities, they are alienated towards each other and cannot be regarded as a *class*. Class entails a common will and awareness of the real conditions. Marx gives the example of French peasant families and argues that the French peasantry in Bonaparte’s time could not be regarded as a class because they *only* shared the same life conditions. Instead, to form a class it was necessary for these scattered peasants to defend their rights either through the agency of a parliament or a council.<sup>22</sup> The *third* kind of alienation is between the producer and his product. This results from the unconsciousness of the producer about his activity; the producer does not attribute any meaning to the good he has produced; so there arises a discrepancy between the labour and its creation.<sup>23</sup>

Alienation is directly related to the modern state-system and the capitalist mode of production. This is because “in modern civil society all relationships are in practice subordinated to the single abstract relationship of money and speculation”.<sup>24</sup> In every purchase and sale, two men with opposed interests confront each other and the confrontation is antagonistic, for each thinks that they are in a state of opposition.

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<sup>19</sup> Etienne Balibar, **The Philosophy of Marx**, London, Verso, 2007, p. 37.

<sup>20</sup> Marx and Engels, (2008), (B). pp. 58-59.

<sup>21</sup> Linklater, (2005), pp. 113-114.

<sup>22</sup> Karl Marx, **Louis Bonaparte’in 18 Brumaire’i**, (trans.) Sevim Belli, Ankara, Sol Yayınları, 2007, (A), p. 122.

<sup>23</sup> Karl Marx, **Yabancılaşma**, (trans.) Kenan Somer, Ahmet Kardam, Sevim Belli, Arif Gelen, Yurdakul Fincancı, Alaattin Bilgi, Ankara, Sol Yayınları, 2007. Wood, (2004), pp. 44-60. Wolff, (2002), pp. 28-37. Tom Rockmore, **Marx After Marxism: The Philosophy of Karl Marx**, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, pp. 61-63. David Renton, **Marx on Globalization**, London, Lawrence&Wishart, 2001, pp. 111-124.

<sup>24</sup> Marx, (1964), p. 161.

Therefore, the initial consequences are mutual mistrust and the justification of this mistrust.<sup>25</sup> The roots of this mistrust can be found in the universal rights of humankind such as the rights to *liberty*, *security* and *property*, which were the main principles of liberal thought in the period of Enlightenment. At first glance, these rights seem natural and undisturbing. But, when examined closer, it is possible to see that “liberty is the right to do as you wish as long as you don’t *harm* others”. Security implies the right to be *protected* from others and “property is the right to extend this security to the enjoyment of your legitimate possessions”.<sup>26</sup> Thus, the other people automatically become *alien* against whom we must protect our liberty, security and property. This, in turn, facilitates to see others as potential threats. For that reason, these three rights, which are closely related to the liberal thought, “presuppose and then reinforce our alienation from each other”<sup>27</sup> rather than create a society of enlightened and emancipated individuals.

It is not anything inherent about human nature which makes the world competitive and people selfish. In order to understand the human nature, some philosophers thought that human essence can be understood with regard to an abstract *universal* conception of *essence*. They thought that by means of this *essence*, they could understand differences among individuals. Because, they supposed that “this generic abstraction is somehow inherent in individuals of the same genus, either as a quality they possess, by which they may be classified, or even as a form or a force which causes them to exist as so many copies of the same model”.<sup>28</sup> But, they did not take into consideration that “human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual... [but] it is the ensemble of social relations”.<sup>29</sup>

In Marxism, human nature does not derive from a *timeless* human essence, but from the mode of production. The *ontological* essence of human beings comes into being as a result of the mutual relationship between them and their economic activities. In capitalist society *what makes man a man* is his labour; unless he works

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<sup>25</sup> Renton, (2001), p. 41.

<sup>26</sup> Wolff, (2002), p. 42.

<sup>27</sup> Wolff, (2002), p. 42. (emphases added).

<sup>28</sup> Balibar, (2007), p. 27.

<sup>29</sup> Balibar, (2007), p. 27.

(by selling his labour), he starves. For that reason, work is vital; but capitalism (as a consumption-based economy) “commodifies, transforms and degrades human relations... Everything, sooner or later, has its price”.<sup>30</sup> So, the money in capitalist society becomes a magic, in Shakespeare’s words: “that will make black, white; foul, fair; wrong, right; base, noble; old, young; coward, valiant”.<sup>31</sup>

#### 4.1.1. The State

In order to understand the nature of the alienated individuals in the capitalist society, it is necessary that Marxist conceptualizations of state be analysed in order to exhibit the real nature of *interests* in the capitalist society. There are two *main* conceptions of state in Marxist literature. The first one is *instrumentalist* and the other is *structuralist*. Both of them accept the fact that the state, in the last analysis, serves the interests of the dominant class; but they differ from each other with regard to the *degree* of consensus between the state and the dominant class.

In terms of the structural conception of state, the state is *relatively independent* of society and it may have distinct interests from the dominant class. It is the *relative autonomy* of the state, which prevents us to see the state as a naive representative of the dominant class; because the state, in the structural conceptualization, is not under the *direct* control of the ruling class. Although there is an objective consensus between the state and the dominant class, the state can also act against the dominant class. For example, it can grant concessions to the subordinated class, although this act also aims to defend the long-run interests of the dominant class.<sup>32</sup>

The relationship between the bourgeois class and the state is an *objective* relation in that the power of the state assures the consolidation of the capitalist

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<sup>30</sup> Wolff, (2002), p. 38.

<sup>31</sup> Wolff, (2002), p. 38.

<sup>32</sup> Nicos Poulantzas, **Siyasal İktidar ve Toplumsal Sınıflar**, (trans.) trans. Şen Süer, L. Fevzi Topaçoğlu, İstanbul, Belge Yayınları, 1992.

enterprise. The structure of the capitalist economy is maintained by means of the state power. This may seem to contradict the state's relative autonomy from the dominant class. However, this is not the case, because every political power has an economic base. In the early agricultural states and empires, the state professionals were at the same time the hegemonic economic class. This means, the state and dominant class were identical. But, with the rise of capitalist state, there arose a *division of labour* between the economic leadership and state profession. In capitalism, the dominant class is not part of the administration process. This fact can be understood more clearly if the difference between *state power* and *state apparatus* is defined.<sup>33</sup>

Related to the place of the state in a social formation, state apparatus refers to two things: a) technical-economical, political and ideological functions of the state, and b) the state personnel, bureaucracy, and the army. On the other hand, the state power implies a *social class*, which holds the state power. For example, the transition from Russia to the Soviets (from a power centre to another power centre) illustrates the conception of power in Poulantzas' argument. It was the *content* of the state power that changed with the socialist ideology in the Soviet case. *Theoretically*, it became the working class that represented the state power, not the bourgeoisie.<sup>34</sup>

The other approach deduced from the writings of Marx about the state claims that, in Marx's own words, "the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie".<sup>35</sup> The state is seen as a coercive apparatus of rule to secure the dominant position of the capitalist class against the threat from the proletariat.<sup>36</sup> *State power* is the main instrument by which the power of the capitalist class is protected and its objective interests are realized.<sup>37</sup> In short, the state and its bureaucracy are seen as the direct instruments of the

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<sup>33</sup> Anthony Giddens, **Sosyoloji: Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım**, (trans.) Ruhi Esengün, İsmail Öğretim, İstanbul, Birey Yayıncılık, 1994, p. 83.

<sup>34</sup> Giddens, (1994), p. 117.

<sup>35</sup> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, **Komünist Manifesto ve Komünizmin İlkeleri**, (trans.) Muzaffer Erdost, Ankara, Sol Yayınları, 2008, p. 119.

<sup>36</sup> Wetherly, (2005), p. 15.

<sup>37</sup> Ralph Miliband, **Kapitalist Devlet**, (trans.) Osman Akınhay, İstanbul, Belge Yayınları, 1989, p. 54.

hegemonic class.<sup>38</sup> According to this approach, the state is not a neutral force that represents the general interest of the society. It is neither an apparatus imposed to society from outside nor is it the materialization of moral consciousness. But, it is the apparatus of the dominant class and a repressive apparatus of one class over another class. It is a particular form of power organization; a kind of coercive apparatus which aims to subjugate a certain class.<sup>39</sup> It is an apparatus which does not represent *universal* and *general* interests but *particular* ones. Its mode of governance is conditioned by the forces operating in the society. The relations and mode of property in the society conditioned by the mode of production shape the structure of the state in which arise many differentiated interests due to the nature of capitalist sharing. In the capitalist state, “the interests of the dominant class are incarnated in the state. So, the rules the state enforces serve the very well-being of the dominant class”.<sup>40</sup>

The state is born in the midst of the clashing class interests to restrain the antagonisms of the classes. It is the state of a certain class, which has become economically and politically dominant in society and has acquired the means to subordinate the oppressed class and exploit it.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, the state is the domain of power in which the collectivity of social formation is regulated and ensured. So, the state has a cohesive function. Why such a function is necessary? Because of the uncompromising interests in the society, the regulation of the contradictions in a certain way becomes necessary. For that reason, as a historical category, the state has emerged in order to control these irreconcilable class interests. Although its power arises from within society, the state gradually becomes more alienated from society and it seems as an absolute and necessary apparatus.

The state is not created by means of a social contract as Rousseau claims. “It is not the will of the people which shapes the structure of the state, but the state is the

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<sup>38</sup> Wetherly, (2005), p. 18.

<sup>39</sup> V. I. Lenin, **Devlet ve İhtilal**, (trans.) Süleyman Arslan, Ankara, Bilim ve Sosyalizm Yayınları, 1989, pp. 36, 18.

<sup>40</sup> John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry, **Devlet**, (trans.) İsmail Çekem, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005, pp. 9-12.

<sup>41</sup> Friedrich Engels, “Ailenin, Özel Mülkiyetin ve Devletin Kökeni”, (trans.) Kenan Somer, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, **Seçme Yapıtlar 3**, Ankara, Sol Yayınları, 1979, p. 400.

objective situation of the relationships between people”.<sup>42</sup> It does not represent general will, but the will of the dominant group, and the general interest is indeed the particular interest of a group. The dominant class succeeds to present its class interests as the general interest.<sup>43</sup> In short, the task of the state is to “legitimize the interests of the dominant classes and fractions as against the other classes of the formation”.<sup>44</sup> So, the state does not express some transcendent rationality superior to social life, nor is it inherent in society or an expression of its immanent rationality.<sup>45</sup> Rather the state is

*a class state because it is the condensation of social class relations and social class power... The very existence of state power necessarily corresponds to the interests of the hegemonic class or class fraction. With respect to the ruling classes, the... state is a class state insofar as it organizes their class powers into a political unity and insofar as it creates and maintains their political hegemony over the dominated classes.*<sup>46</sup>

#### **4.1.2. Nationalism, Capitalism and Nation-state**

Having presented the Marxist conceptualizations of state, it is vital to analyse the relationship between the modern nation-state, nationalism and capitalism. Why was the nation-state necessary and why did it emerge after the industrial revolution with the rise of the capitalist mode of production? Marxism claims that nationalism is an *invention* required to meet the demands of capitalist market and its success depends on some factors. These factors can be enumerated as “the aggregation of the production and the exchange, a stable and modernized rule of law, an expanded and organized state, a politically extensive cadre based on a democratic sovereignty and

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<sup>42</sup>Marx, (1978), pp. 7-8.

<sup>43</sup>Marx and Engels, (2008), (B), p. 103.

<sup>44</sup> Robert Paul Resch, **Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory**, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992, p. 359.

<sup>45</sup> Henri Lefebvre, **Marx’ın Sosyolojisi**, (trans.) Selahattin Hilav, İstanbul, Sorun Yayınları, 1996, pp. 111-112.

<sup>46</sup> Resch, (1992), pp. 332-333.

the ground of common culture”.<sup>47</sup> In the light of these factors, it becomes apparent that the *territorial body* of the state refers to its *commercial capacity* while its borders are its *tariff walls*.

Therefore, rather than being a *divine* will, “nation is both a society and this society’s dream; it is a reality, notwithstanding it is a mythos”.<sup>48</sup> Hereof, the state is not the reflection of the *unconflicting* union of the nation but the creator of the nation and the repressive apparatus both aiming to prevent the emergence of diverse voices and to regulate the market.<sup>49</sup> Regulation of the market demanded that the bourgeoisie centralise means of production, and concentrate property in a few hands. As a result, “independent... provinces with separate interests, laws, governments and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one *nation*, with one government, one code of laws, one *national class-interest*, one frontier and one customs-tariff.”<sup>50</sup>

It is not a coincidence that nationalism is concomitant with capitalism. Because, capitalism is not only an economic system, but it also brings with itself its own life style and a *specific* worldview. If capitalism were only a commercial activity, then its conception of citizenship and its emphasis on loyalty to the nation-state would mean nothing. Indeed, capitalism is not only a market economy or merely a formal exchange relation between the labour and the capital.<sup>51</sup> Marx developed the empirical argument of *surplus-value* to prove that capitalism is not only a formal *exchange* relation but also, and more fundamentally, a system of exploitation. Marx explains the latter by differentiating between two kinds of surplus-value: absolute and relative. Absolute surplus-value directly depends on lengthening the working-day. But, the relative surplus-value is much more significant than the former; it is the hidden essence of capitalist production. Relative surplus-value entails the existence of *labour time* and *surplus-labour time*. In labour time, the worker produces commodity *equivalent* to his labour-power. But, in

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<sup>47</sup> Server Tanilli, **Değişimin Diyalektiği ve Devrim: Marksizm Üstüne Yeni Düşünceler**, İstanbul, Adam Yayınları, 2001, p. 172.

<sup>48</sup> Çağlar Keyder, **Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası**, İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 1993, p. 55

<sup>49</sup> Keyder, (1993), pp. 53-54.

<sup>50</sup> Renton, (2001), p. 29. (emphasis added).

<sup>51</sup> Wood, (2004), p. 247.

surplus-labour time, the worker produces surplus-value which is *usurped* by the capital.<sup>52</sup> Thus, capitalism is a system of exploitation which has to hide its essence and display itself only as an economic system of exchange.

Not being only an economic system, capitalism is also a worldview which is in need of *affirming* itself as the inevitable and universal system. Its self-affirmation, to a large extent, depends on the efficiency of the *nationalist discourse* which is vital to achieve capitalist union under the nation-state. For Wallerstein, the efficiency of the nationalist discourse is more possible in the developed countries than in the undeveloped countries.<sup>53</sup> This is because the advanced industrial powers have more resources to achieve *national* prosperity and defend *national* independence when compared middle-sized states.<sup>54</sup> Thus, there is an *objectively* necessary relationship between the success of ideology and the economic prosperity, although a small part of the society benefits most from that prosperity. The question then to ask should be how capitalism achieves such a self-affirmation and how it accomplishes public legitimacy. The answer of this question entails explaining two significant concepts, *ideology* and *hegemony*, for they play prominent roles in facilitating such a societal union under one nation-state with a *singular national interest*.

#### 4.1.3. Ideology and Hegemony

There are mainly two traditions on the concept of ideology. The first one, having a more optimist nature, is associated with French rationalism (as seen in the philosophy of De Tracy) which later evolved into empiricism under the influence of the Anglo-Saxon approaches. Since its emergence with the Enlightenment, this mode of rational thinking has emphasized the nature of society as being based on

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<sup>52</sup> Karl Marx, **Kapital: Birinci Cilt**, (trans.) Alaattin Bilgi, 5. Baskı, Ankara, Sol Yayınları, 1997, pp. 483-492.

<sup>53</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, **Dünya Sistemleri Analizi: Bir Giriş**, (trans.) Ender Abadoğlu, Nuri Ersoy, İstanbul, Aram Yayıncılık, 2004, p. 88.

<sup>54</sup> William Wallace, “Kurtuluş mu geri Çekilme mi? Batı Avrupa’da Ulus Devlet, 1945-93”, (trans.) Ali Çakıroğlu, Peter Gowan and Perry Anderson (ed.s), **Avrupa Sorunu: Avrupa Ne, Avrupalı Kim?**, İstanbul, Aykırı Yayıncılık, 2005, p. 47.

consensus and claimed that a deep reasoning could provide truths. The other one is the German tradition which is interested in *how* rather than *what*.<sup>55</sup>

The Enlightenment thinkers were spiritual predecessors of 1789 French Revolution. *Ideology*, as a term, was first used after the revolution by Antoine Destutt De Tracy. In *Eléments d'Idéologie*, written between 1801 and 1815, Tracy proposed a new science of ideas, *ideology*, as a ground for all other sciences. Tracy argued that all our ideas depended upon our physical senses. Thus, he rejected all metaphysical prejudices and claimed that the ideas of human beings could be analysed rationally by means of *ideology*.<sup>56</sup> Tracy thought that people would get enlightened with the help of ideology as this would provide true means of thinking.<sup>57</sup> For that reason, ideology initially had *positive* and *progressive* features. On the other hand, as the power of Napoleon evolved into an empire, supported also by the religious foundation, the ideologues depicted as liberal and republican were criticized harshly.<sup>58</sup> The word of ideology later became a subject of disapproval and scoff in the arguments of Napoleon. What was interesting was that Napoleon was accusing the ideologues for making *metaphysics*. So, ideology acquired the meaning of *strange ideas* and started to have pejorative content.<sup>59</sup> Not being identical with the discourse of Napoleon, the German tradition also tried to unveil the negative characteristics of ideology. There arose counter arguments about the nature of that concept in German tradition, which claimed that ideology was a system to mask the reality. Accordingly, the emphasis shifted from *observation* to how the reality is *produced*.<sup>60</sup>

At this point, ideology becomes the means of giving a distorted picture of contradictions.<sup>61</sup> So, the ideology is reduced to an inaccurate imagination of history or to an abstraction that ignores history. Ideology gives the dominant classes the

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<sup>55</sup> David Mclellan, **İdeoloji**, (trans.) Barış Yıldırım, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005, p. 9.

<sup>56</sup> Mclellan, (2005), p. 6.

<sup>57</sup> Şerif Mardin, **İdeoloji**, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1997, p. 22.

<sup>58</sup> Mclellan, (2005), p. 6.

<sup>59</sup> Mardin, (1997), p. 23.

<sup>60</sup> Mclellan, (2005), p. 10.

<sup>61</sup> Marx and Engels, (2008), (B), p. 45.

chance to present their interests to the society as the general interests of the society. And if the oppressed people begin to embrace ideological signals of the dominant class, this situation leads to their acceptance of their position in the world as natural and unchangeable. Once these oppressed people start feeling that they are in a condition, which is their fate and unchangeable, this signals that the ideological leadership of the dominant class has succeeded to accommodate other segments of the society. In other words, it has become the *hegemonic leader*.<sup>62</sup>

Gramsci argues that the dominant class (aristocracy) before the French Revolution was so conservative that they did not see it essential to *organically* incorporate other classes to their structure. Consequently, it did not seek to extend its technical and ideological interests to the societal realm. In contrast, the bourgeoisie introduced itself as an active organism, which tried to bring all society to its own cultural and economic level. Hence, the function of the state changed with the bourgeoisie; the state became a means of education for the sake of the bourgeoisie.<sup>63</sup> This mission of the capitalist state entailed *ideological* and *hegemonic* leadership in order to hold the whole society in order.

