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**SECULARIZATION AND DESECULARIZATION IN
EGYPT:THE RISE OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD**

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE



DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this master's thesis titled as "Secularization And Desecularization In Egypt: The Rise Of Muslim Brotherhood" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned sources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honor.

04/07/2019

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ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

Secularization and Desecularization in Egypt: The Rise of Muslim Brotherhood

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The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has been one of the most organized and powerful Islamist movements. Although there are many studies that explain the gradual rise of Muslim Brotherhood as a reaction to top-down secularization, there are not enough studies on the effects of desecularization (reversal of secularization) on this movement. Mainstream approach assumes that secularization process is imposed from above and temporary, while desecularization is spontaneous and natural. This approach prevents us from seeing the use of religion by leaders to legitimize their policies at times. In this thesis, the effects of state-led secularization and desecularization processes on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is examined. Ideologies and policies of different rulers in the 20th century, and the Muslim Brotherhood's response to them are analysed.

Major theoretical approaches about secularization and desecularization processes are examined and recent trends in the literature are critically discussed in the first chapter. In the second chapter, the long history of secularization and desecularization in Egypt is explored. Particularly the factors that caused the revival of religion in politics since Sadat, like socio-economic problems, military defeat against Israel, decline of pan-Arabism, withdrawal of state from economy and social policy, growing alienation between society and government, the effects of external powers, are studied. In the last chapter, the transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood since the early 20th century until the recent fall of Morsi is discussed. Its relations with Egyptian leaders, with

other political and societal groups, and with regional and global powers, is examined.

Keywords: Secularization, Desecularization, Political Islam, Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood



ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

Mısır'da Sekülerizasyon ve Desekülerizasyon: Müslüman Kardeşlerin Yükselişi
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Mısır'daki Müslüman Kardeşler, en organize ve en güçlü İslami hareketlerden biri olmuştur. Müslüman Kardeşler'in kademeli yükselişini tepeden inme sekülerleşmeye bir tepki olarak açıklayan birçok çalışma olmasına rağmen, desekülerizasyonun (sekülerleşmenin tersine dönmesi) bu hareket üzerindeki etkileri konusunda yeterli çalışma yoktur. Yaygın yaklaşım, sekülerizasyon sürecinin yukarıdan empoze edilen ve geçici, desekülerizasyon sürecinin ise kendiliğinden ve doğal olduğunu varsayar. Bu yaklaşım, zaman zaman liderler tarafından politikalarını meşrulaştırmak için dinin kullanımını görmemizi engeller. Bu tezde, devlet öncülüğünde sekülerizasyon ve desekülerizasyon süreçlerinin Mısır'daki Müslüman Kardeşler üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. 20. yüzyıldaki farklı yöneticilerin ideolojileri ve politikaları ile Müslüman Kardeşler'in onlara karşı tepkisi analiz edilmiştir.

Birinci bölümde sekülerizasyon ve desekülerizasyon süreçleri ile ilgili temel teorik yaklaşımlar incelenmiş ve literatürdeki son eğilimler eleştirel olarak ele alınmıştır. İkinci bölümde, Mısır'da sekülerleşme ve desekülerizasyonun uzun tarihi ele alınmıştır. Özellikle, Sedat'tan bu yana siyasette dinin canlanmasına neden olan, sosyo-ekonomik sorunlar, İsrail'e karşı askeri yenilgiler, pan-Arabizm'in gerilemesi, devletin ekonomiden ve sosyal politikadan çekilmesi, toplum ve hükümet arasında yabancılaşmanın artması, dış güçler gibi faktörler incelenmiştir. Son bölümde, Müslüman Kardeşler'in 20. yüzyılın başlarından Mursi'nin düşüşüne kadar olan

dönüşümü ele alınmıştır. Örgütün Mısırlı liderlerle, diğer siyasi ve toplumsal gruplarla ve bölgesel ve küresel güçlerle ilişkileri incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sekülerizasyon, Desekülerizasyon, Siyasal İslam, Mısır, Müslüman Kardeşler



**SECULARIZATION AND DESECULARIZATION IN EGYPT:
THE RISE OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD**

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|
| MB | Muslim Brotherhood |
| RCC | Revolutionary Command Council |
| UN | United Nations |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| NDP | National Democratic Party |
| SCAF | Supreme Council of the Armed Forces |
| FJP | Freedom and Justice Party |

INTRODUCTION

Egypt, with its strategic position and cultural, religious and ethnic diversities, has always been an important topic for political studies. Recently it has witnessed the rise and decline of an Islamist movement. The consequences are not yet clear, but the process needs to be analysed. The Muslim Brotherhood has a considerable place in Islamist movements. It is one of the most organized and powerful Islamist movements. In this thesis, the relationship between state policies and the rise and the fall of political Islam in Egypt is examined via the Muslim Brotherhood. The long history of the Muslim Brotherhood gives us a chance to analyse the reasons that cause the rise of secularism and reactions against it in Egypt.

This thesis will attempt to contribute to the academic literature by combining studies on the Muslim Brotherhood with those on state-led secularization and desecularization. There are many resources in literature about secularism, secularization, different types of secularisms and reactions against secularism. However, there are not enough resources about top-down secularization and top-down desecularization; that is, top-down Islamization. Mainstream approach about this issue is that secularization process is top-down and temporary while desecularization is spontaneous and natural. This mainstream approach prevents us to see the support of leaders for desecularization process to legitimize their policies at times. Also, modernization and secularization processes has created individuals and groups of people in the society who are open to the influence of secular leaders and their policies. So, the rise of Muslim Brotherhood cannot be simply explained by the release of secularist pressures on the society. The factors that first made secular nationalism and later Islamism attractive to people in the 20th century needs to be analysed in detail.

The thesis in particular will focus on the effects of secularism on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It will examine the ideologies and policies of the leaders in Egypt and reactions of the Muslim Brotherhood against these policies and ideologies. In doing that, it will also be attempted to shed some light to the relationship between Islam and secularism and their compatibilities. This relationship will be examined in different contexts and under different leaders.

This thesis also aims to examine the transformation of the ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood from Hasan Al-Banna to Mohamed Morsi. Internal debates and groups in the Muslim Brotherhood will be analysed according with respect to secularization and desecularization processes. It is assumed that there appeared ideological differences in the Muslim Brotherhood ranging from conservative and radical side to more reformist and secular side. The ideas and ideologies of important figures in the Muslim Brotherhood will not only be examined in terms of the effects of the ideologies of various rulers in Egypt but also in terms of the effects of the regional and hegemonic powers in the international arena.

In order to understand the secularization and desecularization processes in the Middle East, major theoretical approaches will be examined in the first chapter. Secularization refers to the long process in which human ideas and actions became more important than religious doctrines. Secularism refers to the idea and practice that there should be a separation between the public sphere and the private sphere, and religious ideas should be confined to the private sphere. Main concepts like secular, secularism, secularization and desecularization will be defined. Their history since the 17th century will be briefly depicted.

Many classical and modern sociologists such as Weber, Marx, Durkheim, Bruce, Dobbalaere etc. have studied modernization and secularization as the decline of religious influence in society. According to the classical secularization theory, modernization caused the decline of religion as a source of political legitimacy and true knowledge. It led to a differentiation between religion and other social domains of life. Rationalization emerged with modernization and this caused rational mentality to prevail religious mentality. On the other hand, for some scholars, modernization and rationalization did not cause the decline of religious influence. According to them, classical secularization theory did not predict the rise of religious fundamentalist movements and religious influence in public sphere in the 1970s onwards. Classical secularization theory has been criticized for being biased and normative. It is claimed that researches and observations worldwide do not support the assumptions of secularization theory. Some important scholars like Berger, Casanova, Taylor, Asad, Habermas etc. criticized the paradigm of secularism by arguing that modernization did not cause the end of religion and last decades showed

the evidence of a “resurgence of religion” and a post-secular society. These ideas will be discussed in the first chapter.

Other important tendencies in recent studies about secularism is to differentiate between different types of secularism, and to discuss the compatibility between Islam and secularism. According to some scholars, there are no political rules in Islam; that is why Islam is compatible with secularism, modernization and democracy. On the other hand, according to others, secularism is specific to Christianity and there is no separation between public sphere and private sphere in Islam. According to this approach, secularism in Muslim world did not occur as a result of social developments. It was imposed from above. This approach explains desecularization; i.e. the reversal of secularism, as a reaction to top-down and assertive secularization. Alienation and dislocation in society was caused by the policies of governments which imposed secularism from above. This top-down secularization process caused the reaction in society and this created desecularization process in some Muslim states. According to this approach, desecularization is spontaneous and natural but secularization process is temporary and artificial. When we look at the issue from this perspective, we are unable to see that how leaders sometimes imposed a desecularization process from above to legitimise their claims and policies. These claims and debates will be introduced in the first chapter and empirically tested in the following chapters. It is assumed that there are many different factors for the emergence of desecularization and revival of religion.

In the second chapter, the long history of secularization and desecularization in Egypt, and many factors that caused these results, will be examined. First modernizing influence came to Egypt in 1798 after the French occupation and continued with the political and social transformation of Egypt under Mehmet Ali Pasha. Later the under British colonialism from the late 19th cc until mid-20th century a more modern and secular atmosphere has been promoted. On the other hand, the reaction to colonial powers also led to the rise of nationalist ideologies that merged nationalism with religious motives and symbols. This reaction ended up with the rise of Nasser. Nasser became the symbol of Pan-Arabism, secular-nationalism and Arab socialism. He promoted more secular and nationalist ideologies and did not

let religious groups become powerful in Egypt. Nasser's policies towards Islamist ideology and actors will be examined in this chapter.

The second chapter will then focus on Sadat and Mubarak periods. It will be examined if the socio-economic problems, military defeat against Israel, and growing alienation between society and government towards the end of Nasser period has justified the transformation under Sadat. During his rule, the decline of belief to secularism, socialism, and Pan-Arabism accelerated and Sadat used Islamist groups as a legitimacy vehicle against secular groups. It will be attempted to understand in what ways economic and political liberalization caused the rise of Islamists. It is assumed that economic liberalization policies did not fix the economic problems in Egypt during Sadat and Mubarak periods; on the contrary, the cut in subsidies and lack of social services put people in difficulty. The gap that emerged with the withdrawal of state was filled by Islamist groups. This opened the door for Islamists to increase their influence on lower and middle classes. Also, more direct effects of Sadat and Mubarak's policies of religion in the top-down desecularization process will be detected. Also, external factors like the supports of the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, the policies to promote Islamist groups by the United States within the framework of Green Belt project in the rise of the influence of the Islamist groups in Egypt will be taken into consideration.

In the last chapter, specific focus will be on the transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood in its long history since the early 20th century until the recent fall of Morsi. Its relations with Egyptian leaders, other political and societal groups in Egypt, and with regional and global powers, will be examined in this chapter. An analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood in the more general framework of rise and fall of secularism in Egypt is the aim of this thesis. This requires considering multiple factors such as colonial heritage, ideological struggles, regional and global balance of power, economic patterns etc This broader perspective would allow us to understand the changing ideas and characteristics of the organization as well as the divisions within the organization between more radical and more secular sections. This flexibility might even approve the idea that secularization process had a steady effect on the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt despite top-down desecularization process led by various internal and external factors.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORIES ON SECULARIZATION AND DESECULARIZATION

1.1. MAIN CONCEPTS

The first appearance of the term ‘secularization’ and historical usage of it was in the Treaty of Westphalia. In Treaty of Westphalia, certain lands were determined and transferred from the church to the princes. Secularization came to be applied to any aspect of life which is not controlled by church. Also, it referred to the growing importance of experiences, ideas and institutions apart from the divine (Shiner, 1965: 283-284).

The term “secularism” was coined by British secularist George Jacob Holyoake in the 1840s. According to him, state should be tolerant and impartial in all religious matters. That is why Holyoake is very important for the development of the idea of secularism. Also, Charles Bradlaugh, who was an English political activist and the founder of the National Secular Society to promote secularism in 1866, is a very important figure for secularism and his ideas are more radical than Holyoake. He is the author of *Doubts in Dialogue* and he criticized all religions in his book. Besides, he argued that the main point in secularization is the separation between religion and public sphere. He supported limiting the power of religion on other institutions like law, education, economy, politics etc. According to this definition, secularism envisages exclusion of religious influences from the public sphere. Public sphere is about law, education, government etc. It is an area in social life and in here, individuals can discuss freely together, identify societal problems and talk about politics. Public sphere is governed by common norms, values and ethics. On the other hand, private sphere is different from the public sphere. There is no governmental or other fields’ intervention to individuals’ private sphere. Also, private sphere is personal and about free will (Wu, 2007:55). It is important to note that narrow definitions of secularism that define it as the separation of religion and state have appeared later.

There are distinctions between the secular, secularization and secularism. The secular is a central modern epistemic category. Secularization is the

conceptualization of a modern historical process. Secularism is a worldview and ideology. The secular is a category which constructs legal, political and cultural realm. This realm was differentiated from religion. Secularization is a historical process. It refers to the transformation and differentiation of the religious and the secular. Here the religious is religious institution and churches while; the secular is the non-clerical institutions of state, economy, science, art, law etc. In this process, there is a decline of religion and privatization of religion in the modern world. Secularism is an ideology that sets secularization as a norm (Casanova, 2011:55-56). We must be careful about defining secularism as an ideology though; it is more a political stance than a distinct ideology. It is usually embodied by different broad ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism or socialism. For the purpose of this study, it is important to define secular nationalism. Secular-nationalism is a secular ideology, which aims to create a sense of community among a certain group of people, with respect to a particular ethnicity, place and history. It is neutral to religion and focuses on the common will of citizens rather than their common religious identity. Common culture, communication instruments, economic network and educational system is necessary for the essence of secular nationalism for Ernest Gellner (Juergensmeyer, 2008:14-20).

A last concept that must be defined is laicism. Laicism and secularism are the similar words and are often used interchangeably. Laicism is used in continental Europe, especially France. In the Anglosaxon literature, the concept of secularism is used to express a softer and inclusive understanding of secularism. I will examine these different uses of the secularism in the title of Passive vs Assertive Secularism. For Niyazi Berkes, secularism is a big cluster which includes laicism. While laicism refers to the change in the source of legitimacy and the separation between religion and state, secularism refers to the broader social transformation and the supremacy of modern world view over religious worldview (Çelikoğlu, 2013: 7). The idea of laicism dates back to the French Revolution. In France, there appeared a conflict between the church and the state, reflecting societal divisions. There were two sides. One side was Catholic, traditionalist and religious people. The other side was radical anti-clericalists. These republican radicals eventually managed to introduce laicism;

i.e., the separation between institutions of state and the church (Marranci, 2010:31-32).

Secularism reflects and reveals important cleavages in the society. Many religious people support a more central role for religion in public life. They do not want to separate religion from public sphere because they believe that religion is a source of morality in society and a symbol of moral order. On the other hand, people who support a more secular life, worry about corrupting influence of the politicization of the religion. Secularism is necessary to protect religion from the negative effects of its politicization. There are different religions and now states are multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies. Association of religion and government can cause fear of marginalization among minority groups; that is, they can be seen as a second-class citizen (Kashdan, 2012: 125).

In secular states, there is a distinction between state and religion. This distinction prevents the power of religious institution over state and other institutions. State is independent from religious institution. For Jeroen Temperman, state is not bound up with religious principles and laws. Secular state is non-denominational and non-religious. Any positive identification with the religion is denied by the secular state. Enlightenment separationists were the first to support the separation between religion and state. Religion should be confined to private sphere and public institutions should be free from religion. All religious influence should be removed from public institutions. There are two views about why religion should be confined to private sphere. Firstly, separation protects state from divisiveness and unpredictability of religion. State means power and with religion, this can create problem. Secondly, separation protects religion from intrusions and corruption of temporal rulers of state (Ahdar, 2013:405-406). In the next parts, different approaches to the relationship religion and modernity as well as different normative ideas about the proper place of religion in public life will be discussed.

1.2. SECULARIZATION THESIS

The idea that modernity is incompatible with religious worldview dates back to the Enlightenment Age. For Kant, enlightenment is the waking up from self-

imposed immaturity. Knowledge is very important, and it comes from experiences and actions of human being. However, before enlightenment, some people need to be guided by divine things. With enlightenment, people saw that rational choices and reasons can guide them without any divine order. European Enlightenment shows that church was very powerful and influential before. With secularism and enlightenment, people saw that they do not need to be guided by divine orders, they can use experiences, actions and reasons to reach true knowledge that was not limited by any holy faith. According to Kant, secularism is independence of state from the religion and separation between church and state. Religion must be separated from the public sphere and religion must be confined to private sphere. Religion cannot play a role in political institutions, political decision-making and policies. Moral and religious commitment of people is not important for secular state because all citizens are equal. Secularism gives an opportunity to choose lifestyle regardless of religious moral rules and limitations. Moral or human reason is enough for political decision-making processes. There is no necessity for religious reason to justify political issues (Glendon and Zacher, 2012: 552-555).

According to many writers, this separationism of religion and state is inherent in Christianity. For example, there is a statement which is arrogated to Jesus Christ in the Holy Bible; "They said, "Caesar's." Then he said to them, "Therefore render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." However, for Mert, historical processes and struggles caused the evolution and the emergence of the secularism. According to Mert, like Weber, there is no inherent separation in Christianity that allows for secular-political organization. There are different historical processes in different regions, but all have witnessed the secularization struggles. Despite all differences of historical processes, the experience of secularization process is similar in these societies (Mert, 1994: 45-46). For Weber, with modernization, world view and social opinion changed. The rise of modernization caused the decline of tradition in society, so secularism is inevitable with decline of traditional religious values. Secularization caused the change of the world view. Modernization led to the decline of authority of religion in public sphere. Religion lost its power on determination of political legitimacy and true

knowledge. Modernization led to rationalization and this created the secular view (Mert, 1994: 21).

For Weber, Marx and Durkheim, secularization is important part of the modernization and it will reach all over the world. According to Thomas Woolston - an 18th cc radical theologian-, Frederick Engels, Karl Marx and Freud, modernization and rationalization in human nature will cause the end of the religion in future. In the thesis of Olivier Tschannen, the effect of religion in society will decrease and also, for Swatos and Christiano, the secularization process will cause the religiousless society (Köse, 2001: 150-152). According to Walls and Bruce, modernization would cause the decline of religious influence at society. Religion would not disappear, but it lost its power in public sphere because of the rationalization at society with modernization and secularism (Erdogan, 1995: 179).

Secularism has been interpreted in various ways. Some scholars and thinkers focus on the legal separation between religion and state, some focus on the differentiation of science, philosophy and theology, and some of them focus on the practical differentiation of morality, law and religion (Casanova, 2011:55-56). Classical secularization thesis claims that religion and state are differentiated from each other during modernization. Religion becomes differentiated from other social domains of life. These differentiations created new institutions like education, law, economy, politics etc. These institutions become autonomous from religion and religion loses its power on these institutions (Tschannen, 1991:400-401). Autonomization is very important for Berger because secularization is an autonomization of institutions, cultural and social domains from religious institutions and symbols. For example, education becomes more scientific with secular autonomization (Tschannen, 1991:407). With secularization, religion loses its control and power over other spheres of life. Competition between religion and other world views starts and this causes collapse of religious world views. It loses its plausibility and monopoly over truth (Tschannen, 1991:398). Harvey Cox, who is an American theologian, mentioned in *The Secular City* that secularism is the liberation of man from metaphysical myths and religious symbols. (Hashemi, 2010:326-327).

According to supporters of secularization, secularization theory is not against religion. It has tried to empirically explain the decline of religious practices and

Christian Churches. According to supporters, there had been religious dominance in entire world. This dominance had been created and protected by religious institutions. This dominance has taken damage from secularization and this has caused the decline of dominance and influence of religious institutions in public sphere (Zielinska, 2013: 29).

According to Giddens, before secularism, religion was the superset which contains both public and private spheres. However, secularization process enforced religion to be a subset in private sphere. Then, the efficiency of religion in public sphere decreased. This reduction in the efficiency of religion created separation between public sphere and religion. Also, religious influence on political decisions took a damage from this process (Çelik, 2017: 213).

Dobbelaere, who is a sociologist of religion, mentions that there are three dimensions of secularization. First one is laicization. This is about differentiation process. All other institutions like scientific, educational, political etc. gain autonomy from religious institution. After that religion loses its feature of being the primary institution. This is the first step for a secular society and system. Second dimension is internal secularization. In internal secularization process, religious organizations adapt to the secularized world and revise/reform some of their principles. Last one is religious disinvolvement. This process refers to the decline of religious belief and practice in society. Not only do religious authorities' control over people's actions decrease in public sphere, but also in religious sphere (Chaves, 1994:757). For Swatos and Christiano, not only does secularism cause the separation of religion from state and the decline of the religious in public sphere, but also lead to the development of the scientific rationality in society that makes it become less religious (Çelikoğlu, 2013: 19).

According to Larry Shiner, religious symbols and religious institutions lost their prestige with secularization process. Also, the endpoint of the secularization process would be irreligious society. Effects of religion would be limited to the private sphere and importance of worldly issues would increase. Rationalization would cause the decline of religious doctrine in society. The rise of rational mentality in society with secularism would overtop against religious mentality (Küçükcan, 2005: 112). On the other hand, for some scholars, rationalization and modernization

did not cause the decline of religious influence. They also claim that traditional secularization theory could not examine and interpret the future of religious power in public sphere.

1.3. CRITIQUES OF SECULARIZATION THESIS AND THE IDEA OF ‘POST-SECULAR SOCIETY’

According to Casanova, when the secularization process has started, it was seen as evident without any research or data. Also, secularization theory has not been examined or formulated systematically with researches (Zielinska, 2013: 27-28). According to Jeffrey K. Hadden, the classical secularization theory is a doctrine rather than a scientific approach. The assumptions of the secularization theory are ideological, based on prejudices rather than a systematic set of propositions. Secularization is not a logical and rational theory which can explain the rise or decline of religious influence with assumptions supported by researches and data. Researches and observations in worldwide do not support the assumptions of secularization theory. The rise of religious fundamentalism and radicalism are contrary to the assumptions of classical secularization theory which claims the decline of religion's importance in society. There is no basis for the assumption of secularism that religion would be stuck in private sphere. Religious influence decreased with secularization process and this was predicted by some scholars, according to Evolutionary Modernization Theory. Nevertheless, developments in recent years have revealed invalidity of the classical secularization theory for both Hadden and Bellah (Çelik, 2017: 219; Kirman, 2008: 286; Zielinska, 2013: 6).

For Peter Berger, secularization process is withdrawal of religious institution and its symbols from other institutions and culture of society. After that religious content decreases in arts and literature. Science becomes autonomous from religion. This creates secularization of consciousness in society. State can legitimize itself with reference to the normative primacy of secular reason instead of traditional values and religious beliefs. Nevertheless, during the Cold War, academic and public discourses about criticism of secularism increased. Some religious movements engaged in political field in the Middle East and they came to power. Societal role of

religion increased in Latin American and Central European countries (Keyman, 2007:215-217). Some people saw this as a “resurgence of religion”. They criticized the paradigm of secularism by arguing that modernization did not cause the end of religion and last decades showed the evidence of the rise of religion again (Çelikoğlu, 2013: 17).

Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud are important thinkers of nineteenth century. All of them thought that modernization, industrialization, urbanization and rationalisation will cause the decline of religion. However, decline of religion never occurred. On the contrary, fundamentalist religious movements and popularity of religion increased (Norris and Inglehart, 2004:3). There are many evidences for the rise of the religion after the 1960s such as the rise in the attendance to religious practice in the United States, and the rise of fundamentalist religious movements etc. (Çelikoğlu, 2013: 21)

By the end of the 20th century, many authors have criticized the traditional secularization theory and offered to revise it. They admitted that there is a decline in the influence and importance of religion with the secularization process. However, for Robert Bellah, a sociologist of religion, religion has been still powerful in modern society and it has maintained its influence in society. Also, José Casanova and Peter Berger were initially supporters of the traditional secularization thesis, but they later claimed that secularization thesis was a mistake and certain practices based on it caused counter-secularization in some regions, as they provoked religious fundamentalism and political Islam in the Middle East (Iranzo, 2016:888). The main aim of this study is to analyse critically the suggestion that secularization caused the counter-secularization and to see if there are different factors which cause counter-secularization.

Berger supported secularization when he published *The Sacred Canopy* in 1967. However, when he published *The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview* in 1999, he admits that secularization process was always affected by region’s culture, religion, political affiliation. Different regions and different cultures cause different consequences of secularization process. According to him, modernization did not cause the decline of religiosity. Even religiosity increased in some areas. Maybe secularism created secular societies, but it created counter-

secular masses. For Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, who are sociologists of religion, secularization theory has been full of errors and it is unsuccessful (Küçükcan, 2005:114-116).

For advocates of liberal tolerance, political secularization is very important because it creates private religious sphere for individuals' belief and practice. However, many thinkers recently studied how secularization can work against toleration. According to them, in modern societies, religion can be seen as a cultural identity and it is sometimes difficult to separate them. If the state intervenes in any appearance of religion in public sphere through some regulations or prohibitions, this poses a threat to social identity in multi-faith and multicultural societies (Marranci, 2010:13). What is proposed by these critics of secularism is a post-secular society ideal.

Post-secular is an eruption of religion in public sphere for Habermas. Communication and dialogue between religions is necessary because lack of dialogue can cause political conflict in society (Marranci, 2010:14-15). For Habermas, secularization does not cause the decline of religion and the rise of the importance of religion is not the danger for secularization. However, there is a tension between secular and religion. He offers to revise secularism instead of disposal. Post-secularism basically asserts that restrictions on the representation of religion in public sphere should be removed on the one hand, and liberal institutions and their policies must be protected from fundamentalist religious groups on the other. Two areas should be created in liberal public sphere. One is the state apparatus. This area should be protected from religious arguments. And the other area in liberal public sphere should be the area of expression and debate, and in this area religious arguments should be allowed for religious people to express themselves (Addis, 2013:57).

Habermas opposes laicism and "assertive secularism" in law and public policies. Such policies can cause the resentment of religious groups in society (Addis, 2013:60-61). Traditional secularization thesis is thus regarded as the reason of the revival of religion and counter-secularization. Post-secular society is necessary because it can fix the negative aspects of secularization. It offers the existence of religious communities in secular environment, and in this way secularization process

can continue in the existence of religious communities (Habermas, 2008:17-20). Today the presence of religion in politics increases and, religious people and communities participate in debates about the scale of public sphere. According to many people, this creates a plural democratic society (Iranzo, 2016:888-889). Diversity of people have increased, and religious people are not the exception. For Habermas, representative capacity should be expanded for religious people, migrants, minorities etc. For Habermas, multiculturalism is very important because there are many different cultures, beliefs and ethnics in secular societies (Habermas, 2008:26). The post-secular can achieve the equal participation of believers and non-believers without giving up the neutrality of state. Habermas focuses on communication and translation process. Religious people should participate and contribute arguments in politics, but they should translate religious arguments in a reasonable way. This reasonable religion should be compatible with secular principles of the liberal state and the morality of the constitutional state (Iranzo, 2016:893). Habermas gives importance to the rule of law because only law can protect politics and public sphere from unreasonable religious effects.

Charles Taylor also criticizes the traditional secularization thesis. He used the term "Secular Age" instead of post-secular society. He agrees with Habermas about the relationship between secular and religion. For Taylor, there is no conflict between religion and secularism. People need a supreme power, so religion is permanent. Also, secular states do not need to be anti-religious. State should provide its citizens equality. Belief systems and ethnicities of people are not important for state and neutrality is necessary. Separation between religion and state is necessary for Taylor, but that does not mean total separation. Religion still plays an important role in public sphere and it is not necessarily against the principles of secularization. Secular state should provide freedom of speech and conscience, as well as neutral laws, regardless of religion, ethnicity, culture etc. (Mozumder, 2011: 1-45).

Today there are many academic works about the limitations and failures of secularization thesis. Many argue that secularization thesis is specific to Europe (Marranci, 2010:11). After 1980s, sociologists tried to review their assumptions about secularization thesis because their assumptions were the decline of religion and privatization of religion. On the contrary, what we faced was deprivitization of

religion (Marranci, 2010:12). Modern sociology rejects that modernization will cause the decline of religion and states that religion becomes more important in public sphere than before. For Peter Berger, after the Enlightenment, religion lost its power and influence in public sphere, but not entirely. People continued to give importance to their religious and cultural norms, which caused the rise of new religious movements after the 1960s (Marranci, 2010:28, 48-49).

Talal Asad does not share the same opinion with such critics of secularization as Habermas and Taylor. Asad does not see secularization as a failed project. It is very important for modern era but scholars failed to theorize it. Asad rejected that secularism belongs to Christianity and Europe. Even though secularism was born in Europe, it can emerge in other regions that have different religious majorities like in Turkey, India and Egypt. Also, there is no relationship between nationalism and secularism. The emergence of the secularism and nationalism at the same places and time are coincidence for Asad. Before secularism, there was religion's dominance in public and private spheres. After that secularism took over this dominance. For Asad, there is no sharp separation between state and religion. Although in secular states, religion is in private sphere, it can affect morality, economy and politics; that is, public sphere can be affected from the private sphere unintentionally. Religion is confined to private sphere and state should intervene to reproduce the separation with religion. Intervention of state to private sphere of religion is not against the principles of secularization theory (Mozumder, 2011:47-58; Dursun, 2015:77-79).

Besides Asad, Keddie also does not fully support secularization theory. There are some scholars like Keddie who do not fully support or deny classical secularization thesis. According to Keddie, it is important to recognize the relationship between modernization and secularization. Secularization depended on the impact of technology and modernization such as industrialization, urbanization, mass communication, etc. Modern industrial world needs more secularization and states should adopt some secular principles. Today even some fundamentalist countries, like Iran, adopted some secular laws and procedures because this adaptation is necessary to keep them in power. Moreover, there is no purely secular state. For example, the state collects religious taxes to support the church in Germany and Spain. In France, the state supports some churches and mosques, but these states

are secular (Keddie, 1997:24). Church membership and declared religious belief are important criteria to measure secularization in that country or region. Secularization with modernization caused a decline in church membership. People are less likely to declare themselves as religious (Keddie, 1997:21). Modernization helped secularization to spread; yet, “true believers” continue to exist. They react against secular nationalist culture and rule, imposed from above. There are top-down secularization processes not only in the East and Middle East but also in the West. This type of secularization process causes the alienation between government and society (Keddie, 1997:23). So, Keddie emphasized the role of state in secularization process. In some non-western states like modern Turkey, Pahlavi’s Iran, Bourguiba’s Tunisia, and Nasser’s Egypt, religious institutions previously had been so strong in law, education and social welfare. State took power from these religious institutions and used this power for modernization and centralizing changes (Keddie, 1997:25).

For Casanova, secularization thesis failed, but it must not be given up entirely. Casanova offers to see secularization thesis as a sub-theme of modernization and this sub-theme is about the separation of religious sphere and secular sphere. Also, Casanova criticized people who think that secularization just means the decline of religious belief and practice. There are two secularizations for Casanova. These are political secularization and social secularization. Social secularization is about questions of belief and practice in everyday life. Political secularization is the separation of religion from other spheres of society. Political secularization is simply the separation between church and state. There are many societal sub-systems like economy, culture, education, politics and these must be separated from religion (Marranci, 2010:13). So, differentiation of religious and non-religious spheres is very important and necessary for Casanova to create state neutrality toward all religions in a secular state (Gorski, 2012: 6).

After 1980s, Swatos and Christiano offers to protect the secularization paradigm to examine the religion which had a quality because of the institutional change which was different from other institutions (Çelikoğlu, 2013: 24). For Chaves, secularization thesis did not cause the decline of the religiosity in private level. Also, secularization thesis promoted religion in private sphere with

modernization. However, in public level, there is a decline of religious authority (Çelikoğlu, 2013: 25).

1.4. PASSIVE VERSUS ASSERTIVE SECULARISM

Besides the critical approach to secularization thesis, another current tendency in the literature is to differentiate between different secularisms. With modernization, secularism spread rapidly but it did not cause the same consequences, and the same secularization process was not applied by the rulers of these states. So, there are different stories in secularization process in different countries. For example, French secularism is very different from American secularism and Turkish secularism is very different from Indian secularism. However, mainly there are two types of secularism. According to Ahdar, these are “benevolent form of secularism” and “hostile form of secularism” (Ahdar, 2013:408). Other scholars have given different names to the same phenomena, such as Kuru’s assertive and passive secularisms.

In benevolent form of secularism, state does not impose any non-religious beliefs or conventional religious beliefs. Benevolent secularism is very soft and passive secularism. It creates respect and tolerance in society. Religious impulse is not limited only to individuals for benevolent secularism and it recognize religious communities and associations. Religion is not regarded a threat. Hence, benevolent secularism takes religion in public sphere (Ahdar, 2013:409-410).

Hostile secularism is different from benevolent secularism. It is the radical, assertive and programmatic type of secularism. This assertive secularism applies pressure on religious institution and society’s belief. It tries to create a public sphere free from religion. Sometimes states, which adopt this type of secularism, promote unbelief and anti-religion. According to McClay, who is historian from the United States and has articles on secularism, people should be free from religion and they can shape their destinies without irrational motivations and myths. This type of secularism is the defence of the secular cause. Religion should be confined to private sphere and never be represented in public sphere. State can follow assertive policies over religion to keep it in private sphere (Ahdar, 2013:411-412; Gisi, 2015: 6).

For Ahmet Kuru, benevolent secularism is a passive secularism. Assertive secularism is more aggressive, and it tries to eliminate religion from public sphere (Kuru, 2007:571-572). There are two types of secularism; passive and assertive. In passive secularism, state do not intervene into religion and let appearance of religion in public. In assertive secularism, state keeps away religion from public sphere. State plays aggressive role to keep religion in private sphere (Kuru, 2007:570; 2009a:7-8). Ancient regimes' monarchy with hegemonic religion created the anticlericalism in Turkey and France, which are examples of assertive secularism. There was no monarchic past for the US, unlike France and Turkey. Also, the United States was a new country that were founded by immigrants. That is why a passive secularism developed in the US. In US, secular elites and religious elites reached a consensus about the separation of church from politics (Kuru, 2007:571; 2009a:8). Religious symbols can be used by students in public schools and there is a more positive tone towards religion in US. On the contrary, in examples of France and Turkey, religious symbols were not allowed in public schools. Private religious schools are prohibited by Turkey. There are private religious schools in France, but these schools must accept the state control with signing a contract. There is ban on school prayer in all three examples. However, in Turkey and France, justification of the ban on school prayer is the secular principles of these countries. On the other hand, justification of the ban on school prayer is that this can cause psychological pressure on religious beliefs of minority students in US. We can see religious expressions like In God We Trust or God Bless America in public sphere. Also, sessions of the Supreme Court in the United States started with " God save the United States and this Honorable Court". There are no religious public discourses in France and Turkey (Kuru, 2009a:12-13; Gisi, 2015: 6).

For Peter Berger, different causes create different secularisms (Tschannen, 1991:398). Also, David Martin stated that secularization is not a unilinear process. Secularization can create different consequences in different societies. (Tschannen, 1991:399; Mozumder, 2011: 44). It is hard to make simple generalizations. For instance, we cannot simply talk about different secularization practices in Western civilization and Muslim civilization. For example, both France and United States are Christian countries. However, secularism in United States is different and softer than

France. Also, Turkey has a huge Muslim population, but its secularism is similar to France (Kuru, 2007:575). With post-colonial governments, secularism in Egypt created a situation like in France and Turkey.

Some types of secularization processes show us that there is one-sided exclusion in relationship between state and religion. State have power over religion and if necessary, it intervenes. State can suppress religion or help it. For state, religion become the object of law and public policy. However, religion cannot intervene to state, politics or other institutions. When there is one historically dominant religion in country, there appears a counter influence of state on religion to keep it in private sphere. Anticlericalism in France resembles the story in Egypt and other countries which had a monopoly of Islam prior to the secularization process (Bhargava, 2010:12).

1.5. SECULARIZATION IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: ARE ISLAM AND SECULARIZATION COMPATIBLE?

There is another theoretical debate related to our inquiry of the Egyptian case – the compatibility of Islam and secularization. Islam, Judaism and Christianity are monotheistic and scriptural. They each have basic teachings and practices for believers. These three monotheistic religions had strong religious institutions. These institutions had power on law, education, ideologies. These affected political and economic structure. With modernization, these old religious institutions could not quickly adopt technological, scientific and political developments. These caused the rise of political secularization in states. Nevertheless, there are important differences between these religions regarding secularization. For example, in Christianity, modernization process and secularization began earlier than Islam. Some claim that Christianity coexists with a worldly tradition, but Islam does not allow any secular legal tradition. Hence, secularization process is very difficult in Muslim-majority countries because there is resistance to secularization in Islam (Keddie, 1997:26).

The answers to the question “can Islam and secularism be together?” have changed in time. According to Haifaa Jawad who studies about religion, Islam and Middle East, Muslims in Egypt have different position on secularization issue. For

some of them, secularization and Islam are not compatible because there is Islamic structure which was derived from the Qur'an and Sunnah. On the other hand, for others, there is no form of governance which was planned by the Qur'an and Sunnah. There is only guidance. Also, secularism is a progress and it is inevitable (Marranci, 2010:5-6).

According to Mosca, both Islam and Christianity are theocentric doctrines. There is no separation between religion and worldly issues in these religions. The difference between two religions is that Islamist religious people have not been independent from state, but in Christianity, there is Papacy; that is, religious institution has been independent from state. This difference caused different historical experiences and results, when they faced modernization (Erdogan, 1995: 186).

Charles Tilly, on the other hand, claims that although secularism emerged in response to political problems of Western Christian society, it can be used in other non-Christian societies which are modern. The rise of the modern nation state relates to emergence of secularism. Hence, if non-Christian states modernize, they can experience privatization of religion and be secular societies. Tibi also argues that when a Muslim society modernizes, it will experience secularism and separation between religion and public affairs. Gellner does not agree with Tibi and Charles Tilly. According to him, Islam has a unique ability to survive against secular assumptions. Muslim nation gives importance to their religion and promote purified religion. Islam always continues to be strong in public affairs and focuses on relations between religion and politics (El Sharakawy, 2013: 25-26).

According to Ernest Gellner, Islam and secularization are not compatible because Islam has a resistance to secularization. Islam wants to build a social order. It has a set of rules to rule both public and private spheres. For Bernard Lewis, Judaism and Islam are different from Christianity. Judaism and Islam have resistance to the secularization. They make no distinction between sacred law and secular law. Secularization is only compatible with Christianity. For Huntington too, there is incompatibility between Islam, democracy and secularization because there is no distinction between state and religion in Islam, so nature of Islam is against the secularization and democracy in Muslim societies (Kuru, 2009b:36-38; 2009a:17).

For al-Qaradawi, secularism is more compatible with Christianity instead of Islam. According to him, Islam and Christianity are fundamentally different. Christianity accepts the separation between religion and politics. In Christianity, life has two parts. One part is for religion and other part is for state. However, Islam cannot accept this separation. There is connection between religion and politics. There is one indissoluble life in Islam that is ruled by God alone. God is lord of the heavens and the earth. Secularism tries to separate this indissoluble life in Islam so secularism is not compatible with Islam (Esposito, 2010:8). For Tariq Ramadan too, Islam and secularism are not compatible. He points out that freedom and freedom of choice are very important elements of Western secularism. For example, in Europe, Muslims can live their religion because there is a freedom of religion. Also, freedom of choice is very important for Islam. The main problem for Ramadan is that Muslim states should not be forced or imposed secularism by Western powers like during the colonial rule or the Nasser administration in Egypt. Ramadan supports that people can live their religion in both public and private sphere (Marranci, 2010:56-57). Both important figures try to find middle way not to isolate themselves from the modern world, but both promote Islamic way of life and modern interpretation of Islam.

Spiritual and worldly are bonded in Islam so state and religion cannot be separated. Islam is religion and state, not doctrine or community. Tariq al-Bishri, who was a judge and Egyptian thinker, claimed that Islam and secularism cannot accept each other because Islam and Christianity are not same (Najjar, 1996:7). According to Imara, Islam and Christianity are different. Christianity is spiritual religion. In Bible, Jesus said, "give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and give to God what belongs to God." There is separation between the spiritual and worldly affairs. On the other hand, there is no separation between the spiritual and worldly affairs in Islam. For Christianity, Church is for salvation of souls, but Islam legislates state and social relations. (Najjar, 1996:8).

Paul Salem claims that Christianity is different from Islam. There is a separation between God and Caesar; that is, worldly and spiritual distinction in Christianity. However, Islam affects both public and private life and these are inseparably connected. Christianity is just about private life, but Islam claims all

private and public life, even political life. So, secular principles do not represent a defiance against Christianity, but they are against Islam (Mondal, 2003: 147-148).

Another set of arguments concerning the difference between Western and Muslim worlds makes a critique of top-down secularization and governmental control of religion in the Muslim world. Western liberal political theory supports that secularism creates neutral space for people to agree or disagree about religion. This neutral space is public sphere. Also, government and public sphere are supposed to be objective toward religion. Religion should not be involved in public sphere or politics. Secular public sphere creates ‘overlapping consensus’, according to Charles Taylor. This overlapping consensus refers to a dialogue between people who believe in different religions but support similar political principles. Only a secular public sphere can create this. On the other hand, in the Muslim countries, governments that embrace secularism use it to control society. They create monopoly on religion and try to control society. These governments’ aim is control-seeking rather than creating a negotiating pattern (El Sharakawy, 2013: 27). Colonialism is regarded as responsible for this top-down secularization in the Muslim world. According to some, secularism has been politicized by post-Colonial regimes in the Muslim world (El Sharakawy, 2013: 27-28). However, not only did states use secularism as a tool for repression and legitimacy, but also used religion to build legitimacy and stability for the political system. Elites in government used religion to justify their decisions and policies. Religion and secularism were essential and effective tools for elites in Muslim states’ governments (El Sharakawy, 2013: 28).

For some authors, Islam is anti-secular uniquely. Islam’s historical experiences and reaction against modernity prevented development of secularism in Muslim world. For Bernard Lewis, Muslims have different historical experiences, and this creates reaction to anything from abroad. Secularism was brought by colonial and imperial powers to Muslim societies. In the post-colonial period, new leaders kept secularism alive and promoted it. Top-down secularism resulted with autocratic states which forced society to rapid Westernization, modernization and secularization. This caused alienation and dislocation. Autocratic states, which were secular and nationalist, gave damage to reputation of secularism and caused the rise of political Islam in Middle East (Hashemi, 2010:334). So, there is a widespread idea

in the literature that top-down and west-imposed secularism caused the revival of religion again in society.

According to Haynes, Islamic world is a major counter-example against the classical secularization theory. Religious effect in society and politics has increased from Indonesia to Magreb. For Rodney Stark and Peter Berger, there is a very important harmony between Islamic faith and modernization. According to Berger, Islamist movement does not support unmodernised society. They have had more influence in modernized cities. Even if political elites had studied in Western type of education, they have given importance to their religious faith in societies like Turkey and Egypt (Köse, 2001: 161).

According to Celik, there are some problems in classical secularization theory. Firstly, conflicts between the religious system and state in some specific states are generalized to other countries which do not face with same historical conditions. That different historical experiences can create different processes is not acknowledged by this perspective. Secondly, secularism was imported by some non-Western countries as a condition of modernity and political project for their legitimacy. Muslim states and their societies had theological and cultural resistance against secularism. On the other hand, Çelik asserts that significant changes were ignored by many scholars. There are important secular groups and countries in the Muslim World (Çelik, 2017: 216).

In Egypt, Taha Hussein, Muhammad Hussein Heykel and Ali Abdel Raziq were supporters of secularism in 1920s and 1930s. According to them, there were no rigid political rules or principles in Islam. They gave importance to democracy and freedom. Also, they believed that Islam lets democracy and freedom of speech so there should be separation between religion and politics (Küçükcan, 2005: 121). After 1950s, there have been more Muslim intellectuals interested in secularism and laicism. Reformist and secular Muslims criticized Muslim governments for their illiberal and autocratic Islamists policies. According to Muslim secular intellectuals, laicism is necessary to reach democracy, civil liberties and human rights. Islamic doctrine opposes them, and laicism can accomplish this. According to laicism, everyone can be equal citizen regardless of any belief. That is why laicism is

historical, political and social requirement for Fouad Zakariya who was a secular Egyptian philosopher and the father of Arab existentialism (Marranci, 2010:36-38).

1.6. DESECULARIZATION AND STATE

Desecularization is the process of counter-secularization. In desecularization, religion increases its influence in society and creates a reaction against secular process. Religious beliefs and practices are resurrected by society again. With secularization process, religious content in arts, philosophy, literature etc. is not used anymore but with desecularization, religious content comes back in a variety of culture's subsystems. In secular states, privatization of religion is very important and there is no place for religion in public sphere. With this privatization, religion does not intervene public sphere issues like, education, law, politics etc. However, desecularization brings religion back to public sphere and causes de-privatization of religion. This refers to the reappearance of religious material structures and redefinition of territories according to religion (Karpov, 2010: 250).

According to Swatos and Christiano, after secularization process, de-secularization process emerged. There is no secularization process which causes the destruction of religion from earth. Secularization process should not be evaluated with a linear approach, it should be evaluated with a circular approach. Secularization has just emerged on the point which religion has started to decline in this loop or circle. For Kirman, societies are in a cycle of divergence with and rapprochement to religion (Kirman,2008: 286-290).

Berger claims that counter-secularization expresses mass discontent with secular elites and elite ideology of secularism. These religious masses revolt against secular elites because for them, secular elites are anti-religious people and try to decrease religiosity in society. (Karpov, 2010: 252). Mainstream approach about this issue is that secularization process is top-down and temporary while desecularization is spontaneous and natural. This approach prevents us to see (1) how leaders sometimes supported desecularization process to legitimise their claims and policies, and (2) how secularization processes is related with modernization and have created

secular societies or group of people in society. There is a gap in this research field and there are not enough resources about top-down desecularization.

Religiosity can be influential in society and this may not cause desecularization or mass discontent against secularism and its institutions. Even if they want to make desecularization, these religious masses can be weak and lack resources. On the other hand, some religious elites can come to the power for desecularization, even if there is no will from below. Secularization and desecularization can be from above and from below (Karpov, 2010: 254). There are two models in Muslim world. These are top-down secularization and top-down Islamisation. Both of them failed. Turkey and Tunisia are some examples of top-down secularization. Iran and Saudi Arabia are the example of top-down Islamisation. Both of them dictated their ideologies to their societies and tried to change it but they failed. Same is available for Egypt. Sometimes, like in Egypt, secular elites bring secularism, and this is top-down secularism or Islamists are provided a greater space by elites and this is top-down Islamisation (Ghannoushi, 24 June 2016).

The study of religion and secularism have been popular topics in the recent years. Not only is there is an academic interest but also practical desire to understand relationship between religion and secularism. In this study I focus on Egypt because Egypt has a specific history of the relationship between religion and secularism. Religious society became more secular with secularization process. After that we can see the rise of Islamization process from above like the secularization process. We can easily see the rise and fall of both Islamism and secularism, and the state's role in it.

1.7. FALL OF NATIONALISM AND RISE OF FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: MAJOR THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Nationalism became very important in the Middle East after reign of the Ottoman Empire. In Egypt, this nationalism merged with secularism during the Nasser era and this caused competitive relations between secular-nationalism and religion. Nasser saw secular-nationalism as superior to religion. For Hans Kohn, a

Jewish American scholar who studied nationalism, secular-nationalism was promoted by Western powers to Egypt. Secular-nationalism became the rival of religion in Egypt for Kohn. With secular-nationalism, religion lost its influence on society because it is promoted by the state to build a nation-state. According to Rupert Emerson, a specialist on nationalism, with secularism or secular-nationalism, religious influence declined in the West. Also, secular-nationalism was spread into other regions by Western imperialism. Colonial goals were behind the spread of secular-nationalism to other regions. However, religion was very powerful in face of the externally imposed secular-nationalism (Juergensmeyer, 2008:12).