Gramsci makes a distinction between state and civil society and he takes into account the significance of institutions to (re)produce consent or hegemony over civil society. He argues that “the institutions may become the anchor for a hegemonic strategy since they lend themselves both to the representations of diverse interests and to the universalization of policy”.<sup>64</sup> Hegemony over civil society entails the creation of a collective will, which becomes “the protagonist of political action”. This new protagonist depends on “the creation of a ideological unity which will serve as cement” of the political actions.<sup>65</sup> Common sense also “allows the moral, political and cultural values of the dominant group to become widely dispersed throughout society and to be accepted by subordinate groups and classes as their

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<sup>62</sup> Sara Mills, **Michel Foucault**, London, Routledge, 2003, p. 75.

<sup>63</sup> Antonio Gramsci, **Hapishane Defterleri**, (trans.) Adnan Cemgil, İstanbul, Belge Yayınları, 2007, p. 327.

<sup>64</sup> Cox, (1981), p. 1549.

<sup>65</sup> Chantal Mouffe, “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci”, Chantal Mouffe (ed.), **Gramsci and Marxist Theory**, London, Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1979, p. 184.

own”.<sup>66</sup> Common sense is a folkloric philosophy, for Gramsci. It implies a way of thinking which appears natural for every one. But, indeed it is conditioned by material forces in society and hides the exploitative relations in the societal dynamics.

Shifting from Gramscian hegemony to Althusserian interpellation, it can be argued that the process of reproduction of hegemony in civil society requires the notion of *interpellation* of subjects and the creation of subject-positions. Quoting from Althusser, Weldes indicates that “interpellation refers to a dual process whereby identities or subject-positions are created and concrete individuals are hailed into or interpellated by them”.<sup>67</sup> Interpellation creates specific identities and subject positions. Then, individuals come to identify with these subject positions. But, the situation from where they look to the world is imaginary and “the power relations and interests” in their identification with their subject positions are “naturalized”.<sup>68</sup>

Ideology is a process the individual develops consciously, but s/he does this by means of a *fettered psyche* since s/he does not know what the real forces in the world affecting his/her existence are.<sup>69</sup> For that reason, the ideological interpellation can be seen as a more important tool of the modern state than the more conventionally recognised *repressive state apparatuses* like the army and the police. This is because convincing people not to go on strike is much more effective than sending in armed police to break up a strike.<sup>70</sup> Thus, the modern state is much more than a system of rule backed by physical force. It is also concerned with the securing of *consent* to its rule.<sup>71</sup> In order to obtain this consent, which is necessary to sustain the structure of the state and the societal order, the state uses numerous apparatuses

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<sup>66</sup> Stephen Hobden and Richard Wyn Jones, “Marxist theories of International Relations” John Baylis and Steve Smith (ed.s), **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations**, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 210.

<sup>67</sup> Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1996, p. 287.

<sup>68</sup> Weldes, (1996), p. 287.

<sup>69</sup> McLennan, (2005), p. 20.

<sup>70</sup> Louis Althusser, **Yeniden-Üretim Üzerine**, (trans.) Işık Ergüden, İstanbul, İthaki Yayınları, 2005, (A), pp. 112, 12. Louis Althusser, **İdeoloji ve Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları**, (trans.) Alp Tümertekin, İstanbul, İthaki Yayınları, 2005.

<sup>71</sup> Wetherly, (2005), p. 4.

to incorporate the wills and consciousness of the people. This is an *objectively necessary* condition for capitalism, for “a certain mode of production only continues to exist as long as the reproduction of its conditions of production are provided and maintained”.<sup>72</sup>

As an ideological force, modern law is an important tool of modern society since it denotes sovereignty of the law. According to the modern law, the citizens are equal before the law which is regarded as the expression of the collective will of the citizens. Hereby, modern state can succeed to present itself as if it realized the will of the whole nation and secured the general interests of the society. From the Marxist perspective, this feature of the modern state is closely related with the capacity of one class to practice its *specific objective interests*.<sup>73</sup> It also verifies that the ideas of the dominant class become dominant ideas. In other words, “the dominant class in society is, at the same time, dominant intellectual power”. This is because the class holding the physical means of production also happens to hold the intellectual means of production. Dominance or hegemony is based on its ability to present its *particular* interests as if they were the *general* interests of the whole society.<sup>74</sup> For example, the belief that free enterprise is the essential foundation of prosperity, progress, freedom and democracy and that it is also therefore synonymous with the *national interest* exemplifies that capitalist logic.<sup>75</sup> Eventually, individuals (may) come to believe, consciously or unconsciously, that the best way to secure their country is to constitutionalize the superstructural institutions of capitalism. If they believe in the discourse supported by the ideological interpellation, this means the ideological interpellation of people by the state has succeeded because it has made them ignore or even forget their real life conditions.

So far, I have tried to give a general account of the Marxist arguments. In the sections below, I try to construct a conception of the *socialist interest*. Before doing that, I give concise accounts of the Leninism, the imperialism theory of Lenin and

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<sup>72</sup> Althusser, (2005), (A), pp. 12.

<sup>73</sup> Poulantzas, (1992), pp. 107, 125-126.

<sup>74</sup> Marx and Engels, (2008), (B), pp. 75, 115.

<sup>75</sup> Wetherly, (2005), p. 69.

the world-system theory of Wallerstein, which, it is hoped, will ease the task of developing the conception in question.

#### 4.2. BREAKING POINT:LENINISM

In Russia the thesis of Marx was put into practice, but in a *transformed* manner. The transformation of Marxism resulted in the emergence of Leninism. Then, this couple came to be known as *natural allies* for nearly seventy years. However, Leninism can be seen as the *breaking* point in Marxist epistemology rather than a complement of it. For Marx, the socialist revolution was possible in the Western industrialized countries. And Engels was indicating that it would be a *world* revolution, not a revolution in a *state*.<sup>76</sup> Contrary to the expectations, in 1917, a revolution took place in Russia that had not only a socialist but also a nationalist (defensive) character against imperialism.

Marx and Engels noted that “though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle.”<sup>77</sup> In addition, they were also claiming that “since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, it must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word”.<sup>78</sup> Propositions of Marx and Engels like these may seem contradictory because of their overall unwillingness or ignorance to develop a specific theory of nationalism and nationalist struggle.<sup>79</sup> As they mostly thought in universal terms, it is possible that they did not see it essential to develop specific arguments about nationalism. But, Lenin would later undertake the task which Marx and Engels ignored.

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<sup>76</sup> Marx and Engels, (2008), p. 181.

<sup>77</sup> Marx and Engels, (2008), p. 129.

<sup>78</sup> Marx and Engels, (2008), p. 138.

<sup>79</sup> Benedict Anderson, **Hayali Cemaatler: Milliyetçiliğin Kökenleri ve Yayılması**, (trans.) İskender Savaşır, İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 2007, pp. 17, 8.

In the next section, Leninist conceptualization of imperialism and Wallerstein's world-system theory will be explained. This will make more illuminating what is meant by Leninism, since what led Lenin to revise Marxism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century is closely related to his understanding of imperialism and is of much importance.

#### 4.2.1. Imperialism and World-System

Leninism is the realization of the Marxist principles in a less developed country. Its popularity and alleged legitimacy derives from its conception and analysis of imperialism. According to Lenin, capitalism entered into a new stage, which he described as imperialism. Imperialism, for Lenin, is the highest stage of capitalism. It results from the combination of the capital of the banks that have achieved to incorporate much of the available capital to their own assets and the capital of the monopolistic industrial groups. These monopolistic forces shared the territories of the world and began to influence the foreign policies of *politically* independent states.<sup>80</sup> “Under monopoly capitalism, a two tier structure had developed within the world economy with a dominant core exploiting the less-developed periphery”.<sup>81</sup> Eventually, a structural differentiation between the interests of the world proletariat emerged. This happened because “the capitalists of the core could pacify... their own working class through the further exploitation of the periphery”.<sup>82</sup> For that reason, Lenin advocated a more different strategy for the socialist revolution than the strategy of the internationalist socialist struggle. He advocated a struggle at the national level, as will be discussed later.

Lenin enumerates the characteristics of imperialism as the intensification of the production or monopolism; the export of capital; the emergence of finance capital and finance oligarchy; and the division of the world into spheres of influence

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<sup>80</sup> V. I. Lenin, **Emperyalizm: Kapitalizmin En Yüksek Aşaması**, (trans.) Cemal Süreya, Ankara, Sol Yayınları, 1992, p. 100.

<sup>81</sup> Hobden and Jones, (2001), p. 206.

<sup>82</sup> Hobden and Jones, (2001), p. 206.

of great powers.<sup>83</sup> To start with the first characteristic of imperialism, monopolism, Lenin explains that free market competition of capitalism of the 18<sup>th</sup> century was taken over by the monopolies from the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century on. In addition, the export of capital changed the face of capitalism. In the early years of capitalism, it was the commodity that was exported; but with the imperialist age the capital also started to flow out. The reason for the latter given by Lenin is that the cheap raw materials of the less developed countries make it plausible for the capitalists to invest in these countries.<sup>84</sup> If capital stays only in the borders of these developed countries, in the long run capitalists will lose profit. For that reason, new lands must be opened up for the production.

The next steps, Lenin explains, were the finance capital and finance oligarchy. With the rise of imperialism, the roles of the banks also changed. Finance capital refers to the transformation of the bank capital into the industry capital. As the banks have come to hold large amounts of capital in the imperialist age, there arose a direct relationship between the industries and the banks in the form of the latter providing the former with the credits. This led to the emergence of a finance oligarchy which refers to the sovereignty of the finance capital over the market.<sup>85</sup>

The monopoly capitalism has resulted in the superiority of some countries as *centres* while it has made the rest *periphery*. While some countries were withholding the world surplus-value and improving the life conditions in their own countries, most of the rest were getting poorer day by day. One of the evident characteristics of capitalism is its inclination to *monopolism*. It is not only the working class, which is impoverished continuously; but the capitalists of the *small-sized* production are also repressed and eventually incorporated by the monopolies. This is “the expropriation of the capitalist by another capitalist”.<sup>86</sup> The aim is to create strong monopolies each of which gets specialized in certain type of production. For example, while one monopoly deals with the coffee production, the other deals with the steel production. The production of certain goods depends on the absolute control of the production

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<sup>83</sup> Lenin, (1992), p. 100.

<sup>84</sup> Lenin, (1992), pp. 19-34.

<sup>85</sup> Lenin, (1992), pp. 35-52.

<sup>86</sup> Marx, (1997), p. 597.

process by one monopoly, from the beginning till the end. The production and capital eventually come to be centralized in the hands of a few capitalists or companies. In order to prevent crisis and inflation, monopolies also begin to shape the context of trade rather than trusting in the *invisible* hand of the economy.<sup>87</sup> “With the help of their state apparatuses”<sup>88</sup>, these giant monopolies influence especially the vulnerable parts of the world, rendering them economically weaker and dependent on the core.

Lenin defines England, Russia, France, Germany, United States and Japan as the imperialistic countries of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>89</sup> It is not a coincidence that these states participated in the World War I. The (Marxist-Leninist) reason of the war is monopoly capitalism’s pursuit of raw material from the *peripheral* countries. For the sake of its own capitalist enterprise, each great power tried to colonize as many states of the periphery as possible to get cheap raw material, dividing the world into spheres of influence. The consequence of this situation has been “the declining terms of trade”<sup>90</sup> in the periphery. That means “year by year it [i.e. the periphery] requires more tons of coffee to pay for a refrigerator” because of the *unequal* exchange between the two camps. As a result, peripheral countries become “poorer relative to the core”<sup>91</sup> because there arises a transfer of surplus from the periphery to the core. The *surplus* lies in the *unequal* character of the exchange between the core and the periphery.

In the imperialist age, the capital of the developed core could exploit the less-developed periphery as it has been reinforced by a strong state apparatus.<sup>92</sup> The capital of the core highly depends on its state apparatus.<sup>93</sup> This has resulted in the world proletariat’s losing its homogeneous character and its structural differentiation to the favour of *the proletariat of the centre* and the detriment of *the periphery’s proletariat*. For that reason, Lenin argues that the *de facto* conditions of the

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<sup>87</sup> Lenin, (1992), pp. 92-93.

<sup>88</sup> Wallerstein, (2004), p. 55.

<sup>89</sup> Lenin, (1992), p. 91.

<sup>90</sup> Hobden and Jones, (2001), p. 206.

<sup>91</sup> Hobden and Jones, (2001), p. 206.

<sup>92</sup> Lenin, (1992), pp. 102-103.

<sup>93</sup> Wallerstein, (2004), p. 55.

proletariat of the exploited countries and the proletariat of the exploiting countries cannot be the same in terms of the *national question*. For Lenin there are economical, political and ideological differences within the world proletariat.

Lenin claims that the proletariat of the developed countries benefits from the *super profits*, which the capitalists of the developed world get, among others, by means of exploiting the working class of the underdeveloped countries. According to Lenin, the economical statistics show that the proletariat of the developed countries, when compared with the proletariat of the less developed countries, are becoming *straw bosses* and a big amount of these workers are becoming *worker aristocrat*.<sup>94</sup> Politically speaking, the proletariat of the developed world have many privileges in the political domain (i.e. the trade unions and the right of collective bargaining).<sup>95</sup> Ideologically, the proletariat of the developed world are taught in schools to scoff the proletariat of the underdeveloped countries,<sup>96</sup> accentuating the division between the two.

As a result of these three differences, Lenin concludes that there is a *dualism* (independent from the wills of individuals) as far as the proletariat and its interests are concerned. He says that the *International Working Men's Association* consists of the workers who are divided into two camps: the workers of the exploiting nations and the workers of the exploited nations. Inevitably, the propaganda of the International cannot be the same for these two camps.<sup>97</sup>

As for Wallerstein's world-system theory, its origins "can be traced back to... Lenin".<sup>98</sup> Wallerstein defines the world system as exploitative exchange relations between a developed core and an underdeveloped periphery. He focuses on the differing economic roles played by different regions. There are three zones in his theoretical frame: core, semi-periphery and periphery. According to world-system

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<sup>94</sup> V. I. Lenin, **Emperyalist Ekonomizm: Marksizmin Bir Karikatürü**, (trans.) Yurdakul Fincancı, Ankara, Sol Yayınları, 1991, p. 53.

<sup>95</sup> Lenin, (1991), p. 53.

<sup>96</sup> Lenin, (1991), p. 53.

<sup>97</sup> Lenin, (1991), p. 54.

<sup>98</sup> Hobden and Jones, (2001), p. 205.

theory, “the three zones of world economy are linked together in an exploitative relationship in which wealth is drained away from the periphery to the centre”.<sup>99</sup> Despite Cox’s claim that “this theory has... though unintended, system-maintenance bias”,<sup>100</sup> the world-system theory is useful for analysing the world economy. Wallerstein has a holistic ontology as is also acknowledged by Wendt.<sup>101</sup> Wendt makes an analogy between “Althusser’s insistence on the absolute ontological priority of the whole over the parts” and Wallerstein’s taking the world system (as a whole) as his unit of analysis.<sup>102</sup>

Wallerstein argues that traders and firms are not enough to speak about capitalism, as there have been such people or organizations for thousands of years. The wage labour cannot also suffice to prove the existence of capitalism, since “it is possible to claim that we live in a capitalist society, only if the system gives priority to the infinite accumulation of capital”.<sup>103</sup> The infinite accumulation of capital means that there are *structural* mechanisms in the system and the ones behaving contrary to these structural demands of capitalist world system will be punished by the mechanisms of the system.<sup>104</sup> As Waltz, Wallerstein also points to structural restraints on the behaviour of units.

For Wallerstein, there are two types of world system: world empires and world economies. Capitalist world economy is different from world empires in that the former is multi-centric while the latter is directed from one centre: “In a world empire a centralized political system uses its power to redistribute resources from peripheral areas to the central core area”.<sup>105</sup> In a world economy, on the other hand, there is no single political authority. In contrast, there are many actors operating in a

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<sup>99</sup> Hobden and Jones, (2001), p. 208.

<sup>100</sup> Cox, (1981), p. 1539.

<sup>101</sup> Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, **International Organization**, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1987, p. 336.

<sup>102</sup> Wendt, (1987), p. 345.

<sup>103</sup> Wallerstein, (2004), p. 46.

<sup>104</sup> Wallerstein, (2004), p. 46.

<sup>105</sup> Hobden and Jones, (2001), p. 206.

world economy. The main actors related to this discussion are market, firms, and states.<sup>106</sup>

The market in the classical economy theory is based on free competition, which leads to a long-term balance between supply and demand. In theory, the state's interference into the economic activities is rejected, because it is believed that the forces competing *freely* in market can determine the context of the market and in the long term their competition will make contribution to the *general* well-being of the society. Its logic is that if everyone follows its own interests, the society's interests will also be satisfied. Against this classical schema, Wallerstein claims that a free market did never occur. This is because the operation of the market always needed and needs some interference by the state. Thus, the ideal of free trade as assumed by the classical economic theory is a *myth*. If a free market existed, then it would be possible that buyers could draw the prices down after a rational *bargaining*, with the result that, the seller could not get the benefit hoped. For that reason, Wallerstein argues, sellers always need partial-monopoly. Instead of competitive firms in the market, there are *partial-monopolies*. By means of these partial monopolies, sellers get the chance of creating a margin between the costs of production and the prices. And it is the state apparatus that uses its power to create and maintain such partial-monopolies in the first place. Through subsidies, tax-cuts and protectionist measures these partial-monopolies are sustained.<sup>107</sup>

Firms are another main actor in Wallerstein's world-system theory. They are the primary agents of the market. But they are also opponents of one another. As their ultimate aim is the maximization of profit, it is natural that some firms will be eliminated from the system by the logic of the market. If every firm succeeded to accumulate capital, there would be no point in trading, since all of the firms would get less benefit than they could in the circumstance of the operation of fewer firms in the market. So, the elimination of the *weak capital* from the market is the *sine qua*

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<sup>106</sup> Wallerstein, (2004), p. 47.

<sup>107</sup> Wallerstein, (2004), pp. 47-49.

*non* of the accumulation of capital. As a result, there arise few strong firms with high political influence.<sup>108</sup>

The division of labour in the world economy divides the production in terms of the production of the goods peculiar to the core (mainly industrial goods) and the production of the goods peculiar to the periphery (predominantly raw agricultural goods). As the unit price of the former is significantly higher than that of the latter, “[w]hat core-periphery dichotomy implies is the degree of the profit”.<sup>109</sup> Since the profit is directly related to the monopolization, the process of the production in the core is controlled by the partial-monopolies. On the other hand, within the production process in the periphery an *unfair competition* takes place, as there is not a strong state that can defend the interests of the periphery’s working class and masses while the capital of the core pulls the elites of the periphery to its own side.<sup>110</sup> Since the partial-monopolies are tied to the patronage of the powerful states, the exchange between the core and the periphery becomes an *unequal* one. This enables a continuous transfer of surplus value from the producers of the periphery to the producers of the core.<sup>111</sup>

States are the most prominent supporters of the monopolized firms. Unless such state support existed in a world economy, it would not be possible for the elements of the core to earn *super profits*. This is because firms compete with each other by means of their own state apparatuses.<sup>112</sup> They use their own state apparatuses both for the competition between themselves and for the *pacification* of the peripheral elements. Not being a direct follower of the Leninist understanding, the world system theory, however, includes many theoretical arguments similar to Lenin’s theory of imperialism. At least, two writers agree on the fact that there is a *disproportional* or *unequal* relationship between the states of the centre and those of the periphery. This leads Lenin to conclude that the duty of the proletariat and the

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<sup>108</sup> Wallerstein, (2004), p. 51.