In 1950s, secular-nationalism spread into post-colonial states. New leaders of these post-colonial countries adopted secular-nationalism with the economic and political support of Western powers, not because of indigenous sentiments, but as a new basis on which they built their legitimacy (Juergensmeyer, 2008:24). While pan-Arabist elites during the Nasser era supported the construction of a secular nation-state and promoted secular nationalism, Islamist counter-elites called for an Islamic state and society (Tibi, 1999:192). Islamism and religious fundamentalism became the ideology of this latter group. For the Islamist counter-elite group, secularism or secular-nationalism started with colonial period and this ideology was imposed by Western colonial powers. Post-colonial leaders adopted these European norms and values for their own legitimacy. These norms and values were not chosen by Middle Eastern societies. Religion became less important while national elements of culture were emphasized. Hence, a struggle between secular elites and Islamist counter-elites broke out in the Middle East. In some cases, the struggle between these groups predominantly occurred in the legal political structures like in Turkey, or occurred in the underground like in Egypt (Tibi, 1999:191-194).

Also, for Vali Reza Nasr, an Iranian-American academician, secularism did not emerge from indigenous forces, but was exogenous to the society. It was imported from the West. Secularism was promoted first by colonial rules and then local elites in the Middle East. This caused problems between colonial or post-colonial governments and society. Because none asked the society and they used pressure on religious sections of the society. Authoritarian secularism in Egypt

created a resistance to the secular government. After secular governments weakened, re-Islamization started in the region indigenously (Nasr, 2003:68).

The mainstream idea that desecularization and rise of Islamism in the region is the result of a domestic reaction to the external and top-down imposition of secular values, should be evaluated carefully and critically. There are different factors which caused the rise of fundamentalism and religion in region. Before World War II, colonial powers, France and the Great Britain had influence in the Middle East. With the Cold War, there appeared a bipolar international system. The United State and USSR became the dominant powers in the international state system. When the Great Britain lost its effect on the Middle East, this gap was filled by the US. The Green Belt project was developed by the United States to stop the expansion of the influence of the USSR (Delibas, 2015: 77). Islam and Muslim societies became very important for the United States policies in the Middle East to balance and prevent the effect of communism on the region. The USSR supported anti-western, anti-imperialist, liberationist and nationalist groups in the Middle East, especially in Egypt. The United States supported Islamist, jihadist and fundamentalist groups. Islam was used by the United States as a wall against communism (Eligür, 2010:69). For example, during the Soviet-Afghan war, the United States supported jihadists in Afghanistan against the USSR indirectly and directly. The United States gave support to religious groups and helped them to come to the power because governments in the Middle East, like Iraq, Syria and Egypt, were Ba'athist and nationalist. These governments were anti-American and gave damage to American interests in the Middle East. At the end of the Cold War, these jihadists and Islamists groups have become a problem for the United States and the West. "Good Muslims" of the Cold War have become "the Bad Muslims". After that the United States revised its Green Belt Project and supported moderate Islamists groups in the region. For example, under the influence of the new Green belt project and in order to weaken the opposition, Mubarak administration promoted moderate Muslims against radical Muslims and this contributed to the Islamization of Egypt (Kılıç, 2015: 52-53; Mavelli, 2012: 1070-1071).

During the Arab Spring, some writers saw the Arab Spring as a reaction to the post-colonial secularization process which confined religion to private sphere. These

authoritarian governments sometimes used both religion and secularism to justify their legitimacy (Haqqani, 2013: 7). For Hussein Ali Agrama, a post-secular sense of national unity in Egypt showed the power of desire of justice in Tahrir Square. Leftists, secularists, communists, liberals, conservatives, Muslim Brothers etc. merged for the collective movement. ‘‘Our revolution is civil; neither violent, nor religious’’ was a post-secular slogan of the protesters in Tahrir Square (Mavelli, 2012: 1073). For some scholars and writers, there were authoritarian regimes in the region and these revolts led to democratization. On the other hand, according to others, this democratization and liberalization soon caused further polarization in society like the one between secularists and Islamists in Egypt. Islamists came to the power in some Middle Eastern states and de-liberalization caused pressure on other groups like secularists. Arab Spring has failed because of the deliberalization and undemocratic attempts. After Arab Spring, opposition parties failed to build a coalition and the ones who came to the power used pressure on other opposition parties and movements (Dina, 2010: 20-30).

After waves of struggle and even coup d'états, currently there is a return to rule by more secular-oriented political actors in the region. This reversal shows that there are many factors that affect secularization and desecularization. For instance, economic problems are emphasized by some scholars. During the secular nationalist governments, economic slowdown and stagnation created a reaction against new secular elites and their ideology. This caused the rise of right-wing populist movements that tend to nationalism and religiopolitics in the Middle East. Those social groups, which suffered from socio-economic changes, tended to support new and culturally familiar political activity; right-wing nationalism or religiopolitics in Middle East (Keddie, 1998: 699-701).

1.8. CONCLUSION

In order to understand the secularization and desecularization processes in the Middle East, major theoretical approaches are examined in this chapter. Classical secularization theory argued that modernization caused the decline of religion as a source of political legitimacy and true knowledge. Rationalization emerged with

modernization and this caused rational mentality to prevail religious mentality. On the other hand, for some scholars, modernization and rationalization did not cause the decline of religious influence, and classical secularization theory could not examine and predict the future rise of religious fundamentalisms and the increasing role of religion in the public sphere. They argued that the assumptions of the secularization theory are based on ideological prejudices rather than a systematic set of researches and observations. Some important scholars like Berger, Casanova, Taylor, Asad, Habermas etc. criticized the paradigm of secularism by arguing that modernization did not cause the end of religion and last decades showed the evidence of a “resurgence of religion” and a post-secular society.

Another important tendency in recent studies is to state that there is not one single secularism, but different types of secularism have been implemented all over the world, and their effects and results have been different. Furthermore, some scholars distinguish between passive and assertive types of secularism. In passive secularism, state does not intervene in religion and let appearances of religion in public. In assertive secularism, state plays an aggressive role in keeping religion in private sphere. Some argue that Islam is compatible with secularism, modernization and democracy because there are no political rules in Islam, while others argue that, unlike Christianity, there is no separation between public sphere and private sphere in Islam, thus it is not compatible with secularism. This latter view implies that secularisms in the Muslim world were not a result of social developments but imposed from above. Secularism in Europe came from bottom-up but in Muslim world, secularism came from top-down. Top-down secularism resulted with autocratic states which forced society towards rapid Westernization, modernization and secularization. Governments embraced secularism, used it to control society in some Muslim states. Also, not only was secularism used as a repression and legitimacy tool, but also religion was used for the same purposes by elites.

This mainstream approach explains desecularization as a reaction to that top-down and assertive secularization. It is argued that such government policies caused alienation and dislocation in society. Religion has thus increased its influence in society and created a reaction against secular process in some Muslim states. However, it is argued in this thesis that the claim that secularization process is top-

down and temporary while desecularization is spontaneous and natural is flawed. Top-down secularization thesis ignores how leaders sometimes imposed a desecularization process from above to legitimise their claims and policies. Furthermore, the assertion that the nature of secularization caused the desecularization prevents us from seeing various other factors which cause desecularization and revival of religion. In the following chapters the rise and fall of secularization process in Egypt will be examined in light of multiple causes such as the British colonial heritage, the influence of leaders, rise and fall of pan-Arabism in the region, the influence of Arab-Israeli wars, economic crises, the withdrawal of state from social policies, rise of religious organizations as agents of social welfare and solidarity, left-wing parties' failure to obtain popular support, increased power of right-wing parties as coalition partners, global and regional powers' role in the promotion of right-wing parties, and so on.

CHAPTER TWO

THE HISTORY OF SECULARIZATION AND DESECULARIZATION IN EGYPT

2.1. BEGINNING OF SECULARIZATION IN THE OTTOMAN ERA

During the colonial period, religion was very important for some parts of society because religion provided the morality and identity of society. During the Ottoman Empire period in Egypt, religious institutions were central to social life and this continued after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Nationalism later appeared as another vital source of identity during the British colonial rule in Egypt. Nationalist ideologies merged with religious motives and symbols in order to unite different groups against British colonial rule. Religion intertwined with patriotism in Egypt (Hibbard, 2010: 6-7).

First modernizing influence came to Egypt in 1798 after the French occupation. European political, economic, and ideological thoughts affected Egyptian society. Then political and social transformation of Egypt started with Mehmet Ali Pasha in 1805. He was an Ottoman Albanian commander in the Ottoman army. He became pasha and governor of Egypt. He declared himself as a Khedive of Egypt that was an autonomous tributary state of the Ottoman Empire. Another important figure for Egypt was Ismail Pasha who was known as an Ismail the Magnificent. Ismail Pasha was the grandson of Mehmet Ali Pasha. He gave importance to economic developments and industrialization of Egypt. He created more budget for the education of Egyptians. He followed his grandfather on the western type of the army training. These two important figures for Egypt had a common point. Both decreased the power of traditional religious elites and eliminated the dominant Mamluk leadership. They accomplished it by nationalization of the Awqaf. The Awqaf refer to endowments or endowments of land that is made by a Muslim to a religious, educational, or charitable cause. Before Mehmet Ali Pasha era, Awqaf were independent from the state. For example, Al-Azhar mosque was free to get donation from the communities and charities; that is why, they remained independent economically from the state because of the

donations. Ulema and imams had become free and independent from state. With Mehmet Ali Pasha, these endowments were nationalized. With this nationalization of Awqaf, traditional religious elites' (the Ulema) control over education and the law decreased. The dependence of Ulema on the state caused a decline in their role in the public sphere, so this facilitated the emergence of Western-style education and legal codes (Ansari, 1959: 230-231; Hibbard, 2010: 53; Yousef, 2013: 54; Küçükcan, 2005: 121).

Mehmet Ali Pasha was the important figure for development of modern Egypt. Reforms during Mehmet Ali Pasha era created opportunity for development at region. When he was appointed by the Ottoman sultan, there was bad condition in Egypt. After withdrawal of French forces, there was power vacuum at region. There was economic and military problem. Firstly, he changed tax system of the country. There was corruption on tax system. He tried to end corruption to fix economic problems. Some lands that was endowed for religious purposes were free from tax, but Mehmet Ali Pasha changed it. He took tax for every land. Ulama and religious communities was not enough powerful to stop him. New canals were built to empower agriculture sector. If land owner did not produce production, land was taken from land owner. This nationalization increased the income of the country. Mehmet Ali Pasha needed army because he was appointed by the Ottoman sultan and it could be revoked. He gave importance to army training. Army training was given by the French officers according to modern French army methods. There were different ethnicities in the military. Egypt's main trade partners in Europe were Britain and France. He tried to be independent from the Ottoman Empire but even though European trade partners and modern troops, he was stopped by the Western powers and Russia (Fahmy, 1998: 147-178).

Mehmet Ali Pasha's support to Western-style education created an opportunity for education of people in Europe. One of these people was Rifa'a al-Tahtawi. Tahtawi was a writer, translator, and teacher. He worked as an editor for translation of French books into Arabic in France. He wrote about understanding the Christian civilization and culture, and properly integrating it with the Muslim culture. He published "The Trusted Guide for Girls and Boys" in 1873, in which he discussed the importance of educational reform. His argument was that Egyptian

children needed comprehensive and enlightened education but that education had to include both European and traditional science and methods. Teaching only European science and methods could give damage to the heritage of the Muslim culture. On the other hand, an exclusively traditional education could prevent modernization in Egypt (Ansari, 1959: 232; Yousef, 2013: 55-58).

Mehmet Ali Pasha and Ismail Pasha have had a permanent impact on the modernization of Egyptian public life, education and political life. The desire for a Western-style development paved the way for a secular modernization program (Yousef, 2013: 54). A secular political leadership emerged in Egypt with these social and political changes, and nationalism that came into prominence after the invasion of Egypt by Britain was going to spread among these secular-minded group as well as among conservative/Islamist groups. Egypt was an autonomous state of Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century but there were financial and strategic interests of British rule. Control of the Suez Canal was a vital interest for Britain so this caused British invasion in Egypt and direct colonial rule in 1882 (Ansari, 1959: 230-232; Hibbard, 2010: 53-54).

2.2. RISE OF DIFFERENT VIEWS ON RELIGION AND POLITICS DURING THE COLONIAL ERA

In the beginning, nationalism had a religious tone and Colonialism caused this. During the World War I, British colonial rule changed Egypt's status as a British protectorate. After World War I and the nationalist revolt of 1919, liberty, democracy and independence desires of Egyptian society increased. After the nationalist revolt of 1919, Egypt became more independent, but it depended on Britain in foreign policy and security. British influence on Egypt had not come to the end until the Nasser era. Saad Zaghlul, the leader of the Wafd Party, became the elected prime minister in 1924. The Wafd Party became the dominant actor to implement more secular policies. Nationalist revolt of 1919 paved the way Egyptian Constitution of 1923. This constitution promoted the secular vision of society and provided basic citizenship rights that premised on national. This reduced religious

importance on basic citizenship rights. National identity became influential after this time (Shukrallah, 1994: 21).

Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) was an important figure for Islam because he was an Egyptian jurist and religious scholar. Also, he was a liberal reformer and a key figure for Islamic modernism. Abduh tried to reinterpret Islam in a modern context. He supported a liberal interpretation of Islamic tradition. He advocated reforms in Islam to revive the national community. For Abduh, science and reason are vital for material progress and enlightenment norms are compatible with Islamic tradition (Halstead, 1969: 90-92; Hibbard, 2010: 54).

Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) was an influential Islamist thinker who developed a political philosophy of an Islamic state. He was influenced by the early Salafi Movement and Abduh ideas. He was a conservative activist. For Rashid Rida, Salafi movement was an alternative to secularism in the 1920s and 1930s. This Islamist reform movement affected Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) who was the imam and Islamic teacher. He was one of the founders of Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. He developed principles of early Islamic fundamentalism. These influential people had different opinions about interpretation of Islam, but they had a common view about Egypt. This common view was the Western dominance and colonialism in Egypt. Conservative Islamists, fundamentalist Islamists, supporters of liberal reforms in Islam and liberal secular people in Egypt were against British colonial rule and Western colonialism. They believed that Egypt has its own culture and nation-state. Also, Egypt deserves to be independence from British colonial rule (Halstead, 1969: 90-91; Hibbard, 2010: 54-56).

One of the important actors was Wafd Party in Egypt. Wafd Party had a liberal and secular ideology. After the nationalist revolt of 1919, Wafd party was a face of the liberal nationalism and had political dominance in Egypt. Wafd party used the fear and hostility of Egyptian society about the West and British colonial rule. However, Wafd party's secular and liberal ideas were seen as an unfamiliar by religious population in Egypt. This gap was filled by Communists, socialist, nationalist, religious, left and right-wing parties. Some parties supported communism, socialism, some defended liberal and secular ideas and some advocated Islamic revivalism to regain the strength of Egyptian society, but common ground for

political parties, Islamists and secularists was nationalism. (Ansari, 1959: 240-241; Hibbard, 2010: 54-56).

Groups' common enemy in Egypt was British colonial rule and all of them were against colonialism. There was a formless nationalism between these groups. For instance, the liberal Wafd party supported more secular and cosmopolitan form of nationalism. They desired more secular nation and they wanted to develop Egypt with European lines (Ansari, 1959: 240). Islamist reformers desired that Islamic tradition ought to premise on and this Islamic tradition should be consistent with secular principles. Although British colonial rule was in oppressive position, people, like Abduh, thought that progress and development can be achieved by European model of development. For Hasan al-Banna and his supporters, the biggest weakness of Egypt was the emulation of the West. Emulation of the West and adaptation of secular concepts harmed cultural heritage of Egypt. Loss of religion caused corruption and decay, so Egypt should come back to the true path of Islam again. If Egypt again returns to Islam and creates an Islamic order, it can be powerful and challenge to the West again. Also, the purpose of Hasan al-Banna was to unify all Islamist communities into one Islamic state (Hibbard, 2010: 54-56; Ansari, 1961: 12-13).

In the 1920s, Egyptian secular-liberalism increased because of liberal parties in Egypt and colonial power. The Watani party in Egypt was a nationalist party. During the Great War, there was a big group of nationalists who support Pan-Islamism and Ottoman Empire (Flores, 1988: 27). Some of these nationalists supported secular side after Turanianism policy over religion implemented by Ottoman Empire (Farah, 1963: 142). After the Great War, many of them were sent into exile because of the Wafd party's initiatives. Egyptianists, who were the supporters of secular side of nationalism, became more effective and powerful. For 1923 Constitution of Egypt, all Egyptians had equal rights and duties. Their religions, languages or races did not matter to become Egyptian. Freedom of consciences and unconditional equality were very important for secularists (Warburg, 1982: 131). Religious influence decreased after 1923 Egyptian Constitution. According to 1923 Egyptian Constitution's Article 149 in Part VI: General Provisions, Islam shall be the State's religion. Nevertheless, there was still

religious influence and Islamic dominance over other religions in Egypt (Mondal, 2003: 154-159). In the 1930s and 1940s, authoritarian right wing and Islamists rose its influence in society because negative effects of British colonial rule and Jewish people in Palestine increased the effect of Pan-Arabism ideology and religion (Mondal, 2003: 199).

Another crucial effect of the British rule in colonial states was in the legal system. Western colonialism also affected legal systems in Egypt. Islamic legal systems were changed or reorganized by colonial powers. The western positive law became very effective to change Islamic legal system. With the post-colonial period, Islamic thinking increased in Muslim societies and affected Islamic legal system. This created legal pluralism and classic Shari'a law did not become dominant. New Islamic legal system has become more modern (Marranci, 2010:24-25). Some Muslim scholars see secularism as an outcome of the hegemony of the Catholic Church in the West. The hegemony of the Catholic Church caused separation of religion and state; that is, secularism. Unlike the Christianity, Islam is a faith and law of God. The state must be governed by Shari'a which God's rules are (Najjar, 1996:7). Law in Islamic countries was bonded to Islamic institutions historically. Divine sources created main laws in Islamic countries. The main source of law in Islamic countries was the Quran. Also, the examples and narratives of the Prophet were used by Muslim countries as sources of the law. Thereafter some Clerics were trained in the craft of the law by Islamic countries. There are the Ulama. There are the protectors of legal and religious tradition in Islam. Ulama arranged many different public fields like the affairs of the subjects, disputes, family issues, compensations etc. The sacred law is the most important thing for Ulama and their regulations or actions cannot contradict the sacred law. The Shari'a becomes an area for the claim of religious authority. This created ideological battlefield between supporters of the Shari'a and secularists (Zubaida, 2005:440).

Shari'a law has an important role in shaping and developing ethical norms and values. These norms and values can play a role in general legislation and public policies. However, Shari'a principle cannot be enforced or used by the state as a public law or public policy. If it happens, the outcome will be the political will of the state, not about the religious law of Islam. Sometimes ruling elites can use religion as

a tool to legitimate their political claims and control of state so any attempt in the name of Islam does not mean that these attempts or claims are true. Muslims can live their own belief in Islam as a matter of religious obligations, not because of state's coercion, if the state does not enforce Shari'a principles to society by using public sphere (Munavvarov, Schneider-Deters, 2003: 1-2). Many Muslims see secularism as a relegation of Islam. Secularism is a secularization of society and hostility to religion. So, the state should be secular, not society. Islamic scholar Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im claims that secularism has a negative meaning in Muslim society, so states should be secular state, not secular society. The state is territorial, so it should not be Islamic (Munavvarov, Schneider-Deters, 2003: 9). If we go back to Shari'a issue, Shari'a comes from a human interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunna; that is, Shari'a is a product of human agency of believers who comprehend and seek to obey according to their own specific historical context. Shari'a is just a passageway into being Muslim. Shari'a should not be enforced by the state as a positive law and official state policy. On the other hand, Islam is more than Shari'a (Munavvarov, Schneider-Deters, 2003: 10).

Egypt's state religion is Islam and Egypt is an incompletely secular state. In law, Egypt's law based on European law, but personal status law based on religious law; that is, Shari'a. On the other hand, the state banned some forms of head scarfs of women although the constitution of Egypt protects the right of freedom of religious belief and worship. This paradox creates a problem about the secular-religious issue. According to Hussein Ali Agrama, secularism itself makes religion into an object of politics. This is not mean that before secularism, religion was not used as a tool by people, groups or elites. Religion as an object of politics is viewed differently because the use of religion for politics is seen as an authentic use. All religious claims are seen as a serious, dangerous, suspicious threats which can spread political effects to society immediately (Agrama, 2012: 2-33).

For secularists, the state is not one of the vital elements of Islam because there is no specific constitution in Qur'an and Imara agree with secularists on this issue. However, For Imara, this does not mean that there is no relation between state and religion. Muslims need Islamic state to fulfill religious duties. The judicial system is very important, and Muslims need Islamic law. The Islamic state can apply

Shari'a law but theocratic and secular states cannot do this. For Imara, Islamic state should be Islamic and civil. Imara supported Islamic civil state, not theocracy. In the Islamic state, public interests are more important than self-interest. Islamic states' constitution should base on Qur'an and Islamic laws can create a more peaceful state for Ghannouchi and Imara (Najjar, 1996:9; Esposito, 2010: 10). Some extremist Islamist claimed that the true Islamic state has to be governed by Qur'an which was sent by God and a human being cannot legislate but Imara refuses this.

Education is vital for the secularization of society. There are lessons about sciences, languages, mathematics etc. in education. These started in military and elite schools of Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. Also, there was an education in religious institutions. This education included religious sciences such as scriptures, traditions, law etc. On the other hand, some schools like the Azhar in Egypt taught philosophy, mathematics, and history but they were largely from medieval times. Traditional kuttub system is a public education for Muslims until modern European education in the Arab world. In the traditional kuttub system, Muslim students learned the Quran and hadith. Also, they learned basic education in Arabic language and mathematics (Faour, 13 August 2012).

Not only did the British colonial rule affect the legal system, but also the education in colonial states. In pre-colonial period, there was religious education. There were religious scriptures and rituals in education. With British colonial rule, the new western model in education occurred in the region. A new type of education brought secular subjects in education. In traditional education, education based on religious faith and religion was for justification of truth. Western education did not base on religious faith and focused on consciousness and science. These schools focused on math, science, and language. Also, they did not give reference from religion. The Western education did spread slowly in the Middle East. Students graduated from schools, which had Western education model, to fill personnel vacancy in the colonial bureaucracy (Langohr, 2005: 161-163).

Reform in education is very difficult in Muslim countries, if these reforms are dictated from abroad because Islamists accuse the West to undermine Islam with these education reforms. Education should make students more tolerant people towards other faiths (Davies, 2014: 196). Egypt has a large population in the region

and it is a cultural centre, so the Egyptian educational system affected the all Arab world. Education is a very complex issue. Political power has always a power on education and politics always affected education. For example, British Colonial power did spread Western type of education in Egypt and this type of education was supported by the secularists and secular political parties. Also, education has been always shaped by the power to justify policies for the rulers (Fandy, 2007: 78).

Secular-religious education debate for the Egyptian educational system was very important for Hussein. Hussein supported to a more secular educational system in Egypt according to the European model. Hussein saw Europe as an educational model. For Hussein, Egypt should follow European model. Hussein saw outside world as a benefit for Egypt's development. Qutob criticized Hussein's secular educational system and supported Islamic educational system in Egypt.

Qutob saw Egypt as part of the Muslim world. For Qutob, Egypt should follow Islamic model. For Qutob, Islamic values and principles should be protected from Western influences and pressures. Also, Qutob saw outside world as a hostile against Islam and its values. Qutob saw the world as two rivals; East and West. East is a good one and protector of Islam. Other is the West which is a bad one that represents ignorance and atheism (Fandy, 2007: 80).

Dr Syed Ismail Ali asserted that there should be national religious ethos in the system of education in Egypt because, with Colonial period, European educational system divided society into two (Cook, 2000: 486-487). One part's education based on modern secular European educational system. Other part's education based on traditional religious education and Islamic teaching. These two groups created different cultural styles. Insufficient religious and moral instruction can cause bigger social woes in Egypt (Faksh, 1980: 42).