<sup>109</sup> Wallerstein, (2004), p. 50.

<sup>110</sup> Atila Eralp, “Hegemony”, Atila Eralp (ed.), **Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar**, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2006, p. 174.

<sup>111</sup> Wallerstein, (2004), p. 52.

<sup>112</sup> Wallerstein, (2004), p. 55.

nationalists in the periphery cannot be the same as the duty of the proletariat and the nationalists of the developed core. One of the duties of the proletariat of the undeveloped periphery is to get the right of the self-determination. This right is closely related to the nationalist movements. Lenin gave much importance to the national issues as Russia and China (later) were the countries in which there were two enemies. The enemy outside was the imperialism and the enemy inside was the feudalism.<sup>113</sup> For that reason, the socialist revolution must give priority to the accomplishment of two steps. The first one is the nationalist step and the other is the socialist step. The national issue of Leninism should be thought of in this context.

#### 4.2.2. The Socialist Interest

Classical Marxism does not believe that a class state can have a national interest as the representative of the general will of the nation. It claims that only classes in the society can have certain interests, depending on their *structural positions* in the system. In Marxist epistemology, the national interest is the interest of the dominant class, which has achieved to hold the political power in the state. The main proposition that can be derived from the classical Marxist theory about the national interest is that a society based on class conflict cannot have any real *national interest*. This is because the main conflict is between the owners of the means of production and the working class, not between competing nation-states. For that reason, the *real interest* can only be the expropriation of the means of production by the labour in order to get rid of “the contradiction between the mode of [collectivist] production and the [individualistic] property relations” and give rise to new relations of production.<sup>114</sup> This contradiction is the main antinomy of capitalist society. For Marxism, transcending this contradiction is related to the emancipation of human beings, in particular the working class. As the alienation of people depends on the very nature of capitalism, the capitalist relations of production must be replaced by the communist relations of production so that an emancipated

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<sup>113</sup> Murat Sarıca, **100 Soruda Siyasi Düşünce Tarihi**, İstanbul, Gerçek Yayınevi, 1987, p. 170.

<sup>114</sup> Wood, (2004), p. 76.

world can be created.<sup>115</sup> Capitalism is neither the order of nature nor is it based on a *harmony of interests* between the capital and the labour. Rather, there is a constant struggle between the labour and the capital about the nature and conditions of work, and how the surplus is to be divided.<sup>116</sup> For that reason, Marxism suggests that without freeing the production process and overcoming the alienation of people, it is impossible to emancipate the society, the real *interest* of which depends on transcending capitalist relations of production.<sup>117</sup> But, transcending the contemporary society entails the socialist struggle. What may be the path that the socialist struggle can follow?

This section tries to construct the concept of the *socialist interest* in tandem with the Marxist aim of transcending the capitalist society. The socialist interest is developed in reference to Lenin and Gramsci. The concept of the *national interest* of the *realpolitik* thinking is not suitable to operationalize in the Marxist literature because the two schools speak different *languages*. For that reason, the transformation of the concept of the *national interest* is required in order to avoid being *trapped* in *realpolitik* theorising with the Marxist arguments. As will be seen, the transformed concept may seem like the manifesto or declaration of some Marxist movement or party. But this should be seen natural because Marxism believes in the unity of theory and practice. For that reason, it should not be a surprise to see a socialist schema of the revolution unfolding below. It is preferable to start the discussion by briefly mentioning the *political party* understanding of Gramsci and Lenin.

Gramsci claims that in the *modern* age the actor is not an individual like Machiavelli's prince; instead, the actor is the political party as a modern prince.<sup>118</sup> Gramsci enumerates three necessary conditions for establishing a political party. The first one is the ordinary people who are necessary for the continuity of the party. They are not expected to know everything about Marx's teachings. Their number is

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<sup>115</sup> Wolff, (2002), p. 45.

<sup>116</sup> Wolff, (2002), p. 118.

<sup>117</sup> Rockmore, (2002), pp. 61-62.

<sup>118</sup> Antonio Gramsci, **Modern Prens**, (trans.) Pars Esin, Ankara, Birey ve Toplum Yayıncılık, 1984, p. 36.

much more important than their quality. They may be all workers or consist of different groups like intellectuals and other segments of the society. But the hegemonic leadership must belong to the working class. The second one is the professional cadre, which is to lead the party and the masses. The third one is the moral and intellectual relationship between these two.<sup>119</sup> All these make the political party very much like a *Jacobin engineer*.<sup>120</sup> It has a *leading* (avant-garde) character and a *regulatory* function, aiming to enlighten the population and develop class consciousness. It is seen as the expression of the “doctrinal orthodoxy”.<sup>121</sup>

The political party must be *national*. Because of the unequal development of the world proletariat under the conditions of imperialism, the role each socialist/communist party must play is different from each other. For example, in Italy, the construction of the *national popular* (as a counter-bloc) was closely related to the success to incorporate the South. To form a national popular, it was necessary to “enable communication among the cultural levels”<sup>122</sup> and to “form alliances with other subordinate groups, particularly the peasantry and the intellectuals”.<sup>123</sup> Lenin also emphasizes this necessity by arguing that “the revolutionary party must adopt the struggles of *all* oppressed groups and classes, not just the economic struggle of the industrial working class”.<sup>124</sup> The working class can be the *hegemonic* leader only if it mobilizes “the majority of the working population against capitalism and the bourgeois State”.<sup>125</sup> How can a political party be the hegemonic leader and gain the consent of the subalterns? For Gramsci it is possible with *the war of position*, which means “actively building a counter-hegemony within an established hegemony”.<sup>126</sup> *War of position* means creating *consent* in the civil society. For example, establishing “positive relationship with the news media before an election”<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Gramsci, (1984), pp. 43-44.

<sup>120</sup> Maurice Duverger, **Diktatörlük Üstüne**, (trans.) Bülent Tanör, İstanbul, Dönem Yayınları, 1965, p. 72.

<sup>121</sup> Maurice Duverger, **Siyaset Sosyolojisi**, (trans.) Şirin Tekeli, İstanbul, Varlık Yayınları, 2004, p. 314.

<sup>122</sup> Steve Jones, **Antonio Gramsci**, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 36.

<sup>123</sup> Jones, (2006), p. 42.

<sup>124</sup> Jones, (2006), p. 43.

<sup>125</sup> Jones, (2006), p. 45.

<sup>126</sup> Andrew Deak, “The Condition of Hegemony and the Possibility of Resistance”, **Undercurrent**, Vol. 2, No. 3. 2005, p. 48.

<sup>127</sup> Jones, (2006), p. 31.

illustrates the war of position. It is a war in the superstructure of the society. In war of position, “the meanings and values become the object of the struggle”.<sup>128</sup> It is the necessary step in order to form alliance among the whole nation. After forming the political party and succeeding to gain the consent of the subalterns in addition to the working class, there arises the issue of policy-choice. I want to comment on the policy-choice in reference to Lenin’s concept of *dualism*.

Lenin indicates that “the social revolution can no longer be the united action of the proletariat of the whole world”.<sup>129</sup> Because of the unequal development between states, the proletariat of the core must work for the promotion of the socialist principles whereas the proletariat of the periphery must *primarily* work for the national defence since imperialism<sup>130</sup> is the worldwide phenomenon affecting every aspect of life. In addition, imperialism’s superstructure is *conservatism* instead of the democracy of the classical competitive capitalism.<sup>131</sup> If we also take into consideration the late *becoming-nation* of the Asian or African *communities*, the importance of the nationalist struggles becomes obvious. Stalin sees it legitimate to support every nationalist struggle (be it feudal, monarchist or conservative) against imperialism<sup>132</sup> because every counter-movement against imperialism is for the benefit of the socialist strategy. For that reason, the first step is nationalistic for the proletariat of the periphery. But the same situation is not valid for the proletariat of the core. Because the proletariat of the core must be opposed to all forms of nationalism in favour of the universal solidarity of the working class.<sup>133</sup> The proletariat of the developed core must work for the *class* unification in lieu of dealing with national questions, since the states of the core had completed their *nationhood* (as a necessary step of capitalism) long time ago. “[T]here are not left any general national aims that must be accomplished now”<sup>134</sup> in the core. The

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<sup>128</sup> Jones, (2006), p. 31.

<sup>129</sup> Lenin, (1991), p. 56.

<sup>130</sup> The *socialist interest* conception is developed with regard to Lenin’s *imperialism* theory. *A priori* of this section is imperialism.

<sup>131</sup> Lenin, (1991), p. 139.

<sup>132</sup> Sarıca, (1987), p. 166. See also V. I. Lenin, *Ulusal ve Sömürgeci Ulusal Sorun Üzerine*, (trans.) İsmail Yarkin, Süheyla Kaya, Saliha Kaya, Ankara, İnter Yayınları, 1998, p. 305.

<sup>133</sup> Lenin, (1998), p. 305.

<sup>134</sup> Lenin, (1991), p. 57.

general aim here refers to the building of the nation-state as the territorial borders of capitalist market.

It can be concluded that imperialism, as an economical and political issue, must be *contained* by the proletariat of the core and the periphery in line with the socialist interest. Because of the national question in the periphery, it is quite natural that there may arise controversies about the nationhood. At this point, Leninism will be a proper guide to tackle the national question within the confines of the Marxist framework. This renders possible to speak about the right of national self-determination. Lenin proposed the right of self-determination to the nations under the sovereignty of the Russian Empire. He thought that the structure of the newly founded Soviet system had to depend on the consent of all the nations and on the mutual recognition, not on assimilation. Lenin was seeing the nationalist struggles as the first steps towards a socialist state. For Lenin, the national independence would follow a rebellion or an armed struggle since he believed freedom could not be granted but only be won.<sup>135</sup>

The struggle of the nationalists against imperialism must seek to accomplish two objectives: the enlargement of the democratic platform as much as possible and trying to hold the state power. The necessity of developing democratic platform is because of the imperialism's dependence on *conservatism*.<sup>136</sup> The latter may lead imperialism to prompt military dictatorships guarding the capitalist states at the periphery. This makes the struggle for democracy at the periphery an imperative, since the democratic form of governance increases the chances of people to attend socialist movements.<sup>137</sup> It is through free elections and the creation of socialist consciousness in the public that the transformation of society can be possible. Thus, according to Lenin, the Marxists should not repudiate the requirement of using all the alternatives provided by the democratic system on the condition that they must try to transcend the democratic structure instead of being restricted in that structure.

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<sup>135</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, **Liberalizmden Sonra**, (trans.) Erol Öz, İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 1998, p. 137.

<sup>136</sup> Lenin, (1991), p. 39.

<sup>137</sup> Lenin, (1991), p. 70.

It must be stressed that the struggle must not only be confined to the national level although the national bloc is the primary. The coalition of national counter blocs against the hegemonic power and the capitalist world-system can also be constructed. The struggle can only be *tactically* bound to the national level. It is practically necessary to form national struggles because of the unequal development. However, theoretically there is only one proletarian interest: the socialism and then the communism. Lenin notes that “the general interests of the working class entails the unity of all workers from different national affiliations in the proletarian organizations”.<sup>138</sup> As a result, the respect for difference about the national belongings must not be *prior* to the general interests of the world proletariat. Against the hegemony of the dominant power and its ideology, the working class must be cautious.<sup>139</sup> For that reason, the working class must know that the nationalist struggles in the periphery are not for the national ambitions; but they are for the unification of all the repressed populations against imperialism and hegemony.<sup>140</sup>

The argument of the socialist interest described so far is a theoretical framework developed in reference to the Leninist and Gramscian concepts. It may help us to think what the Marxist stance towards national questions can be. It is only a framework. As mentioned before, there is not an explicit argument of the national interest in the Marxist literature. For that reason, the socialist interest conception as developed here is only a *theoretical construction* instead of the prescription of a *real* socialist revolution, which is based on the analysis and observation of the current phenomena in world politics. It is constructed by using some of the key concepts of Lenin and Gramsci. It may be seen as time- and space-bound because the arguments mentioned are very old rather than being current analyses. Thus, this last section must only be regarded as an *attempt* to systematize the arguments presented in the preceding sections.

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<sup>138</sup> Lenin, (1998), p. 508.

<sup>139</sup> Lenin, (1998), pp. 100-101.

<sup>140</sup> Lenin, (1998), p. 151.

## Conclusion

Without repeating the arguments put forward so far, as a conclusion, it can be said that this chapter tried to deduce an interest conception from the approaches of important Marxist thinkers such as Lenin, Gramsci and Wallerstein. The first two of these thinkers were also activists, being the actors of a certain period. Although their approaches and evaluations can be and were referred to for many years, it is necessary to state that these thinkers are not like Marx. They are the actors of a *specific* time and place while Marx is a theoretician in addition to his activist character. Marxism has become a doctrine which was deployed in different contexts in different ways. For example, the means and the conditions in Russia, China, Cuba, Vietnam or the Eastern bloc countries in Europe were not the same with regards to the application of Marxism which is like a *book* with some propositions which were read with different interpretations by different actors. Moreover, its propositions entail a developed Western country. When one looks at the Communist Party Manifesto (even superficially), it can easily be seen that Marx was not the thinker of the whole world but he was essentially *Euro-centric*. This was inevitable because his theory is based on the analysis of industrialism, not feudalism for instance.

As a result, it can be stated that Marx's estimates did not come to pass. However, his ideas were applied in the contexts which he may not even have imagined. Thus, when one speaks about Marxism it is necessary to ask her/him which Marxism s/he exactly is referring to. Because there is no more one Marxism but many Marxisms, some of which found the chance of being applied and some of which did not. Leninism is, for example, is one of the variations of Marxist theory, which had such a chance. Gramsci is another proponent of Marxist practice in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Both Lenin and Gramsci with their insights and experiments about the nature of the socialist revolution are referred to in this section to construct the concept of the socialist interest. Therefore, the socialist interest developed in this section *must* not be regarded as the exact definition of the Marxist understanding of the politics. Rather, it must be seen as a *constructed* discourse in the light of the experiences of the world communist movement of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

## FIFTH CHAPTER

### CRITICAL THEORY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Critical theory aims to transcend the contemporary world. It can be regarded as one step further than the *conventional* theories called as “problem-solving”<sup>1</sup> theories. Critical theory contains “an element of utopianism in the sense that it can represent a coherent picture of an alternative world order”.<sup>2</sup> Its aims are to *criticize* and to *change*, as Horkhemier puts it.<sup>3</sup> The aim of the criticism is not to maintain the conditions within which the system can reproduce itself, but “the point is to change it” rather than only interpret it.<sup>4</sup> Critical theory is a method rather than a theory. So, every perspective can use it in its own epistemological context. For example, the critique of the feminist theory and the critique of the Coxian theory do not resemble each other. But both of them can meet on a common ground, the principles of which are to criticize and change. For that reason, rather than seeing the critical theory as a monolithic theory with its own formulations and mathematical schemas, it is more suitable to see it as a *normative* enterprise.

With an aim to make a review of the critical theory and to develop a critical understanding of the concept of the national interest, this chapter is divided into twelve sections. In the first section, positivism and rationality are evaluated from a critical perspective. It is argued that reason has become an apparatus of the technique and lost its critical characteristic. Hence, trusting in the validity of rationality does not mean anything because the reason lost its productive capability and became an instrumental tool. In the second part, realism and neorealism are criticized because of their problem-solving features. They are described as conservative ideologies, which try only to maintain the existing status quo rather than change it. They are defined as the extensions of the modern mind, which constructed itself on the binary

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<sup>1</sup> Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1981, p. 1541.

<sup>2</sup> Cox, (1981), pp. 1541-1542.

<sup>3</sup> Max Horkheimer, **Akil Tutulması**, (trans.) Orhan Koçak, İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 2008, p. 183.

<sup>4</sup> Friedrich Engels, **Ludwig Feuerbach ve Klasik Alman Felsefesinin Sonu**, (trans.) Sevim Belli, Ankara, Sol Yayınları, 2006, p. 64.

oppositions. In the case of realism and neorealism, this opposition displays itself as the distinction between the inside and the outside of the state. In the third part, a critique of modernity is provided. Without a critique of modernity, it would be meaningless to discuss the possibilities of alternative world orders. In the fourth part, the features and the aims of the critical theory are discussed. Its methodological and epistemological propositions are evaluated. The critical theory is seen as a normative enterprise. In the fifth part, the issues of nation and nationalism are briefly evaluated. It is claimed that there is no validity of the concept of the nation in terms of the critical theory. Nations are described as the imagined communities. In the sixth part, the effects of globalization on the structure of the nation-state are discussed and it is claimed that globalization weakens the state authority. In the seventh part, a description of the world citizenship is provided and the notion of the world citizenship is seen as the inevitable and necessary part of the critical international theory. In the eighth part, an emphasis on the notions of difference and identity are discussed. They are seen as the prerequisites of an alternative democratic world order. In the ninth part, Habermasian rationality is discussed because of its possible contribution to the development of a democratic culture. In the tenth part, postmodernism and its main implications are discussed. In the eleventh part, feminist critique is looked into and it is seen as a necessary tool of the critical theory because of its emphasis on the notion of difference and its critique of the masculine-based nature of IR. In the last part, the concept of the national interest is inverted by purifying it from all its realist or neorealist content. The national interest is changed as *the interest of the humanity* and the democratic culture. A critical international theory cannot take the concept of the national interest for granted but it enlarges it for the benefit of the all humanity. For that reason, in the final section on the national interest, the requisites of an alternative world order are discussed with a view to that emancipatory aim in mind. The concept of the *humanity's interest* developed in that section is *constructed* by referring to the arguments analysed in this chapter.

It is important to state that this chapter does not contain all of the ideas referred to as *critical* in the literature and is limited in scope. In addition, since the Gramscian understanding of hegemony was mentioned in the chapter of Marxism,

the Coxian critical theory is not discussed in this chapter. This section focuses on the critical theory's criticism's of the contemporary society and its objective of transcending it by *peaceful democratic* means.

## 5.1. CRITIQUE of POSITIVISM AND RATIONALITY

With the Enlightenment, it was thought that human beings could deal with all the phenomena in the world with the help of the *positivist reason*. There emerged a faith in positivism as a reliable means of science. The aim was to gain "control both over the nature and the society".<sup>5</sup> As a "philosophical technocracy"<sup>6</sup> positivism had a logic like that of the engineering. Positivism would not construct bridges or skyscrapers but it would construct the *mentality* believing in the necessity of all these buildings. Positivism was firstly applied in the natural sciences, but then the argument claiming that "the social world [was also] amenable to the same kinds of analysis as those applicable to the natural world" arose.<sup>7</sup> There were some rules the analyst had to obey to carry out his/her research. They can be enumerated as the distinction between the subject and the object, "the separation between facts and values", "a commitment to uncovering patterns and regularities in the social world" and "a commitment to empiricism as the arbiter of what counts as knowledge".<sup>8</sup>

The distinction between the subject and the object signifies that the object, regardless of its observation by the subject, displays the same (patterned) behaviour all the time. "Positivism is another form of empiricism",<sup>9</sup> which needs a *human subject*, which will observe the objects and list their characteristics. The separation between facts and values implies that the observer can distinguish his/her personal

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<sup>5</sup> Jürgen Habermas, '**İdeoloji' Olarak Teknik ve Bilim**, (trans.) Mustafa Tüzel, İstanbul, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2007, p. 34.