Now we can go back to the effects of the relationship between nationalism, religion, and secularism in Egypt. They all relate to each other in Egypt because for Arabs, religion and nationalism are very important. Secular nationalism started before Nasser period and it created a connection between secularism and nationalism in the Middle East. Islam played an important role against secular nationalism in the region. Islamism is a social and political activism which supports public and private life should be guided by Islamic principles. For many Arabs, Islam is very important.

On the other hand, a nation is a large group or collective people who have common attributes like language, culture, tradition, ethnicity etc. nationalism is an ideological movement which based on the premise that the individual's loyalty and devotion to the nation-state surpass other individual or group interests. At this point, there is a conflict between Egyptian secular nationalists and Islamists. Both secular nationalists and Islamists tried to unite people to create the ideal society with national or spiritual needs (Kenney, 2012:428-429).

Western powers and colonial rulers were very effective to cause the growth of Arab nationalism. Experiences under Western powers and their colonial rulers founded a place for Arab nationalism. Arabism or Arab nationalism was born in the nineteenth century. Firstly, Arab nationalism did not emerge against Western powers, it was a reaction against policies of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman had huge Arabic population and Arabic speaking population was administered by the Ottoman Turkish. The Ottoman Empire used Islam as a unification vehicle of different identities and ethnic groups who speak a different language. Holy Qur'an was sent to an Arab prophet in the seventh century by God in Arabic. Before the Ottoman Empire, Arabs conquered from the Oxus to the Pyrenees to carry Islam. These were pride and honor for Arabs. There was no distinction between Arabs and Turks in the Ottoman Empire and with the Ottoman Empire, Arabs saw themselves as participants of the defense and expansion of Islam. After the eighteenth century, the power of the Ottoman Empire reduced. Weak Ottomans created the Arab awakening. Near the last breath of Ottoman Empire, the desire of independence country from the Ottoman Empire took nationalist form and turned into Arab nationalism (Kramer, 1993:173-175). Many Arabs believed that they have bonded with Islam. Understanding of Islam was very important for the greatness of the Arabs. For Arab nationalism, only Arabs make Islam great again to found a great empire and civilization.

Before the independence of Egypt, Egyptian nationalism rose. Egyptian nationalism aimed to unite all people who live in Egypt regardless of ethnicity or religion. The main object of Egyptians was the independence of Egypt from the British rule, so religion played less important role than nationalism. However, there were two types of Egyptians. One side was secular Egyptian nationalism and the other one was Islamic form of Egyptian nationalism. Lutfi al-Sayyid was secular-

liberal nationalist and supported the utility of people who live in Egypt. The bonds of common interest and patriotism are more important than other things like religion. Religion is not important to become Egyptian. Religion should be removed from politics for Lutfi al-Sayyid, so he rejected Pan-Islamism and promoted Pan-Egyptianism (Mondal, 2003: 142-149).

Because of the colonial rulers of Western power, Egyptian nationalists became anti-imperialist. After 1948, they became revolutionary and secular Egyptian nationalists came to the power. After Arab-Israel wars, nationalism increased in Egypt and other countries which had huge Arabic population. This Egyptian nationalism merged with Arab nationalism when Nasser's administration came to the power in Egypt. He was the inspiration for Pan-Arabism and secular-nationalism. During his administration, he claimed that he is trying to create an Arab nationalism bridge to unite all Arabs from Africa to Asia. Arab nationalism in Nasser administration was secular nationalism, so the importance of religion in secular nationalism decreased (Kramer, 1993:182-192). In the next part, I will examine and explain the rise of the secular-nationalism at the regional and domestic level under the Nasser administration.

2.3. SECULARIZATION AND SECULAR-NATIONALISM UNDER NASSER REGIME

In 1952, young military officers overthrow the government. Monarch of Egypt and King Farouk were sent into exile. Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power. This military intervention changed many things for the future of Egypt. These Free Officers faced British dominance in the economy, economic inequality in society, class divisions and ideological pluralism. Before the military intervention, a nationalist movement had grown against both the British colonial rule and Egyptian monarch. However, there was a great deal of diversity among them. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood represented right-wing, the Communists represented the left and the Wafd party was in the center. These groups agreed that Egypt needs economic development and gets rid of British colonial rule. The main problem

between these groups after British withdrawal was who should rule Egypt? (Hibbard, 2010: 56; Lewy, 1968: 10)

Gamal Abdel Nasser and other Free Officers did not come to power with a mass movement or they did not represent one of the aforementioned groups or ideologies. They had one difference from others; they had the armed forces. Armed forces provided an ability to overthrow the ruling government and to come to power. Although the main purpose of Free Officers was an economic and social transformation in large-scale, political diversity in society was a threat for the new regime. Hence, Free Officers had to create populist or nationalist support for themselves. They gave importance to the centralization and consolidation of state and acceptance of military rule. (Hibbard, 2010: 56-57; Lewy, 1968: 15).

Nasser and Free Officers saw the state as a vehicle to modernize Egyptian society. They created one-party state and this party did spread its influence on Egyptian society's life like in the Soviet Union. General Muhammad Naguib was the first president of Egypt. He thought that democratic constitutionalism is important, and he wanted parliamentary rule. However, General Muhammad Naguib was overthrown by Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein and he became the second president of Egypt in 1954. With Free Officers, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) had been established to supervise the revolution (Hibbard, 2010: 56-57; Lewy, 1968: 10-15). When Nasser came to power he controlled the RCC. During the Nasser era, political parties were banned by the regime to eliminate potential rivals. During the Revolution of 1952, both the modern elite and Islamist groups like Muslim Brotherhood supported the revolution because each expected to realize their vision under the new regime. Policies about groups like Muslim Brotherhood totally changed with Nasser era (Juergensmeyer, 1994: 36).

In this period, there was a single party in Egypt. The opposition was under control of Nasser administration. In order to undermine their power nationalization process in public utilities, banks, manufactures, communication etc. was started (Kenney, 2012: 437). For Nasser administration, economic development was the best way to gain support from Egyptian society. Nasser administration's main purposes were state-led industrialization and land reform. These policies changed the socio-economic structure and distribution of wealth in Egyptian society. Land reform

caused disempowerment of traditional elites, thus landowners and traditional religious elites became against Nasser regime. Redistribution of lands provided peasants' supports for the regime. Nasser administration gave importance to the development of public sector and nationalization of industries. State-led industrialization created some new job opportunities for urban workers. Nasser regime supported lower classes against landowners and religious elites. These socio-economic reforms and policies prevented reactionary groups from gaining public support. Nasser built a bridge between government and people. A social contract was signed between Egyptian lower-middle classes and Nasser. This contract included welfare state, rich social services, and subsidies in food and fuels (Hibbard, 2010: 57; Nagarajan, 2013: 24; Ates, Duman and Bayraktar, 2006: 61).

Education was regarded very important for modernization of Egypt. State promoted free education to increase educated people in society. Nasser promised a job in public sector for all graduated people from universities. This increased university enrolment rates (Loveluck, 2012: 4).

In the 1950s and 1960s, while national development increased, state elites promoted secular norms in national institutions. With secular norms, states elites' attitudes toward religion changed dramatically. The government focused on policies about poverty alleviation, state-led economic development, and social justice. Scott W. Hibbard believes that modernization has a relationship with secularism and progress. Secularism was necessary for modernization in Egypt. Secularism provided a basis of citizenship to integrate diverse populations into a common political framework (Hibbard, 2010: 6-8).

Secularization process has been started before Gamal Abdel Nasser and it reached the peak with him. However, Nasser's government only was winning the battles but was losing the war because although secularization process continued, the Egyptian government and state elites did not break the connection with their religious moorings. They sometimes used religion for moral legitimacy and to get support for their policies. Sometimes they used Islam to sanction political authority officially. However, there is an important difference between Nasser and his successor. Islam was very important for nationalist discourse, but it was rendered

consistent with both secularism and Arab socialism (Hibbard, 2010: 50; Lewy, 1968: 22-25).

There were two important ideologies in Nasser era. These were Arab Socialism and Arab nationalism. Development of public sector, land reform, nationalization of industries and state-led industrialization built a support for administration so Arab Socialism was important for Nasser. Arab Socialism included nationalism and it was similar to economic nationalism (Ayubi, 1980: 485). Arab socialism was different from the Soviet model. In the Soviet model, there was hostility to religion. He adopted socialism to an Arab context. Furthermore, Nasser wanted to be independent from the Soviet Union, so the Non-Aligned Movement was founded by Ghana, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, India, and Egypt. Nasser was one of the founding fathers (Hibbard, 2010: 57-58; Lewy, 1968: 27-30).

Arab nationalism was another important ideology in Nasser era. There was a belief that the Arab people are defined by their language, culture, and history. Arab people were a nation and should be unified politically. There was no place for religious affiliation in Arab nationalism. It was a secular nationalism in the sense that all Arab people could unite in Arab nationalism irrespective of their religious affiliations or their sects. They could be Orthodox Arab, Catholic Arab, Shia Arab, Sunni Arab etc. (Hibbard, 2010: 58-59; Lewy, 1968: 23-24). Another element of Arab nationalism was hostility to imperialism. This anti-imperialist sentiment saw European colonial powers as a threat and obstacle for Arab development.

Nasser's relation with Western powers was very bad and this gave popularity to him among Arab masses. First big arms deal of Nasser administration was signed with the USSR in 1955. In 1956, the People's Republic of China was recognized by Egypt. These issues caused more problems with the West. The United States of America and Great Britain cancelled all aids to Egypt for a high dam in the Nile. Thereafter Nasser tried to nationalize the Suez Canal Company to wipe out all effects of Britain and France in Suez Canal. Britain and France attacked with Israel to Egypt in 1956. This war declaration gave an opportunity for Nasser to cancel all agreements between Egypt and Britain, and to close the Suez Canal base. The pressure of USSR against Britain and France ended with a victory of Nasser who was seen as a hero for Arab masses. Nasser, who was the hero of the Arab masses, tried

to sustain this role in the foreign policy of Egypt (Mansfield, 1973: 677-678). There were economic effects of the Suez Canal Crisis. After the crisis, Nasser government applied law about nationalization of French and British properties. Dominancy of France and Britain in economy was replaced by an Egyptianization process. (Mansfield, 1973: 680).

The main concrete evidence of unification of Arab people was the United Arab Republic. The United Arab Republic was established by the political union between Syria and Egypt from 1958 to 1961. The United Arab Republic was established by Nasser government in Egypt and Ba'ath Party in Syria. Merge of these countries was regarded a first step to unify all Arabs in one state. Nasser was seen as the Arab's Bismarck. In the regions that Arab people live, Nasser was seen as a Hero by the Arab masses. Some events, like the failed assassination attempt to Nasser in 1954 and the Suez Canal Crisis, increased the idea of Arab nationalism and legitimacy of the regime. United Arab Republic was a political union between Egypt and Syria. In reality, Egyptians tried to run Syria as a colony and export Arab socialism to Syria. After misgovernment and bad economy caused a coup d'état in Syria, the new regime in Syria declared the end of the United Arab Republic in 1961. Deep differences between Egypt and Syria surfaced. Arab nationalism took a damage from this event (Kramer, 1993: 186).

Despite this setback, Arab nationalism strengthened Nasser inside and outside. Nasser improved his control over the opposition after the government implemented new constitutions in 1956 and 1964. With a more centralized state, the political strength of Nasser's enemies decreased (Hibbard, 2010: 59). There was a big population loyal to the ulema in Egypt and this caused a problem for the Nasser regime. Nasser used the power of Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council to control popular religious sentiment. RCC used imams and religious leaders to prove the compatibility of Islam with socialist policies. All mosques were controlled by the Ministry of Religious Endowments and this increased government control over religion. The government constructed new mosques and controlled their imams and preachers to promote government's policies. While conservative Islam was prevented, a liberal and modernist interpretation of Islam was promoted by the government (Hibbard, 2010: 59-61).

We must open a parenthesis about liberal versus illiberal interpretations of religion. Hibbard refers to Sir Karl Raimund Popper, a famous supporter of liberal democracy in the 20th century. There are two types of religious interpretations according to him. Liberal and modernist interpretations of religion are more critical to religion. The inclusive or civic form of nationalism is the aim of liberal interpretations of religion. They question all dogmas and traditional readings. They try to interpret God's Will accurately. They make use of reason to understand religious tradition and truths. Open society tolerates and promotes diversity and pluralism. Religion is thus seen as a matter of individual conscience, not a public matter (Hibbard, 2010: 34).

The second type is illiberal. Illiberal or exclusive interpretations of religion are associated with ethnic nationalism. This is the Popper's closed society. These types of interpreters are conservative and fundamentalist. They are not critical to religious traditions and readings. They believe that traditional moral framework did not change and it is unchangeable. Their actions and beliefs are true and reflective of God's Will. There is no tolerance to diversity and pluralism in society. Critical approach to religious tradition is seen as a lack of belief and apostasy by illiberal interpreters of religion. Individual conscience is not important for illiberal interpreters. They focus on conformity in matters of belief. People, who are against illiberal interpreters of religion, are seen as unpatriotic and treasonous (Hibbard, 2010: 34). Although Nasser's regime would not be regarded as an open society by Popper, Nasser's approach to religion may be defined as "promoting liberal interpretation of Islam while preventing its illiberal interpretation".

When we look at the relationship between Nasser administration and Muslim Brotherhood, there was no problem at the beginning. However, the war between Nasser regime and the Muslim Brotherhood started after 1954. Two problems caused a war between these two sides. One of these problems was about sharing power. Muslim Brotherhood wanted more power to expand its influence in Egyptian society. Another problem was that Muslim Brotherhood was against secular policies. Nasser government's secular policies and Muslim Brotherhood's desire for Islamic state clashed. There were different factions in Muslim Brotherhood. Hasan al-Hodeiby, who was the successor of Hasan al-Banna, worked with Free Officers and Nasser

administration. He warned Nasser to turn toward the true faith of Islam again. Al-Hodeiby was arrested by Nasser government in 1954 (Hibbard, 2010: 62; Lewy, 1968: 16-21).

Another faction of Muslim Brotherhood was led by Ahmad Sanadi. One of the influential members of Muslim Brotherhood was Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) and he was in this faction. Ahmad Sanadi supported the use of force to overthrow Nasser. Shortly after the arrest of Hasan Al-Hodeiby, an assassination attempt on Nasser's life was made by a member of Muslim Brotherhood. Nasser used this assassination attempt as an opportunity to get rid of Muslim Brotherhood. Many members of Muslim Brotherhood were arrested by Nasser. Muslim Brotherhood's influence in government and other institutions were broken. Six leaders of Muslim Brotherhood were executed and many of them were arrested. Muslim Brotherhood's influence was ended by Nasser for the time being. Nasser concluded debates about whether Egypt should be a religious state or a secular state (Hibbard, 2010: 62; Lewy, 1968: 16-21). In the next chapter, I will explain the relationship between Muslim Brotherhood and other actors in detail.

There were many institutions and mosques under the control of Islamists. Influence of Islamists on mosques was prevented by Nasser government. All incomes and aids of mosques were under control of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. Nasser government allocated these incomes to mosques who admit and follow the regime's leadership. Regime punished other mosques. Moreover, Nasser regime abolished the sharia courts in Egypt (Asad, 2001: 3). That was a very important decision to pick the secular side and step towards the rule of law without religious influence (Hibbard, 2010: 61-64; Asad, 2003: 210-212). Abolition of the sharia court in Egypt was seen as a war declaration against Islam by Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Secularization program had occurred in Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the region. The abolition of the religious courts in Egypt was seen as a "Kemalization" in Egypt, and religious groups reacted this type of secularization process. Not only were sharia courts abolished, but the Christian courts were abolished too. One of the important propagandas of Nasser regime was that religion is for God and the country is for all. The abolition of the religious courts was defended on the grounds of strengthening the national unity. However, in reality,

while most Christian judges retired, most Muslim judges were recruited by the government. This was protested by the Catholics and the Copts, but not fixed by the government. After that Nasser regime was criticized by the Catholics and the Copts for being a supporter of Muslims (Lewy, 1968: 34-35). Furthermore, Islamic rules in family law continued like a marriage and divorce issues and these rules applied to all Egyptian society, even the Catholics and the Copts (El Sharakawy, 2013: 39; Berger, 2001: 128).

During the colonial era, secularists believed that Egypt needed modernization and religious motives were preventing the modernization of Egyptian society. According to them, religion should be in private sphere. Religion and politics should be separated, and the de-politicization of Islam must be provided. The main object was the decline of the effect of religion in all areas of the public sphere. Religion referred to here was Islam, because of its dominance in societal and state level. Old Islamic dogmas prevented modernization in Egypt and a new type of interpretation of religion could transform an unmodernised and non-secular society into a modernised and secular society. However, the biggest obstacle for the reinterpretation of Islamic doctrines was seen as the Al-Azhar University and its ulama (Mondal, 2003: 148-149).

Al-Azhar University is still very important for regional and domestic politics. Before the revolution in Egypt, Al-Azhar University was very religious and its ulema had influence in Egyptian politics. It was a bastion against different understanding or interpretations of religion. Books written by Ali Abdel Raziq, an Egyptian scholar and former minister who studied the separation between religion and politics, and by Khalid Muhammad Khalid known for his anti-theocratic and secular ideas, were banned by Al-Azhar University. Religious authority in Al-Azhar University was against the nationalists and reformers (Lewy, 1968: 36-37).

After the revolution, Nasser regime knew that Al-Azhar University needed reforms and modernization. In 1961, Nasser passed a law about Al-Azhar University's curriculum and its jurisdiction (Zeghal, 1999: 372-373). The main idea of reforms in Al-Azhar University was to bring worldly and religious affairs together (Zeghal, 1999: 376-377). Modern courses added to the university's curriculum and new faculties opened like agriculture, medicine, and engineering. Al-Azhar

University was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. President of Egypt had a power to appoint the director and the sheikh of Al-Azhar University. With this power, Nasser controlled the ulema without any use of force. All people, who were against the reforms, were removed from Al-Azhar University and supporters of Nasser regime were brought to these positions. All anti-regime groups and their resources were denied by the government. Anti-regime Islamists accused Nasser as a supporter of godless secularism which was imposed by the West. All policies, which were implemented by the government, created a monopoly over the interpretation of religion by the Nasser regime. This monopoly gave the regime to justify its socialist, secular and nationalist policies. Islam became incorporated as a state apparatus and was nationalized to eliminate radical interpretations (Hibbard, 2010: 61-64; Zeghal, 1999: 371-372). The rise and fall of Arab nationalism and Nasser's role as its leadership were of great importance for the rise and fall of secularism in Egypt.

In the international realm, conservative monarchies saw Nasser regime as a problem. These monarchies were states in the Gulf region and Saudi Arabia. Egypt was a threat for Saudi Arabia because of its socialist, secular and revolutionary policies. Nationalist policies of Nasser regime were a threat to the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Nasser saw Saudi Arabia the capital of conservative interpretation of Islam and this was against Nasser's interests. According to Nasser, these conservative regimes continued their relations with colonial powers, and prevented the unification of all Arabs in the region. Both states sought state monopoly on religion to justify their political agendas. Both of them used Islamic institutions to promote their interests. The competition between Egypt and those states became obvious during the Yemen civil war in 1962. Conservative regimes and Egypt supported different sides. Gulf monarchies supported the Salafist Islam. Egypt advocated a secular and socialist version of Arab nation. On the other hand, Nasser regime also had a state monopoly on religion and used it to promote their secular and socialist policies. However, it was not a commitment to religion. Nasser tried to create a new religious modernism to prove a compatibility between socialism, secularism, and Islam (Hibbard, 2010: 64).

Major blow to Arab socialism and nationalism was to come from the defeat to Israel in 1967. One of the biggest enemies had been Israel for many Arab countries. For Arabs, Israel was supported by Western colonial powers and was a colonial implant in the Middle East (Keddie, 1998: 721). The Arab–Israeli conflict was one of the biggest problems for the region. In 1947, the civil war started in Palestine and turned into the First Arab–Israeli War in 1948. The First Arab–Israeli War resulted in the Israeli Declaration of Independence (Hibbard, 2010: 65-66). Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic contents merged in the Arab–Israeli conflict and a regional war broke out in 1967. Egypt, Syria and Jordan were on the same side against Israel. The Six- Day War in June 1967 was the biggest defeat for Nasser. Corruption in government, unprepared army and waste of power in Yemen proxy war caused this result. The defeat took most of the power of Arab nationalism and charisma of Nasser in the region (Leonard, 2008: 20).

The defeat gave damage to a vision of secular-nationalism and socialism. The debate about secular state versus Islamic state emerged again. Anti-Nasser right-wing Islamist groups promoted on Islamic revivalism and criticized secularism claiming that secularism was no alternative to Islam. Islamic tradition was very important for Islamists and they believed that Nasser regime tried to transform Egyptian society into a less religious society than before. They thought that Arabs turned away from God and God turned away from them. That was why Egypt lost the Six- Day War according to them. On the other hand, left-wing also criticized Nasser regime because reforms were not enough to transform Egyptian society into a secular one. According to the leftists, revolution and reforms did not change the society. Also, religion's superiority still existed, and that attitude was continued by Nasser regime like other regimes before. Reforms did not cause modernization in Egyptian society, and traditional society in Egypt went on (Hibbard, 2010: 65-66). In 1970 Arab League summit, Gamal Abdel Nasser passed away because of the heart attack. In the end of the many successes and failures, he has become an iconic figure for the region.

2.4. NEW REGIME, NEW ELITES: EGYPT UNDER SADAT REGIME

Nasser's successor, Sadat, increased Islamists' expectations. He released most of the Muslim Brotherhood members in jail that were punished by Nasser administration. Sadat called himself "Upholder of the Faith" and used his first name, Muhammed. Also, he promoted religious schools and used religion as a legitimacy vehicle for his policies. Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat was away from secular policies. He promoted Islamic fundamentalism. Religious schools were expanded by the government and Islamic programmes in state-run television increased. The policies of the Islamic fundamentalism were the key factors for the campaign of the marginalization of the left, seculars and socialists. Arab nationalism and secular-nationalism policies were not embraced by authority (Juergensmeyer, 1994: 36; Hibbard, 2010: 2-3).

With the post-colonial period, some leaders, like Nasser in Egypt and Nehru in India, adopted more secular policies. State actors and elites promoted secular norms. This created top-down secularization in Egypt. Illiberal religious interpretations were not tolerated by these administrations and elites in government. However, that does not mean that there was no religion in politics. Religion had an influence on politics by order of these secular elites. The government adopted the secular policy that was an inclusive vision of religion in society. On the other hand, states' secular norms and policies caused improvements in social justice, reduction of poverty and economic developments, thus did not cause much public resentment (Hibbard, 2010: 4-8). When we look at Sadat era, we can see that everything changed. Socialist and secular elites were gone. New administrative elites were not nationalist, statist or populist. They were supporters of privatization, cosmopolitanism, and liberalism. Also, they were conservative and had tolerance to an illiberal interpretation of religion (Hinnebusch, 1981: 453-455).

Rapprochement process started between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in Sadat era. Sadat's alliance with Muslim Brotherhood occurred in 1971. Both sides reached an agreement. In an agreement, Muslim Brotherhood promised to stop the use of violence and activities against the regime. Also, Sadat promised freedom to members of Muslim Brotherhood in prison and exile. With this agreement, Muslim

Brotherhood was expected to be peaceful defenders and spreaders of Islam. The most important arena for political activities was university campuses. Marxist and leftist groups were powerful on campuses and Islamist students were a minority. So, Sadat gave support to Islamist students' organizations to decrease the influence of opposition. Trainee camps, which was run by Islamists, were tolerated by the regime because Islamist organizations in universities were the antidote against Marxist, Leftist, Nasserist and pro-Soviet groups. Members of Muslim Brotherhood joined activities on campuses. They denied taking financial support from the government, but their activities were tolerated by the regime. Regime constructed a new campus for Al-Azhar to increase religious education with the financial support of Saudi Arabia. Sadat regime used Ulema's fatwas against communism and socialism. Communism and socialism were described as impiety, atheism and faithlessness (Hibbard, 2010: 68-71).