<sup>6</sup> Horkheimer, (2008), p. 95.

<sup>7</sup> Steve Smith, "The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: "Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline"", **International Studies Review**, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2002, p. 71.

<sup>8</sup> Smith, (2002), p. 71.

<sup>9</sup> Levent Köker, **İki Farklı Siyaset: Bilgi Teorisi-Siyaset Bilimi İlişkisi Açısından Pozitivizm ve Eleştirel Teori**, Ankara, Vadi Yayınları, 1998, pp. 21-22.

beliefs from the object analysed. The commitment to find out regularities means that there are repetitions and regularities in the social world. The aim of the theory is not to understand all the events in the world, but to discover some of the underlying *causes* assumed to have regular and systematic characteristics. The theory, while doing that, omits some other ones, since trying to include all the phenomena will distort the conduct of the theory. As Köker puts it, “every theoretical attempt trying to explain the whole creates a system [theory] devoid of the possibility of being tested”.<sup>10</sup> From the empiricist perspective, science must depend on proposals with logical internal coherence.<sup>11</sup> This means the theory must have hypotheses *testable* by anyone who wishes to observe whether the theory’s presumed argument will come true or not.

*One* of the most significant features of the *rationalist* modern era is the *mechanized* mass production. This mode of production entails division of labour, which leads to alienation among human beings engaged in the production process. This alienation is not only *among* human beings but also *inside* them and between human beings and the nature. This is because mechanized production results in the formalization of the reason.<sup>12</sup> Formalization of the reason signifies the instrumental character of the reason in the society. The mechanical mass production is associated with the emergence of the mathematical and analytical formulations, which took over the status of mental activities.<sup>13</sup> Concepts of the language have become “rationalized, labor-saving devices”.<sup>14</sup> “Reason has become completely harnessed to the social process. Its role in the domination of men and nature has been made the sole criterion”.<sup>15</sup> Accordingly, ideas and reason have become *instrumentalized*. “They are considered things, machines”.<sup>16</sup> So, what/who does reason work for? It works for the maintenance of the system and the people who benefit from the maintenance of this system. For that reason, nothing is pure in modern era; but everything is related with some other things in the system. The *economization* of the

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<sup>10</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 28.

<sup>11</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 33.

<sup>12</sup> Horkheimer, (2008), p. 66.

<sup>13</sup> Horkheimer, (2008), p. 69.

<sup>14</sup> Horkheimer, (2008), p. 68.

<sup>15</sup> Horkheimer, (2008), p. 67.

<sup>16</sup> Horkheimer, (2008), p. 68.

concepts and the reduction of the language to a *problem-solving* device reflect the modern positivist mentality, which emphasizes the importance of the control over the nature and the society.

Feyerabend claims that science is not an autonomous activity any more. It has gained a leading role similar to that of the Catholic Church, which erstwhile shaped the trajectory of the society.<sup>17</sup> Despite his harsh criticisms, Feyerabend has nonetheless a faith in the *supremacy* of science when compared to other modes of investigations. But he believes that the other modes of thought and conceptual frameworks must also acquire an equal place in the society like science.<sup>18</sup> This is because “*political* relativism”,<sup>19</sup> which means the right of every group or people to express their own ideas and beliefs, can help us to create a free society if we really desire that condition. Feyerabend is only opposed to the *fetish* of science. He suggests that science be an open zone that can be observed by anyone who wishes. This means the attendance of the public to the development of scientific investigations. That is the first path to a *free society*. But this does not necessarily mean chaos. Every analytical tool must grasp its own *legitimacy* by means of the validity of its discourse and methods. To that end the necessary step is to purify science from its positivist clothes and also to “separate science from the state”<sup>20</sup> since science is not as neutral as liberals claim.<sup>21</sup> As Marcuse notes, its positivist assumptions and technical rationality are in a mutual relationship with the interests of the dominant group in the society. The interests of the dominant group were not incorporated in the nature of science *later* on as they are “naturally allied with the structure of the technical apparatus”.<sup>22</sup> For that reason, the relationship between reason and *technical* understanding of science must be ruptured. Science is not

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<sup>17</sup> Paul Feyerabend, **Özgür Bir Toplumda Bilim**, (trans.) Ahmet Kardam, İstanbul, Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1999, p. 100.

<sup>18</sup> Feyerabend, (1999), p. 131.

<sup>19</sup> Feyerabend, (1999), p. 112.

<sup>20</sup> Feyerabend, (1999), pp. 140, 138.

<sup>21</sup> Feyerabend, (1999), p. 110.

<sup>22</sup> Habermas, (2007), p. 34.

under the monopoly of positivist mentality but it can also develop newer conceptions apart from positivism.<sup>23</sup>

One is right to ask how the transcendence of the contemporary society against the will of the dominant group will be achieved. As most of these thinkers mentioned are generally anarchists or communists that lost their belief in the validity and necessity of the historical role of the proletariat to change the system, the way often proposed to subsume this repressive society is the “activism of citizenship”.<sup>24</sup> As Feyerabend argues, the attendance of people to public events, and their conscious events and decisions can help to transform the structure of the society in the long term.<sup>25</sup>

## 5.2. CRITIQUE of REALISM AND (NEO)REALISM

Mainstream IR refers to the hegemonic status of realism and neorealism in the academic literature. Such status signifies the “problem-solving”<sup>26</sup> characteristic of these two traditions. This section aims to unveil their status quo-biased tendencies and criticize them with an emancipatory intent.

As Weber states, both realists and neorealists agree on the fact that the most important goal of all states is to survive. “The only way that states can reasonably ensure their survival is to increase their power”. Claiming that power is essential for the preservation of the self, realists and neorealists also agree that “there is no way out of international anarchy”.<sup>27</sup> But they disagree about the causes of wars. Realists believe that the war is a result of the flawed human nature. On the other hand, neorealists are mostly inclined to find the causes of war in the international

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<sup>23</sup> İsmet Özel, *Üç Mesele: Teknik-Medeniyet-Yabancılaşma*, İstanbul, Şule Yayınları, 2008, pp. 145-152.

<sup>24</sup> Feyerabend, (1999), p. 142.

<sup>25</sup> Feyerabend, (1999), p. 142.

<sup>26</sup> Cox, (1981), p. 1540.

<sup>27</sup> Cynthia Weber, *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction*, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 16.

structure.<sup>28</sup> However, both schools agree on the maximization of power to ensure security. Why is power to be maximized? From whom/what is the state to be secured? These questions force us to analyse the realist conceptualization of the state and to make some critiques of the realist writings.

Both realism and neorealism treats the state as a unit. For the two schools, “the state is a *territorially-based political* unit... [with] a central decision-making and enforcement machinery”.<sup>29</sup> The state is a sovereign power both internally and externally. Internal sovereignty implies “domestic hierarchy and vertical order”.<sup>30</sup> External sovereignty refers to “equality and the possibility of horizontal disorder”.<sup>31</sup> What external sovereignty and internal sovereignty imply constitutes the main critical question, since the distinction made between the inside and the outside (internal vs. external) is the extension of the modern mind. That means the modern states system is constructed on such arbitrary (maybe historically necessary) dichotomies. For Realpolitik thinking, “there are two political spaces in the modern world of sovereign states; one within states and another between states”.<sup>32</sup> When such a binary opposition is *constructed* in state terminology, then it becomes inevitable that “inside states there is justice, law, freedom and social progress made possible by the sovereign authority governing the state”.<sup>33</sup> After such a conceptualization, however, the same concepts like justice and law cannot be attributed to the international space. This is because the difference between the inside and the outside or between *us* and *them* must be maintained in order to ensure legitimacy for the state’s actions. For that reason,

*in the international space time is framed differently: here the idea of progress is replaced by repetition or the deferment of the progressive project into eternity. The self-interested states and/or the lack of*

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<sup>28</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 16.

<sup>29</sup> Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, **Understanding International Relations**, 3rd edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 63-64.

<sup>30</sup> Gabriella Slomp, “On Sovereignty”, Trevor C. Salmon and Mark F. Imber (ed.s), **Issues in International Relations**, 2nd Edition, New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 41.

<sup>31</sup> Slomp, (2008), p. 41.

<sup>32</sup> Lene Hansen, “R.B.J.Walker and International Relations: deconstructing a discipline”, Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever (ed.s), **The Future of International Relations**, London, Routledge, 1997, p. 342.

<sup>33</sup> Hansen, (1997), p. 342.

*overarching authority lead to a (potential) state of conflict, power politics and war.*<sup>34</sup>

Realpolitik thought attributes a *self-help* character to the state. According to this principle, the state is assumed to operate in an anarchic environment. For that reason, it must only depend on its own power. Such realist arguments will inevitably arrive at the idealization of the state as the most valid form of political organization. Against such realist thoughts, “critical international theory seeks to provide a social theory of the state” rather than taking the state for granted.<sup>35</sup> Critical theory problematizes the structure of the state. In addition to accepting the modern capitalist era as a contest between the labour and the capital, critical theorists go much further than this basic clash of the modern period. Critical theory claims that it is not only the working class subjugated within the modern state; but there are also minorities, women, and marginalized groups, or, shortly, the *atonal* particulars against the massing universality of the modern state. As the exclusionary and gendered structure of the state will be discussed later, this argument will not be further elaborated in this section.

It is appropriate to finish this section by indicating the consequences of the realist conceptualization of the state. As realism thinks of the state as a decision-making entity with a corporate body, the competitive behaviour of units in the international system against one another is not interesting since the main interest of all states is survival. And such a competition between states causes each state to see other states as means to satisfy its needs. So states “use one another as mere things to be manipulated, controlled, deflected, or balanced”.<sup>36</sup> That means each state continues to be the *other* of the other state. As survival and the anarchic environment are conceptualized in an *unchangeable* and irreversible manner, it becomes natural to expect state behaviour to be egoistic and to criticize the states which follow friendly

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<sup>34</sup> Hansen, (1997), p. 342.

<sup>35</sup> Richard Devetak, “Critical Theory”, Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True (ed.s), **Theories of International Relations**, 3rd edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, (A), p. 150.

<sup>36</sup> Richard K. Ashley, “Political Realism and Human Interests”, **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1981, p. 219.

or cooperative foreign policies. Two points must be made here. The first one is from Habermas and the other is the danger of “reproducing ‘what is’”.<sup>37</sup>

Habermas identified three knowledge-constitutive interests. The first one is the practical cognitive interest, the second one is the technical cognitive interest and the last one is the emancipatory cognitive interest. The first implies the desire to know and to act in a possible manner. The second implies the knowledge of the things but it also contains “extending control over objects in the subject’s behaviour”.<sup>38</sup> The third one is related to emancipation from “hypostatized forces”<sup>39</sup> and aims at human autonomy and critical science.

The second category of Habermas fits into the nature of both realist schools. Referring to Waltz, Ashley argues that the neorealist understanding of theory encourages exercising control over a particular situation.<sup>40</sup> For the neorealists, “the usefulness of theoretical explanation resides in its capacities to *orient purposive-rational attempts to exert control over an objectified reality*”.<sup>41</sup> Then, “struggles for power among states”<sup>42</sup> becomes an ordinary phenomenon. However, the important point is that such realist and neorealist conceptualizations such as power, interest and so on, in the final analysis, work for the benefit of powerful states. As Smith argues, reinforcing the dialectical relationship between the foreign policy centres and the academy causes the emergence of “the hegemonic country and hegemonic discipline”.<sup>43</sup> He says that “the US view of International Relations as a social science has led to the subject strongly reflecting US policy concerns”<sup>44</sup> because the values and norms inevitably reflect the power of the powerful.<sup>45</sup> In other words, the

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<sup>37</sup> Marysia Zalewski, “‘All these theories yet the bodies keep piling up’: theory, theorists, theorizing”, Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (ed.s) **International Theory: Positivism and Beyond**, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 341-342.

<sup>38</sup> Ashley, (1981), p. 208.

<sup>39</sup> Ashley, (1981), p. 208.

<sup>40</sup> Ashley, (1981), p. 217.

<sup>41</sup> Ashley, (1981), p. 217.

<sup>42</sup> Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism”, **International Organization**, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1984, p. 247.

<sup>43</sup> Smith, (2002), pp. 77-81.

<sup>44</sup> Steve Smith, “Paradigm Dominance in International relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science”, **Millennium**, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1989, p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> Ashley, (1984), p. 256.

dominant or hegemonic state becomes dominant intellectual power<sup>46</sup> due to the fact that “power translates into domination in the sphere of the manufacturing and reproduction of knowledge”.<sup>47</sup> For that reason, it is possible to claim that “neorealist structuralism lends itself wonderfully well to becoming an apologia for the status quo, an excuse for domination”.<sup>48</sup>

### 5.3. CRITIQUE of MODERNITY

Modernity is a *worldview* with its roots in the Enlightenment philosophy. “[Its] political dimension... was the struggle against the Church and the economic dimension was the rise of the market economy.”<sup>49</sup> Modernity means the *emancipation* of people from the metaphysical alienation. It claims that people have to make their own history consciously.<sup>50</sup> Modernity depends on the rejection of all transcendental authorities for the sake of the *individual*. This worldview was *initially* an imagination of creating a world in which living together did not mean the restriction of the freedom of *others* but entailed the welfare of all human beings. As a result of the integration of this concept with the Enlightenment ideals, two notions arose: secularism and positivism. With secularism, the individuals became stronger against transcendentalism; with positivism the control of human beings over the nature could be guaranteed.<sup>51</sup>

Modernity is closely related to the degree of the Western development. For that reason, it has certain economic roots and a cultural *vision*. The bourgeoisie, as a new class, had been seeking the ways to weaken the *absolute* authority of the

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<sup>46</sup> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, **Alman İdeolojisi [Feuerbach]**, (trans.) Sevim Belli, Ankara, Sol Yayınları, 2008, p. 75.

<sup>47</sup> Mohammed Ayoob, “Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism”, **International Studies Review**, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2002, p. 27.

<sup>48</sup> Ashley, (1984), p. 257

<sup>49</sup> Haldun Gülalp, “Enlightenment by Fiat: Secularization and Democracy in Turkey”, **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2005, p. 356.

<sup>50</sup> Fikret Başkaya, “Doğu-Batı Çatışması Değil, Kapitalist/Emperyalist Saldırı”, Seyfi Öngider (ed.), **Doğu-Batı Kışkırcı Türkiye**, İstanbul, Aykırı Yayıncılık, 2004, p. 73.

<sup>51</sup> Hasan Bülent Kahraman, **Postmodernite ile Modernite Arasında Türkiye**, İstanbul, Agora Yayınları, 2007, p. 2.

remnants of the feudal age and most importantly *the church*. In order to create its own legitimacy, the bourgeoisie initially supported the freedom of all individuals to gain the *consent* of the subordinated segments of the society in its struggle against the aristocracy. “[The bourgeoisie] tried to extend its technical and ideological interests to the societal realm and introduced itself as an *active organism* by means of creating its own *organic* apparatuses.”<sup>52</sup> But, after the institutionalization of the bourgeoisie in the society, the spontaneous character of modernity evolved into a *voluntary* activity of this group which sought the ways to create a new order.

With the initiatives of the bourgeoisie to institutionalize itself, modernity evolved into *modernization* which meant “the activation and instigation of the principles of the *modern* in order to shape the *consciousness* of the subjects and the society”.<sup>53</sup> The reason why modernity evolved into a project is that “the Enlightenment philosophy was politicized by the French Revolution... [which] both let the bourgeoisie be a political force and rendered parliamentarianism a natural social phenomenon”.<sup>54</sup> As a result, central authority (the government) began to take decisions on behalf of its citizens. Inevitably, the state power was transformed into a *sacralized* authority because with the rise of secular ideologies the authority of the traditional religions faded away. “Nations moved into the political realm vacated by religion by positing themselves as sacred communities ... [aiming] to replace religious truths with nationalist truths”.<sup>55</sup> This has resulted in the sacralization of the state authority.

It can be argued that the *essential* nature of the modernity and its discourse on *freedom* soon disappeared and modernity evolved into a project of *modernization* that was thought only to be achieved by *the state elite*, the bourgeoisie, which used modern concepts to *deconstruct* the Ancien Régime. Furthermore, “after the dissolution of the Ancien Régime, the concepts of modernity were used to *stabilize* the power of the bourgeoisie. Thus, it can be argued that it has become impossible to

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<sup>52</sup> Antonio Gramsci, **Hapishane Defterleri**, (trans.) Adnan Cemgil, İstanbul, Belge Yayınları, 2007, p. 327.

<sup>53</sup> Kahraman, (2007), p. 2.

<sup>54</sup> Kahraman, (2007), p. 4.

<sup>55</sup> Gülaıp, (2005), pp. 356, 352.

achieve the ideals of modernity [e.g. freedom]”.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, the modernist vision of the world ceased to be a *worldview* in time and it has become an *ideology*.

It does not sound abnormal that universal arguments of modernity have been seen ambiguous. Many voices have been on the rise against modernity’s homogenizing and elitist polity. Some of these counter ideas reject the necessity of “emulating cultural achievements of the modernity”<sup>57</sup> and try to “form their identities that had been excluded from both the practice and the history of modernization”.<sup>58</sup> Thus, they can be regarded as enthusiastic supporters of anti-modern approaches. Modernity is no longer regarded as a grand narrative that has *timeless* truth. Indeed, “we are witnessing the eclipse of the progressive and emancipatory discourse of modernity”.<sup>59</sup> On the other hand, there have arisen alternative conceptualizations of modernity finding expression in the concept of *multiple modernities*. The concept was proposed by Eisenstadt who refuted the original European model as being supreme in its influence on non-European societies. He argued that structural differences of the non-Western societies did not let produce the exact replicas of the European model.<sup>60</sup>

Non-Western societies are generally interested in the technological achievements of the West rather than the ideals of the modern discourse such as human rights, democracy, cosmopolitan ethics and so on.<sup>61</sup> But this section is not interested in non-Western modernizations or multiple modernities. Instead, it briefly gives some *negative* and repressing features of modernity.

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<sup>56</sup> Başkaya, (2004), p. 74.

<sup>57</sup> Çağlar Keyder, “Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s”, Sibel Bozdoğan and Resat Kasaba (ed.s) **Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey**, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1997, p. 17.

<sup>58</sup> Sibel Bozdoğan and Resat Kasaba, “Introduction”, Sibel Bozdoğan and Resat Kasaba (ed.s) **Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey**, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1997, p. 5.

<sup>59</sup> Bozdoğan and Kasaba, (1997), p. 3.

<sup>60</sup> Raymond L.M. Lee, “In search of second modernity: reinterpreting reflexive modernization in the context of multiple modernities”, **Social Science Information**, 47, 2008, p. 64.

<sup>61</sup> Reşat Kasaba, “Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities”, Sibel Bozdoğan and Resat Kasaba (ed.s) **Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey**, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1997, p. 56.