In the 1970s and 1980s, not only did religion become the centre of politics, but also illiberal interpretations of religion. State actors and state elites changed their course from secular norms to conservative and illiberal religious ideologies. Conservatives and illiberal religious groups were seen as an ally and partner instead of illiberal groups that should be suppressed by the state like in Nasser era. Normalization of the illiberal religious ideologies was organized by state actors and this started top-down Islamization process in Egypt. State actors used their resources to Islamize the society of Egypt and, liberal and secular norms were delegitimized. After Nasser, Islamists re-emerged again with Sadat because the left, Arab nationalists and Nasserists were a problem for the legitimacy of Sadat regime. Sadat used Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood as a vehicle to decrease the power of the opposition. Détente between regime and Islamists started with Sadat era in the 1970s. Muslim Brotherhood was still outlawed but regime tolerated the activities of Muslim Brotherhood. Muslim Brotherhood increased its power and influence with civil society institutions, social service institutions, educational works and political activities (Rubin, 2010: 229-230).

Egypt's defeat against Israel had given a damage to secular-nationalism ideology. Economic and political problems had caused the break out of secular-Islamist debate after Nasser. Anwar Sadat left the secular path and adopted Salafist

Islam which was influenced by Saudi Arabia. “Corrective Revolution” was adopted by Sadat’s Egypt. In Corrective Revolution, the state changed its strategies in economy, politics, foreign policy and the principles of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. Sadat stopped to promote secular-nationalism. Also, the state chose Islamist vision as an ideology of state instead of secular-nationalism and Pan-Arabism. Anwar Sadat and its administration started the purge of pro-Soviet officers, the left-wing and the Nasserists in administration and security forces. In this strategy, Sadat formed an alliance with the opposition of the early Nasser era such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s landowners and the leaders of Saudi Arabia. Conservative religious groups were supported by the authority against secular, leftist and Nasserist groups (Hibbard, 2010: 13; Marranci, 2010: 71).

Ali Sabri was a very influential person in the left-wing. He was the vice president and the former secretary general of the Arab Socialist Union. He was committed to Nasser’s legacy and believed in secular nationalism. So, there was a big support for Ali Sabri in the party. There was no support for Sadat in the party, so he tried to find a support outside of the party. All Nasserists were on Sabri’s side. Sadat found the support from groups which were marginalized in Nasser era. He allied with traditional elites, landowners and fundamentalist groups. Also, he improved ties with the military and influential people within the state that have distrust for Ali Sabri. In 1971, Ali Sabri and his allies were accused of overthrowing the government. Sadat arrested members of Ali Sabri’s faction in government, ruling party and military. That was the part of Corrective Revolution (Hibbard, 2010: 66-67).

After 1970, the secular order in the state lost its power and state elites changed their ideas. Commitment to the secular norms was Nasser’s ideology but this changed with Sadat. Sadat promoted religious groups for political gains. State promoted the fundamentalist ideas instead of suppressing them. Religious revivalism occurred with state elites’ manipulations and social movements of religious groups (Flores, 1988: 1; Hibbard, 2010: 20). State discourses about religious nationalism helped fundamentalist groups and caused intolerance against minorities and other religions. State elites’ chauvinism caused the normalization of fundamentalist ideas and activities. Religion had always been in public sphere and initially, secular state

elites had tried to promote a liberal version of Islam in society. This version had been accepted by secular groups, but illiberal version had had still power in public sphere. Suppression had not caused the destruction of the illiberal version of Islam but limited it during the Nasser era. However, Sadat and Mubarak used a different path to use these fundamentalist groups for political gain. The most important difference between Nasser and his successors is the use of religion. For Nasser, Islam had been part of the nationalist discourse. There had been a modernist and liberal Islam that was consistent with secularism and socialism. However, in Sadat era, there was a Salafist interpretation of Islam. It was more conservative and fundamentalist. Sadat improved good relations with Saudi Arabia, so he helped the Salafist Islam to institutionalize in Egyptian state (Hibbard, 2010: 46-52). The Arab Socialist Union was founded by the Nasser administration. The party had represented Pan-Arabism and Nasserist Arab socialism. Sadat founded new political party, the National Democratic Party, to prevent the spread of the Nasserist policies.

Economic and political liberalization process, which is known as Intifah, started with Sadat. Liberal economic policies created the alliance between Sadat and the economic and religious elites against the left. Conservative Islam became one of the dominant groups in Egyptian politics. Constraints on political expression were limiting the influence of opposition groups against Nasser. During Sadat regime, some constraints on political expression were removed. Thereon, Islamist groups increased their power in public sphere and politics. Islamist groups supported this type of policies of Sadat regime. Some activities, like preaching and publishing newspaper, were allowed by the regime and this created more powerful political Islam in Egyptian politics (Hibbard, 2010: 70).

During Nasser era, Saudi Arabia and Gulf monarchies had been enemies of Egypt. Nasser had promoted more secular, anti-imperialist, nationalist ideologies and stopped to promote religious ideologies. Rival in Nasser era became an ally in Sadat era. The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt created the rapprochement between Egypt and Gulf monarchies. Saudi Arabia and Gulf states provided financial support and promoted conservative and Salafist Islam in Egypt. With this financial support, the regime could marginalize the left and improve regime's economic power (Hibbard, 2010: 70-71; Shehata, 2010: 67-69). Gulf countries, enriched thanks to the

oil boom of the 1970s, had financial power and influences on Islamic companies. They provided financial support to Islamic companies and social services agencies which were run by Muslim Brotherhood. With Islamic investments, Islamic companies, which had ties with Muslim Brotherhood, developed (Hibbard, 2010: 70; Gumuscu, 2010: 849).

When we look at the law in Sadat era, we can see the decline of secularism. There had been no official religion of state in Nasser era. With the new constitution in 1971, Islam became the official religion of the state and primary source of legislation in article 2. This was a symbol of the decline of secular norms in public sphere and politics, and the Islamization of law, education, and politics (Juergensmeyer, 1994: 59; Hibbard, 2010: 71-72).

In 1973, Arab-Israel war broke out. A coalition of Arab states, that was led by Egypt, appeared against Israel. Arab coalition attacked Israel surprisingly on Yom Kippur, a holy day in Judaism. Cold War showed its effects here. During the war, United States helped Israel and USSR helped the coalition of Arab states. The Yom Kippur War ended with the UN-brokered ceasefire. None conceded defeat. Israel saw that this war was not like the previous war against Arab states and it almost lost. Despite the big losses, Egypt behaved as a winner of the war. During the war it was Ramadan, the holy month of Muslim society. Also, code-name of fighting was “Operation Badr” and this referred to the historic “Battle of Badr”; i.e., the decisive war of prophet Muhammed and Muslim people against the pagan Quraish tribe in Mecca. These Islamic references were seen as a state’s return to religion by Sadat (Hibbard, 2010: 71-72).

Sadat gained a prestige and power with the result of the war. Liberalization in economic policies continued. Sadat initiated the Infitah and Egypt opened its doors to the global economy (Shehata, 2010: 64-66). Relaxation in restriction policies caused the increase in foreign investments. Eastern Bloc countries had been the major trade partners of Egypt before. After liberalization in the economy, trade partners changed from Eastern Bloc to the West and the United States. Also, trade increased between oil-rich Arab countries and Egypt. The gap of financial support of the USSR was filled by the United States and the West (Ates, 2005: 135; Ates, Duman and Bayraktar, 2006: 71). Although policies of economic liberalization had radical

changes, political liberalization of Egypt was limited. Press censorship was relaxed by the regime. Many political prisoners were released but most of them were the members of Muslim Brotherhood. In liberalization of the political party system, the regime allowed the foundation of three political parties in the right, left and centre of political spectrum. There was a competitive election between parties, the state was very powerful in parliament in 1976 elections (Hibbard, 2010: 72).

The biggest policy change was in foreign policy. During the Nasser era, enemies in the domestic level had been fundamental religious groups. However, at the regional level, enemies had been Saudi Arabia, Gulf states, and Israel. Sadat treated these states different from Nasser. Firstly, rapprochement process started between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Secondly, good relations between Egypt and Gulf states brought investments of oil-rich Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Thirdly, normalization of relations of Egypt with the biggest enemy of Muslims and Arabs in the region, Israel, started. Egypt and Israel signed Camp David Peace Accords. In the agreement, Sinai Peninsula returned to Egyptian control and this was interpreted as an important and historical accomplishment. Egypt was the first Arab state to recognize Israel officially. Also, this agreement showed the end of the Nasser legacy and Egyptian leadership of Pan-Arabism (Hibbard, 2010: 72).

After normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt, religious groups, which had supported Sadat regime, turned against the regime. Some Islamist student groups like al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad chose violence. Other religious student groups and Islamist groups used alternative ways to protest the regime policies. Not only did regime fail in foreign policy, but also in economic liberalization. Some important issues like education and transportation did not develop to the desired level (Hibbard, 2010: 74-75; Shehata, 2010: 66-68). At the beginning, the Infitah provided economic growth but it did not bring foreign investments that were expected by the regime. In the long run, the Intifah caused the increase of consumption. Economic liberalization caused a bigger gap between the poor and the rich. Also, the gap between import and export became bigger than before. Imbalance in Egyptian trade created inflation and budget deficit. Demands of the IMF and World Bank about cuts in subsidies on basic foodstuffs caused riots in streets (Nagarajan, 2013: 22-28). For Sadat, these riots were plots organized by

socialists, but these uprisings were known as “Revolution of the Hungry” or “Bread Riots”. Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem was a historical trip and it went down well from abroad. However, in domestic level, that caused unrest in society. Both right and left criticized Sadat administration. Left saw the issue as a betrayal of Sadat against Nasser legacy and right saw the issue as a betrayal against Islam. Right benefited from the support and tolerance of regime, but after normalization process with Israel, conservative and fundamental allies turned into the main threat to the regime (Hibbard, 2010: 74-75; Shehata, 2010: 66-68).

Islamists criticized policies of Sadat regime about the peace treaty with Israel and cutting in food subsidies. Then Sadat changed his policy about Islamists. He had tolerated Islamists to take support from them and legitimize his regime. However, there was no toleration anymore by the regime. Sadat government responded Islamists harshly. The national student union was banned by the regime to prevent the politicization of Islam. Financial support of the state to Islamist groups was stopped. Islamists were discredited by the regime to reduce their influence on society. State censorship in media was enforced and Islamists’ newspapers were closed by the regime. A new institution, which was run by sheikh of Al-Azhar, was founded by Sadat government to control and monitor all Muslim organizations. Mosques were the centre of the anti-government criticism so government controlled mosques to prevent these types of activities. With Sadat coming to power, private mosques had been opened to spread the influence of Islamism. When Islamists became the new threat, many private mosques were nationalized by the regime and the regime increased control on them by using regional offices of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. Political liberalization lost its importance to stop and reign Islamist anti-government groups (Hibbard, 2010: 76-78).

Previously Islamists had been the balancing force against supporters of Nasser, for Sadat. When the balance was broken, there was no supporter of Sadat. Sadat’s policies caused it. For example, selective political liberalization process caused the rise of Islamists while the left and Nasserists suffered from authoritarianism because regime suppressed them to promote Islamism. Economic liberalization also created big problems in the society. Inflation and poverty increased in Egypt because there was no protection for domestic market against

global market. Only small part of the population benefited from new economic policies so the gap between the poor and rich enlarged (Hibbard, 2010: 76-78). A narrow population benefited from economic liberalization and big businesses became dependent on the state. Small and medium enterprises were not promoted by the state to integrate the global market (Gumuscu, 2010: 839-840). Also, the peace treaty with Israel and good relations with West caused the unrest in society. Post-colonialism was activated here because most of the groups in Egypt have been anti-imperialist and they never look well to close relations between Egypt and the West-US. Sadat was assassinated in 1981 during the annual victory parade for Operation Badr. Islamist militant organization al-Jihad undertook the assassination of Sadat (Hibbard, 2010: 78-79).

In conclusion, Sadat left behind the marginalized left and dominant group of Islamists. The regime, Islamist militants, and Muslim organizations benefited from the financial support of Saudi Arabia and they all were influenced by Saudi Wahhabism. These Islamist groups' aim was the returning of Egyptian society to Islam. Sadat chose to embrace Islam and give up secular vision unlike Nasser. Nasser's secular norms had created national development and social unification in society because religion had not been important to be a member of Egypt and Pan-Arabism. On the other hand, Sadat promoted a narrow interpretation of Islam and use religion as an ideological vehicle against the opposition. Sadat's policies caused deep communal divisions in society because there were people from different religions and sects (Hibbard, 2010: 78-79).

2.5. MIDDLE COURSE: EGYPT UNDER MUBARAK REGIME

Sadat had released most of the Muslim Brotherhood members in jail that were punished by Nasser administration and gave hope and expectation to Islamists. Next president Mubarak did not do that. He did not give any expectations to Islamists. On the other hand, he did not promote secular and socialist ways, even if Mubarak said that secular vision of Nasser administration would continue. He chose the middle course (Juergensmeyer, 1994: 36; Hendriks, 1985: 12).

After the assassination of Sadat, Mubarak employed a different policy against Islamist groups. Mubarak did not use secular vision as a weapon against Islamist but followed a different way. Islam was used as a vehicle to legitimize the military regime by Mubarak. The government saw itself as a defender of Islamic tradition, not Islamic opposition. Islamist militant groups were not tolerated by the regime, and the government responded them harshly. Also, some Muslim groups, like Muslim Brotherhood, were not banned or closed but their activities and actions were restricted. State went on to promote Islamization of society in Egypt and to create a more obedient society. Islamization in public sphere continued during the Mubarak regime (Hibbard, 2010: 81).

Not only did the regime use Islamic ideology as a vehicle of legitimization, but also other Islamist militant groups and Muslim organizations. During the Nasser era, there had been ideological differences between the regime and religious groups. However, Mubarak regime used the Salafist interpretation of Islam to struggle against other religious groups which were trying to spread Salafist (illiberal) interpretation of Islam. Egypt has a population that consists of different ethnic and religious groups. Nasser had applied policies to merge all people in Egypt as an equal citizen regardless of religion, ethnicity, and culture. On the other hand, policies of Sadat and Mubarak promoted the rise of Islamic tradition and Islamization of society. Hence, this gave big damage to a cosmopolitan basis of Egyptian society (Hibbard, 2010: 81).

Economic problems continued and corruption in government did spread in Egypt during the Mubarak administration. Economic liberalization did not fix the weak economic performance of Egypt. By the end of the 1980s, economic problems at the region cause the decline of external aids of Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and Western countries (Abdalla, 1991: 19). In 1991, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank prepared a reform program for Egypt to fix economic problems (Reed, 1993: 95). Population growth increased, and this caused unemployment and underemployment in society. Low living standards in large sections of the population produced unrest in society. Like in Sadat era, only a small part of population benefited from economic liberalization of Egypt. Big parts of the population suffered from economic liberalization and integration into the global

market. Reform program of IMF and the World Bank included the cutting in subsidies. Cutting in subsidies on basic foodstuffs and poor social services of state caused the big gap in society. This gap was filled mostly by Islamist groups which took financial support from the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. Elimination of political participation of all groups caused finding different ways to increase influence on society. Islamist groups used the professional syndicates and mosques to increase their influences and express their ideological thinking (Hibbard, 2010: 82-83). In 1982, there were more than 27.000 private mosques while state-run mosques were just 6.000. Like student unions, professional syndicates became very important platforms for politics. Islamists groups tried to create an influential area in professional syndicates for Islamist agenda and propaganda. Mubarak regime sometimes supported the leftist candidates in professional syndicates' elections to prevent the spread of Islamic influence (Shehata, 2010: 61-63). Islamist NGOs were so effective and had a powerful social base. Secular NGOs had limited efficiency and a poor social base. They took aids from outside like Islamists. The main difference between Islamist NGOs and secular NGOs was cooperation. Unlike the secular ones, Islamist NGOs gave importance to cooperation between themselves to increase efficiency and spread their influence (Tudoroiu, 2011: 382-383). In the political arena too, Egyptian left was divided into Arab nationalist, Nasserist, Leftist, Socialist and Marxist groups. Limited cooperation and lack of organized groups prevented them to spread their influence on society like in Nasser era (Shehata, 2010: 113-116).

Despite many internal problems, Mubarak regime promoted a more democratic system and applied reforms in the constitution. Mubarak gave importance to citizenship defined in a secular framework. During Nasser administration, secular type of citizenship was adopted by the regime to unite people of Egypt irrespective of any religion, gender and ideologic affiliation in theory. Sadat's promotion of Islam caused the rise of Islamic elements and this caused the pressure on Coptic people and other sects in Egypt. Mubarak used secular type of citizenship to fix discrimination in society (Najjar, 2011: 10-11). One of the most important reforms in the constitution was Article Five. According to this article, political activities or political parties shall not be based on religious foundations and there shall not be any discrimination regarding race and gender. We can look at this issue in two ways.

First one is that this reform was secular and promoted secular norms in Egypt. This reform has supported equality of citizens without any discrimination. Political parties, that use religious affiliations, gender or race discrimination, could harm the national unity. The second one is that this reform prevented the Muslim Brotherhood from founding a political party. In elections, the regime and Muslim Brotherhood used Islam as part of their propaganda but Islamist movements were represented by independent candidates. Also, coalitions were established between different political organizations. On the other hand, Shari'a was still primary source of legislation (Najjar, 2011: 11-12).

There were two groups in Muslim Brotherhood. The first group preferred to be more peaceful and behave like a civil society organization to spread the influence of Islam. The second group was more fundamental and a jihadist group. This fundamentalist group declared the Holy War against other Muslims who are seen as "godless". This jihadist organization saw the Mubarak regime as illegitimate and desired to take over the regime by force so that they could start the Islamization of Egyptian society from above (Rubin, 2010: 229).

During the 1990s, fundamentalist terror and assassinations, like the murder of the speaker of the Assembly, increased. The struggle between Islamist militant groups and regime created violence on both sides. Both moderate and fundamentalist Islamists were imprisoned or killed. State used violence against fundamentalist Islamists and their organizations. After 1997, these organizations lost their powers and were not dangerous for Mubarak regime. Western countries did not consider this issue as a human right violation because they feared that fundamentalists could take over the regime (Hibbard, 2010: 49).

After that, Muslim Brotherhood gained influence in society with civil society institutions and took successful results in elections. The rise of power of Muslim Brotherhood in society and politics caused a change of strategy of Mubarak regime against Muslim Brotherhood. Muslim Brotherhood's activities had been already outlawed but continued with an informal toleration of the regime. When conflict restarted, regime tried to disrupt and prevent its activities. Then regime tried to reduce Muslim Brotherhood's influence in society and politics (Rubin, 2010: 230).

In Mubarak era, political Islam continued to gain importance in Egyptian politics through alliances. Despite the conflict between the regime and Muslim Brotherhood, Muslim Brotherhood indirectly participated in elections and Mubarak regime gave importance to the democratization of Egypt that was forced by the United States (Rubin, 2010: 229). Moderate Muslim Brothers were in al-Wasat Party and they were weak when compared to the proportion in Muslim Brotherhood (Gumuscu, 2010: 855). All details about Muslim Brotherhood at domestic and regional level will be explained in the next chapter.

Leftist NGOs and organizations were mostly based on human rights issue. Although Islamist agenda was the biggest threat for the left, some Marxists supported Islamists against the suppression by the regime. In many issues, the left and the right had different opinions, except external threats. Both were against imperialism, so both were against relations between Israel, the West, United States, and Egypt. Rapprochement process between Israel and Egypt, good relations with the United States instead of the USSR and some events like the Gulf War created good relations between the left and the right in Egypt. Foreign policy issues caused the re-emergence of post-colonial effects in the opposition. In the 1980s and early 1990s, common objectives created an alliance between Islamists and Marxists against the regime. It looked like history repeating itself; once again external threats created common objectives and alliances like by the end of the British colonial rule and Nasser's rise to power in Egypt. They found a middle way between idealism and realism. Post-colonial consciousness became effective to merge opposition with the same purpose against same enemies, former imperialists, and Israel. The alliance between Islamists and Marxists caused some rifts in the left. Some leftists cooperated with the regime against Islamists. Also, there were many unsuccessful alliance attempts of leftist political parties. This problem weakened and undermined the left. Alliance between Socialist Labour Party and Muslim Brotherhood is an example of the Islamic supremacy on the left. After a few years of alliance, Islamists became dominant in the party. Socialism that was promoted by party turned into Islamism and Socialist Labour Party changed its name to Islamic Labour Party (Shehata, 2010: 118-195).

Another coalition between secularists and Islamists was between the Wafd Party and Muslim Brotherhood. The main reason for Muslim Brotherhood to engage was the prohibition of Muslim Brotherhood. Election law prevented the political parties with religious charities, religious organizations and religious affiliations. For secular Wafd Party, which was absent from the political arena for more than 30 years, overcoming the electoral threshold of 8% was the main motivation. Wafd and Muslim Brotherhood used each other, to join the election and pass the election threshold. Both sides used different slogans and banners for the election. Wafd party candidates used more secular slogans and banners while Muslim Brotherhood referred to religion. Wafd Party was one of the most important parties during the British colonial rule. It was a secular party but in the 1980s and 1990s, it changed its policy about religion. It moved away from secularism. It supported Islam as the state religion and highlighted the importance of religion for society. Also, Wafd Party gave importance to Sharia and religious education. End of the election was the end of the coalition between Wafd Party and Muslim Brotherhood. However, even though before this alliance, there was an Islamist group in the secular party. As the alliance gave more power to Islamists in the party, it lost its Muslim secularist and Egyptian Copt supporters. So, there were many successful and unsuccessful alliances between Islamists and secularists in 1990s (Shehata, 2010: 145-150).

The economic field was the other issue which caused polarization in the opposition. During the 1990s, Leftists, Nasserist Party and even the NDP, which was the ruling party, criticized economic reforms of the regime. Economic reforms of Mubarak regime caused inflation, unemployment, and corruption. Also, these caused the collapse of public services, the increase of inequality in society and political violence. For some of the opposition, economic reforms should have protected the public sector and the social contract of the Nasserist revolution with the Egyptian society. On the other hand, liberals and some Islamists supported economic reforms. They gave support to the regime about privatizing the public sector and reinforcing the private sector. This caused a polarization between Leftist-Nasserist and Liberal-Islamists groups (Shehata, 2010: 206-207).

Muslim Brotherhood was also against the economic liberalism of the regime and its reforms. However, economic liberalism indirectly helped the organization to

increase its mass appeal. It took over the responsibility for social services which were retreated by the regime. Although some members of Muslim Brotherhood benefited from economic liberalization, Muslim Brotherhood, through Islamic NGOs, supported the interests of lower and middle class (Gormus, 2017: 70-71).

Especially after the 2000s, Saudi Arabia and Gulf monarchies supported Salafist parties but not Muslim Brotherhood directly. These states chose to support the Mubarak regime and one of the strongest opposition party was Muslim Brotherhood. Also, Muslim Brotherhood's social services promoted its influence and they were seen as an alternative to the regime. Muslim Brotherhood slogan was "Islam is a solution" but after the 2000s, they changed it to "constitution is a solution". Their economic program included Islamist and Nasserist economic plans. The main purpose was to prevent antipathy of secularists to the Muslim Brotherhood and to reverse the tendency of rapprochement between the regime and the left. Secular parties or groups increasingly became afraid of Islamists and fundamentalists instead of the regime. They approached the regime to counter Islamists and gain influence. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and Gulf monarchies saw the new tactic of Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to their monarchies. The democratic opening tactic was posing a threat for the legitimacy of monarchies in the region (Shehata, 2010: 216-217; Gormus, 2017: 70-72).

The US's Green belt Project is another reason for the rise of the Islamist groups after 1970s. After the end of the World War 2, Great Britain lost its influence on Middle East. Loss of influence caused the power gap in the Middle East. During the Nasser administration, there was good relationship between Egypt and the USSR. This was a big problem for the United States because Egypt had strategic importance at region and its neighbour country was one of the important allies of United States, Israel. The United States implemented the Green Belt Project to decrease the USSR influence on region. Green Belt project was a foreign policy of United States to support jihadist groups against Soviet Union indirectly and directly. United States gave support to religious and jihadist groups to come to the power because there were some nationalist and anti-American leaders in the power. Many different religious groups benefited from this project and increased their power. Muslim Brotherhood benefited these direct and indirect supports of the United States to

expand their influence on politics and economy in Egypt (Delibas, 2015: 77; Eligür, 2010:69).