Mechanized mass production, rationalization, bureaucratization, control over the nature and the society can be regarded as the basic defining features of modernity. Mass production differs from the earlier modes of production, because it makes the production process collective. The workers produce goods in a collective manner in accordance with the principle of division of labour.<sup>62</sup> Rationalization and bureaucratization are related to the instrumental reason of the modern logic. The modern reason assumes that everything can be rationally regulated in the light of science. Accordingly, ideas and reason have also become *instrumentalized* and are only seen as the part of the gigantic mass culture.<sup>63</sup> Bureaucratization follows from this situation. It implies the mechanization and professionalization of the governance. The bureaucracy helps the capitalist production to reproduce itself.<sup>64</sup> Control over the nature implies the fetishized nature of the rational mind. “Reason has become completely harnessed to the social process. Its role in the domination of men and nature has been made the sole criterion”.<sup>65</sup>

The division between the particular and the universal is also one of the most significant features of modernity. The rise of modern states system is a typical example of this dichotomy as far as the difference between the inside and the outside the state is concerned. Modernity is paradoxically obsessed “with the idea of national citizenship”.<sup>66</sup> Its paradox lies in the contradiction between the universal ideals of modernity and the rise of particular state communities. This shows that modernity needs an *other* to construct itself. The binary oppositions like civilized/barbaric or reason/emotion also signify this character of the modernity.<sup>67</sup> But the binary oppositions are not restricted to the outside and the inside distinction, but they are also found *within* the state. The tragedy of the Jews during the World War II is a typical example of this situation. The Jewish question is directly related to the

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<sup>62</sup> Paul Wetherly, **Marxism and the State: An Analytical Approach**, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 30.

<sup>63</sup> Horkhemier, (2008), p. 68.

<sup>64</sup> Anthony Giddens, **Sosyoloji: Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım**, (trans.) Ruhi Esengün, İsmail Öğretir, İstanbul, Birey Yayıncılık, 1994, pp. 86-87.

<sup>65</sup> Horkhemier, (2008), p. 67.

<sup>66</sup> Andrew Linklater, **Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity**, London, Routledge, 2007, p. 6.

<sup>67</sup> John M. Hobson, **The State and International Relations**, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 104.

savage *modern* as it signifies “the revolt of the nature”.<sup>68</sup> What does this phrase imply? For Horkhemier, “resistance and revulsion arising from this repression of nature have beset civilization from its beginnings”.<sup>69</sup> This is because of the existence of the *repressed* in the womb of the civilization; mimesis is an example of the repression.

Horkhemier argues that the mimetic impulse is “the means of learning, particularly in... unconscious stages of personal development that determine the individual's eventual character”.<sup>70</sup> That means individual begins learning about the social world by imitating. Mimesis, for Horkhemier, is the source of the civilization because “civilization starts with... man's native mimetic impulses. Cultural progress as a whole... consists largely in converting mimetic into rational attitudes”.<sup>71</sup> According to this schema, the atavistic impulse to imitate is at the beginning of the civilization because it represents a cognitive process; but, Horkhemier claims that mimesis must be “eventually transcend[ed] and transvaluate[ed]” in order to achieve creating a civilization. If this atavistic impulse cannot be transcended or returns back into the civilized society, then there arises the danger of repression. One example for this repression can be found in the structure of “acting out socially repressed mimetic drives”. For example, in one of the incidents in Germany in the years of the repression of Jews, “the speaker impersonated a Jew”. So, the enemy inside was being imitated and “audience got their chief thrill” because the principle of the foundation of the civilization (the repression of the mimesis) was being violated and nobody was being accused of that violation. The reason was that “a forbidden natural urge was permitted to assert itself without fear of reprimand”.<sup>72</sup> This is the revolt of nature. The Germans can be described as the constituting *self* while the Jews are described as the *other*. For that reason, the treatment of Nazis towards Jews verifies the “rationalized irrationality”<sup>73</sup> of modernity.

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<sup>68</sup> Horkhemier, (2008), p. 119.

<sup>69</sup> Horkhemier, (2008), p. 120.

<sup>70</sup> Horkhemier, (2008), p. 135.

<sup>71</sup> Horkhemier, (2008), p. 135.

<sup>72</sup> Horkhemier, (2008), pp. 136-137.

<sup>73</sup> Horkhemier, (2008), pp. 136-137.

Horkhemier does not reject the great development of human rights under the umbrella of modernity but he only warns to be cautious about the *naturally barbaric* inclinations of modernity. For that reason, the *negative* critique must understand this main contradiction lying in the nature of modernity. Neither Horkhemier nor Adorno seems to be much optimistic about the modern age, but they cannot also stop thinking that “people are usually much better than what they think or say or do”.<sup>74</sup>

One of the other criticisms of the modernity is directed against its *social* pressure. This is related to the modernist conceptualization of the development as linear and inevitable. For the theory of modernization, (political) development signifies the process of evolution from the traditional society to the modern society<sup>75</sup>, or from “*gemeinschaft* [to] *gesellschaft*, [from] traditional [to] legal–rational authority”.<sup>76</sup> However, the *linear* conceptualization of the development and the attribution of a *good* character to the latter concepts (*gesellschaft* and legal–rational authority) are very arbitrary categorizations for the critical theorists who reject “the universalization of any specific system”.<sup>77</sup> The critical theorist argues that the inevitability of modernity cannot be accepted. The proposition “the traditional societies will experience anti-democratic governances during the process of their transformation from the traditional society to modern society” cannot be defended, since for critical theorists the modern society is not a democratic society. This is because the communication is distorted<sup>78</sup> and the culture is manipulated.<sup>79</sup> In addition, modernization and democratization are also not concomitant, as they cannot feed each other. Therefore, the modern and anti-modern cannot be dichotomized against one another. Every object must be analysed in reference to its historical *particularity*. It is indefensible to fix a *historical particularity* and accept it as a *universal* reference point to judge or evaluate other societies. Such a mentality, which deploys a *universal criterion* to evaluate the degree of modernization of other

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<sup>74</sup> Horkhemier, (2008), p. 163.

<sup>75</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 105.

<sup>76</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 39.

<sup>77</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 109.

<sup>78</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 107.

<sup>79</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, **Kültür Endüstrisi-Kültür Yönetimi**, (trans.) Nihat Ülner, Mustafa Tüzel, Elçin Gen, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2007, p. 23.

societies, cannot rescue itself from being Euro-centric and may inevitably be a repressive force that seeks to be accepted as the last point of development.<sup>80</sup>

#### 5.4. CRITICAL THEORY AS A NORMATIVE ENTERPRISE

Positivist understanding insists that a distinction be made between the subject and the object in order to construct a theory that is self-referential in terms of its internal coherence. Theory is seen as a “tool” that is used to analyse the (natural or social) world regarded as an object to be observed by the scientist. The latter is expected, while observing, to separate his/her beliefs and the *objective* reality.<sup>81</sup> This forms the basis of the positivist understanding of science to which critical thinkers direct their objections. According to those thinkers there will certainly arise “a tension between the need to study ‘what is’ and the danger of... reproducing ‘what is’”.<sup>82</sup> For that reason, critical thinkers do not accept the validity of the positivist separation between beliefs and facts. The positivist presumption that “events in the world are ontologically prior to our theories about them” is rejected.<sup>83</sup> They think that it is imperative that “the nature of theory and theory’s relationship with the world” should be clearly indicated. The need arises because the construction process of a theory can also distort reality and manipulate it so as to fit the existing world to its theoretical framework. So what is theory for the critical thinkers? How should we deal with the theories or is it really necessary to construct a theory? Such questions directly force us to investigate the distinction between the *real* world and the theory assumed by positivists.

For those belonging to the critical camp, theory is a critique which can help us to comprehend that “the world is [not] inevitably unequal and hierarchical” and it gives us the chance “to understand how those inequities came to exist” and to use

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<sup>80</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 109.

<sup>81</sup> Zalewski, (1996), p. 341.

<sup>82</sup> Zalewski, (1996), pp. 341-342.

<sup>83</sup> Zalewski, (1996), p. 345.

theory “as a base for changing them”.<sup>84</sup> Here it can be seen that critique gains a normative dimension: to change. It does not aim to present itself as a theory claiming that the main objective of the theory is to reflect what is going on in the world. As Devetak claims such “traditional conceptions of theory tend to work in favour of stabilizing prevailing structures of world order and their accompanying inequalities of power and wealth”.<sup>85</sup> Critical thought, on the other hand, both aims to catch what is going on in the world and seek solutions to transcend and to change the existing social structure. For that reason, critical thought is the critique with a normative dimension. Its aims “change, freedom and human autonomy”.<sup>86</sup> Adorno also emphasizes the accomplishment of similar objectives such as “human autonomy, spontaneity and critique”,<sup>87</sup> which are lost in modern times because of the culture industry that manipulates the society.

For Adorno, culture industry has weakened the ability of the individual to decide consciously, and has put an end to human autonomy by means of the planning of the society. For culture industry, “the planning of the whole [system or society] is prior to individual sensations”.<sup>88</sup> The critique has also suffered in the process because the critical mind is regarded harmful for the system’s operation.<sup>89</sup> For that reason, if we really want to be free individuals, it is firstly necessary to unveil the existing social structure and then try to propose alternative ways of life rather than submit to it. However, achieving such a freedom entails sacrifice and can only be achieved by the individuals who have become intellectually autonomous and sensitive to other individuals. These individuals must transcend the *stories* about the selfish nature of the human being and begin to hold different ideas about human nature that is neither too optimistic nor pessimistic as indicated by the theological philosophers. The aim is to criticize the contemporary society and to show its antinomies. Such an aim can be achieved by means of a critical thought that “confronts the existing in its historical context with its own conceptual principles

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<sup>84</sup> Zalewski, (1996), p. 345.

<sup>85</sup> Devetak, (2005), (A), p. 142.

<sup>86</sup> Scott Burchill, “Introduction”, Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (ed.s), **Theories of International Relations**, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 8.

<sup>87</sup> Adorno, (2007), p. 139.

<sup>88</sup> Adorno, (2007), p. 139.

<sup>89</sup> Adorno, (2007), p. 140.

with a view to criticizing and transcending”<sup>90</sup>. It is the duty of the critique to unveil the contradiction between the existing society and the ideals or principles the society claims to represent. Thus, critical thought “derives its positive character precisely from the interplay of these two negative procedures [i.e. to criticize and transcend]”.<sup>91</sup> Such an approach “does not take the institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question”.<sup>92</sup> Put shortly, “critical theory provides a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order”.<sup>93</sup>

Critical theory is not like a theory as conceptualized by positivism. “Making science the theory of philosophy, positivism disavows the spirit of science itself”.<sup>94</sup> Positivism reduces science to an activity of classification and quantification. Horkhemier criticizes the positivist tendency to constitute arbitrary formulations and to see whether the hypotheses proposed will come true or not. What is a scientific endeavour for positivists seems only to be constructing a *theoretical* system with internal coherence, which waits for being justified by the events of the world. “Positivists rely on the successes of science as a justification of their own methods”.<sup>95</sup> Being obsessed with the *gap* (created by this mentality) between the theory and the *real* world, positivists seek to grasp the logic of the real world by constructing theories. Such an understanding is inevitably restricted by the ambition of finding regularities in the social and natural worlds to develop hypotheses. This is especially so if the dictum of Popper “every theoretical attempt trying to explain the whole creates a system [theory] devoid of the possibility of being tested” is remembered.<sup>96</sup> The aim of testing which reflects the desire of positivist reason to dominate is, for Horkhemier, “the disease of reason”.<sup>97</sup>

During the process of making generalizations about the regularities in the world for the sake of scientific inquiry, it becomes necessary to “omit some other

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<sup>90</sup> Horkheimer, (2008), p. 183.

<sup>91</sup> Horkheimer, (2008), p. 183.

<sup>92</sup> Burchill, (1996), p. 19.

<sup>93</sup> Burchill, (1996), p. 19.

<sup>94</sup> Horkheimer, (2008), p. 105.

<sup>95</sup> Horkheimer, (2008), p. 108.

<sup>96</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 28.

<sup>97</sup> Horkheimer, (2008), p. 179.

things”, which are not homogeneous and cannot be included into the whole.<sup>98</sup> These other things are regarded as the *particulars* that resist the *general*. For Adorno, the aim of a critical theorist should be to discover the voices of these particulars. He claims that the enlightened reason has identified rationality “with the subsumption of the particular under the universal”. That means “the intrinsic properties of things... their sensuous, social and historical particularity” are disregarded.<sup>99</sup> The particular is incorporated by the universal. For that reason, the aim of the critique must be to catch the *atonal* sound of the truth, which emerges as a result of the clash between the *real* and the thoughts throughout the history.<sup>100</sup>

In search of the atonal sounds and against the fetishized *universal* of the modern discourse, critical theory should “problematize this fetishization and draw attention to the ‘moral deficits’ that are created by the state’s interaction with the capitalist world economy”. It must falsify the argument that “the modern state is the natural form of political community”. This can be done by deconstructing the universal assumptions of the modernity and showing its deficiencies in order to provide the individual with the chance to resist “modern forms of mass manipulation”.<sup>101</sup>

## 5.5. NATION AS A MYTH

Critical thinkers, like Marxists, do not have any belief in the eternity of nationalist assumptions, which are thought to be repressive in character. From a critical standpoint, nationalism can be defined as a *historically and specifically necessary discourse*. The *necessity* of nationalism depends on the need of the new capitalist mode of production to reproduce itself. The *specificity* of nationalism is due to the fact that it emerged in the *Western* context. It is also historical as it has

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<sup>98</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 28.

<sup>99</sup> Adorno, (2007), p. 14.

<sup>100</sup> Horkheimer, (2008), p. 17.

<sup>101</sup> Horkheimer, (2008), p. 99.

emerged after the Industrial revolution and its discourse entails the necessity of submission to the nation-state.

Anderson lists three factors that contributed to the development of nationalism. The first is the emergence of the language by means of which millions of people began to understand each other and share the same feeling.<sup>102</sup> The second one is the emergence of the age of *mechanical reproduction*. The importance of mechanical (re)production lies in its capacity to produce limitless copies of an original work and to bring *constancy* to language. This constant feature of language contributed to the construction of the concept of *eternity*, which had a special significance for the emergence of the *subjective nations*. The third factor is the fact that “capitalist publishing created a new different sovereign language different from earlier administrative folk languages”.<sup>103</sup>

As nationalism was born in the Western context and initially alien for the Eastern *communities*, then how did it become possible for it to spread all over the world? One ostensible reason can be the anti-imperialist movements and their dialectical relationship with Marxism. In accordance with the *imperialism* diagnosis of Lenin, the Marxists of the underdeveloped communities (i.e. Asian and African nationalisms) thought they could only fight with the imperialist hegemonic countries by means of the development of nationalist discourse. Theirs was a struggle against the exploitation.<sup>104</sup> “The political language was Marxism. This language... was translating the local to national and the national to general”.<sup>105</sup> That means Marxism coincided with the then popular themes of the underdeveloped world such as recognition and exploitation. It was like a grand-narrative, which was able to create a *superior* identity with which every movement, be it nationalist or anti-imperialist, could feel sympathy. Marxism provided the underdeveloped world with “some methods and terminology to understand the world... The concepts such as ideology,

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<sup>102</sup> Benedict Anderson, **Hayali Cemaatler: Milliyetçiliğin Kökenleri ve Yayılması**, (trans.) İskender Savaşır, İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 2007, p. 60.

<sup>103</sup> Anderson, (2007), p. 60.

<sup>104</sup> Antonis Liakos, **Dünyayı Değiştirmek İsteyenler, Ulusu Nasıl Tasavvur Etiler**, (trans.) Merih Erol, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2008, p. 41.

<sup>105</sup> Liakos, (2008), p. 42.

economy and social class were transferred to the Asian and African languages with the Marxist content.” But it must be also noted that “after the systematization of Maoist Communism, Cuban Communism and Latin American communism”, the relationship between the third world nationalism and Marxism worked for the benefit of the *nationalist* discourse. The French Communist Party’s extension of support for the imperialistic policies of the French government can be seen as a factor which weakened the influence of Marxism on the third world anti-imperialist struggles. From that time onwards, the struggle began to take a form against the image of the European, “which tried to exterminate the third world from the history”.<sup>106</sup>

These explanations suggest that nation is neither an eternal truth nor is it a timeless category to be belonged to. Nationalism was either *imagined*<sup>107</sup> or created as a *strategy*<sup>108</sup> against the powerful states of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. But in both cases, it is a *mythical discourse* and signifies an imagined community.

## 5.6. TRANSCENDENCE of the NATION STATE AND GLOBALIZATION

It is a critical assumption that there is a conflict between the citizenship and the humanity. Since the modern states-system privileges the citizenship over the humanity, “[t]he conflict between [them] is fundamental to the experience of the modern states-system”.<sup>109</sup> The conflict is also one between ethical universalism and moral favouritism.<sup>110</sup> Ethical universalism is interested in the equality of all humankind and thus reflects the *initial* hopes of modernity, as discussed in the first section. But, moral favouritism is a particularistic discourse. It stands for territorial loyalties and is based on the claim that “duties we owe to our compatriots may be more extensive than the duties we owe to strangers”.<sup>111</sup> Here a split between

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<sup>106</sup> Liakos, (2008), p. 42.

<sup>107</sup> Anderson, (2007).

<sup>108</sup> Liakos, (2008), pp. 41-42.

<sup>109</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 16.

<sup>110</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 34.

<sup>111</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 34.

universalism and particularism is seen. This is the main antinomy of modernity. On the one hand, modernity claims the supremacy of reason and believes in the universality of human rights; on the other hand, it is associated with the emergence of territorial states with particular loyalties. Therefore, modernity is not as universal as it presents itself. Critical theorists are aware of this fact and propose *world citizenship* in lieu of *state citizenship*.

Ethical universalism should go hand in hand with the *detrterritorialized citizenship*. The loyalty to state must be replaced with the loyalty to humanity as a whole. Deterritorialization is an increasing feature of today's world and accompanied by the mobility of people. This mobility is so instantaneous that it transcends the borders of the nation-states and can give a chance to the humanity to meet on a common ground (especially on cyberspace). Societies are continuously being mobilized and individuals are continuously becoming *detrterritorialized* by means of technological innovations and permanent mobilization. Thus, it becomes vital that "studying the transformation of localities by deterritorialization inevitably should entail studying the mobility which characterizes them".<sup>112</sup>

Due to the instant access and acceleration in media technologies, it is possible to argue that *locality* is mobilized and the sharp distinction between the global and the local is eroding. That means a small event, which occurs in a village of Austria, can reach a huge audience by means of the technological connections. History has become a story that is written in a few seconds and consumed after a while because "the gap between arrival and departure or a certain order of desire and its fulfilment has been closed by a sort of technological legerdemain".<sup>113</sup> "Deterritorialization does not cause the end of the local culture"<sup>114</sup>; but, it causes the emergence of *non-placeness*. And this non-placeness makes it difficult to accept the nation-state as only reference point. For instance, "the conditions under which the state has exercised its monopoly power of taxation have been transformed by globalization".<sup>115</sup> However,

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<sup>112</sup> John Tomlinson, "Globalization and Cultural Analysis", D. Held and A. McGrew (ed.s), **Globalization Theory**, London, Polity, 2007, p. 156.

<sup>113</sup> Tomlinson, (2007), p. 158.

<sup>114</sup> Tomlinson, (2007), p. 152.