After 9/11 events, the rise of pressure on Islamists in Egypt was tolerated by the US. There were three important reasons for keeping good relations between the United States and Egypt. The first one is continuity of peace between Israel and Egypt. The second one is that the Suez Canal should remain open. The third one is the support of Mubarak regime to the US' War on Terror. However, with the Arab Spring, the United States changed its foreign policy towards Egypt. Obama administration warned Mubarak regime with respect to human rights. After that the United States became the supporter of change of ruler in the Middle East, while Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, and Palestine supported the Mubarak regime. Opposition groups unified without reference to any specific ideology. The main purpose of the opposition was the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, and it was expected that this would cause the promotion of democracy with fair elections. There were no religious discourses or political preferences in the slogans of Tahrir Square. Muslim Brotherhood became passive during the uprisings even if it supported. (Henderson and Ganguly, 2015: 50-52).

2.6. CONCLUSION

This brief historical account of secularization and desecularization in Egypt shows that political struggles, socio-economic problems and foreign involvement played important roles in the growth of political Islam in Egypt. Secular policies were dominant during the Nasser era as his political agenda was embedded in Arab socialism and nationalism. Secular policies were approved by the masses, who were content with the protectionism and welfare-provisions in economy. When the economic problems surfaced, and Arabs were defeated by Israel in the late 1960s, an alienation between the society and government appeared. Yet, this alienation itself did not automatically cause the retreat of secularism but Sadat radically revised the state policies towards religion in order to build political alliances for obtaining domestic and foreign support against his rivals. Sadat used Islamist groups as a legitimacy vehicle against secular groups and contributed to their revival. Economic

liberalization under Sadat and Mubarak indirectly furthered the power of Islamism, as the cuts in subsidies and lack of social services opened the door to Muslim Brotherhood to increase its influence on lower and middle class through Islamic NGOs. External support of Gulf states and Saudi Arabia helped Salafist-Islamist groups to fill the gap in social services that appeared upon the withdrawal of government. Although there appeared occasional fluctuations in the attitudes and alliances, the rise of Muslim Brotherhood did the peak in 2010. In the next chapter, the story of this rise will be examined with a focus on the discourses and strategies of the Brotherhood.



CHAPTER THREE

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT

3.1. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD UNDER THE BRITISH RULE

One of the largest and influential of Islamic revivalist organization is The Society of the Muslim Brothers but many people know that organization as the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928. The main object of the organization was to restore the primacy of Islam in social and moral order. Before and during the Ottoman Empire, Islam had a position in the centre of the social order. However, this position took a damage because of the British colonial rule. That is why the main aim of the Muslim Brotherhood was to bring back Islam's position in the centre of the social and moral order like before the intervention of the British colonial rule (Wilmot, 2015: 381-382).

The Muslim Brotherhood was a conservative and Islamist organization. The organization focused on Islamic thoughts, teachings and a certain interpretation of the Quran and other religious texts. The primary aim of the Muslim Brotherhood was to save Egypt from the colonial and imperialist powers. For the movement, colonial period damaged the culture and morality in Egyptian society. The effects of Western powers on Egypt caused the decline of religious norms on society and the rise of the poverty among the people. The solution for the Muslim Brotherhood was that Islamic thoughts must be powerful again in the society and all Muslims must work together as a community against the corrupted policies of the Western imperialist powers. The main objective of the movement was to get rid of the dominance of the imperial and immoral Western powers. They offered an Islamic state to fix the deforming effect of Western imperial powers on the culture and morality. Also, they supported a republican version of the Islamic state; the movement was against monarchy like the ones in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. Main strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood was to expand their influence on the Egyptian society through educational institutions, medical clinics, and other civil society associations. Not only did the organization aim to expand their influence in the Egyptian society, but also to establish good relationships with other Arab and Muslim states. The movement

advocated state censorship on radio, television, newspapers, and books because there was a need for state intervention to fix the emulation of the secular lifestyle which was promoted by the colonial power and post-colonial government. With colonial intervention, people got away from God and Islamic thought. The state must follow some religious policies to fix this and ensure people back to true Islam (Munson, 2001: 490).

Some scholars try to understand the rise of such groups that call for a return to traditional beliefs. David Emile Durkheim was a French sociologist and he studied modern social science, education, law and religious studies. For Emile Durkheim, some social changes like rapid population growth, urbanization, and industrialization caused reaction in some parts of the society. The birth of the Muslim Brotherhood may be understood as a reaction to rapid modernization. These types of groups offer the return of the traditional belief to fix the problems which were created by the changes in the modernization process of the country, imposed by the Western powers. (Munson, 2001: 491).

Founder of the Muslim Brotherhood was Hassan Al-Banna. Hassan Al-Banna was a teacher and imam. For Al-Banna, Islam is a comprehensive system of life and its constitution is Quran. He focused on Islamization in the state, economy, and society. To make Islamic law the basis of social order became the primary object of the organization. He supported a modern Islamist ideology and he criticized Egyptian ulema's traditionalism. He criticized Western materialism and he thought that Western materialism gives damage to the morality of the Egyptian society. Also, he was against Western imperialism. With imperialism, Egyptian society moved away from their culture and religion. Religion lost its power in society and this caused the increase of corruption. Hassan Al-Banna was impressed with the charms of the Egyptian and Pan-Arab patriotism. However, he did not support Arab-nationalism. Ethnicity is not important for Al-Banna, religion is. He believed in Ummah as a supra-national community of Muslim people. According to Al-Banna, secularism, which was brought by the colonial rule, caused social, moral and cultural changes. This colonial culture was imitated by some parts of society in Egypt. He called all Muslims to jihad against imperialist and colonial powers (Wilmot, 2015: 381-382). Hassan Al-Banna offered an Islamic view of the world and the hereafter in the Fifth

Conference of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to him, Islam is not a religion that only demands that people focus on spiritual life. Islam is both in worldly affairs and spiritual affairs. Islam is an ideology and worship, or sword and book. In secularism, there is no religion in public sphere, but Islam must be in public sphere because Islam includes both worldly and spiritual affairs (Said Aly and Wenner, 2013: 340).

Al-Banna was suspicious about the political participation of the organization but Muslim Brotherhood joined elections in 1941 and 1945. In 1941, they were pressured by the authority to withdraw from the election. In 1945, Muslim Brotherhood's candidates joined the election and all candidates were defeated. The pressure in 1941 and defeat in 1945 were because the organization resorted to violence. Although Muslim Brotherhood's acts of violence were against the British colonial rule targets, sometimes they targeted Egyptian statesmen such as Prime Minister Mahmoud An-Nuqrashi Pasha. These acts were the likely cause of the defeat in elections (Wilmot, 2015: 381-382).

Hasan Al-Banna and his brother were assassinated and some resoruces claimed that Hasan Al-Banna was assassinated by King Farouk. After the assassination of Hassan Al-Banna, Hassan al-Hudaybi became the second "General Guide" and the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. During the leadership of al-Hudaybi, tension increased in the organization. There were two groups. The first one gave more importance to reforms in organization and were against acts of violence. The second group thought that the organization's aims could be achieved through violence. Al-Hudaybi was against violence and supported reformists. On the other hand, he was not a real leader but a symbolic one. He was appointed to the leadership of the organization, but he could not become influential to set the order in Muslim Brotherhood (Wilmot, 2015: 381-382).

3.2. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD UNDER GAMAL ABDEL NASSER

In 1949, the Muslim Brotherhood claimed that the organization had more than 600.000 members and 2000 branches. The organization increased its influence in Egypt and spread its power. Hasan al-Hudaybi supported the officers' coup in

Egypt against British Colonial Rule. There was a good relationship between the first president, Muhammad Naguib, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Both sides saw each other as a beneficial partner (Özdemir, 2013: 14). When Free Officers came to the power, there was no problem between the authority and the Muslim Brotherhood because both Free Officers and the Muslim Brotherhood were against the British colonial rule in Egypt and both wanted Egypt to be an independent country. Also, when Free Officers came to the power, they did not have clear-cut policies. Hence, the Muslim Brotherhood supported Free Officers. In time, policies of Nasser regime became more Arab-nationalist and secular. The main object of the Muslim Brotherhood was to restore the position of Islam in the center of the social and moral order like before the British colonial rule in Egypt. Secular policies were seen as an emulation of the West and were criticized (Musallam, 2005: 137-140).

As the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood grew, security concerns of Egyptian authorities increased. Despite the peaceful views of al-Hudaybi, the act of violence by the members of the Muslim Brotherhood continued with the assassination attempt on Nasser's life. After the failed assassination attempt, one of the highest levels of repression on the Muslim Brotherhood by the regime started. Failed assassination attempt on Nasser's life gave big damage to the organization. Muslim Brotherhood was banned by the regime and became an illegal organization. Its leaders and members were arrested. Many members of the organization were put in prison camps and some of them became refugees in Islamic countries that were against the Nasser regime's ideology like Saudi Arabia and Gulf monarchies. Eight Muslim Brotherhood leaders' sentence was capital punishment except for Hassan al-Hudaybi (Wilmot, 2015: 381-382).

Hassan al-Hudaybi was not executed because he did not support the violence against the regime and peacefully criticized the regime for emulation of the West and secular policies. There was a difference between Hassan al-Hudaybi and Sayyid Qutb. Sayyid Qutb always criticized American culture and colonial culture. However, he argued that Nasser's regime was not different from the colonial period in terms of the effect of colonizers in culture. Arab nationalism divided people with respect to ethnicity. However, ethnicity was not as important as religion. Religion was vital to get rid of the effects of colonial culture and repair the negative effects of

it. On the other hand, Hassan al-Hudaybi supported a more peaceful way to repair the negative effects of colonial culture in Egypt. He believed in non-violent gradualism. For Hudaybi, they are Preachers, not Judges and Only Allah can judge. So, there appeared two different ways to attain the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization was divided as reformists and militant Islamists. Because of the militant Islamists, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned by the regime. It became unfunctional because of the repression on the organization. Organization's many leaders were executed, and members were arrested. They lost their financial support and there was limited member recruitment. Reformists in the Muslim Brotherhood continued their activities in non-violent ways under the repression of the Nasser regime. Until the 1970s, the Nasser regime has eliminated the violence problem of the Muslim Brotherhood (Wilmot, 2015: 381-382; Leiken and Brooke, 2007: 110-113).

Sayyid Qutb was an influential actor in the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1950s. Qutb was an Egyptian author, poet, Islamic theorist and member of the Muslim Brotherhood. He supported the establishment of a government based on Islamic ideology. He was against Westernism and secularism because Qutb's travel to America in 1949 changed his view about the Western civilization. Qutb criticized the lifestyle of capitalist states and their moral corruption. With colonialism in Egypt, this type of lifestyle and moral values caused the danger of corruption in a Muslim society (Pehlivan, 2013: 24). He was the advisor of the Revolutionary Command Council and appointed to the Ministry of Education. When Nasser came to the power instead of Naguib, his appointment was withdrawn by the Nasser government. After the failed assassination attempt, he was arrested by the regime. His sentence was 15 years in prison, although he was a very influential member of the organization. He supported violence and his books have been an ideological source for many later terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. His books were "*Social Justice*", "*Milestones*" and "*In the Shade of the Qur'an*". He was released in 1964 and was rearrested by the regime. Charges against him were attempting to overthrow the government and call for violence against the regime in his books. His sentence was capital punishment (Wilmot, 2015: 381-382; Musallam, 2005: 140-142).

Sayyid Qutb is the most important ideologue in the Muslim Brotherhood. He is the creator of the Islamic fundamentalism in the post-colonial Muslim world. According to Sayyid Qutb, secularism is for Western civilizations because there is a struggle between clergy and state in the West. There is no such struggle between Muslim states and Islamic institutions. State and Islamic institution are connected to one another in Muslim states (Pehlivan, 2013: 24).

Qutb mentioned Jahiliyah and Jihad concepts in his books. For Qutb, there are two types of societies. These are the Jahili and Islamic society. Islamic society follows God's rule (Islamic rule) in every aspect of life. However, Jahili society does not follow God's rule and its moral values are corrupted (Pehlivan, 2013: 25). There is a Jahilliye period in the world according to Qutb. The only way to fix the system is Islam. There is no tolerance for Jahili society, there is no need for friendship or cooperation with Jahili society (Terzi, 2014: 28).

The difference between Ihvan and Qutb supporters is the policy toward authority. Ihvan means brotherhood and it represents Muslim community. According to Ihvan, there is a corruption in the system and it can be fixed by the strategic movements of the organization. On the other hand, for Qutb, corruption in the system cannot be fixed with strategic movements and it must be completely changed. Also, force can be used to change the system (Terzi, 2014: 27). Also, Islam must be imposed on all parts of the society before attempting political ways. If the organization uses political ways for Islamic will too early, the Islamic system is applied as a matter of form but corruption in the system goes on (Terzi, 2014: 28).

Mawdudi and Al-Banna supported re-Islamization of the Egyptian society from the bottom up. They tried to strengthen the social ties in the society and convince the people for an Islamic social and political system. On the other hand, for Qutb and his followers, Jihad is an offensive movement and it must be used against the system to change it from above completely. Only political revolution and Jihad against non-Islamic elements in a state cause the end of the Jihaliyya period and the rise of the Muslim society again (Pehlivan, 2013: 27).

According to Hasan Al-Banna, there are multiple developments which caused the corruption in Muslim World like impacts of British Colonial Rule, Westernization, de-Islamization policies which were associated with the modern

political and administrative system in Egypt (Pehlivan, 2013: 22). According to Rashid Rida, Islamic teachings and thoughts are all inclusive. Not only is Islam a religion, but also the nation, state, and nationality. Islam is not just a spiritual yearning for another world. Islam is both for this world and hereafter. Al-Banna was affected by the ideas and thoughts of Rashid Rida. Islam includes all aspects of life for Al-Banna. He refused the thoughts that Islam is just spiritual religion. Al-Banna supported a harmonious relationship between religion and state. One of the biggest problems for the Muslim world was Western materialism and secularism. The Muslims could only save themselves via preventing the spread of Western ideas, values, and its materialism. Islamic ideology would inspire the rise of the Muslim world again (Pehlivan, 2013: 23-24).

According to Asad, colonial rule in Egypt started to exclude religion from the public sphere with the laws. However, there were no religious motives or slogans of people in the 1919 revolution, in which Muslim people and the Coptic minority merged against the colonial rule with nationalist slogans (Demir, 2012: 151-153). There was no Islamic revival or religious segments in the revolution. After colonial rule, these secular policies continued with Nasser administration. Arab nationalism was against the West and secular Arabism also tried to determine the place of religion in society. Arab nationalism led to a system of law and citizenship regardless of one's religious affiliation. Arab nationalism tried to locate religion in the private sphere. The aim was to create a "nation" regardless of religious identity (Salama and Friedman, 2012: 106-108).

Talal Asad focused on the secularization process in Egypt from the colonial period to the post-colonial period. He tried to observe the changes from the religious political sphere to the secular political sphere in Egypt. There was the dual court system and shari'a had power in Egyptian law in the beginning. The colonial rule gave importance to the secularization process in Egypt, but they did not change the influence of shari'a on the law with the shari'a courts. However, after the colonial rule, the post-colonial government changed the law system from the dual court system to the national court system. In 1955, shari'a courts were abolished by the Nasser regime. Even though Arab nationalists were against the West, they adopted European legal principles in Egyptian law. These types of secular policies were

supported by the religious reformers who gave importance to the compatibility between Islam and modernism (Salama and Friedman, 2012: 109-111).

The debate about the relationship between state and religion has continued in Egypt. According to Seyh Ali Abdulrezzak, there is no message or Prophet Muhammed about an Islamic state in his moral principles and actions. Also, for Talha Huseyin, religion and language do not create the foundation of states for political union. Muslim world understands at the end of the long experiences that there should be a separation between religion and state like in modern Europe (Terzi, 2014: 36).

So, considering the predominance of nationalism and absence of fundamentalist ideas for many decades, the spread of Muslim Brotherhood's ideology in the 1970s needs further explanation. A negative factor is the release of the pressure put on Islamists. As we have already mentioned, after the assassination attempt against Nasser, purge for the Muslim Brotherhood's members was started by the Egyptian authority. Many members of the Muslim Brotherhood were prisoned or exiled by the Nasser regime. Exiled and prisoned members in the organization tried to stay in contact with each other. Exiled members in the Muslim Brotherhood created a new opportunity for the organization to spread the efficiency of the organization at the regional level (Özdemir, 2013: 16). They turned into supporters of liberal political and economic principles, while they of course denied liberal cultural values. According to the Muslim Brotherhood, liberal values like freedom of speech, equality, individualism, tolerance to other religions and cultures were withdrawn by the Nasser government. Anti-liberal socialist policies were also applied in the economic field and all capitalist elements were tried to be removed from the Egyptian economy by the Nasser regime (Koc, 2014: 71).

Not only did the Nasser regime implement anti-liberal socialist policies in economic and social life, but also anti-Islamic policies. The rise of popularity and influence of the Muslim Brotherhood can be observed after Arab-Israel wars. All defeats of Arab countries caused the rise of Islamist organizations in Egypt. According to the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the biggest reasons for defeat has been Nasser's policies against Islam because his policies caused the corruption and imitation of the West. Due to his de-Islamization policies, Egyptian society moved

away from Islam. The only way to defeat Israel is to turn Egyptian society back to Islam again (Koc, 2014: 88-89). According to Al-Banna, Islam is both religion and state and, Islam answers all questions of people. Islam is both sword and book, homeland and citizen, matter and meaning; that is why Islam cannot be separated from states (Terzi, 2014: 37).

Nasser policies drew a clear line for the separation between state and religion. This line prevented Islamist organizations to spread their power via religion. These caused the decline of Islamist organizations and groups' efficiency in Egypt. On the other hand, more radical and extremist groups have emerged. These radical and extremist groups have founded new Islamist organizations or transformed the existing Islamist organizations into more radical organizations (Pehlivan, 2013: 53-54).

3.3. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD UNDER ANWAR SADAT AND HOSNI MUBARAK

Nasser gave importance to Arab nationalism, secular-nationalism, and Pan-Arabism. Arab nationalism became more important with Nasser era and ethnicity became more important than religion. Before this era, religion and nation had been considered as linked. Under the British colonial rule, conservative people appealed to nation and religion at the same time to unite people for one goal. For example, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Banna supported the Egyptianism and Pan-Arabism because one of the main determinants of Pan-Arabism and Egyptianism was religion, especially Islam. Majority of the population were Muslim, and religion could unify people again for one goal, independence of Egypt from the British colonial rule. When Nasser's policies became more secular-nationalist, conservatives left the nationalist way of unification because of the desire of a government under Islamic order (Wilmot, 2015: 381-382).

After the ban of the Muslim Brotherhood, the organization had lost its power and influence in society until the end of the Nasser regime. When Anwar Sadat came to power, the Muslim Brotherhood became free unofficially. During the Nasser era, leftist, Nasserist and Marxist groups increased their power and influence in society.

Sadat used Islamist groups to counter those groups to protect his throne. Sadat liberalized the economy and gave power to the Islamist groups. The Muslim Brotherhood was illegal technically, but it was functioning with the support of the Sadat regime. Partial openness in politics and economy opened the way to the Muslim Brotherhood to spread their influence and power in the society again (Wilmot, 2015: 381-382).

Not only did Sadat try to reduce the influence of leftist and nationalist groups, but also promoted Islamist groups. Members of Muslim Brotherhood were active in university student unions and the professional syndicates after the Nasser administration. Islamist student unions in universities increased Islamic consciousness with the support of Sadat in the 1980s. Some of them became Islamist militants in the 1990s. The professional syndicates were very important because there was no full political participation of Muslim Brotherhood and some Islamist organizations. These syndicates were the place to talk about politics and policies of the government. Also, syndicates were the place to spread the influence of the awakening of the Islamic consciousness in Egypt. During the elections of the professional syndicates, some representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood were successful and took a good position to achieve organization's goals (Wilmot, 2015: 381-382).

The economy of Egypt had still gone worse with the Sadat administration. During the Nasser era, trade nodes were African, some Middle Eastern and Socialist countries for Egypt. After the economic liberalization, these trade nodes shifted to the West. Economic structure became a decisive factor for the rise of Political Islam in the Middle East. Changes of economic policies from socialist type to neo-liberal one and the failures in a new economic system created space for political Islam to spread its power in the Egyptian society (Pehlivan, 2013: 42). Economic openness gave damage to lower and middle class of Egypt because of the withdrawal of the government in some social services and food subsidies. This created an opportunity for Islamist organization, especially Muslim Brotherhood, to spread their influence on the periphery of the society. Muslim Brotherhood worked like a social service for society and filled the gap left by the government. After the ban of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Hudaybi also went on to spread organization's influence in

other Islamic countries. During the Nasser administration, there was a tension between Saudi Arabia and Egypt because of the ideological conflict between secularism and Islamism. With Sadat era, normalization process started again. Most of the refugee members of the Muslim Brotherhood came back to Egypt. Good relations between Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Muslim Brotherhood supplied financial support to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Salafist organizations in Egypt by Saudi Arabia and Gulf monarchies. With this financial support of rich members of Muslim Brotherhood in exile and other Muslim states, the Muslim Brotherhood became like a functional social service. Until the Mubarak era, the Muslim Brotherhood has increased its power on the periphery of the society with the permission of Sadat (Nagarajan, 2013: 22-28; Rubin, 2010: 230).

During Nasser regime, relationship between Egypt and the West, as well as relationship between Egypt and Arab States was not good. After Sadat came to power, rapprochement process started. One of the most important sources in Sadat regime was foreign assistance. Egypt received \$7 billion foreign aid from the conservative Arab states. Withdrawal of secular-nationalism after Nasser and the return to Islam again created new opportunities and economic aids for Egypt. Furthermore, peace process between Egypt and Israel opened the door for new loans and foreign aids from US, the West, Japan and international banks. Egypt took more than \$15 billion loans and foreign aids between 1974 and 1980 according to Waterbury (Shehata, 2010: 67-69).

One of the important effects which caused the rise of Islamist groups in Egypt were the Islamic NGOs. If we compare Islamist and secular groups or organization, we can see the differences between these groups in terms of their impact on the Egyptian society. Even though some secular organizations and NGOs were supported by the West, there was a problem in societal level. These organizations could not reach the society and expand their influence in the Egyptian society. However, Islamic NGOs started to organize in societal level. During the Nasser era, there was a pressure on Islamist and religious groups. Regime's secular policies prevented the expansion of the religious groups in Egypt. These Islamic NGOs were supported by the Gulf monarchies and Saudi Arabia mostly. The main idea behind the financial support for them by the Arabic states was their ideological differences with the

Nasser administration. Despite this external support, the influence of these NGOs was limited due to the pressure on them and due to the social policies and subsidies. When Sadat administration came to power, Islamist organizations increased their influence and power in society with the support of the new administration. Islamic NGOs increased from 17.3% in the 1960s to 34% in the 1980s. With Mubarak administration, they became even more visible in society. They focused on social services issues which were withdrawn by the regime to decrease foreign debts of the country. Islamist organizations served as providers of social services such as education, medical care or housing. The number of Islamist charities has been more than 1,600 and the number of private mosques has been more than 27,000 when we compare with 6,000 mosques which were governed by the government (Shehata, 2010: 63-64; Jackson, 1981: 65). There was no direct link between the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic NGOs, but the Muslim Brotherhood played a hegemonic role in Islamic civil society. Decisions and actions of Islamic NGOs were affected by the movement. There have been 7,500 NGOs in the 1970s and this has become more than 20,000 during Mubarak administration. Also, Islamic NGOs have become more than 40 percent of total number of formal NGOs. Private mosques, medical clinics, religious schools and many other institutions were organized and opened by the Islamic NGOs that were under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood (Tudoroiu, 2011: 383; Shehata, 2010: 75-77).