<sup>115</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 95.

the hope that globalization has undermined the nation-state and will create a free international society is illusory. This is because globalization mostly works for the benefit of the globalized capital and at the expense of the locally repressed people. As Bauman claims, with globalization (he finds this concept insufficient and cloudy) the clash between the local and the global elements intensified and the locally oppressed people feel that their life worlds are being encroached upon by the *global forces*.<sup>116</sup>

For Bauman, it is quite natural that in the global era there arise new states of the ethnic minorities. Because these newly established *so-called* states, which are under the control of global organizations, are the local stations of global finance. Far from threatening the existence of global capital, on the contrary, these weak states are necessary for its survival and enrichment. Globalization causes the states' authority to get weak or collapse but it does not propose alternative better ways of living. The spokesmen of globalization find it plausible to define globalization as a process, the control of which is not directed from definite centres. They are inclined to present it as a spontaneous, self-reinforcing phenomenon over which no one can have control.<sup>117</sup>

Rather than defining globalization as an *uncontrollable* process, it is much suitable to describe it as the beginning of a new era in which everything can take *liquid* forms. And it can also be seen as a connective platform by means of which individuals from all over the world can develop new forms of struggle against global exploitation.

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<sup>116</sup> Zygmunt Bauman, **Küreselleşme: Toplumsal Sonuçları**, (trans.) Abdullah Yılmaz, İstanbul, Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2006, pp. 110, 111.

<sup>117</sup> Bauman, (2006), p. 79.

## 5.7. TOWARDS WORLD CITIZENSHIP

Rescuing “humanity split into states”<sup>118</sup> entails that the sphere of belonging should be extended as much as possible. But that does not mean being trapped by another universalism. The aim is not to construct a “universalized moral code but rather to find the right balance between the universal and the particular”.<sup>119</sup> For that reason, all forms of exclusion must be challenged. The aim must be to construct “the ethical ideal of securing the consent of each and every member of the human race”.<sup>120</sup> This does not necessarily include “the demise of inner circles of obligations”. But it entails that “the inner sanctum must be open to the scrutiny of outsiders”.<sup>121</sup> That means the outsider should not be excluded only because of the fact that s/he belongs to another particular community. Instead s/he must be included and be given the chance to participate into the sanctum of other (world) citizens and have an equal footing with them. The state, for example, as an analytical category is not refuted; but its structure is problematized. Because the duty of ethical universalism is to create world citizenship rather than creating new state-centric belongings.

The world citizenship must create new spheres of belonging for people because “individuality is impaired when each man decides to shift for himself”.<sup>122</sup> The aim must be to develop both the society and the individual. For that reason, triple transformation can help to change contemporary forms of political community. Linklater identifies three transformational elements as “a progressive recognition that moral, political and legal principles ought to be universalized, an insistence that material inequality ought to be reduced and greater demands for deeper respect for cultural, ethnic and gender differences”.<sup>123</sup> Based on this, the form of the state can also be changed. To change its exclusionary character, democratic participation can be enlarged. Such a shift will automatically entail that “the idea that power,

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<sup>118</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 35.

<sup>119</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 35.

<sup>120</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 36.

<sup>121</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 36.

<sup>122</sup> Horkhemier, (2008), p. 150.

<sup>123</sup> Devatak, (2005), (A), p. 154.

authority, territory and loyalty must be focused around a single community or monopolized by a single site of governance”<sup>124</sup> be refuted. This is because the sense of belonging will no longer be *only* restricted into the confines of the state’s territory, but it will be enlarged as much as possible to include other spheres of life. World citizenship necessitates “identification with the universal community of humankind that exists above the states-system”.<sup>125</sup> The ethical universalism proposed by Linklater “challenges traditional notions of sovereignty and citizenship with a view to realizing the prospects for new forms of political community”. Linklater argues that this new perspective towards world citizenship must imagine “new dialogic possibilities that require states to dispatch their powers into two directions: upwards in the search for greater universality and downwards in response to claims for the public recognition of valued cultural differences”. The first one can be identified with the ambition of constructing a new ethical universalism while the latter illustrates the democratic developments within states about the gender and minority rights.

There are mainly three conditions for the establishment of world citizenship. The first one is “the establishment and maintenance of the conditions necessary for open and non-exclusionary dialogue”.<sup>126</sup> The second one is the development of a democratic discourse ethics (that will be analysed later) and the final one is that discourse ethics must be “a form of moral-practical reasoning”. That means utilitarian calculations of expediency no more guides actions of the people.<sup>127</sup> The aim of all these efforts is “to change international relations by modifying the structural context of strategic interaction”.<sup>128</sup> As the concept of world citizenship is *a priori* of all critical theorists as an absolute desire to be fulfilled, the description given here should be sufficient. In the next section, the issue of identity and difference will be analysed as it constitutes the core of the critical agenda.

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<sup>124</sup> Devatak, (2005), (A), p. 155.

<sup>125</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 114.

<sup>126</sup> Devatak, (2005), (A), p. 157.

<sup>127</sup> Devatak, (2005), (A), p. 157.

<sup>128</sup> Devatak, (2005), (A), p. 158.

## 5.8. IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

The epistemological, ontological and normative features of the identity issues have found their reflections in the realm of international relations since the 1980s. Since then it has become common sense to think of international relations in relation with the discourses of philosophical modernity,<sup>129</sup> against which have arisen later on many counter arguments. The latter can be clustered into three main arguments. The first is the claim that the classical IR scholars make a (artificial) distinction between the inside and the outside.<sup>130</sup> The second is that the cultural system established by modernity depends upon the antagonistic relationship between the *self* and the *other*. As a matter of logic, defining the *self* (the West) as rational and developmentalist inevitably rendered the *other* anti-developmental and irrational, in need of being regulated and modernized.<sup>131</sup> The third argument is that the other defined in terms of *enemy* legitimizes the conceptualization of the international system as the domain of conflict. Thus, it can be argued that the state-centric conceptualization of the international relations is constructed on a cultural logic.<sup>132</sup> This cultural system is depicted differently by different critical theorists. For example, “for Gramsci the system is hegemonic; for Foucault the system is disciplinary; for Derrida the system is logo-centric; for Habermas the system is the social formation under the hegemony of instrumental reason; for Said the system is orientalism”.<sup>133</sup>

If the identity is based on the humiliation of the other, the sense of belonging and affiliation make it harder for one to identify himself/herself with the other. The role of the nation state is also significant at this point because of its *monopolization* of the belongings of people. Indeed, it is the nation state of the modern era which, “‘tells us who we are’, ‘tells the people who they are’, and it ties state, people and political identity together”.<sup>134</sup> As a result, the identity of individuals is tied to the state. But during the identity formation of individuals, it is inevitable that certain (i.e.

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<sup>129</sup> E. Fuat Keyman, “Kimlik ve Demokrasi”, Atilla Eralp (ed.), **Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar**, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2006, (A), p. 221.

<sup>130</sup> Keyman, (2006), (A), p. 221.

<sup>131</sup> Keyman, (2006), (A), p. 222.

<sup>132</sup> Keyman, (2006), (A), p. 222.

<sup>133</sup> Keyman, (2006), (A), p. 222.

<sup>134</sup> Hansen, (1997), p. 352.

different) identities are excluded. This is illustrated in the critique of modernity. The construction of the binary dichotomies by the *rational* modern reason results in the attribution of supremacy to the concepts affirming the *rational* mentality. In the Western context, these are maleness, whiteness, civilization, and reason attributed to the modern state and its citizens.<sup>135</sup>

With the rise of critical thinking, the notion of *difference* has gained prominence in the IR agenda. In the following pages, three paradigms will be analyzed to look more closely into the *difference* problem in IR. The first paradigm is the *communicative rationality* notion of Habermas. The second one is *postmodernism*. The third one is *feminism*. The common point of these paradigms is that they are all opposed to *exclusion* and not satisfied with the state of contemporary world. They reveal the deficiencies of the modern nation-state system and criticize it on several grounds.

## 5.9. COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY

The rationality understanding of the modern positivist reason (and thus of modern liberal democratic society) is criticized, as was explained in the first section, mainly because of its dependence on the calculation of “the optimum balance between the means and aims and the maximization of the self-interest”.<sup>136</sup> The rationality understanding of Habermas’ philosophy, on the other hand, is *a bit* different from that of the liberal democratic conceptualization of rationality even though Habermas is not as hostile to instrumental rationality as the first generation of the Frankfurt School. The criticism of Habermas concerning the contemporary world derives from his argument that “the system is embedded in and depends on the lifeworld”. According to him, the former “tends to encroach upon, displace and even

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<sup>135</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 6.

<sup>136</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 99.

destroy the latter”.<sup>137</sup> So, the aim should be to develop an undistorted communication and to cure the discrepancy between the lifeworld and the system. For Habermas, the lifeworld signifies “the home of communicative rationality” in which “the meanings of deeds and words and the ends of action tend to be open to view”.<sup>138</sup> Therefore, the aim is *not* to abolish the capitalist liberal institutions and markets but to *contain* them.<sup>139</sup> For Habermas, there have arisen some pathologies because of the colonization of the lifeworld. These pathologies can be enumerated as such:

*decrease in shared meanings and mutual understanding (anomie), erosion of social bonds (disintegration), increase in people’s feelings of helplessness and lack of belonging (alienation), consequent unwillingness to take responsibility for their actions and for social phenomena (demoralization), destabilization and breakdown in social order (social instability).*<sup>140</sup>

The reason of the emphasis on the erosion of the lifeworld is because of the fact that “the system depends actually on the lifeworld”.<sup>141</sup> With an aim to improve these five negative developments, Habermas suggests deploying discourse ethics. However, before explaining what the latter is about, it is necessary to discuss Habermas’ theory of social evolution and to mention his thoughts about modernity.

Habermas’ theory of social evolution is related to Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. According to Kohlberg, there are three invariable levels of moral competence. Each of these three levels is “sub-divided into two categories”.<sup>142</sup> The first level is pre-conventional morality. At pre-conventional morality, the child begins to respond to objects and interprets them by means of empirical consequences. At stage 1, “morality is understood in terms of punishment”. At stage 2, “morality is understood instrumentally as a way of satisfying one’s own needs”.<sup>143</sup> At level two, “the characteristic attitude is one of fitting in and being loyal to the

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<sup>137</sup> James Gordon Finlayson, **Habermas: A Very Short Introduction**, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 54.

<sup>138</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 54.

<sup>139</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 58.

<sup>140</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 57.

<sup>141</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 57.

<sup>142</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 69.

<sup>143</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 69.

social order”. At stage 3, morality is understood as playing the role of a good boy/girl. At stage 4, morality means performing duties with a view to “maintaining the social order and the welfare of the society or group”.<sup>144</sup> At level three, there arises a distinction between “the validity of moral norms and the authority of the groups or persons subscribing to them”. Morality begins to be understood as the common good agreed by all members of the society.<sup>145</sup> At stage 5, “morality is conceived as the basic rights, values and legal contracts of a society, even when they conflict with the concrete rules and laws of a group”. That means some non-universal values and norms can be protected regardless of majority opinion. At stage 6, morality becomes a set of universal moral principles. “Examples are universal principles of justice, equality, and respect for the dignity of all human beings.”<sup>146</sup>

The schema of Kohlberg is based on a *linear* conception of moral development and reflects generally the tendencies of modern universalism. Habermas’ thesis is that “just as the development of the moral consciousness of individuals is a learning process... so is the development of society at large.”<sup>147</sup> While some thinkers are of the opinion that modernity has never been realized, Habermas thinks that modernity is an unfinished project. This is due to his belief that modernity did not fulfil one of its two promises. The two promises of modernity are development and freedom. According to him, modernity ignored the *freedom* issue while supporting only the technological development.<sup>148</sup> Despite its social pathologies like anomie, disintegration, alienation, demoralization and social instability,<sup>149</sup> modernity, for Habermas, has brought “cognitive, economic and practical gains that are worth preserving”.<sup>150</sup> Hence, rather than rejecting the project of modernity as a whole, he supports its completion.<sup>151</sup> The tools suggested by Habermas to realize freedom are the communicative rationality and discourse

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<sup>144</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 69.

<sup>145</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 69.

<sup>146</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 71.

<sup>147</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 72.

<sup>148</sup> E. Fuat Keyman, “Eleştirel Düşünce: İletişim, Hegemonya, Kimlik/Farklılık”, Atıla Eralp (ed.), **Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar**, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2006, p. 233.

<sup>149</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 57.

<sup>150</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 74.

<sup>151</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 73.

ethics.<sup>152</sup> Habermas' discourse ethics is "a development of a modern, Kantian conception of morality".<sup>153</sup> However, Kantian morality is different from Habermas' as it does not oblige people to talk to each other because of its assumed universal character. On the other hand, Habermas' discourse ethics claims that the universality of the discourse must be constructed by means of a rational communication. The dialogue must be open to everyone (not exclusionary) and cognitive, and its arguments must be strong in that discourse must also have validity claims that are true, right, sincere and meaningful.<sup>154</sup>

The aim of the communicative rationality is to replace the technical rationality supported by the modernity. As indicated before, modernity initially had two promises: progress and freedom. It realized progress by identifying it with the control over the nature and men while it failed to bring about the latter.<sup>155</sup> Against the technical rational character of the modern societies, Habermas tried to create a theory of communicative rationality so as to transcend the technical rationality. The aim of his theory is to create undistorted communication. For him, the engulfment of the public sphere by the technical rationality resulted in the construction of the identity of the individual in a technocratic manner. The aim of the technical rationality can be described as solving the problems encountered in the daily life. Habermas aims to "analyse and explain how the technical rationality dominated modernist knowledge production". He argues that with the spread of the technical rationality, epistemology has been subsumed by positivism and the importance of the individual and his/her capacity over his/her actions has diminished. As the rationality is only restricted to being a problem-solving device, the result has become the diminishing importance of the individual.<sup>156</sup>

Against the technocratic rationality of modernity, Habermas proposes communicative rationality on the basis of discourse ethics. According to this schema,

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<sup>152</sup> E. Fuat Keyman, **Küreselleşme, Devlet, Kimlik/Farklılık: Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramını Yeniden Düşünmek**, (trans.) Simten Coşar, İstanbul Alfa Yayınları, 2000, p. 143.

<sup>153</sup> Keyman, (2000), p. 69.

<sup>154</sup> Andrew Edgar, **Habermas: The Key Concepts**, London, Routledge, 2006, pp. 44-46, 167.

<sup>155</sup> Keyman, (2000), p. 145.

<sup>156</sup> Keyman, (2000), p. 140.

if every individual can enter into a dialogue with one another without any restriction, a genuine communication among them can be realized and the restriction of rationality to only a problem-solving device can be overcome. At the heart of the communicative rationality, there is the discourse ethics, which means that the speakers will have the responsibility of telling the fact which s/he can support with evidences and validity claims. With the communicative rationality, it will become possible to create a public sphere in which validity claims are constructed in the form of discourse and are tested by the *dialogue*. It is hoped that this will enable an ideal dialogue in which nothing is veiled. Equipped with the tools to criticize the veiled concepts of the contemporary world politics with an emancipatory intention, “discourse ethics offers a means of criticizing and justifying the principles by which humanity organizes itself politically. By reflecting on the principles of inclusion and exclusion, discourse ethics can reflect on the normative foundations of political life”.<sup>157</sup> When the exclusionary character of the state is questioned with a normative commitment to create a democratic realm where the freedom of individuals can be secured and the aims of democracy such as creating a society of free individuals can be realized, it becomes possible to speak beyond the borders of the nation-states in a cosmopolitan manner.<sup>158</sup>

By means of undistorted communication Habermas seeks to transcend the alienation caused by the modernity. But one of his theory’s weaknesses lies in its ignorance of the production process.<sup>159</sup> It chooses to reform and modify the system but it does not take into consideration the capitalist production process. In addition, his euro-centric mentality (that he also accepts)<sup>160</sup> and his reference to the Kohlberg’s schema of the linear development suppose that every society and individual will go through the same processes and inevitably end up at the final universal point. For that reason, Habermas can be criticized on two points. Firstly, he ignores production process of the capitalist society. As a result, his critical theory is

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<sup>157</sup> Devatak, (2005), (A), p. 159.

<sup>158</sup> Köker, (1998), pp. 100-101.

<sup>159</sup> Keyman, (2000), p. 145.

<sup>160</sup> Keyman, (2000), p. 144.

defined as “neo-liberal rationalism”.<sup>161</sup> Second criticism is related to his ignorance of the differences between societies and his analysis of different societies within the same category. He eschews the fact that all these societies do not have the same means to deal with the problems of the contemporary society.<sup>162</sup> In addition, Habermas’ theory demands the transcendence of the difference and supposes that every society has a Western kind of rationality.<sup>163</sup> These points distinguish Habermas from Adorno, another important name in the school of critical theory. While Habermas’ theory aims at a *homogenous* rationality, the critical theory of Adorno seeks “to equip individuals with the capacities that would enable them to resist integration into the fateful homogenizing institutions of capitalist society”.<sup>164</sup>

Against Habermas’ universalizing morality, there is much need to emphasize the *differences* between rather than the universality of morality claims. So, in the next two sections, postmodernism and feminism will be analysed as they put much emphasis on the notion of *difference*.

## 5.10. POSTMODERNISM

Postmodernism is different from the Habermasian rationality in that postmodernist philosophy does not have any claim to universality. On the contrary, it is anti-foundationalist because of its rejection of the *grand* truths. Against modernity’s universalism, postmodernism supports the particulars. It is interested in unveiling the “privileged discourses” in history.<sup>165</sup> It claims that the history is not a record of a linear process. On the contrary, the history is full of “silenced, subjugated, or simply forgotten” others.<sup>166</sup> So, the aim of the analysis must be to

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<sup>161</sup> Robert Paul Resch, **Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory**, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992, p. 6.

<sup>162</sup> Keyman, (2000), p. 143.

<sup>163</sup> Keyman, (2006), p. 237.

<sup>164</sup> Finlayson, (2005), p. 14.

<sup>165</sup> Jef Huysmans, “James Der Derian: the unbearable lightness of theory”, Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (ed.s), **The Future of International Relation**, London, Routledge, 1997, p. 364.

<sup>166</sup> Huysmans, (1997), p. 364.

reverse the history by displaying its dominant character rather than applauding its claims about *the* truth. Although it is difficult to give an exact definition of postmodernism, it is possible to discern its general characteristics as such:

*a) the rejection of the universal and foundationalist mind; the centralization of the subject. b) suspicion about all grand narratives; the emphasis on the relationship between knowledge, power, interest. c) the critique of modernity and the Enlightenment. d) the description of history and culture as fictitious discourses and domains of conflict. e) sensitivity towards difference, exclusion, and anomalies. f) the questioning of contemporary intellectual boundaries. g) the rejection of the modernist distinction between the high art and the popular art. h) the emphasis on the importance of the globalization and the effect of the internationalization of capital on migration. i) the emphasis on the spatial characteristic of social relations.*<sup>167</sup>

As for its methodology, postmodernism traces back the history and tries to hear the voice of the repressed that is not recorded by the history. The main methods used by postmodernism are genealogy, inter-textualism and deconstruction.

Genealogy refers to the study of historical documents to discover the relationships between the particulars which may be seen as separate from each other at first glance. “Genealogy focus[es] on the process by which we have constructed origins and given meaning to particular representations of the past, representations that continuously guide our daily lives and set clear limits to political and social options”.<sup>168</sup> In short, it asks how a thing or a person is constructed and what constitutes its essence. “The genealogical search of the truth analyses the construction of individuals as the subjects of knowledge”.<sup>169</sup> The genealogical understanding depends on the belief that the ontological status of individuals is the product of both the past and the present. For that reason, the analysis must be carried out in a genealogical manner.