Another reason for the rise of the Islamist groups was the project of Green Belt. Great Britain had the power in the Middle East at the end of the World War 2. This power soon eroded. There were three choices for countries in the region. These were communist USSR, capitalist United States, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Egypt under Nasser administration was in the Non-Aligned Movement, but it had still close relationship with the USSR. This was a big problem for the United States because Egypt had strategic importance in the region and it was neighbour to one of the important allies of the United States, Israel. The United States used the Green Belt project to decrease the effect of Soviet Union on Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. Green Belt project was a foreign policy of the United States, based on providing support to jihadist groups against Soviet Union indirectly and directly. The United States helped these groups come to power by toppling nationalist and anti-

American leaders. The United States supported these groups at a time the Cold War was approaching its end. Muslim Brotherhood benefited from these direct and indirect supports of the United States to expand their influence on politics and economy in Egypt (Delibas, 2015: 77; Eligür, 2010:69).

After the assassination of Sadat, Hosni Mubarak had realized the rise of Islamist groups in Egypt and how dangerous they could be. However, liberalization processes in economy and politics continued in Mubarak regime. Political liberalization brought a chance for Muslim Brotherhood to participate in elections. Mubarak regime permitted opposition parties to join elections, but elections were unfair when we compare the difference between the regime and opposition parties' economic resources and power in important institutional positions. The Muslim Brotherhood was still an illegal organization so their participation in elections was not directly. There was no link between the political parties, independent candidates and the movement formally. The first election was in 1984 and the party of the Muslim Brotherhood participated in a very small number of areas. However, they joint the elections with more candidates, independent candidates and alliances with other political parties, even leftist parties after 1984 (Wilmot, 2015: 382).

3.4. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: FROM OPPOSITION TO POWER

The Egyptian revolution in 2011 means the end of the military regime and its oppressions on opposition groups. The January 25 revolution created an opportunity for opposition groups that were under the harassment of the regime. With Sadat administration, Islamists had increased their power and influence in society and political arena because he gave more tolerance and space to Islamic ideology instead of secular ideology. Islamist groups and organizations have spread in the society. They became highly organized and took over the mission of the social services which was withdrawn by the regime. On the other hand, secular opposition lacked such an organization and support from the society, which made them weak. Hence, the Egyptian revolution in 2011 was a big opportunity for the Islamists (Wilmot, 2015: 380).

When the region-wide Arab Spring started, the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia has overthrown the dictatorship of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. In Egypt, not only was Muslim Brotherhood neutral to the Egyptian revolution but also kept its distance with the regime because they did not want to take a risk. Muslim Brotherhood did not support the regime because there was still a pressure of the regime on the organization. Mubarak regime saw themselves as the true Islamists and used Islamism as an ideology against both conservative and leftist parties. Also, The Jasmin Revolution proved that the regime can be overthrown by the Egyptian people. On the other hand, the movement did not support the revolutionaries directly because if these demonstrations failed, the regime could use Muslim Brotherhood's support to the revolutionaries as a reason to target the organization again like in Nasser era. Because of these reasons, the movement became neutral. Some youth members of the Muslim Brotherhood took the permission of the organization's supreme leaders to join the demonstration as an individual, not as representatives of the organization. Another reason why the movement did not support the revolution directly is that this type of direct support could make the revolution look like as if it was dominated by religious concerns and was controlled by religious groups. This could have harmed the unity in Tahrir and could be seen as antipathetic in the international arena. There were no religious slogans during the revolution and the Muslim Brotherhood conformed with it (Wilmot, 2015: 384-385; Demir, 2012: 151-153; Hove and Ndawana, 2017: 33).

During the protest, the Muslim Brotherhood was between the protesters and the regime. The movement did not want to stay out the negotiations between the regime and the protesters, so it kept the contact with the regime. That was criticized by some group of the protesters as a double-play of the Muslim Brotherhood, but the movement responded that the Muslim Brotherhood did put across the demands of the Egyptian people in negotiations between the movement and the regime. When Mubarak tried to deploy the Egyptian armed forces to streets, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took the charge. SCAF came to power for the transitional period. It suspended the constitution and dissolved the Egyptian parliament. Also, SCAF fixed the electoral laws and permitted foundation of new political parties again (Wilmot, 2015: 384-385).

For Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian revolution in 2011 was a big chance to come to power. Muslim Brotherhood has joint elections as a political party or independent candidates since 1984. Sometimes election results were bad and sometimes good for them. Also, sometimes electoral alliances occurred between the Muslim Brotherhood and one secular party. However, Muslim brotherhood had never come to power because the ruling party was very powerful and preserved its influence in society. Political restraints and bans always became a barrier to the political inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sometimes the movement was under repression of the regime and sometimes it was boosted by the regime. It was then an influential power in the society and the Arab Spring gave it the chance to translate this societal power to the political area legally. Removal of the ruling regime and Mubarak broke the barrier which prevented the full political inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood (Wilmot, 2015: 380-387).

One of the main symbols of the revolution was the demand for democracy in Egypt. Democracy became the element which united secularists and Islamists in Tahrir square during the revolution. Also, democracy was the main objective of the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa. Not only did secularists and liberals but also younger Islamist generation give importance to democracy. The younger generation and reformists in the Muslim Brotherhood gave priority to democracy in Egypt. However, the old guard in the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to use democracy as a vehicle for the legitimization of the movement. Chris Harnisch and Quinn Mecham, who study Middle Eastern politics and political Islam, claimed that the old guard in movement acted pragmatically about democracy. Their aim was an Islamic state which was compatible with democracy. That compatibility was important even for them because they needed legitimacy in the international arena and domestic politics (Tudoroiu, 2011: 385).

After the removal of the ruling regime, there was no obstacle to political participation for the Muslim Brotherhood. After that, they founded “Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)”. Freedom and Justice Party joined the political arena as a legal representative of the Muslim Brotherhood and that was the first time. Before Freedom and Justice Party, other political parties and independent candidates did not entirely represent the Muslim Brotherhood because of the political restrictions

(Wilmot, 2015: 380). To be a member of the movement was very difficult because of the hard membership procedures. However, FJP was a political party and anyone who supports the Islamic agenda of the movement could become the member of the party or support the party in elections. Although the party was seen as independent from the movement, most of the members of the party were the members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Also, members of the Muslim Brotherhood could not be the member of other political parties and this caused that the movement had a big influence on the party. Supreme leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood appointed Mohammed Sa'ad Al-Katani and Mohamed Morsi as a secretary-general and president of the party. Also, The Muslim Brotherhood prepared the bylaws of the FJP and the party made decisions in consultation with the Muslim Brotherhood. President of the party was appointed by the supreme leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood instead of internal party elections and this showed us that there was a direct linkage between the party and the movement. Some members of the movement and the party criticized the movement's influence on the party. For example, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and was in Egyptian politics since the 1970s. Also, he was the member of the Muslim Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau that is an important position in the movement. After the Arab Spring, he criticized the linkage between the party and the movement. According to him, the Muslim Brotherhood should have remained as a civil society organization and do not intervene in politics. After the criticism, he was removed from the Guidance Bureau (Wilmot, 2015: 386-387; Pioppi, 2013: 56-57).

Another opposition group was the Younger Brothers in Muslim Brotherhood. They had a more positive approach to the revolution in Egypt, compared to the Older Brothers. They shared more common views with the secular side about democracy, political participation, and human rights. They wanted more representation in the Supreme Guidance in the movement for the Younger Brothers. The Younger Brothers organized the Muslim Brotherhood Youth Conference in 2011 and supported the independence of the Freedom and Justice Party from the movement for the sake of consolidation of democratic transition in Egypt. Another problem between Old Guards and Young Brothers was about the place of woman in the public sphere. In 2007, Muslim Brotherhood stated publicly that Christians and women

cannot be a head of state in Egypt. Muslim Brotherhood's political party, FJP, had female candidates in elections but female candidates or members were not in upper councils in the state or the movement. The place of the women for the older guards was home and their mission was to educate the future generations to be an active member and rule the movement. Women are not mentally and emotionally capable to rule the state according to the older guards in the movement. This was criticized by the seculars, liberals and minority groups, even by some members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Younger Brothers have a more secular tone than the old guards. For the Younger Brothers, women can participate in all spheres of life and their participation is very important for the future of Egypt. Some of the Younger Brothers stayed in the movement and fought against the older guards' radical and old policies. On the other hand, some of them established a new political party to become independent from the movement in politics: the New Renaissance Party. Not only were the Younger Brothers against some policies of the old guards of the movement, but also reformists in movement were (Farag, 2012: 219-220; Tudoroiu, 2011: 384).

The Muslim Brotherhood's resources were devoted to the political aims of the party. The movement's agenda was shaped by political issues and sometimes this caused split in the Muslim Brotherhood. There was always a problem between reformists and old guards. After al-Hudaybi, reformists founded a political party, "Wasat Party". One of the important reformists of the Muslim Brotherhood, Aboul Ela Mady, seceded from the movement for the creation of the Wasat Party. In the 2000s, nothing changed. Most of the old guards kept the balance of power in internal elections of the movement against the reformists. Repression of the regimes on the Muslim Brotherhood had caused an obedience and discipline in the organization. Repressions on the organization justified these types of desires of the Supreme leaders. Hence, the movement protected its hierarchal and conservative structure after the creation of the FJP. Reformists were removed from the movement and the party (Wilmot, 2015: 387). When we look at the inner problems of the Muslim Brotherhood, there are different groups which think more conservative, reformer or secular. This shows us that there were some ideological differences between the groups in the movement about the politics and ruling style. Sometimes these

ideological differences caused the removal of the members from the movement and the foundation of the new political parties (Farag, 2012: 220).

The SCAF ruled the transition period of Egypt. It gave rights to the opposition to found political parties. When the Muslim Brotherhood established the FJP, it cooperated with the SCAF to engage in the political system again. The movement tried to create good relations with the SCAF because at end of the successful transition, the movement needed the support of the military. In the transition period, the judiciary and the military made decisions, which was against the interest of the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement did not use violence or criticize, they only fought against decisions in the legal arena. The movement did not want a problem with the military and the judiciary during the transition period and after that (Wilmot, 2015: 388; Hove and Ndawana, 2017: 40-41).

After the 1970s, the rise of the Islamization in Egypt occurred. The Left and secular-nationalists lost their dominance in politics and society. After the Egyptian revolution in 2011, Islamist groups had an advantage over other political groups in Egypt because they had economic resources, a well-defined political structure and organized groups in society. On the other hand, the Left was unorganized and had limited time to spread their influence into society. The first attempt of the SCAF for the successful transition was the Egyptian parliamentary elections. Before the parliamentary elections, parties established political alliances and blocs. Important alliances were Democratic Alliance, Egyptian Bloc, and Islamist Bloc. Democratic Alliance included the Muslim Brotherhood's FJP, some Islamist and nationalist parties. Al-Nour Party was the important representative of the Islamist Bloc. Egyptian Bloc was the representative of the left and liberal parties, but it had one Islamist party who was against the Muslim Brotherhood. After the Egyptian parliamentary elections, Democratic Alliance won the elections. The Muslim Brotherhood's FJP almost represented the half of the Egyptian parliamentary seats with the 45% and they took 37% of votes. The second party in elections was the Islamist Bloc with the 25% of the votes. The third one was the New Wafd party with the 9.2% of votes and the fourth one was the Egyptian Bloc with the 8.9%. New Wafd party did not join any alliance or bloc. This parliamentary election shows that Islamist parties were very powerful when we compare them with the leftist parties.

Islamists had a strong majority in Egyptian parliament against the left and liberals (Wilmot, 2015: 389-390; Pioppi, 2013: 57). After the victory in the election, the FJP desired to prove to international and domestic actors that the party is a moderate and responsible actor in politics.

The Muslim Brotherhood changed its former strategies and actions after the 2000s. They changed their discourses and slogans from religious ones to more secular ones. For example, they used “Islam is a solution” as a slogan before the 2000s but with the arrival of political participation and democratic process, the movement followed a pragmatic tactic; they used terms like freedom, democracy, equality to expand their political power to other segments of society, not just for Salafist groups. Before the 2000s, Islamist militants were very active. In the 1980s and the 1990s, use of violence by the Islamist militants reached the peak. The Muslim Brotherhood used violence against state institutions, tourists and Coptic people in Egypt. This harmed the image of Salafist movements in Egypt. Militant members of the Salafist groups used Qutb’s ideology as a guide (Ranko and Nedza, 2016: 519). Security forces of the state almost stopped these types of actions in the late 1990s. Also, with the democratic process in Egypt, the movement rejected all aspects of violence and militant actions. However, after the Mubarak era, arrested Islamist militants were released from prison and this caused the rise of militant activities which ended up with the Al-Sisi intervention.

There were two candidates for Egyptian presidential election in 2012. One of them was Ahmed Shafik. He was the former prime minister of the Mubarak era. He served as a prime minister only one month. Also, he was a senior commander in Egyptian Air Force. Mohamed Morsi was the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice party. Although Ahmed Shafik was supported by the minority groups and the groups which were against the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Morsi won the Egyptian presidential election narrowly. That was the big success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Arab countries. After the post-colonial period, first time Islamists have come to the power. Also, they did win against the former senior military commander (Wilmot, 2015: 391-392).

Some analysts who applied Hannah Arendt’s analysis of totalitarian movements to this movement, the Muslim Brotherhood was a threat for the modern

political life in Egypt. Members of the movement were like brethren instead of citizens. They were an authoritarian community of believers who supported the traditional religious law. However, they were well-organized and one of the most influential religious movement in Egypt. This movement saw the religion and state as one (Starkman, 2013: 597). Bassam Tibi, a German-Syrian political scientist, defined the movement as a militant Islamist group. For Tibi, Islamism is not a religious thing, it is a political religion, and this is very dangerous because the movement presents a way of life and system of rules for the society (Starkman, 2013: 604-605).

For some observers, one of the main reasons for the rise of political Islam was the failure of the Arab secularism. Arab secularism failed to bring equality in society and establish a powerful economy. After that Islam was seen as a solution for some people in the country. However, in 2012 the Muslim Brotherhood used more secular slogans like “Freedom is the Solution and Justice is the Application” in order to take secular votes for coming to the power (Starkman, 2013: 598).

For the first time, a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood has come to power. Mohamed Morsi became the President of Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP became dominant in the Egyptian parliament. However, Islamist dominance in Egyptian parliament was blocked by the decision that was taken by the supreme constitutional court (Hearst and Hussein, 06.14.2012). When the SCAF came to the power with the coup against the Mubarak regime, it had appointed people to the state institutions to protect the balance of power. The main goal of the SCAF was the balance of power and protect groups which were unelected. Before the presidential election, the supreme constitutional court dissolved the legislative parliament elected in 2011 parliamentary elections. SCAF have had both executive and legislative power. When Mohamed Morsi became the President of Egypt, he said that decision of the supreme constitutional court must be respected. After that, he started to criticize the decision and reinstated the former legislative parliament. That was the start of the fight between Muslim Brotherhood and Military- Judiciary branches. Mohamed Morsi used the power of the executive branch to consolidate his power against the military. New military leaders were reassigned by the executive branch. Many revolutionaries supported Morsi’s effort to consolidate his power and enforce the civilian rule against the military rule. Even though “Brotherization” in the state

would cause the Islamization of the state institutions, some liberals and seculars supported the efforts of Morsi administration against the military rule. For the groups that were against the Muslim Brotherhood, all attempts of the Morsi administration were seen to protect its dictatorial power against other groups (Wilmot, 2015: 391-392).

A Constituent Assembly had been elected by the legislative parliament to draft a new constitution for Egypt before the dissolution of the parliament by the supreme constitutional court. The new constitution gave more power to the presidency and the legislative parliament. The new constitution was against arbitrary detention and torture, but it did not include freedom of expression of religion, women's rights and minority rights. Some Salafist-conservative parties supported the new constitution. Also, many unions which were under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood supported the new constitution. For them, this new constitution could bring stability to Egypt. Some of them criticized the constitution because the constitution should have been more based on Shari'a law. On the other hand, liberals, seculars, and groups which were against the Salafist dominance in politics criticized the new constitution because it would give more power to the Islamists for "Brotherization of the state" and it did not enough protect women and minority rights (Wilmot, 2015: 393-394; Özdemir, 2013: 126-127).

One of the main reasons for the revolution in Egypt was economic problems. Poor economic performance in Mubarak era and the corruption in the state institutions caused the rise of the inflation and unemployment in Egypt. After 1990s, economic problems in Egypt increased. Gulf Wars caused the return of 700,000 Egyptian workers to homeland from Gulf states. Also, the decline in tourism made Egypt needy to loans of international banks and funds (Zahid, 2010: 46). Loans of IMF and the World Bank caused the rise of foreign debts and the budget deficit. These loans did not develop and mobilize the Egyptian economy enough. State subsidies in basic food supplies were removed by the regime with the direct desire of the IMF and the World Bank. The rise of unemployment and poverty became one of the important reasons for the change in the power. The Muslim Brotherhood's FJP promised justice and equality as a part of Islamic ideology in the economy but before the elections, there was no economic plan of the party. Although during the elections,

candidates of the FJP criticized the high unemployment rate, high inflation, and poor economic conditions, after the elections, their economic policies did not change anything. Morsi government took loans from the World Bank to restore the poor economic condition in the country, but it did not work well. The rise of unemployment and inflation continued. Also, the big budget deficit and foreign debt grew (Al-Awadi, 2013: 545-546; Létourneau, 2016: 305-306).

The party of the Muslim Brotherhood, FJP, gave priority to the Islamic values because of the effects of the movement on the policies of the party. The party has seen the Quran as a constitution like Hassan Al-Banna who was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (Pahwa, 2013: 201). In the new constitution, they kept that Sharia is a primary source of the legislation and Islam is the religion of the state. Second Salafist party in dissolved parliament supported the FJP about the Islamic values' importance in the constitution. FJP saw the Sharia as a national value. In the constitution, Egyptian family is based on religion, morality, and patriotism. For the movement, the state must protect the religion because religious and patriotic values are part of national heritage. Article about the women's equality to men in the constitution was changed by the authority. Before changing, there was a "without prejudice to Islamic law" at the end of the Article but this was removed. Removal of "without prejudice to Islamic law" caused the rise of Islamic law effect. The idea behind this removal was to stop normalization of the female sexual freedom, homosexuality, contraception, and abortion. This was criticized by secularists and liberals because of the effect of the religion on women's lives with the article in the constitution (Pahwa, 2013: 202). Also, new constitution limited minority religious believers to the private sphere but Islam was seen as a majority religion and became dominant in public sphere (Pahwa, 2013: 204). These types of policies caused the deep polarization of the Egyptians about religion's place in public sphere (Lavie, 2017: 1009).

Muslim Brotherhood regarded the state as responsible for the flourishing of Islam. According to them, the state should represent both democratic and Islamic values. Democratic and liberal values were important for the movement if they were compatible with the main source of legislation, Sharia. Also, morality and culture of the Egyptian people, which took damage from the policies in colonial and post-

colonial periods because of the emulation to the West, had to be restored. That is why the state had moral and cultural obligations. So, the movement believes that state must implement conservative Islamic norms. However, this type of point of view about the state's religious duty was criticized by the liberals and secularists, for it excluded Christians in Egypt from public offices (Ranko and Nedza, 2016: 521-523). On the other hand, FJP offered the Egyptian people political reforms, economic improvement, uncorrupted state institutions, security in the homeland and party membership to all Egyptian people regardless of race, political affiliation, gender and religious affiliation. Also, Vice-president of the FJP was Rafiq Habib who is a Coptic Christian and member of the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Awadi, 2013; 544-545).

With the new constitution, the judiciary became more powerful and the SCAF's power reduced. The tension between secularists and Islamists increased during the Morsi administration. Bad economic conditions, state control on media, unlimited power of the President with the new constitution and Brotherhoodization in state security led to demonstrations in streets (Al-Awadi, 2013: 546). Secularist groups and anti-Muslim Brotherhood groups merged against the Morsi regime and rioted. That was known as the Tamarod Campaign and it means rebellion. When millions of protesters were on the streets, Al-Sisi warned the Morsi administration to restore public order in 48 hours or the military would intervene. After 48 hours, the military came to power with the overthrow of Morsi's government. Al-Sisi played a crucial role in the military coup against the Morsi's government. Al-Sisi was appointed by the Morsi government to reduce the power and influence of the SCAF in government. He became the Minister of Defence during the Morsi regime. However, Morsi was toppled down by Al-Sisi (Wilmot, 2015: 393-394; Pioppi, 2013: 63).

Al-Sisi's military intervention was seen as a coup d'état for some people, especially people who support the Muslim Brotherhood and democratically elected President Morsi. For some people, this was not a coup d'état. For Mohamed A. Arafa, a professor of Middle Eastern legal and political issues, more than thirty million people wanted Morsi government to step down and the Egyptian military served according to the will of the people. The military provided security at home. Adly Mansour, who was the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, became the

interim President for the transition period after the intervention of the Egyptian Armed Forces. Also, the military left everything to the civilian government. According to Arafa, the intervention of the Egyptian military was not a coup because normal military coup means that the military topples down a government and takes all power of the government for itself. In the Egyptian case, the military gave all power to the civilian government according to the will of the citizens who rioted against the Morsi government (Arafa, 2015: 861-862). With the Egyptian military intervention, a new transition period for the democracy started again.

In the international arena, this Egyptian military intervention caused different reactions of different countries. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon did not use the term “coup” for the military intervention. Also, the United States and the West did not use that word. The West mentioned worries about violence against Islamist protesters and democratic transition period. Obama administration declared that the United States hoped for a fast transition of all powers to the democratic and elected civilian government again. Saudi Arabia and Gulf Monarchies supported the military intervention against the Morsi government because the Muslim Brotherhood was a threat for the legitimacy of the royal families in these monarchies. The Muslim Brotherhood is against the monarchy and supports the elected rulers. The movement supports the Caliphate system after the Muhammad. They support Rashidun Caliphate, that is, the system in the first four Caliphs who were elected by people. The rise of the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi was seen as a threat for Saudi Arabia and Gulf Monarchies, so they supported the military intervention in Egypt. On the other hand, Turkey, Iran, and Qatar supported the Morsi government and the Muslim Brotherhood. These countries used the term “coup” for the military intervention against the Morsi government and the movement. Turkey criticized the West and the United States for not using the term “coup” for the military intervention. The West was criticized by these countries for looking at the issue as an ordinary human rights, not toppling down of the elected government. Despite the different reactions, the main concern in the international arena was the humanitarian issues and human rights violations against Islamist protesters (Al-Awadi, 2013: 546; Arafa, 2015: 861-874).

After the Mubarak regime ended, the Muslim Brotherhood used its resources for political engagement of the movement. Islamists had organizational and societal advantages when we compare them with secularist and liberal groups. They were organized in society. Egypt is a Muslim-majority country, and this has been always used by Islamist-Salafist groups. Not only was Islam used by Islamist movements, but also used by regimes to legitimate their policies and political existence in government like Sadat and Mubarak. On the other hand, with Arab Spring, the desire of democratization emerged in the Middle East. It toppled down most of the regimes. Democratic transition became very important in the region. This transition was ruled by the military and the judiciary. The big success of the Salafist-Islamist groups in parliamentary election caused intervention of the military and the judiciary in an attempt to restore the balance of power between Islamists and other groups. The biggest tension was between Islamists and secularists during the Morsi government. Also, this tension was boosted by the referendum on the new constitution (Wilmot, 2015: 394). Inflation and unemployment rate increased. Budget deficit caused unrest in society because of the foreign debts. State control on media and security problems led to the rise of unrest. After one year which the FJP came to the power, the government was toppled down by the coup because of the unrest and protests in Egypt. Strategic mistakes of the government at regional level also played a role. Egypt under the FJP established close relationships with non-Arab countries like Turkey and Iran. They did not expand their influence in Gulf monarchies and the Saudi Arabia except Qatar. There was a rivalry in the region between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Good relations between Iran and Egypt caused untrusted relation between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Muslim Brotherhood is against the monarchic structure, which was regarded by Saudi Arabia as a threat to their legitimacy. Hamas was the ideological ally of the Muslim Brotherhood. Good relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas triggered deteriorated relations between Israel and Egypt. For one of the biggest allies of Israel is the United States, and a bad relationship between Israel and Egypt also gave damage to the relationship between Egypt and United States (Al-Awadi, 2013: 546). This isolation facilitated the fall of Morsi.