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<sup>167</sup> Keyman, (2000), p. 188.

<sup>168</sup> Keyman, (2000), p. 163.

<sup>169</sup> Keyman, (2000), p. 175.

Inter-textualism means the relations between texts. Text is fundamental for postmodernism. Because postmodern philosophers think that the analysis of the text can give the necessary clues about the object being studied. Therefore, considerable importance is attached to the textual information. Different from genealogical method, which uses discourses, textualism depends on the analysis of the text.<sup>170</sup> However, a text does not have much importance by itself alone. A relationship must be constructed between the texts in question in order to reveal that the knowledge is not a *neutral* reflection of the world but a product of the process of power and domination.<sup>171</sup> For that reason, the task of the criticism must be to investigate the relationship between power and knowledge in an inter-textual manner. The method of Der Derian, for example, is inter-textual because he does not categorize his resources according to their genres. In addition, no priority is attributed to any genre. On the contrary, the techniques Derian uses in his books reflect his inter-textual method. “His works are full of references to TV images, to noise, to simulations, to movies, etc.”<sup>172</sup>

Deconstruction is another important method of postmodernism. It is a mode of critical investigation of *what is taken as stable*. The aim is to unveil or *deconstruct* the essence of the conceptual definitions and oppositions and to be aware of the arbitrary categorizations made by the dominant reason.

*[C]onceptual oppositions are never simply neutral but are inevitably hierarchical. One of the two terms in the opposition is privileged over the other. This privileged term supposedly connotes a presence, propriety, fullness, purity, or identity which the other lacks (for example, sovereignty as opposed to anarchy). Deconstruction attempts to show that such oppositions are untenable, as each term always already depends on the other.*<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Keyman, (2000), p. 181.

<sup>171</sup> Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism”, Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True (ed.s), **Theories of International Relations**, 3rd edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 162.

<sup>172</sup> Huysmans, (1997), p. 367.

<sup>173</sup> Devetak, (2005), p. 367.

As seen, the privileged one is seen superior to the other even though there is not an *essential* difference between the two. Rather, the difference and the identity are constructed by subjugating the other as inferior, unreasonable or black. The success of postmodernism lies in its capacity to get people not to believe in what they accept as neutral and natural. However, the important point as a cautionary note is that postmodernist writers do not have foundationalist claims, so it becomes difficult to take a reference point while trying to describe the world from a postmodernist perspective.

Postmodernist philosophers, like globalization theorists who describe globalization as an uncontrollable process,<sup>174</sup> may tend to reproduce the intellectual component of the hegemony of the status quo.<sup>175</sup> Without taking into consideration the production process like Habermasian rationality, postmodernism makes it difficult to criticize the contemporary society because of the absence of any common reference point and a continuous sympathy for the epistemological relativism. Instead, there is left a world of simulations in which any distinction between the real and the unreal becomes impossible to discern.<sup>176</sup> Thus, it can be argued that although postmodernism provides valuable insights about the modern contemporary society, its interest in *ambiguity* and *infinity* may not help the constitution of any strong arguments against global capitalism. In the next chapter, feminist critique will be discussed because of its important contributions to the IR agenda.

## 5.11. FEMINISM

Feminism puts forward a number of criticisms about the conceptualization of International Relations. It criticizes the male dominated feature of IR, and investigates the place of women in politics, domestic and international, and in the

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<sup>174</sup> Bauman, (2006), pp. 110, 111.

<sup>175</sup> Keyman, (2000), p. 193.

<sup>176</sup> Jean Baudrillard, *Simulakrlar ve Simülasyon*, (trans.) Oğuz Adanır, İzmir, Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 1998, p. 13.

areas in which *only* men are supposed to operate. For that reason, it inevitably problematizes the masculine nature of the state and the discipline.

Dunn interrogates privileges in IR. Trying to present a critique of the unequal character of IR, Dunn argues that the “white male academic operating within the field” provide the terminology of the discipline. As the majority of IR discipline is produced by white males of the North America and Europe, it becomes inevitable that some concepts such as power or competition are taken for granted. This is because of the substitution of the general with the particular. That means “representation of the world... is the work of men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth”. For that reason, the concepts of IR discipline, which seem natural or neutral, have actually gendered content. It must be stressed that when the gendered character of IR is ignored, some artificial dichotomies arise. For example, while the writings of the white male are assumed to represent *the truth*, some other categories such as black or women are excluded because of their *abnormality*. Because the constituting *subject* is implicitly the white male. As a result, “while other people are raced, white people are self-represented as being just people”.<sup>177</sup>

*The often unreflective claim to be just a person is an attempt to define the bounds of normality. Such self-representations are both a manifestation of power and an assertion to power. The claim to power is the claim to speak for the commonality of humanity. Raced people can't do that—they can only speak for their race. Often unreflectively, white males simultaneously seek to define what is normal and speak for humanity.*<sup>178</sup>

The white is understood as *normal* against which the *abnormal* can be situated and the boundaries of the normal can be defined. “The dominant racial and gender discourses in Western societies tend to powerfully bind whiteness and masculinity to assumed claims of realness”.<sup>179</sup> That means the real is grasped by means of filtering it through the lenses of the white male. As a result, the white male

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<sup>177</sup> Kevin Dunn, “Interrogating White Male Privilege”, Jane L. Parpart and Marysia Zalewski (ed.s), **Rethinking the Man Question: Sex, Gender and Violence in International Relations**, London, Zed Books, 2008, p. 52.

<sup>178</sup> Dunn, (2008), p. 52.

<sup>179</sup> Dunn, (2008), pp. 51-52.

(particular) achieves to represent itself as the normal (general). When the normal and the real are defined implicitly in terms of the white male's perspective, it becomes inevitable that the discourse ethics of masculinity constitutes the main theoretical framework of the disciplines, IR in our case.<sup>180</sup> If we remember the binary dichotomies constructed by the modern mind, it becomes clearer that "within the academic discipline and practice of IR, one can see a lengthy tradition of North American and Western European white males writing about world politics from their own subjective position". So, to speak for all humanity is indeed the particular aspiration of the white males rather than being a universal one.<sup>181</sup>

One of the leading feminist theorists in IR, Jacqui True, divides feminism into three categories: empirical, analytical, and normative. *Empirical feminism* claims that women and their experiences have been excluded from the domain of international relations. As a result, the dominant theories reflect sexist inclinations and cannot really explain the reality as they claim. The reality remains distorted because of the gendered logic of the IR scholars.<sup>182</sup>

*Analytical feminism* deconstructs the theoretical framework of International Relations. According to analytical feminism, masculinity and femininity are social constructions rather than only being biological differences. The values attributed to masculinity are "autonomy, sovereignty, the capacity for reason and objectivity and universalism, whereas the dominant notion of femininity is associated with the absence or lack of these characteristics".<sup>183</sup> Analytical feminists also claim that the image of woman's subordination to the masculine power because of her weakness is continuously reproduced. For example, "the routine practices of militaries replicate these hegemonic gender identities by training soldiers both to protect 'womenchildren' through killing and to suppress (feminine) emotions associated with bodily pain and caring".<sup>184</sup> Body becomes an important tool of politics and

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<sup>180</sup> Dunn, (2008), p. 52.

<sup>181</sup> Dunn, (2008), p. 52.

<sup>182</sup> Jacqui True, "Feminism", Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True (ed.s), **Theories of International Relations**, 3rd edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 216.

<sup>183</sup> True, (2005), p. 222.

<sup>184</sup> True, (2005), p. 222.

national projects. The performative rituals of the soldiers and their corporeal activities illustrate this fact. “These performative and performing bodies in the nation-politics are predominantly... male-identified bodies”.<sup>185</sup> So, there is a direct relationship between soldiery and maleness.

*Normative feminism* has global normative aims. It is related to the international ethics, humanitarian aid and intervention, and human rights issues.<sup>186</sup> It tries to provide “a normative agenda for global change”. True also stresses that “all forms of feminist theorising is normative”<sup>187</sup> because all feminists “share a *normative* struggle to sustain connections to practical feminist politics and the concrete workings of gendered power”.<sup>188</sup> For that reason, this category can be thought as a common ground on which all feminists can agree.

As the feminist theories were the last category in my presentation of the school of critical theory, now is the time to make some comments on the notion of the national interest. In the last section below, the realist conception of the national interest, which revolves around concepts such as power, security, and anarchy, will be inverted so as to develop a more civilian conception of the national interest. The emphasis will be on the *individual* and the world citizenship.

## 5.12. THE HUMANITY’S INTEREST

As discussed through the whole chapter, IR cannot be regarded as a *neutral* field; but it is laden with gendered and instrumentalist content in the form of *normality*. From a feminist standpoint, it is the *white male* who has written the IR scholarship and defined its core concepts. In accordance with the Habermasian

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<sup>185</sup> Dibyesh Anand, “Porno-Nationalism and the Male Subject”, Jane L. Parpart and Marysia Zalewski (ed.s), **Rethinking the Man Question: Sex, Gender and Violence in International Relations**, London, Zed Books, 2008, p. 165.

<sup>186</sup> True, (2005), p. 228.

<sup>187</sup> True, (2005), p. 228.

<sup>188</sup> True, (2005), p. 229.

understanding, it is the *instrumental rationality*, which leaked into the nature of the field. When all the other criticisms about the nature of modernity and its inclinations are also taken into consideration, it becomes very difficult to argue that IR is a *value-free* science; on the contrary, it is a *subjective* preference of the dominant intellectual mind. In this section, against the Realpolitik concept of the *national* interest, the concept of the *humanity's interest* is developed.

Critical theory does not use the concepts of the Realpolitik thinking; it deploys its own concepts in order to paint a *different* picture of the politics. Thus, this section develops an *anti-Realpolitik* understanding of the notion of *interest*. Accordingly, the concept is no longer called as the *national interest* because trying to provide a fertile basis for evaluating the world events entails the re-conceptualization of the concept of the interest. Otherwise, the danger of reproducing the Realpolitik concepts such as the national interest embedded within the realist norms continues.

Critical theory longs for an *alternative* world order, which entails the re-conceptualizations of the norms and values on which today's politics depends. For that reason, this section seeks to make some *assumptions* about the characteristics of an alternative free world. It does not discuss whether there is any need to complete the project of modernity or not. The economic dimension of the struggle too is not discussed. This section only describes the *superstructural* needs of a free world.

The concept of the humanity's interest is a term constructed in reference to the arguments presented in this chapter. It is composed of two realms. The first one is related to the *cosmopolitan level* and the other to the *intra-state level*. The humanity's interest is developed by means of the dialectical relationship between these two levels. It must not be forgotten that the concept developed in this section is not *explicitly* developed by any critical theorist in the name of the humanity's interest. Rather, it is an *eclectic* concept developed in the light of the critical arguments presented in this chapter.

According to the critical theorists, national interest is an illusionary concept because it does not reflect the interests of the whole people it claims to represent, but it “always turns out to reflect the interest... of the individual who employs the concept and of the group he speaks for”.<sup>189</sup> Hence, the national interest is a *partial* discourse in that it does not mirror a coherent picture of the society as a whole because someone is inevitably excluded as s/he holds *other* values. After such an introduction, it is plausible to explain the two *levels* of the humanity’s interest in reference to the arguments developed throughout the chapter.

The *cosmopolitan* level of the humanity’s interest can be seen as a *general* common denominator on which all the critical theorists can agree if they really wish to construct a different world order than the contemporary world. Respect for the difference and the transcendence of the nation-state are described as two objectives of the cosmopolitan level.

The *first objective* is the respect for the *differences* among the societies in the world. In the light of the critique of modernity presented in the previous chapters, it can be claimed that all the societies in the world did not experience the same *paths* in the history; but, each society has its own *authentic* particularity. For that reason, each society being different in relation to other societies must have the right to live with its differences. *Universalizing* mind assuming that *premodern* societies will also inevitably *develop* like the Western *free world* by means of “economic development, urbanization, the increase of the literacy, the development of the mass media and the nationalization”<sup>190</sup> sees the Western form of society as the ultimate point of progress. For the sake of an alternative world order, such a universal mind must be rejected because it “runs the risk of ignoring or repressing certain marginalized or vulnerable groups unless it respects legitimate differences”.<sup>191</sup> For that reason, the critical perspective must demand that the *fetishized* character of the Western form of political organization not be *sacralized*; the non-Western societies should be allowed to live and flourish in their own ways as as the Westerners do.

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<sup>189</sup> John H. Kautsky, “The National Interest: The Entomologist and the Beetle”, **Midwest Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1966, p. 224.

<sup>190</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 47.

<sup>191</sup> Devatak, (2005), (A), p. 155.

Difference can be described as a feature which differentiates two things from each other. Length, width or colour are some of the bases of difference; this is natural. But, if difference is transformed into a *constitutive* (foundational) identity by taking a *fixed reference* point, the problem arises. Because, in this situation, difference far from being the expression of the intrinsic features of the *self* becomes a relationship between the inferior and the superior. Thus, difference (as the constitutive feature of the identity) must not have any *normative* dimension such as superiority or inferiority. It must only signify the *pluralist* character of the societies. As shown in the critique of modernity, conceptualization on the basis of the dual dichotomies by attributing a *positive* value to one of them while reducing the other to the bottom is the characteristic of modernity. For that reason, difference can only be defended *only* because it implies the features of individuals or societies; but the subsumption of a *particular* identity by another particular *identity* must not be justified. Presenting a particular identity as the *normal* identity, as indicated in the feminist critique<sup>192</sup>, cannot be defended if the concept like the humanity's interest is to be constructed for the sake of all the people in the world. Unlike the modernist understanding, in critical theorising, the *other* is neither excluded nor is it included to be assimilated in the melting pot of another universalism. Rather, the *other* must be understood in a *dialogical understanding*<sup>193</sup> in its own specific *particularity*. If there does not exist any *constant* reference point according to which the identities are classified as normal or abnormal, difference and identity only become a type of expression. For example, when the whiteness, maleness or progress are not seen as the *constitutive* norms, then there does not arise any need to carry out identity politics because the individual will be respected only because s/he is a *human*.

The *second* cosmopolitan objective is the *transcendence* of the nation-state as the *only* point of reference. The aim here is not to refute the *state*; but to admit that there can also be *other* spheres of *belongings* apart from the nation-state. If *nation* is seen as an identity of belonging there is no problem; but attributing any *normative superiority* to one nation over another nation is problematic, at least from the critical standpoint.

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<sup>192</sup> Dunn, (2008), pp. 51-52.

<sup>193</sup> Keyman, (2000), p. 283.

Every individual is a subject; every individual's thoughts are, for that reason, naturally *subjective*. Thus, the aim of the critical theory should be to create a *common* ground on which a consensus on some matters related to the whole humanity can be achieved in a *rationally communicative* intersubjective manner. Every individual's thoughts and feelings reflect his/her subjective position. Accordingly, the belongings and thoughts of every nation, state or race also reflect its *common sense*. For that reason, any *eternal truths* about the structures and the ideals of nation-states cannot be defended. Rather, it should be accepted that nation is a *constructed* and *imagined*<sup>194</sup> category instead of having some *atavistic* heritage. When each nation is defined as an imagined category or community, it is difficult to put forward *eternal* truths about its features.

Instead of the *citizenship* of the nation-state, the *humanity* must be taken as the reference point. As Linklater argues, there emerged an artificial opposition between these two notions with the rise of the nation-state as the political organization of modernity. Hence, it is the task of the critical theorists to rescue "humanity split into states".<sup>195</sup> The means of rescuing humanity can be via the *extension* of the sphere of *belonging* as much as possible. The aim must be to construct "the ethical ideal of securing the consent of each and every member of the human race".<sup>196</sup> This does not necessarily mean that the loyalty to the nation-state will be devastated; but it means accepting the fact that every form of loyalty can change as time passes. *World citizenship* can illustrate this point as it represents the ambition of creating a *general bill of rights* for the humanity as a whole. World citizenship is opposed to state-centric conceptions. The state-centric understanding of citizenship "promotes exclusion, generating estrangement, injustice, insecurity and violent conflict between self-regarding states by imposing rigid boundaries between 'us' and 'them'".<sup>197</sup> On the contrary, world citizenship implies the togetherness of all individuals all over the world. "The establishment and maintenance of the conditions

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<sup>194</sup> Anderson, (2007).

<sup>195</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 35.

<sup>196</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 36.

<sup>197</sup> Devatak, (2005), (A), p. 148.

necessary for open and non-exclusionary dialogue” and the development of a democratic ethics are two important features of the world citizenship.<sup>198</sup>

After indicating the general objectives of the critical theory, the second level of the humanity’s interest can be discussed. This second level is related to more concrete actions *within* states. It can be regarded as a *domestic analogy*, which claims that if the internal structures of states acquire the features of democratic governance, the world of states will also be democratic. The concept of *democracy* here must not be identified with the Western form of the political system; rather it means a *communitarian* conception of democracy, which never found the chance of application.

The objective of the intra-state level can be described as the encouragement of the *democratic* and *communicative* governance, which implies that individuals participate in politics with their free will. According to this understanding, the politics is not a *technical enterprise* or business performed only by the professional politicians. One of the requirements of such governance is that the politics has to regain its *ethical* dimension. That means politics must have an *ethical* discourse about the truth such as “good and just world”.<sup>199</sup> Another requirement is that the division between the politics and the political science must be ruptured. With the rise of the modern period, the political science has come to be seen as an area of expertise. As a result, a *differentiation* came into being between the politics as an everyday *practice* and the political science as the *professional* study of the politics. Critical theory aims to transcend this dichotomy<sup>200</sup> because the professionalization of the politics causes individuals to compete with each other for political power, which is seen as something outside them.<sup>201</sup>

Liberalism conceptualizes *freedom* in opposition to *political power*. It describes the latter as an *autonomous* realm, which must be “grasped, defended and performed” as an *object*. When political power is seen as an object to be grasped,

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<sup>198</sup> Linklater, (2007), p. 157.

<sup>199</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 86.

<sup>200</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 88.

<sup>201</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 88.

defended and performed, the discrepancy between political power and citizens increases.<sup>202</sup> Because it causes citizens to pursue and to exercise their freedom *despite* the political power. Liberalism conceptualizes freedom as if it were “competing with political power”.<sup>203</sup> Thus, it locates freedom in private space of the individual. However, Arendt argues that there does not need to be any contradiction between political power and citizens. Rather, they should be thought of as mutually constituting each other.<sup>204</sup> For Arendt, “the liberal conception of freedom understands political power as something that contradicts freedom and thereby imprisons happiness in the private sphere of domestic life”.<sup>205</sup> The reason why liberalism chooses such a conceptualization lies in its *sacralization* of individual rights in *egoistic* terms. So, the other people automatically become alien against whom we must protect our liberty, security and property. These three rights, which are closely related to the liberal thought, “presuppose and then reinforce our alienation from each other”<sup>206</sup> rather than create a society of enlightened and emancipated individuals.

Arendt proposes a more *communitarian* conceptualization of freedom by means of which individuals can feel the satisfaction of being and sharing togetherness.<sup>207</sup> In such a conceptualization the divisions between the public and the private, the state and the civil society, which embody a sense of separateness, become meaningless. Thus, these arbitrary divisions must be transcended in order to create a free and communitarian society. The communicative rationality is significant in that it is assumed to play a critical role in the creation of such a free society. It depends on the undistorted communication among individuals, which, in turn, needs to be based on discourse ethics.

Described as one of the proponents of the republican democracy, Arendt supports the “spontaneous creation of the soviets or councils” against the

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<sup>202</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 98.

<sup>203</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 93.

<sup>204</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 93.

<sup>205</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 92.

<sup>206</sup> Jonathan Wolff, **Why Read Marx Today?**, New York, Oxford University Pres, 2002, p. 42.

<sup>207</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 97

“parliamentary or multi-party system”.<sup>208</sup> The aim is to create a political *community* in which there is a moral principle, which was defined by the actions of the people who have the power to influence that community by means of their joint action.<sup>209</sup> This moral principle is the *common good* of the community. In Arendt’s understanding of the republican democracy, the abstract liberal notions such as inalienable rights and freedom of the humanity are meaningless because of the liberal conceptualization of freedom in opposition to political power.

Arendt’s understanding of democracy does not divide the spheres as public or private. Rather, it aims to provide a *republican communitarian* democracy in which there is no artificial division between public and private. On the contrary, every joint action of individuals will contribute to the elevation of the public good. As political power is not conceptualized in opposition to people, individuals become aware of their potential of making common arrangements to regulate their own life.<sup>210</sup> “The political movements of the 1960s and 1970s”<sup>211</sup> which can be described as *anti-systemic* movements<sup>212</sup>, to borrow Wallerstein’s concept, can be regarded as significant examples of “participatory politics and responsible citizenship”.<sup>213</sup> Arendt gave importance to the rise of these *anti-systemic* movements of the 1960s and 1970s because of their probable elevation of the understanding of democracy.

In the light of the proposals indicated so far, it can be seen that the aim of the critical theory is to change the contemporary world. Rather than overcoming the obstacles in order to ensure the system’s operation, critical theory has an idealist and normative dimension because of its hope to change the world. The contemporary era can be regarded as a new era for many reasons. The technological developments, the global relations and the consciousness about all these activities could not have been

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<sup>208</sup> April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes, “Introduction”, April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes (ed.s), **Liberal Democracy and Its Critics: Perspectives in Contemporary Political Thought**, Oxford, Polity Press, 1998, pp. 4-5.

<sup>208</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 95.

<sup>209</sup> Köker, (1998), p. 95.

<sup>210</sup> Köker, (1998), pp. 92-94.

<sup>211</sup> Carter and Stokes, (1998), p. 5.

<sup>212</sup> Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, **Sistem Karşıtı Hareketler**, (trans.) C. Kanat, B. Somay, S. Sökmen, İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 1995.

<sup>213</sup> Carter and Stokes, (1998), p. 5.

imagined sixty years ago. In a rapidly shrinking world,<sup>214</sup> the critique should go beyond mere observance so as to include attending politics as a free and active cosmopolitan citizen to make the world a more liveable planet as much as possible.

It is important not to forget that the differences among the people in the world are not obstacles for a free world but the prerequisite of a cosmopolitan world. Therefore, against the *one-dimensional man*<sup>215</sup> of the capitalist technocratic society, the people of a cosmopolitan democracy are defended. In short, no categorization, no differentiation, no exclusion, no description. In the liquid atmosphere of the world, everyone has the right to live in a peaceful way with equal opportunities and economic advantages. The essence of the critical international theory can be summarized in such a statement: ‘Do not mind the other but defend his/her right to live as you do yours’.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter aimed to present the critique of the modernist and classical conceptions of the rationality, the state, the modernity and the politics in general. It argued that the creation of a democratic world order depends on the establishment of mutual understandings. For example, a person should not be respected only because s/he is rich, beautiful or white. But s/he should be respected only because s/he is an *individual*. Such an understanding is not easy to bring about and entails self-sacrifice.

Describing the world as anarchic and people as power-seekers, the conservative *ideologies* guarantee the maintenance of the status quo power relations. They do not want to change the world order because they benefit from the status quo. Changing the world order for the better entails *sincerity* and *trust*. One has to be

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<sup>214</sup> James N. Rosenau, “The Relocation of Authority in a Shrinking World”, **Comparative Politics**, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1992.

<sup>215</sup> *Habermas*, (2007), p. 36.

honest and sensitive towards others first before expecting similar treatment in return. Within the limited space of this chapter, it has not been possible to argue all the possible dimensions of a free world. But the main argument presented in this paper is that if we really want to change something we must firstly change *ourselves* because the society is composed of individuals.

The concept of the humanity's interest is a constructed discourse with regard to the arguments presented in this chapter. Postmodernism, feminism and critical theory all agree on the fact that the contemporary world is not perfect. Thus, the aim of this chapter was to gather these traditions and reach a statement. The humanity's interest is constructed with such an aim as an idealist/normative discourse. It is specific to the arguments discussed in this chapter rather than being a general prescription for the interests of all the humanity. Its first principle is showing respect for the differences of societies and individuals. The second objective is to transcend the exclusionary character of the nation-state, at least in mind. The intra-state level can be regarded as a concrete step to reach the universal ambitions of the cosmopolitan level. Instead of the liberal democracy, a communitarian democracy can be a useful guide for a critical international theory. The individual who believes in the strength of the participatory democracy can firstly become a good citizen and then a good *world citizen*. Thinking the notion of the interest in terms of the interest of all humanity inevitably forces us to rethink about the concepts which seem neutral and value-free.

As a result, it can be argued that critical theory is not *just* a theory; but it can also offer guides for political actions. As the aim is to change the world for the better rather than ensuring its reproduction, the critique must aim to transcend the contemporary world and establish a new world order in which being woman, black or minority does not matter.

## CONCLUSION

This thesis tried to analyse the concept of the national interest from the perspectives of five IR theories. Its aim was not to find a middle ground among the theories; it only tried to analyse the national interest understanding of each theory in the light its theoretical propositions. The result is *pluralistic* because there is not any *consensus* among the theories about the content of the national interest. That is inevitable because each theory approaches the concept and analyses it with regard to its own framework. But, it is such a plurality which makes it possible to speak about the *theories* of International Relations instead of one theory of International Relations. And this thesis is founded upon such a diversity out of which it tried to grasp different meanings of the national interest.

*International Relations (IR)*, *morphologically*, implies the relations between nations. However, due to the *implicit* assumption about the complementary relationship between the nation and the state, IR refers to the relations between states. That is why IR is usually described as the analysis of the inter-state relations and these states are mostly described as the *nation-states*. Why? At this point, the relation between the nation and the state needs be discussed.

As argued in the Marxism chapter, the affinity between the nation and the state goes back to the 18<sup>th</sup> century. However, it can be argued that the nation-state gained commonsensical appeal at the outset of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which is also the era of the birth of the International Relations as a discipline. The rise of the contemporary system of the nation-states should be thought in a dialectical relationship with nationalism, which can be described as the superstructural need of the capitalist market relations. That means the centralization of the production with the capitalist mode of production also centralized the context in which the production took place; so, the *nation-state* arose. The reason why the state has a *national* character is because of two general factors. Firstly, the newly-founded nation-states had to replace the old loyalties in order to stabilize their power in the system. By

means of nationalism, the dynastic affinities of the former period were replaced by the nationalist discourse. Secondly, these nation-states had to mask the exploitative relationship in the society. As the nation-state, founded upon the capitalist mode of production, was led by the bourgeoisie, this new class had to strengthen its position in the society by means of legitimizing the citizenship and the rule of law. Every citizen was considered equal politically; but the economical inequality was not discussed. That means by giving political freedom to the population, the bourgeoisie aimed to stabilize its economical supremacy in the system. Thus, it can be claimed that the relationship between the nation and the state is *historically specific*. As a result, the nation-state is also historically a specific form of political governance. Therefore, International Relations is also a specific discourse as it is founded upon the implicit affinity between the nation and the state and the nation-state as a kind of state.

When IR is defined as a specific time/space discourse, it becomes possible to speak about alternative political understandings, which do not necessarily conceptualize the politics at the state-level. In addition, this historically specific relationship between the nation and the state must be analysed and criticized. Because such an endeavour represents the first step to think about International Relations in more critical terms. What the theories like Marxism and Critical Theory try to do is such an analysis and critique.

Marxism and Critical Theory aim to transcend the contemporary state-centric world order. Thus, they can be described as revolutionary theories. On the contrary, realism, neo-realism and (neo)liberal institutionalism are *problem-solving* theories, as Cox argues.<sup>216</sup> They aim to reproduce the existing status quo and provide a theoretical legitimacy to the hegemonic projects of the capitalist world system. For example, offensive neo-realism is like a spoilt child of the powerful states. According to this kind of neo-realism, *states must try to gain as much power as possible and, if possible, must pursue hegemony*. What does this statement mean? It reminds Thucydides' dictum "the strong do what they have the power to do and the

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<sup>216</sup> Cox, (1981), p. 1541.

weak accept what they have to accept”.<sup>217</sup> In short, it means working for the benefit of the ministry of the foreign affairs of the powerful states. Thus, an intellectual *containment* policy is at issue. If we really long for a free world order, firstly, it is necessary to refuse to think in power-oriented terms.

The realist argument such as the power-seeking and flawed human nature is only the intellectual instrument of the powerful states to legitimize their actions, let alone being a *scientific* claim. It is not scientific even in the positivist understanding of science, which seeks for evidence to support an argument. Anarchy, in the case of neo-realism, is like a destiny from which there is no escape. (Neo)liberal institutionalism aims to create a flexible context for the flux of the capital. Arguing that there are also international organizations apart from states, it advises creating regimes with an aim to make cooperation among states possible. Regimes for what and for whom? I do not think regimes are *primarily* interested in improving the conditions in Africa or preventing AIDS in South Asia.<sup>218</sup> As the institutionalists (or neo-liberals) do not question the structure of the world economical system with an aim to change it, the answer *for what* most probably seems to be for the capital and the answer *for whom* is for the international finance corporations or multi-national corporations (MNCs), in the words of the institutionalists.

The national interest understanding of realism entails the maximization of the state’s power. Does the state have any classes? This question is beyond the agenda of realism according to which the most significant point is to ensure the existence of the state. Attributing a primary importance to the survival of the state as the most important national interest objective automatically reduces some matters as *low* politics. For example, the problems in the domestic society are considered secondary issues when compared to the international political objectives of the state. Dividing the politics as high and low renders the class contradictions in the state *marginal* because the class-based structure of society is regarded as a domestic phenomenon.

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<sup>217</sup> Viotti and Kauppi, (1999), p. 59.

<sup>218</sup> Although there are many international organizations about environment, humanitarian intervention or so on which try to elevate the common good of the whole humanity, they cannot be regarded as much successful as multi-national corporations. Because, the productivity and proficiency entail capital which is absent in the structures of most international organizations.

When the class-based structure of the state is ignored, the remaining fact becomes an *abstract* state with *some* national interests. But, whose interests are they which the state claims to defend? This question is again answered by reference to survival, which is seen as the common interest of the whole population of a state. As the survival is regarded as the main interest of the state, other issues like the working conditions, minority rights, gender issues or green politics occupy the agenda of low politics.

Wendtian constructivism is also like realism. Although Wendt claims that the interests and identities of *states* are constructed, he insists that there are some *objective* interests, which all states must fulfil. Wendt's point of departure is also the *state*. He investigates the ways of cooperation among states. As Cynthia Weber claims, Wendt invents a story like *anarchy is what states make of it*.<sup>219</sup> As a result, the state is again fetishized. A corporate identity is attributed to the state according to which the state has a corporate character before its social character.

Finnemore's international society-centric constructivism seems persuasive; but it is not. Norms are also social constructions, which take their roots from an interest conception. Every norm signifies some political demands. Thus, norms also reflect the interests of the powerful states. Can any *counter*-norms against the hegemony of the superpowers emerge? If so, what are their chances of survival or implementation? It can be argued that the counter-norms' chance of being widely held is weak because norms are not abstract discourses, rather, they depend on some material basis for enforcement. As an example, are the anti-American protests against the war in Iraq successful? They are not. Norms are also power-based. For that reason, the society-centric version of constructivism can be regarded as a poor approach because of its seemingly optimistic stance. However, the critical constructivists touch upon some important matters as they question the identity of the state and its interests. Thus, the critical version of constructivism is much more illuminating than the other two versions of constructivism.

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<sup>219</sup> Weber, (2005), p. 61.

The critical constructivists represent the first step to transcend the contemporary world order. Weldes' important insights about the ideological background of the concept of the national interest make it possible to question the given character of the concept. In the light of Weldes' evaluations, one sees that the national interest is a *discourse* created by means of articulation and interpellation. That means the national interest is the product of statesmen and their perceptions rather than an objective category. As statesmen are subjects with personal feelings and background, they naturally have some demands which reflect their *subjective* position. Thus, the national interest cannot be an objective category, which can be analytically considered and measured.

The internationalist and the idealist versions of liberalism are also problem-solving theories. The community interest of liberal internationalism does not appeal to the interest of the whole humanity. Every theory is political by nature and defends the rights of some segments in the society. Liberal internationalism can be regarded the reflection of the mentality of the rising bourgeoisie of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Equality, fraternity, freedom or some other concepts were in the direct interests of this new class. Presenting some values, to ensure its position in the system, as the universal principles, the bourgeoisie was leading the liberal internationalist discourse. The community interest was, indeed, the interest of the capitalist entrepreneurs; it was not in the direct interest of the whole society.

Idealism is much more prone to state-centric analysis than liberal internationalism because of the rising status of the nation-states after the French Revolution. Idealism was heralding the rise of International Relations as a discipline because the unit of analysis was slowly being shaped. It was the state. In liberal internationalism, it was claimed that the harmony in the society would be created by the *invisible* hand of free market. The latter understanding does not place much emphasis on the state. In contrast, the state must be minimal. However, idealism takes the state as the unit of analysis and sees it as a *bridge* between the national and the international. The bridge character of the state is because of the fact that the universal principles of the Enlightenment are still defended; but the apparatus to

carry out the Enlightenment ideals is considered to be the state. The self-determination principle and the collective security system, presented as the *national interests* of idealism, also signify the statist recommendations of idealism. The states seen as the main actors of the international politics have dual tasks. The first duty is to develop nationalism. The second is to promote internationalism by means of these erected nationalisms.

The significance of idealism (Wilsonism) lies in its oppositional character against Leninism. The self-determination principle of Wilson's Fourteen Points can be regarded as a policy to weaken the Soviet influence in the peripheral areas and to gain their support for the United States. As a result, it can be argued that idealism was a specific discourse of the 1910s and it was responsive to the demands of that era. Thus, it was only a policy in order to gain legitimacy for the U.S. policies. The policies prescribed like the collective security could not succeed to prevent another world war. As a result, it was replaced with realism. But, it was only a policy preference. The important point is that such a replacement occurred in the same state. Thus, the competition between Idealism and Realism is only a sibling strife because their fathers is the same.

As another theory, (neo)liberal institutionalism claims that the world structure is much different from the previous centuries. Developments in the communication technologies were heralding the birth of a new era. Likewise, international organizations and corporations were becoming significant actors, which could not be ignored by states. These institutions constitute the essence of the institutionalist discourse. These organizations are numerous; their importance is because of their institutionalized structure. In contrast to Waltzian neo-realism, the institutionalist perspective claims that the anarchical structure of the international politics is not an obstacle for cooperation among states. Regimes are regarded as important institutions to mitigate hostility among states while promoting and facilitating cooperation among them.

What the institutionalists were doing served and strengthened the neo-realist discourse, because they also accepted the international structure as anarchical and states as egoistic. The only thing they aimed is to improve the chance of cooperation among *egoistic* states. Thus, (neo)liberal institutionalism can be regarded as a further step than realism or (neo)realism because of its aim to capture the dynamics of the world politics; but (neo)liberal institutionalist perspective can also be transcended by another theories like Critical Theory and Marxism.

As for Waltzian neo-realism, it is like a *sacred* book, which dictates/advises states how to survive. Anarchy and the distribution of capabilities are out of the control of states like a destiny. There is a system in which states interact; but none of them can change its structure by means of their agential power. The system sends signals to states and these states are compelled to catch and follow in line with these signals in order to defend their positions in the system. To defend the position in the system can be regarded as the national interest prescription of the neo-realist theory.

Waltzian specification of the international politics in its own right purged of all historical and economical dimensions makes Waltzian neo-realism a barren theory. The international relations in *its own right* do not mean anything. Although the politics is among states, states are composed of people. That means regarding the states as atomistic units causes one to ignore the economical dimension of the world system, which cannot be ignored from the analysis. In pursuit of developing a theory, neo-realism is insufficient to explain the world politics. Its quest for developing a theory of international politics seems as its supreme interest. Neo-realism refers to some events in the world to validate its hypotheses rather than explain the politics. For Waltz, there is no point in trying to explain all the political events; instead, developing theory must be the primary concern. As neo-realism does not question the structure of the world system with an aim to improve it, its national interest understanding will inevitably work for the benefit of the state elites or corporations. So, neo-realism is also a status-quo oriented problem-solving theory.

There remain two theories: Marxism and Critical Theory. These two theories are useful guides for understanding the world. They can help the students of International Relations to question the given nature of the world politics in lieu of taking it for granted. They provide the necessary intellectual equipments for the students of IR and the ordinary people to be critical of the concept of the national interest and to be aware that there are some specific interests *disguised* in the name of the national interest.

The socialist interest developed in the Marxism chapter and the humanity's interest developed in the Critical Theory chapter can help one to think about IR in a different way. The concept of the humanity requires equality about the issues like class structure, identity politics, gender issues or some other issues rendered as low politics by Realism.

The point on which Marxism and Critical Theory agree is the unequal character of the contemporary world order. They both seek to change it for the better (i.e. a more egalitarian and peaceful order). Unlike realism, they are not motivated by some invalidated prior sensations like the flawed human nature. Indeed, such an argument like the flawed human nature provides an escape for realism. When its simple and ordinary evaluations about the politics are taken into consideration, it is no wonder that realism succeeds to gain the admiration of the masses because the masses generally choose to believe in simple arguments rather than try to analyse the *difficult* arguments. Realism also has a *self-fulfilling prophecy* in that once actors start acting in line with its prescriptions, the consequences of their behaviour constrain their future behaviour, forcing them to continue to act in line with the same prescriptions. This causes an illusionary image that realism is *the* theory which can most forcefully explain international politics, although there are numerous cases which are not sufficiently accounted for by the original realist assumptions.

For both Critical Theory and Marxism, there is not any national interest. Thus, the duty of the *revolutionary/emancipatory* theory must be to find the *ideology* which can erect a discourse like the national interest and deconstruct it with an aim to

generate a real interest. Communitarian conception of democracy and class politics may help the unsatisfied masses to overcome the enduring problems associated with the contemporary society. An individual who is conscious about his/her place in the system and respectful of the differences among people can be the starting point of the inquiry. As indicated in the Marxism chapter, for an alternative world order, class politics is inevitable. As indicated in the Critical Theory chapter, the cosmopolitan level of the humanity's interest is also illuminating. There is a dualistic struggle. One is the intra-state struggle which involves communitarian democratization and equality, and the other level signifies more universal values such as respect for identity and difference. However, it must be pointed out that the carriers of such an emancipatory project are not states, international regimes or multi-national corporations; but they are politically developed and intellectual individuals who really wish to replace the contemporary world order with a free and communitarian democratic system.

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