3.5. EFFECTS OF SECULARIZATION AND DESECULARIZATION ON MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

In order to understand the rise of Muslim Brotherhood in the 20th century, first it is important to note the debates between those who support and oppose secularization. Secularization process started before the colonial period, but secular people increased during the colonial period. Some people respected the secularization process and they saw the secularization as a separation between politics and religion. On the other hand, some of them saw the secularization process as an emulation of Western societies. For them, secularization process was to decrease the influence of religion on the public sphere and reduce the importance of Islam in society. Arab Muslim secularists' reflections began with Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi who was a Syrian author and supporter of Pan-Arabism. He published *Umm Al-Qura* and *Tabai al-Istibdad wa-Masari al-Isti'bad*. In these books, he supported the separation between religion and politics. According to him, if Caliph is necessary, he should be only a pure spiritual authority. Caliph should not have administrative, military and political power. Caliph should not be a ruler. Ruler's religious affiliation should not be important and should be just. Ahmed Lutfi el-Sayed and Qasim Amin are the other important figures of Arab Muslim secularists. Ahmed Lutfi el-Sayed was Egyptian intellectual and anti-colonial activists. Qasim Amin was Islamic modernist and one of the founders of the Egyptian national movement. According to them, Muslim societies need secularism. Islam was the arbitrator of policy and law, but now Muslim society needs the separation between religion and politics. Ali Abdel Raziq, who was an Egyptian scholar of Islam and government minister, focuses on Caliph. According to traditional opinion, Caliph's power comes from God and every Muslim should obey him. On the other hand, Ali Abdel Raziq criticizes it. For him, there is no clear regulation about the Caliphate in the Holy Qur'an or in the Prophetic Hadith. Taha Hussein supports the idea that Islam is a religion, not the political system. Islam orders Muslims to be just and kind. Their wills about worldly matters are very important for Islam (Wu, 2007:59; Musallam, 2005: 4-5).

Secular as a term was first used in nineteenth century in Egypt. It meant worldly and non-ecclesiastical. In 1919, Wafd Party was founded in Egypt and it was called Secular Party. It means that party's aims were about social, political and national identities. It did not make references to religion. For the party, "religion belongs to God, the homeland belongs to all". Wafd Party was not against religion. Not only did party refuse any religious order in Islam, but it was also against religion which was used by Kings or governments to reinforce his/its authority (Najjar, 1996:2).

Shaykh Ali Abd al-Raziq is the first Muslim religious scholar who defends the secularism against Islamists. He has a book, *al-Islam wa 'Usui al-Hukm*, published in 1925. Abd al-Raziq claimed that Islam is a religion and spiritual structure for people who believe in the Prophet and the Quran of God. Islam is not a state and its messages are for people, not for political institutions or governments. Abd al-Raziq believed that religion should not involve political field because religion is for people, not for governments. After these claims, Abd al-Raziq was defrocked by Azharite Committee of Ulama (Najjar, 1996:1; Musallam, 2005: 4-5). After this issue, debates between secularists and Islamists increased. Islamists used terms of secularist and secularism as a humiliation and insult in slogans. Like Muhammad al-Ghazali who was the Islamist philosopher, Abu al- A' la Mawdudi claimed that secularists try to create modern society with unbelief. Claim about identifying secularism with unbelief created frontline against secularists. Some secularists were threatened, beaten and murdered by Islamists. Then some secularists and writers used "civil" instead of "secular " (Najjar, 1996:2).

Ali Abd al-Raziq is the intellectual father of Islamic secularism in Egypt. He was scholar and jurist at Al-Azhar in Cairo. According to him, Islamic texts should be neutral in political and civil debates. He did not support secularization of society, but he gave importance to the separation of state and religion. He claimed that Muslims are governed by religious or worldly governments, it is not important. Common welfare and interests of society are important for Abd al-Raziq. Faraj Foda, who was the follower of Abd al-Raziq, was Egyptian professor, writer, and human rights activist. He claimed that the caliphate is about worldly, is not about religion or divine and it is the political institution. There is historical evidence about mixing

religion and state. It always creates intolerance and violence in Islamist movements for Faraj Foda. He was against the religious state because the religious state cannot be accepted in the modern age and the religious state can destroy national unity of Egypt that was formed by different ethnic, cultural and religious groups (Najjar, 1996:4).

Syed Abul A'la Maududi was an Islamist philosopher and he is the first to theorize key concepts like the Islamic State that affected many Islamists like Sayyid Qutb (Keddie, 1998: 699-701). Sayyid Qutb supported Islamic values and Islamic laws. He lived several years in the United States of America. He studied educational administration in there. After he came back to Egypt, he started to criticize the United States and Western policies in the Middle East. Secularism is a strategy followed by Western powers to remove Islam in public life and compress it through private life. For Qutb, there are divisions within humanity and the most basic one is religion, not race or nationality. Hence, religion should always be in every part of our lives, not just one. For example, killing is allowed in religious war morally because it is for divine and has a purpose for the divine. He focused on education networks. Schools should teach law, education, math etc. but they should teach them from the Islamic perspective. Muslim clergy and universities should be connected. Schools and colleges should be supervised by the clergy. Public and private schools should be under the state control to establish common national goals. So, he was against secularism because Islam should be in law, education, politics; that is, Islam should be in everything and it cannot be separated from other fields of lives (Juergensmeyer, 1994: 60). For Qutb, Western culture is different from the Eastern culture. Western culture gives importance to the materialistic matters, but Eastern culture gives more importance to the spiritual issues. He criticized imitation of the West and warned Egyptian people not to trust Western powers because of their history of colonial domination over Islamic countries and their support for the Zionists (Musallam, 2005: 75-84; Wistrich, 2012: 26).

Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali was an Islamic scholar who was against the secularization of Egyptian society. According to him, secularists may have well-intentions but they are as misguided or wrong. He blamed secularists because secularists always talk about western superiority and their culture. Muhammad al-

Ghazali sometimes agreed with secularists that Muslims should adopt something from West but not all of them. Muslims should be selective. For example, Muslims should not adopt secular principles about separation of religion and state. Also, religion, culture and Islamic law should be protected (Najjar, 1996:6). We can see the conflict between religious groups and secular groups in Egyptian history from the past to present.

These ideological debates are influenced by changing political and social circumstances. In the Ottoman Empire there was an Islamic state. Religion had supremacy over other spheres. Hence, there was no conflict between Islamist groups and secular groups because there were no such big secular groups. The Colonial rule implemented secular norms and policies in the region. These policies caused the emergence of the secular groups. Religion lost its supremacy over other fields. During the post-colonial period, secular policies were also implemented by the government. These developments caused a problem between secular groups and Islamist groups because there was no challenger against the supremacy of religion before but, with colonial rule and post-colonial government, secular policies created secular groups to challenge against Islamist groups to decrease the importance of religion in society. Secular nationalist policies of Nasser administration were not against the religion, but those policies were seen as an emulation of Western powers to prevent the supremacy of Islam in the country by the Islamist groups. Education issue was one of the examples of the emulation, and a major topic of confrontation. There was traditional education before the colonial power. With colonial power's secular policies, Western type of education emerged in Egypt. This caused polarization in society about Western and traditional education. With Western education, religious influence on education decreased. After that Islamists started to use violence against these groups to reinforce the supremacy of Islam again (Juergensmeyer, 2008: 12-24).

For the revival of Muslim Brotherhood happened in the 1970s, we must focus on the specific factors of this era. One of the main reasons for the rise of the Islamist groups in the 1970s was the change of the Egyptian leader. Nasser employed more secular and nationalist policies in Egypt. These secular-nationalist policies caused pressure on religious groups at domestic level. Also, these types of policies triggered

the ideological differences at the regional level. The ideological competition started between Saudi Arabia, Gulf monarchies, and Egypt. When Sadat came to the power, these secular-nationalist policies were not implemented by his administration because there was more secular and Nasserist candidate, Ali Sabri. Ali Sabri was supported by the secular and nationalist groups. Leftist groups were so strong and religious groups were weak. Sadat used religious groups to counter leftist groups. Religious groups were tolerated by the regime. Their influence increased in the society because of support of the regime and regional Islamist countries. There was support of the regional Islamist monarchies because the relationship between Egypt and them was fixed by the Sadat regime. Sadat helped Islamist groups to expand their power and influence against the secular-nationalist groups. Good relations between Egypt and Islamist monarchies led to the financial support for the Islamist groups in Egypt (Hibbard, 2010: 66-67).

At the international level, there was the bipolar system. One side was liberal and capitalist United States and other side communist USSR. There was the effect of socialism in Egypt because of the policies of Nasser administration. With Sadat administration, bad relations between Egypt and United States was fixed. During the Cold War, United States implemented Green Belt Project to decrease the influence of communism with the support of Islamist groups. During this time, United States helped the Islamist and fundamentalist groups. This type of financial supports helped fundamental religious groups to expand their power and influence in countries that had leaders who had a bad relationship with the United States (Delibas, 2015: 77; Eligür, 2010: 69; Kılıç, 2015: 52-53).

In economy, Nasser implemented socialist and nationalist policies. War against Israel, Yemen Civil War, and expansion of the Pan Arabism caused big economic problems in Egypt. After Nasser, Sadat came to power and implemented more liberal policies in economy. Economic liberalization at first seemed to fix problems, but this liberalization moves in economy gave damage to the domestic market because Egyptian domestic market was not ready to compete with Western markets. During the Mubarak administration, foreign debts and budget deficit grew. Mubarak's government took loans from IMF and World Bank. Some policies like cutting food subsidies of the state were implemented. These policies gave damage to

the middle and lower classes. After the 1970s, liberalization policies of Sadat government and tolerance to the Islamist groups led to the increase in the Islamist NGOs' influence on society. Islamist NGOs filled the gap of the government about healthcare, education, food subsidies issues. Leftist NGOs could not be effective like Islamist NGOs because they lacked the necessary support and organizational structure. Islamist groups made a difference in civil society and this created an Islamist alternative for the regime (Tudoroiu, 2011: 382-383; Gormus, 2017: 70-71).

Another state-led factor for the rise of Islamism was that leaders of Egypt sometimes used religion as a vehicle for the legitimacy of their policies. For example, sometimes Nasser used religion as a moral legitimacy to get support from religious part of society. Nasser used socialist and secular policies but did not reject the religious influence on society and tried to create a connection between religion and secular-nationalist policies. Nasser did not reject religion like in some communist countries. He tried to create a bond between them. After Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak came to power and used religion for their legitimacy. Sadat boosted the power of the Islamist groups to remain in power. After the assassination of Sadat, Mubarak used different policy. He did not support religious groups, but he used Islam as a legitimacy vehicle. We can see that sometimes religion was used as a vehicle for the policies of the administrations. Sometimes religion used as a vehicle to justify their thrones (El Sharakawy, 2013: 28).

After 9/11 events, United States left the Green Belt Project and gave importance to the modern Islamists. Fundamentalist groups lost their power or became modern Islamists. With Arab Spring, democratic desires of Egyptian people increased. The Egyptian revolution in 2011 caused the end of the military regime in Egypt. This was a big opportunity for the Islamist groups because there was no big and organized group against them. Muslim Brotherhood's party, FJP, came to power. The movement that was under the repression of the post-colonial governments, came to power. While they used "Islam is Solution" slogan before the 2000s, with 2005 elections in Egypt, they started to use terms like freedom, democracy, equality to expand their political power to other segments of society. That was a pragmatic tactic of the Muslim Brotherhood to get to power and reflects the growing importance of the young generation and reformists in Muslim Brotherhood. Old guards were in

charge and did not let more secular, democratic and liberal policies which were supported by the young generation and reformists. Also, the new constitution, which was supported by the FJP, did not include secular policies, did not improve women rights, minority rights, and minority religious groups. Another pragmatic tactic of the Muslim Brotherhood was the relationship with the military. Repression policies of Nasser administration against the movement was a good lesson for the movement. This time, they had established good relations with the military until the military tried to stop the movement and provide the balance of power between Islamist parties and other parties in politics. After that, the FJP tried to decrease the influence of the military in administration (Muqtedar, 2014: 78; Hove and Ndawana, 2017: 40-41).

During the period of the FJP, there was a polarization in society about secularism and religion. This polarization caused unrest in Egypt and protests against the Morsi administration started. There were seculars liberals, Islamists, Copts and people who were against the Muslim Brotherhood. Military intervention happened, and the movement lost its power. These were the reasons in domestic level. In the regional and the international level, the Muslim Brotherhood's ally choices were problematic. There was a good relationship between the movement and Saudi Arabia because of the religious issues. With Arab Spring, democracy did spread into the Middle East and this was a threat for the monarchies in the Middle East like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. When the Muslim Brotherhood came to power, this was seen as a threat for the legitimacy of the monarchies by the regional monarchies. Also, the Muslim Brotherhood's good relations with Iran and Hamas was seen as a threat to both Gulf states and Israel. These relations caused the silence of some global and regional powers regarding the toppling down of the Morsi government (Hove and Ndawana, 2017: 44-45).

The Sisi administration came to the power in June 2014. Purge against the Muslim Brotherhood started with the removal of Morsi from the power. The Sisi regime has implemented two approaches for the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood. First one is to destroy the leadership's control over the organization. The Guidance Office and the Shura Council are top executive branches in the organization. The members of the Guidance Office and the Shura Council in the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested or exiled. Second one is to isolate the Muslim

Brotherhood in regional and international arena by referring to their link with terrorist and fundamentalist religious groups. The Muslim Brotherhood was declared as a terrorist organization and banned by the Sisi administration. Not only has the Sisi regime declared the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, but US also approved that declaration and imposed sanctions to it. The regime has focused on other areas like public services, the military, the judiciary, syndicates, nongovernmental organizations, media outlets and universities to purge these areas from the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. Also, the regime has confiscated the organization's assets and closed affiliated social welfare associations. Exiled and arrested leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood has created opportunity for Younger Brothers to take the leadership in the organization. The conflict between Old Guards and Younger Brothers has emerged. Different approaches have caused disagreements between Old Guards and Younger Brothers over whether to undertake a range of actions from civil disobedience to vandalizing public installations and public buildings. Even though the Muslim Brotherhood was suppressed by the regime and isolated in the international arena, some countries have supported them, and some cities have become the center for them like Turkey, Qatar and London (Zollner, 11 March 2019; Narayan, 20 April 2019).

When Sisi came to the power, he focused on making changes in the constitution. According to the new constitution in Egypt, the military should preserve the constitution, democracy, the rights and freedoms of individuals. Under the new constitution, political parties may not be based on religion, race, gender or geography. One amendment in constitution has extended a presidential term from four to six years. Sisi's power over the legislative branch increased with the new constitution. Another change is that president is able to appoint Vice-Presidents and members of the judiciary. Upper house, the Senate, was established with the new constitution and also president is able to handpick one-third of the members. Also, the number of seats in the lower house, the House of Representatives, was reduced from 596 to 450, with at least 25% reserved for women. Moreover, Sisi regime has given importance to women's rights about early marriage, deprivation of education and post-divorce rights (Narayan, 20 April 2019; El-Bakry, 8 April 2019).

3.6. CONCLUSION

One must not simply think of the rise of Muslim Brotherhood as a reaction to state-led secularism. There are important aspects that must be considered. There have been disagreements about the separation between religion and politics between religious and secular groups. However, after Nasser, a state-led desecularization process started with the Sadat era. This desecularization process reached the peak when counter-elite group, Islamists, came to power to complete the Brotherhoodisation of the state. Secularization process was seen as a top-down process by the Islamist groups. On the other hand, with the Sadat administration, Islamization of the Egyptian society was seen as a top-down process by the secular groups (Tibi, 1999:192; Al-Awadi, 2013: 546).

There were many different reasons for the rise of the Islamists. These were supports of Islamist monarchies in the region, the failure of secular-elite administrations, socio-economic problems, limited political participation, pressure on political and religious groups and massive corruption. In the 1980s and the 1990s, there was a use of violence that was implemented by the fundamentalist groups which were strengthened by the Green Belt Project of the United States. After the 2000s, the United States decided to support more moderate Islamist instead of the fundamentalist religious groups. During the 2000s, Mubarak was in the power and he put pressure on religious groups, acting as an agency of the War on Terror policy of the United States (Zahid, 2010: 30-39, Pehlivan, 2013: 83).

The state was hence the enemy for the movement. When the Muslim Brotherhood came to power, they knew that they should establish good relationship with the military because of the experiences since the Nasser era. However, their relationship with military went worse when the SCAF tried to create a balance of power between the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups in society. In response, the MB started the Brotherhoodization of the state to neutralize the pressure from institutions of the state against them. This time, Islamists have become the new elite group until the al-Sisi intervention (El-Shimy, 2015: 87).

Morsi was toppled down by the military intervention which was supported by many sections of society. There were different reasons for the military intervention.

At domestic level, economic problems continued during the FJP administration. The party tried to bring Shari'a and democracy together. Also, they tried to get rid of secular and liberal policies to create Islamic democracy. Islamization of society, desecularization and Brotherhoodization of the state triggered liberals, seculars, Copts and even some Islamists to protest the Morsi government's policies. At the regional and the international level, Morsi was isolated. Regional monarchies were against the Muslim Brotherhood because of political and ideological differences (Özdemir, 2013: 126-127; Al-Awadi, 2013: 546; Yaylaci, 2014: 241).

Military intervention is not an end of the democratic process in Egypt for Muqtedar. Al-Sisi intervention was not against democracy, it was against the Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, this was not the failure of Islam or Islamization. The Muslim Brotherhood does not have monopoly on Islam. There are many Islamist parties and groups which have different point of views and ideas from the movement (Muqtedar, 2014: 79-80). For Nafaa, the Muslim Brotherhood increased the polarization in society. This polarization could cause the civil war like in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The intervention prevented the civil war and gave the chance for the creation of the political and democratic system in Egypt (Nafaa, 2016: 185-186). Even though the movement came to power and was toppled down by the military, it seems that the conflict and debates between people about secularization and desecularization is unlikely to end.

CONCLUSION

The rise and the fall of the political Islam and secularism are very important topics to understand the issues in the Middle East. There are researches about the effects of secularism in the region. These researches are based on certain theoretical approaches, and study various external and internal factors. Unlike the majority of these researches, this thesis focuses on top-down desecularization process and some factors that have a role in this process.

In the first chapter, I focused on the different theoretical approaches to secularism, secularization process and desecularization process. Since its first appearance in the Treaty of Westphalia, the term secular implies a humanistic view and assumes a separation between non-religious public sphere and religious private sphere. The decline of religious influence on the public sphere in modern times gave way to the development of different descriptive and normative approaches about secularization. Some scholars have supported the classical secularization thesis that assumes an incompatibility between religion and modernity, some have severely criticized it, and some have argued that secularization theory needs to be revised.

It is concluded in the first chapter that current mainstream trends in the academic literature on secularization are as such: (i.) modernization did not cause the end of religion and, on the contrary, last decades witnessed a “resurgence of religion”, (ii.) even if the decline in the influence of religion on politics, intellectual life and public sphere is a fact, there is not one single secularism but there are assertive and passive versions, (iii.) secularism in Muslim countries usually took place in an assertive and top-down manner by autocratic states which forced society towards rapid Westernization, (iv.) those policies have caused alienation and dislocation in society, which created a reaction against secular process in some Muslim states. This approach saw secularization process as top-down and temporary, while desecularization was regarded as a spontaneous and natural reaction. It is claimed in the first chapter that top-down secularization thesis ignores the role of state in reinstating religion in public sphere, as well as more or less permanent aspects of secularization. There are many different factors which cause desecularization and revival of religion. There are multiple causes such as the British

colonial heritage, the influence of leaders, rise and fall of pan-Arabism in the region, the influence of Arab-Israeli wars, economic crises, the withdrawal of state from social policies, rise of religious organizations as agents of social welfare and solidarity, left-wing parties' failure to obtain popular support, increased power of right-wing parties as coalition partners, the United States' Green Belt project to promote religious groups, global and regional powers' role in the promotion of right-wing parties, and so on. These factors were discussed in the second chapter.

The brief historical account of secularization and desecularization in Egypt in the second chapter shows that political struggles, socio-economic problems and foreign involvement played important roles in the growth of political Islam in Egypt. It is stated that secularization in Egypt dates back to late 18th century. Secular policies were dominant during the Nasser era as his political agenda was embedded in Arab socialism and nationalism. Secular policies were approved by the masses, who were content with the protectionism and welfare-provisions in economy. When the economic problems surfaced, and Arabs were defeated by Israel in the late 1960s, an alienation between the society and government appeared. Yet, this alienation itself did not automatically cause the retreat of secularism but Sadat radically revised the state policies towards religion in order to build political alliances for obtaining domestic and foreign support against his rivals. Sadat used Islamist groups as a legitimacy vehicle against secular groups and contributed to their revival. Economic liberalization under Sadat and Mubarak indirectly furthered the power of Islamism, as the cuts in subsidies and lack of social services opened the door to Muslim Brotherhood to increase its influence on lower and middle class through Islamic NGOs. External support of Gulf states and Saudi Arabia helped Salafist-Islamist groups to fill the gap in social services that appeared upon the withdrawal of government. Although there appeared occasional fluctuations in the attitudes and alliances, the rise of Muslim Brotherhood did the peak in early 2010s.

In the third chapter the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, and briefly its recent fall from power, was analysed. One must not simply think of the rise of Muslim Brotherhood as a reaction to state-led secularism. There were many different reasons such as supports of Islamist monarchies in the region, the failure of secular-elite

administrations, socio-economic problems, limited political participation, pressure on political and religious groups and massive corruption.

The organization had an interesting political journey in Egypt. Although it was part of the anticolonial bloc, it had a tense relation with secular nationalists from the beginning. After the assassination attempt against Nasser by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, many members of the movement were arrested and Muslim Brotherhood's influence in government and society were broken. Sadat, on the other hand, gave support to Islamist students' organizations against Marxist, Leftist, Nasserist and pro-Soviet groups. He released most of the Muslim Brotherhood members in jail. Sometimes the movement was under repression of the regime and sometimes it was boosted by the regimes, but it was an influential power since Sadat years.

Whenever political restraints and bans acted as a barrier to the political inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood, they have participated the elections as independent candidates or in alliance with other political parties. They used "Islam is Solution" slogan before the 2000s. With 2005 elections in Egypt, they used the terms like freedom, democracy, equality to expand their political power to other segments of society. It must be noted that there have been different approaches about modernization, democracy, human rights, freedom of speech and secularism in the Muslim Brotherhood in the recent years. Despite the radical attitudes of leading figures like Al-Banna and Qutb, more peaceful and reformist strategies like that of al-Hudaybi found space in the movement. This paved the way for pro-democratic groups like Younger Brothers in Muslim Brotherhood. Although desecularization process from above has caused the rise of fundamentalist religious groups, more modern and secular groups have also emerged from among Islamists. They shared some common views with the secular side about democracy, political participation, and human rights when we compare with the older brothers. This shows another effect of secularism on the Muslim Brotherhood. This also made their rise to power after the Arab Spring possible.

When Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) of the Muslim Brotherhood came to power, the party tried to bring Shari'a and democracy together. Also, they tried to get rid of secular and liberal policies to create Islamic democracy. Islamization of society

and Brotherhoodization of the state triggered liberals, seculars, Copts and even some Islamists to protest the Morsi government's policies. Besides, economic problems continued. Thus, the military intervention that toppled down the government was supported by many sections of society. Also, at the regional and the international level, Morsi was isolated. However, it is difficult to make predictions about the future of Muslim Brotherhood. Although it lost many political assets that would help it to carry out its Islamization project, it is early to declare the movement defeated. Under any circumstances, the history of the Muslim Brotherhood will continue to be examined as an important case to understand alternating trends of secularization and desecularization in the Middle East, and the role of state power in it.



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